G.R. No.
L-19568 March 31, 1964 there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (on the aforesaid date of 28th
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE L. CHUPECO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
J. Gonzales Orense for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in its
Crim. Case No. 14786) to the Court of Appeals, but which the latter
court, pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
had certified the Supreme Court as a case in which the jurisdiction of an
inferior court is in issue.
The accused-appellant, Jose L. Chupeco, was charged on 2 February
1951 before the Court of First Instance of Manila under the following
information:
That on or about the 28th day of November, 1947, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused being the owner of, and, having previously
on the 24th day of July, 1946, executed a Chattel Mortgage on the
following properties:
An open shed under construction to be used sawmill building,
containing an area of 350 sq. m. more or less, located at Sitio Saguing,
Dinalupihan, Bataan.1äwphï1.ñët
SAWMILL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT:
One "Wheland" Circular sawmill No. 3 complete with carriage and
w/60" inserted circular saw (new);
One Gray Marine Full Diesel Engine 225 H.P. Serial No. 13835, Engine
No. C-17040;
One RD-14 Tractor with Bulldozer, motor No. 6719028;
One D-6 Caterpilar tractor motor 626-134;
One Clitract International Caterpilar Motor No. 2398-D;
One Air compressor (Aray type);
One complete set of welding instruments (local made);
One Lathe machine — F.E. Reed Co. Length 8' swing 8";
One planer for iron and steel — F. E. Reed & Co.;
One tracing machine and one vise (local made);
TRANSPORTATION UNITS:
One Chevrolet truck Model 1941 Motor No. KR-214658 — 1946 Plate
No. 9794;
One International Baby truck Model 1938 Motor No. ND-13-6470;
One G.M.C. Army truck 6 x 6 Motor No. 70485739-Plate No. 10239;
One Willy's jeep Motor No. DP 2977-Plate No. 1512.
located at sitio Saguing, Dinalupihan, Bataan in favor of the Agricultural
and Industrial Bank, whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and
choses in action were subsequently transferred to the herein
complainant Rehabilitation Finance Corporation an institution created
and operating pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 85, with
principal office at the City of Manila, Philippines, to secure a loan of
P20,000.00, from said Agricultural and Industrial Bank, did then and
Mardeville Dowling & Co., 5 NW 776), which in this case amounted to
day of November, 1947, with intent to defraud the said Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation, pledge and incumber, or cause to be pledged and
incumbered the same personal properties to one Mateo B. Pinile
without having fully satisfied the mortgage and during the term thereof
and without the consent of the mortgagee bank written on the back of
the mortgage, and, thereafter) knowingly transfer and remove, or cause
to be transferred and removed the said properties to the municipality
of Subic, Zambales, also without the written consent of the mortgagee
bank, to the damage and prejudice of the said Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation in the sum of P15,935.80, Philippine currency, representing
the unpaid balance of the aforesaid mortgage.
The accused moved to quash the foregoing information on the ground
that more than one offense is charged and that the court had no
jurisdiction. Upon denial of the motion, the accused was arraigned, and
he entered a plea of not guilty. After the case was partly tried, the
defense counsel and the fiscal entered into an agreement to have the
information amended to the effect that the charge be only for removal
of properties mortgaged, eliminating the portion referring to pledging
already pledged property. The information, however, remained un-
amended. The accused then filed a motion to dismiss involving the
agreement, but the court denied it, and ordered that the case be tried
on the charge "of having pledged property which had been previously
pledged or mortgaged". After trial, the court found the accused guilty of
the said offense, and imposed a penalty of two months and one day of
arresto mayor.
Not satisfied, the accused interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
but the said court certified the case to the Supreme Court, as formerly
stated.
The accused attacks the jurisdiction of the trial court on the strength of
the agreement with the fiscal to discard the charge of repledging or
remembering the chattels already mortgaged to the Agricultural and
Industrial Bank thus leaving in force only the accusation of having
transferred the encumbered property from Bataan to Zambales without
the consent of the mortgagee. It is argued that since the place where
the chattels were, as well as the site to which they were moved, are
both outside of Manila, the courts of the latter acquired no jurisdiction
to try the case, because the offense was not committed within the
Manila territory.
We find this stand without merit. The original terms of the charge
averred (and it is not disputed) the crime of repledging already
encumbered property without the creditor's consent, and one of the
essential ingredients of the offense (the execution of the first
mortgage) having been alleged, to have taken place in Manila, the court
of first instance of that city acquired jurisdiction over the offense under
the Rules of Court (People vs. Mission, 48 O.G., 1331; Rule 110, section
9). It is well-established that once vested, the jurisdiction is not tolled
by subsequent amendment or stipulation (McClain vs. Kansas City
Bridge Co., 83 SW 2d, 132; Shankle vs. Ingram, 45 S.E. 578; Walton vs.
no more than an avowal by the prosecution that it could not establish
the other elements of the offense.
Furthermore, the court actually rejected the defense motion to dismiss,
and directed that the cue be tried on the original charge of repledging
property already encumbered. The accused obeyed that directive, and
by so doing it renounced the claim that the information had been so
amended as to discard that particular averment.
But the fatal error in the decision appealed from is its disregard of the
fact that the evidence fails to show that the properties mortgaged to
the bank are the same one encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinili. In
fact, the Office of the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the
accused on this very ground Brief, pp. 10-11).
There is no question that the herein accused execute in the City of
Manila a Chattel Mortgage, Exhibit "D", on the properties located in
Bataan and listed in the in formation in favor of the Agricultural and
Industrial Bank on 24 July 1946, and that the accused pledged or
encumbered in the City of Manila, on 28 November 1947 the properties
listed in Exhibit "E", which are as follows:
One (1) sawmill with gray marine engine 125 H.P. circular law and all
appurtenances, implements and parts, also building, camarin and
housing improvements under Tax No. 1260-V for 1947, assessed at
P8,000.00 paid under O.R. No. 59318, dated May 14, 1947, Dinalupihan,
Bataan;
One (1) bulldozer H.D.-14, with dozer, Make: Allis-Chalmers, Eng. No.
3251541;
Two (2) cargo trucks (6 x 6), Eng. No. 220314218-Reg. No. 17094 and
Eng. No. 220359225-Reg. No. 17093.
However, there is nothing in the evidence to show that the properties
listed in Exhibit "D" and in the information are the same properties
listed in Exhibit "E". The descriptions are materially different.
An assential element common to the two acts punished under Article
319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed or
repledged, as the case may be should be the same or identical property
that was mortgaged or pledged before such removal or repledging.
Therefore, even if the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction
over the case, the accused cannot be found guilty on the evidence on
record of the crime for which he stands indicted.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASON, the appealed decision is hereby
reversed, and another one entered acquitting the accused Jose L.
Chupeco. No pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Parades, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 when presented for payment within (90) days from the date thereof,
ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA, G.R. No. 149995 was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason Drawn
Petitioner, Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of such
Present: dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson), check or make arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking
- versus - Austria-Martinez, days after receiving notice.[2]
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioners non-
Reyes, JJ. apprehension despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.[3] On
June 27, 1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled and set aside[4] after
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner posted the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25, 1995
Respondent. when he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[5]
Promulgated: Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in
September 1987, petitioner and his wife borrowed money from him in
September 28, 2007 the amount of P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan,
DECISION petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount in favor of the
complainant.[6] However, when the check was presented for payment,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: it was dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent
demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the said
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. dishonored check.[7]
21879 dated September 17, 2001,[1] affirming the September 23, 1997
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, in Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private
Criminal Case No. 91-5617 convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana complainant was an investment by the latter who was his business
with violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the partner. He argued that the subject check was not issued in September
Bouncing Checks Law. 1987 to guarantee the payment of a loan since his checking account
was opened only on December 1, 1987.[8] He claimed that private
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor allegedly to be
22 in an Information which reads as follows: shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership with the
necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was
That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro issued sometime in February 1988,[9] complainant knew that the same
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable was not funded.[10]
Court, the above-named accused did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos to After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on
apply on account or for the value the check described below: September 23, 1997 a Decision[11] finding petitioner guilty as charged,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
Check No. : 326317PR
Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana guilty
Drawn Against : Asian Savings Bank as charged and sentences him to a prison term of Six (6) months and to
indemnify the private complainant the sum of P590,000.00 plus legal
Paseo de Roxas Branch interest from filing of this case until full payment.
investment theory. In ruling against the existence of a partnership
between them, the trial court noted that the so-called partnership
venture, Palanas General Merchandising, was registered on December
1, 1987 only in the name of petitioner.[13] The Court of Appeals also
held that the act of lending money does not necessarily amount to an
investment of capital.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE
LOWER COURT DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT
THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A
CONSIDERATION OR FOR VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED WAS ONLY TRICKED
BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE THE SAID CHECK AS A MEANS
OF BINDING THE ACCUSED TO RETURN HIS INVESTMENT IN THE
PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS THEN SUFFERING FROM BUSINESS
REVERSALS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME THE ACCUSED
WAS ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25, 1995 R.A. 7691 EXPANDING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT WAS ALREADY IN
EFFECT.[14]
The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22; and 2) whether the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to
R.A. 7691 is without merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action[15] and not during the arraignment of the accused. The
Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed
on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of
jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129[16] which provides:

In the amount of : P590,000.00
Postdated : February 15, 1988
Payable to : Dr. Alex B. Carlos said accused well knowing that at the
time of issue, he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial courts decision in toto.[12]
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was
issued as a guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioners
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now
falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by
the latter.
xxxx

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less
than 30 days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than
but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in
no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment[17] at the
discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is
P200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial Court properly acquired
jurisdiction over the case.[18] The Metropolitan Trial Court could not
acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is
only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.
The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court[19] on June 15,
1994 cannot divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over
petitioners case. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising
jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final
determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate on actions pending before its enactment. Indeed, R.A. No.
7691 contains retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to civil
cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an
express proviso nor by implication can it be construed that R.A. No.
7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided
by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.[20] The jurisdiction
of the RTC over the case attached upon the commencement of the
action by the filing of the Information and could not be ousted by the
passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior
courts, the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in
nature.[21]
After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioners
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense
penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes,
draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the
accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution.
Petitioner admitted that at the time he issued the subject check, he
knew that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check. Consequently, when the check
was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he received demand letters to pay
the amount of the check from private complainant but he did not
comply with it.[22]
In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or value,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld private
complainants claim that the check was issued as a guaranty for the loan
and rejected petitioners investment theory. The issue as to whether the
amount of the subject check represents the amount of the money
loaned by private complainant to petitioner or as an investment in the
alleged partnership is a factual question involving the credibility of
witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the appellate court will
not generally disturb the findings of the lower court considering that it
is in a better position to settle that issue since it had the advantage of
hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct during the trial,
which circumstances carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In
the present case, we see no reason to reverse the finding of the trial
court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the amount of the
subject check was a loan and not an investment.[23]
Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it
is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration, which
may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to
the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss
or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or
undertaken by the other side. Since it was established that petitioner
received money from private complainant in various amounts,[24]
petitioner cannot now claim that the checks were not issued for
value.[25]
The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to potential
suppliers is not a valid defense. In Cueme v. People,[26] the Court held
thus:
The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be
shown to prospective investors of her corporation is, to say the least,
not a defense. The gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22
is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The law has made the
mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by
the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is
whether the law has been breached. Criminal intent becomes
unnecessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy,
and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent are
unavailing.
The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be
encashed or deposited in a bank, produce the same effect as ordinary
checks. What the law punishes is the issuance of a rubber check itself
and not the purpose for which the check was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. This is not without good reasons. To
determine the purpose as well as the terms and conditions for which
checks are issued will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the
stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and
bring about havoc in the trading and banking communities. Besides, the
law does not make any distinction as to the kind of checks which are
the subject of its provisions, hence, no such distinction can be made by
means of interpretation or application. What is important is the fact
that petitioner deliberately issued the checks in question and those
checks were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant
to the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.[27]
The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the subject check is
likewise immaterial. Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, is the first delivery of the check.[28] In the case at bar,
the Information alleged that the check was postdated February 15,
1988 although issued in or about September 1987. During trial,
petitioner testified that the Checking Account was opened only on
December 1, 1987 and that the check was issued sometime in February
1988.
The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information
and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is
material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his
substantial rights.[29] In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time
of the issuance of the subject check is material since it forms part of the
second element of the offense that at the time of its issuance,
petitioner knew of the insufficiency of funds. However, it cannot be said
that petitioner was prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised by it.
Records show that petitioner knew at the time he issued the check that
he does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the amount of
the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the same claiming that the same
would only be shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not
valid.
Moreover, there is no merit in petitioners allegation that private
complainant knew that the check is not funded. Both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals found that the subject check was issued as
guaranty for payment of the loan hence, was intended to apply for
account or for value. As such, it was incumbent upon petitioner to see
to it that the check is duly covered when presented for payment.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as
clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty
of fine may be imposed in lieu of imprisonment considering that the
prosecution failed to prove or allege that petitioner is not a first-time
offender.[30] Hence, in lieu of imprisonment, a fine of P200,000.00
shall be imposed upon petitioner.[31]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO
PABLITO M. PALANA guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay private
complainant the amount of P590,000.00, representing the value of the
check, with six (6%) percent interest from date of filing of the
Information until the finality of the decision, the amount of which,
inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve percent (12%) interest,
from finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of imprisonment,
petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 133289. December 23, 1999]
LICERIO A. ANTIPORDA, JR., ELITERIO RUBIACO, VICTOR GASCON and
CAESAR TALIA petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, HON.
EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. CATALINO CASTAEDA, JR. in their
capacity as Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to restrain the
respondent Justices of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan from
further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 24339 and from enforcing the
warrants for the arrest of the accused named therein (herein
petitioners) or to maintain the status quo until further orders from this
Court.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Accused Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor Gascon, and
Caesar Talla were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer
Ramos in an Information dated September 18, 1997. It was filed with
the First Division of the Sandiganbayan comprised of the Honorable
Francis E. Garchitorena, Edilberto E. Sandoval, and Catalino Castaeda,
Jr. The Information reads as follows:
That on or about September 1, 1995, in the Municipality of Sanchez
Mira, Province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Eliterio Rubiaco, Caesar Talla, Vicente Gascon
and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., armed with guns, conspiring together and
helping one another, by means of force, violence and intimidation and
without legal grounds or any authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one Elmer
Ramos from his residence in Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his
will with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle.
CONTRARY TO LAW[1]
On November 10, 1997, the Court issued an order giving the
prosecution represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili thirty
(30) days within which to submit the amendment to the Information.
The said order is quoted in full as follows:
ORDER
This morning, the prosecution represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T.
Lucero Agcaoili appeared in response to this Courts Order of
clarification on the propriety of proceeding with the Information as it
stands.
On her own, Prosecutor Agcaoili informed the Court that there were
inadequacies in the allegations in the Information for which reason she
would beg leave to amend the same. The Court for its part expressed
anxiety as to the Courts jurisdiction over the case considering that it
was not clear whether or not the subject matter of the accusation was
office related.
For this purpose, Prosecutor Agcaoili is given thirty (30) days within
which to submit the amendment embodying whatever changes she
believes are appropriate or necessary in order for the Information to
effectively describe the offense herein charged. Within the same
period, Prosecutor Agcaoili shall submit an expansion of the
recommendation to file the instant Information against the accused
before this Court indicating thereon the office related character of the
accusation herein so that the Court might effectively exercise its
jurisdiction over the same.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The prosecution on even date complied with the said order and filed an
Amended Information, which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan in a
resolution dated November 24, 1997.[3] The Amended Information
thus reads:
That on or about September 10, 1997, at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Licerio
Antiporda, Jr., being the Municipal Mayor of Buguey, Cagayan in the
exercise of his official duties as such and taking advantage of his
position, ordered, confederated and conspired with Juan Gallardo,
Barangay Captain of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan (now deceased) and
accused Eliterio Rubiaco, barangay councilman of San Lorenzo, Buguey,
Cagayan, Vicente Gascon and Caesar Talla with the use of firearms,
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kidnap and abduct the victim Elmer Ramos without any
authority of law from his residence at Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan
against his will, with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle
and subsequently bring and detain him illegally at the residence of
accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda, Jr. for more than five (5) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Accused then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion dated November 16,
1997 praying that a reinvestigation of the case be conducted and the
issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred.[5]

An order dated November 26, 1997 was penned by Prosecutor Evelyn T.
Lucero-Agcaoili recommending the denial of the accuseds Urgent
Omnibus Motion[6] was approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
on January 9, 1998.[7]
The accused thereafter filed on March 5, 1998 a Motion for New
Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance and/or Recall
Warrant of Arrest Issued.[8] The same was denied in an order given in
open court dated March 12, 1998 "on the ground that there was
nothing in the Amended Information that was added to the original
Information so that the accused could not claim a right to be heard
separately in an investigation in the Amended Information. Additionally,
the Court ruled that 'since none of the accused have submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court, the accused are not in a
position to be heard on this matter at this time' (p. 245, Record)."[9]
Subsequently, the accused filed on March 24, 1998 a Motion to Quash
the Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged.[10]
On March 27, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order, to wit:
"The Motion to Quash filed in behalf of the accused by Atty. Orlando B.
Consigna is ignored, it appearing that the accused have continually
refused or otherwise failed to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of
this Court. At all events there is an Amended Information here which
makes an adequate description of the position of the accused thus
vesting this Court with the office related character of the offense of the
accused.
"SO ORDERED."[11]
A motion for reconsideration was filed on April 3, 1998 by the accused
wherein it was alleged that the filing of the Motion to Quash and the
appearance of their counsel during the scheduled hearing thereof
amounted to their voluntary appearance and invested the court with
jurisdiction over their persons.[12]
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
accused in its resolution dated April 24, 1998.[13]
Hence, this petition filed by Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco,
Victor Gascon, and Caesar Talla.
The petitioners pose the following questions for the resolution of this
Court.
a) CAN THE SANDIGANBAYAN, WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION, SUBSEQUENTLY
ACQUIRE SUCH JURISDICTION BY THE SIMPLE EXPEDIENT OF
AMENDING THE INFORMATION TO SUPPLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME,
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS NOT PREVIOUSLY AVERRED IN THE ORIGINAL
INFORMATION? and
b) COROLLARILY, CAN THE AMENDED INFORMATION BE ALLOWED
WITHOUT CONDUCTING ANEW A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION FOR
THE GRAVER OFFENSE CHARGED THEREIN?
The petition is devoid of merit.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for
administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order
for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it
must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.[14]
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861
provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
fine of P6,000.00. Provided, however, That offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does
not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a
fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court.
The Sandiganbayan exercises not only civil but also criminal jurisdiction.
Criminal jurisdiction, as defined in the case of People vs. Mariano[15], is
necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense and
impose the punishment for it.
The case of Arula vs. Espino[16]enumerates the requirements wherein a
court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case, to wit:
To paraphrase: beyond the pale of disagreement is the legal tenet that
a court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the
following requisites concur: (1) the offense is one which the court is by
law authorized to take cognizance of, (2) the offense must have been
committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and (3) the person charged
with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial,
forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the
court.
The petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case because the original information did not
allege that one of the petitioners, Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., took
advantage of his position as mayor of Buguey, Cagayan to order the
kidnapping of Elmer Ramos. They likewise assert that lacking
jurisdiction a court can not order the amendment of the information. In
the same breath, they contend however that the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over the persons of the accused.
They question the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over
their case yet they insist that said court acquired jurisdiction over their
motion to quash. The petitioner can not have their cake and eat it too.
In the aforementioned case of Arula vs. Espino[17]it was quite clear
that all three requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense, territory and
person, must concur before a court can acquire jurisdiction to try a
case.
It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over
the case.
And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that
when they filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary
submission to the Courts authority. They cite the case of Layosa vs.
Rodriguez[18] in support of their contention. For therein, it was ruled
that the voluntary appearance of the accused at the pre-suspension
hearing amounted to his submission to the courts jurisdiction even if no
warrant of arrest has yet been issued.
To counter this contention of the petitioners the prosecution adverted
to case of de los Santos-Reyes vs. Montesa, Jr.[19] which was decided
some 28 years after the Layosa case. In this more recent case, it was
held that:
xxx the accused xxx have no right to invoke the processes of the court
since they have not been placed in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of their liberty by reason or as a consequence of the filling of
the information. For the same reason, the court had no authority to act
on the petition.
We find that the case of Layosa and de los Santos-Reyes are not
inconsistent with each other since both these cases discussed the rules
on when a court acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the accused,
i.e., either through the enforcement of warrants of arrest or their
voluntary submission to the court.
The only difference, we find, is that the de los Santos-Reyes case harped
mainly on the warrant of arrest angle while the Layosa case dealt more
on the issue of voluntary submission ruling, that the appearance at the
hearing through a lawyer was a submission to the courts jurisdiction.
Having discussed the third requirement we now come to the question
of whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
We answer in the negative. The original Information filed with the
Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the
accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the
prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was
omitted therein.
However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to
motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June 10,
1997[20] filed with the same court, it was they who challenged the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated
in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work
connected, which is hereunder quoted, as follows:
Respondents (petitioners herein) have thoroughly scanned the entire
records of the instant case and no where is there any evidence to show
that the Honorable Prosecution Office of the Province of Cagayan have
been authorized by the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman to conduct
the Preliminary Investigation much less had the former office been
authorized to file the corresponding Information as the said case, if
evidence warrants, fall exclusively with the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Sandiganbayan notwithstanding the presence of other public officers
whose salary range is below 27 and notwithstanding the presence of
persons who are not public officers.
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction.[21]
We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
case because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to
order the amendment of the Information.
Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides thus:
Section 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the
same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner prayed that a reinvestigation be made in view of the
Amended Information.
We hold that the reinvestigation is not necessary anymore. A
reinvestigation is proper only if the accuseds substantial rights would be
impaired. In the case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be
unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is filed without a
reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the Information
merely describe the public positions held by the accused/petitioners
and stated where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped.
It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially
inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor
to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on
the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the
persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.[22]
The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already
and we see no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation
should still be conducted.
As an aside, an offense is considered committed in relation to office
when it is intimately connected with their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions.[23]
In the case of Cunanan vs. Arceo, it was held that:
... the absence in the information filed on 5 April 1991 before Branch 46
of the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, of an allegation that petitioner
had committed the offense charged in relation to his office is
immaterial and easily remedied. Respondent RTC judges had forwarded
petitioners case to the Sandiganbayan, and the complete records
transmitted thereto in accordance with the directions of this Court set
out in the Asuncion case: x x x As if it was originally filed with [the
Sandiganbayan]. That Information may be amended at any time before
arraignment before the Sandiganbayan, and indeed, by leave of court at
any time before judgment is rendered by the Sandiganbayan,
considering that such an amendment would not affect the juridical
nature of the offense charged (i.e., murder), the qualifying
circumstances alleged in the information, or the defenses that
petitioner may assert before the Sandiganbayan. In other words, the
amendment may be made before the Sandiganbayan without surprising
the petitioner or prejudicing his substantive rights.[24] (Underscoring
Supplied)
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON,
Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution
denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive
portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN
DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated
September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint
Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for
Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING,
AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and
Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered
REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE
forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private
respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases
Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok
Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies
of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio
Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño,
SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu,
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of
Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts
of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be
arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this
Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the
accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April
2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain
Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the
deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against
petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn
confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash
the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan
noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said
urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by
the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State
Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took
over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of
Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the
warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied
this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao
moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for
the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for
inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint
Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16
October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant
the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid
resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001
dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19
November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s cash bond
evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued
the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the
Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public
Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and
willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November
2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations
for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the
Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondent’s
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the
criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied
in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this
Court the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001
and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and
36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order
dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial
relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524
in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial
Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-
3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch
36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in
ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against
herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become
final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the
body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with
the Court of Appeals’ ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of
the accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such
as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when
he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may
invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing,
Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must
first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act
on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief
since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty
at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary
investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of
arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in
applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that
such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act
on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction
over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the
adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of
Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case
or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized
under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs.
Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the
accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been
arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court
was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance
pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive
Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from
the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of
the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners
invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in
Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to
the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing
for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail,
since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the
accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of
the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required
before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not
required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant
where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody
of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9
while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his
arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the
law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion
before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can
be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not
be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody
after his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law
signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will
and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12
Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of
Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case,
which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the
custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico
reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke
the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently
ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had
jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the
application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it
concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings,
constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special
requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In
Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure
one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is
free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a
person who is in the custody of law.’" The rationale behind this special
rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his
stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court
by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the
requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the
case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the
jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance.
These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not
other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases,
motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest.
The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them
would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality
of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the
accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except
in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of
the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to
the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule
applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the
custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where
we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of
the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the
jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the
application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of
jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:

1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for
certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant
of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding
with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused’s Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease
and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer
the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a
petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the
criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law
in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant
of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody
of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail
will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the
commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other
hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the
custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely
entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same
judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not
he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause,
and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find
probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official
functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed
and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the
day and night.22 Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused
can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since
flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is
likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before
asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of
rights than property rights,23 demanding that due process in the
deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered
by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of
Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the
criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing
warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently
filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on
the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city.
Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s
resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of
this Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days
after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against
further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners,
petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution
before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming
office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal.
According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because
of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to
charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity
when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because
the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor’s
resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review
was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains
that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s
resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail
as premature the filing of the information in court against them on the
ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of
the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been
quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the
warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence,
Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the
above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill
of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the
above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep
perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular
Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-
movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution
as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including
the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his
determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely
abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of
the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which
clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was based on
the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate
determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of
regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly
showed that it was based only on the fiscal’s certification.28
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no
such indication that he relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification.
The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the
Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by
personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was
accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement
under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting
documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda
and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente
Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on
the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution.
Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said
section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable
cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is
incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two
years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was
given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a
fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious
reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during
the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where
"Santiago City voters were pitted against each other along the lines of
the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S.
Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the
other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no
reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a
witness is not within the province of the determination of probable
cause. As we held in Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed
by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States,
while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires
"less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a
part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in
another case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among
other things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant
prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after
the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, Judge
Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the
petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et
al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he
pinpointed to Mr. Miranda – the mastermind and with him and the
other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001
Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder,
certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and
lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were
likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001
statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made
untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same
is without probable value." This Court agrees with the defense’s views.
Indeed, of what use is Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court
rejected the prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced in Criminal
Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in
these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to,
the probative value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda
dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two
(2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court
in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R. No. 13886,
acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the
evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the
two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are
ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to
twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal,
who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the
Leaño case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the
accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of
criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The blunder
of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision
in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leaño that
the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in
that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not
even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at
bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in
Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son,
whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of
respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable
doubt in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made
untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same
is without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the
use of our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable
doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecution’s version of
the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of
probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the
informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a
bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further
proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the
informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able
to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such
abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Court’s resolve to
issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the
motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the
reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of
Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by
Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue
apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it
was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a
personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of
new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the
warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of
scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be
allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case
where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other
direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001
Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest.
Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings
conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of
proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the
orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order
quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those
warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new
warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would
have been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the
preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals,
and are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals
and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not
merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in
Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of
probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had
resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the
judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same
vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of
probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case
dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of
Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of
dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to
petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of
Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders
which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliao’s Petition for
Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent
before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page
of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge
Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad,
which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is
NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the
Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of
the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of
Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case
because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001
Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three
weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14
November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in
filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order
dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On
21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in
view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public
Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the
issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that
Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14
November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge
Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November
2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the
effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001
Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases
upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing of a bond in the amount of
P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November
2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt,
seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court
processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of
opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite
public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the
nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy
cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it
was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for
certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the
number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to
convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We
further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by
transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524
to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December
2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-
3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the
RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the
transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is
likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten
(10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the
criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to
report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10)
days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to
act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith
warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda,
Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal,
conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18
December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August
2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988
ALFREDO CUYOS y TULOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NICOLAS P. GARCIA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, San
Fernando, Pampanga and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
De la Cruz, De Loso and Sison Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos, in this Petition for certiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction seeks to set aside the Order dated 9 September
1977 issued by respondent Municipal Court Judge Nicolas P. Garcia in
Criminal Case No. 77-1848 (entitled " People of the Philippines, plaintiff
vs. Alfredo Cuyos y Tulor, accused") denying petitioner's Motion to
Transfer said case to the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for
trial on the merits.
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, with homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property, through reckless imprudence. Petitioner was
driver of a cargo truck which had collided with a Volkswagen
automobile in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death of one
(1) person and physical injuries to four (4) other people. The Amended
Complaint against petitioner read as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of June 1977, at about 6:10 P.M., at the
MacArthur Highway, barrio San Isidro, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a truck bearing
plate No. V 139 T Filipinos 1977, willfully and unlawfully drive and
operate the same in a negligent, imprudent and careless manner, and
without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations, and without
taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and
damage to property, causing by such negligence, imprudence and
carelessness, the said truck driven and operated by him bumped and hit
a Volkswagen car bearing plate no. E 604 Filipinos 1977, then driven by
Antonio M. Concepcion, as a result of which one of the occupants of the
said car, Victoriana Miranda Concepcion died in the said accident, and
the other occupants namely: Antonio Concepcion, Rhinna Lin Capili,
Renee Ann Capili and Lourdes Concepcion sustained serious physical
injuries, and the said car suffered damages in the amount of
P18,000.00, belonging to Antonio Concepcion, to the damage and
prejudice of the offended parties.
Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. After
arraignment, respondent Judge set the case for trial on 12,14 and 16
September 1977.
Before trial could commence, however, petitioner filed on 6 September
1977 a " Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance for
Trial" , alleging lack of jurisdiction over the case on the part of the
Municipal Court. Petitioner's argument was that the amended criminal
complaint alleged that the Volkswagen car involved in the accident had
suffered damages amounting to P18,000.00, and that under paragraph
3, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime with which he was
charged would carry a fine in an amount ranging from the amount of
the damage to three (3) times the value of the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x
P18,000.00 or P54,000.00). Petitioner urged in his Motion that because
under Section 87 (e) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended (Republic
Act No. 296 as amended), the respondent Municipal Court of the
Provincial Capital of Pampanga, had jurisdiction only over offenses
punishable by a fine not exceeding P6,000.00, the case had to be
transferred to the Court of First Instance. On the same date, petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion to Postpone the trial of the case relying on the
same grounds set out in his Motion to Transfer the Case to the Court of
First Instance.
After a joint hearing of the two (2) Motions filed by petitioner, the
respondent Municipal judge issued an order dated 9 September 1977
denying the Motion to transfer the Case to the Court of First Instance
and set the trial of the case for 5 October 1977. A verbal Motion for
Reconsideration by petitioner was denied.
Hence the present Petition for Certiorari, assailing the jurisdiction of the
respondent court to try the criminal case against petitioner on the
merits.
By a Resolution dated 26 September 1977, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondent Municipal Court
from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 77-1848.
The sole issue raised in this Petition is whether or not the respondent
Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the
criminal case against petitioner.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated 27 October 1977, agreed
with and adopted the position taken by petitioner that respondent
Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. 77-1848.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General.
Criminal Case No. 77-1848 involves a complex crime of homicide,
multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property, resulting
from reckless imprudence. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
in a prosecution for a complex crime constituted by two (2) or more
grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime is to
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. In the
present case, one might, as respondent Municipal Judge did, look only
at the acts which constitute the offenses comprising the complex crime
here involved. One is likely to do so through eyes which are culturally
conditioned and so is likely to assume, as did respondent Municipal
Judge, that the most serious offense of which petitioner is accused is
homicide through reckless imprudence. Under paragraph 2, Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable upon petitioner,
should he be found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence,
would be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions contained in this Article shall not be applicable:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
automobile law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case
the defendants shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
xxx xxx xxx
At the time of the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioner
before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, such Municipal
Court in the capital of the Province of Pampanga had jurisdiction to
impose a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine
not exceeding P6,000. 00 or both. The applicable provision was the
fourth paragraph of Article 87 (c) of Republic Act No. 296 as amended
which provided as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and
judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First
Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their
respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years
or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both, and in the absence of
the district judge, shall have like jurisdiction within the province as the
Court of First Instance to hear applications for bail.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if the basic assumption made earlier as to the relative gravity of
homicide through reckless imprudence and damage to property
through reckless imprudence were correct, the respondent Municipal
Judge would have to be vested with jurisdiction over the criminal
charges against petitioner.
As a technical legal proposition, however, the relative seriousness of
offenses is determined by the seriousness of the penalties attached by
the law to the several offenses. It was noted earlier that the imposable
penalty in case of homicide through reckless imprudence is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., a correctional
penalty in the scale of penalties set up in Article 25 of the Revised Penal
Code. Upon the other hand, the penalty for damage to property
through reckless imprudence is provided for in the third paragraph of
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as follows:
When the execution of the Act covered by this Article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of paid
damages to three-times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than P25.00. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 26 of the same Code, a fine may be an afflictive penalty
(i.e., if it exceeds P6,000.00) or a correctional penalty (i.e., if it is
P200.00 or more but does not exceed P6,000.00). The offense so
penalized with a fine may be a grave felony (i.e. if the imposable fine is
afflictive in nature) or a less grave felony (i.e., if the imposable fine is
merely correctional). 1 In the instant case, the maximum fine which
may be imposed upon petitioner is P54,000.00 (3 x P18,000.00),
obviously an afflictive penalty and hence, in the scheme of the Revised
Penal Code, more serious than the penalty imposable for homicide
through reckless imprudence.
In complex crimes, it is not uncommon that one constitutive offense
carries with it an afflictive penalty while the other or other constitutive
offenses carry with them only a correctional or even a light penalty.
Jurisdiction over the whole complex crime must logically be lodged with
the trial court having jurisdiction to impose the maximum and most
serious penalty imposable on an offense forming part of the complex
crime. A complex crime must be prosecuted integrally, as it were, and
not split into its component offenses and the latter made the subject of
multiple informations possibly brought in different courts. This is the
thrust of our case law on the matter.
In Angeles, etc., et al, v. Jose, et al., 2 the Court had occasion to deal
with a criminal information against one Domingo Mejia before the
Court of First Instance of Manila, charging him with the crime of
damage to property in the sum of P654.22 and with less serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, committed, in one single
act. There, the respondent Court of First Instance dismissed the criminal
information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code was only arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court. The prosecution then invited attention to the fact that
the fine which could be imposed by the respondent court on account of
the damage to property through reckless imprudence was a sum
ranging from P654.22 to P1,962.66 (P654.22 x 3) which amount was
beyond the jurisdiction of a Municipal Court to impose as fine. In setting
aside the order of dismissal by the respondent Court of First Instance
and remanding the case to the trial court further proceedings, the
Supreme Court said:
[The third paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code] simply
means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed
therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there,
should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot
be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the
damage to property, for both the injuries and the damage committed
were caused by one single act of the defendant and constitute what
may be called a complex crime of physical injuries and damage to
property. It is clear that the fine fixed by law in this case is beyond the
jurisdiction of the municipal court and within that of the court of first
instance. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Angeles, we held that the jurisdiction of the Court to take
cognizance of the case must be determined, not by the penalty for the
physical injuries charged but by the fine imposable for the damage to
property resulting from reckless imprudence. Damage to property
through reckless imprudence need not be a lighter offense than less
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Because the
maximum fine (P1,962.66) imposable upon the accused in the Angeles
case was beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila to
impose, the criminal case fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent
Court of First Instance of Manila.
People v. Villanueva 4 followed the rule set out in Angeles. In
Villanueva, the accused was charged before the Justice of Peace Court
of Batangas, Batangas with the crime of serious and less serious
physical injuries, with damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00,
through reckless imprudence. The Justice of Peace Court subsequently
declared itself without jurisdiction to try the case and forwarded the
same to the Court of First Instance. The latter court then declared itself
similarly without jurisdiction over the complex crime charged in the
information, upon the ground that the penalty for the graver offense of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was only arresto mayor in
its, maximum and medium periods which penalty, even if applied in its
maximum degree (in view of the complex -nature of the crime), would
remain within the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace Court. Upon
appeal by the prosecution, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, held that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over
the complex crime there involved:
We find the appeal well taken, for this case comes squarely under the
rule laid down by us in Angeles, et al. v. ,rose, et al. [96 Phil. 151
(1954)],, wherein we held that.—
xxx xxx xxx
Consider that it is the court of first instance that would undoubtedly
have jurisdiction if the only offense that resulted from appellant's
imprudence were the damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00,
it would be absurd to hold that for the graver offense of serious and
less serious physical injuries combined with damage to property
through reckless imprudence, jurisdiction would lie in the justice of the
peace court. The presumption is against absurdity, and it is the duty of
the courts to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd results.
Our system of apportionment of criminal jurisdictions among the
various trial courts proceeds on the basic theory that crimes cognizable
by the Courts of First Instance are more serious than those triable
injustice of the peace or municipal courts.
Moreover, we cannot discard the possibility that the prosecution may
not be able to prove all the supposed offenses constituting the complex
crime charge. Were we to hold that it is the justice of the Peace court
that has jurisdiction in this case, if later the prosecution should fail to
prove the physical injuries aspect of the case and establish only the
damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00, the inferior court
would find itself without jurisdiction to impose the fine for the damage
to property committed, since such fine can not be less than the amount
of the damage. Again, it is to avoid this further absurdity that we must
hold that the jurisdiction lies in the court of first instance in this case. 5
The applicable rule on the allocation of jurisdiction between an inferior
court on the one hand and the Regional Trial Court on the other, in
respect of complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, was summarized
by Mr. Justice Barrera in People v. Malabanan: 6
It is true that, following the ruling of this Court in the case of Lapuz v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-6382, March 30,1954 (40 O.G. 18 supp.), in
imposing the corresponding penalty, to the quasi-offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in physical injuries and damage to property,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. However, there
may be cases, as the one at bar, where the imposable penalty for the
physical injuries charged would come within the jurisdiction of the
municipal or justice of the peace court while the fine, for the damage to
property, would fall on the Court of First Instance. As the information
cannot be split into two, one for damages and another for the physical
injuries, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case
must be determined not by the corresponding penalty for the physical
injuries charged but by the fine imposable for the damage to property
resulting from the reckless imprudence. 7 (Emphasis supplied)
It remains only to point out that under B.P. Blg. 129, the law presently
in effect, we would have to reach the same result: i.e., that the criminal
case against petitioner falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. Under Section 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months, or a
fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they should have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the maximum fine imposable in the present case is P54,000.00,
and the maximum imprisonment imposable (for the homicide through
reckless imprudence) is six (6) years, clearly, the criminal charge
involved falls outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and
consequently within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Municipal Court of 9
September 1977 is hereby SET ASIDE as null and void and the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 26 September
1977 is hereby made PERMANENT. Because the proceedings before the
respondent Municipal Court are null and void, the Provincial Fiscal of
Pampanga will have to file a new information against petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. L-74053-54 January 20, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION,
petitioners,
vs.
NATHANIEL M. GROSPE, Presiding Judge, Branch 44, Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga and MANUEL PARULAN, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision of
respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, dismissing Criminal Case No. 2800 for Violation of B.P. Blg.
22, and Criminal Case No. 2813 for Estafa, for being "bereft of
jurisdiction to pass judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits
of these cases."
Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale
dealer of petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC, for short) in Bulacan.
In Criminal Case No. 2800 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, he
was charged with Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22 for
having issued a check on 13 June 1983 for P86,071.20) in favor of SMC
but which was dishonored for having been drawn against 'insufficient
funds and, in spite of repeated demands, for having failed and refused
to make good said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC.
In Criminal Case No. 2813 of the same Court, Respondent-accused was
charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code for having made out a check on 18 June 1983 in the sum of
P11,918.80 in favor of SMC in payment of beer he had purchased, but
which check was refused payment for "insufficient funds" and, in spite
of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to redeem said
check to the damage and prejudice of SMC.
The two cases were tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution
and defense being the same for the two suits.
Based on the facts and the evidence, Respondent Judge arrived at the
following "Findings and Resolution:"
From the welter of evidence adduced in these two , this Court is
convinced that the two checks involved herein were issued and signed
by the accused in connection with the beer purchases made by him on
various occasions at the Guiguinto, sales office of SMC at Guiguinto,
Bulacan and which checks he handed and delivered to the sales
Supervisor of SMC, Mr. Ruben Cornelio, who holds office in that
municipality. The Court finds it rather difficult to believe the claim and
testimony of the accused that these checks which he admittedly signed
and which he delivered to Mr. Cornelio in blank were filled up without
his knowledge particularly the amounts appearing therein which in the
case of the check involved in Criminal Case No. 2800 amounted to
P86,071.20, and, in the case of the check involved in Criminal Case No.
2813, amounted to Pl1,918.80. The accused had been engaged in
business for some time involving amounts that are quite considerable,
and it is hard to believe that he will agree to this kind of arrangement
which placed or exposed him to too much risks and uncertainties.
But even as this Court is convinced that the accused had issued these
checks to the representative of SMC on the occasions testified to in
these cases by the witnesses for the prosecution which two checks
were subsequently dishonored due to lack of funds resulting in damage
to SMC, the offended party herein, this Court, after considering the
totality of the evidence and the circumstances that attended the
issuance of these two checks until they were both dishonored by the
drawee bank, the Planters Development Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan,
has come to the conclusion that it is bereft of jurisdiction to pass
judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits of these cases.
which he reasoned out, thus:
Deceit and damage are the two essential elements that make up the
offenses involving dishonored checks. And in order that this Court may
have jurisdiction to try these cases, it must be established that both or
any one of these elements composing the offenses charged must occur
or take place within the area over which this Court has territorial
jurisdiction. Here, however, it is clear that none of these elements took
place or occurred within the jurisdictional area of this Court.
As gleaned from the evidence, the two checks involved herein were
issued by the accused at Guiguinto, Bulacan. They were delivered and
handed to Supervisor Ruben Cornelio of San Miguel Corporation in his
capacity as the representative of the company holding office in that
municipality where the transactions of the accused with SMC took
place. It was before Supervisor Cornelio at Guiguinto, Bulacan that false
assurances were made by the accused that the checks issued by him
were good and backed by sufficient funds in his bank, the Planters
Development Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan, only to turn out later on
that this was not so.
The other element of damage pertaining to the offenses charged in
these cases was inflicted on the offended party, the SMC, right at the
moment the checks issued by the accused were dishonored by the
Planters Development Bank, the drawee bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan
which received them from the BPI, San Fernando, Pampanga branch for
clearing purposes. The argument advanced by the prosecution in its
memorandum filed herein that the two checks were deposited by SMC
at the BPI, San Fernando, Branch, San Fernando, Pampanga, where it
maintained its accounts after receiving these checks from its Guiguinto
Sales Office which bank later on made the corresponding deductions
from the account of SMC in the amounts covered by the dishonored
checks upon receiving information that the checks so issued by the
accused had been dishonored by the drawee bank at Santa Maria,
Bulacan, is inconsequential. As earlier stated, the element of damage
was inflicted on the offended party herein right at the moment and at
the place where the checks issued in its favor were dishonored which is
in Santa Maria, Bulacan.
Respondent Judge then decreed:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered dismissing these cases for lack of jurisdiction.
The bail bond posted by the accused in these cases are ordered
cancelled.
This Petition for certiorari challenges the dismissal of the two criminal
cases on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent-accused adopts the contrary proposition and argues that
the order of dismissal was, in effect, an acquittal not reviewable by
certiorari, and that to set the order aside after plea and trial on the
merits, would subject Respondent-accused to double jeopardy.
Upon the attendant facts and circumstances we uphold the Petition.
The principal ground relied upon by Respondent Judge in dismissing the
criminal cases is that deceit and damage, the two essential elements
that make up the offenses involving dishonored checks, did not occur
within the territorial jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but rather in
Bulacan where false assurances were given by Respondent-accused and
where the checks he had issued were dishonored. The People maintain,
on the other hand, that jurisdiction is properly vested in the Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga.
At the outset, it should be pointed out, as the Solicitor General has
aptly called attention to, that there are two dishonored checks
involved, each the subject of different penal laws and with different
basic elements: (1) On June 13, 1983, Respondent-accused issued
Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch) [PDB] Check
No. 19040865 in the sum of P86,071.20 in favor of SMC, which was
received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan. The check was
forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San Fernando, Pampanga,
where it was delivered to and received by the SMC Finance Officer, who
then deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI),
San Fernando Branch, which is the SMC depository bank. On July
8,1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor of the
said check for "insufficiency of funds" from the PDB, the drawee bank in
Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is the subject of the charge
of Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22) in Criminal Case
No. 2800 of the lower Court (hereafter, the Bouncing Checks Case).
(2) On June 18, 1983, Respondent-accused likewise issued PDB
Check No. 19040872 in the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC,
which was received also by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan,
as direct payment for the spot sale of beer. That check was similarly
forwarded by the SMC Supervisor to the SMC Regional Office in San
Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to the Finance Officer
thereat and who, in turn deposited the check with the SMC depository
bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. On July 8,1983, the SMC depository
bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the
drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check
is the subject of the prosecution for Estafa by postdating or issuing a
bad check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code
in Criminal Case No, 2813 of the lower Court (briefly, the Estafa Case).
In the crime of Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and
damage are essential elements of the offense (U.S. vs. Rivera, 23 Phil.
383-390) and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant
conviction.
For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the
elements of deceit and damage are not essential nor required. An
essential element of that offense is knowledge on the part of the maker
or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds (Lozano vs. Hon.
Martinez, Nos. L-63419, etc., December 18, 1986; 146 SCRA 323; Dingle
vs. IAC, G.R. No. 75243, March 16, 1987,148 SCRA 595). The Anti-
Bouncing Checks Law makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check a
special offense punishable thereunder (Cruz vs. IAC, No. I,66327, May
28,1984,129 SCRA 490. Malice and intent in issuing the worthless check
are immaterial, the offense being malum prohibitum (Que vs. People of
the Philippines, et. al., G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 21, 1987). The
gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check, not the non-
payment of an obligation (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, supra).
A. With the distinction clarified, the threshold question is
whether or not venue was sufficiently conferred in the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga in the two cases.
Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been
carried over in Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, specifically provides:
SEC. 14. Place where action is to be instituted —
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was
committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or province where the offense was in part
committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts
material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation
occur in one province and some in another, the Court of either province
has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first Court
taking cognizance of the Case will exclude the others (Tuzon vs. Cruz.
No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). However, if an the acts
material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation
occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that municipality
or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case (People vs. Yabut, L-
42902, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 624).
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or
continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may arise
independently in separate places (People vs. Yabut, supra). In this case,
deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was
inflicted in Bulacan where the cheek was dishonored by the drawee
bank in that place (See People vs. Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may,
therefore, be entertained by either the Bulacan Court or the Pampanga
Court.
For while the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not
completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it
was uttered and delivered. "What is of decisive importance is the
delivery thereat The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential
to its consummation as an obligation" (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725,
cited in People vs. Yabut, supra). For although the check was received
by the SMC Sales Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, that was not the
delivery in contemplation of law to the payee, SMC. Said supervisor was
not the person who could take the check as a holder, that is, as a payee
or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto. The rule is
that the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a
person who takes it as a holder, which means "the payee or indorsee of
a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer, thereof" (Sec.
190, Negotiable Instruments Law, cited in People vs. Yabut, supra.)
Thus, said representative had to forward the check to the SMC Regional
Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, which was delivered to the Finance
Officer thereat who, in turn, deposited it at the SMC depository bank in
San Fernando, Pampanga. The element of deceit, therefore, took place
in San Fernando, Pampanga, where the rubber check was legally issued
and delivered so that jurisdiction could properly be laid upon the Court
in that locality.
The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case before
Us appears to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken
place in Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where
the checks were dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction
can, therefore, be entertained by either the Malolos court or the
Caloocan court. While the subject checks were written, signed, or dated
in Caloocan City, they were not completely made or drawn there, but in
Malolos, Bulacan, where they were uttered and delivered. That is the
place of business and residence of the payee. The place where the bills
were written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the
place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the
delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential
to its consummation as an obligation (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725).
An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the contract is
revocable (Ogden, Negotiable Instruments, 5th ed., at 107). And the
issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who
takes it as a holder, which means "(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or
note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof" (Sec. 190,
Negotiable Instruments Law). Delivery of the check signifies transfer of
possession, whether actual or constructive, from one person to another
with intent to transfer title thereto (Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks, 3rd
ed. at 57-59; Sec. 190, Negotiable Instruments Law). Thus, the
penalizing clause of the provision of Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: "By
postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when
the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check," Clearly,
therefore, the element of deceit thru the issuance and delivery of the
worthless checks to the complainant took place in Malolos, Bulacan,
conferring upon a court in that locality jurisdiction to try the case.
In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be
continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very
fact of its performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29,
1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not
only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or
drawing and issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II,
No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been filed
also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the determinative factor (in
determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check". However,
it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of
the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential
ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether
the accused be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon.
Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly,
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga.
And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is
determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling
(Arches vs. Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-
27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). The Information filed herein
specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando,
Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below.
B. The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent
Judge, predicated on his lack of jurisdiction, is correctable by Certiorari.
The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment
on the merits. Well-settled is the rule that questions covering
jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari,
inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion, which are equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction (City of Davao vs. Dept. of Labor, No. L-19488,
January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 111, 115). An error of jurisdiction renders
whatever order of the Trial Court nun and void.
C. The present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the
void Decision of Respondent Judge does not place Respondent-accused
in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will be recalled that the
questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a
dismissal upon Respondent Judge's erroneous conclusion that his Court
had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases. Where an order
dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar
as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense (People vs.
Bellosillo, No. L-18512, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 835, 837).
The dismissal being null and void the proceedings before the Trial Court
may not be said to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore,
no second proceeding which would subject the accused to double
jeopardy.
Since the order of dismissal was without authority and, therefore, null
and void, the proceedings before the Municipal Court have not been
lawfully terminated. Accordingly, there is no second proceeding to
speak of and no double jeopardy. A continuation of the proceedings
against the accused for serious physical injuries is in order. (People vs.
Mogol, 131 SCRA 306, 308).
In sum, Respondent Judge had jurisdiction to try and decide the subject
criminal case, venue having been properly laid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Respondent Judge of February 17, 1986 is
hereby set aside and he is hereby ordered to reassume jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment
of either conviction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence
already adduced during the joint trial of said two cases.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San
Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the
prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes
without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.1 The referral-
complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information
was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the
crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the
respondent judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first
argues that the charge against her is governed by the following
provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law
for the offenses charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or
a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other
imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling
within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the
offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint
shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to
Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts
and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin
to Run," reading as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .
Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two
months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining
and penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of
the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the
ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was
suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the
Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action
shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court, by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the
purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint
directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office.
However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the
complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that
the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all
cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling
under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of
the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance
for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after
mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true
doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this
conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in
declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether
the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or
investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of
the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the
injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on
his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30,
1983, two months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary
Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110
is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last
paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not
subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which
plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are
subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in
the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section,
that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a
statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of
the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among
the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it
should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for
violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule
and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling
under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No.
129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties
agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case
shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or
not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This
means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the
date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326
which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to
the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law
does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the
information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was
done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated
October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal
Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
prescription. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo,
JJ., concur.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule
on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if
there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in
the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of
the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe

that the decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110,
as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the
Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution
in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which
the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may
prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's
office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary
judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should
not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious
intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is
not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to
prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to
the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11,
1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in
accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by