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A number of recent market events As a result of this, we have recently witnessed increased
demand for protection and a profusion of “tail-hedging”
have highlighted the costly impact that products, which may present challenges to potential investors
improbable or highly unlikely events looking to build a hedging program. At JPMAAM we believe that
investors should carefully understand the risk factors when they
can have on investors’ portfolios. try to hedge their portfolios and consider the merits of such tail
The credit crisis in the United States hedging techniques, taking into account considerations such as
in 2008, the failure of financial cost, timing/possibility of monetization and possible ‘crowding’
effect in tail hedges.
counterparties such as Lehman
The emphasis of this paper is to discuss the main consider-
Brothers in the same year, as well ations investors should take into account before engaging in a
as the debt crisis in Europe and the tail hedging program. We will then spend some time focusing
on the different tail hedge alternatives available to investors,
associated political risk more recently with their respective pros and cons. We will conclude with
have prompted investors to seek ways JPMAAM’s new hedging approach as well as potential institu-
to protect their portfolios against tional implications.
Rationale for tail hedging and considerations a sell-off of -15% could generate a return of +150%. Negative
carry is another important consideration for investors. Negative
We believe it is important for investors to understand the
carry is the cost associated with hedging techniques. For exam-
different risk factors embedded in their portfolio and the
ple, option based strategies have a negative carry which repre-
sensitivity of their portfolio to different risks, such as equity,
sents the time-decay of the option.
credit, rates, etc. The traditional approach of purchasing put
options on indices (e.g. S&P 500) to protect against the Basis risk is another factor investors should consider before
occurrence of a dramatic event has some important engaging in a hedging program. Basis risk is the risk of a
limitations. Today there is an increasing number of investors, hedge not working, i.e. it is the risk that offsetting investments
spooked by the events of 2008–2009, who have flocked to in a hedging strategy will not experience price changes in
options as a way to hedge the tail. This has created high entirely opposite directions from each other. This imperfect
demand for puts, resulting in a steady increase in price. As of correlation between the two investments creates the potential
September 2011, for example, a 15% out-of-the-money put for excess gains or losses in a hedging strategy, thus adding
option on the S&P 500 index expiring one year from today risk to the position. For example an investor may realize that
would cost a little over 6%, a premium implying a break-even it is less costly to hedge a long position in IBM by buying a put
rate of over 21%, which is very expensive by historical option on the entire S&P 500 (as opposed to sourcing the spe-
standards and could be far beyond what many rational cific IBM stock to borrow and short it). This strategy, although
investors would be ready to pay. At JPMAAM, instead of buying less costly, presents serious flaws as there is no guarantee for
a series of out of the money put options on indices, we more the IBM stock to move in tandem with the S&P 500. So chang-
appropriately analyse and disaggregate our portfolios on a ing the basis of the underlying hedge may result in a hedge
risk factor basis and we try to hedge out these specific risks. that is not as efficient as initially anticipated.
The alpha component of a hedging strategy is another important
Portfolio risk sensitivity Equity, credit, rates, etc. factor to consider. Some hedging strategies - such as buying and
Sizing approach Insurance budget vs. target level of protection selling options opportunistically and monetizing these options,
Return profile Attachment point, convexity, negative carry
or some idiosyncratic short credit strategies – can offer alpha
and have the potential to outperform naïve index replication.
Basis risk Risk of hedging failing to provide expected protection
Alpha Potential to outperform native index replication The capital efficiency of a hedging technique is another key
consideration for investors. Some hedging strategies, such as
Capital efficiency Reducing “cash drag”
short selling are “capital intensive” meaning investors have to
Liquidity Ability to monetize mark-to-market gains
deploy USD 100 to get USD 100 of notional exposure. Option
Counterparty risk Over-the-counter vs exchange exposure related strategies on the other hand are more capital efficient
Transparency Ability to monitor investment due to the implicit leverage embedded in option contracts. The
more capital efficient a strategy, the less capital needs to be
deployed to reach a certain level of notional exposure or pro-
It is important for investors to understand the different charac- tection. This reduces the “cash drag” on the portfolio, enabling
teristics of each of the different hedging techniques available to capital to be deployed more effectively towards other, poten-
them: return profiles, attachment points, convexity and negative tially higher yielding investments.
carry. Attachment points are the level at which protection starts
“kicking in”. For example, options have different strike prices A consideration which is often overlooked by investors is the
implying different levels of protection. The convexity of a hedge ability to monetize mark-to-market gains. Hedge fund manag-
is also a crucial concept for investors to grasp. Protection can ers specializing in option trading have the ability to monetize
either be linear or convex. For example, in a linear protection mark to market gains through a number of different tech-
scenario, if the market is up +10% you could reasonably expect niques. Examples of monetization techniques include:
your hedge to lose -10% and if the market is down -10% you
• Selling actual put positions that have accrued value
can reasonably expect your hedge to be positive approximately
+10%. In a convex tail hedging strategy you can expect your • Not rolling into new positions over the course of the month
hedge to be increasingly effective as the market sells off. For
example a sell-off of -10% could generate a return of +60% and • Covering a portion or all of the position’s short delta
JPMAAM’s approach to active portfolio high yield bonds, and credit indices. Given the tightness of
credit spreads, the protection offered by shorting these credits
hedging
can be quite convex. For example, investment grade credit
JPMAAM’s approach to portfolio hedging places a spreads currently around 110bps can only go to 0 (historically,
premium on strategies which: investment grade has bottomed out around the 30 level), but
• Utilize asset class specialists could potentially move to 300 or higher in periods of market
stress and dislocation. The potential asymmetry of returns to
• Focus primarily upon equity (but also credit) sensitivity the upside in case of a market shock or a left tail event makes
• Offer convex, including out-of-the money hedges this strategy extremely compelling.
• Add linear protection to smooth distribution One of the key differentiator in our approach to portfolio
• Minimize basis and counterparty risk hedging is the dynamic mix between convex and linear hedg-
ing strategies. We believe that combining convex and linear
• Focus on capital efficiency
hedging program offers an attractive payout for our investors.
We believe it is generally in the investors’ interest to outsource The reason for this is that convex payout profiles tend to offer
the construction of optimal hedges to experts specific to each greater capital efficiency and protection in severe tail events,
asset class. For example, within the option arbitrage bucket we i.e. when “it hurts the most” whilst linear hedging strategies
have carried out due diligence on and selected managers who smooth out the distribution of returns. In addition, mixing
have over a decade of experience not just in trading equity these different hedging strategies provides us with the flexibil-
options, but in specifically crafting positive convex tail positions ity to change the mix depending on individual client situations,
through equity options. These managers’ reputation and stand- embedded risk factors or utility functions. For example, inves-
ing as a first call liquidity provider for desks and brokers with tors may require different attachment points (i.e. threshold at
downside options to lay-off allows for significant transactional which protection is triggered) to protect against different
inefficiencies. Especially in very short dated out-of-the money extreme scenarios or different levels of stress in the markets.
options, bid-ask spreads can be quite wide as a percentage of The combination of convex and linear protections help us
premium expended; the ability to transact at mid market (or bet- achieve these desired levels of protection while smoothing the
ter) can therefore prove highly advantageous. The managers’ distribution of returns in the left shoulder and belly of the dis-
expertise and flexibility to optimize the hedge along the term tribution as depicted in the graph below.
structure can also be quite valuable. For example, the ability to
trade shorter-dated options can prove particularly cost-effective TARGETED PAYOFF PROFILES FOR GIVEN EQUITY MARKET RETURNS
during periods of an upward sloping implied volatility curve. Targeted payoff by strategy Targeted payoff: A closer look
And in addition to being more cost effective, shorter term at the “tradeoff”
options are also more liquid and potentially easier to monetize in Option Arbitrage Short Equity Short Credit Combo Hedge
a crisis.
400 20
On the equity and credit protection side, we tend to employ
Hedge strategy return (%)
300 15
Hedge strategy return (%)
portfolio only gives back a small portion of upside during The following graphs show the cumulative outperformance of
positive equity markets but dramatically outperforms the the hedged portfolio against the unhedged portfolio over the
unhedged portfolio during negative equity markets. January 1997-April 2011 period. The following graph (below
Interestingly as well, the sharper the market decline, the right) shows the difference in rolling 12-month returns between
greater the outperformance of the hedge portfolio. This is due the hedged and the non-hedged Institutional portfolios. The
to the highly convex nature of our Portfolio Hedge allocation. graph shows a net outperformance of the hedged portfolio
For example, the left hand side of the graph shows that there during the Asia crisis/LTCM debacle in 1998, the 2001 tech
were two occurrences when the S&P 500 monthly returns wreck, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2002 accounting scandals
were lower than -12% over the period, and the proforma at Adelphia, Enron and WorldCom and the 2008 credit collapse.
portfolio hedge program returned a monthly average of
+230.6%* during these months. As a consequence of this
CUMULATIVE RETURN
highly convex tail hedging strategy, the hedged portfolio
outperforms the unhedged portfolio by nearly 600 bps on 200
average during these months of market stress. It is the 180
160
blending of linear (short sellers) and convex hedges (out of 140
Ann. Return: 7.83%
Ann. Vol: 8.19%
the money options and short credit strategies) that help us 120
Percent
100
achieve this asymmetric return profile where the gains in the 80
extreme negative tail events far outweigh the drag on 60 Ann. Return: 7.10%
40 Ann. Vol: 9.39%
performance during periods of benign equity markets.
20
0
Apr-11
Oct-03
Apr-05
Oct-97
Apr-99
Apr-02
Apr-08
Jan-03
Oct-06
Jul-98
Oct-00
Oct-09
Jul-01
Jan-97
Jul-10
Jul-07
Jul-04
Jan-00
Jan-06
Jan-09
Institutional unhedged portfolio-Typical Institutional Portfolio*:
(55% Equities, 40% Fixed Income, 5% Hedge Funds)
Portfolio hedge
Enhanced new hedged portfolio-Typical Institutional Portfolio with 2.25% Portfolio
Hedge allocation (0.50% Short Equity, 1.25% Option Arbitrage, 0.50% Short Credit)
Institutional unhedged portfolio—Typical Institutional Portfolio*:
enhanced portfolio return (%)
150 8 Portfolio Hedge allocation (0.50% Short Equity, 1.25% Option Arbitrage, 0.50% Short Credit)
100 4
50 14.2 14.4 Institutional unhedged portfolio—Typical Institutional Portfolio*:
3.9 2.2 0
0 (55% Equities, 40% Fixed Income, 5% Hedge Funds)
-50 (# occurences) -0.8 -5.3 -3.3 -8.5
-100 -4 Enhanced new hedged portfolio—Typical Institutional Portfolio with 2.25%
-150 (2) (3) (12) (16) (31) (51) (34) (19) (2) Portfolio Hedge allocation (0.50% Short Equity, 1.25% Option Arbitrage, 0.50% Short Credit)
-200
-8 DIFFERENCE 10 IN PERFORMANCE BETWEEN ENHANCED AND
-250 -12 INSTITUTIONAL8 PORTFOLIOS
Enhanced Portfolio
>9%
Difference in performance
< -12%
6
(%) portfolios (%)
6% to 9%
-3% to 0%
-6% to -3%
-9% to -6%
-12% to -9%
4 outperforms
2
10
0
8
-2 Enhanced Portfolio
Difference in performance
-4
between
4 outperforms
Institutional portfolios
-6 Institutional Portfolio
between Enhanced
2
Source: J.P. Morgan Alternative Asset Management, Bloomberg. Financial -8 outperforms
0
information is as of April 2011. -10
-2
Jul-10
Apr-11
Jul-07
Oct-03
Jan-97
Apr-05
Oct-06
Oct-09
Apr-08
Jan-06
Jan-09
Jul-01
Jul-98
Oct-97
Jan-03
Apr-02
Jul-04
Apr-99
Oct-00
Jan-00
-4
-6 Institutional Portfolio
-8 outperforms
-10
Jul-10
Apr-11
Jul-07
Oct-03
Jan-97
Apr-05
Oct-06
Oct-09
Apr-08
Jan-06
Jan-09
Jul-01
Jul-98
Oct-97
Jan-03
Apr-02
Jul-04
Apr-99
Oct-00
Jan-00
* Typical Institutional Portfolio represents 40% Barclays Aggregate Bond Index, 20% S&P 500, 20% MSCI AC World Index Ex U.S. (LCL currency), 15% Russell 2000 and 5%
HFR Composite . HFR Composite reflects performance of HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index from April 2003 onwards and HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index from January
1997 to March 2003. The MSCI AC World Index Ex U.S. (LCL currency) reflects performance of the MSCI AC World Index Ex U.S. (LCL currency) from February 1999 onwards
and the MSCI World Index (LCL currency) prior to February 1999. Data presented from January 1997 through April 2011. Portfolios are rebalanced quarterly. Enhanced
portfolio allocation to Portfolio Hedge is funded pro-rata from Institutional Portfolio allocations. Please see “Important Notes” in the back of this presentation for more
information. The above charts are for illustrative and discussion purposes only. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Returns are proforma and have not
been experienced by investors.
A well constructed portfolio hedge can help protect significant 3. Credit protection fund
capital in market dislocations. This protection has a number of
The bottom line is that we can help construct a tail hedging
benefits: 1. It may allow investors to hold assets that have
program that is geared towards specific risk factors (equity or
dislocated as opposed to selling these in an unfavorable
credit related for example) and work together with the client to
market to raise liquidity in their portfolios. 2. It may allow
define the most appropriate attachment points given their risk
investors to be offensive and reallocate their portfolios to
aversion/views of market risks.
undervalued assets during or after the dislocation. Most
investors who experienced severe losses in 2008 were not in a
position to take advantage of the dislocations in the market.
CONTACTS
Pascal Bougiatiotis
London: +44-207-742-2274
Calvin Ho, CFA
Asia: +65-68821085
Raphael Guiragossian, CAIA
Geneva: +41-22-744-1926
Douglas Smith, CFA
New York: 212-648-2622
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