2017 LabRel Finals CaseDigest PDF

ATTY.
JEFFERSON MARQUEZ
Professor
AVE CHAEZA C. EYAS
LLB 2 – EH 402
LABOR RELATIONS LAW

[LLB 2 – EH 402]
Labor Relations Law – CASE DIGESTS 1
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION 3
SAN MIGUEL CORP., VS. MANDAUE PACKING PRODUCTS 3
GSIS VS. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS 4
DIOKNO VS. CACDAC 5
SMC EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO VS. SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNION 7
DONG SEUNG INC., VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS 10
DEL PILAR ACADEMY ET AL., VS. DEL PILAR ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION 12
S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL INC., VS. SS VENTURES LABOR UNION 13
INGUILLO ET AL, VS. FIRST PHIL SCALES INC., ET AL. 14
STA LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORP., VS. SOLE ET AL. 17
MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS INC. VS. SECRETARY OF DOLE, ET AL. 18
GENERAL MILLING CORP VS. CASIO ET AL. 20
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA VS. NATL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL ETC. 22
LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS LTD., VS. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LEGENDA 24
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-
SUPER) ET AL., VS. CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORP. 25
SAN MIGUEL FOODS VS. SAN MIGUEL CORP SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION 26
BPI VS. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER 27
OCTAVIO VS. PHIL LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY 29
NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES VS. PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 30
TAKATA PHILS CORP. VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, ET AL. 32
UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE CONCEPCION VS. OFFICE OF SOLE 34
SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN SHIPYARD VS. BLR, ET AL 35
HSBC EMPLOYEES UNION VS. NLRC 37
HIJO RESOURCES CORP.VS. MEJARES 39
RAMIREZ ET AL., VS. POLYSON INDUSTRIES INC. 40
ERSON ANG LEE DOING BUSINESS AS SUPER LAMINATION SERVICES VS. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG SUPER LAMINATION 40
PENINSULA EMPLOYEES UNION VS. ESQUIVEL 42
ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT VS. ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT FACULTY ASSOCIATION 43
SUMIFRU (PHILS) CORP VS. NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA SUYAPA FARM 43
UNITED POLYRESINS, INC. VS. PINUELA 44
RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION 46
SARMIENTO VS. TUICO 46
RIVERA VS. ESPIRITU 47
MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION VS. COURT OF APPEALS 48
UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE CONCEPCION VS. SEC. OF LABOR 49
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER VS. NLRC 51
LIGHT RAILWAY TRANSIT VS. VENUS, JR. 52
SUKHOTAI CUISINE & RESTAURANT VS. COURT OF APPEALS 53
PHILCOM EMPLOYEES UNION VS. PHIL. GLOBAL COMMUNICATION 55
GSIS VS. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS 56
BIFLEX PHILS., INC., LABOR UNION VS. FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL & MFG., CORP. 57
MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. MANILA HOTEL CORP., G.R. NO. 154591, MARCH 5, 2007, CITING GRAND BOULEVARD
HOTEL VS. DACANAY 58
SAN MIGUEL FOODS INC., VS. SAN MIGUEL CORP EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO 60
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS WORKERS ASSO. VS. NLRC 61
YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILS VS. YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION 64
PHIL. AIRLINES INC. VS. PHIL AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 65
STEEL CORP. VS. SCP EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL 67
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK ET AL. 69
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG KAPATIRANG HALIGI ING ALYANSA (SAMMA-LIKHA) VS.
SAMMA CORP. 70
HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILS., (HYATT REGENCY) VS SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT-(NUWHRAIN) 71
MIRANDA VS. ASIAN TERMINALS INC., ET AL. 72
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES-MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER VS. SOLE, ET AL.
73
SORIANO AVIATION VS. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF A. SORIANO AVIATION ET AL. 76
YSS EMPLOYEES UNION-PHIL TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION VS. YSS LABORATORIES, INC. 78
GSIS ET AL., VS. VILLAVIZA ET AL. 79
PICOP RESOURCES INC. VS. TANECA ET AL. 80
INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL VS. WATERFRONT INSULAR HOTEL-DAVAO 82
CIRTEX EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-FFW VS. CIRTEX ELECTRONICS INC. 84

SOLIDBANK CORP. VS. GAMIER ET AL 85
FADRIQUELAN ET AL., VS. MONTEREY FOOD CORP 87
BARAIRO VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 87
MAGDALA MULTIPURPOSE & LIVELIHOOD COOPERATIVE VS. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LGS ET AL. 88
ABARIA ET AL., VS. NLRC ET AL. 89
PICOP RESOURCES INC. VS. DEQUILLA ET AL. 91
C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC. 92
DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS INC. VS. DIGITEL EMPLOYEES UNION ET AL. 93
AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE REBUILDERS VS. PROGRESIBONG UNYON NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA AER 94
HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL VS. HON. STO TOMAS ET AL. 95
VISAYAS COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER VS. YBALLE, ET AL. 96
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES INC. VS. PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 97
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILS., VS. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILS., FACULTY & STAFF ASSO. 97
TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. 98
SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION ET AL., VS. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. 99
FRONDOZO ET AL., VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY 101
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE 103
GENERAL MILLING CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS 103
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS. CONFESOR 104
PHIL. CARPET EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. STO. TOMAS 107
ST. JOHN COLLEGES INC., VS. ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY EMPLOYEES UNION 110
SAN MIGUEL FOODS INC., VS. SAN MIGUEL CORP EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO 113
PUREFOODS CORP VS. NAGKAKAISANG SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG PUREFOODS RANK AND FILE 114
GEN. SAN. COCA-COLA P LANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS VS. CCBPI (GEN. SANTOS CITY) ET AL. 116
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY ET AL., VS. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 116
TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA SA ASIA BREWERY VS. ASIA BREWERY INC. 118
MANILA MINING CORP. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-FFW VS. MANILA MINING CORP. 120
PRINCE TRANSPORT ET AL., VS. GARCIA ET AL. 121
PARK HOTEL ET AL., VS. SORIANO ET AL. 122
GOYA INC. VS. GOYA INC. EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW 123
BAPTISTA ET AL., VS. VILLANUEVA ET AL., 124
TH SHOPFITTERS CORP., ET AL., VS. T&H SHOPFITTERS CORP., UNION 125
PHIL ELECTRIC CORP., VS. COURT OF APPEALS 126
ZAMBRANO ET AL., VS. PHIL CARPET CORP. 127
REVISED GUIDELINES OF THE NCMB FOR THE CONDUCT OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS 128
SANYO PHILIPPINE WORKERS UNION-PSSLU VS. CANIZARES 128
NAVARRO III VS. DAMASCO 129
SAN MIGUEL CORP., VS. NLRC 130
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS INC., VS. NLRC 133
SILVA ET AL., VS. NLRC 134
UNION OF NESTLE WORKERS CAGAYAN DE ORO FACTORY VS. NESTLE PHILS., INC. 138
TABIGUE, ET AL. VS. INTERNATIONAL COPRA EXPORT CORP. 139
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY VS. COBARRUBIAS 140
TENG VS. PAHAGAC, ET AL. 141
CAONG, JR. VS. BEGUALOS 142
ESTATE OF DULAY VS. ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME INC. ET AL. 143
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY VS. THE LEPANTO CAPATAZ UNION 145
7K CORP. VS. ALBARICO 147
BARONDA VS. CA 148
COCA-COLA FEMSA PHILS VS. BACOLOD SALES FORCE UNION 149
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
San Miguel Corp., vs. Mandaue Packing Products
G.R. No. 152356, August 16, 2005
Facts: On 15 June 1998, Respondent union, identifying itself as an affiliate of Federation of Free Workers (FFW), filed a petition for
certification election with the DOLE Regional Office. In the petition, respondent stated that it sought to be certified and to represent the
permanent rank-and-file monthly paid employees of the petitioner. The following documents were attached to the petition:
(1) a Charter Certificate issued by FFW on 5 June 1998 certifying that respondent as of that date was duly certified as a local or chapter
of FFW;
(2) a copy of the constitution of respondent prepared by its Secretary, Noel T. Bathan and attested by its President, Wilfred V. Sagun;
(3) a list of respondent’s officers and their respective addresses, again prepared by Bathan and attested by Sagun;
(4) a certification signifying that respondent had just been organized and no amount had yet been collected from its members, signed by
respondent’s treasurer Chita D. Rodriguez and attested by Sagun; and
(5) a list of all the rank-and-file monthly paid employees of the Mandaue Packaging Products Plants and Mandaue Glass Plant prepared
by Bathan and attested by Sagun.
Petitioner company filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election on the sole ground that the respondent union is not listed
or included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
Respondent then submitted to the BLR the same documents earlier attached to its petition for certification. The accompanying letter stated
that such documents were submitted in compliance with the requirements for the creation of a local/chapter pursuant to the Labor Code and
its Implementing Rules; and it was hoped that the submissions would facilitate the listing of respondent under the roster of legitimate labor
organizations. After which, the Chief of LRD-DOLE Regional Office issued a Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter certifying that from
30 July 1998, respondent has acquired legal personality as a labor organization or worker’s association, it having submitted all the required
documents. Opting not to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss, respondent instead filed a Position Paper wherein it asserted that it had
complied with all the necessary requirements for the conduct of a certification election, and that the ground relied upon in the Motion to
Dismiss was a mere technicality.
In turn, petitioner filed a comment, wherein it reiterated that respondent was not a legitimate labor organization at the time of the filing of
the petition. Petitioner also propounded that contrary to respondent’s objectives of establishing an organization representing rank-and-file
employees, two of respondent’s officers, namely Vice-President Emannuel L. Rosell and Secretary Bathan, were actually supervisory
employees. In support of this allegation, petitioner attached various documents evidencing the designation of these two officers in supervisory
roles, as well as their exercise of various supervisory functions.[9] Petitioner cited Article 245 of the Labor Code, which provides that
supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees.
Agreeing with the petitioner company, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order dismissing respondent’s petition for certification election. The sole
ground relied upon for the dismissal was the Med-Arbiter’s Opinion that as of the date of filing of the petition on 15 June 1998, respondent
did not have the legal personality to file the said petition for certification election.
Respondent union appealed the Med-Arbiter’s order to the DOLE which reversed the same. The DOLE concluded that respondent acquired
legal personality as early as 15 June 1998, the date it submitted the required documents, citing Section 3, Rule VI of the New Rules
Implementing the Labor Code which deems that a local/chapter acquires legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documentary
requirements as mandated in the Implementing Rules. DOLE’s ruling was also affirmed by the CA.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the union has already acquired legal personality at the time of its filing for certification election.
2. Whether or not the union’s president and secretary are supervisory employees and thus barred from membership in that union.
Ruling:
1. The SC held that the union has already acquired legal personality at the time of its filing for certification election. Section 3, Rule VI of
Department Order No. 9 provides when the local/chapter acquires legal personality.
Section 3.Acquisition of legal personality by local chapter. – A local/chapter constituted in accordance with Section 1 of this Rule shall
acquire legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documents enumerated therein. Upon compliance with all the documentary
requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the local/chapter a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations.
It is evident based on this rule that the local/chapter acquires legal personality from the date of the filing of the complete documentary
requirements, and not from the issuance of a certification to such effect by the Regional Office or Bureau. On the other hand, a labor
organization is deemed to have acquired legal personality only on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration, which takes place only
after the Bureau of Labor Relations or its Regional Offices has undertaken an evaluation process lasting up until thirty (30) days, within
which period it approves or denies the application. In contrast, no such period of evaluation is provided in Department Order No. 9 for the
application of a local/chapter, and more importantly, under it such local/chapter is deemed to acquire legal personality “from the date of
filing” of the documents enumerated under Section 1, Rule VI, Book V.
Apart from promoting a policy of affiliation of local unions with national unions, there is a practical reason for sanctioning a less onerous
procedure for the registration of a local/chapter, as compared to the national union. The local/chapter relies in part on the legal personality
of the federation or national union, which in turn, had already undergone evaluation and approval from the Bureau of Legal Relations or
Regional Office. In fact, a federation or national union is required, upon registration, to establish proof of affiliation of at least ten (10) locals
or chapters which are duly recognized as the collective bargaining agent in the establishment or industry in which they operate; and the names
and addresses of the companies where the locals or chapters operate and the list of all the members in each of the companies. Once the
national union or federation acquires legal personality upon the issuance of its certificate or registration, its legal personality cannot be subject
to collateral attack.
The fact that the local/chapter acquires legal personality from the moment the complete documentary requirements are submitted seems to
imply that the duty of the Bureau or Regional Office to register the local/chapter is merely ministerial.
It is thus very clear that the issuance of the certificate of registration by the Bureau or Regional Office is not the operative act that vests legal
personality upon a local/chapter under Department Order No. 9. Such legal personality is acquired from the filing of the complete
documentary requirements enumerated in Section 1, Rule VI. Admittedly, the manner by which respondent was deemed to have acquired
legal personality by the DOLE and the Court of Appeals was not in strict conformity with the provisions of Department Order No. 9.
In the ordinary course, it should have been FFW, and not respondent, which should have submitted the subject documents to the Regional
Office. Nonetheless, there is no good reason to deny legal personality or defer its conferral to the local/chapter if it is evident at the onset that
the federation or national union itself has already through its own means established the local/chapter. In this case, such is evidenced by the
Charter Certificate dated 9 June 1998, issued by FFW, and attached to the petition for certification election. The Charter Certificate expressly
states that respondent has been issued the said certificate “to operate as a local or chapter of the [FFW]”. The Charter Certificate expressly
acknowledges FFW’s intent to establish respondent as of 9 June 1998. This being the case, the SC consider it permissible for respondent to
have submitted the required documents itself to the Regional Office, and proper that respondent’s legal personality be deemed existent as of
15 June 1998, the date the complete documents were submitted.
2. The SC held that they are not supervisory employees and are thus qualified to join the rank-and-file union.
Under the law, a managerial employee is “one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies
and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.” A supervisory employee is “one who, in the interest
of the employer, effectively recommends managerial actions if the exercise of such recommendatory authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment.’” Finally, “all employees not falling within the definition of managerial or
supervisory employee are considered rank-and-file employees”. It is also well-settled that the actual functions of an employee, not merely
his job title, are determinative in classifying such employee as managerial, supervisory or rank and file.
In the case of Emmanuel Rossell, appellant’s evidence shows that he undertakes the filling out of evaluation reports on the performance of
mechanics, which in turn are used as basis for reclassification. Given a ready and standard form to accomplish, coupled with the nature of
the evaluation, it would appear that his functions are more routinary than recommendatory and hardly leave room for independent judgment.
In the case of Noel Bathan, appellant’s evidence does not show his job title although it shows that his recommendations on disciplinary
actions appear to have carried some weight on higher management. On this limited point, he may qualify as a supervisory employee within
the meaning of the law. This may, however, be outweighed by his other functions which are not specified in the evidence.
Assuming that Bathan is a supervisory employee, this does not prove the existence of fraud, false statement or misrepresentation. Because
good faith is presumed in all representations, an essential element of fraud, false statement and misrepresentation in order for these to be
actionable is intent to mislead by the party making the representation. In this case, there is no proof to show that Bathan, or appellee union
for that matter, intended to mislead anyone. If this was appellee union’s intention, it would have refrained from using a more precise
description of the organization instead of declaring that the organization is composed of ‘rank and file monthlies’. Hence, the charge of fraud,
false statement or misrepresentation cannot be sustained.
Petition is denied.
GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS

G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006
Facts: This case has its genesis when the manager of GSIS issued a memorandum directing a number of its employees who are union
members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass
action. The union’s counsel sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work
in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, of
administrative charges against some 110 union members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The union then filed with the CA a petition for prohibition against the GSIS on the ground that its members should not be made to explain
why they supported their union’s cause since the Civil Service Resolution No. 021316, otherwise known as the Guidelines for Prohibited
Mass Action, Section 10 of which exhorts government agencies to “harness all means within their capacity to accord due regard and attention
to employees’ grievances and facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition through the use of grievance machinery or any other modes of
settlement sanctioned by law and existing civil service rules.” It argued that the organized demonstrating employees did nothing more than
air their grievances in the exercise of their “broader rights of free expression” and are, therefore, not amenable to administrative sanctions.
On the other hand, petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural consequence of the service-disrupting rallies and
demonstrations staged during office hours by the absenting GSIS employees, there being appropriate issuances outlawing such kinds of mass
action.
The CA ruled in favor of the union and held that the filing of administrative charges against the union members is tantamount to grave abuse
of discretion which may be the proper subject of the writ of prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass
action.
Ruling: The SC held that the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted
mass action. It may be that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances stand
on a level higher than economic and other liberties. Any suggestion, however, about these rights as including the right on the part of
government personnel to strike ought to be, as it has been, trashed.
The Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision “in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by
law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of
the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service” by stating that the Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms
of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees to organize is
limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike, adding that public employees going on disruptive
unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondent’s members launched or participated in during that
time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited concerted
activity” refers to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees’ organization, with
the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it
includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG members and other
GSIS employees staged a walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main
office building. The record of attendance for the period material shows that, on the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per
cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., leaving
the other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. On the second day, 707
employees left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306
employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.
To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained at the usual level of efficiency at the GSIS main office
during those four (4) days of massive walkouts and wholesale absences would be to understate things. And to place the erring employees
beyond the reach of administrative accountability would be to trivialize the civil service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of
professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
Ruling of the CA is reversed.
Diokno vs. Cacdac

GR No. 168475, July 4, 2007
Facts: The First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is a legitimate labor organization which is the supervisory
union of Meralco.Petitioners and private respondents are members of FLAMES. On 1 April 2003, the FLAMES Executive Board created the
Committee on Election (COMELEC) for the conduct of its union elections scheduled on 7 May 2003.The COMELEC was composed of
petitioner Dante M. Tong as its chairman, and petitioners Jaime C. Mendoza and Romeo M. Macapulay as members. Subsequently, private
respondents Jimmy S. Ong, Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano filed their respective certificates of candidacy.On
12 April 2003, the COMELEC rejected Jimmy S. Ongs candidacy on the ground that he was not a member of FLAMES.Meanwhile, the
certificates of candidacy of Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano were similarly rejected on the basis of the exclusion
of their department from the scope of the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA).The employees assigned to the aforesaid department
are allegedly deemed disqualified from membership in the union for being confidential employees.
On 24 April 2003, private respondents Jimmy S. Ong, Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, Jaime T. Valeriano (Ong, et al.), and a certain
Leandro M. Tabilog filed a Petition before the Med-Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
On 30 April 2003, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Alex E. Maraan issued an Order directing DOLE personnel to observe the conduct of the
FLAMES election on 7 May 2003.
On 2 May 2003, petitioners filed a Petition with the COMELEC seeking the disqualification of private respondents Edgardo Daya, Pablo
Lucas, Leandro Tabilog, Reynaldo Espiritu, Jose Vito, Antonio de Luna, Armando Yalung, Edwin Layug, Nards Pabilona, Reynaldo Reyes,
Evangeline Escall, Alberto Alcantara, Rogelio Cervitillo, Marcelino Morelos, and Faustino Ermino (Daya, et al.).
On 6 May 2003, the COMELEC issued a Decision, declaring Daya, et al., officially disqualified to run and/or to participate in the 7 May
2003 FLAMES elections.
According to the COMELEC, Daya, et al., violated Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES Constitution and By-Laws (CBL) by allowing
non-members to aid them in their campaign.Their acts of solicitation for support from non-union members were deemed inimical to the
interest of FLAMES.
On 7 May 2003, the COMELEC proclaimed the following candidates, including some of herein petitioners as winners of the elections.
On 8 May 2003, private respondents Daya, et al., along with Ong, et al., filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR, a Petition
to: a) Nullify Order of Disqualification; b) Nullify Election Proceedings and Counting of Votes; c) Declare Failure of Election; and d) Declare
Holding of New Election to be Controlled and Supervised by the DOLE.
On 14 May 2003, another group led by private respondent Gaudencio Jimenez, Jr., along with private respondents Johnson S. Reyes, Gavino
R. Vidanes, Arnaldo G. Tayao, Bonifacio F. Cirujano, Edgardo G. Cadavona, Maximo A. Caoc, Jose O. Maclit, Jr., Luzmindo D. Acorda,
Jr., Lemuel R. Ragasa and Gil G. de Vera (Jimenez, et al.) filed a Petition with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR against petitioners
to nullify the 7 May 2003 election on the ground that the same was not free, orderly, and peaceful.It was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-
0305-004-LRD, which was subsequently consolidated with the Petition of Daya, et al. and the earlier Petition of Ong, et al.
Meanwhile, the records show that a subsequent election was held on 30 June 2004, which was participated in and won by herein private
respondents Daya, et al.
The Court of Appeals, in the aforesaid case, rendered a Decision dated 12 January 2007, upholding the validity of the 30 June 2004 elections,
and the declaration of herein private respondents Daya, et al., as the duly elected winners therein.
On 7 July 2003, Med-Arbiter Tranquilino B. Reyes, Jr. issued a Decision in favor of private respondents, Daya, et al.However, the petition
of Jimenez, et al.,was dismissed because it was premature, it appearing that the COMELEC had not yet resolved their protest prior to their
resort to the Med-Arbiter.Finally, the Petition of Ong, et al., seeking to declare themselves as bona fide members of FLAMES was ordered
dismissed.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the Director of the BLR.On 3 December 2003, the Director of the BLR issued a Resolution,
affirming in toto the assailed Decision of the Med-Arbiter.Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari.The
Court of Appeals found petitioners appeal to be bereft of merit. The appellate court held that the provision relied upon by the COMELEC
concerns the dismissal and/or expulsion of union members, which power is vested in the FLAMES Executive Board, and not the
COMELEC.It affirmed the finding of the BLR Director that the COMELEC, in disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al., committed a
procedural shortcut.
Petitioners sought a reconsideration of the 17 June 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied
Hence, the instant Petition.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the jurisdiction of the BLR to take cognizance of
the case and then upheld the ruling of the BLR Director and Med-Arbiter, nullifying the COMELECs order of disqualification of private
respondents Daya et al., and annulling the 7 May 2003 FLAMES elections.
Ruling: The Petition is devoid of merit.We affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals upholding the jurisdiction of the BLR.Article 226 of
the Labor Code is hereunder reproduced, to wit:
ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices
of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties,
on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in
all workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
This Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, interpreting Article 226 of the Labor Code, was explicit in declaring that the BLR has the original
and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts.We said that since Article 226 of the Labor Code has declared that the
BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, there should be no more doubt as to its
jurisdiction.As defined, an intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, while an inter-union controversy or
dispute is one occurring or carried on between or among unions. More specifically, an intra-union dispute is defined under Section (z), Rule
I of the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code, viz:
(z) Intra-Union Dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members, and includes all disputes or grievances arising from any
violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, including cases arising from chartering or
affiliation of labor organizations or from any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the Code.
The controversy in the case at bar is an intra-union dispute.There is no question that this is one which involves a dispute within or inside
FLAMES, a labor union.At issue is the propriety of the disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al., by the FLAMES COMELEC in
the 7 May 2003 elections.It must also be stressed that even as the dispute involves allegations that private respondents Daya, et al., sought
the help of non-members of the union in their election campaign to the detriment of FLAMES, the same does not detract from the real
character of the controversy.It remains as one which involves the grievance over the constitution and bylaws of a union, and it is a controversy
involving members of the union.Moreover, the non-members of the union who were alleged to have aided private respondents Daya, et al.,
are not parties in the case.We are, therefore, unable to understand petitioners persistence in placing the controversy outside of the jurisdiction
of the BLR.The law is very clear. It requires no further interpretation.The Petition which was initiated by private respondents Daya, et al.,
before the BLR was properly within its cognizance, it being an intra-union dispute. Indubitably, when private respondents Daya, et al.,brought
the case to the BLR, it was an invocation of the power and authority of the BLR to act on an intra-union conflict.
The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 June 2004, and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA are
AFFIRMED
SMC Employees Union-PTGWO vs. San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union
G.R. No. 171153, Sept. 12, 2007
Facts: Petitioner is the incumbent bargaining agent for the bargaining unit comprised of the regular monthly-paid rank and file employees
of the three divisions of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), namely, the San Miguel Corporate Staff Unit (SMCSU), San Miguel Brewing
Philippines (SMBP), and the San Miguel Packaging Products (SMPP), in all offices and plants of SMC, including the Metal Closure and
Lithography Plant in Laguna. It had been the certified bargaining agent for 20 years – from 1987 to 1997.
Respondent is registered as a chapter of Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PDMP). PDMP issued Charter Certificate No. 112
to respondent on 15 June 1999.5 In compliance with registration requirements, respondent submitted the requisite documents to the BLR for
the purpose of acquiring legal personality. Upon submission of its charter certificate and other documents, respondent was issued Certificate
of Creation of Local or Chapter PDMP-01 by the BLR on 6 July 1999. Thereafter, respondent filed with the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE
Regional Officer in the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR), three separate petitions for certification election to represent SMPP, SMCSU,
and SMBP.8 All three petitions were dismissed, on the ground that the separate petitions fragmented a single bargaining unit.9
On 17 August 1999, petitioner filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of respondent's registration and its dropping
from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations. In its petition, petitioner accused respondent of committing fraud and falsification, and non-
compliance with registration requirements in obtaining its certificate of registration. It raised allegations that respondent violated Articles
239(a), (b) and (c) and 234(c) of the Labor Code. Moreover, petitioner claimed that PDMP is not a legitimate labor organization, but a trade
union center, hence, it cannot directly create a local or chapter.
On 14 July 2000, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B. Lim issued an Order dismissing the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation,
and irregularity in the submission of documents by respondent. Regional Director Lim further ruled that respondent is allowed to directly
create a local or chapter. However, he found that respondent did not comply with the 20% membership requirement and, thus, ordered the
cancellation of its certificate of registration and removal from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.
Respondent appealed to the BLR.
While the BLR agreed with the findings of the DOLE Regional Director dismissing the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and in
upholding that PDMP can directly create a local or a chapter, it reversed the Regional Director's ruling that the 20% membership is a
requirement for respondent to attain legal personality as a labor organization.
Invoking the power of the appellate court to review decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 9 March 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the BLR Hence, this Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the private respondent is required to submit the number of employees and names of all its members comprising at least
20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate
2. Whether or not PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor organization and has the power to create a local or chapter
Ruling: There is merit in petitioner's contentions.

A legitimate labor organization is defined as "any labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and
includes any branch or local thereof."The mandate of the Labor Code is to ensure strict compliance with the requirements on registration
because a legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code, and are involved in activities directly affecting
matters of public interest. Registration requirements are intended to afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be
lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the labor organization for
illegitimate ends.Legitimate labor organizations have exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one
of which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. The acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition for
certification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor
organization.
The procedure for registration of a local or chapter of a labor organization is provided in Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor
Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9 which took effect on 21 June 1997, and again by Department Order No. 40 dated 17 February
2003. The Implementing Rules as amended by D.O. No. 9 should govern the resolution of the petition at bar since respondent's petition for
certification election was filed with the BLR in 1999; and that of petitioner on 17 August 1999.
The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-fold procedure for the creation of a chapter or a local. The first involves the affiliation
of an independent union with a federation or national union or industry union. The second, finding application in the instant petition, involves
the direct creation of a local or a chapter through the process of chartering.
A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local or chapter by submitting to the DOLE Regional Office or to the
BLR two copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter; and
(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; Provided, That where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that of
the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to
by its President.
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a local or chapter may be directly created by a federation or national union. A duly constituted local
or chapter created in accordance with the foregoing shall acquire legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documents with the
BLR. The issuance of the certificate of registration by the BLR or the DOLE Regional Office is not the operative act that vests legal
personality upon a local or a chapter under Department Order No. 9. Such legal personality is acquired from the filing of the complete
documentary requirements enumerated in Section 1, Rule VI.
Petitioner insists that Section 3 of the Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9, violated Article 234 of the Labor Code
when it provided for less stringent requirements for the creation of a chapter or local. This Court disagrees.
Article 234 of the Labor Code provides that an independent labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon its registration with the BLR:
Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the
following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational
meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks
to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the
members who participated in it. (Italics supplied.)
It is emphasized that the foregoing pertains to the registration of an independent labor organization, association or group of unions or workers.
However, the creation of a branch, local or chapter is treated differently. This Court, in the landmark case of Progressive Development
Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, declared that when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or
chapter, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration are no longer necessary or compulsory. Whereas an applicant for
registration of an independent union is mandated to submit, among other things, the number of employees and names of all its members
comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, as provided under Article 234 of the Labor Code
and Section 2 of Rule III, Book V of the Implementing Rules, the same is no longer required of a branch, local or chapter. The intent of the
law in imposing less requirements in the case of a branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation
of a local union with a federation or national union in order to increase the local union's bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions
of labor.
Subsequently, in Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano where the validity of Department Order No. 9 was directly put in issue, this Court was
unequivocal in finding that there is no inconsistency between the Labor Code and Department Order No. 9.As to petitioner's claims that
respondent obtained its Certificate of Registration through fraud and misrepresentation, this Court finds that the imputations are not impressed
with merit. In the instant case, proof to declare that respondent committed fraud and misrepresentation remains wanting. This Court had,
indeed, on several occasions, pronounced that registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents confer no legitimacy upon
a labor organization irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor
organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights.
This Court emphasizes, however, that a direct challenge to the legitimacy of a labor organization based on fraud and misrepresentation in
securing its certificate of registration is a serious allegation which deserves careful scrutiny. Allegations thereof should be compounded with
supporting circumstances and evidence. The records of the case are devoid of such evidence. Furthermore, this Court is not a trier of facts,
and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, such as the
BLR, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect
but even finality.
Still, petitioner postulates that respondent was not validly and legitimately created, for PDMP cannot create a local or chapter as it is not a
legitimate labor organization, it being a trade union center.
Petitioner's argument creates a predicament as it hinges on the legitimacy of PDMP as a labor organization. Firstly, this line of reasoning
attempts to predicate that a trade union center is not a legitimate labor organization. In the process, the legitimacy of PDMP is being impugned,
albeit indirectly. Secondly, the same contention premises that a trade union center cannot directly create a local or chapter through the process
of chartering.
Anent the foregoing, as has been held in a long line of cases, the legal personality of a legitimate labor organization, such as PDMP, cannot
be subject to a collateral attack. The law is very clear on this matter. Article 212 (h) of the Labor Code, as amended, defines a legitimate
labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE, and includes any branch or local thereof." On the other hand,
a trade union center is any group of registered national unions or federations organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for
assisting such members in collective bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of social and employment policies, standards, and
programs, and is duly registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules.
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance
of its certificate of registration. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack.
It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the Implementing
Rules. The aforementioned provision is enunciated in the following:
Sec. 5.Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers' association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality
on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may
be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.
PDMP was registered as a trade union center and issued Registration Certificate No. FED-11558-LC by the BLR on 14 February 1991. Until
the certificate of registration of PDMP is cancelled, its legal personality as a legitimate labor organization subsists. Once a union acquires
legitimate status as a labor organization, it continues to be recognized as such until its certificate of registration is cancelled or revoked in an
independent action for cancellation. It bears to emphasize that what is being directly challenged is the personality of respondent as a legitimate
labor organization and not that of PDMP. This being a collateral attack, this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain questions indirectly
impugning the legitimacy of PDMP.
Corollarily, PDMP is granted all the rights and privileges appurtenant to a legitimate labor organizationand continues to be recognized as
such until its certificate of registration is successfully impugned and thereafter cancelled or revoked in an independent action for
cancellation.We now proceed to the contention that PDMP cannot directly create a local or a chapter, it being a trade union center.This Court
reverses the finding of the appellate court and BLR on this ground, and rules that PDMP cannot directly create a local or chapter.
After an exhaustive study of the governing labor law provisions, both statutory and regulatory, we find no legal justification to support the
conclusion that a trade union center is allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering. Apropos, we take this occasion to
reiterate the first and fundamental duty of this Court, which is to apply the law. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and
apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.
Presidential Decree No. 442, better known as the Labor Code, was enacted in 1972. Being a legislation on social justice, the provisions of
the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules have been subject to several amendments, and they continue to evolve, considering that labor
plays a major role as a socio-economic force. The Labor Code was first amended by Republic Act No. 6715, and recently, by Republic Act
No. 9481. Incidentally, the term trade union center was never mentioned under Presidential Decree No. 442, even as it was amended by
Republic Act No. 6715. The term trade union center was first adopted in the Implementing Rules, under Department Order No. 9.
Culling from its definition as provided by Department Order No. 9, a trade union center is any group of registered national unions or
federations organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting such members in collective bargaining; or for
participating in the formulation of social and employment policies, standards, and programs, and is duly registered with the DOLE in
accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules. The same rule provides that the application for registration of an industry or
trade union center shall be supported by the following:
(a) The list of its member organizations and their respective presidents and, in the case of an industry union, the industry where the union
seeks to operate;
(b) The resolution of membership of each member organization, approved by the Board of Directors of such union;
(c) The name and principal address of the applicant, the names of its officers and their addresses, the minutes of its organizational
meeting/s, and the list of member organizations and their representatives who attended such meeting/s; and
(d) A copy of its constitution and by-laws and minutes of its ratification by a majority of the presidents of the member organizations,
provided that where the ratification was done simultaneously with the organizational meeting, it shall be sufficient that the fact of
ratification be included in the minutes of the organizational meeting.
Evidently, while a "national union" or "federation" is a labor organization with at least ten locals or chapters or affiliates, each of which must
be a duly certified or recognized collective bargaining agent; a trade union center, on the other hand, is composed of a group of registered
national unions or federations.
The Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9, provide that "a duly registered federation or national union" may directly
create a local or chapter. The provision reads:
Section 1.Chartering and creation of a local/chapter. – A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local/chapter
by submitting to the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter; and
(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; provided that where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that
of the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to
by its President.
Department Order No. 9 mentions two labor organizations either of which is allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering
– a duly registered federation or a national union. Department Order No. 9 defines a "chartered local" as a labor organization in the private
sector operating at the enterprise level that acquired legal personality through a charter certificate, issued by a duly registered federation or
national union and reported to the Regional Office in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-E of these Rules.
Republic Act No. 9481 or "An Act Strengthening the Workers' Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending for the Purpose
Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines" lapsed into law on 25 May 2007 and
became effective on 14 June 2007. This law further amends the Labor Code provisions on Labor Relations.
Article 234 now includes the term trade union center, but interestingly, the provision indicating the procedure for chartering or creating a
local or chapter, namely Article 234-A, still makes no mention of a "trade union center.”
Also worth emphasizing is that even in the most recent amendment of the implementing rules, there was no mention of a trade union center
as being among the labor organizations allowed to charter.
This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Under this maxim of statutory interpretation, the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to
exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. If a statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of
a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. Such is the case here. If its intent were otherwise, the law could have so easily
and conveniently included "trade union centers" in identifying the labor organizations allowed to charter a chapter or local. Anything that is
not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom, and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language
of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule is restrictive in the sense that it proceeds from the premise that the legislating body would
not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A
person, object or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally.
Therefore, since under the pertinent status and applicable implementing rules, the power granted to labor organizations to directly create a
chapter or local through chartering is given to a federation or national union, then a trade union center is without authority to charter directly.
The ruling of this Court in the instant case is not a departure from the policy of the law to foster the free and voluntary organization of a
strong and united labor movement, and thus assure the rights of workers to self-organization. The mandate of the Labor Code in ensuring
strict compliance with the procedural requirements for registration is not without reason. It has been observed that the formation of a local or
chapter becomes a handy tool for the circumvention of union registration requirements. Absent the institution of safeguards, it becomes a
convenient device for a small group of employees to foist a not-so-desirable federation or union on unsuspecting co-workers and pare the
need for wholehearted voluntariness, which is basic to free unionism. As a legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights under
the Labor Code and involved in activities directly affecting public interest, it is necessary that the law afford utmost protection to the parties
affected. However, as this Court has enunciated in Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary of Department of Labor and
Employment, it is not this Court's function to augment the requirements prescribed by law. Our only recourse, as previously discussed, is to
exact strict compliance with what the law provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.
In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor organization, it has no power to directly create a local or chapter. Thus,
SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be created under the more lenient requirements for chartering, but must have complied with the more stringent rules
for creation and registration of an independent union, including the 20% membership requirement.
Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Certificate of Registration of San
Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union–Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino is ORDERED CANCELLED, and SMPPEU-
PDMP DROPPED from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations. Costs against petitioner.
Dong Seung Inc., vs. Bureau of Labor Relations

G.R. No. 162356, April 14, 2008
Facts: Petitioner filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region IV a Petition for cancellation of the union registration
of respondent union on the grounds that the List of Officers and Constitution and By-laws which the respondent union attached to its
application for union registration contain the union secretary's certification but the same is not under oath, contrary to Section 1, Rule VI of
the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997; and that, as shown in a
Sinumpaang Petisyon, 148 out of approximately 200 employees-members have since denounced respondent union for employing deceit in
obtaining signatures to support its registration application.
DOLE (Region IV) Regional Director Ricardo Martinez, Sr. delisted from the roster of legitimate labor organization the Charter Certificate
[of] NAMAWU-Local 188. Respondent union appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations BLR gave due course to the appeal and granted the
same, it ordered that NAMAWU-Local 188, shall remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
After its motion for reconsideration was denied by the BLR, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari, insisting that the BLR acted
with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to respondent union’s appeal despite its having been filed out of time. The CA dismissed
the petition and the motion for reconsideration which was subsequently filed by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the BLR when it declared respondent’s union registration valid.
Ruling: The BLR found respondent union’s appeal tardy yet gave due course to it on account of its inherent merit. The CA found respondent
union’s appeal to have “substantially complied with the requirements provided by law.
The requirement that the union secretary certify under oath all documents and papers filed in support of an application for union registration
is imposed by Article 235 of the Labor Code, to wit:
Art. 235. Action on application. The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within thirty (30) days from filing.
All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as the case may be,
and attested to by its president.
In reversing DOLE Region IV, the BLR cited its Advisory, dated October 14, 1998, which interprets the requirement under Article 235, to
wit:
Pursuant to Rule XVII, Section 1 of Department Order No. 09, Series of 1997 x x x. [T]he Bureau of Labor Relations is empowered,
consistent with the State policy to promote unionism, to “devise or prescribe such forms as are necessary to facilitate the process of
registration of labor organizations x x x,” including the chartering of locals or chapters. Accordingly, the Bureau has devised and
transmitted to the Regional Offices the appropriate official registration forms, particularly the following:
xxxx
5. BLR Reg. Form No. 5-LOC-LO. S. 1998 For Chartering Locals/ Chapters
xxxx
Part I of each of the first seven forms is a space provided for the notarization of the application x x x. However, considering that applicants
are not yet fully familiar with the forms in spite of orientation and seminar conducted, some applications have been submitted without
using the forms prescribed by the Bureau. In lieu of submitting a notarized application using the official forms, some applicants comply
with the requirements by having their supporting documents separately notarized.
To prevent inconvenience to the public, particularly to the applicants, the Regional Offices are hereby advised that applications submitted
with supporting documents which are separately notarized need not comply with the notarization requirement under Part I or Part II, as
the case may be, of the prescribed forms. x x x
Accordingly, the absence of notarization under Part I or Part II of the appropriate forms shall not be a basis for denying applications where
it appears that all the required supporting documents have already been notarized or attested. (Emphasis supplied)
The BLR explained that under the foregoing Advisory, the certification issued by respondent union’s secretary may be notarized either
separately or along with the main application. The BLR noted that respondent union correctly availed of the second option:
A perusal of the registration records of the [respondent] revealed that respondent’s registration application was sufficient in form and
substance, having been notarized as provided in the BLR official forms. (Atty. Manuel E. Robles notarized such application on 8 February
1999 at Cavite City.) All the other supporting documents to the charter certificate issued by the National Mines and Allied Workers Union
were certified true and correct by the secretary and attested to by the president.
Thus, from the standpoint of compliance, [respondent] x x x submitted all the documentary requirements for the creation of a local/chapter
in accordance with Section 1, Rule VI, D.O. 9 series of 1997. [28] (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, all that Article 235 requires is that the secretary’s certification be under oath. It does not prescribe a specific manner of its notarization.
Based on its interpretation of Article 235, the BLR, in its October 14, 1998 Advisory, allows for the wholesale notarization of a union’s
application for registration and recognizes the effects thereof even on the attachments, including the secretary’s certification. This is a
reasonable interpretation considering that the form of notarization contemplated in said Advisory adequately serves the purpose of Article
235, which is to forestall fraud and misrepresentation. More importantly, such interpretation of the BLR is accorded great weight by the
Court for it is said agency which is vested with authority and endowed with expertise to implement the law in question.
The other ground cited by DOLE Region IV in canceling the registration of respondent union is that the latter allegedly committed
misrepresentation in securing the signatures of its members. The CA and BLR, on the other hand, assign no credence to the Sinumpaang
Petisyon for it is a mere photocopy, the genuineness and due execution of which cannot be reasonably ascertained. Another factor which
militates against the veracity of the allegations in the Sinumpaang Petisyon is the lack of particularities on how, when and where respondent
union perpetrated the alleged fraud on each member. Such details are crucial for in the proceedings for cancellation of union registration on
the ground of fraud or misrepresentation, what needs to be established is that the specific act or omission of the union deprived the
complaining employees-members of their right to choose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Del Pilar Academy et al., vs. Del Pilar Academy Employees Union
G.R. No. 170112, April 30, 2008
Facts: Respondent Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (the UNION) is the certified collective bargaining representative of teaching and
non-teaching personnel of petitioner Del Pilar Academy (DEL PILAR), an educational institution operating in Imus, Cavite.
On September 15, 1994, the UNION and DEL PILAR entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) granting salary increase and
other benefits to the teaching and non-teaching staff.
The UNION then assessed agency fees from non-union employees, and requested DEL PILAR to deduct said assessment from the employees’
salaries and wages. DEL PILAR, however, refused to effect deductions claiming that the non-union employees were not amenable to it.
Traversing the complaint, DEL PILAR denied committing unfair labor practices against the UNION. It justified the non-deduction of the
agency fees by the absence of individual check off authorization from the non-union employees. As regards the proposal to amend the
provision on summer vacation leave with pay, DEL PILAR alleged that the proposal cannot be considered unfair for it was done to make the
provision of the CBA conformable to the DECS’ Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the union that DEL PILAR should have deducted the union fees from the non-union employees citing
article 248 of the Labor Code. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Arbiter’s ruling. In gist, it upheld
the UNION’s right to agency fee, but did not consider DEL PILAR’s failure to deduct the same an unfair labor practice. The UNION’s
motion for reconsideration having been denied, it then went to the CA via certiorari. On July 19, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision,
affirming with modification the resolutions of the NLRC.
Like the Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA upheld the UNION’s right to collect agency fees from non-union employees, but did not adjudge
DEL PILAR liable for unfair labor practice. However, it ordered DEL PILAR to deduct agency fees from the salaries of non-union employees.
Issue: Whether or not the UNION is entitled to collect agency fees from non-union members, and if so, whether an individual written
authorization is necessary for a valid check off.
Ruling: The collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees, from employees who are not union members, is
recognized by Article 248(e) of the Labor Code. When so stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or authorized in writing by the
employees concerned, the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules recognize it to be the duty of the employer to deduct the sum equivalent
to the amount of union dues, as agency fees, from the employees' wages for direct remittance to the union. The system is referred to as check
off. No requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is necessary if the non-union employees accept the benefits
resulting from the CBA.
DEL PILAR urges this Court to reverse the CA ruling insofar as it ordered the deduction of agency fees from the salaries of non-union
employees, arguing that such conclusion proceeds from a misplaced premise that the salary increase arose from the CBA. The argument
cannot be sustained.
Contrary to what DEL PILAR wants to portray, the grant of annual salary increase is not the only provision in the CBA that benefited the
non-union employees. The UNION negotiated for other benefits, namely, limitations on teaching assignments to 23 hours per week,
additional compensation for overload units or teaching assignments in excess of the 23 hour per week limit, and payment of longevity pay.
It also negotiated for entitlement to summer vacation leave with pay for two (2) months for teaching staff who have rendered six (6)
consecutive semesters of service. For the non-teaching personnel, the UNION worked for their entitlement to fifteen (15) days leave with
pay. These provisions in the CBA surely benefited the non-union employees, justifying the collection of, and the UNION’s entitlement to,
agency fees.
Accordingly, no requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is needed to effect a valid check off. Article 248(e)
makes it explicit that Article 241, paragraph (o), [requiring written authorization is inapplicable to non-union members, especially in this
case where the non-union employees receive several benefits under the CBA.
As explained by this Court in Holy Cross of Davao College, Inc. v. Hon. Joaquin viz.:
The employee's acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective bargaining agreement justifies the deduction of agency fees from his
pay and the union's entitlement thereto. In this aspect, the legal basis of the union's right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory,
but quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting
from employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86868, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
S.S. Ventures International Inc., vs. SS Ventures Labor Union

G.R. No. 161690, July 23, 2008
Facts: Petitioner S.S. Ventures International, Inc. (Ventures), a PEZA-registered export firm with principal place of business at Phase I-
PEZA-Bataan Export Zone, Mariveles, Bataan, is in the business of manufacturing sports shoes. Respondent S.S. Ventures Labor Union
(Union), on the other hand, is a labor organization registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
On March 21, 2000, the Union filed with DOLE-Region III a petition for certification election in behalf of the rank-and-file employees of
Ventures. Five hundred forty two (542) signatures, 82 of which belong to terminated Ventures employees, appeared on the basic documents
supporting the petition.
On August 21, 2000, Ventures filed a Petition to cancel the Unions certificate of registration invoking the grounds set forth in Article 239(a)
of the Labor Code, the petition alleged the following:
(1) The Union deliberately and maliciously included the names of more or less 82 former employees no longer connected with Ventures
in its list of members who attended the organizational meeting and in the adoption/ratification of its constitution and by-laws held on
January 9, 2000 in Mariveles, Bataan; and the Union forged the signatures of these 82 former employees to make it appear they took
part in the organizational meeting and adoption and ratification of the constitution;
(2) The Union maliciously twice entered the signatures of three persons namely: Mara Santos, Raymond Balangbang, and Karen Agunos;
(3) No organizational meeting and ratification actually took place; and
(4) The Unions application for registration was not supported by at least 20% of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures, or 418 of the
total 2,197-employee complement. Since more or less 82 of the 500[3] signatures were forged or invalid, then the remaining valid
signatures would only be 418, which is very much short of the 439 minimum (2197 total employees x 20% = 439.4) required by the
Labor Code.
In a Decision dated April 6, 2001, Regional Director Ana C. Dione of DOLE-Region III found for Ventures. Aggrieved, the Union interposed
a motion for reconsideration, a recourse which appeared to have been forwarded to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). Although it would
later find this motion to have been belatedly filed, the BLR, over the objection of Ventures which filed a Motion to Expunge, gave it due
course and treated it as an appeal.Despite Venturesmotion to expunge the appeal, the BLR Director rendered on October 11, 2002 a decisionin
BLR-A-C-60-6-11-01, granting the Unions appeal and reversing the decision of Dione.
Ventures sought reconsideration of the above decision but was denied by the BLR.Ventures then went to the Court of Appeals (CA) on a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. On October 20, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision, dismissing Ventures petition. Ventures motion for
reconsideration met a similar fate.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.
Issue: Whether or not there was fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the Union sufficient to justify cancellation of its registration.
Ruling: The petition lacks merit.

The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected by Art. XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution and such right, according to Art.
III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 246 of the Labor Code, shall not be abridged. Once registered with the DOLE, a union is considered
a legitimate labor organization endowed with the right and privileges granted by law to such organization. While a certificate of registration
confers a union with legitimacy with the concomitant right to participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining unit, the registration
may be canceled or the union may be decertified as the bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested of the status of a legitimate labor
organization. Among the grounds for cancellation is the commission of any of the acts enumerated in Art. 239(a) of the Labor Code, such as
fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the adoption or ratification of the unions constitution and like documents. The Court, has in
previous cases, said that to decertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in its membership. It must
also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with the application for registration and the supporting
documents, such as the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the
constitution or by-laws, among other documents.
Essentially, Ventures faults both the BLR and the CA in finding that there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the Union sufficient
to justify cancellation of its registration. In this regard, Ventures makes much of, first, the separate hand-written statements of 82 employees
who, in gist, alleged that they were unwilling or harassed signatories to the attendance sheet of the organizational meeting.
We are not persuaded. As aptly noted by both the BLR and CA, these mostly undated written statements submitted by Ventures on March
20, 2001, or seven months after it filed its petition for cancellation of registration, partake of the nature of withdrawal of union membership
executed after the Unions filing of a petition for certification election on March 21, 2000. We have in precedent cases said that the employees
withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of the petition for certification election is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after
the filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same. Now then, if a withdrawal from union membership
done after a petition for certification election has been filed does not vitiate such petition, is it not but logical to assume that such withdrawal
cannot work to nullify the registration of the union? Upon this light, the Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the BLR did not abuse its
discretion nor gravely err when it concluded that the affidavits of retraction of the 82 members had no evidentiary weight.
It cannot be over-emphasized that the registration or the recognition of a labor union after it has submitted the corresponding papers is not
ministerial on the part of the BLR. Far from it. After a labor organization has filed the necessary registration documents, it becomes mandatory
for the BLR to check if the requirements under Art. 234 of the Labor Code have been sedulously complied with. If the unions application is
infected by falsification and like serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the face of the application and its attachments, a union
should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. Prescinding from these considerations, the issuance to the Union of Certificate
of Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-0003 necessarily implies that its application for registration and the supporting documents thereof are
prima facie free from any vitiating irregularities.
Second, Ventures draws attention to the inclusion of 82 individuals to the list of participants in the January 9, 2000 organizational meeting.
Ventures submits that the 82, being no longer connected with the company, should not have been counted as attendees in the meeting and
the ratification proceedings immediately afterwards.
The assailed inclusion of the said 82 individuals to the meeting and proceedings adverted to is not really fatal to the Unions cause for, as
determined by the BLR, the allegations of falsification of signatures or misrepresentation with respect to these individuals are without basis.
The Court need not delve into the question of whether these 82 dismissed individuals were still Union members qualified to vote and affix
their signature on its application for registration and supporting documents. Suffice it to say that, as aptly observed by the CA, the procedure
for acquiring or losing union membership and the determination of who are qualified or disqualified to be members are matters internal to
the union and flow from its right to self-organization.
To our mind, the relevancy of the 82 individuals active participation in the Unions organizational meeting and the signing ceremonies
thereafter comes in only for purposes of determining whether or not the Union, even without the 82, would still meet what Art. 234(c) of the
Labor Code requires to be submitted, to wit:
Art. 234. Requirements of Registration.Any applicant labor organization x x x shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the
following requirements:
xxxx
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to
operate.
The bare fact that three signatures twice appeared on the list of those who participated in the organizational meeting would not, to our mind,
provide a valid reason to cancel Certificate of Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-0003. As the Union tenably explained without rebuttal
from Ventures, the double entries are no more than normal human error, effected without malice. Even the labor arbiter who found for
Ventures sided with the Union in its explanation on the absence of malice.
The cancellation of a unions registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. Accordingly, we
can accord concurrence to the following apt observation of the BLR: [F]or fraud and misrepresentation [to be grounds for] cancellation of
union registration under Article 239 [of the Labor Code], the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough
to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.
In its Comment, the Union points out that for almost seven (7) years following the filing of its petition, no certification election has yet been
conducted among the rank-and-file employees. If this be the case,the delay has gone far enough and can no longer be allowed to continue.
The CA is right when it said that Ventures should not interfere in the certification election by actively and persistently opposing the
certification election of the Union. A certification election is exclusively the concern of employees and the employer lacks the legal
personality to challenge it. In fact, jurisprudence frowns on the employers interference in a certification election for such interference unduly
creates the impression that it intends to establish a company union.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution dated respectively of the CA are AFFIRMED. S.S. Ventures Labor
Union shall remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations, unless it has in the meantime lost its legitimacy for causes set forth in the
Labor Code. Costs against petitioner.
Inguillo et al, vs. First Phil Scales Inc., et al.

GR No. 165407, June 5, 2009
Facts: First Philippine Scales, Inc. (FPSI), a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing of weighing scales, employed Bergante and
Inguillo as assemblers. In 1991, FPSI and First Philippine Scales Industries Labor Union (FPSILU) entered into a Collective Bargaining
Agreement, the duration of which was for a period of 5 years starting September 12, 1991 until September 12, 1996. On September 19, 1991,
the members of FPSILU ratified the CBA in a document entitled RATIPIKASYON NG KASUNDUAN. Bergante and Inguillo, who were
members of FPSILU, signed the said document.
During the lifetime of the CBA, Bergante, Inguillo and several FPSI employees joined another union, the Nagkakaisang Lakas ng
Manggagawa (NLM), which was affiliated with a federation called KATIPUNAN (NLM-KATIPUNAN, for brevity). Subsequently, NLM-
KATIPUNAN filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an intra-union dispute against FPSILU and FPSI. In said case,
the Med-Arbiter decided in favor of FPSILU. It also ordered the officers and members of NLM-KATIPUNAN to return to FPSILU the
amount of P90,000.00 pertaining to the union dues erroneously collected from the employees. Upon finality of the Med-Arbiter's Decision,
a Writ of Execution was issued to collect the adjudged amount from NLM-KATIPUNAN. However, as no amount was recovered, notices of
garnishment were issued to United Coconut Planters Bank and to FPSI for the latter to hold for FPSILU the earnings of Domingo Grutas, Jr.
(Grutas) and Inguillo, formerly FPSILU's President and Secretary for Finance, respectively.
The executive board and members of the FPSILU addressed a document denominated as "Petisyon"to FPSI's general manager, Amparo
Policarpio (Policarpio), seeking the termination of the services of the following employees, namely: Grutas, Yolanda Tapang, Shirley Tapang,
Gerry Trinidad, Gilbert Lucero, Inguillo, Bergante, and Vicente Go, on the following grounds: (1) disloyalty to the Union by separating from
it and affiliating with a rival Union, the NLM-KATIPUNAN; (2) dereliction of duty by failing to call periodic membership meetings and to
give financial reports; (3) depositing Union funds in the names of Grutas and former Vice-President Yolanda Tapang, instead of in the name
of FPSILU, care of the President; (4) causing damage to FPSI by deliberately slowing down production, preventing the Union to even attempt
to ask for an increase in benefits from the former; and (5) poisoning the minds of the rest of the members of the Union so that they would be
enticed to join the rival union.
Inguillo filed with the NLRC a complaint against FPSI and/or Policarpio (respondents) for illegal withholding of salary and damages. On
May 16, 1996, respondents terminated the services of the employees mentioned in the "Petisyon."
The following day, two (2) separate complaints for illegal dismissal, reinstatement and damages were filed against respondents by: (1) NLM-
KATIPUNAN, Grutas, Trinidad, Bergante, Yolanda Tapang, Go, Shirley Tapang and Lucero (Grutas complaint, for brevity); and (2) Inguillo
(Inguillo complaint). Both complaints were consolidated with Inguillo's prior complaint for illegal withholding of salary, which was pending
before Labor Arbiter Manuel Manansala. Some of the complainants agreed to amicably settle their cases. Bergante and Inguillo, the remaining
complainants, were directed to submit their respective position papers, after which their complaints were submitted for resolution.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the remaining complaints of Bergante and Inguillo and held that they were not illegally dismissed. He explained
that the two clearly violated the Union Security Clause of the CBA when they joined NLM-KATIPUNAN and committed acts detrimental
to the interests of FPSILU and respondents. Affirmed by NLRC and when elevated the case to CA, the latter also affirmed the decision of
NLRC.
CA’s decision: The employer FPSI did nothing but to put in force their agreement when it separated the disaffiliating union members, herein
complainants, upon the recommendation of the union. Such a stipulation is not only necessary to maintain loyalty and preserve the integrity
of the union, but is allowed by the Magna Carta of Labor when it provided that while it is recognized that an employee shall have the right
of self-organization, it is at the same time postulated that such rights shall not injure the right of the labor organization to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. Having ratified their CBA and being then members of FPSILU, the
complainants owe fealty and are required under the Union Security clause to maintain their membership in good standing with it during the
term thereof, a requirement which ceases to be binding only during the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of the
CBA, which was not present in this case.
x x x the dismissal of the complainants pursuant to the demand of the majority union in accordance with their union security [clause]
agreement following the loss of seniority rights is valid and privileged and does not constitute unfair labor practice or illegal dismissal.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has for so long a time already recognized a union security clause in the CBA, like the one at bar, as a specie of
closed-shop arrangement and trenchantly upheld the validity of the action of the employer in enforcing its terms as a lawful exercise of its
rights and obligations under the contract.
The collective bargaining agreement in this case contains a union security clause-a closed-shop agreement.
A closed-shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire only members of the contracting union who must
continue to remain members in good standing to keep their jobs. It is "the most prized achievement of unionism." It adds membership and
compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a promise of employment in the closed-shop, it welds group solidarity. (National Labor
Union v. Aguinaldo's Echague Inc., 97 Phil. 184). It is a very effective form of union security agreement.
This Court has held that a closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and such a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a
restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the enforcement of the aforesaid Union Security Clause justified herein petitioners' dismissal from the service.
Ruling: Yes, the enforcement justified petitioner’s dismissal.

Essentially, the Labor Code of the Philippines has several provisions under which an employee may be validly terminated, namely: (1) just
causes under Article 282; (2) authorized causes under Article 283; (3) termination due to disease under Article 284; and (4) termination by
the employee or resignation under Article 285. While the said provisions did not mention as ground the enforcement of the Union Security
Clause in the CBA, the dismissal from employment based on the same is recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction.
"Union security" is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends "closed shop," "union shop," "maintenance of membership" or any
other form of agreement, which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting
employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for
their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of
the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are
promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. A closed-shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an
enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or
certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good
standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.
In their Petition, Bergante and Inguillo assail the legality of their termination based on the Union Security Clause in the CBA between FPSI
and FPSILU. Article II of the CBA pertains to Union Security and Representatives, which provides:
The Company hereby agrees to a UNION SECURITY [CLAUSE] with the following terms:
XXXXXX
5. Any employee/union member who fails to retain union membership in good standing may be recommended for suspension or
dismissal by the Union Directorate and/or FPSILU Executive Council for any of the following causes:
a) Acts of Disloyalty;
b) Voluntary Resignation or Abandonment from the UNION;
c) Organization of or joining another labor union or any labor group that would work against the UNION;
XXX XXX
The aforesaid provision requires all members to maintain their membership with FPSILU during the lifetime of the CBA. Records show that
Bergante and Inguillo were former members of FPSILU based on their signatures in the document which ratified the CBA. It can also be
inferred that they disaffiliated from FPSILU when the CBA was still in force and subsisting, as can be gleaned from the documents relative
to the intra-union dispute between FPSILU and NLM-KATIPUNAN. In view of their disaffiliation, as well as other acts allegedly detrimental
to the interest of both FPSILU and FPSI, a "Petisyon" was submitted to Policarpio, asking for the termination of the services of employees
who failed to maintain their Union membership.
The Court is now tasked to determine whether the enforcement of the aforesaid Union Security Clause justified herein petitioners' dismissal
from the service.
In the case at bar, in terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the Union Security Clause, the employer needs only to
determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security
provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union's decision to expel the employee from the union or company.
We hold that all the requisites have been sufficiently met and FPSI was justified in enforcing the Union Security Clause, for the following
reasons:
First. FPSI was justified in applying the Union Security Clause, as it was a valid provision in the CBA, the existence and validity of which
was not questioned by either party. Moreover, petitioners were among the 93 employees who affixed their signatures to the document that
ratified the CBA. They cannot now turn their back and deny knowledge of such provision.
Second. FPSILU acted on its prerogative to recommend to FPSI the dismissal of the members who failed to maintain their membership with
the Union. Aside from joining another rival union, FPSILU cited other grounds committed by petitioners and the other employees which tend
to prejudice FPSI’s interests, i.e., dereliction of duty - by failing to call periodic membership meetings and to give financial reports; depositing
union funds in the names of Grutas and former Vice-President Yolanda Tapang, instead of in the name of FPSILU care of the President;
causing damage to FPSI by deliberately slowing down production, preventing the Union from even attempting to ask for an increase in
benefits from the former; and poisoning the minds of the rest of the members of the Union so that they would be enticed to join the rival
union.
Third. FPSILU's decision to ask for the termination of the employees in the "Petisyon" was justified and supported by the evidence on record.
Bergante and Inguillo were undisputably former members of FPSILU. In fact, Inguillo was the Secretary of Finance, the underlying reason
why his salary was garnished to satisfy the judgment of the Med-Arbiter who ordered NLM-KATIPUNAN to return the Union dues it
erroneously collected from the employees. Their then affiliation with FPSILU was also clearly shown by their signatures in the document
which ratified the CBA. Without a doubt, they committed acts of disloyalty to the Union when they failed not only to maintain their
membership but also disaffiliated from it. They abandoned FPSILU and even joined another union which works against the former's interests.
This is evident from the intra-union dispute filed by NLM-KATIPUNAN against FPSILU. Once affiliated with NLM-KATIPUNAN,
Bergante and Inguillo proceeded to recruit other employees to disaffiliate from FPSILU and even collected Union dues from them.
In Del Monte Philippines, the stipulations in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory provisions
on dismissal under the Labor Code, since a CBA is the law between the company and the Union, and compliance therewith is mandated by
the express policy to give protection to labor. In Caltex Refinery Employees Association (CREA) v. Brillantes, the Court expounded on the
effectiveness of union security clause when it held that it is one intended to strengthen the contracting union and to protect it from the
fickleness or perfidy of its own members. For without such safeguards, group solidarity becomes uncertain; the union becomes gradually
weakened and increasingly vulnerable to company machinations. In this security clause lies the strength of the union during the enforcement
of the collective bargaining agreement. It is this clause that provides labor with substantial power in collective bargaining.
To safeguard the rights of the employees, We have said time and again that dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal,
subject only to the requirement of due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to dismissal. In like manner, We emphasized that the
enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law, provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with
due process.
There are two (2) aspects which characterize the concept of due process under the Labor Code: one is substantive––whether the termination
of employment was based on the provisions of the Labor Code or in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence; the other is procedural -
the manner in which the dismissal was effected.
Corollarily, procedural due process in the dismissal of employees requires notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the employee two
written notices before termination may be effected. The first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, while the second notice informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing,
on the other hand, is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.
In the present case, the required two notices that must be given to herein petitioners Bergante and Inguillo were lacking. The records are
bereft of any notice that would have given a semblance of substantial compliance on the part of herein respondents. The Court has always
underscored the significance of the two-notice rule in dismissing an employee and has ruled in a number of cases that non-compliance
therewith is tantamount to deprivation of the employee’s right to due process.
In fine, We hold that while Bergante and Inguillo's dismissals were valid pursuant to the enforcement of Union Security Clause, respondents
however did not comply with the requisite procedural due process. As in the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, where
the dismissal is for a cause recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence, the absence of the statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal
or render it illegal, or ineffectual. Accordingly, for violating Bergante and Inguillo's statutory rights, respondents should indemnify them the
amount of P30,000.00 each as nominal damages.
Sta Lucia East Commercial Corp., vs. SOLE et al.

GR No. 162355, August 14, 2009
Facts: On 27 February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of its chartered local, instituted a petition for
certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates. The affiliate
companies included in the petition were SLE Commercial, SLE Department Store, SLE Cinema, Robsan East Trading, Bowling Center,
Planet Toys, Home Gallery and Essentials.
On 21 August 2001, Med-Arbiter Bactin ordered the dismissal of the petition due to inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. CLUP-Sta.
Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates Workers Union appealed the order of dismissal to this Office on 14 September 2001.On
20 November 2001, CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates Workers Union [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates
Workers Union]moved for the withdrawal of the appeal. On 31 January 2002, this Office granted the motion and affirmed the dismissal of
the petition.
In the meantime, on 10 October 2001, [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union] reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta.
Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association (herein appellant CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the rank-and-
file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation. It was issued Certificate of Creation of a Local Chapter.
On the same date, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition. It alleged that [SLECC] employs about 115 employees and that more than
20% of employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are its members.[CLUP-SLECCWA] claimed that no certification election has
been held among them within the last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition, and while there is another union registered with DOLE-
Regional Office No. IV on 22 June 2001 covering the same employees, namely [SMSLEC], it has not been recognized as the exclusive
bargaining agent of [SLECCs] employees.
On 22 November 2001, SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition.It averred that it has voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] on 20 July 2001
as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees, and that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced
between them.
On 29 November 2001, a CBA between [SMSLEC] and [SLECC] was ratified by its rank-and-file employees and registered with DOLE-
Regional Office No. IV on 9 January 2002.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court committed a reversible error when it affirmed the Secretary’s finding that SLECCs voluntary
recognition of SMSLEC was done while a legitimate labor organization was in existence in the bargaining unit.
Ruling: The petition has no merit. We see no reason to overturn the rulings of the Secretary and of the appellate court.
Legitimate Labor Organization

Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for
the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. Upon compliance with
all the documentary requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate indicating
that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. Any applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be
entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration.
Bargaining Unit
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit. We explained
the concept of a bargaining unit in San Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma, where we stated that:
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent
with equity to the employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law.
The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);(2)
affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.
Contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court has categorically ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining history is neither decisive
nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit.
However, employees in two corporations cannot be treated as a single bargaining unit even if the businesses of the two corporations are
related.
A Legitimate Labor Organization Representing an Inappropriate Bargaining Unit

CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Unions initial problem was that they constituted a legitimate labor organization representing a non-
appropriate bargaining unit. However, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA,
limiting its members to the rank-and-file of SLECC.SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union was a
legitimate labor organization at the time of SLECCs voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide
whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union represented an appropriate bargaining unit.
The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due
to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
Thus, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having
acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for SLECC is to file a petition for cancellation
of certificate of registrationof CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union and not to immediately commence voluntary recognition
proceedings with SMSLEC.
SLECCs Voluntary Recognition of SMSLEC

The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in unorganized establishments. SLECC was not an unorganized
establishment when it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as its exclusive bargaining representative on 20 July 2001.CLUP-SLECC and its
Affiliates Workers Union filed a petition for certification election on 27 February 2001 and this petition remained pending as of 20 July
2001.Thus, SLECCs voluntary recognition of SMSLEC on 20 July 2001, the subsequent negotiations and resulting registration of a CBA
executed by SLECC and SMSLEC are void and cannot bar CLUP-SLECCWAs present petition for certification election.
Employers Participation in a Petition for Certification Election

We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC, filed a motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWAs petition for certification election. In petitions
for certification election, the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiters decision. The exception
to this rule, which happens when the employer is requested to bargain collectively, is not present in the case before us.
The petition is DENIED and AFFIRM the Decision promulgated of the Court of Appeal
Mariwasa Siam Ceramics Inc. vs. Secretary of DOLE, et al.

G.R. No. 183317, December 21, 2009
Facts: On May 4, 2005, respondent Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. (SMMSC-Independent) was issued
a Certificate of Registration as a legitimate labor organization by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region IV-A.
On June 14, 2005, petitioner Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union Registration against respondent,
claiming that the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not complying with the 20% requirement, and that it committed massive
fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Article 239 of the same code.
On August 26, 2005, the Regional Director of DOLE IV-A issued an Order granting the petition, revoking the registration of respondent, and
delisting it from the roster of active labor unions.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
In a Decision dated June 14, 2006, the BLR granted respondent’s appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the BLR denied
it in a Resolution dated February 2, 2007. Petitioner sought recourse with the Court of Appeals (CA) through a Petition for Certiorari; but
the CA denied the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was likewise denied, hence, this
petition based on the following grounds—
Issues:
1. Whether or not private respondent union complied with the 20% membership requirement
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it ruled that private respondent union did not commit misrepresentation, fraud
or false statement.
Ruling: The petition should be denied.

The petitioner insists that respondent failed to comply with the 20% union membership requirement for its registration as a legitimate labor
organization because of the disaffiliation from the total number of union members of 102 employees who executed affidavits recanting their
union membership.
It is, thus, imperative that we peruse the affidavits appearing to have been executed by thes affiants.
Evidently, the affidavits were written and prepared in advance, and the pro forma affidavits were ready to be filled out with the employees’
names and signatures.
It is worthy to note, however, that the affidavit does not mention the identity of the people who allegedly forced and deceived the affiant into
joining the union, much less the circumstances that constituted such force and deceit. Indeed, not only was this allegation couched in very
general terms and sweeping in nature, but more importantly, it was not supported by any evidence whatsoever.
In appreciating affidavits of recantation such as these, our ruling in La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations11 is enlightening, viz.—
On the second issue—whether or not the withdrawal of 31 union members from NATU affected the petition for certification election
insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned, We reserve the Order of the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, it
appearing undisputably that the 31 union members had withdrawn their support to the petition before the filing of said petition. It would
be otherwise if the withdrawal was made after the filing of the petition for it would then be presumed that the withdrawal was not free
and voluntary. The presumption would arise that the withdrawal was procured through duress, coercion or for valuable consideration.
In other words, the distinction must be that withdrawals made before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is
convincing proof to the contrary, whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are deemed involuntary.
The reason for such distinction is that if the withdrawal or retraction is made before the filing of the petition, the names of employees
supporting the petition are supposed to be held secret to the opposite party. Logically, any such withdrawal or retraction shows voluntariness
in the absence of proof to the contrary. Moreover, it becomes apparent that such employees had not given consent to the filing of the petition,
hence the subscription requirement has not been met.
When the withdrawal or retraction is made after the petition is filed, the employees who are supporting the petition become known to the
opposite party since their names are attached to the petition at the time of filing. Therefore, it would not be unexpected that the opposite party
would use foul means for the subject employees to withdraw their support.
In the instant case, the affidavits of recantation were executed after the identities of the union members became public, i.e., after the union
filed a petition for certification election on May 23, 2005, since the names of the members were attached to the petition. The purported
withdrawal of support for the registration of the union was made after the documents were submitted to the DOLE, Region IV-A. The logical
conclusion, therefore, following jurisprudence, is that the employees were not totally free from the employer’s pressure, and so the
voluntariness of the employees’ execution of the affidavits becomes suspect.
It is likewise notable that the first batch of 25 pro forma affidavits shows that the affidavits were executed by the individual affiants on
different dates from May 26, 2005 until June 3, 2005, but they were all sworn before a notary public on June 8, 2005.
Accordingly, we cannot give full credence to these affidavits, which were executed under suspicious circumstances, and which contain
allegations unsupported by evidence. At best, these affidavits are self-serving. They possess no probative value.
Nevertheless, even assuming the veracity of the affidavits of recantation, the legitimacy of respondent as a labor organization must be
affirmed. While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation from the union, the fact remains that at the time
of the union’s application for registration, the affiants were members of respondent and they comprised more than the required 20%
membership for purposes of registration as a labor union. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership during
the application for union registration. It does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all
throughout its existence.
Respondent asserts that it had a total of 173 union members at the time it applied for registration. Two names were repeated in respondent’s
list and had to be deducted, but the total would still be 171 union members. Further, out of the four names alleged to be no longer connected
with petitioner, only two names should be deleted from the list since Diana Motilla and T.W. Amutan resigned from petitioner only on May
10, 2005 and May 17, 2005, respectively, or after respondent’s registration had already been granted. Thus, the total union membership at
the time of registration was 169. Since the total number of rank-and-file employees at that time was 528, 169 employees would be equivalent
to 32% of the total rank-and-file workers complement, still very much above the minimum required by law.
For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent, it must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in
connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto; the minutes of ratification; or, in
connection with the election of officers, the minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together
with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.
The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who participated in the organizational meeting would not, to our mind,
provide a valid reason to cancel respondent’s certificate of registration. The cancellation of a union’s registration doubtless has an impairing
dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration
under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority
of union members.
In this case, we agree with the BLR and the CA that respondent could not have possibly committed misrepresentation, fraud, or false
statements. The alleged failure of respondent to indicate with mathematical precision the total number of employees in the bargaining unit is
of no moment, especially as it was able to comply with the 20% minimum membership requirement. Even if the total number of rank-and-
file employees of petitioner is 528, while respondent declared that it should only be 455, it still cannot be denied that the latter would have
more than complied with the registration requirement.
The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
General Milling Corp vs. Casio et al.

GR No. 149552, March 10, 2010
Facts: The labor union Ilaw at Buklod ng Mangagawa (IBM)-Local 31 Chapter (Local 31) was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the rank and file employees of GMC in Lapu-Lapu City. On November 30, 1991, IBM-Local 31, through its officers and board members,
namely, respondents Virgilio Pino, Paulino Cabreros, Ma. Luna P. Jumaoas, Dominador Booc, Bartolome Auman, Remegio Cabantan, Fidel
Valle, Loreto Gonzaga, Edilberto Mendoza and Antonio Panilag (Pino, et al.), entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with
GMC. The effectivity of the said CBA was retroactive to August 1, 1991.
The CBA contained the following union security provisions:

Section 3. MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSHIP – All employees/workers employed by the Company with the exception of those who
are specifically excluded by law and by the terms of this Agreement must be members in good standing of the Union within thirty (30)
days upon the signing of this agreement and shall maintain such membership in good standing thereof as a condition of their employment
or continued employment.
Section 6. The Company, upon written request of the Union, shall terminate the services of any employee/worker who fails to fulfill the
conditions set forth in Sections 3 and 4 thereof, subject however, to the provisions of the Labor Laws of the Philippines and their
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Union shall absolve the Company from any and all liabilities, pecuniary or otherwise, and
responsibilities to any employee or worker who is dismissed or terminated in pursuant thereof.
Casio, et al. were regular employees of GMC with daily earnings ranging from P173.75 to P201.50, and length of service varying from eight
to 25 years. Casio was elected IBM-Local 31 President for a three-year term in June 1991, while his co-respondents were union shop
stewards.
In a letter dated February 24, 1992, Rodolfo Gabiana (Gabiana), the IBM Regional Director for Visayas and Mindanao, furnished Casio, et
al. with copies of the Affidavits of GMC employees Basilio Inoc and Juan Potot, charging Casio, et al. with “acts inimical to the interest of
the union.” Through the same letter, Gabiana gave Casio, et al. three days from receipt thereof within which to file their answers or counter-
affidavits. However, Casio, et al. refused to acknowledge receipt of Gabiana’s letter.
Subsequently, on February 29, 1992, Pino, et al., as officers and members of the IBM-Local 31, issued a Resolution expelling Casio, et al.
from the union. Gabiana then wrote a letter dated March 10, 1992, addressed to Eduardo Cabahug (Cabahug), GMC Vice-President for
Engineering and Plant Administration, informing the company of the expulsion of Casio, et al. from the union pursuant to the Resolution
dated February 29, 1992 of IBM-Local 31 officers and board members. Gabiana likewise requested that Casio, et al. “be immediately
dismissed from their work for the interest of industrial peace in the plant.”
Pressured by the threatened filing of a suit for unfair labor practice, GMC acceded to Gabiana’s request to terminate the employment of
Casio, et al. GMC issued a Memorandum dated March 24, 1992 terminating the employment of Casio, et al. effective April 24, 1992 and
placing the latter under preventive suspension for the meantime.
Casio, et al. next sought recourse from the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch VII by filing on
August 3, 1992 a Complaint against GMC and Pino, et al. for unfair labor practice, particularly, the termination of legitimate union officers,
illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, and moral and exemplary damages.
Issue: Whether Casio, et al. were illegally dismissed without any valid?
Ruling: In this case, the Voluntary Arbitrator was convinced that Casio, et al. were legally dismissed; while the Court of Appeals believed
the opposite, because even though the dismissal of Casio, et al. was made by GMC pursuant to a valid closed shop provision in the CBA, the
company still failed to observe the elementary rules of due process. The Court is therefore constrained to take a second look at the evidence
on record considering that the factual findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator and the Court of Appeals are contradictory.
There are two aspects which characterize the concept of due process under the Labor Code: one is substantive – whether the termination of
employment was based on the provision of the Labor Code or in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence; the other is procedural – the
manner in which the dismissal was effected. After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals. The
dismissal of Casio, et al. was indeed illegal, having been done without just cause and the observance of procedural due process.
In Alabang Country Club, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court laid down the grounds for which an employee may be
validly terminated, thus:
Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly terminated on the following grounds: (1) just causes under Art. 282; (2) authorized
causes under Art.283; (3) termination due to disease under Art.284, and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Art. 285.
Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. x x x.
“Union security” is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends “closed shop,” “union shop,” “maintenance of membership,” or
any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting
employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for
their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date
of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they
are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. A closed shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an
enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or
certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good
standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.
Union security clauses are recognized and explicitly allowed under Article 248(e) of the Labor Code, which provides that:
Art. 248. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers. x x x
xxxx
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a
recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another
union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement.
It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness
than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer. For this reason, the law has allowed stipulations for “union shop”
and “closed shop” as means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and
interest vis-à-vis the employer.
Moreover, a stipulation in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under
the Labor Code, since “a CBA is the law between the company and the union and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to
give protection to labor.”
In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that:
(1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3)
there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause
for terminating an employee based on the union security provision of the CBA.
There is no question that in the present case, the CBA between GMC and IBM-Local 31 included a maintenance of membership and closed
shop clause as can be gleaned from Sections 3 and 6 of Article II. IBM-Local 31, by written request, can ask GMC to terminate the
employment of the employee/worker who failed to maintain its good standing as a union member.
It is similarly undisputed that IBM-Local 31, through Gabiana, the IBM Regional Director for Visayas and Mindanao, twice requested GMC,
in the letters dated March 10 and 19, 1992, to terminate the employment of Casio, et al. as a necessary consequence of their expulsion from
the union.
It is the third requisite – that there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al. – which appears to be
lacking in this case.
The failure of GMC to make a determination of the sufficiency of evidence supporting the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al. is
a direct consequence of the non-observance by GMC of procedural due process in the dismissal of employees.
As a defense, GMC contends that as an employer, its only duty was to ascertain that IBM-Local 31 accorded Casio, et al. due process; and,
it is the finding of the company that IBM-Local 31 did give Casio, et al. the opportunity to answer the charges against them, but they refused
to avail themselves of such opportunity.
This argument is without basis. The Court has stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere
allegation is definitely not evidence. The records of this case are absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to substantiate the bare
allegation of GMC that Casio, et al. were accorded due process by IBM-Local 31. There is nothing on record that would indicate that IBM-
Local 31 actually notified Casio, et al. of the charges against them or that they were given the chance to explain their side. All that was stated
in the IBM-Local 31 Resolution dated February 29, 1992, expelling Casio, et al. from the union, was that “a copy of the said letter complaint
[dated February 24, 1992] was dropped or left in front of E. Casio.” It was not established that said letter-complaint charging Casio, et al.
with acts inimical to the interest of the union was properly served upon Casio, that Casio willfully refused to accept the said letter-notice, or
that Casio had the authority to receive the same letter-notice on behalf of the other employees similarly accused. It’s worthy to note that
Casio, et al. were expelled only five days after the issuance of the letter-complaint against them. The Court cannot find proof on record when
the three-day period, within which Casio, et al. was supposed to file their answer or counter-affidavits, started to run and had expired. The
Court is likewise unconvinced that the said three-day period was sufficient for Casio, et al. to prepare their defenses and evidence to refute
the serious charges against them.
Contrary to the position of GMC, the acts of Pino, et al. as officers and board members of IBM-Local 31, in expelling Casio, et al. from the
union, do not enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, because the presumption applies only to public officers
from the highest to the lowest in the service of the Government, departments, bureaus, offices, and/or its political subdivisions.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of procedural due process. The law requires the employer to
furnish the employee sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) a written
notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought in order to afford him an opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel, if he desires, and (2) a subsequent notice informing the employee of the employer’s
decision to dismiss him. This procedure is mandatory and its absence taints the dismissal with illegality.
Irrefragably, GMC cannot dispense with the requirements of notice and hearing before dismissing Casio, et al. even when said dismissal is
pursuant to the closed shop provision in the CBA. The rights of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable
opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his own union are not wiped away by a union security clause or a
union shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company which disregards
his rights but also from his own union the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership
and hence dismissal from his job.
In the case at bar, Casio, et al. did not receive any other communication from GMC, except the written notice of termination dated March 24,
1992. GMC, by its own admission, did not conduct a separate and independent investigation to determine the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the expulsion of Casio, et al. by IBP-Local 31. It straight away acceded to the demand of IBP-Local 31 to dismiss Casio, et al.
In sum, the Court finds that GMC illegally dismissed Casio, et al. because not only did GMC fail to make a determination of the sufficiency
of evidence to support the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al., but also to accord the expelled union members procedural due
process, i.e., notice and hearing, prior to the termination of their employment
An employee who is illegally dismissed is entitled to the twin reliefs of full backwages and reinstatement. If reinstatement is not viable,
separation pay is awarded to the employee. In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu of reinstatement, the
amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one month salary for every year of service. Under Republic Act No. 6715, employees who are
illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from
the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement but if reinstatement is no longer
possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. Thus, Casio, et al. are
entitled to backwages and separation pay considering that reinstatement is no longer possible because the positions they previously occupied
are no longer existing, as declared by GMC.
Casio, et al., having been compelled to litigate in order to seek redress for their illegal dismissal, are entitled to the award of attorney’s fees
equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
The Heritage Hotel Manila vs. Natl Union of Workers in Hotel etc.
GR No. 178296, January 12, 2011
Facts: On October 11, 1995, respondent filed with the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) a
petition for certification election. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition on February 14, 1996 and ordered the holding of a certification
election. On appeal, the DOLE Secretary, in a Resolution dated August 15, 1996, affirmed the Med-Arbiter's order and remanded the case to
the Med-Arbiter for the holding of a pre-election conference on February 26, 1997. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied on September 23, 1996.
The pre-election conference was not held as initially scheduled; it was held a year later, or on February 20, 1998. Petitioner moved to archive
or to dismiss the petition due to alleged repeated non-appearance of respondent. The latter agreed to suspend proceedings until further notice.
The pre-election conference resumed on January 29, 2000.
Subsequently, petitioner discovered that respondent had failed to submit to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) its annual financial report
for several years and the list of its members since it filed its registration papers in 1995. Consequently, on May 19, 2000, petitioner filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration of respondent, on the ground of the non-submission of the said documents. Petitioner prayed that
respondent's Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter be cancelled and its name be deleted from the list of legitimate labor organizations. It
further requested the suspension of the certification election proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the non-submission of financial reports warrant the cancellation of the respondent’s registration
Ruling: No. The respondent's registration as a legitimate labor union should not be cancelled.
The Regional Director has ample discretion in dealing with a petition for cancellation of a union's registration, particularly, determining
whether the union still meets the requirements prescribed by law. It is sufficient to give the Regional Director license to treat the late filing
of required documents as sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. After all, the law requires the labor organization to submit
the annual financial report and list of members in order to verify if it is still viable and financially sustainable as an organization so as to
protect the employer and employees from fraudulent or fly-by-night unions. With the submission of the required documents by respondent,
the purpose of the law has been achieved, though belatedly.
We cannot ascribe abuse of discretion to the Regional Director and the DOLE Secretary in denying the petition for cancellation of respondent's
registration. The union members and, in fact, all the employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit should not be deprived of a
bargaining agent, merely because of the negligence of the union officers who were responsible for the submission of the documents to the
BLR.
Labor authorities should, indeed, act with circumspection in treating petitions for cancellation of union registration, lest they be accused of
interfering with union activities. In resolving the petition, consideration must be taken of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article XIII,
Section 3 of the Constitution, i.e., the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities. Labor authorities should bear in mind that registration confers upon a union the status of legitimacy and the concomitant right and
privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor organization, particularly the right to participate in or ask for certification election in a
bargaining unit. Thus, the cancellation of a certificate of registration is the equivalent of snuffing out the life of a labor organization. For
without such registration, it loses - as a rule - its rights under the Labor Code.
It is worth mentioning that the Labor Code's provisions on cancellation of union registration and on reportorial requirements have been
recently amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9481. The amendment sought to strengthen the workers' right to self-organization and enhance
the Philippines' compliance with its international obligations as embodied in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No.
87, pertaining to the non-dissolution of workers' organizations by administrative authority. Thus, R.A. No. 9481 inserted in the Labor Code
Article 242-A, which provides:
ART. 242-A. Reportorial Requirements.-The following are documents required to be submitted to the Bureau by the legitimate labor
organization concerned:
xxx xxx
(c) Its annual financial report within thirty (30) days after the close of every fiscal year; and
xxx xxx
Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a ground for cancellation of union registration but shall subject the erring
officers or members to suspension, expulsion from membership, or any appropriate penalty.
ILO Convention No. 87, which we have ratified in 1953, provides that "workers' and employers' organizations shall not be liable to be
dissolved or suspended by administrative authority." The ILO has expressed the opinion that the cancellation of union registration by the
registrar of labor unions, which in our case is the BLR, is tantamount to dissolution of the organization by administrative authority when such
measure would give rise to the loss of legal personality of the union or loss of advantages necessary for it to carry out its activities, which is
true in our jurisdiction. Although the ILO has allowed such measure to be taken, provided that judicial safeguards are in place, i.e., the right
to appeal to a judicial body, it has nonetheless reminded its members that dissolution of a union, and cancellation of registration for that
matter, involve serious consequences for occupational representation. It has, therefore, deemed it preferable if such actions were to be taken
only as a last resort and after exhausting other possibilities with less serious effects on the organization.
It is undisputed that appellee failed to submit its annual financial reports and list of individual members in accordance with Article 239 of
the Labor Code. However, the existence of this ground should not necessarily lead to the cancellation of union registration. Article 239
recognizes the regulatory authority of the State to exact compliance with reporting requirements. Yet there is more at stake in this case than
merely monitoring union activities and requiring periodic documentation thereof.
The more substantive considerations involve the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association and right of workers to self-organization.
Also involved is the public policy to promote free trade unionism and collective bargaining as instruments of industrial peace and democracy.
An overly stringent interpretation of the statute governing cancellation of union registration without regard to surrounding circumstances
cannot be allowed. Otherwise, it would lead to an unconstitutional application of the statute and emasculation of public policy objectives.
Worse, it can render nugatory the protection to labor and social justice clauses that pervades the Constitution and the Labor Code.
Moreover, submission of the required documents is the duty of the officers of the union. It would be unreasonable for this Office to order the
cancellation of the union and penalize the entire union membership on the basis of the negligence of its officers. In National Union of Bank
Employees vs. Minister of Labor, the Supreme Court ruled:
As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director Noriel: "The rights of workers to self-organization finds general and
specific constitutional guarantees. x x x Such constitutional guarantees should not be lightly taken much less nullified. A healthy respect
for the freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be not easily visited with capital punishments against
the association itself." At any rate, we note that on 19 May 2000, appellee had submitted its financial statement for the years 1996-1999.
With this submission, appellee has substantially complied with its duty to submit its financial report for the said period. To rule differently
would be to preclude the union, after having failed to meet its periodic obligations promptly, from taking appropriate measures to correct
its omissions. For the record, we do not view with favor appellee's late submission. Punctuality on the part of the union and its officers
could have prevented this petition.
Legend International Resorts Ltd., vs. Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legenda

G.R. No. 169754, Feb. 23, 2011
Facts: June 6, 2001, KML filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, San Fernando, Pampanga, a petition for certification election.
KML alleged that it is a legitimate labor organization of the rank and file employees of Legend. It was issued its Certification of Registration
by DOLE on May 18, 2001.
Legend moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it is not a legitimate labor organization because its membership is a mixture of rank
and file employees and supervisory employees. KML also committed acts of fraud and misrepresentation when it made it appear that certain
employees attended its general membership meeting on April 5, 2001 when in reality some of them were either at work, have already resigned,
or were abroad.
KML argued that even if the supervisory employees were excluded from membership, the certification election could still proceed because
the required number of total rank and file employees necessary is still sustained. It also claimed that its legitimacy as a labor union cannot be
attacked collaterally.
Med Arbiter judgment September 20, 2001: dismissed KML’s petition for certification election. Since its membership included supervisory
employees, it was not a legitimate labor organization. KML was also guilty of fraud and misrepresentation; 70 employees who were claimed
to be among those who attended its organizational meeting were either at work or elsewhere.
Office of the Secretary of DOLE May 22, 2002 decision: reversed Med- Arbiter’s decision. KML’s legitimacy as a union cannot be attacked
collaterally. The presence of supervisory employees does not ipso facto render the existence of a labor organization illegal. Mixed
membership is not one of the grounds for dismissal of a petition for certification election. Ordered the immediate conduct of the certification
election.
Legend filed a Motion for Reconsideration. It also alleged that it filed a petition for cancellation of union registration of KML which was
granted by the DOLE Regional Office, November 7, 2001. MFR was denied in a resolution dated August 20, 2002: a final order of
cancellation is required before a petition for certification of election may be dismissed on the ground of lack of legal personality, and that the
November 7, 2001 decision was reversed by the BLR March 26, 2002.
CA: held that the issue on the legitimacy of KML as a labor organization has already been settled with finality. The March 26, 2002 decision
upholding the legitimacy had long become final and executor for failure of Legend to appeal.KML being a legitimate labor org, it could
properly file a petition for certification election. Legend filed MFR stating that it has appealed to the CA the March 26, 2002 decision and is
still pending. CA denied MFR.
Issues:
1. Whether Legend has timely appealed the March 26, 2002 decision (re: cancellation of union registration)
2.Whether the cancellation of KML’s certificate of registration should retroact to the time of its issuance (it was cancelled in the November
7, 2001 decision)
3. Whether the legitimacy of the legal personality of KML can be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election
Ruling:
1.Yes. The March 26, 2002 decision has not yet attained finality considering that it has timely appealed to the CA and which at that time is
still pending resolution. Legend timely filed on Sept 6, 2002 a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the March 26, 2002 decision.
On June 30, 2005, CA reversed the March 26, 2002 decision of the BLR and reinstated the November 7, 2001 decision cancelling the
certificate of registration of KML. KML’s MRF was denied. KML filed a petition for certiorari before the SC which was denied. KML moved
for reconsideration but it was denied with finality. The decision to cancel KML’s certificate of registration became final and executory and
entry of judgment was made on July 18, 2006.
2.No. According to ACA vs Calleja, a certification proceeding is not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but an
investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character. An order to hold a certificationelection is proper despite the pendency of the
petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale is that at the time the union filed the petition, it
still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing the cancellation.
There is no basis for Legend’s assertion that the cancellation of KML’s certificate of registration should retroact to the time of its issuance
or that it effectively nullified all of KML’s activities, including its filing of the petition for certification election and its demand to collectively
bargain.
3.NO. The legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election proceeding. Such
legal personality may not be subject to a collateral attack but only through a separate action instituted particularly for the purpose of assailing
it.
SC affirmed the May 22, 2002 decision (KML’s legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally, presence of supervisory employees does not
render it illegal) and the August 20, 2002 resolution (a final order of cancellation is required before a petition for certification election may
be dismissed on the ground of lack of personality, reversed March 26, 2002 decision)
Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Phils for Empowerment and Reforms (SMCC-SUPER) et al., vs.
Charter Chemical and Coating Corp.
G.R. No. 169717, March 16, 2011
Facts: On June 6, 2001, KML filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, San Fernando, Pampanga, a Petition for Certification
Election docketed as Case No. RO300-0106-RU-001. KML alleged that it is a legitimate labor organization of the rank and file employees
of Legend International Resorts Limited (LEGEND). KML claimed that it was issued its Certificate of Registration No. RO300-0105-UR-
002 by the DOLE on May 18, 2001.
LEGEND moved to dismiss the petition alleging that KML is not a legitimate labor organization because its membership is a mixture of rank
and file and supervisory employees in violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code. LEGEND also claimed that KML committed acts of fraud
and misrepresentation when it made it appear that certain employees attended its general membership meeting on April 5, 2001 when in
reality some of them were either at work; have already resigned as of March 2001 or were abroad.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the cancellation of KML’s certificate of registration should retroact to the time of its issuance
2. Whether or not the legitimacy of the legal personality of KML can be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election
Ruling:
1. The cancellation of KML’s certificate of registration should not retroact to the time of its issuance.
Notwithstanding the finality of the Decision cancelling the certificate of registration of KML, we cannot subscribe to LEGEND's proposition
that the cancellation of KML's certificate of registration should retroact to the time of its issuance.
At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the public respondent that an order to hold a certification election is
proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is
that at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing the
cancellation. In Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, we also held that "the pendency of a petition for cancellation of union
registration does not preclude collective bargaining." In Association of Court of Appeals Employees v. Ferrer-Calleja, this Court was tasked
to resolve the issue of whether "the certification proceedings should be suspended pending [the petitioner's] petition for the cancellation of
union registration of the UCECA." The Court resolved the issue in the negative holding that "an order to hold a certification election is
proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is
that at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing a
cancellation."
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is clear that a certification election may be conducted during the pendency of the cancellation
proceedings. This is because at the time the petition for certification was filed, the petitioning union is presumed to possess the legal
personality to file the same. There is therefore no basis for LEGEND's assertion that the cancellation of KML's certificate of registration
should retroact to the time of its issuance or that it effectively nullified all of KML's activities, including its filing of the petition for
certification election and its demand to collectively bargain.
2. The legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election.
We agree with the ruling of the Office of the Secretary of DOLE that the legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally
attacked in a petition for certification election proceeding. Such legal personality may not be subject to a collateral attack but only through
a separate action instituted particularly for the purpose of assailing it."
This is categorically prescribed by Section 5, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V, which states as follows:
SEC. 5.Effect of registration. - The labor organization or worker's association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality
on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack but may be
questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.
Hence, to raise the issue of the respondent union's legal personality is not proper in this case.
. . . Section 5, Rule V of D.O. 9 is instructive on the matter. It provides that the legal personality of a union cannot be the subject of collateral
attack in a petition for certification election, but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation of union registration.
This has been the rule since NUBE v. Minister of Labor, 110 SCRA 274 (1981). What applies in this case is the principle that once a union
acquires a legitimate status as a labor organization, it continues as such until its certificate of registration is cancelled or revoked in an
independent action for cancellation.
Equally important is Section 11, Paragraph II, Rule IX of D.O. 9, which provides for the dismissal of a petition for certification election
based on the lack of legal personality of a labor organization only in the following instances: (1) appellant is not listed by the Regional Office
or the BLR in its registry of legitimate labor organizations; or (2) appellant's legal personality has been revoked or cancelled with finality.
Since appellant is listed in the registry of legitimate labor organizations, and its legitimacy has not been revoked or cancelled with finality,
the granting of its petition for certification election is proper.
"[T]he legal personality of a legitimate labor organization x x x cannot be subject to a collateral attack. The law is very clear on this matter.
x x x The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of
issuance of its certificate of registration. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to a
collateral attack. In may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of
the Implementing Rules."
San Miguel Foods vs. san Miguel Corp Supervisors and exempt Union
G.R. No. 146206 August 1, 2011
Facts: A certification election was conducted and on the date of the election, petitioner employer filed the Omnibus Objections and Challenge
to Voters, questioning the eligibility to vote by some of its employees on the grounds that some employees do not belong to the bargaining
unit which respondent seeks to represent or that there is no existence of employer-employee relationship with petitioner.
The following issues were raised when the case reached the SC: the inclusion of employees in supervisor levels 3 and 4 and the exempt
employees in the proposed bargaining unit, thereby allowing their participation in the certification election; the application of the “community
or mutuality of interests” test; and the determination of the employees who belong to the category of confidential employees
Ruling:
First Issue: Certain factors, such as specific line of work, working conditions, location of work, mode of compensation, and other relevant
conditions do not affect or impede their commonality of interest
Petitioner’s contentions are erroneous. In G.R. No. 110399, the Court explained that the employees of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia
Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis constitute a single bargaining unit, which is not contrary to the one-company,
one-union policy. An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all
of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.[21]
In National Association of Free Trade Unions v. Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union – United Lumber and General
Workers of the Phils,[22] the Court, taking into account the “community or mutuality of interests” test, ordered the formation of a single
bargaining unit consisting of the Sawmill Division in Butuan City and the Logging Division in Zapanta Valley, Kitcharao, Agusan [Del]
Norte of the Mainit Lumber Development Company. It held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned
with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of
grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or
not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights.[23] Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. Their functions
mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both. There may be differences as to the
nature of their individual assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit.[24]
Thus, applying the ruling to the present case, the Court affirms the finding of the CA that there should be only one bargaining unit for the
employees in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis[25] of Magnolia Poultry Products Plant involved in “dressed” chicken processing and
Magnolia Poultry Farms engaged in “live” chicken operations. Certain factors, such as specific line of work, working conditions, location
of work, mode of compensation, and other relevant conditions do not affect or impede their commonality of interest. Although they seem
separate and distinct from each other, the specific tasks of each division are actually interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests which
warrants the formation of a single bargaining unit.
Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine,
and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations.[26] The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee
is to be considered a confidential employee - that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and
the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who,
in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be
accomplished by the “confidential employee rule.”[27]
Second Issue: PAYROLL MASTER NOT CONFIDENTIAL, HUMAN RESOURCE ASSISTANT and PERSONNEL ASSISTANT
CONFIDENTIAL
A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate, or with the custody, handling or care and protection of the employer’s
property.[28] Confidential employees, such as accounting personnel, should be excluded from the bargaining unit, as their access to
confidential information may become the source of undue advantage.[29] However, such fact does not apply to the position of Payroll Master
and the whole gamut of employees who, as perceived by petitioner, has access to salary and compensation data. The CA correctly held that
the position of Payroll Master does not involve dealing with confidential labor relations information in the course of the performance of his
functions. Since the nature of his work does not pertain to company rules and regulations and confidential labor relations, it follows that he
cannot be excluded from the subject bargaining unit.
Corollarily, although Article 245[30] of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial
employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work
are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and, hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential
records.[31] Confidential employees are thus excluded from the rank-and-file bargaining unit. The rationale for their separate category and
disqualification to join any labor organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees, because if allowed to be affiliated with
a union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty in view of evident conflict of interests and the union can also become company-
denominated with the presence of managerial employees in the union membership.[32] Having access to confidential information,
confidential employees may also become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act as a spy or spies of either party to a
collective bargaining agreement.
In this regard, the CA correctly ruled that the positions of Human Resource Assistant and Personnel Assistant belong to the category of
confidential employees and, hence, are excluded from the bargaining unit, considering their respective positions and job descriptions. As
Human Resource Assistant,[34] the scope of one’s work necessarily involves labor relations, recruitment and selection of employees,
access to employees' personal files and compensation package, and human resource management. As regards a Personnel Assistant,[35] one's
work includes the recording of minutes for management during collective bargaining negotiations, assistance to management during
grievance meetings and administrative investigations, and securing legal advice for labor issues from the petitioner’s team of lawyers, and
implementation of company programs. Therefore, in the discharge of their functions, both gain access to vital labor relations information
which outrightly disqualifies them from union membership.
The proceedings for certification election are quasi-judicial in nature and, therefore, decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain
finality.
It bears stressing that a certification election is the sole concern of the workers; hence, an employer lacks the personality to dispute the
same. The general rule is that an employer has no standing to question the process of certification election, since this is the sole concern of
the workers.[37] Law and policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining
representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be
effective, must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.[38] The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the
petition pursuant to Article 258[39] of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively.[40]
BPI vs. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter

GR No. 164301, October 19, 2011 Reso on the Decision of Aug. 18, 2010
Facts: On March 23, 2000, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the Articles of Merger executed on January 20, 2000 by and between
BPI, herein petitioner, and FEBTC. This Article and Plan of Merger was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 7,
2000.
Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger, all the assets and liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as the surviving
corporation. FEBTC employees, including those in its different branches across the country, were hired by petitioner as its own employees,
with their status and tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained.
Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter - Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank (hereinafter the "Union," for brevity) is the
exclusive bargaining agent of BPI’s rank and file employees in Davao City. The former FEBTC rank-and-file employees in Davao City did
not belong to any labor union at the time of the merger. Prior to the effectivity of the merger, or on March 31, 2000, respondent Union invited
said FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding the Union Shop Clause (Article II, Section 2) of the existing CBA between petitioner BPI and
respondent Union.
The parties both advert to certain provisions of the existing CBA, which includes:
Section 2. Union Shop - New employees falling within the bargaining unit as defined in Article I of this Agreement, who may hereafter be
regularly employed by the Bank shall, within thirty (30) days after they become regular employees, join the Union as a condition of their
continued employment. It is understood that membership in good standing in the Union is a condition of their continued employment with
the Bank.
After the meeting called by the Union, some of the former FEBTC employees joined the Union, while others refused. Later, however, some
of those who initially joined retracted their membership.
Respondent Union then sent notices to the former FEBTC employees who refused to join, as well as those who retracted their membership,
and called them to a hearing regarding the matter. When these former FEBTC employees refused to attend the hearing, the president of the
Union requested BPI to implement the Union Shop Clause of the CBA and to terminate their employment pursuant thereto.
Issue: Whether or not the former FEBTC employees that were absorbed by petitioner upon the merger between FEBTC and BPI should be
covered by the Union Shop Clause found in the existing CBA between petitioner and respondent Union.
Ruling: Yes. They are covered by the Union Shop Clause.

"Union security" is a generic term which is applied to and comprehends "closed shop," "union shop," "maintenance of membership" or any
other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting
employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period for their continued
employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement,
or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or
transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. A closed-shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in
which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed
departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a
union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.
In the case of Liberty Flour Mills Employees v. Liberty Flour Mills, Inc., we ruled that: It is the policy of the State to promote unionism to
enable the workers to negotiate with management on the same level and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and
independently bargain for the improvement of their respective conditions. To this end, the Constitution guarantees to them the rights "to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations and peaceful concerted actions including the right to strike in accordance with law."
There is no question that these purposes could be thwarted if every worker were to choose to go his own separate way instead of joining his
co-employees in planning collective action and presenting a united front when they sit down to bargain with their employers. It is for this
reason that the law has sanctioned stipulations for the union shop and the closed shop as a means of encouraging the workers to join and
support the labor union of their own choice as their representative in the negotiation of their demands and the protection of their interest vis-
à-vis the employer.
In other words, the purpose of a union shop or other union security arrangement is to guarantee the continued existence of the union through
enforced membership for the benefit of the workers.
All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in their CBA with management are subject to its terms. However,
under law and jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are exempted from its coverage, namely, employees who at the time the union
shop agreement takes effect are bona fide members of a religious organization which prohibits its members from joining labor unions on
religious grounds; employees already in the service and already members of a union other than the majority at the time the union shop
agreement took effect; confidential employees who are excluded from the rank and file bargaining unit; and employees excluded from the
union shop by express terms of the agreement.
When certain employees are obliged to join a particular union as a requisite for continued employment, as in the case of Union Security
Clauses, this condition is a valid restriction of the freedom or right not to join any labor organization because it is in favor of unionism. This
Court, on occasion, has even held that a union security clause in a CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed
by the Constitution. Moreover, a closed shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire only members of the
contracting union who must continue to remain members in good standing to keep their jobs. It is "the most prized achievement of unionism."
It adds membership and compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a promise of employment in the closed shop, it wields group
solidarity.
Indeed, the situation of the former FEBTC employees in this case clearly does not fall within the first three exceptions to the application of
the Union Shop Clause discussed earlier. No allegation or evidence of religious exemption or prior membership in another union or
engagement as a confidential employee was presented by both parties. The sole category therefore in which petitioner may prove its claim is
the fourth recognized exception or whether the former FEBTC employees are excluded by the express terms of the existing CBA between
petitioner and respondent.
As the Union likewise pointed out in its pleadings, there were benefits under the CBA that the former FEBTC employees did not enjoy with
their previous employer. As BPI employees, they will enjoy all these CBA benefits upon their "absorption." Thus, although in a sense BPI is
continuing FEBTC’s employment of these absorbed employees, BPI’s employment of these absorbed employees was not under exactly the
same terms and conditions as stated in the latter’s employment contracts with FEBTC. This further strengthens the view that BPI and the
former FEBTC employees voluntarily contracted with each other for their employment in the surviving corporation.
The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop clauses in a CBA, even if they impinge upon the individual employee’s right or freedom
of association, is not to protect the union for the union’s sake. Laws and jurisprudence promote unionism and afford certain protections to
the certified bargaining agent in a unionized company because a strong and effective union presumably benefits all employees in the
bargaining unit since such a union would be in a better position to demand improved benefits and conditions of work from the employer.
In the case at bar, since the former FEBTC employees are deemed covered by the Union Shop Clause, they are required to join the certified
bargaining agent, which supposedly has gathered the support of the majority of workers within the bargaining unit in the appropriate
certification proceeding. Their joining the certified union would, in fact, be in the best interests of the former FEBTC employees for it unites
their interests with the majority of employees in the bargaining unit. It encourages employee solidarity and affords sufficient protection to
the majority status of the union during the life of the CBA which are the precisely the objectives of union security clauses, such as the Union
Shop Clause involved herein. We are indeed not being called to balance the interests of individual employees as against the State policy of
promoting unionism, since the employees, who were parties in the court below, no longer contested the adverse Court of Appeals’ decision.
Nonetheless, settled jurisprudence has already swung the balance in favor of unionism, in recognition that ultimately the individual employee
will be benefited by that policy. In the hierarchy of constitutional values, this Court has repeatedly held that the right to abstain from joining
a labor organization is subordinate to the policy of encouraging unionism as an instrument of social justice.
In sum, this Court finds it reasonable and just to conclude that the Union Shop Clause of the CBA covers the former FEBTC employees who
were hired/employed by BPI during the effectivity of the CBA in a manner which petitioner describes as "absorption." A contrary appreciation
of the facts of this case would, undoubtedly, lead to an inequitable and very volatile labor situation which this Court has consistently ruled
against.
In the case of former FEBTC employees who initially joined the union but later withdrew their membership, there is even greater reason for
the union to request their dismissal from the employer since the CBA also contained a Maintenance of Membership Clause.
A final point in relation to procedural due process, the Court is not unmindful that the former FEBTC employees’ refusal to join the union
and BPI’s refusal to enforce the Union Shop Clause in this instance may have been based on the honest belief that the former FEBTC
employees were not covered by said clause. In the interest of fairness, we believe the former FEBTC employees should be given a fresh thirty
(30) days from notice of finality of this decision to join the union before the union demands BPI to terminate their employment under the
Union Shop Clause, assuming said clause has been carried over in the present CBA and there has been no material change in the situation of
the parties.
Octavio vs. Phil Long Distance Telephone Company

G.R. No. 175492, Feb. 27, 2013
Facts: On May 28, 1999, PLDT and Gabay ng Unyon sa Telekominaksyon ng mga Superbisor (GUTS) entered into a CBA covering the
period January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2001 (CBA of 1999-2001). Article VI, Section I thereof provides:
Section 1. The COMPANY agrees to grant the following across-the-board salary increase during the three years covered by this Agreement
to all employees covered by the bargaining unit as of the given dates:
Effective January 1, 1999 10% of basic wage or P2,000.00 whichever is higher;
Effective January 1, 2000 11% of basic wage or P2,250.00 whichever is higher;
Effective January 1, 2001 12% of basic wage or P2,500.00 whichever is higher.
On October 1, 2000, PLDT hired Octavio as Sales System Analyst I on a probationary status. He became a member of GUTS. When Octavio
was regularized on January 1, 2001, he was receiving a monthly basic salary of P10,000.00. On February 1, 2002, he was promoted to the
position of Sales System Analyst 2 and his salary was increased to P13,730.00.
On May 31, 2002, PLDT and GUTS entered into another CBA covering the period January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004 (CBA of 2002-
2004) which provided for the following salary increases: 8% of basic wage or P2,000.00 whichever is higher for the first year (2002); 10%
of basic wage or P2,700.00 whichever is higher for the second year (2003); and, 10% of basic wage or P2,400.00 whichever is higher for the
third year (2004).
Claiming that he was not given the salary increases of P2,500.00 effective January 1, 2001 and P2,000.00 effective January 1, 2002, Octavio
wrote the President of GUTS, Adolfo Fajardo (Fajardo). Acting thereon and on similar grievances from other GUTS members, Fajardo wrote
the PLDT Human Resource Head to inform management of the GUTS members claim for entitlement to the across-the-board salary increases.
Accordingly, the Grievance Committee convened on October 7, 2002 consisting of representatives from PLDT and GUTS. The Grievance
Committee, however, failed to reach an agreement. In effect, it denied Octavios demand for salary increases. Aggrieved, Octavio filed before
the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a Complaint for payment of said salary increases. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint of Octavio
and upheld the Committee Resolution.
Upon Octavios appeal, the NLRC, in its September 30, 2005 Resolution, affirmed the Labor Arbiters Decision. Octavios Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise dismissed by the NLRC in its November 21, 2005 Resolution.
Octavio thus filed a Petition for Certiorari which the CA found to be without merit. In its August 31, 2006 Decision, the CA declared the
Committee Resolution to be binding on Octavio, he being a member of GUTS, and because he failed to question its validity and enforceability.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Octavio disclaimed his alleged failure to question the Committee Resolution by emphasizing that he filed
a Complaint before the NLRC against PLDT. However, the CA denied Octavios Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Did Octavio properly raise the issues to the court despite remedies stated in the grievance machineriy in the CBA?
Ruling: The Petition has no merit.

Under Article 260 of the Labor Code, grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the parties CBA should be resolved in
accordance with the grievance procedure embodied therein. It also provides that all unsettled grievances shall be automatically referred for
voluntary arbitration as prescribed in the CBA.
In its Memorandum, PLDT set forth the grievance machinery and procedure provided under Article X of the CBA of 2002-2004, viz:
Section 1. GRIEVANCE MACHINERY - there shall be a Union-Management Grievance Committee composed of three (3) Union
representatives designated by the UNION Board of Directors and three (3) Management representatives designated by the company
President. The committee shall act upon any grievance properly processed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The Union
representatives to the Committee shall not lose pay for attending meetings where Management representatives are in attendance.
Section 2. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE - The parties agree that all disputes between labor and management may be settled through
friendly negotiations; that the parties have the same interest in the continuity of work until all points in dispute shall have been discussed
and settled; that an open conflict in any form involves losses to the parties; and that therefore, every effort shall be exerted to avoid such
an open conflict. In furtherance of these principles, the parties agree to observe the following grievance procedures.
Step 1. Any employee (or group of employees) who believes that he has a justifiable grievance shall present the matter initially to his
division head, or if the division is involved in the grievance, to the company official next higher to the division head (the local manager
in the provincial exchanges) not later that fifteen (15) days after the occurrence of the incident giving rise to the grievance. The initial
presentation shall be made to the division head either by the aggrieved party himself or by the Union Steward or by any Executive
Officer of the Union who is not a member of the grievance panel. The initial presentation may be made orally or in writing.
Step 2. Any party who is not satisfied with the resolution of the grievance at Step 1 may appeal in writing to the Union-Management
Grievance Committee within seven (7) days from the date of receipt of the department heads decision.
Step 3. If the grievance is not settled either because of deadlock or the failure of the committee to decide the matter, the grievance shall
be transferred to a Board of Arbitrators for the final decision. The Board shall be composed of three (3) arbitrators, one to be nominated
by the selection of such Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, preferably from the listing of qualified Voluntary
Arbitrators duly accredited by the Board. In case the parties fail to select a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, the
Board shall designate the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, as may be necessary, pursuant to the selection
procedure agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, which shall act with the same force and effect as if the Arbitrator or
panel of Arbitrators has been selected by the parties as described above. The decision of the board shall be final and binding both the
company and the Union in accordance with law. Expenses of arbitration shall be divided equally between the Company and the Union.
Indisputably, the present controversy involves the determination of an employees salary increases as provided in the CBAs. When Octavios
claim for salary increases was referred to the Union-Management Grievance Committee, the clear intention of the parties was to resolve their
differences on the proper interpretation and implementation of the pertinent provisions of the CBAs. And in accordance with the procedure
prescribed therein, the said committee made up of representatives of both the union and the management convened. Unfortunately, it failed
to reach an agreement. Octavios recourse pursuant to the CBA was to elevate his grievance to the Board of Arbitrators for final decision.
Instead, nine months later, Octavio filed a Complaint before the NLRC.
It is settled that when parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration
then that procedure should be strictly observed. Moreover, we have held time and again that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention
of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of the courts judicial intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass
upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly.
By failing to question the Committee Resolution through the proper procedure prescribed in the CBA, that is, by raising the same before a
Board of Arbitrators, Octavio is deemed to have waived his right to question the same.
Clearly, he departed from the grievance procedure mandated in the CBA and denied the Board of Arbitrators the opportunity to pass upon a
matter over which it has jurisdiction. Hence, and as correctly held by the CA, Octavios failure to assail the validity and enforceability of the
Committee Resolution makes the same binding upon him. On this score alone, Octavios recourse to the labor tribunals below, as well as to
the CA, and, finally, to this Court, must therefore fail.
National Union of bank Employees vs. Philnabank Employees Association

G.R. No. 174287, Aug. 12, 2013
Facts: Respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) used to be a government-owned and controlled banking institution established under
Public Act 2612, as amended by Executive Order No. 80 dated December 3, 1986 (otherwise known as The 1986 Revised Charter of the
Philippine National Bank). Its rank-and-file employees, being government personnel, were represented for collective negotiation by the
Philnabank Employees Association (PEMA), a public sector union.
In 1996, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved PNB’s new Articles of Incorporation and By-laws and its changed status as a
private corporation. PEMA affiliated with petitioner National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), which is a labor federation composed of
unions in the banking industry, adopting the name NUBE-PNB Employees Chapter (NUBE-PEC). Later, NUBE-PEC was certified as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the PNB rank-and-file employees. A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was subsequently signed
between NUBE-PEC and PNB covering the period of January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2001.
Following the expiration of the CBA, the Philnabank Employees Association-FFW (PEMA-FFW) filed on January 2, 2002 a petition for
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of PNB. The petition sought the conduct of a certification election to be participated
in by PEMA-FFW and NUBE-PEC.
While the petition for certification election was still pending, two significant events transpired – the independent union registration of NUBE-
PEC and its disaffiliation with NUBE.
PEMA sent a letter to the PNB management informing its disaffiliation from NUBE and requesting to stop, effective immediately, the check-
off of the P15.00 due for NUBE. Acting thereon, on July 4, 2003, PNB informed NUBE of PEMA’s letter and its decision to continue the
deduction of the P15.00 fees, but stop its remittance to NUBE effective July 2003. PNB also notified NUBE that the amounts collected would
be held in a trust account pending the resolution of the issue on PEMA’s disaffiliation.
Alleging unfair labor practice (ULP) for non-implementation of the grievance machinery and procedure, NUBE brought the matter to the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for preventive mediation.
Issue: Whether PEMA validly disaffiliated itself from NUBE, the resolution of which, in turn, inevitably affects the latter’s right to collect
the union dues held in trust by PNB.
Ruling: The right of the local members to withdraw from the federation and to form a new local union depends upon the provisions of the
union's constitution, by-laws and charter and, in the absence of enforceable provisions in the federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation
of a local union, a local may sever its relationship with its parent.
In the case at bar, there is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by NUBE that PEMA was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from
the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a valid breakaway. This being so, PEMA is not precluded to disaffiliate from NUBE
after acquiring the status of an independent labor organization duly registered before the DOLE.
Consequently, by PEMA's valid disaffiliation from NUBE, the vinculum that previously bound the two entities was completely severed. As
NUBE was divested of any and all power to act in representation of PEMA, any act performed by the former that affects the interests and
affairs of the latter, including the supposed expulsion of Serrana et al., is rendered without force and effect.
Also, in effect, NUBE loses it right to collect all union dues held in its trust by PNB. The moment that PEMA separated from and left NUBE
and exists as an independent labor organization with a certificate of registration, the former is no longer obliged to pay dues and assessments
to the latter; naturally, there would be no longer any reason or occasion for PNB to continue making deductions.
Takata Phils Corp. vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, et al.

GR No. 196276, June 4, 2014
Facts: On July 7, 2009, petitioner filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office a Petition for Cancellation
of the Certificate of Union Registration of Respondent Samahang Lakas Manggagawa ng Takata (SALAMAT) on the ground that the latter
is guilty of misrepresentation, false statement and fraud with respect to the number of those who participated in the organizational meeting,
the adoption and ratification of its Constitution and By-Laws, and in the election of its officers.
It contended that in the May 1, 2009 organizational meeting of respondent, only 68 attendees signed the attendance sheet, and which number
comprised only 17% of the total number of the 396 regular rank- and-file employees which respondent sought to represent, and hence,
respondent failed to comply with the 20% minimum membership requirement. Petitioner insisted that the document "Pangalan ng mga Kasapi
ng Unyon" bore no signatures of the alleged 119 union members; and that employees were not given sufficient information on the documents
they signed; that the document "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi" was not submitted at the time of the filing of respondent's application
for union registration; that the 119 union members were actually only 117; and, that the total number of petitioner's employees as of May 1,
2009 was 470, and not 396 as respondent claimed.
Respondent denied the charge and claimed that the 119 union members were more than the 20% requirement for union registration. The
document "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi sa Unyon" which it presented in its petition for certification election supported their claim of
119 members. Respondent also contended that petitioner was estopped from assailing its legal personality as it agreed to a certification
election and actively participated in the pre-election conference of the certification election proceedings. Respondent argued that the union
members were informed of the contents of the documents they signed and that the 68 attendees to the organizational meeting constituted
more than 50% of the total union membership, hence, a quorum existed for the conduct of the said meeting.
On August 27, 2009, DOLE Regional Director, Atty. Ricardo S. Martinez, Sr., issued a Decision granting the petition for cancellation of
respondent's certificate of registration. Atty. Martinez held that 68 is less than 20% of 396 hence, short of union registration requirement.
The attendance sheet containing the names and signatures of 68 members contradicted list of names in the “Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng
Unyon”and the “Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi” was not attached to the application for registration, it was only submitted in the petition
for certification election.
Dissatisfied, respondent, through Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP) Paralegal Officer, Domingo P. Mole, filed a Notice and
Memorandum of Appeal with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). However, on September 28,2009, respondent, through its counsels,
Attys. Napoleon C. Banzuela, Jr. and Jehn Louie W. Velandrez, filed an Appeal Memorandum with Formal Entry of Appearance to the Office
of the DOLE Secretary, which the latter eventually referred to the BLR. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Appeals praying for their
dismissal on the ground of forum shopping as respondent filed two separate appeals in two separate venues; and for failing to avail of the
correct remedy within the period; and that the certificate of registration was tainted with fraud, misrepresentation and falsification.
In its Answer, respondent claimed that there was no forum shopping as BMP's Paralegal Officer was no longer authorized to file an appeal
on behalf of respondent as the latter's link with BMP was already terminated and only the Union President was authorized to file the appeal;
and that it complied with Department Order No. 40-03.
On December 9, 2009, the BLR reversed the decision of the Regional Director. BLR found that petitioner failed to prove that respondent
deliberately and maliciously misrepresented the number of rank-and-file employees. It pointed out petitioner's basis for the alleged
noncompliance with the minimum membership requirement for registration was the attendance of 68 members to the May 1, 2009
organizational meeting supposedly comprising only 17% of the total 396 regular rank-and-file employees. However, the BLR found that the
list of employees who participated in the organizational meeting was a separate and distinct requirement from the list of the names of members
comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit; and that there was no requirement for signatures opposite the names of the
union members; and there was no evidence showing that the employees assailed their inclusion in the list of union members.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the BLR. Undaunted, petitioner went to the CA via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 which denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the BLR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated March 29, 2011. Hence, this petition for review.
Issues:
1. Is respondent guilty of forum shopping?
2. Did respondent commit misrepresentation and fraud, which are grounds to cancel their registration?
Ruling:
1. No. Respondent is not guilty of forum shopping.
It is undisputed that BMP Paralegal Officer Domingo P. Mole was no longer authorized to file an appeal on behalf of union SALAMAT and
that BMP was duly informed that its services was already terminated. SALAMAT even submitted before the BLR its "Resolusyon Blg. 01-
2009" terminating the services of BMP and revoking the representation of Mr. Domingo Mole in any of the pending cases being handled by
him on behalf of the union. So, considering that BMP Paralegal Officer Domingo P. Mole was no longer authorized to file an appeal when it
filed the Notice and Memorandum of Appeal to DOLE Regional Office No. IV-A, the same can no longer be treated as an appeal filed by
union SALAMAT. Hence, there is no forum shopping to speak of in this case as only the Appeal Memorandum with Formal Entry of
Appearance filed by Atty. Napoleon C. Banzuela, Jr. and Atty. Jehn Louie W. Velandrez is sanctioned by SALAMAT.
Since Mole's appeal filed with the BLR was not specifically authorized by respondent, such appeal is considered to have not been filed at all.
It has been held that "if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed.
An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect."
Respondent through its authorized representative filed its Appeal Memorandum with Formal Entry of Appearance before the Labor Secretary,
and not with the BLR. As the appeal emanated from the petition for cancellation of certificate of registration filed with the Regional Office,
the decision canceling the registration is appealable to the BLR, and not with the Labor Secretary. However, since the Labor Secretary motu
propio referred the appeal with the BLR, the latter can now act on it. Considering that Mole's appeal with the BLR was not deemed filed,
respondent’s appeal, through Banzuela and Associates, which the Labor Secretary referred to the BLR was the only existing appeal with the
BLR for resolution. There is, therefore, no merit to petitioner's claim that BLR chose the appeal of Banzuela and Associates over Mole's
appeal.
2. No. Respondent did not misrepresent and no fraud was committed.

Art. 234 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 234. Requirements of Registration. - A federation, national union or industry or trade union center or an independent union
shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations
upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (₱ 50.00)registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational
meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) In case the applicant is an independent union, the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the
members who participated in it."
And after the issuance of the certificate of registration, the labor organization's registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of
registration proceedings in accordance with Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code. And the cancellation of union certificate of registration
and the grounds thereof are as follows:
ART. 238. Cancellation of Registration. - The certificate of registration of any legitimate labor organization, whether national or
local, may be cancelled by the Bureau, after due hearing, only on the grounds specified in Article 239 hereof.
ART. 239. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration. - The following may constitute grounds for cancellation of union
registration:
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or
amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification;
(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and
the list of voters;
(c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.
Petitioner's charge that respondent committed misrepresentation and fraud in securing its certificate of registration is a serious charge and
must be carefully evaluated. Allegations thereof should be compounded with supporting circumstances and evidence. We find no evidence
on record to support petitioner's accusation. Petitioner's allegation of misrepresentation and fraud is based on its claim that during the
organizational meeting on May 1, 2009, only 68 employees attended, while respondent claimed that it has 119 members as shown in the
document denominated as "Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon;" hence, respondent misrepresented on the 20% requirement of the law as to
its membership.
We do not agree. It does not appear in Article 234 (b) of the Labor Code that the attendees in the organizational meeting must comprise 20%
of the employees in the bargaining unit. In fact, even the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code does not so provide. It is
only under Article 234 (c) that requires the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit where it seeks to operate. Clearly, the 20% minimum requirement pertains to the employees’ membership in the union and
not to the list of workers who participated in the organizational meeting. Indeed, Article 234 (b) and (c) provide for separate requirements,
which must be submitted for the union's registration, and which respondent did submit. Here, the total number of employees in the bargaining
unit was 396, and 20% of which was about 79. Respondent submitted a document entitled "Pangalan ng Mga Kasapi ng Unyon" showing the
names of 119 employees as union members, thus respondent sufficiently complied even beyond the 20% minimum membership requirement.
Respondent also submitted the attendance sheet of the organizational meeting which contained the names and signatures of the 68 union
members who attended the meeting. Considering that there are 119 union members which are more than 20% of all the employees of the
bargaining unit, and since the law does not provide for the required number of members to attend the organizational meeting, the 68 attendees
which comprised at least the majority of the 119 union members would already constitute a quorum for the meeting to proceed and to validly
ratify the Constitution and By-laws of the union. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner to contend that grounds exist for the cancellation
of respondent's union registration. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under Article 239 of
the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of
union members.
Petitioner's claim that the alleged union members signed documents without adequate information is not persuasive. The one who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. In fact, we note that not one of those listed in the document denominated
as "Pangalan ng Mga Kasaping Unyon" had come forward to deny their membership with respondent. Notably, it had not been rebutted that
the same union members had signed the document entitled "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi," thus, strengtheningtheir desire to be
members of the respondent union.
Petitioner claims that in the list of members, there was an employee whose name appeared twice and another employee who was merely a
project employee. Such could not be considered a misrepresentation in the absence of showing that respondent deliberately did so for the
purpose of increasing their union membership. In fact, even if those two names were not included in the list of union members, there would
still be 117 members which was still more than 20% of the 396 rank-and-file employees.
As to petitioner's argument that the total number of its employees as of May 1, 2009 was 470, and not 396 as respondent claimed, still the
117 union members comprised more than the 20% membership requirement for respondent's registration.
In sum, respondent could not have possibly committed misrepresentation, fraud, or false statements. The alleged failure of respondent to
indicate with mathematical precision the total number of employees in the bargaining unit is of no moment, especially as it was able to
comply with the 20% minimum membership requirement. Even if the total number of rank-and-file employees of petitioner is 528, while
respondent declared that it should only be 455, it still cannot be denied that the latter would have more than complied with the registration
requirement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.
University of Immaculate Concepcion vs. Office of SOLE

GR No, 178085-86, Sept 14, 2015
Doctrine:
1. Confidential employees should be excluded from the bargaining unit and disqualified from joining any union: employees should not be
placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests.
2. In the case at bar, the secretaries, registrars, accounting personnel and guidance counselors of UIC were considered as confidential
employees and were validly terminated due to their refusal to resign from the Union.
Facts:
1. UIC is an educational institution with campuses at Fr. Selga and Bonifacio Sts., Davao City. Private respondent [“Union”] is the certified
sole bargaining agent of UIC's rank and file employees.
2. Union filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice.
3. On the same occasion, the UIC demanded the exclusion of secretaries, registrars, accounting personnel and guidance counselors
[“Respondent employees”] from the bargaining unit, on account of them being confidential employees.
4. Arbitration Panel: The parties agreed to submit this issue to voluntary arbitration, the arbitration panel sustained the UIC and ruled that
the respondent employees are confidential employees
5. UIC gave the affected respondent employees the option to choose between keeping their positions or resigning from the Union. When
they elected to keep both their positions and their union membership, UIC sent them notices of termination, which led into a notice of
strike.
6. Secretary: Ordered UIC to reinstate the respondent employees. This Order was later modified by directing the payroll reinstatement of
the respondent employees, instead of physical reinstatement. Secretary ruled that the respondent employees were illegally dismissed.
7. CA: Upheld the Secretary's conclusion of illegal dismissal on the ground that UIC could not validly prevent them from joining the Union
since they did not perform managerial functions.
a. The appellate court opined that notwithstanding the confidential nature of Respondent Employees' position, they were not
prohibited from joining the Union; hence, their dismissal by UIC was not legally justified.
b. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied UIC's motions for reconsideration
8. In a separate comment filed by the respondent employees, they claim that they have the right to maintain their union membership not
for the purpose of collective bargaining, but for legal representation in dealing with the employer; thus, there is no legal justification for
their dismissal.
Issue: Whether a confidential employee's refusal to vacate his / her union membership is a valid ground for dismissal.
Held: YES. The Secretary and CA believe it is not. We reverse.

1. Arbitration panel settled that respondent employees are confidential employees:
a. As a preliminary matter, we clarify that the issue of whether or not the respondent employees are confidential employees has
long been settled and its reexamination is already barred by res judicata.
b. The panel of voluntary arbitrators had already determined that the respondent employees are confidential employees who
must be excluded from the bargaining unit.The Arbitration Case having attained finality, the issues resolved may no longer
be disturbed or modified.
2. UIC informed them of the “loss of confidence”:
a. UIC cites willful disobedience and "loss of confidence" as the grounds for dismissing the respondent employees.
b. In its termination letters, UIC informed them that because of their continued union membership notwithstanding the voluntary
arbitration decision, "management no longer has any trust and confidence in you in the delicate, sensitive and confidential
position you hold."
c. Generally, employers are given wide latitude in terminating the services of employees who perform functions which by their
nature require the employer's full trust and confidence. Nonetheless, employers do not have unbridled authority to dismiss
employees by simply invoking Article 282(c). The loss of confidence must be genuine and cannot be used as a subterfuge for
causes which are illegal.
3. Requisites of “loss of confidence”: In determining whether loss of confidence is a just cause for dismissal under Article 282(c), we
laid down the following requisites in the 2008 case of Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.), Inc. v. Baban:
a. The employee must hold a position of trust and confidence.
b. There must be a willful act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.
4. 1st requisite present respondent employees hold position of trust and confidence: As a rule, loss of confidence may only be invoked
by the employer against an employee occupying a position of responsibility, trust and confidence — hence, the first requisite.
Ordinarily, this would require us to make a determination with regard to the true nature of the respondent employees' positions.
a. HERE: But given the facts of this case, noting in particular the final and executory decision in the Arbitration Case which
deemed respondent employees as confidential employees, we only now need to determine whether confidential
employees hold positions of trust and confidence.
5. Respondent employees are fiduciary rank and file employees: Bristol Myers and subsequent cases essentially follow the same formula
by subdividing positions of trust and confidence into two classes: (1) managerial employees and (2) fiduciary rank-and-file employees.
a. HERE: Respondent employees fall under the latter category.
6. 2nd requisite present respondent employees’ refusal is a “willful act”: The essence of the second requisite is that the loss of confidence
must be based on a willful breach of trust founded on clearly established facts.
a. HERE: It is not disputed that the respondent employees refused to resign from the Union, notwithstanding the decision in the
Arbitration Case. Respondent Employees do not claim that they were coerced into retaining their union membership; in fact,
they even insist upon their right to join the Union.
b. HERE: The voluntariness of respondent employees' refusal to vacate their union membership — which constitutes the "willful
act" — is therefore unequivocally established.
7. We hold that the willful act of refusing to leave the Union is sufficient basis for UIC to lose its trust and confidence on respondent
employees.
a. There was just cause for dismissing the respondent employees.
b. In this regard, CA erred in holding that they are allowed to join the Union. If Respondent Employees were allowed to retain
their union membership, UIC would not be assured of their loyalty because of the apparent conflict between the employees'
personal interests and their duty as confidential employees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the appealed Decision are MODIFIED as follows: (1) petitioner's dismissal
of respondent employees is hereby declared valid for just cause and petitioner is therefore authorized to remove the aforementioned employees
from its payroll upon finality of this decision; and (2) petitioner is ordered to pay each of the Respondent-Employees the sum of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00) as nominal damages for non-compliance with the mandatory procedural due process requirements. The
Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard vs. BLR, et al

GR No. 211145, Oct. 14, 2015
Doctrine: The right to self-organization is not limited to unionism. Workers may also form or join an association for mutual aid and protection
and for other legitimate purposes.
Facts: On February 16, 2010, Samahan filed an application for registration of its name "Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard"
with the DOLE. On February 26, 2010, the DOLE Regional Office No. 3, City of San Fernando, Pampanga (DOLE-Pampanga), issued the
corresponding certificate of registration in favor of Samahan.
On March 15, 2010, respondent filed a petition with DOLE-Pampanga praying for the cancellation of registration of Samahan's association.
DOLE Regional Director Ernesto Bihis ruled in favor of Hanjin.
Aggrieved, Samahan filed an appeal before the BLR. The BLR granted Samahan's appeal and reversed the ruling of the Regional Director.
It stated that the law clearly afforded the right to self-organization to all workers including those without definite employers but directed
Samahan to remove the words "Hanjin Shipyard" from its name.
The CA rendered its decision, holding that the registration of Samahan as a legitimate workers' association was contrary to the provisions of
Article 243 of the Labor Code. It stressed that only 57 out of the 120 members were actually working in Hanjin. The CA was of the view that
dropping the words "Hanjin Shipyard" from the association name would not prejudice or impair its right to self-organization because it could
adopt other appropriate names.
Issues:
1. The court of appeals seriously erred in finding that samahan cannot form a workers' association of employees in hanjin and instead should
have formed a union, hence their registration as a workers' association should be cancelled.
2. The court of appeals seriously erred in ordering the removal/deletion of the word "hanjin" in the name of the union by reason of the
company's property right over the company name "hanjin.
Ruling:
1. Right to self-organization includes right to form a union, workers' association and labor management councils
Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
And Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution also states:

Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right to self-organization includes the right to form, join or assist labor organizations
for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the
same purpose for their mutual aid and protection.
The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends two notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, that is, the absence
of restraint which guarantees that the employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and (b) the power, by virtue of which
an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association.
A labor organization is defined as "any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective
bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment."
A union refers to any labor organization in the private sector organized for collective bargaining and for other legitimate purpose, while a
workers' association is an organization of workers formed for the mutual aid and protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose
other than collective bargaining.
Any labor organization which may or may not be a union may deal with the employer. This explains why a workers' association or
organization does not always have to be a labor union and why employer-employee collective interactions are not always collective
bargaining.
To further strengthen employee participation, Article 255 (now 261) of the Labor Code mandates that workers shall have the right to
participate in policy and decision-making processes of the establishment where they are employed insofar as said processes will directly
affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers may form LMCs.
The existence of employer-employee relationship is not mandatory in the formation of workers' association. What the law simply requires is
that the members of the workers' association, at the very least, share the same interest. The very definition of a workers' association speaks
of "mutual aid and protection."
Right to choose whether to form or join a union or workers' association belongs to workers themselves
In the case at bench, the Court cannot sanction the opinion of the CA that Samahan should have formed a union for purposes of collective
bargaining instead of a workers' association because the choice belonged to it. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily
includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising the said right.
Hanjin posits that the members of Samahan have definite employers, hence, they should have formed a union instead of a workers' association.
The Court disagrees. There is no provision in the Labor Code that states that employees with definite employers may form, join or assist
unions only.
The Court agrees with Samahan's argument that the right to form a workers' association is not exclusive to ambulant, intermittent and itinerant
workers. The option to form or join a union or a workers' association lies with the workers themselves, and whether they have definite
employers or not.
No misrepresentation on the part of Samahan to warrant cancellation of registration

The Court concludes that misrepresentation, to be a ground for the cancellation of the certificate of registration, must be done maliciously
and deliberately. Further, the mistakes appearing in the application or attachments must be grave or refer to significant matters. The details
as to how the alleged fraud was committed must also be indubitably shown.
The records of this case reveal no deliberate or malicious intent to commit misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The use of such words
"KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard" in the preamble of the constitution and by-laws did not constitute misrepresentation
so as to warrant the cancellation of Samahan's certificate of registration.
Even granting arguendo that Samahan's members misrepresented themselves as employees or workers of Hanjin, said misrepresentation does
not relate to the adoption or ratification of its constitution and by-laws or to the election of its officers.
2. Removal of the word "Hanjin Shipyard" from the association's name, however, does not infringe on Samahan's right to self-organization.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the BLR that "Hanjin Shipyard" must be removed in the name of the association. A legitimate workers'
association refers to an association of workers organized for mutual aid and protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other
than collective bargaining registered with the DOLE. Having been granted a certificate of registration, Samahan's association is now
recognized by law as a legitimate workers' association.
The Court refers to the Corporation Code, which governs the names of juridical persons. Section 18 thereof provides:
No corporate name may be allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission if the proposed name
is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already protected by law or is
patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing laws.
For the same reason, it would be misleading for the members of Samahan to use "Hanjin Shipyard" in its name as it could give the wrong
impression that all of its members are employed by Hanjin.
HSBC Employees Union vs. NLRC

GR No. 156635, Jan. 11, 2016
Facts: In the period material to this case, petitioner Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union (Union) was the duly
recognized collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of respondent Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC).
A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governed the relations between the Union and its members, on one hand, and HSBC effective
April 1, 1990 until March 31, 1993 for the non-representational (economic) aspect, and effective April 1, 1990 until March 31, 1995 for the
representational aspect.5 The CBA included a salary structure of the employees comprising of grade levels, entry level pay rates and the
individual pays depending on the length of service.
On January 18, 1993, HSBC announced its implementation of a job evaluation program (JEP) retroactive to January 1, 1993. The JEP
consisted of a job designation per grade level with the accompanying salary scale providing for the minimum and maximum pay the employee
could receive per salary level.
On December 22, 1993, at around 12:30 p.m., the Union's officers and members walked out and gathered outside the premises of HSBC's
offices on Ayala Avenue, Makati and Ortigas Center, Pasig.17 According to HSBC, the Union members blocked the entry and exit points of
the bank premises, preventing the bank officers, including the chief executive officer, from entering and/or leaving the premises.18 This
prompted HSBC to resort to a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of its officials and employees thus prevented from leaving the premises,
whom it airlifted on December 24, 1993 to enable them to leave the bank premises.
On December 24, 1993, HSBC filed its complaint to declare the strike illegal.
In the meantime, HSBC issued return-to-work notices to the striking employees on December 22, 1993. Only 25 employees complied and
returned to work. Due to the continuing concerted actions, HSBC terminated the individual petitioners on December 27, 1993.23 The latter,
undeterred, and angered by their separation from work, continued their concerted activities. not dismissal
Issues:
1. Whether the strike commenced on December 22, 1993 was lawfully conducted
2. Whether the petitioners were illegally dismissed
Ruling: Non-compliance with Article 263 of the Labor Code renders a labor strike illegal.
The right to strike is a constitutional and legal right of all workers because the strike, which seeks to advance their right to improve the terms
and conditions of their employment, is recognized as an effective weapon of labor in their struggle for a decent existence. However, the right
to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employers. Thus, the law prescribes limits on
the exercise of the right to strike.40cralawred
Article 263 of the Labor Code specifies the limitations on the exercise of the right to strike, viz.:
Article 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts, x x

xxxx
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employers may
file a notice of lockout with the [Department] at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practices, the
period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed
by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly
elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the existence of the union
is threatened, the 15-day cooling off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.
(d) The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and regulations as the [Secretary] of Labor and Employment may
promulgate.
(e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the [Department] to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a
voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of clays from the mandatory filing of
the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout.
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained
by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of
the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called
for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when
the strike or lockout vote was taken. The [Department] may, at its own initiative or upon request of any affected party, supervise the
conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the [Department] the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.
xxxx
The procedural requirements for a valid strike are, therefore, the following, to wit: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE at least 30 days
before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of ULP; (2) a strike vote approved by the majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (3) a notice of the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike given to the DOLE. These requirements are mandatory, such that non-compliance therewith by the
union will render the strike illegal.41
We underscore that the language of the law itself unmistakably bears out the mandatory character of the limitations it has prescribed, to wit:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. - (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained
collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without
the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the [Department]
Hijo Resources Corp.vs. Mejares

GR No. 208986, Jan. 13, 2016
Doctrine:
The ruling in a certification election case on the existence or non-existence of an employer-employee relationship does not operate as res
judicata in the illegal dismissal case filed before the NLRC.
Facts: Respondents Mejares, Baluran, Saycon, and Cucharo were among the complainants, represented by their labor union named
"Nagkahiusang Mamumuo ng Bit, Djevon, at Raquilla Farms sa Hijo Resources Corporation" (NAMABDJERA-HRC), who filed with the
NLRC an illegal dismissal case against petitioner Hijo Resources Corporation (HRC). They alleged that HRC, formerly known as Hijo
Plantation Incorporated (HPI), is the owner of agricultural lands in Madum, Tagum, Davao del Norte, which were planted primarily with
Cavendish bananas. In 2000, HPI was renamed as HRC. In December 2003, HRC's application for the conversion of its agricultural lands
into agri-industrial use was approved. The machineries and equipment formerly used by HPI continued to be utilized by HRC.
In 2001, complainants were absorbed by HRC, but they were working under the contractor-growers: Buenaventura Tano (Bit Farm); Djerame
Pausa (Djevon Farm); and Ramon Q. Laurente (Raquilla Farm). Complainants asserted that these contractor-growers received compensation
from HRC and were under the control of HRC. They further alleged that the contractor-growers did not have their own capitalization, farm
machineries, and equipment. When the complainants formed a union named NAMABDJERA-HRC, and filed a petition for certification
election before the DOLE, the 3 contractor-growers filed with the DOLE a notice of cessation of business operations. In September 2007,
they were terminated. So they, filed a case for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and illegal deductions with prayer for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees before the NLRC, represented by NAMABDJERA-HRC.
On November 19 2007, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order dismissing the certification election case because of lack of employer-employee
relationship between HRC and the complainants. Such order was issued after the complainants were terminated from their employment in
September 2007, which led to the filing of the illegal dismissal case before the NLRC on 19 September 2007. Considering their termination
from work, it would have been futile for the members of the respondent union to appeal the Med-Arbiter' s order in the certification election
case to the DOLE Secretary. Instead, they pursued the illegal dismissal case filed before the NLRC.
Issue: WON the Labor Arbiter, in the illegal dismissal case, is bound by the ruling of the Med-Arbiter regarding the existence or non-
existence of employer-employee relationship between the parties in the certification election case?
Ruling: No.
There is no question that the Med-Arbiter has the authority to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the
parties in a petition for certification election. Under Article 226 of the Labor Code, as amended, the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), of
which the med-arbiter is an officer, has the following jurisdiction -
"ART. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. - The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the
Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties,
on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations
in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties."
From the foregoing, the BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to inter alia, decide all disputes, grievances or problems arising from
or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural. Necessarily, in the exercise of this
jurisdiction over labor-management relations, the med-arbiter has the authority, original and exclusive, to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between the parties.
Apropos to the present case, once there is a determination as to the existence of such a relationship, the med-arbiter can then decide the
certification election case. As the authority to determine the employer-employee relationship is necessary and indispensable in the exercise
of jurisdiction by the med-arbiter, his finding thereon may only be reviewed and reversed by the Secretary of Labor who exercises appellate
jurisdiction under Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides -
"ART. 259. Appeal from certification election orders. - Any party to an election may appeal the order or results of the election as determined
by the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment on the ground that the rules and regulations or parts thereof
established by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the conduct of the election have been violated. Such appeal shall be decided
within fifteen (15) calendar days."
As mentioned, the Med-Arbiter's order in this case dismissing the petition for certification election on the basis of non-existence of employer-
employee relationship was issued after the members of the respondent union were dismissed from their employment. The purpose of a petition
for certification election is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer.
The respondent union, without its member-employees, was thus stripped of its personality to challenge the Med-Arbiter's decision in the
certification election case. Thus, the members of the respondent union were left with no option but to pursue their illegal dismissal case filed
before the Labor Arbiter. To dismiss the illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter on the basis of the pronouncement of the Med-
Arbiter in the certification election case that there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties, which the respondent union
could not even appeal to the DOLE Secretary because of the dismissal of its members, would be tantamount to denying due process to the
complainants in the illegal dismissal case. This, we cannot allow.
Ramirez et al., vs. Polyson Industries Inc.

GR No. 207898, Oct. 19, 2016
Facts: Respondent Polyson Industries, Inc. (Polyson) is a duly organized domestic corporation, which is primarily engaged in the business
of manufacturing plastic bags for supermarkets, department stores and the like. Petitioners, on the other hand, were employees of Polyson
and were officers of Obrero Pilipino (Obrero), the union of the employees of Polyson.
The instant case arose from a labor dispute, between herein petitioners and Respondent Corporation, which was certified by the Secretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Polyson alleged that: on April 28, 2011, it
received a notice of hearing from the DOLE with respect to the petition for certification election filed by Obrero; on May 31, 2011, Polyson,
through counsel and management representative, met with the officers of Obrero, led by the union president, herein petitioner Ramirez;
Obrero asked that it be voluntarily recognized by Polyson as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Polyson, but
the latter refused and opted for a certification election; furious at such refusal, the Obrero officers threatened the management that the union
will show its collective strength in the coming days.
Polyson received a rush order from one of its clients for the production of 100,000 pieces of plastic bags; the management of Polyson informed
the operators of its Cutting Section that they would be needing workers to work overtime because of the said order. The supervisors then
requested that the operators set aside their time for the following day to work beyond their regular shift; on June 8, 2011, five (5) operators
indicated their desire to work overtime; however, after their regular shift, three of the five workers did not work overtime which resulted in
the delay in delivery of the client's order and eventually resulted in the cancellation of the said order by reason of such delay.
When management asked the workers, who initially manifested their desire to work overtime, two of the three workers, namely, Leuland
Visca (Visca) and Samuel Tuting (Tuting) gave the same reason, to wit: "Ayaw nila/ng iba na mag-OT [overtime] ako"; the management
then conducted an investigation and a hearing where Visca affirmed his previous claim that petitioners were the ones who pressured him to
desist from rendering overtime work. The management informed petitioners that it has decided to terminate petitioners' employment on the
ground that they instigated an illegal concerted activity resulting in losses to the company.|
Petitioners denied the allegations of Polyson contending that they were terminated from their employment not because they induced or
threatened their co-employees not to render overtime work but because they established a union which sought to become the exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Polyson; that their termination was undertaken without affording them substantive and
procedural due process; and that Polyson is guilty of unfair labor practice.
Subsequently, on June 29, 2011, Obrero filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) which was
predicated on various grounds, among which was the alleged illegal dismissal of herein petitioners.
Thereafter, on July 21, 2011, the DOLE Secretary certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for immediate compulsory arbitration where the
parties were required to maintain the status quo, in accordance with Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s dismissal from employment is valid.
Ruling: Due process under the Labor Code involves two aspects: first is substantive, which refers to the valid and authorized causes of
termination of employment under the Labor Code; and second is procedural, which points to the manner of dismissal.
As a complementary principle, the employer has the onus of proving with clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence the validity of
the dismissal. The evidence on record clearly establishes that herein [petitioners] resorted to an illicit activity. The act of inducing and/or
threatening workers not to render overtime work, given the circumstances surrounding the instant case, was undoubtedly a calculated effort
amounting to 'overtime boycott' or 'work slowdown.' [Petitioners], in their apparent attempt to make a statement — as a response to [Polyson's]
refusal to voluntarily recognize Obrero Pilipino — Polyson Industries Chapter as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-
and-file employees, unduly caused [Polyson] significant losses in the aggregate amount of Two Hundred Ninety Thousand Pesos
(PhP290,000.00). The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the above findings, which were affirmed by the CA.|||
In any case, a review of the records at hand shows that the evidence presented by Polyson has proven that petitioners are indeed guilty of
instigating two employees to abstain from working overtime.|| Hence, the grave penalty of dismissal imposed on the guilty parties is a natural
consequence, considering the interest of public welfare.
Erson Ang Lee Doing Business as Super Lamination Services vs. Samahang Manggagawa ng Super Lamination
GR No. 193816, Nov. 21, 2016
Facts: Three Labor Unions (Union A— Samahan ng mga Manggagawa ng Super Lamination Services; Union B—Express Lamination
Workers’ Union; and Union C—Samahan ng mga Manggagawa ng Express Coat Enterprises, Inc) filed a Petition for Certification Election
to represent all the rank-and-file employees of Express Super Lamination, Express Lamination and Express Coat, respectively.
These companies were companies allegedly owned by one, Ang Lee (petitioner). The three companies filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of
employer-employee relationship between the establishments and the bargaining units. The common defense was that these employees were
not their employees but the employees of the other two companies. The unions argued that their petitions should have been allowed
considering that the companies involved were unorganized, and that the employers had no concomitant right to oppose the petitions. They
also claimed that while the questioned employees might have been assigned to perform work at the other companies, they were all under one
management's direct control and supervision.
DOLE found that these sister companies had one common human resource department responsible for hiring and disciplining the employees
of the three companies. To DOLE, these circumstances showed that the companies were engaged in a work-pooling scheme, which they
might be considered as one and the same entity for determining the appropriate bargaining unit in a certification election. DOLE then applied
the concept of multi-employer bargaining for the creation of a single bargaining unit for the rank-and-file employees of all three companies.
Issue: WON the rank and file employees of the 3 companies constitute an appropriate bargaining unit
Ruling: Yes. The basic test for determining the appropriate bargaining unit is the application of a standard whereby a unit is deemed
appropriate if it affects a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions, and other
subjects of collective bargaining.
Geographical location can be completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not sacrificed. In the present
case, there was communal interest among the rank-and- le employees of the three companies. While there is no prohibition on the mere act
of engaging in a work-pooling scheme as sister companies, that act will not be tolerated, and the sister companies' separate juridical
personalities will be disregarded, if they use that scheme to defeat the workers' right to collective bargaining. The employees' right to
collectively bargain with their employers is necessary to promote harmonious labor-management relations in the interest of sound and stable
industrial peace.
Peninsula Employees Union vs. Esquivel

GR No. 218454, Dec. 1, 2016
Docrtrine: The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully negotiated the CBA with the employer is given the right to collect
a reasonable fee called “agency fee” from non-union members who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount equivalent
to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in case they accept the benefits under the CBA.
Facts: On December 13, 2007, Peninsula Employees Union’ (PEU) Board of Directors passed Local Board Resolution No. 12, series of
20078 authorizing, among others, the affiliation of PEU with NUWHRAIN, and the direct membership of its individual members thereto.
On the same day, the said act was submitted to the general membership, and was duly ratified by 223 PEU members. Beginning January 1,
2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union dues/agency fees from one percent (1%) to two percent (2%) of the rank and file
employees’ monthly salaries, brought about by PEU’s affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its affiliates to remit to it
two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries.
The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased agency fees arguing that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no written
CBA has been formally signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and the Hotel; (b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant and unreasonable; and
(c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for such increase.
Issues:
1.Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect the increased agency fees.
2.Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for such increase.
3.Whether the agency is exorbitant and unreasonable.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully negotiated the CBA with the employer is given the right to collect a
reasonable fee called “agency fee” from non-union members who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount equivalent
to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in case they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the collection of agency fees is
recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code, as amended, the legal basis of the union’s right to agency fees is neither
contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-union employees may not unjustly enrich
themselves by benefiting from employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. In the present case, PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to
collect agency fees is not disputed.
2. Yes. Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and ( o ) of the Labor Code mandates the submission of three (3) documentary requisites in
order to justify a valid levy of increased union dues. These are: (a) an authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members
at the general membership meeting duly called for the purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting, which shall include
the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees; and
(c) individual written authorizations for check-off duly signed by the employees concemed. In the present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN
failed to show compliance with the foregoing requirements. It attempted to remedy the “inadvertent omission” of the matter of the approval
of the deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the monthly basic salary of each union member.
While the matter of implementing the two percent (2%) union dues was taken up during the PEU-NUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership
Meeting on October 28, 2008, there was no sufficient showing that the same had been duly deliberated and approved. The minutes of the
Assembly itself belie PEU-NUWHRAIN’s claim that the increase in union dues and the corresponding check-off were duly approved since
it merely stated that “the [two percent (2%)] Union dues will have to be implemented,” meaning, it would still require the submission of such
matter to the Assembly for deliberation and approval.
3. Yes. Having failed to establish due deliberation and approval of the increase in union dues from one percent ( 1 % ) to two percent (2% ),
as well as the deduction of the two percent (2%) union dues during PEU-NUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership Meeting on October 28,
2008, there was nothing to confirm, affirm, or ratify through the July 1, 2010 GMR. Contrary to the ruling of the OSEC in its March 6, 2012
Order, the July 1 2010 GMR, by itself, cannot justify the collection of two percent (2%) agency fees from the non-PEU members beginning
July 2010. The Assembly was not called for the purpose of approving the proposed increase in union dues and the corresponding check-off,
but merely to “confirm and affirm” a purported prior action which PEU-NUWHRAIN, however, failed to establish.
Corollarily, no individual check-off authorizations can proceed therefrom, and the submission of the November 2008 check-off authorizations
becomes inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that the express consent of the employee to any deduction in his compensation is required to
be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by the law, which must be followed to the letter; however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to
comply. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that there is no legal basis to impose union dues and agency fees more than that allowed in the expired
CBA, .e., at one percent (1 %) of the employee’s monthly basic salary.
Asian Institute of Management vs. Asian Institute of Management Faculty Association

GR No. 207971, January 23, 2017
Facts: Respondent AFA is a duly registered labor organization composed of members of the AIM faculty. AFA filed a petition for
certification election seeking to represent a bargaining unit in AIM consisting of forty (40) faculty members. AIM opposed the petition,
claiming that respondent's members are neither rank-and-file nor supervisory, but rather, managerial employees. Subsequently, AIM filed a
petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration on the grounds of misrepresentation in registration and that respondent is
composed of managerial employees who are prohibited from organizing as a union.
On the first case, the Med-Arbiter of DOLE denied the petition for certification election on the ground that AIM' s faculty members are
managerial employees. This Order was appealed by respondent before the SOLE who reversed the same. Meanwhile, in the second case, the
Regional Director of DOLE granted AIM's petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration and ordering its delisting from
the roster of legitimate labor organizations. This Order was appealed by AFA before the BLR which reversed the same and ordered AFA's
retention in the roster of legitimate labor organization.
AIM insists that the members of its tenure-track faculty are managerial employees, and therefore, ineligible to join, assist or form a labor
organization. It ascribes grave abuse of discretion on SOLE for its rash conclusion that the members of said tenure-track faculty are not
managerial employees solely because the faculty's actions are still subject to evaluation, review or final approval by the board of trustees
(BOT). AIM argues that the BOT does not manage the day-to-day affairs, nor the making and implementing of policies of the Institute, as
such functions are vested with the tenure-track faculty.
The first case remains pending before the Supreme Court via Certiorari. As to the second case, the CA affirmed the decision of the BLR to
retain AFA in the list of legitimate labor organizations. This decision is what’s being assailed in this case.
Issue: Whether or not AFA’s members are all managerial employees who are disqualified from joining, assisting, or forming a labor
organization.
Ruling: Jurisprudence already provides that "in case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an
employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union's certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code.”
AIM was therefore correct in filing a petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration. Petitioner's sole ground for seeking
cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration - that its members are managerial employees and for this reason, its registration is thus
a patent nullity for being an absolute violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code which declares that managerial employees are ineligible to
join any labor organization --- is, in a sense, an accusation that respondent is guilty of misrepresentation for registering under the claim that
its members are not managerial employees.
However, the issue of whether respondent's members are managerial employees is still pending resolution in the first case. To avoid
conflicting decisions, this case cannot be resolved until the first case is first resolved.
Sumifru (Phils) Corp vs. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm

GR No. 202091, June 7, 2017
Facts: Sumifru is a domestic corporation and is the surviving corporation after its merger with Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation
(FBAC) in 2008. FBAC was engaged in the buying, marketing, and exportation of Cavendish bananas. Respondent Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm (NAMASUF ANAFLU-KMU) (NAMASUFA) is a labor organization affiliated with the National Federation of
Labor Unions and Kilusang Mayo Uno.
The CA summarized the start of the proceedings with the Med-Arbiter as follows:
On March 14, 2008, the private respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm (NAMASUF A-NAFLU-KMU), a legitimate labor
organization, filed a Petition for Certification Election before the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XI in Davao
City. NAMASUFA sought to represent all rank-and-file employees, numbering around one hundred forty, of packing plant 90 (PP 90) of
Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC). NAMASUF A claimed that there was no existing union in the aforementioned establishment.
On May 9, 2008 FBAC filed an Opposition to the Petition. It argued that there exists no employer-employee relationship between it and the
workers involved. It alleged that members of NAMASUF A are actually employees of A2Y Contracting Services (A2Y), a duly licensed
independent contractor, as evidenced by the payroll records of the latter.
NAMASUFA, in its Comment to Opposition countered, among others, that its members were former workers of Stanfilco before FBAC took
over its operations sometime in 2002. The said former employees were then required to join the Compostela Banana Packing Plant Workers'
Cooperative (CBPPWC) before they were hired and allowed to work at the Packing Plant of FBAC. It further alleged that the members of
NAMASUF A were working at PP 90 long before A2Y came.
In June 20, 2008, pending resolution of the petition, FBAC was merged with SUMIFRU, the latter being the surviving corporation.
Issue: WON SUMIFRU IS THE EMPLOYER OF THE WORKERS ENGAGED BY THE COOPERATIVE AND/OR A2Y FOR THE
UPPER SIOCON GROWERS' PACKAGING OPERATIONS IN PACKING PLANT 90.
Ruling: The Petition is denied.

Sumifru's arguments raise questions of facts. Indeed, it even submitted to this Court, as annexes to its Petition, the very same evidence it had
presented before the Med-Arbiter, the DOLE Secretary, and the CA in its attempt to try to convince the Court that the members of
NAMASUFA are not its employees.
It is fundamental that in a petition for review on certiorari, the Court is limited to only questions of law. As specifically applied in a labor
case, the Court is limited to reviewing only whether the CA was correct in determining the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the DOLE Secretary. Thus, in Holy Child Catholic School v. Sta. Tomas, the Court ruled:
Our review is, therefore, limited to the determination of whether the CA correctly resolved the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the decision of the [Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE)], not on the basis of whether the latter's decision on the
merits of the case was strictly correct. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion is not what is ruled upon but whether it
correctly determined the existence or want of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the SOLE.
FFW v. Court of Appeals, findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies are entitled to great respect when they are supported by substantial
evidence and, in the absence of any showing of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, the factual findings bind the Court:
We take this occasion to emphasize that the office of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires
that it shall raise only questions of law. The factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of Labor and
Employment, when supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their respective fields.
Judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor official's findings rest. It
is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to an appeal,
particularly where the findings of both the trial court (here, the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter coincide, as in
this case at bar. The Rule limits that function of the Court to the review or revision of errors of law and not to a second analysis of the
evidence. Here, petitioners would have us re-calibrate all over again the factual basis and the probative value of the pieces of evidence
submitted by the Company to the DOLE, contrary to the provisions of Rule 45. Thus, absent any showing of whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the appellate court be amply demonstrated, we may not
disturb such factual findings.
Here, the CA was correct in finding that the DOLE Secretary did not commit any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment when it found
substantial evidence to support the DOLE Secretary's ruling that Sumifru was the employer of the members of NAMASUFA.
As defined, substantial evidence is "that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise." Here, the Med-Arbiter found, based on documents submitted
by the parties, that Sumifru gave instructions to the workers on how to go about their work, what time they were supposed to report for work,
required monitoring sheets as they went about their jobs, and provided the materials used in the packing plant.
In affirming the Med-Arbiter, the DOLE Secretary relied on the documents submitted by the parties and ascertained that Sumifru indeed
exercised control over the workers in PP 90. The DOLE Secretary found that the element of control was present because Sumifru required
monitoring sheets and imposed disciplinary actions for non-compliance with "No Helmet - No Entry" "No ID - No Entry" policies.
In turn, the CA, even as it recognized that the findings of facts of the DOLE Secretary and the Med-Arbiter were binding on it because they
were supported by substantial evidence, even went further and itself reviewed the records - to arrive, as it did arrive, at the same conclusion
reached by the DOLE Secretary and Med-Arbiter: that is, that Sumifru exercised control over the workers in PP 90.
In light of the foregoing, the Court cannot re-calibrate the factual bases of the Med-Arbiter, DOLE Secretary, and the CA, contrary to the
provisions of Rule 45, especially where, as here, the Petition fails to show any whimsicality or capriciousness in the exercise of judgment of
the Med-Arbiter or the DOLE Secretary in finding the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
United Polyresins, Inc. vs. Pinuela

GR No. 209555, July 31, 2017
Facts: Petitioner United Polyresins, Inc. (UPI) is a registered domestic corporation doing business in San Pedro, Laguna, while petitioners
Ernesto Uy Soon, Jr. and Julito Uy Soon are its corporate officers. Respondent Marcelino Pinuela was employed by UPI in 1987. He became
a member of the labor union, Polyresins Rank and File Association (PORFA), and was elected President thereof in May, 2005 and slated to
serve until the end of 2007. In a Collective Bargaining Agreement it was stipulated that UPI shall grant the Union P300,000 free of interest
for the establishment of a cooperative for the needs of its members.
On December 8, 2007, or several days before the P300,000.00 loan by UPI to PORFA became due, petitioners, respondent, and the other
union officers met to discuss the proposed new CBA. Thereat, petitioners told respondent that until the P300,000.00 is returned, the former
shall not discuss the proposed CBA.
On January 7, 2008, respondent led a complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), claiming that petitioners
refused to bargain collectively. During the scheduled conferences before the NCMB, petitioners raised the issue of non-payment of the
P300,000.00 owing to UPI and insisted on its payment; they also threatened to deduct the amount of P1,500.00 from the respective salaries
of the union members.
Because of the recurring threat of failed CBA negotiations and salary deductions as means of recovering the P300,000.00 loaned to the union,
union members began to demand the holding of a special election of union officers. They likewise accused respondent and the other union
officers of mismanagement, unduly hanging on to their positions, and lack of accountability.
Thereafter, a special elections was held wherein the new set of union officers conducted an investigation into the fact that the union had little
or no funds remaining in its bank account. Respondent attended the investigation, and admitted that the union had no more funds as they
were "utilized in the prosecution of cases during his incumbency.
After another inquiry by the new union officers, respondent was expelled from PORFA for being guilty of the following:
1. No actual financial statement
2. No listings or ledger of union member's [sic] emergency loans.
3. Unposted cheques on the Union's passbook collected from union members [sic] monthly dues.
4. Our union checking account at Security Bank were[sic] Zero balance/closed account.
5. No receipts/cash disbursement presented for the union operational [sic] expenses.
6. Unable to return the P300,000.00 lent by the management free of interest. (Art. XXVII, Section 3 of our CBA).
7. Unable to explain and present documents to support where the agency fees and union dues collected from legitimate union members were
used.
The officers held that these violations constituted an infringement of the union's Constitution, particularly Article XV, Section 1, paragraphs
(e) and (f) thereof, which speci cally prohibit the misappropriation of union funds and property and give ground for the impeachment and
recall of union officers.
Issue: Whether or not the charges of misappropriation of funds against the respondent were sufficient to expel the respondent from union
membership.
Ruling: The Court denied the Petition.

Respondent’s expulsion from PORFA is grounded on Article XV, Section 1 (e) and (f) of the union’s Constitution which provides:
e. Misappropriation of union funds and property. This is without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate criminal or civil action against the
responsible o cer/(s) by any interested party;
f. Willful violation of any provision of the constitution or rules, regulations, measures, resolution(s) and decision of the union.
However, these provisions refer to impeachment and recall of union officers, and not expulsion from union membership. It was error on the
part of PORFA and petitioners to terminate respondent's employment based on Article XV, Section 1, paragraphs (e) and (f) of the union's
Constitution. Such a ground does not constitute just cause for termination.
On the other hand, grounds for disqualification from membership may be found in Article IV, which states that —
Section 3. The following are not eligible neither [sic] for membership nor to election or appointment to any position in the union:
a. Subversive or persons who profess subversive ideas.
b. Persons who have been convicted of crime involving moral torpitude.
c. Persons who are not employees of the company.
These provisions do not apply in respondent's case. Although he was eventually charged with estafa, a crime involving moral turpitude, still,
he has not been convicted of the crime. For this reason, he may not be disqualified as union member.
RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION

Sarmiento vs. Tuico
GR Nos. L-75271-73, June 27, 1988
Facts: Asian Transmission Corp (ATC) terminated the services of Catalino Sarmiento,VP of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union
(BATU), for allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in the company premises .BATU filed a notice of strike, claiming that ATC had committed
an unfair labor practice. ATC, then, filed a petition asking the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the
matter or certify the same to NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
MOLE issued an order certifying the labor dispute to NLRC. At the same time, it enjoined the management from locking out its employees
and the union from declaring ga strike or similar concerted action. Proceedings could not continue in the NLRC, however, because of the
acceptance by Pres. Aquino of the resignations of 8 of its members, leaving only the vice-chairman in office. MOLE set aside the previous
orders and directly assumed jurisdiction of the dispute, at the same time, enjoined the company to accept all returning workers. This order
was later set aside upon motion of both BATU and ATC in view of the appointment of new commissioners in NLRC. MOLE then returned
the cases to NLRC and directed it to expedite the resolution of all issues relating to the dispute.
Conformably, NLRC issued on Jan 13, 1987 a resolution, which it affirmed in its resolution of Feb 12, denying the motion of reconsideration.
Three criminal complaints were filed against the workers, two by the personnel administrative officer of ATC and the third by Philippine
Constabulary. The first two complaints were for ―Violation of Art 265 par 1, in relation to Art 273 Labor Code. The third was for coercion.
In all 3 complaints, the defendants were charged with staging an illegal strike, barricading the gates of the ATC plant and preventing the
workers through intimidation, harassment and force from reporting for work.
Respondent Judge Orlando Tuico issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and committed 72 of them to jail although he later ordered
the release of 61 of them to the custody of the mayor of Calamba. The petitioners had earlier moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest
and the referral of the coercion charge to NLRC and later, for the dismissal of the criminal cases on the ground that they came under the
primary jurisdiction of the NLRC.
Issues:
1. W/N A RETURN TO WORK ORDER MAY BE VALIDLY ISSUED BY NLRC PENDING DETERMINATION OF THE LEGALITY
OF THE STRIKE;
2. W/N SUCH DETERMINATION, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF CERTAIN PERSONSINVOLVED IN THE SAID STRIKE
MAY BE VALIDLY RESTRAINED
Ruling: The authority for the order is found in Art 264(g) Labor Code, as amended by BP blg. 227, which provides: When in his opinion
there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but
not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and export oriented industries,
including those within export processing zones, MOLE shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking our locked out employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout.
The minister may seek the assistance of law-enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as such orders as he may
issue to enforce the same. There can be no question that MOLE acted correctly in certifying labor dispute to NLRC, given the predictable
prejudice the strike might cause not only to the parties but more especially to the national interest.
Thus, the return to work order was equally valid as a statutory part and part of the certification order issued by MOLE on Nov 24, 1986. The
challenged order of NLRC was actually only an implementation of the above provision of the Labor Code and a reiteration of the directive
earlier issued by MOLE in its own assumption order of Sept 9, 1986. It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return to work order
is to protect the workers who might otherwise be locked out by the employer for threatening or waging the strike, the more important reason
is to prevent impairment of the national interest in case the operations of the company are disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to
work as directed.
More particularly, it is the national economy that will suffer because of the result ant reduction in our export earnings and our dollar reserves,
not to mention possible cancellation of contracts of the company with foreign investors. It is also to emphasize that the return to work order
not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the
worker‘s will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option but of obligation. The suspension of proceedings in the criminal
complaints filed is justified on the ground of prematurity as there is no question that the acts complained of are connected with the compulsory
arbitration proceedings still pending in NLRC.
The 3 criminal cases should be suspended until the completion of the compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC, conformably to the
policy embodied in Circular no.15, series of 1982 and Circular no. 9, series of 1986, issued by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the
implementation of BP 227. These circulars require fiscals and other government prosecutors to first secure clearance of MOLE and/or Office
of the President before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and filing in court of the corresponding information of
cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute, including allegations of violence, coercion, physical injuries, assault upon a person in
authority and other similar acts of intimidation, obstructing the free ingress to and egress from a factory or place of operation of the machines
of such factory, or the employer‘s premises. it does not appear from the record that such clearance was obtained, conformably to the procedure
laid down to attain the industrial peace which is the primordial objects of this law.
Rivera vs. Espiritu

G.R. No. 135547, January 23, 2002
Facts: On June 5, 1998, PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) went on a three-week strike,
causing serious losses to the financially beleaguered flag carrier. As a result, PAL’s financial situation went from bad to worse. Faced with
bankruptcy, PAL adopted a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than one-third.
On July 22, 1998, PALEA went on strike to protest the retrenchment measures adopted by the airline, which affected 1,899 union members.
The strike ended four days later, when PAL and PALEA agreed to a more systematic reduction in PAL’s work force and the payment of
separation benefits to all retrenched employees.
On August 28, 1998, then President Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 16 creating an Inter-Agency Task Force (Task Force) to address
the problems of the ailing flag carrier. The Task Force was composed of the Departments of Finance, Labor and Employment, Foreign
Affairs, Transportation and Communication, and Tourism, together with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It was
“empowered to summon all parties concerned for conciliation, mediation (for) the purpose of arriving at a total and complete solution of the
problem.” Conciliation meetings were then held between PAL management and the three unions representing the airline’s employees, with
the Task Force as mediator.
PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer by private respondent Lucio Tan, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of PAL, of
a plan to transfer shares of stock to its employees. The pertinent portion of said plan, apart from transferring shares of stocks of the company
to employees reads that:
xxx
3. In order for PAL to attain (a) degree of normalcy while we are tackling its problems, we would request for a suspension of the Collective
Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) for 10 years.
This offer was rejected by the members of PALEA, a duly organized registered union of PAL. After a few more negotiations, and mounting
pressure on the worker’s due to PAL’s imminent closure, the following was agreed upon and further ratified by PALEA and PAL:
“x x x
4. To assure investors and creditors of industrial peace, PALEA agrees, subject to the ratification by the general membership, (to) the
suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten (10) years, provided the following safeguards are in place:
a. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file ground employees of the
Company;
b. The ‘union shop/maintenance of membership’ provision under the PAL-PALEA CBA shall be respected.
x x x.”
Seven officers and members of PALEA filed a petition to annul the agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA on the ground that it
violates the constitutional rights of employees to self-organization and collective bargaining, being founded on public policy, may not be
waived, nor waiver, ratified.
Issue: Whether or not the PAL-PALEA agreement, stipulating the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA unconstitutional and contrary to
public policy.
Ruling: The SC held that the agreement is both constitutional and in consonance with public policy.
Petitioners claim the agreement’s unconstitutionality saying that violates the worker’s right to self-organization and collective bargaining
hence violating the “protection to labor” policy laid down by the Constitution:
ART. 253-A. Terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. – Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall,
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years.x x x All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution.
Under this provision, insofar as representation is concerned, a CBA has a term of five years, while the other provisions, except for
representation, may be negotiated not later than three years after the execution. Petitioners submit by agreeing to a 10-year suspension,
PALEA, in effect, abdicated the workers’ constitutional right to bargain for another CBA at the mandated time. This argument is devoid of
merit.
A CBA is “a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement
reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for
adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement.”
The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe
financial situation faced by the employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but
preventing the latter’s closure.
The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor-management relations in order to create a climate of a sound and stable industrial
peace.
The SC found no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Article 253-A has a two-fold purpose. One is to
promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during its rehabilitation,
said agreement satisfies the first purpose of Article 253-A. The other is to assign specific timetables wherein negotiations become a matter
of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A, prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables and agreeing
on the remedies to enforce the same.
In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PAL’s ground employees, that voluntarily entered into the CBA with
PAL and opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either case it was the union’s exercise of its right to collective bargaining. The right
to free collective bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it.
Petitioners further allege that the 10-year suspension of the CBA under the PAL-PALEA agreement virtually installed PALEA as a company
union for said period, amounting to unfair labor practice.
The questioned proviso of the agreement reads:

a. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified-bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file ground employees of the
Company;
The aforesaid provision clearly only shows the intent of the parties to maintain “union security” during the period of the suspension of the
CBA. Its objective is to assure the continued existence of PALEA during the said period. We are unable to declare the objective of union
security an unfair labor practice. It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even playing
field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer. For this reason, the law has
allowed stipulations for “union shop” and “closed shop” as means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the
protection of their rights and interests vis-à-vis the employer.
Petitioners’ contention that the agreement installs PALEA as a virtual company union is also untenable. Under Article 248 (d) of the Labor
Code, a company union exists when the employer acts “[t]o initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters.” The case
records are bare of any showing of such acts by PAL.
We also do not agree that the agreement violates the five-year representation limit mandated by Article 253-A. Under said article, the
representation limit for the exclusive bargaining agent applies only when there is an extant CBA in full force and effect. In the instant case,
the parties agreed to suspend the CBA and put in abeyance the limit on the representation period.
In sum, we are of the view that the PAL-PALEA agreement dated September 27, 1998, is a valid exercise of the freedom to contract. Under
the principle of inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution, the contract must be upheld. Petition is dismissed.
Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 140518, December 16, 2004
Facts: On November 11, 1996, Petitioner union filed a petition for a certification election so that it may be declared the exclusive bargaining
representative of the Hotel’s employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. The petition was dismissed by the DOLE on January 15,
1997. After a few months, however, on August 25, 1997, petitioner union sent a letter to the Hotel informing it of its desire to negotiate for
a collective bargaining agreement. In reply, respondent hotel write to the union stating that the Hotel cannot recognize it as the employees’
bargaining agent since its petition for certification election had been earlier dismissed by the DOLE. On that same day, the Hotel received a
letter from the Union stating that they were not giving the Hotel a notice to bargain, but that they were merely asking for the Hotel to engage
in collective bargaining negotiations with the Union for its members only and not for all the rank and file employees of the Hotel.
On September 18, 1997, the Union announced that it was taking a strike vote. A Notice of Strike was thereafter filed on September 29, 1997,
with the NCMB for the Hotel’s alleged “refusal to bargain” and for alleged acts of unfair labor practice. The NCMB summoned both parties
and held a series of dialogues, the first of which was on October 6, 1997. On November 29, 1997, however, the Union staged a strike against
the Hotel. Numerous confrontations between the two parties followed, creating an obvious strain between them. The Hotel claims that the
strike was illegal and it had to dismiss some employees for their participation in the allegedly illegal concerted activity. The Union, on the
other hand, accused the Hotel of illegally dismissing the workers.
The SOLE then assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute, and issued an order certifying the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
The striking officers and members of the union were also directed to return to work and the Hotel to accept them back under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. The parties are enjoined from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation. The union
members reported for work the day after in received the order but the Hotel refused to accept the returning workers and instead filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the SOLE’s Order.
Thereafter, the SOLE issued another order modifying the order earlier issued. Instead of an actual return to work, the SOLE directed that the
strikers be reinstated only in the payroll. The Union moved for the reconsideration of this Order, but its motion was denied. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the order of the SOLE for payroll reinstatement. The CA held that the challenged order is merely an error of judgment and not
a grave abuse of discretion and that payroll reinstatement is not prohibited by law, but may be “called for” under certain circumstances.
Issue: Whether or not the order of the SOLE for payroll reinstatement is “called for the circumstance” of this case.
Ruling: The SC held that there is no showing that the facts called for payroll reinstatement as an alternative remedy. A strained relationship
between the striking employees and management is no reason for payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement. Petitioner correctly
points out that labor disputes naturally involve strained relations between labor and management, and that in most strikes, the relations
between the strikers and the non-strikers will similarly be tense. Bitter labor disputes always leave an aftermath of strong emotions and
unpleasant situations. Nevertheless, the government must still perform its function and apply the law, especially if, as in this case, national
interest is involved.
As a general rule, the State encourages an environment wherein employers and employees themselves must deal with their problems in a
manner that mutually suits them best. This is the basic policy embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution, which was further
echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code. Hence, a voluntary, instead of compulsory, mode of dispute settlement is the general rule.
However, Article 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, which allows the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute
involving an industry indispensable to the national interest, provides an exception:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission
for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike
or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. x x x
This provision is viewed as an exercise of the police power of the State. A prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy
and, therefore, the situation is imbued with public necessity and involves the right of the State and the public to self-protection.
Under Article 263(g), all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. This Court must point out that the law uses the precise phrase of “under the same terms
and conditions,” revealing that it contemplates only actual reinstatement. This is in keeping with the rationale that any work stoppage or
slowdown in that particular industry can be inimical to the national economy. It is clear that Article 263(g) was not written to protect labor
from the excesses of management, nor was it written to ease management from expenses, which it normally incurs during a work stoppage
or slowdown. It was an error on the part of the Court of Appeals to view the assumption order of the Secretary as a measure to protect the
striking workers from any retaliatory action from the Hotel. This Court reiterates that this law was written as a means to be used by the State
to protect itself from an emergency or crisis. It is not for labor, nor is it for management.
It is, therefore, evident from the foregoing that the Secretary’s subsequent order for mere payroll reinstatement constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Indeed, this Court has always recognized the “great breadth of discretion” by the
Secretary once he assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute. However, payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement is a departure
from the rule in these cases and there must be showing of special circumstances rendering actual reinstatement impracticable, as in the UST
case aforementioned, or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purpose of the law in providing for assumption of jurisdiction by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment in a labor dispute that affects the national interest. None appears to have been established in this case.
Even in the exercise of his discretion under Article 236(g), the Secretary must always keep in mind the purpose of the law. Time and again,
this Court has held that when an official by-passes the law on the asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective, the same will not be
maintained if the intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated.
University of Immaculate Concepcion vs. Sec. Of Labor

G.R. No. 151379, January 14, 2005
Facts: During the negotiations for the CBA between petitioner school and its union, one item was left unresolved and this was the inclusion
or exclusion of the following positions in the scope of the bargaining unit:
a. Secretaries
b. Registrars
c. Accounting Personnel
d. Guidance Counselors
This matter was submitted for voluntary arbitration. The panel of voluntary arbitrators rendered a decision excluding the above-mentioned
secretaries, registrars, chief of the accounting department, cashiers and guidance counselors from the coverage of the bargaining unit, while
included the accounting clerks and the accounting staff member in the bargaining unit. The union moved for the reconsideration of the above
decision. Pending, however, the resolution of its motion, it filed a notice of strike with the NCMB on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and
unfair labor practice. During the thirty (30) day cooling-off period, two union members were dismissed by petitioner.
Consequently, the union went on strike. Thereafter, the SOLE issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute, and all workers
were directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt of this Order and for Management to accept them back under the
same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. Parties were further directed to cease and desist from committing any or all acts that
might exacerbate the situation. Parties were also directed to submit their respective position papers.
Anent the motion for reconsideration filed by the union, the panel of voluntary arbitrators denied the same. Petitioner school then furnished
copies of the panel’s denial of the motion for reconsideration and the Decision to the individual respondents. Thereafter, the petitioner school
gave the above mentioned individual respondents two choices: to resign from the union and remain employed as confidential employees or
resign from their confidential positions and remain members of the union. The petitioner school relayed to these employees that they could
not remain as confidential employees and at the same time as members or officers of the Union. However, the individual respondents
remained steadfast in their claim that they could still retain their confidential positions while being members or officers of the Union. Hence,
the petitioner school sent notices of termination to the individual respondents.
The union then filed another notice of strike, this time citing as a reason the petitioner school’s termination of the individual respondents.
The union alleged that the school’s act of terminating the individual respondents is in violation of the Order of the SOLE. The SOLE issued
another Order reiterating the directives contained in the earlier Order. The SOLE also stated therein that the effects of the termination from
employment of these individual respondents be suspended pending the determination of the legality thereof. Hence, the school was directed
to reinstate the individual respondents under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute.
The school, thereafter, moved to reconsider the aforesaid 2nd order of the SOLE. It argued that the SOLE’s Order directing the reinstatement
of the individual respondents would render nugatory the decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude them from the collective
bargaining unit. However, the school’s motion was denied by the SOLE, wherein the latter declared that the decision of the panel of voluntary
arbitrators to exclude the individual respondents from the collective bargaining unit did not authorize the school to terminate their
employment. With its 2nd MR denied, the school filed another which made the SOLE modify the two previous orders. The 3rd order of the
SOLE directed the school to place the 12 terminated employees under payroll reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally
resolved.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition of the school for lack of merit and likewise denied its MR. Hence, this petition.
The school contends that the Secretary cannot take cognizance of an issue involving employees who are not part of the bargaining unit. It
insists that since the individual respondents had already been excluded from the bargaining unit by a final and executory order by the panel
of voluntary arbitrators, then they cannot be covered by the Secretary’s assumption order.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the SOLE can take cognizance of an issue involving employees who are not part of the bargaining unit.
2. Whether or not the order of the SOLE for payroll reinstatement is “called for the circumstance” of this case.
Ruling:
1. The SC held that the contention of the school is incorrect. Although the SC it recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives and it
often declines to interfere with the legitimate business decisions of the employer, this privilege is not absolute, but subject to exceptions.
One of these exceptions is when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes involving industries indispensable to the
national interest under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, which states:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. x x x
When the Secretary of Labor ordered the school to suspend the effect of the termination of the individual respondents, the Secretary did not
exceed her jurisdiction, nor did the Secretary gravely abuse the same. It must be pointed out that one of the substantive evils which Article
263(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further detriment of the national interest.
The University’s act of suspending and terminating union members and the Union’s act of filing another Notice of Strike after this Office
has assumed jurisdiction are certainly in conflict with the status quo ante. By any standards, these acts will not in any way help in the early
resolution of the labor dispute. It is clear that the actions of both parties merely served to complicate and aggravate the already strained labor-
management relations.
Indeed, it is clear that the act of the school of dismissing the individual respondents from their employment became the impetus for the union
to declare a second notice of strike. It is not a question anymore of whether or not the terminated employees, the individual respondents
herein, are part of the bargaining unit. Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise to further contentious
issues or increase the tensions between the parties should be considered an act of exacerbation and should not be allowed.
2. The SC held that the order of the SOLE for payroll reinstatement is “called for the circumstance” of this case.
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code states that all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under
the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The phrase “under the same terms and conditions” makes it clear that
the norm is actual reinstatement. This is consistent with the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be
detrimental to the national interest. As an exception to the rule, payroll reinstatement must rest on special circumstances that render actual
reinstatement impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law.
The “superseding circumstances” mentioned by the SOLE no doubt refer to the final decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential
nature of the positions of the twelve private respondents, thereby rendering their actual and physical reinstatement impracticable and more
likely to exacerbate the situation. The payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement ordered in these cases, therefore, appears justified
as an exception to the rule until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. This Court sees no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the SOLE in ordering the same.
The decision of the CA is affirmed.
Capitol Medical Center vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 147080, April 26, 2005
Facts: After the respondent union was able to get a Supreme Court decision dismissing its rival union’s petition for certification election was
dismissed and ordering petitioner company to negotiate a CBA with respondent union as the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees, said union requested for a meeting with the petitioner company to discuss matters pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA,
conformably with the decision of the Court.
However, petitioner company rejected the proposed meeting, on the claim that it was a violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and that the Union
was not a legitimate one. Petitioner company also filed a Petition for the Cancellation of the Union’s Certificate of Registration with the
DOLE on the ground that the union failed for several years to submit financial statements as required by law, and the union was engaged in
a strike which has been declared illegal by the NLRC. Apparently unaware of the petition, the Union reiterated its proposal for CBA
negotiations but to no avail. Instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the enforcement of the SC decision, the union filed a Notice of
Strike with the NCMB on the grounds of refusal to bargain, coercion on employees and interference/restraint to self-organization.
After a series of fruitless conferences before the NCMB, petitioner company filed a letter with the NCMB requesting that the Notice of Strike
be dismissed because the union failed to furnish the agency with a copy of a notice of meeting where the strike vote was conducted.
Thereafter, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes of the alleged strike vote purportedly held on November 10, 1997 at the parking
lot in front of the petitioner’s premises, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. It appears that 178 out of
the 300 union members participated therein, and the results were as follows: 156 members voted to strike; 14 members cast negative votes;
and eight votes were spoiled.
On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. Subsequently, on December 1, 1997, the Union filed an ex
parte motion with the DOLE, praying for its assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute. The Union likewise prayed for the imposition of
appropriate legal sanctions, not limited to contempt and other penalties, against the hospital director/president and other responsible corporate
officers for their continuous refusal, in bad faith, to bargain collectively with the Union, to adjudge the same hospital director/president and
other corporate officers guilty of unfair labor practices, and for other just, equitable and expeditious reliefs in the premises. The SOLE then
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and directed all striking workers to return to work within 24 hours and the management to resume
normal operations and accept back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Further, parties are
directed to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation; and for both parties to submit their respective proposals
for the CBA.
In obedience to the order of the SOLE, the officers and members of the Union stopped their strike and returned to work. For its part, the
petitioner filed a petition to declare the strike illegal with the NLRC where it appended affidavits of a number of persons who where in at the
corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City on November 10, 1997, and attested that no secret balloting took place in
the said premises. Another also attested that his signature was forged while others declared that they were not union members yet their
signatures were included in the strike vote attendance. In their position paper, the respondents appended the joint affidavit of the Union
president and those members who alleged that they had cast their votes during the strike vote held on November 10, 1997.
In the meantime, the Regional Director of the DOLE denied the petition of petitioner for the cancellation of the respondent Union’s certificate
of registration. As to the petition of petitioner to declare the union’s striker illegal, the Labor Arbiter ruled in the affirmative and held that
the strike staged by respondent union was illegal and subsequently, the union officers lost their employment status with petitioner. The Labor
Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997; moreover, no notice of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least
twenty-four (24) hours prior to the intended holding of the strike vote.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA and petitioner’s MR was likewise denied. Petitioner elevated its cause to the CA which
in turn dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner asserts that the NLRC and the CA erred in holding that the submission of a notice of a strike vote to the Regional Branch of
the NCMB as required by Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, is merely directory and not mandatory.
The use of the word “shall” in the rules, the petitioner avers, indubitably indicates the mandatory nature of the respondent Union’s duty to
submit the said notice of strike vote.
Issue: Whether or not the strike staged by the union was legal.
Ruling: The SC held that the strike staged by the union was illegal.
The respondent Union failed to comply with the second paragraph of Section 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads:
Section 10.Strike or lockout vote. – A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be
approved by a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer, corporation or association or the partners obtained by a secret ballot in a
meeting called for the purpose.
The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret
balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and notice of meetings referred to in the
preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings as well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before
the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period provided in this Rule.
Although the second paragraph of Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in the Labor Code of the Philippines, nevertheless, the same
was incorporated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code and has the force and effect of law.
Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, a union intending to stage a strike is
mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meeting. Unless the
NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be
unable to supervise the holding of the same, if and when it decides to exercise its power of supervision. In National Federation of Labor v.
NLRC, the Court enumerated the notices required by Article 263 of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules, which include the 24-hour
prior notice to the NCMB:
1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy
furnished the employer of the union;
2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of
bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where the union’s existence
is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed.
…
4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The
decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.
5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the
cooling-off period.
A union is mandated to notify the NCMB of an impending dispute in a particular bargaining unit via a notice of strike. Thereafter, the
NCMB, through its conciliator-mediators, shall call the parties to a conference at the soonest possible time in order to actively assist them in
exploring all possibilities for amicable settlement. In the event of the failure in the conciliation/mediation proceedings, the parties shall be
encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. However, if the parties refuse, the union may hold a strike vote, and if the
requisite number of votes is obtained, a strike may ensue. The purpose of the strike vote is to ensure that the decision to strike broadly rests
with the majority of the union members in general and not with a mere minority, and at the same time, discourage wildcat strikes, union
bossism and even corruption. A strike vote report submitted to the NCMB at least seven days prior to the intended date of strike ensures that
a strike vote was, indeed, taken. In the event that the report is false, the seven-day period affords the members an opportunity to take the
appropriate remedy before it is too late. The 15 to 30 day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably
resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an
opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.
The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours before the meeting for the said purpose is
designed to (a) inform the NCMB of the intent of the union to conduct a strike vote; (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on whether or
not there is a need to supervise the conduct of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence and/or irregularities attendant thereto; and (c)
should the NCMB decide on its own initiative or upon the request of an interested party including the employer, to supervise the strike vote,
to give it ample time to prepare for the deployment of the requisite personnel, including peace officers if need be. Unless and until the NCMB
is notified at least 24 hours of the union’s decision to conduct a strike vote, and the date, place, and time thereof, the NCMB cannot determine
for itself whether to supervise a strike vote meeting or not and insure its peaceful and regular conduct. The failure of a union to comply with
the requirement of the giving of notice to the NCMB at least 24 hours prior to the holding of a strike vote meeting will render the subsequent
strike staged by the union illegal.
Petition is granted.
Light Railway Transit vs. Venus, Jr.

G.R. No. 163782, March 24, 2006
Facts: Petitioner LTRA, a government corporation, constructed a light rail transit system from Monumento in Kalookan City to Baclaran in
Parañaque, Metro Manila. LTRA then, contracted petitioner METRO to operate and manage the Metro manila Light Rail Transit System.
METRO then hired its own employees including herein private respondents. Petitioner METRO thereafter entered into a 10-year CBA with
Pinag-isang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa METRO, Inc. – National Federation of Labor, otherwise known as PIGLAS-METRO, INC. – NFL –
KMU (Union), the certified exclusive collective bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner METRO.
However, in 1989, LTRA purchased the shares of stocks in petitioner METRO. LTRA and METRO continued with their distinct and separate
juridical personalities. Hence, when the CBA expired, they renewed the same, initially on a yearly basis, and subsequently on a monthly
basis.
In July 2000, the union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB against METRO on account of a deadlock in the CBA. On the same day, the
Union struck. The power supply switches in the different light rail transit substations were turned off. The members of the Union picketed
the various substations. They completely paralyzed the operations of the entire light rail transit system. As the strike adversely affected the
mobility of the commuting public, the SOLE issued on that same day an assumption of jurisdiction order directing all the striking employees
“to return to work immediately upon receipt of this Order and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of
employment prevailing prior to the strike.” The SOLE’s order of assumption of jurisdiction was personally served on the Union through its
members and officers, but the latter refused to receive the same. The sheriffs thus posted the Order in the different stations/terminals of the
light rail transit system. Further, the Order of assumption of jurisdiction was published in newspapers. Despite the issuance, posting, and
publication of the assumption of jurisdiction and return to work order, the Union officers and members, including herein private respondent
workers, failed to return to work. Thus, private respondents were considered dismissed from employment.
In the meantime, the Agreement for the Management and Operation of the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit System between petitioners
LRTA and METRO expired. The Board of Directors of petitioner LRTA decided not to renew the contract with petitioner METRO and
directed the LRTA management instead to immediately take over the management and operation of the light rail transit system to avert the
mass transportation crisis.
Private respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before NLRC and impleaded both petitioners LRTA and METRO. The LA
ruled in favor of the private respondents and held that they were illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC found that the striking workers
failed to heed the return to work order and reversed and set aside the decision of the labor arbiter. The suit against LRTA was dismissed
since “LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of Executive Order No. 603 with an original charter”10
and “it had no participation whatsoever with the termination of complainants’ employment. The private respondents’ MR was also denied by
the NLRC.
The CA, however, reversed the ruling of the NLRC and declared the workers’ dismissal as illegal, pierced the veil of separate corporate
personality and held the LRTA and METRO as jointly liable for back wages. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner METRO maintains that private respondent workers were not illegally dismissed but should be deemed to have abandoned their
jobs after defying the assumption of jurisdiction and return-to-work order issued by the Labor Secretary. Private respondent workers, on the
other hand, submit that they could not immediately return to work as the light rail transit system had ceased its operations.
Issue: Whether or not private respondents were illegally dismissed.
Ruling: The SC held that private respondents were not illegally dismissed.
In Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. NLRC, The SC said that the five-day period for the strikers to obey the Order of the Secretary of
Justice and return to work was not sufficient as “some of them may have left Metro Manila and did not have enough time to return during
the period given by petitioner, which was only five days.” In Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., it was further held –
The contention of the petitioner that the private respondents abandoned their position is also not acceptable. An employee who forthwith
takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said to have abandoned his work.
For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee
to resume his employment. This refusal must be clearly established. As we stressed in a recent case, mere absence is not sufficient; it must
be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.
In the instant case, private respondent workers could not have defied the return-to-work order of the SOLE simply because they were
dismissed immediately, even before they could obey the said order. The records show that the assumption of jurisdiction and return-to-work
order was issued by the SOLE on July 25, 2000. The said order was served and posted by the sheriffs of the Department of Labor and
Employment the following day, on July 26, 2000. Further, the said order of assumption of jurisdiction was duly published on July 27, 2000,
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. On the same day also, on July 27, 2000, private respondent workers were dismissed.
Neither could they be considered as having abandoned their work. If petitioner METRO did not dismiss the strikers right away, and instead
accepted them back to work, the management agreement between petitioners LRTA and METRO could still have been extended and the
workers would still have had work to return to. Thus petitioner METRO is guilty of illegal dismissal.
Decision of the CA is affirmed.
Sukhotai Cuisine & Restaurant vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 150437, July 17, 2006
Facts: Sometime in March 1998, the majority of the employees of the petitioner company organized themselves into a union which affiliated
with the Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC), and was designated as PLAC Local 460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter (Union).
On December 3, 1998, private respondent union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB on the ground of unfair labor practice, and
particularly, acts of harassment, fault-finding, and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs. On December 10,
1998, in a conciliation conference, the representatives of the petitioner agreed and guaranteed that there will be no termination of the services
of private respondents during the pendency of the case, with the reservation of the management prerogative to issue memos to erring
employees for the infraction, or violation of company policies. On the following day, or on December 11, 1998, a Strike Vote was conducted
and supervised by NCMB personnel, and the results of the vote were submitted to the NCMB on December 21, 1998.
On January 21, 1999, the petitioner and the Union entered into a Submission Agreement, thereby agreeing to submit the issue of unfair labor
practice – the subject matter of the foregoing Notice of Strike and the Strike Vote – for voluntary arbitration with a view to prevent the strike.
On March 24, 1999, during the pendency of the voluntary arbitration proceedings, the petitioner, through its president, Ernesto Garcia,
dismissed Eugene Lucente, a union member, due to an alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee in February 1999. In view of this termination,
private respondent Union filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. In the morning of June 24, 1999, private respondent Jose
Lanorias, a union member, was relieved from his post, and his employment as cook, terminated. Subsequently, respondent Billy Bacus, the
union vice-president, conferred with Ernesto Garcia and protested Lanorias’s dismissal. Shortly thereafter, respondents staged a “wildcat
strike.” On June 25, 1999, a Notice of Strike was re-filed by the private respondents and the protest, according to the respondents, was
converted into a “sit-down strike.” On the next day, or on June 26, 1999, the same was transformed into an “actual strike.”
On June 29, 1999, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike with the NLRC against private respondents, seeking to declare the strike
illegal, and to declare respondents, who participated in the commission of illegal acts, to have lost their employment status. Having arrived
at no amicable settlement, the parties submitted their position papers, together with supporting documents, affidavits of witnesses, and
photographs, in compliance with the orders of the Labor Arbiter.
On October 12, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring the strike illegal, and the employment of union officers and all
individual respondents are deemed validly terminated in accordance with law. The LA held that the Union failed to comply with the
mandatory requisites for a lawful strike; that the issuance of memos by the petitioner to instill discipline on erring employees is a lawful
exercise of management prerogative and do not amount to acts of unfair labor practice; that, instead of resorting to a strike, private respondents
should have availed of the proper legal remedies such as the filing of complaints for illegal suspension or illegal dismissal with the NLRC;
that, the root causes of the controversy are the petition for certification election and petition for cancellation of union registration which were
then pending before the Department of Labor as well as the issue on unfair labor practice then pending before the voluntary arbitrator, and,
hence, the parties should have awaited the resolution of the cases in the proper fora; and that even if private respondents complied with all
the requisites of a valid strike, the strike is still illegal due to the commission of prohibited acts, including the obstruction of free ingress and
egress of the premises, intimidation, and threat inflicted upon non-striking employees.
On appeal by the union, the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and dismissed the complaint of illegal strike. In overruling the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC held that the petitioner is guilty of union busting; that the petitioner violated the Submission Agreement dated December
10, 1998 in that no termination shall be effected during the voluntary arbitration proceedings and, hence, the strike was justified; that the
Notice of Strike and Strike Vote dated December 3, 1998 and December 11, 1998, respectively, are applicable to the strike of June 24, 25,
and 26, 1999 since the same issues of unfair labor practice were involved and that unfair labor practices are continuing offenses; that even if
the foregoing Notice of Strike and Strike Vote were not applicable, the Union may take action immediately since the petitioner is guilty of
union busting; and that the re-filing of a Notice of Strike on June 25, 1999 cured the defect of non-compliance with the mandatory
requirements.
After its MR was denied by the NLRC, petitioner company appealed to the CA, which in turn, was denied. Hence, this petition.
Respondents insist that the filing of the Notice of Strike on December 3, 1998, the Strike Vote of December 11, 1998, the submission of the
results of the vote to the NCMB on December 21, 1998, and their observation of the 15-day cooling-off period in case of unfair labor practice
as well as the seven-day reporting period of the results of the strike vote, all satisfy the mandatory requirements under Article 263[9] of the
Labor Code and are applicable to the June 1999 strike. In support of this theory, respondents invoke Article 263(f) in that the decision to
strike is valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike vote was taken, thus, there
is no need to repeat the process. Furthermore, according to the respondents, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Notice of Strike
and Strike Vote in December 1998 cannot be made to apply to the concerted actions in June 1999, these requirements may nonetheless be
dispensed with since the petitioner is guilty of union busting and, hence, the Union can take action immediately.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the strike staged by the private respondents is illegal.
2. Whether or not private respondents were deemed to have lost their employment status by participating in the commission of illegal acts
during the strike.
Ruling:
1. The SC held that the strike staged by the private respondents is illegal. The undisputed fact is that at the time the strike was staged in June
1999, voluntary arbitration between the parties was ongoing by virtue of the January 21, 1999 Submission Agreement. The issue to be
resolved under those proceedings pertained to the very same issues stated in the Notice of Strike of December 3, 1998: the commission of
unfair labor practices, such as acts of harassment, fault-finding, and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs.
Article 264 of the Labor Code provides that “no strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving
the same grounds for the strike or lockout.”
This Court has held that strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration are illegal, since these agreements must be strictly
adhered to and respected if their ends are to be achieved. The rationale of the prohibition under Article 264 is that once jurisdiction over the
labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the
coercive processes of a strike. Indeed it is among the chief policies of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective
bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation, as modes of settling labor, or industrial disputes.
The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations
between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis, subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws
and other labor and welfare legislation.
The alleged dismissals of Lucente and respondent Lanorias, both union members, which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike, are not
sufficient grounds to justify the radical recourse on the part of the private respondents. The questions that surround their dismissal, as private
respondents so affirm, are connected to the alleged breach of the “guarantee” by the petitioner not to dismiss its employees during the
pendency of the arbitration case, the very questions which they also link to the other incidents of unfair labor practices allegedly committed
by the petitioner—these matters should have been raised and resolved in the voluntary arbitration proceedings that were commenced precisely
to address them. On the other hand, if private respondents believed that the disciplinary measures had nothing to do with the issues under
arbitration, then they should have availed of the appropriate remedies under the Labor Code, such as the institution of cases of illegal dismissal
or, by agreement of the parties, the submission of the cases to the grievance machinery of the CBA, if one is available, so that they may be
subjected to separate voluntary arbitration proceedings, or simply seek to terminate the pending voluntary arbitration case and complete the
mandatory procedure for a lawful strike. Private respondents should have availed themselves of any of these alternative remedies instead of
resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure, specifically, the holding a wildcat strike. And because of the fact that the Union was fully aware
that the arbitration proceedings were pending, good faith cannot be invoked as a defense.
For failing to exhaust all steps in the arbitration proceedings by virtue of the Submission Agreement, in view of the proscription under Article
264 of the Labor Code, and the prevailing state policy as well as its underlying rationale, this Court declares that the strike staged by the
private respondents is illegal.
2. The SC held that private respondents were validly terminated. In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents, the
applicable provision is Article 264(a) of the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited Activities – (a) x x x

xxxx
x x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker
in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the
employer during such lawful strike.
The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264, make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein: an
ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal
acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike,
and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike. In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal, may suffice. Liability for prohibited acts is to be determined on an individual basis as was clearly provided by the evidence
submitted by the company. Thus, the Labor Arbiter is correct in ruling that the employment of all individual private respondents are deemed
validly terminated.
Philcom Employees Union vs. Phil. Global Communication

G.R. No. 144315, July 17, 2006
Facts: During the course of the negotiations for the renewal of its CBA, the union filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike due to perceived
unfair labor practice committed by the company. In view of the filing of the Notice of Strike, the company suspended negotiations on the
CBA which moved the union to file another Notice of Strike, on the ground of bargaining deadlock. At a conciliation conference held at the
NCMB, the parties agreed to consolidate the two (2) Notices of Strike filed by the union and to maintain the status quo during the pendency
of the proceedings.
However, while the union and the company officers and representatives were meeting, the remaining union officers and members staged a
strike at the company premises, barricading the entrances and egresses thereof and setting up a stationary picket at the main entrance of the
building. The following day, the company immediately filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction
over the labor dispute in accordance with Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.
Thereafter, the SOLE issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, enjoining any strike or lockout, whether threatened or actual,
directing the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation, directing the striking workers to return to
work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Secretary’s Order and for management to resume normal operations, as well as accept
the workers back under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties were likewise required to submit their respective
position papers and evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. A second order was issued reiterating the previous directive to
all striking employees to return to work immediately.
The union filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing, among others, the authority of the SOLE to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
Said motion was denied.
As directed, the parties submitted their respective position papers. In its position paper, the union raised the issue of the alleged unfair labor
practice of the company, such as contractualization, disallowance of union leave, non-implementation of employees’ benefits, etc. The
company, on the other hand, raised in its position paper the sole issue of the illegality of the strike staged by the union.
Based on the position papers, the SOLE held that the union’s allegation of unfair labor practices were not within the legal connotation of
Article 248 of the Labor Code, but were actually mere grievances which should have been processed through the grievance machinery or
voluntary arbitration outlined under the CBA. The SOLE further ruled that the strike conducted by the union was illegal.
Upon appeal to the CA, the appellate court denied the union’s petition and affirmed the ruling of the SOLE.
Issue: Whether or not the SOLE can take cognizance of the issue of the legality of a strike notwithstanding the absence of any proper petition
to declare the strike illegal.
Ruling: The SC held that the SOLE properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike. Since the very reason of the Secretary’s
assumption of jurisdiction was PEU’s declaration of the strike, any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to, but is essentially
involved in, the labor dispute itself.
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides:

When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders
as he may issue to enforce the same.
x x x x.
The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power
of the State, with the aim of promoting public good.[16] When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted “great breadth of
discretion” in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike
or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place.
It is of no moment that PEU never acquiesced to the submission for resolution of the issue on the legality of the strike. PEU cannot prevent
resolution of the legality of the strike by merely refusing to submit the issue for resolution. It is also immaterial that this issue, as PEU asserts,
was not properly submitted for resolution of the Secretary. The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing
or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies
arising from such labor dispute. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the
dispute.
Petition is dismissed.
GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS

G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006
Facts: This case has its genesis when the manager of GSIS issued a memorandum directing a number of its employees who are union embers
to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action. The
union’s counsel sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work in obedience
to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, of administrative charges
against some 110 union members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The union then filed with the CA a petition for prohibition against the GSIS on the ground that its members should not be made to explain
why they supported their union’s cause since the Civil Service Resolution No. 021316, otherwise known as the Guidelines for Prohibited
Mass Action, Section 10 of which exhorts government agencies to “harness all means within their capacity to accord due regard and attention
to employees’ grievances and facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition through the use of grievance machinery or any other modes of
settlement sanctioned by law and existing civil service rules.” It argued that the organized demonstrating employees did nothing more than
air their grievances in the exercise of their “broader rights of free expression” and are, therefore, not amenable to administrative sanctions.
On the other hand, petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural consequence of the service-disrupting rallies and
demonstrations staged during office hours by the absenting GSIS employees, there being appropriate issuances outlawing such kinds of mass
action.
The CA ruled in favor of the union and held that the filing of administrative charges against the union members is tantamount to grave abuse
of discretion which may be the proper subject of the writ of prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass
action.
Ruling: The SC held that the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted
mass action. It may be that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances stand
on a level higher than economic and other liberties. Any suggestion, however, about these rights as including the right on the part of
government personnel to strike ought to be, as it has been, trashed.
The Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision “in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by
law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of
the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service” by stating that the Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms
of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees to organize is
limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike, adding that public employees going on disruptive
unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondent’s members launched or participated in during that
time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited concerted
activity” refers to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees’ organization, with
the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it
includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG members and other
GSIS employees staged a walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main
office building. The record of attendance for the period material shows that, on the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per
cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., leaving
the other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. On the second day, 707
employees left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306
employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.
To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained at the usual level of efficiency at the GSIS main office
during those four (4) days of massive walkouts and wholesale absences would be to understate things. And to place the erring employees
beyond the reach of administrative accountability would be to trivialize the civil service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of
professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
Ruling of the CA is reversed.
Biflex Phils., Inc., Labor Union vs. Filflex Industrial & Mfg., Corp.
G.R. No. 155679, December 19, 2006
Facts: Petitioners Patricia Villanueva, Emilia Bandola, Raquel Cruz, Delia Relato, Regina Castillo, Lolita delos Angeles, Marissa Villoria,
Marita Antonio, Lolita Lindio, Eliza Caraulia, and Liza Sua were officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union. On the other hand, petitioners
Myrna dela Torre, Avelina Añonuevo, Bernice Borcelo, Narlie Yagin, Evelyn Santillan, Leony Serdoncilo, Trinidad Cuya, Andrea Lumibao,
Gynie Arneo, Elizabeth Capellan, Josephine Detosil, Zenaida Francisco, and Florencia Anago were officers of Filflex Industrial and
Manufacturing Labor Union. The two petitioner-unions, which are affiliated with National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), are the
respective collective bargaining agents of the employees of corporations.
Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation (respondents) are sister companies engaged in the
garment business. Situated in one big compound along with another sister company, General Garments Corporation (GGC), they have a
common entrance.
On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest the accelerating prices of oil. On even date, petitioner-unions, led
by their officers, herein petitioners, staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days, prompting respondents to file on October 31, 1990
a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to comply with procedural requirements. On November 13, 1990, respondents
resumed their operations. Petitioners, claiming that they were illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside from the fact that the
welga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the apprehension that violence would erupt between those participating in the welga and
the authorities, respondents’ workers were prevented from reporting for work. Petitioners further assert that respondents were “slighted” by
the workers’ no-show, and as a punishment, the workers as well as petitioners were barred from entering the company premises.
On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of respondents’ premises, petitioners, who claim that they filed a notice
of strike on October 31, 1990, explain that those were for the convenience of union members who reported every morning to check if the
management would allow them to report for work.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the work stoppage was illegal since the following requirements for the staging of a valid strike
were not complied with: (1) filing of notice of strike; (2) securing a strike vote, and (3) submission of a report of the strike vote to the
Department of Labor and Employment.
The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the respondents and held that the strike was illegal. Consequently, their following officers are declared
to have lost their employment status. Respondents thereupon terminated the employment of petitioners.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, it holding that there was no strike to speak of as no labor or industrial dispute
existed between the parties. It accordingly ordered respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former positions, without loss of seniority
rights, and with full backwages from the date of their termination. On respondents’ petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed that
of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue: Whether or not the strike staged by the union was illegal.
Ruling: The SC held that the strike was illegal.
That petitioners staged a work stoppage on October 24, 1990 in conjunction with the welga ng bayan organized by the labor sector to protest
the accelerating prices of oil, it is not disputed. Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an extended
sympathy strike. It affects numerous employers including those who do not have a dispute with their employees regarding their terms and
conditions of employment.
Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are scheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join a
welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage.
Even if petitioners’ joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an exercise of their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly
or freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances, the exercise of such rights is not absolute. For the protection of other
significant state interests such as the “right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth” enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution must also be considered, otherwise, oppression or self-destruction of capital in order to promote the interests of labor
would be sanctioned. And it would give imprimatur to workers’ joining demonstrations/rallies even before affording the employer an
opportunity to make the necessary arrangements to counteract the implications of the work stoppage on the business, and ignore the novel
“principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers” aimed at fostering industrial peace.
There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that they were allowed by respondents, to join the welga
ng bayan on October 24, 1990, their work stoppage is beyond legal protection.
Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with legal formalities, the strike would just the same be illegal,
for by blocking the free ingress to and egress from the company premises, they violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides
that “no person engaged in picketing shall … obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or
obstruct public thoroughfares.” In fine, the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its legal formalities but also by the
means by which it is carried out.
Petitioners, being union officers, should thus bear the consequences of their acts of knowingly participating in an illegal strike, conformably
with the third paragraph of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code which provides:
. . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
The SC, passing on the use of the word “may” in the immediately quoted provision, held that “the law . . . grants the employer the option of
declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment.” Reinstatement of a striker or retention of his
employment, despite his participation in an illegal strike, is a management prerogative which this Court may not supplant.
Petition is denied.
Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Corp., G.R. No. 154591, March 5, 2007, citing Grand Boulevard Hotel vs. Dacanay
GR. No. 153665, July 18, 2003
Facts: On 11 November 1999, the MHEA filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB Manila Hotel on the grounds of unfair labor practices.
Upon the petition of Manila Hotel, the SOLE certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g)
of the Labor Code. Specifically, the Order enjoined any strike or lockout and the parties were ordered to cease and desist from committing
any acts that may exacerbate the situation. MHEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 November 1999 assailing the validity of said
Order. During the conferences at the NLRC, the parties were advised of the certification order, which prohibited them from taking any action
that would exacerbate the situation.
On 10 February 2000, the MHEA conducted a strike despite the clear terms of the Order issued by the SOLE, and despite the repeated
reminders thereof. Manila Hotel then filed a complaint with prayer for injunction and or TRO, alleging that MHEA conducted an illegal
strike, blocked all ingress and egress of the hotel premises, harassed and intimidated company officers, non-striking employees, customers
and suppliers. In addition, it sought a declaration that the strike was illegal and that, consequently, the striking employees lost their
employment.
The NLRC issued an Order directing the striking workers to return to work immediately and the hotel to accept them back under the same
terms and conditions of employment. The NLRC further instructed the parties to submit proof of compliance with the instant order
immediately after the lapse of twenty-four hours. The NLRC received a copy of the Compliance filed by Manila Hotel on 14 February 2000,
manifesting that only six striking employees complied with the return-to-work Order and were reinstated. The other striking employees had
openly defied the said Order.
In response to the NLRC’s return-to-work order, the union filed a motion alleging that the NLRC had not acquired jurisdiction over the labor
dispute pending the resolution of the MR filed questioning the order of the SOLE. The union claimed that said motion had prevented the said
Order of the SOLE from becoming final and executory.
The NLRC ruled that the strike held by the union was illegal for its defiance of the return-to-work order. . However, it determined that only
the union officers were deemed to have lost their employment. It ruled that there was no evidence showing who among the striking employees
were actually notified of the return-to-work order, and therefore, such employees have not forfeited their employment. But in view of the
antagonism on both sides, the NLRC awarded a severance pay equivalent to one-month salary to the returning union members for every year
of service, instead of ordering Manila Hotel to reinstate them.
Issue: Whether or not the strike held by petitioner was illegal.
Ruling: The SC held that it was illegal.
MHEA members seek their reinstatement after participating in an illegal strike, that is, a strike that was conducted after receiving an Order
of assumptionby the SOLE certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Worse still, the strikers failed to comply with the
11 February 2000 return-to-work Order, issued by the NLRC, despite receipt thereof. The law explicitly prohibits such acts.
ART. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCKOUTS

xxxx
(g) When, in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of the assumption
or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations
and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders
as he may issue to enforce the same.
ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES

(a) x x x x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or
submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike
or lockout.
More to the point, the Court has consistently ruled in a long line of cases spanning several decades that once the SOLE assumes jurisdiction
over a labor dispute, such jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout.
Defiance of the assumption order or a return-to work order by a striking employee, whether a union officer or a member, is an illegal act and,
therefore, a valid ground for loss of employment status.
The assumption of jurisdiction by the SOLE over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to
the national interest is in the nature of a police power measure.
The allegation[ that the strikers relied on their honest belief that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, issued by the SOLE
on 24 November 1999, entitled them to participate in a strike, cannot be sustained. A return-to-work order is immediately executory
notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition
questioning its validity.
The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other construction. The certification attests to the urgency
of the matter, affecting as it does an industry indispensable to the national interest. The order is issued in the exercise of the court’s
compulsory power of arbitration, and therefore must be obeyed until set aside. To say that its [return-to-work order] effectivity must await
affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the
return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element it
concerned.
Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together
with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. This
extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without
jeopardizing national interests. Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or
desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order
is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their
action.
Petition is denied.
San Miguel Foods Inc., vs. San Miguel Corp Employees Union-PTGWO
G.R. No. 168569, October 5, 2007
Facts: On November 9, 1992, some employees of San Miguel Foods, Inc’s Finance Department, through the Union represented by Edgar
Moraleda, brought a grievance against Finance Manager Gideon Montesa (Montesa), for "discrimination, favoritism, unfair labor practices,
promoting divisiveness, etc, before SMFI Plant Operations Manager George Nava in accordance with Step 1 of the grievance machinery.
The Union sought the "1. review, evaluat[ion] & upgrad[ing of] all Finance staff and 2. promot[ion of] G.Q. Montesa to other SMC affiliate[s]
& subsidiaries."
SMFI informed the Union that it planned to address the grievance through a "work management review" to be completed by March 1993.
However, it was not completed by March 1993, prompting the Union to, elevate the grievance to Step 2.
Almost 9 months after the grievance meeting was held or on October 6, 1993, SMFI rendered a "Decision on Step 1 Grievance" stating that
it was still in the process of completing the "work management review," hence, the Union’s requests could not be granted.
The Union filed a complaint on October 20, 1993 before the NLRC, Arbitration Branch, against SMFI, its President Amadeo P. Veloso, and
its Finance Manager Montesa for "unfair labor practice, [and] unjust discrimination in matters of promotion . . . " It prayed that SMFI et al.
be ordered to promote the therein named employees "with the corresponding pay increases, etc.”
SMFI et al. filed a motion to dismiss,8contending that the issues raised in the complaint were grievance issues and, therefore, "should be
resolved in the grievance machinery. The Labor Arbiter granted SMFI et al.’s motion to dismiss and ordered the remand of the case to the
grievance machinery for completion of the proceedings.
On appeal, to the NLRC by "Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal", such was granted and accordingly ordered the Labor Arbiter to continue
the proceedings on the Union’s complaint. Hence, SMFI filed a petition for certiorari with SC which they referred the case to the CA pursuant
to St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.
Court of Appeals denied SMFI et al.’s petition for certiorari, it holding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the complaint of the Union,
they having violated the seniority rule under the CBA by appointing and promoting certain employees which amounted to a ULP.
Issues:
Whether or not the labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.
Whether or not SMFI is guilty of unfair labor practice.
Ruling:
Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court should thus not be strictly applied to a case filed before a Labor Arbiter. In determining jurisdiction
over a case, allegations made in the complaint, as well as those in the position paper, may thus be considered.
SMFI argues that the allegations in the Union’s complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter do not establish a cause of action for ULP, the Union
having merely contended that SMFI was guilty thereof without specifying the ultimate facts upon which it was based. It cites Section 1 of
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court as applying suppletorily to the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Thus, SMFI concludes that the Labor
Arbiter has no jurisdiction over its complaint.
The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters, enumerated in Article 217 of the Labor Code, includes complaints for ULP.
Indeed, the particular acts of ULP alleged to have been committed by SMFI were not specified; neither were the ultimate facts in support
thereof. In its Position Paper, however, the Union detailed the particular acts of ULP attributed to SMFI and the ultimate facts in support
thereof.
Section 7, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides: The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in
nature. The technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto. The Labor Arbiter
may avail himself of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy speedily, including ocular inspection and examination of
well-informed persons.
SMFI guilty of ULP but only on the ground of violation of the CBA Agreement.
ULP on the ground of discrimination which must allege that that they were done to encourage or discourage membership in a labor
organization.
Based on Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor
practices: (e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
On the questioned promotions, the Union did not allege that they were done to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization.
In fact, those promoted were members of the complaining Union. The promotions do not thus amount to ULP under Article 248(e) of the
Labor Code.
ULP on the ground of violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement –
(1) gross violation of the CBA; AND
(2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA.
As for the alleged ULP committed under Article 248(i), for violation of a CBA, this Article is qualified by Article 261 of the Labor Code,
the pertinent portion of which latter Article reads:
xxx
violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice
and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
In Silva v. NLRC, for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, the allegations
in the complaint should show prima facie the concurrence of two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; AND (2) the violation
pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA.
First, Thegrievance machinery provision in the CBA is not an economic provision, however, hence, the second requirement for a Labor
Arbiter to exercise jurisdiction of a ULP is not present.
Second, the Union alleges that violated the Job Security provision in the CBA, specifically the seniority rule, in that SMFI "appointed less
senior employees to positions at its Finance Department, consequently intentionally by-passing more senior employees who are deserving of
said appointment."
Since the seniority rule in the promotion of employees has a bearing on salary and benefits, it may, following a liberal construction (following
the rule on construction in favor of labor) of Article 261 of the Labor Code, be considered an "economic provision" of the CBA.
The Union charges SMFI to have promoted less senior employees, thus bypassing others who were more senior and equally or more qualified.
It may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA, a ULP over which the
Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals having affirmed the NLRC decision finding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the Union’s complaint and
thus remanding it to the Labor Arbiter for continuation of proceedings thereon, the appellate court’s said finding may be taken to have been
made only for the purpose of determining jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
Toyota Motor Phils Workers Asso. Vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 158786, October 19, 2007
Facts:
Toyota Motor Phils.Workers Assoc. (Union) is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) and is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees.
The Union applied and was granted the immediate holding of a certification election (the most democratic and expeditious method by which
the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are
working. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the
employees themselves) and was later recognized by the NCMB as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file
employees. Toyota challenged said Order via an appeal to the DOLE Secretary.
Pending Toyota’s appeal, the Union submitted its CBA proposals to Toyota which the latter denied. On February 22 & 23, 2001, Despite
denial of the Union’s request, more than 200 employees staged mass actions on in front of the BLR and the DOLE offices, to protest the
partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota which resulted to substantial company losses.
On March 16, 2001, Toyota terminated the employment of 227 employees. In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers,
the Union went on strike on March 17, 2001. Subsequently, from March 28, 2001 to April 12, 2001, the Union intensified its strike by
barricading the gates of Toyota’s Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants. The strikers prevented workers who reported for work from entering the
plants.
On April 10, 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued an Order certifying the labor dispute to the
NLRC. In said Order, the DOLE Secretary directed all striking workers to return to work at their regular shifts by April 16, 2001. On the
other hand, it ordered Toyota to accept the returning employees under the same terms and conditions obtaining prior to the strike or at its
option, put them under payroll reinstatement.
Meanwhile, on May 23, 2001, at around 12:00 noon, despite the issuance of the DOLE Secretary’s certification Order, several payroll-
reinstated members of the Union staged a protest rally in front of Toyota’s Bicutan Plant bearing placards and streamers in defiance of the
April 10, 2001 Order.
Then, on May 28, 2001, around forty-four (44) Union members staged another protest action in front of the Bicutan Plant. At the same time,
some twenty-nine (29) payroll-reinstated employees picketed in front of the Santa Rosa Plant’s main entrance, and were later joined by other
Union members.
When the parties were asked to submit their position papers, only Toyota heeded the order and the NLRC declared the strikes illegal.
Issues:
1. Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes;
2. Extent of the liabilities of union members participating in the strike
3. Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the illegal strikes.
Ruling:
1. Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal strike, viz:
(1) when it is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or
(2) when it violates a specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on requisites of a valid srtrike];
(3) when it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union
employees; or
(4) when it employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited
acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
(5) when it is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and
the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or
(6) when it is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.
A strike means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor
dispute, in turn, includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of the employer and the employee.
The term “strike” has been elucidated to encompass not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts
to damage, destroy, or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities.
While we recognize the right of every person or a group to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, the
exercise of such right is governed by existing laws, rules and regulations.
There are prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, and the Union failed to comply with the following requirements:
(1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice;
(2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose; and
(3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike.
These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them renders the strike illegal. The evident intention of the law
in requiring the strike notice and the strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of
legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law
With respect to the strikes committed from March 17 to April 12, 2001, those were initially legal as the legal requirements were
met. However, on March 28 to April 12, 2001, the Union barricaded the gates of the Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants and blocked the free
ingress to and egress from the company premises. This is a palpable violation of Art. 264(e), which proscribes acts of violence, coercion, or
intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company premises.
While it may be conceded that there was no work disruption in the two Toyota plants, the fact still remains that the Union and its members
picketed and performed concerted actions in front of the Company premises. This is a patent violation of the assumption of jurisdiction and
certification Order of the DOLE Secretary, which ordered the parties “to cease and desist from committing any act that might lead to the
worsening of an already deteriorated situation.” While there are no work stoppages, the pickets and concerted actions outside the plants have
a demoralizing and even chilling effect on the workers inside the plants and can be considered as veiled threats of possible trouble to the
workers when they go out of the company premises after work and of impending disruption of operations to company officials and even to
customers in the days to come.
Union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a strike
Under Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, It is clear that the responsibility of union officials is greater than that of the members. They are tasked
with the duty to lead and guide the membership in decision making on union activities in accordance with the law, government rules and
regulations, and established labor practices. The leaders are expected to recommend actions that are arrived at with circumspection and
contemplation, and always keep paramount the best interests of the members and union within the bounds of law. If the strike is legal at the
beginning and the officials commit illegal acts during the duration of the strike, then they cannot evade personal and individual liability for
said acts.
Member’s liability depends on participation in illegal acts

Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code provides that a member is liable when he knowingly participates in an illegal act “during a strike.” While the
provision is silent on whether the strike is legal or illegal, we find that the same is irrelevant. As long as the members commit illegal acts, in
a legal or illegal strike, then they can be terminated
However, when union members merely participate in an illegal strike without committing any illegal act, are they liable?
This was squarely answered in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC, where it was held that an ordinary striking worker cannot
be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. This was an affirmation of the rulings in Bacus v. Ople and Progressive Workers
Union v. Aguas, where it was held that though the strike is illegal, the ordinary member who merely participates in the strike should not be
meted loss of employment on the considerations of compassion and good faith and in view of the security of tenure provisions under the
Constitution. In Esso Philippines, Inc. v. Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso (MME), it was explained that a member is not responsible for the
union’s illegal strike even if he voted for the holding of a strike which became illegal.
Noted labor law expert, Professor Cesario A. Azucena, Jr., traced the history relating to the liability of a union member in an illegal strike,
starting with the “rule of vicarious liability,” thus:
Under [the rule of vicarious liability], mere membership in a labor union serves as basis of liability for acts of individuals, or for a labor
activity, done on behalf of the union. The union member is made liable on the theory that all the members are engaged in a general
conspiracy, and the unlawful acts of the particular members are viewed as necessary incidents of the conspiracy.
Thus, the rule on vicarious liability of a union member was abandoned and it is only when a striking worker “knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike” that he will be penalized with dismissal.
Now, what are considered “illegal acts” under Art.264(a)?

No precise meaning was given to the phrase “illegal acts.” It may encompass a number of acts that violate existing labor or criminal laws,
such as the following:
(1) Violation of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that “[n]o person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence,
coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public
thoroughfares”;
(2) Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out the strike; and
(3) Violation of any order, prohibition, or injunction issued by the DOLE Secretary or NLRC in connection with the assumption of
jurisdiction/certification Order under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code.
As earlier explained, this enumeration is not exclusive and it may cover other breaches of existing laws. In the cases at bench, the individual
respondents participated in several mass actions, viz:
(1) The rallies held at the DOLE and BLR offices on February 21, 22, and 23, 2001;
(2) The strikes held on March 17 to April 12, 2001; and
(3) The rallies and picketing on May 23 and 28, 2001 in front of the Toyota Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants.
Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC lays down the rule on the liability of the union members: An ordinary striking
employee cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike
and the striker who participated in the commission of illegal act[s] must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required.
Substantial evidence available under the circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR, the court ruled “Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be ‘substantial.’ Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.
2. The general rule is that when just causes for terminating the services of an employee under Art. 282 of the Labor Code exist, the employee
is not entitled to separation pay. The apparent reason behind the forfeiture of the right to termination pay is that lawbreakers should not
benefit from their illegal acts. The dismissed employee, however, is entitled to “whatever rights, benefits and privileges [s/he] may have
under the applicable individual or collective bargaining agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice” or under the
Labor Code and other existing laws. This means that the employee, despite the dismissal for a valid cause, retains the right to receive from
the employer benefits provided by law, like accrued service incentive leaves. With respect to benefits granted by the CBA provisions and
voluntary management policy or practice, the entitlement of the dismissed employees to the benefits depends on the stipulations of the CBA
or the company rules and policies.
As in any rule, there are exceptions. One exception where separation pay is given even though an employee is validly dismissed is when the
court finds justification in applying the principle of social justice well entrenched in the 1987 Constitution. The new Constitution contains a
separate article devoted to the promotion of social justice and human rights with a separate sub-topic for labor. Article XIII expressly
recognizes the vital role of labor, hand in hand with management, in the advancement of the national economy and the welfare of the people
in general. The categorical mandates in the Constitution for the improvement of the lot of the workers are more than sufficient basis to justify
the award of separation pay in proper cases even if the dismissal be for cause.
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is,
for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the
employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on
the ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his
offense.
There are two exceptions when the NLRC or the courts should not grant separation pay based on social justice:
Serious misconduct (which is the first ground for dismissal under Art. 282); or Acts that reflect on the moral character of the employee.
What is unclear is whether the ruling likewise precludes the grant of separation pay when the employee is validly terminated from work on
grounds laid down in Art. 282 of the Labor Code other than serious misconduct.
In all of the foregoing situations, the Court declined to grant termination pay because the causes for dismissal recognized under Art. 282 of
the Labor Code were serious or grave in nature and attended by willful or wrongful intent or they reflected adversely on the moral character
of the employees. We therefore find that in addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. 282 like willful
disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his
family, separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee.
In analogous causes for termination like inefficiency, drug use, and others, the NLRC or the courts may opt to grant separation pay anchored
on social justice in consideration of the length of service of the employee, the amount involved, whether the act is the first offense, the
performance of the employee and the like, using the guideposts enunciated in PLDT (see full text for case reference) on the propriety of the
award of separation pay.
The union officers who participated in and the union members who committed illegal acts during the illegal strike have lost their employment
status. In this case, the strike was held illegal because it violated agreements providing for arbitration. Again, there was no award of
separation pay nor financial assistance.
Lastly, Even though strikes and lockouts have been recognized as effective bargaining tools, it is an antiquated notion that they are truly
beneficial, as they only provide short-term solutions by forcing concessions from one party; but staging such strikes would damage the
working relationship between employers and employees, thus endangering the business that they both want to succeed.
PETITION DISMISSED.
Yokohama Tire Phils vs. Yokohama Employees Union

G.R. No. 159553, December 10, 2007
Facts: On October 7, 1999, respondent Yokohama Employees Union (Union) filed a petition for certification election among the rank-and-
file employees of Yokohama. Upon appeal from the Med-Arbiter’s order dismissing the petition, the Secretary of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) ordered an election with (1) “Yokohama Employees’ Union” and (2) “No Union” as choices. The election held
on November 23, 2001 yielded the following result: YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION – 131, NO UNION - 117, SPOILED - 2; Total
votes cast = 250. Yokohama challenged 78 votes cast by dismissed employees. On the other hand, the Union challenged 68 votes cast by
newly regularized rank-and-file employees and another five (5) votes by alleged supervisor-trainees. Yokohama formalized its protest and
raised as an issue the eligibility to vote of the 78 dismissed employees, while the Union submitted only a handwritten manifestation during
the election.
Issue: Whether or not it is proper to appreciate the votes of the dismissed employees
Ruling: Yes. The votes of the dismissed employees shall be appreciated.

Section 2, Rule XII (of the rules implementing Book V of the Labor Code), the rule in force during the November 23, 2001 certification
election clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously allows dismissed employees to vote during the certification election if the case they filed
contesting their dismissal is still pending at the time of the election.
Here, the votes of employees with illegal dismissal cases were challenged by petitioner although their cases were still pending at the time of
the certification election on November 23, 2001. These cases were filed on June 27, 2001 and the appeal of the Labor Arbiter’s February 28,
2003 Decision was resolved by the NLRC only on August 29, 2003.
Even the new rule has explicitly stated that without a final judgment declaring the legality of dismissal, dismissed employees are eligible or
qualified voters. Thus,
Rule IX
Conduct of Certification Election
Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. – . . . An employee who has been dismissed from work but has contested the
legality of the dismissal in a forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the order for the conduct of a certification
election shall be considered a qualified voter, unless his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final judgment at the time of the conduct of
the certification election.
xxxx
Thus, we find no reversible error on the part of the DOLE Acting Secretary and the Court of Appeals in ordering the appreciation of the votes
of the dismissed employees.
Finally, we need not resolve the other issues for being moot. The 68 votes of the newly regularized rank-and-file employees, even if counted
in favor of “No Union,” will not materially alter the result. There would still be 208 votes in favor of respondent and 189 votes in favor of
“No Union.” We also note that the certification election is already a fait accompli, and clearly petitioner’s rank-and-file employees had chosen
respondent as their bargaining representative.
Phil. Airlines Inc. vs. Phil Airlines Employees Association

G.R. No. 142399, March 12, 2008
Facts: On 6 February 1987, petitioner PAL and respondent PALEA entered into a CBA covering the period of 1986-1989. Part of said
agreement required petitioner PAL to pay its rank and file employees the following bonuses:
Section 4. 13th Month Pay (Mid-year Bonus) A 13th month pay, equivalent to one month’s current basic pay, consistent with the existing
practice shall be paid in advance in May.
Section 5. Christmas Bonus The equivalent of one month’s current basic pay as of November 30, shall be paid in December as a Christmas
bonus. Payment may be staggered in two (2) stages. It is distinctly understood that nothing herein contained shall be construed to mean that
the Company may not at its sole discretion give an additional amount or increase the Christmas bonus.
On 22 April 1988, prior to the payment of the 13th month pay (mid-year bonus), petitioner PAL released a guideline implementing the
aforequoted provision, to wit:
1)Eligibility
a) Ground employees in the general payroll who are regular as of April 30, 1988;
b)Other ground employees in the general payroll, not falling within category a) above shall receive their 13th Month Pay on or before
December 24, 1988;
2) Amount
a)For category a) above, one month basic salary as of April 30, 1988;
b)Employees covered under 1 b) above shall be paid not less than 1/12 of their basic salary for every month of service within the calendar
year.
3)Payment Date: May 9, 1988 for category 1 a) above.

Respondent PALEA assailed the implementation of the foregoing guideline on the ground that all employees of PAL, regular or non-regular,
must be paid their 13th month pay. In response thereto, petitioner PAL informed respondent PALEA that rank and file employees who were
regularized after 30 April 1988 were not entitled to the 13th month pay as they were already given their Christmas bonuses on 9 December
1988 per the Implementing Rules of Presidential Decree No. 851.
Disagreeing with petitioner PAL, respondent PALEA filed a labor complaint [16] for unfair labor practice against petitioner PAL before the
NLRC on 1 March 1989. The complaint interposed that â€œthe cut-off period for regularization should not be used as the parameter for
granting [the] 13th month pay considering that the law does not distinguish the status of employment but (sic) the law covers all employees.
petitioner PAL countered that those rank and file employees who were not regularized by 30 April of a particular year are, in principle, not
denied their 13th month pay considering they receive said mandatory bonus in the form of the Christmas Bonus; that the Christmas Bonus
given to all its employees is deemed a compliance with Presidential Decree No. 851 and the latterâ€™s implementing rules. It argues that 1)
the CBA does not apply to non-regular employees such that any benefits arising from said agreement cannot be made to apply to them,
including the mid- year bonus; and 2) it has always been the company practice not to extend the mid-year bonus to those employees who
have not attained regular status prior to the month of May, when payment of the particular bonus accrues.
Issue: Whether or not employees regularized after 30 April 1988 are entitled to 13th month pay or mid-year bonus
Ruling: Be that as it may, a cursory reading of the 1986-1989 CBA of the parties herein will instantly reveal that Art. I, Sec. 3 of said
agreement made its provision applicable to all employees in the bargaining unit.
Section 3.Application. All the terms and conditions of employment of employees within the bargaining unit are embodied in this Agreement,
xxx
without distinguishing between regular and non-regular employees. As succinctly put by respondent PALEA in its Memorandum:
All employees in (sic) PAL are entitled to the same benefit as they are within the same collective bargaining unit and the entitlement to such
benefit spills over to even non-union members.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a CBA extend to the laborers and employees in the collective bargaining unit, including those
who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor organization. Otherwise, it would be a clear case of discrimination.
Hence, to be entitled to the benefits under the CBA, the employees must be members of the bargaining unit, but not necessarily of the labor
organization designated as the bargaining agent. A “bargaining unit” has been defined as a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicates to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions
of the law. At this point, the allegation of petitioner PAL that the non-regular employees do not belong to the collective bargaining unit and
are thus not covered by the CBA is unjustified and unsubstantiated. It is apparent to us that petitioner PAL excludes certain employees from
the benefits of the CBA only because they have not yet achieved regular status by the cut-off date, 30 April 1988. There is no showing that
the non-regular status of the concerned employees by said cut-off date sufficiently distinguishes their interests from those of the regular
employees so as to exclude them from the collective bargaining unit and the benefits of the CBA.
Having ruled that the benefits provided by the subject CBA are applicable even to non-regular employees who belong to the bargaining unit
concerned, the next and crucial query to be addressed is whether the 13th month pay or mid- year bonus can be equated to the Christmas
bonus. Xxx
It must be stressed that in the 1986-1989 CBA, petitioner PAL agreed to pay its employees 1) the 13th month pay or the mid-year bonus, and
2) the Christmas bonus. The 13th month pay, guaranteed by Presidential Decree No. 851, is explicitly covered or provided for as the mid-
year bonus in the CBA, while the Christmas bonus is evidently and distinctly a separate benefit. Petitioner PAL may not be allowed to brush
off said distinction, and unilaterally and arbitrarily declare that for non-regular employees, their Christmas bonus is the same as or equivalent
to the 13th month pay. Xxx
The non-regular rank and file employees of petitioner PAL as of 30 April 1988, are not actually seeking more benefits than what the other
member-employees of the same bargaining unit are already enjoying. They are only requesting that all members of the bargaining unit be
treated equally and afforded the same privileges and benefits as agreed upon between respondent PALEA and petitioner PAL in the CBA.
Petitioner PAL is committing a patent act of inequity that is grossly prejudicial to the non-regular rank and file employees there being no
rational basis for withholding from the latter the benefit of a Christmas bonus besides the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus, while the same
is being granted to the other rank and file employees of petitioner PAL who have been regularized as of 30 April 1988, although both types
of employees are members of the same bargaining unit. As it had willfully and intentionally agreed to under the terms of the CBA, petitioner
PAL must pay its regular and non-regular employees who are members of the bargaining unit represented by respondent PALEA their 13th
month pay or mid-year bonus separately from and in addition to their Christmas bonus.
A collective bargaining agreement refers to a negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages,
hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.[40] As in all other contracts, the parties to a CBA may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.[41] Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties, and
compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
Steel Corp. vs. SCP Employees Union-NFL

G.R. No. 169829-30, April 16, 2008
Facts: Petitioner Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is engaged in manufacturing construction materials, supplying approximately
50% of the domestic needs for roofing materials. SCP-Federated Union of the Energy Leaders – General and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS)
filed a petition for Certification Election in its bid to represent the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Respondent SCP Employees
Union (SCPEU) – National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) intervened, seeking to participate and be voted for in such election but the
same was denied for having been filed out of time.
Later on, a consent election was conducted, with “FUEL-GAS” and “NO UNION” as choices. Said election was however declared a failure
because less than a majority of the rank-and-file employees cast their votes.
Later on, NAFLU, the mother federation of respondent SCPEU, filed a petition for Certification Election for and on behalf of its affiliate,
seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of petitioner. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election filed by NAFLU
and further ordered the conduct of the election with “NAFLU” and “NO UNION” as choices. Both petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to
the Secretary of Labor, which appeals were later consolidated.
DOLE Undersecretary rendered a consolidated decision ordering the conduct of a certification election with “SCPEU,” respondent and “NO
UNION” as choices. Subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied. Unsatisfied, petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the CA.
However, the certification election, as ordered by the Med-Arbiter, proceeded. FUEL-GAS participated without prejudice to the decision of
the CA in its pending petition. In said election, respondent emerged as winner; hence, an election protest filed by FUEL-GAS.
Meanwhile, the Undersecretary rendered a Decision certifying respondent as the exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner’s employees.
Petitioner and FUEL-GAS timely filed motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.
As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA proposals. Petitioner, however,
held in abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion for reconsideration. Finding no justification in petitioner’s refusal
to bargain with it, respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB.
Later, respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds, petitioner’s refusal to bargain and union busting. The notice was later
dismissed and respondent was enjoined from holding a strike.
Later, respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the grounds of refusal to bargain and union busting. Respondent thereafter went on strike.
However, the Labor Secretary certified the dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees to return to work.
Issue: Whether or not the strike staged by respondent union is illegal
Ruling: Whether or not respondent is the recognized collective bargaining agent had been finally resolved in the negative. Consequently, as
correctly concluded by the CA, it could not compel petitioner to bargain with it. Thus, the only issues left for determination are: the validity
of the strike participated in by the officers of the respondent union; and the validity of their termination from employment by reason of such
participation.
The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human struggle for a decent existence. It is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the
rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal
bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides
limits for its exercise.
In the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal for the following reasons: (1) it is a union-
recognition-strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws; (2) it was undertaken after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration;
and (3) it was in violation of the Secretary's return-to-work order.
Respondent's notices of strike were founded on petitioner's continued refusal to bargain with it. It thus staged the strike to compel petitioner
to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent, making it a union-recognition-strike. As its legal designation implies, this kind of strike is
calculated to compel the employer to recognize one's union and not other contending groups, as the employees' bargaining representative to
work out a collective bargaining agreement despite the striking union's doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of
formal certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit.
The certification election that was conducted where respondent emerged as winner, not having been recognized as valid, it has no authority
to represent the rank and file employees of petitioner. Thus, it could not ask petitioner to bargain with it. As the issue of its identity had been
the subject of a separate case which had been settled by the court with finality,61 petitioner cannot, therefore, be faulted in refusing to bargain.
Neither could this Court sustain respondent's imputation of unfair labor practice and union busting against petitioner. With more reason, this
Court cannot sustain the validity of the strike staged on such basis.
Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondent's purpose or objective in staging a strike, still, the strike would be declared illegal
for having been conducted in utter defiance of the Secretary's return-to-work order and after the dispute had been certified for compulsory
arbitration. Although ostensibly there were several notices of strike successively filed by respondent, these notices were founded on
substantially the same grounds – petitioner's continued refusal to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative.
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides:

When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders
as he may issue to enforce the same. x x x.
The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of
the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted "great breadth of discretion" to find
a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if
one has already taken place.
The moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption
shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue
another order directing a return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a
return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order.
A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the workers may
choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer.
Says the Labor Code:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. –
xxx
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission
of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together
with his co-workers so that the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its
interest. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor
disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. Regardless of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must
cease and/or desist from any and all acts that undermine or tend to undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption
and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of
the company, to justify their action.
Respondent, in the instant case, after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration,
filed notices of strike and staged the strike obviously contrary to the provisions of labor laws. Worse, it filed not one but several notices of
strike which resulted in two certified cases which were earlier consolidated. These disputes could have been averted had respondent respected
the CA's decision. That way, the collective bargaining agent would have been determined and petitioner could have been compelled to
bargain. Respondent, through its officers, instead opted to use the weapon of strike to force petitioner to recognize it as the bargaining agent.
The strike, having been staged after the dispute had been certified for arbitration and contrary to the return-to-work order, became a prohibited
activity, and was thus illegal.
Strikes exert disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace and progress of
society, not to mention the economic well-being of the State. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and members
in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. Hence, the decision to wield the weapon of strike must therefore
rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest
of the union which should not however be antithetical to the public welfare. In every strike staged by a union, the general peace and progress
of society and public welfare are involved.
Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, this Court shall now determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the union officers who
knowingly participated in the strike.
Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities.— x x x
Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with
full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, that mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement
had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. x x x.
It bears stressing that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker merely participating in an illegal
strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost
employment status. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law
provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who
participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from
service. Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the
positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management from filling up their positions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED.
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union vs. Standard Chartered Bank et al.
G.R. No. 161933, April 22, 2008
Facts: Petitioner and the Standard Chartered Bank (Bank) began negotiating for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in May
2000 as their 1998-2000 CBA already expired. Due to a deadlock in the negotiations, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike prompting the
Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
On May 31, 2001, Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued an Order for the parties to
execute their CBA.
Issue: Whether the Bank's Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and HR staff are confidential employees,
such that they shall be excluded in the bargaining unit
Ruling: The CBA provisions in dispute are the exclusion of certain employees from the appropriate bargaining unit and the adjustment of
remuneration for employees serving in an acting capacity for one month.
In their proposal, petitioner sought the exclusion of only the following employees from the appropriate bargaining unit – all managers who
are vested with the right to hire and fire employees, confidential employees, those with access to labor relations materials, Chief Cashiers,
Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and one Human Resources (HR) staff.
The Secretary's disposition of the issues raised by petitioner were affirmed by the CA. The Court sustains the CA.
Whether or not the employees sought to be excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit are confidential employees is a question of fact,
which is not a proper issue in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This holds more true in the present case in which
petitioner failed to controvert with evidence the findings of the Secretary and the CA.
The disqualification of managerial and confidential employees from joining a bargaining unit for rank and file employees is already well-
entrenched in jurisprudence. While Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to
managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or
nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and
highly confidential records.
In this case, the question that needs to be answered is whether the Bank's Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex
Department and HR staff are confidential employees, such that they should be excluded.
As regards the qualification of bank cashiers as confidential employees, National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) – Republic Planters
Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Torres declared that they are confidential employees having control, custody and/or access to confidential
matters, e.g., the branch's cash position, statements of financial condition, vault combination, cash codes for telegraphic transfers, demand
drafts and other negotiable instruments, pursuant to Sec. 1166.4 of the Central Bank Manual regarding joint custody, and therefore,
disqualified from joining or assisting a union; or joining, assisting or forming any other labor organization.
Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja meanwhile stated that “confidential employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph
operators who, having access to confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or
spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.”
Finally, in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court designated personnel staff, in which
human resources staff may be qualified, as confidential employees because by the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a
confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations.
Petitioner insists that the foregoing employees are not confidential employees; however, it failed to buttress its claim. Aside from its
generalized arguments and despite the Secretary's finding that there was no evidence to support it, petitioner still failed to substantiate its
claim. Petitioner did not even bother to state the nature of the duties and functions of these employees, depriving the Court of any basis on
which it may be concluded that they are indeed confidential employees. As aptly stated by the CA:
While We agree that petitioner's proposed revision is in accordance with the law, this does not necessarily mean that the list of exclusions
enumerated in the 1998-2000 CBA is contrary to law. As found by public respondent, petitioner failed to show that the employees sought to
be removed from the list of exclusions are actually rank and file employees who are not managerial or confidential in status and should,
accordingly, be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.
Absent any proof that Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex department and one (1) HR Staff have mutuality of
interest with the other rank and file employees, then they are rightfully excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit. x x x
Petitioner cannot simply rely on jurisprudence without explaining how and why it should apply to this case. Allegations must be supported
by evidence. In this case, there is barely any at all.
Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Samma-Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ing Alyansa (Samma-Likha) vs. Samma Corp.
G.R. No. 167141, Mar. 13, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma– Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng Alyansa (SAMMA-LIKHA) filed
a petition for certification election on July 24, 2001 in the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office IV. It claimed
that: (1) it was a local chapter of the LIKHA Federation, a legitimate labor organization registered with the DOLE; (2) it sought to represent
all the rank-and-file employees of respondent Samma Corporation; (3) there was no other legitimate labor organization representing these
rank-and-file employees; (4) respondent was not a party to any collective bargaining agreement and (5) no certification or consent election
had been conducted within the employer unit for the last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition arguing that (1) LIKHA Federation failed to establish its legal personality; (2) petitioner
failed to prove its existence as a local chapter; (3) it failed to attach the certificate of non-forum shopping and (4) it had a prohibited mixture
of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
In an order dated November 12, 2002, med-arbiter Arturo V. Cosuco ordered the dismissal of the petition on the following grounds: (1) lack
of legal personality for failure to attach the certificate of registration purporting to show its legal personality; (2) prohibited mixture of rank-
and-file and supervisory employees and (3) failure to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping.
Issues:
1. Whether a certificate for non-forum shopping is required in a petition for certification election;
2. Whether petitioner had the legal personality to file the petition for certification election.
Ruling:
1. There is no requirement of certificate of non-forum shopping.
The requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping refers to complaints, counter-claims, cross-claims, petitions or applications where
contending parties litigate their respective positions regarding the claim for relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner or applicant. A
certification proceeding, even though initiated by a "petition," is not a litigation but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding
character.
… [The] rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise the Court of the pendency of another action or
claim involving the same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation.
Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks
havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. Furthermore, the rule
proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before
the courts to promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of
the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions
upon the same issue.
The same situation holds true for a petition for certification election. Under the omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code as amended by
D.O. No. 9, it is supposed to be filed in the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the employer or where the
bargaining unit is principally situated. The rules further provide that where two or more petitions involving the same bargaining unit are filed
in one Regional Office, the same shall be automatically consolidated. Hence, the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting
decisions will rarely happen in this proceeding and, if it does, will be easy to discover.
Notably, under the Labor Code and the rules pertaining to the form of the petition for certification election, there is no requirement for a
certificate of non-forum shopping either in D.O. No. 9, series of 1997 or in D.O. No. 40-03, series of 2003 which replaced the former.
Considering the nature of a petition for certification election and the rules governing it, we therefore hold that the requirement for a certificate
of non-forum shopping is inapplicable to such a petition.
2. Petitioner argues that the erroneous inclusion of one supervisory employee in the union of rank-and-file employees was not a ground to
impugn its legitimacy as a legitimate labor organization which had the right to file a petition for certification election.
We agree.
LIKHA was granted legal personality as a federation under certificate of registration no. 92-1015-032-11638-FED-LC. Subsequently,
petitioner as its local chapter was issued its charter certificate no. 2-01.With certificates of registration issued in their favor, they are clothed
with legal personality as legitimate labor organizations:
Section 5.Effect of registration. – The labor organization or workers’ association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal
personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack,
but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.
Section 3.Acquisition of legal personality by local chapter. - A local/chapter constituted in accordance with Section 1 of this Rule shall
acquire legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documents enumerated therein. Upon compliance with all the
documentary requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor Relations shall issue in favor of the local/chapter a certificate
indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation
of certificate of registration. Unless petitioner’s union registration is cancelled in independent proceedings, it shall continue to have all the
rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to petition for certification election.
Furthermore, the grounds for dismissal of a petition for certification election based on the lack of legal personality of a labor organization
are the following: (a) petitioner is not listed by the Regional Office or the Bureau of Labor Relations in its registry of legitimate labor
organizations or (b) its legal personality has been revoked or cancelled with finality in accordance with the rules.
As mentioned, respondent filed a petition for cancellation of the registration of petitioner on December 14, 2002. In a resolution dated April
14, 2003, petitioner’s charter certificate was revoked by the DOLE. But on May 6, 2003, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this
resolution. Neither of the parties alleged that this resolution revoking petitioner’s charter certificate had attained finality. However, in this
petition, petitioner prayed that its charter certificate be "reinstated in the roster of active legitimate labor [organizations]." This cannot be
granted here. To repeat, the proceedings on a petition for cancellation of registration are independent of those of a petition for certification
election. This case originated from the latter. If it is shown that petitioner’s legal personality had already been revoked or cancelled with
finality in accordance with the rules, then it is no longer a legitimate labor organization with the right to petition for a certification election.
A Final Note
Respondent, as employer, had been the one opposing the holding of a certification election among its rank-and-file employees. This should
not be the case. We have already declared that, in certification elections, the employer is a bystander; it has no right or material interest to
assail the certification election.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
Hotel Enterprises of the Phils., (Hyatt Regency) vs Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-(NUWHRAIN)
GR No. 165756, June 5, 2009
Facts: Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-National Union of Workers in the Hotel Restaurant and Allied Industries (Union) is the
certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Hyatt Regency Manila, a hotel owned by petitioner Hotel Enterprises
of the Philippines, Inc. (HEPI).
In 2001, HEPI’s hotel business suffered a slump due to the local and international economic slowdown. After implementing several schemes
to recover their losses, HEPI decided to implement a downsizing scheme by removing positions identified as redundant. The effect was to
be a reduction of the hotel’s rank-and file employees from the agreed number of 248, from their CBA, down to just 150. The Union opposed
the downsizing plan because they did not believe the financial report stating that the hotel was incurring heavy financial losses, and for being
violative of the CBA.
Despite its opposition, a list of the positions declared redundant and to be contracted out was given by the management to the Union. Notices
of termination were, likewise, sent to 48 employees whose positions were to be retrenched or declared as redundant.
The Union filed a notice of strike based on unfair labor practice (ULP) against HEPI. A petition was likewise filed by HEPI to declare the
strike illegal.
The NLRC decided in favor of HEPI. They gave credence to the financial report that the hotel had incurred huge financial losses necessitating
the adoption of a downsizing scheme. Thus, NLRC declared the strike illegal, suspended all Union officers for a period of six (6) months
without pay, and dismissed the ULP charge against HEPI.
Issue: Whether or not the Union staged a valid strike.
Ruling: The Constitution affords full protection to labor, but the policy is not to be blindly followed at the expense of capital. Always, the
interests of both sides must be balanced in light of the evidence adduced and the peculiar circumstances surrounding each case.
The requisites for a valid strike are: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of
ULP; (b) a strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike. The
requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.
In this case, respondent fully satisfied the procedural requirements prescribed by law: a strike notice filed on April 12, 2002; a strike vote
reached on April 25, 2002; notification of the strike vote filed also on April 25, 2002; conciliation proceedings conducted on May 8, 20002;
and the actual strike on May 10, 2002.
Substantively, however, there appears to be a problem. A valid and legal strike must be based on "strikeable" grounds, because if it is based
on a "non-strikeable" ground, it is generally deemed an illegal strike. Corollarily, a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no acts constituting
ULP actually exist. As an exception, even if no such acts are committed by the employer, if the employees believe in good faith that ULP
actually exists, then the strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal. As a general rule, therefore, where a union believes that an employer
committed ULP and the surrounding circumstances warranted such belief in good faith, the resulting strike may be considered legal although,
subsequently, such allegations of unfair labor practices were found to be groundless.
Here, respondent Union went on strike in the honest belief that petitioner was committing ULP after the latter decided to downsize its
workforce contrary to the staffing/manning standards adopted by both parties under a CBA forged only four (4) short months earlier. The
belief was bolstered when the management hired 100 contractual workers to replace the 48 terminated regular rank-and-file employees who
were all Union members. Indeed, those circumstances showed prima facie that the hotel committed ULP.
Thus, even if technically there was no legal ground to stage a strike based on ULP (because the downzising/retrenchment scheme by the
employer was declared valid), since the attendant circumstances support the belief in good faith that petitioner’s retrenchment scheme was
structured to weaken the bargaining power of the Union, the strike, by exception, may be considered legal.
Because of this, we view the NLRC’s decision to suspend all the Union officers for six (6) months without pay to be too harsh a punishment.
A suspension of two (2) months without pay should have been more reasonable and just. Be it noted that the striking workers are not entitled
to receive strike-duration pay, the ULP allegation against the employer being unfounded.
Miranda vs. Asian Terminals Inc., et al.

GR No. 174316, June 23, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Teodorico S. Miranda, Jr. was employed by respondent ATI in 1991 as Checker I. He also became a member of the
Associated Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU or the union). On April 10, 1992, the petitioner, who was then the Vice President
of the union, was appointed to the position of Shop Steward, which is a union position under the payroll of the
company.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/174316.htm - _ftn5 The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between
the union and ATI provided for the appointment of a Shop Steward from among the union members, upon the recommendation of the union
president. The Shop Steward is a field representative of both the company and the union and acts as an independent arbiter of all complaints
brought to his attention.[
On December 28, 1993, Roger P. Silva, the President of APCWU, wrote a letter to the petitioner regarding the recall of his designation as
the union Shop Steward. The union president explained that the petitioner was recalled as union Shop Steward due to loss of trust and
confidence in him, pursuant to the “Agreement Amending the MPSI (Marina Port Services, Inc.) - APCWU CBA.” The letter further stated
that the petitioner refused to heed the union president’s reminders concerning his “chronic absenteeism” that “is hurting the interest of the
Union members as they are left with no responsible union officer when summoned for investigation concerning alleged infractions of
company rules.”
Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the grievance committee issued its report recommending to ATI the recall of the petitioner as Shop
Steward and for his reversion to his former position of Checker I, in accordance with the CBA. The petitioner questioned his recall as union
Shop Steward, and the union president, Roger P. Silva, issued a letter which reasoned that the petitioner’s recall as Shop Steward was pursuant
to Section 13 of the Agreement Amending the MPSI-APCWU CBA, amending Section 2, Article V of the MPSI-APCWU CBA which
required that the term of office of the Shop Steward shall be based on trust and confidence and favorable recommendation of the duly elected
president of the Union.
The petitioner argues that he is entitled to claim reinstatement as Shop Steward as well as the payment of his backwages pending the
respondent’s appeal. He further contends that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his consolidated petitions which prayed for the
enforcement of his reinstatement as Shop Steward for being moot and academic.
The respondent, on the other hand, maintains that both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals relied on substantial evidence in arriving at their
decision that the consolidated petitions are already moot and academic in view of the previous reinstatement of the petitioner to Checker I
and his retrenchment and separation from ATI since October 31, 2001.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner should be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward
2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the dispute
Ruling: A cursory look at the responsibilities of a shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is a position within the union, and not within
the company. A shop steward is appointed by the union in a shop, department, or plant and serves as representative of the union, charged
with negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with the supervisor of the
employer.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/174316.htm - _ftn55 He is the representative of the union members in a
building or other workplace. Black's Law Dictionary defines a shop steward as a union official elected to represent members in a plant or
particular department. His duties include collection of dues, recruitment of new members and initial negotiations for the settlement of
grievances. The shop steward is responsible for receiving complaints and grievances of the employees and for bringing these complaints to
the immediate supervisor of the employee concerned. If the grievance is not settled through the efforts of the shop steward, it is referred to
the grievance committee.
It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of shop stewards and the supervisors includes the determination of the issues arising from the interpretation
or even implementation of a provision of the CBA, or from any order or memorandum, circular or assignments issued by the appropriate
authority in the establishment. In fine, they are part and parcel of the continuous process of grievance resolution designed to preserve and
maintain peace among the employees and their employer. They occupy positions of trust and laden with awesome responsibilities. Since the
Shop Steward is a union position, the controversy surrounding his recall from his position as Shop Steward becomes a dispute within the
union.
An "Internal Union Dispute" or intra-union conflict refers to a conflict within or inside a labor union. It includes all disputes or grievances
arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, including any violation of the
rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the Code.[ Article 226 of the Labor Code of the
Philippineshttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/174316.htm - _ftn65 vests on the Bureau of Labor Relations and the
Labor Relations Division jurisdiction to act on all inter-union or intra-union conflicts.
The actions of the petitioner bolster the conclusion that his grievances were directed against the union and not the respondent company,
making the dispute an intra-union dispute. The first Complaints filed by the petitioner were against the union and the Union President for
illegal recall of his designation as Shop Steward. A Complaint was then filed before the DOLE Med-Arbiter praying for reinstatement to
union Shop Steward and for the award of the salary differential while he was allegedly illegally demoted. But the money claims could not be
brought before the union since the salaries of the petitioner were paid by the respondent company; thus, a Complaint for illegal demotion
amounting to constructive dismissal was filed before the Labor Arbiter, against the union, union president and this time including respondent
company and the president of the company.
Notwithstanding the determination of the Med-Arbiter, as affirmed by the Secretary of Labor, that the petitioner should be reinstated to the
position of Shop Steward, which is binding on this Court, the petitioner could not be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward because his
eventual separation from respondent ATI made reinstatement unfeasible. Employment with respondent ATI and membership in the union
are required in order to occupy the position of Shop Steward. But the petitioner is neither a member of the union nor employed with respondent
ATI. He was already retrenched from respondent ATI since October 21, 2001, and his retrenchment was finally settled through the execution
of a Quit Claim and Release which was executed before the Second Division of the NLRC in NLRC CA No. 032809-02. The Quit Claim
and Release provides that in consideration of the receipt ofP367,500.00, the petitioner discharges respondent ATI and its officers from any
claims arising from his retrenchment, without prejudice to the present labor case filed by the petitioner.
It may seem that the outcome of this case provides no relief for the petitioner despite his invalid removal from the position of union Shop
Steward, but the reinstatement of the petitioner could not be forced into the present circumstances because the petitioner is no longer employed
by the respondent company. It is a fact that we cannot avoid and must consider in resolving this case. He was already compensated for his
retrenchment from ATI, and he released respondent ATI from any and all claims or liability with respect to his separation from employment
due to retrenchment. To order the respondent company to reinstate the petitioner to his employment in ATI would render the Quit Claim and
Release nugatory.
The events which have taken place during the pendency of the case have rendered the present petition moot and academic.
National Union of Workers in Hotels Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter vs. SOLE, et al.
GR No. 181531, July 31, 2009
Facts: A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila
Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel) with the following results:
In view of the significant number of segregated votes, contending unions, petitioner, NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and respondent Holiday Inn
Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med-Arbiter Ma. Simonette Calabocal to decide which among
those votes would be opened and tallied. Eleven (11) votes were initially segregated because they were cast by dismissed employees, albeit
the legality of their dismissal was still pending before the Court of Appeals. Six other votes were segregated because the employees who cast
them were already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still five other votes were segregated on the ground that they
were cast by probationary employees and, pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote. It
bears noting early on, however, that the vote of one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton), a probationary employee, was counted.
Petitioner, which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE), arguing that the votes of the probationary
employees should have been opened considering that probationary employee Gatbonton’s vote was tallied. And petitioner averred that
respondent HIMPHLU, which garnered 169 votes, should not be immediately certified as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17
segregated ballots would push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169 votes which HIMPHLU garnered
would be one vote short of the majority which would then become 169.
By the assailed Resolution of January 22, 2007, the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE), through then Acting Secretary Luzviminda
Padilla, affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s Order. The Order granting the petition for the conduct of the certification election, the six probationary
employees were not yet hired, hence, they could not vote.
In fine, the SOLE concluded that the certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent was proper.
Issues:
1. Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections should be allowed to vote
2. Whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The inclusion of Gatbonton’s vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right
to vote in a certification election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted. As Airtime
Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja holds:
In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled
to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by
the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for
purposes of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated
by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a
substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as
basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All
they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit."
Rule II, Sec. 2 of Department Order No. 40-03, series of 2003, which amended Rule XI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
provides:
Rule II
Section 2. Who may join labor unions and workers' associations. - All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural
enterprises, including employees of government owned or controlled corporations without original charters established under the
Corporation Code, as well as employees of religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not,
shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining: provided, however,
that supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file employees but may form, join or
assist separate labor unions of their own. Managerial employees shall not be eligible to form, join or assist any labor unions for purposes
of collective bargaining. Alien employees with valid working permits issued by the Department may exercise the right to self-
organization and join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining if they are nationals of a country which grants the same
or similar rights to Filipino workers, as certified by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
For purposes of this section, any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service,
be eligible for membership in any labor organization.
All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the self-employed, rural workers and those without any definite
employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except collective bargaining.
The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers
to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence
thereon.
Prescinding from the principle that all employees are, from the first day of their employment, eligible for membership in a labor organization,
it is evident that the period of reckoning in determining who shall be included in the list of eligible voters is, in cases where a timely appeal
has been
filed from the Order of the MedArbiter, the date when the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment,whether affirming or denying t
he appeal, becomes final and executory.
The filing of an appeal to the SOLE from the Med-Arbiter’s Order stays its execution, in accordance with Sec. 21, and rationally, the Med-
Arbiter cannot direct the employer to furnish him/her with the list of eligible voters pending the resolution of the appeal.
During the pendency of the appeal, the employer may hire additional employees. To exclude the employees hired after the issuance of the
Med-Arbiter’s Order but before the appeal has been resolved would violate the guarantee that every employee has the right to be part of a
labor organization from the first day of their service.
In the present case, records show that the probationary employees, including Gatbonton, were included in the list of employees in the
bargaining unit submitted by the Hotel on May 25, 2006 in compliance with the directive of the Med-Arbiter after the appeal and subsequent
motion for reconsideration have been denied by the SOLE, rendering the Med-Arbiter’s August 22, 2005 Order final and executory 10 days
after the March 22, 2007 Resolution (denying the motion for reconsideration of the January 22 Order denying the appeal), and rightly so.
Because, for purposes of self-organization, those employees are, in light of the discussion above, deemed eligible to vote.
A certification election is the process of determining the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization
and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.
The significance of an employee’s right to vote in a certification election cannot thus be overemphasized for he has considerable interest in
the determination of who shall represent him in negotiating the terms and conditions of his employment.
Even if the Implementing Rules gives the SOLE 20 days to decide the appeal from the Order of the Med-Arbiter, experience shows that it
sometimes takes months to be resolved. To rule then that only those employees hired as of the date of the issuance of the Med-Arbiter’s
EMPLOYEES IN VOTERS’ LIST 353
TOTAL VOTES CAST 346
NUWHRAIN-MPHC 151
HIMPHLU 169
NO UNION 1
SPOILED 3
SEGREGATED 22
Order are qualified to vote would effectively disenfranchise employees hired during the pendency of the appeal. More importantly, reckoning
the date of the issuance of the Med-Arbiter’s Order as the cut-off date would render inutile the remedy of appeal to the SOLE.
But while the Court rules that the votes of all the probationary employees should be included, under the particular circumstances of this case
and the period of time which it took for the appeal to be decided, the votes of the six supervisory employees must be excluded because at the
time the certification elections was conducted, they had ceased to be part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect two months
before the election.
2. No. It is well-settled that under the so-called "double majority rule," for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining
unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.
Prescinding from the Court’s ruling that all the probationary employees’ votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory
employees should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase – from 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor
Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a majority vote. The position of
both the SOLE and the appellate court that the opening of the 17 segregated ballots will not materially affect the outcome of the certification
election as for, so they contend, even if such member were all in favor of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would win, is thus untenable.
It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required
majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections. The opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material.
To be sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the
majority representation of the bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the
determination of who between two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the members of the
bargaining unit as to whether they want to be represented and which union they want to represent them.
Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the required majority, it follows that a run-off election must
be held to determine which between HIMPHLU and petitioner should represent the rank-and-file employees.
A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) highest number of votes in a certification or consent
election with three (3) or more choices, where such a certified or consent election results in none of the three (3) or more choices receiving
the majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the
number of votes cast.8 With 346 votes cast, 337 of which are now deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only garnered 169 and petitioner
having obtained 151 and the choice "NO UNION" receiving 1 vote, then the holding of a run-off election between HIMPHLU and petitioner
is in order.
Soriano Aviation vs. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation et al.

GR No. 166879, Aug. 14, 2009
Facts: A. Soriano Aviation (petitioner or the company) and respondent Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation (the Union), the duly-
certified exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of petitioner, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
which included a “No-Strike, No-Lock-out” clause.
On May 1 & 12, and June 12, 1997, which were legal holidays and peak season for the company, eight mechanics-members of respondent
Union refused to render overtime work. Petitioner treated the refusal to work as a concerted action which is a violation of the “No-Strike,
No-Lockout” clause in the CBA. It thus meted the workers a 30-day suspension. It also filed a complaint for illegal strike.
The attempted settlement between the parties having been futile, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board on October 3, 1997, attributing to petitioner the following acts: (1) union busting, (2) illegal dismissal of union officer,
(3) illegal suspension of eight mechanics, (4) violation of memorandum of agreement, (5) coercion of employees and interrogation of newly-
hired mechanics with regard to union affiliation, (6) discrimination against the aircraft mechanics, (7) harassment through systematic fault-
finding, (8) contractual labor, and (9) constructive dismissal of the Union President, Julius Vargas. As despite conciliation no amicable
settlement of the dispute was arrived at, the Union went on strike on October 22, 1997.
The Labor Arbiter declared that the newly implemented work-shift schedule was a valid exercise of management prerogative and the refusal
of herein individual respondents to work on three consecutive holidays was a form of protest by the Union, hence, deemed a concerted action.
Noting that the Union failed to comply with the formal requirements prescribed by the Labor Code in the holding of strike, the strike was
declared illegal.
The Labor Arbiter declared the second strike illegal. The Labor Arbiter went on to hold that the Union deliberately resorted to the use of
violent and unlawful acts in the course of the “second strike,” hence, the individual respondents were deemed to have lost their employment.
NLRC affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling, holding that the acts of violence committed by the Union members in the
course of the strike were not serious or pervasive to call for loss of employment of the striking employees. Specifically, the appellate court
noted that at the time petitioner filed its complaint in June 1998, almost eight months had already elapsed from the commencement of the
strike and, in the interim, the alleged acts of violence were committed only during nine non-consecutive days.
Issue:
1. Whether the strike staged by respondents is illegal due to the alleged commission of illegal acts and violation of the “No Strike-No
Lockout” clause of the CBA
2. If in the affirmative, whether individual respondents are deemed to have lost their employment status on account thereof
Ruling:
1. The Court rules in the affirmative.
The Court notes that, as found by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97, the first strike or the mechanics’ refusal to work on 3
consecutive holidays was prompted by their disagreement with the management-imposed new work schedule. Having been grounded on a
non-strikeable issue and without complying with the procedural requirements, then the same is a violation of the “No Strike-No Lockout
Policy” in the existing CBA. Respecting the second strike, where the Union complied with procedural requirements, the same was not a
violation of the “No Strike- No Lockout” provisions, as a “No Strike-No Lockout” provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
is a valid stipulation but may be invoked only by employer when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or
other concessions from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is
grounded on unfair labor practice. In the present case, the Union believed in good faith that petitioner committed unfair labor practice when
it went on strike on account of the 30-day suspension meted to the striking mechanics, dismissal of a union officer and perceived union-
busting, among others.
The Court holds that the second strike became invalid due to the commission of illegal action in its course. It is hornbook principle that the
exercise of the right of private sector employees to strike is not absolute. Thus Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 3. x x x
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living
wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Indeed, even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal. Thus, the
employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion in carrying out concerted activities which are injurious to the right to property
renders a strike illegal. And so is picketing or the obstruction to the free use of property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or property,
when accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and coercion as to constitute nuisance.
Apropos is the following ruling in Sukhothai Cuisine v. Court of Appeals:

Well-settled is the rule that even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be
declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code,
particularly paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall:
a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or
b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
c) obstruct public thoroughfares.
The following acts have been held to be prohibited activities: where the strikers shouted slanderous and scurrilous words against the owners of
the vessels; where the strikers used unnecessary and obscene language or epithets to prevent other laborers to go to work, and
circulated libelous statements against the employer which show actual malice; where the protestors used abusive and threatening language
towards the patrons of a place of business or against co-employees, going beyond the mere attempt to persuade customers to withdraw their
patronage; where the strikers formed a human cordon and blocked all the ways and approaches to the launches and vessels of the vicinity of
the workplace and perpetrated acts of violence and coercion to prevent work from being performed; and where the strikers shook their fists
and threatened non-striking employees with bodily harm if they persisted to proceed to the workplace. Permissible activities of the picketing
workers do not include obstruction of access of customers.
The appellate court found in the present case, as in fact it is not disputed, that the Union committed illegal acts during the strike. The Union
members’ repeated name-calling, harassment and threats of bodily harm directed against company officers and non-striking employees
and, more significantly, the putting up of placards, banners and streamers with vulgar statements imputing criminal negligence to the
company, which put to doubt reliability of its operations, come within the purview of illegal acts under Art. 264 and jurisprudence.
That the alleged acts of violence were committed in nine non-consecutive days during the almost eight months that the strike was on-going
does not render the violence less pervasive or widespread to be excusable. Nowhere in Art. 264 does it requires that violence must be
continuous or that it should be for the entire duration of the strike.
The appellate court took against petitioner its filing of its complaint to have the strike declared illegal almost eight months from the time it
commenced. Art. 264 does not, however, state for purposes of having a strike declared as illegal that the employer should immediately report
the same. It only lists what acts are prohibited. It is thus absurd to expect an employer to file a complaint at the first instance that an act of
violence is alleged to be committed, especially, as in the present case, when an earlier complaint to have the refusal of the individual
respondents to work overtime declared as an illegal strike was still pending — an issue resolved in its favor only on September 25, 1998.
The records show that the Union went on strike on October 22, 1997, and the first reported harassment incident occurred on October 29,
1997, while the last occurred in January, 1998. Those instances may have been sporadic, but as found by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,
the display of placards, streamers and banners even up to the time the appeal was being resolved by the NLRC works against the Union’s
favor.
The acts complained of including the display of placards and banners imputing criminal negligence on the part of the company and its officers,
apparently with the end in view of intimidating the company’s clientele, are, given the nature of its business, that serious as to make the
“second strike” illegal. Specifically with respect to the putting up of those banners and placards, coupled with the name-calling and
harassment, the same indicates that it was resorted to coerce the resolution of the dispute – the very evil which Art. 264 seek to prevent.
2. As to the issue of loss of employment of those who participated in the illegal strike, Sukhothai instructs:
In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents, the applicable provision is Article 264(a) of the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited Activities – (a) x x x
x x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
the commission of illegal acts during an illegal strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
xxxx
In Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., this Court explained that the effects of such illegal strikes,
outlined in Article 264, make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein: an ordinary striking worker cannot
be terminated for mere participation in an illegal. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer,
on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits
an illegal act during an illegal strike. In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal,
may suffice.
The liability for prohibited acts has thus to be determined on an individual basis. A perusal of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, which was
affirmed in toto by the NLRC, shows that on account of the staging of the illegal strike, individual respondents were all deemed to have lost
their employment, without distinction as to their respective participation.
Of the participants in the illegal strike, whether they knowingly participated in the illegal strike in the case of union officers or knowingly
participated in the commission of violent acts during the illegal strike in the case of union members, the records do not indicate. While
respondent Julius Vargas was identified to be a union officer, there is no indication if he knowingly participated in the illegal strike. The
Court not being a trier of facts, the remand of the case to the NLRC is in order only for the purpose of determining the status in the Union of
individual respondents and their respective liability, if any.
YSS Employees Union-Phil Transport and General Workers Organization vs. YSS Laboratories, Inc.
G.R. No. 155125, December 4, 2009
Facts: YSS Laboratories is a domestic corporation engaged in the pharmaceutical business. YSSEU is a duly registered labor organization
and the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of YSS Laboratories. In order to arrest escalating business
losses, YSS Laboratories implemented a retrenchment program which affected 11 employees purportedly chosen in accordance with the
reasonable standards established by the company. Of the 11 employees sought to be retrenched, nine were officers and members of
YSSEU. Initially, these employees were given the option to avail themselves of the early retirement program of the company. When no one
opted to retire early, YSS Laboratories exercised its option to terminate the services of its employees as allegedly authorized under Article
283 of the Labor Code. Thus, copies of the Notices of Termination were filed with DOLE on 19 March 2001 and were served to concerned
employees on 20 March 2001.
Claiming that YSS Laboratories was guilty of discrimination and union-busting in carrying out the said retrenchment program, YSSEU
decided to hold a strike. After the necessary strike vote was taken under the supervision of the National Conciliation Mediation Board –
National Capital Region (NCMB-NCR), YSSEU staged a strike on 20 April 2001.
In order to forge a compromise, a number of conciliation proceedings were conducted by the NCMB-NCR, but these efforts proved futile
since the parties’ stance was unbending. This prompted the Secretary of Labor to finally intervene in order to put an end to a prolonged labor
dispute. Underscoring the government’s policy of preserving economic gains and employment levels, the Secretary of Labor deemed that
the continuation of the labor dispute was inimical to national interest. Thus, in an Order dated 11 May 2001, the Secretary of Labor certified
the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration. Accordingly, all striking workers were
thereby directed to return to work within 24 hours from their receipt of the said Order, and YSS Laboratories to accept them under the terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike.
YSS Laboratories, however, refused to fully comply with the directive of the Secretary of Labor. In its Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
YSS Laboratories argued that nine union officers and members who were previously terminated from service pursuant to a valid retrenchment
should be excluded from the operation of the return-to-work order. It also asserted that the union officers who participated in the purported
illegal strike should likewise not be allowed to be back to their employment for they were deemed to have already lost their employment
status.
Issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF LABOR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CERTIFYING THE LABOR
DISPUTE TO THE NLRC FOR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE OPERATION OF THE RETURN
TO WORK ORDER.
Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit.

The Orders dated 11 May 2001 and 9 June 2001 of the Secretary of Labor, certifying the labor dispute involving the herein parties to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and enjoining YSSEU to return to work and YSS Laboratories to admit them under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike, were issued pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. Said provision reads:
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. x x x x
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to
the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time
of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary
of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this
provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
After martial law was lifted and democracy was restored, the assumption of jurisdiction in Art. 263(g) has now been viewed as an exercise
of the police power of the State with the aim of promoting the common good. The grant of these plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor
makes it incumbent upon him to bring about soonest, a fair and just solution to the differences between the employer and the employees, so
that the damage such labor dispute might cause upon the national interest may be minimized as much as possible, if not totally averted, by
avoiding stoppage of work or any lag in the activities of the industry or the possibility of those contingencies that might cause detriment to
the national interest.
In order to effectively achieve such end, the assumption or certification order shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout. Moreover, if one has already taken place, all striking workers shall immediately return to work, and the employer
shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
YSS Laboratories’ vigorous insistence on the exclusion of the retrenched employees from the coverage of the return-to-work order seriously
impairs the authority of the Secretary of Labor to forestall a labor dispute that he deems inimical to the national economy. The Secretary of
Labor is afforded plenary and broad powers, and is granted great breadth of discretion to adopt the most reasonable and expeditious way of
writing finis to the labor dispute.
Accordingly, when the Secretary of Labor directed YSS Laboratories to accept all the striking workers back to work, the Secretary did not
exceed his jurisdiction, or gravely abuse the same. It is significant at this point to point out that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment. Thus, an act may be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed
in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. In the case at bar, there
is no showing that the assailed orders were issued in an arbitrary or despotic manner. The Orders dated 11 May 2001 and 9 June 2001 were
issued by the Secretary of Labor, with the end in view of preserving the status quo ante while the main issues of the validity of the
retrenchment and legality of the strike were being threshed out in the proper forum. This was done for the promotion of the common good,
considering that a lingering strike could be inimical to the interest of both employer and employee. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain
industrial peace. Thus, his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to interfere with the management’s rights but to obtain a
speedy settlement of the dispute.
By harping on the validity of the retrenchment and on the exclusion of the retrenched employees from the coverage of the return-to-work
order, YSS Laboratories undermines the underlying principle embodied in Article 263(g) of the Labor Code on the settlement of labor
disputes -- that assumption and certification orders are executory in character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties, even during
the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. Regardless therefore of its motives, or of the validity of its claims, YSS Laboratories
must readmit all striking employees and give them back their respective jobs. Accepting back the workers in this case is not a matter of
option, but of obligation mandated by law for YSS Laboratories to faithfully comply with. Its compulsory character is mandated, not to cater
to a narrow segment of society, or to favor labor at the expense of management, but to serve the greater interest of society by maintaining the
economic equilibrium.
Instructive is the ruling of this Court in Philippine Airlines Employees Association v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.:
The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other construction. The certification attests to the urgency
of the matter, affecting as it does an industry indispensable to the national interest. The order is issued in the exercise of the court’s
compulsory power of arbitration, and therefore must be obeyed until set aside. x x x.
Certainly, the determination of who among the strikers could be admitted back to work cannot be made to depend upon the discretion of
employer, lest we strip the certification or assumption-of-jurisdiction orders of the coercive power that is necessary for attaining their laudable
objective. The return-to-work order does not interfere with the management’s prerogative, but merely regulates it when, in the exercise of
such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and
limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected
and not one of them is given undue preference.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
GSIS et al., vs. Villaviza et al.

GR No. 180291, July 27, 2010
Facts: Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against
respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia, Pilar Layco, and Antonio
Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in
Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D, (1, c, f) in relation to Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987,
committed as follows:
That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside
the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the
latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;
xxx
That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty.
Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina
pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;
That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known
as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some employees and disrupted
the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.
Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two others, submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo
dated June 6, 2005. Denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-
IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their former union president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their
support, they were interested in that hearing as it might also affect them.
PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service against each of the respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again directed to submit their written answers under oath
within three (3) days from receipt thereof.5 None was filed.
On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and
meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules
and Regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied their right to due process but there
was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Issue: Whether or not respondents' actions on May 27, 2005 amounted to a "prohibited concerted activity or mass action."
Ruling: As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political rights of those in the government
service, the concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in
order to realize their demands of force concession." Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office,
bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of
an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.
Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application
of such prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally
depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe
to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold
that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably
regulated only but can never be taken away.
A review of PGM Garcia's formal charges against the respondents reveals that he himself was not even certain whether the respondents and
the rest of the twenty or so GSIS employees who were at the GSIS-IU office that fateful day marched there or just simply appeared there
simultaneously.14 Thus, the petitioners were not even sure if the spontaneous act of each of the twenty or so GSIS employees on May 27,
2005 was a concerted one. The report of Manager Nagtalon of the GSIS-SD which was the basis for PGM Garcia's formal charges reflected
such uncertainty.
In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS,16 the Court upheld the position of petitioner GSIS because its
employees, numbering between 300 and 800 each day, staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest or demonstration outside the GSIS
for four straight days. We cannot say the same for the 20 or so employees in this case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the
GSIS-IU office for just over an hour with that four-day mass action in Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in
the same manner would most certainly be unfair and unjust.
Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the government's right as an employer to lay down certain standards of
conduct, tend to lean towards a broad definition of "public concern speech" which is protected by their First Amendment. One such case is
that of Scott v. Meters.17 In said case, the New York Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible for operation of New York City's mass transit
service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their uniforms. A number of union members wore union
buttons promoting their opposition to a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the NYTA tried to enforce its rule and threatened to
subject these union members to discipline. The court, though recognizing the government's right to impose reasonable restrictions, held that
the NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally overboard."
Thus, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSC's Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited
concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition, respondents' actuations did
not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion.
Picop Resources Inc. vs. Taneca et al.

GR No. 160828, Aug. 9, 2010
Facts: On February 13, 2001, respondents Tañeca and 14 others filed a Complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and money
claims against petitioner PICOP Resources , Inc. (PRI). Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona fide members
of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PRI Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL), which is the collective bargaining agent
for the rank-and-file employees of petitioner PRI.
PRI has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of five (5) years from May 22, 1995 until May 22,
2000. On May 16, 2000, Atty. Proculo P. Fuentes, VP of PRI sent a letter to the management of PRI demanding the termination of employees
who allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of the Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW)
during the effectivity of the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of campaigning for and signing the petition for certification election
of FFW as an act of disloyalty and a valid basis for termination for a cause in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws, and the terms
and conditions of the CBA.
On October 16, 2000, PRI served notices of termination for causes to the 31 out of the 46 employees whom NAMAPRIL-SPFL sought to be
terminated on the ground of "acts of disloyalty" committed against it. A Notice was also served on the DOLE, Caraga Region.
Respondents alleged that none of them ever withdrew their membership or submitted to PRI any union dues and check-off disauthorizations
against NAMAPRI-SPFL. They claimed that they continue to remain on record as bona fide members. They insisted that mere affixation of
signature on such authorization was not per se an act of disloyalty. They claimed that while it may be true that they signed the said
authorization before the start of the freedom period, the petition of FFW was only filed with the DOLE on May 18, 2000, or 58 days after
the start of the freedom period.
Respondents, likewise, argued that at the time NAMAPRI-SPFL demanded their termination, it was no longer the bargaining representative
of the rank-and-file workers of PRI, because the CBA had already expired on May 22, 2000. Hence, there could be no justification in PRI's
act of dismissing respondents due to acts of disloyalty.
Respondents asserted that the act of PRI in giving in to the wishes of the Union in discharging them on the ground of disloyalty to the Union
amounted to interference with, restraint or coercion of respondents' exercise of their right to self-organization. The act indirectly required
petitioners to support and maintain their membership with NAMAPRI-SPFL as a condition for their continued employment.
The Labor Arbiter declared the respondents' dismissal to be illegal and ordered PRI to reinstate respondents to their former or equivalent
positions without loss of seniority rights and to jointly and solidarily pay their backwages. PRI and NAMAPRI-SPFL appealed to the NLRC
which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter; thus, declaring the dismissal of respondents from employment as legal. Respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for lack of merit. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
The CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolutions of the NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Issues:
1. Whether or not an error in the interpretation of law falls within the ambit of Extraordinary Remedy of Certiorari under Rule 65
2. Whether or not a CBA can be given its effectivity in all its Terms and Conditions, even beyond the 5-year period when no CBA has yet
been entered into, possessing just cause to terminate on the grounds herein
Ruling:
1. PRI perceived an error in the mode of appeal by respondents in assailing the decision of the NLRC. It claimed that assuming that the
NLRC erred in its judgment on the legal issues, its error, if any, is not tantamount to abuse of discretion falling within the ambit of Rule 65.
WRONG.
The power of the CA to review NLRC decisions via Rule 65 or Petition for Certiorari has been settled as early as in our decision in St. Martin
Funeral Home v. NLRC.cThis Court held that the proper vehicle for such review was a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, and that this action should be filed in the CA in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.cra1aw
2. PRI argued that the dismissal of the respondents was valid and legal. It claimed to have acted in good faith at the instance of the incumbent
union pursuant to the Union Security Clause of the CBA. Citing Article 253 of the Labor Code, PRI contends that as parties to the CBA,
they are enjoined to keep the status quo and continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing CBA during the 60-day
period until a new agreement is reached by the parties. UNTENABLE.
"Union security" is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends "closed shop," "union shop," "maintenance of membership," or any
other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting
employment.
However, in terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer needs to determine and prove
that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA;
and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute just
cause for terminating an employee based on the union security provision of the CBA.
As to the first requisite, there is no question that the CBA between PRI and respondents included a union security clause. Following the same
provision, PRI, upon written request from the Union, can indeed terminate the employment of the employee who failed to maintain its good
standing as a union member. Secondly, it is likewise undisputed that NAMAPRI-SPFL, in two (2) occasions demanded from PRI, in their
letters, to terminate the employment of respondents due to their acts of disloyalty to the Union. However, as to the third requisite, there is no
sufficient evidence to support the decision of PRI to terminate the employment of the respondents.
PRI alleged that respondents were terminated based on the alleged acts of disloyalty. It contends that their acts are a violation of the Union
Security Clause, as provided in their CBA. We are not convinced.
The mere signing of the authorization in support of the Petition before the "freedom period," is not sufficient ground to terminate the
employment. Nothing in the records would show that respondents failed to maintain their membership in good standing in the Union.
Respondents did not resign or withdraw their membership from the Union to which they belong. Respondents continued to pay their union
dues and never joined the FFW.
An "authorization letter to file a petition for certification election" is different from an actual "Petition for Certification Election." Likewise,
as per records, it was clear that the actual Petition for Certification Election of FFW was filed within the ambit of the freedom period. Strictly
speaking, what is prohibited is the filing of a petition for certification election outside the 60-day freedom period.
It can be said that while it is incumbent for the employer to continue to recognize the majority status of the bargaining agent even after the
expiration of the freedom period, they could only do so when no petition for certification election was filed. The reason is, with a pending
petition for certification, any such agreement entered into by management with a labor organization is fraught with the risk that such a labor
union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective bargaining representative. The provision for statusquo is conditioned on the fact that no
certification election was filed during the freedom period.
Time and again, we have ruled that we adhere to the policy of enhancing the welfare of the workers. Their freedom to choose who should be
their bargaining representative is of paramount importance. We will emphasize anew that the power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of
the employer, but with limitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when
it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the CBA. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be
observed in dismissing an employee, because it affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood. Employers should, therefore,
respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to labor.
Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL vs. Waterfront Insular Hotel-Davao

GR No. 174040-41, Sept. 22, 2010
Facts: On November 6, 2000, respondent sent the DOLE Region XI, a Notice of Suspension of Operations, notifying the same that it will
suspend its operations for a period of six months due to severe and serious business losses. In said notice, respondent assured the DOLE that
if the company could not resume its operations within the six-month period, the company would pay the affected employees all the benefits
legally due to them.
During the period of the suspension, Domy R. Rojas, President of Davao Insular Hotel Free Employees Union (DIHFEU-NFL), the
recognized labor organization in Waterfront Davao, sent respondent a number of letters asking management to reconsider its decision. The
letters signified, among others, the gesture of support of the union for the economic solutions of the company, which included, suspension of
the CBA for ten years (no strike, no lock-out shall be enforced); payment of benefits be on a staggered basis or as available; overtime hours
rendered shall be off-set as practiced; reduce leave benefits; emergency leave and birthday leave be waived, and multi-tasking of employees,
among others.
After series of negotiations, respondent Hotel and DIHFEU-NFL signed a Memorandum of Agreement wherein Hotel agreed to re-open
subject to certain concessions. Accordingly, Hotel downsized its manpower structure to 100 rank-and-file employees and a new pay scale
was also prepared. The retained employees individually signed a “Reconfirmation of Employment”, which embodied the new terms and
conditions of their continued employment.
On June 15, 2001, respondent resumed its business operations.
On August 22, 2002, certain Darius Joves and Debbie Planas, claiming to be local officers of the National Federation of Labor (NFL), filed
a Notice of Mediation before the NCMB-Regional Office stating that the Union involved was “DARIUS JOVES/DEBBIE PLANAS ET.
AL, National Federation of Labor.” The issue raised in said Notice was the “Diminution of wages and other benefits through unlawful
Memorandum of Agreement.”
The NCMB called Joves and Hotel to a conference to a possibility of settling the conflict. In the said conference, Hotel and petitioner IHEU-
NFL, represented by Joves, signed a Submission Agreement wherein they chose Alfredo C. Olvida to act as voluntary arbitrator. Submitted
for the resolution of Olvida was the determination of WON there was a diminution of wages and other benefits through an unlawful MOA.
In support of his authority to file the complaint, Joves, assisted by Atty. Danilo Cullo (Cullo), presented several Special Powers of Attorney
(SPA) which were, however, undated and unnotarized.
Hotel filed with the NCMB a Manifestation with Motion for a Second Preliminary Conference, raising the following grounds: (1) The persons
who filed the instant complaint in the name of the Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL have no authority to represent the Union; (2) The
individuals who executed the special powers of attorney in favor of the person who filed the instant complaint have no standing to cause the
filing of the instant complaint; and (3) The existence of an intra-union dispute renders the filing of the instant case premature.
On September 16, 2002, a second preliminary conference was conducted in the NCMB, where Cullo denied any existence of an intra-union
dispute among the members of the union. Cullo, however, confirmed that the case was filed not by the IHEU-NFL but by the NFL. When
asked to present his authority from NFL, Cullo admitted that the case was, in fact, filed by individual employees named in the SPAs. The
hearing officer directed both parties to elevate the aforementioned issues to AVA Olvida.
The case was docketed and referred to Olvida. Respondent again raised its objections, arguing that the persons who signed the complaint
were not the authorized representatives of the Union nor were they parties to the MOA. AVA Olvida directed respondent to file a formal
motion to withdraw its submission to voluntary arbitration. Respondent filed its Motion to Withdraw. Cullo then filed an Opposition.
In said Opposition, Cullo reiterated that the complainants were not representing the union but filing the complaint through their appointed
attorneys-in-fact to assert their individual rights as workers who are entitled to the benefits granted by law and stipulated in the collective
bargaining agreement.
On March 18, 2003, AVA Olvida ruled that respondent was correct when it raised its objection to NFL as proper party-complainant. The
proper party-complainant is INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL, the recognized and incumbent bargaining agent of the rank-
and-file employees of the respondent hotel. In the submission agreement of the parties dated August 29, 2002, the party complainant written
is INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL and not the NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and 79 other members. However,
since the NFL is the mother federation of the local union, and signatory to the existing CBA, it can represent the union, the officers, the
members or union and officers or members, as the case may be, in all stages of proceedings in courts or administrative bodies provided that
the issue of the case will involve labor-management relationship like in the case at bar.
Later, respondent filed a Motion for Inhibition alleging AVA Olvida's bias and prejudice towards the cause of the employees. AVA Olvida
voluntarily inhibited himself out of “delicadeza” and ordered the remand of the case to the NCMB. The NCMB then required the parties to
appear before the conciliator for the selection of a new voluntary arbitrator. Respondent, however, maintained its stand that the NCMB had
no jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, at the instance of Cullo, the NCMB approved ex parte the selection of AVA Montejo as the new
voluntary arbitrator.
On April 5, 2004, AVA Montejo rendered a Decision ruling in favor of Cullo, declaring the Memorandum of Agreement in question as
invalid as it is contrary to law and public policy; declaring that there is a diminution of the wages and other benefits of the Union members
and officers under the said invalid MOA, among others.
Both parties appealed the Decision of AVA Montejo to the CA. Cullo only assailed the Decision in so far as it did not categorically order
respondent to pay the covered workers their differentials in wages reckoned from the effectivity of the MOA up to the actual reinstatement
of the reduced wages and benefits. Respondent, for its part, questioned among others the jurisdiction of the NCMB. Respondent maintained
that the MOA it had entered into with the officers of the Union was valid. Both cases were consolidated by the CA.
CA rendered a ruling in favor of respondent Hotel. Aggrieved, Cullo filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied.
Issues:
1. WON the Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator has no jurisdiction over the case, simply because the Notice of Mediation does not mention the
name of the local union but only the affiliate federation.
2. WON the diminution of the benefits enjoyed by the employees is allowable.
Ruling:
1. Cullo contends that the CA committed error when it ruled that the voluntary arbitrator had no jurisdiction over the case simply because the
Notice of Mediation did not state the name of the local union thereby disregarding the Submission Agreement which states the names of local
union as IHEU-NFL.
While it is undisputed that a submission agreement was signed by respondent and “IHEU-NFL,” represented by Joves and Cullo, there are
two circumstances which affect its validity: first, the Notice of Mediation was filed by a party who had no authority to do so; second, that
respondent had persistently objected questioning the authority of Joves, Cullo and the individual members of the Union to file the complaint
before the NCMB.
Who may file a notice or declare a strike or lockout or request preventive mediation. -
Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representativemay file a notice or declare a strike or request for preventive mediation in cases of
bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices.
It is clear that only a certified or duly recognized bargaining agent may file a notice or request for preventive mediation. It is curious that
even Cullo himself admitted, in a number of pleadings, that the case was filed not by the Union but by individual members thereof. Clearly,
therefore, the NCMB had no jurisdiction to entertain the notice filed before it.
A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing
its creation to the will of its members. Mere affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother
federation the license to act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency, where the former acts in representation
of the latter. Hence, local unions are considered principals while the federation is deemed to be merely their agent.
We hold that the voluntary arbitrator had no jurisdiction over the case. While we commend NFL's zealousness in protecting the rights of
lowly workers, We cannot, however, allow it to go beyond what it is empowered to do.
2. It is not allowable. Clearly, the prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits set out in Article 100 of the Labor Code is
specifically concerned with benefits already enjoyed at the time of the promulgation of the Labor Code. Article 100 does not, in other words,
purport to apply to situations arising after the promulgation date of the Labor Code.
A CBA is “a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement
reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for
adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement.” The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor-management
relations in order to create a climate of a sound and stable industrial peace. In construing a CBA, the courts must be practical and realistic
and give due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve. The right to free collective
bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it.
Stipulated in each Reconfirmation of Employment were the new salary and benefits scheme. In addition, it bears to stress that specific
provisions of the new contract also made reference to the MOA. Thus, the individual members of the union cannot feign knowledge of the
execution of the MOA. Each contract was freely entered into and there is no indication that the same was attended by fraud, misrepresentation
or duress. To this Court's mind, that signing should, therefore, be deemed an implied ratification by the Union members of the MOA. It is
iniquitous to receive benefits from a CBA and later on disclaim its validity.
While the terms of the MOA undoubtedly reduced the salaries and certain benefits previously enjoyed by the members of the Union, it cannot
escape this Court's attention that it was the execution of the MOA which paved the way for the re-opening of the hotel, notwithstanding its
financial distress. More importantly, the execution of the MOA allowed respondents to keep their jobs.
Withal, while the scales of justice usually tilt in favor of labor, the peculiar circumstances herein prevent this Court from applying the same
in the instant petition. Even if our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and on the protection of labor, it
does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which
are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
Cirtex Employees Labor Union-FFW vs. Cirtex Electronics Inc.

GR No. 190515, Nov. 15, 2010
Facts: Cirtek Electronics, Inc. (respondent), an electronics and semi-conductor firm situated inside the Laguna Technopark, had an existing
CBA with Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers (petitioner) for the period January 1, 2001 up to December 31, 2005.
Prior to the 3rd year of the CBA, the parties renegotiated its economic provisions but failed to reach a settlement, particularly on the issue of
wage increases. Petitioner thereupon declared a bargaining deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB-Regional Office on April
26, 2004. Respondent, upon the other hand, filed a Notice of Lockout on June 16, 2004.
While the conciliation proceedings were ongoing, respondent placed seven union officers including the President, a Vice President, the
Secretary and the Chairman of the Board of Directors under preventive suspension for allegedly spearheading a boycott of overtime work.
The officers were eventually dismissed from employment, prompting petitioner to file another Notice of Strike which was, after conciliation
meetings, converted to a voluntary arbitration case. The dismissal of the officers was later found to be legal, hence, petitioner appealed.
In the meantime, as amicable settlement of the CBA was deadlocked, petitioner went on strike on June 20, 2005. By Order dated June 23,
2005, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the controversy and issued a Return to Work Order which was complied with.
Before the SOLE could rule on the controversy, respondent created a Labor Management Council (LMC) through which it concluded with
the remaining officers of petitioner a Memorandum of Agreement providing for daily wage increases of P6.00 per day effective January 1,
2004 and P9.00 per day effective January 1, 2005. Petitioner submitted the MOA via Motion and Manifestation to the Secretary of Labor,
alleging that the remaining officers signed the MOA under respondent’s assurance that should the Secretary order a higher award of wage
increase, respondent would comply.
By Orderdated March 16, 2006, the Secretary of Labor resolved the CBA deadlock by awarding a wage increase of from P6.00 to P10.00 per
day effective January 1, 2004 and from P9.00 to P15.00 per day effective January 1, 2005, and adopting all other benefits as embodied in the
MOA.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the Decision. Reconsideration of the Decision was denied by Resolution of August 12, 2008,
hence, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The CA favored respondent.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the SOLE is authorized to give an award higher than that agreed upon in the MOA;
2. Whether or not the MOA was entered into and ratified by the remaining officers of petitioner under the condition, which was not
incorporated in the MOA, that respondent would honor the SOLE’s award in the event that it is higher.
Ruling: The Court resolves both issues in the affirmative.

It is well-settled that the SOLE, in the exercise of his power to assume jurisdiction under Art. 263 (g)of the Labor Code, may resolve all
issues involved in the controversy including the award of wage increases and benefits. While an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized
as an agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because it requires the intervention and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary
of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction, the arbitral award can be considered an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which
would otherwise have been entered into by the parties, hence, it has the force and effect of a valid contract obligation.
That the arbitral award was higher than that which was purportedly agreed upon in the MOA is of no moment. For the SOLE, in resolving
the CBA deadlock, is not limited to considering the MOA as basis in computing the wage increases. He could, as he did, consider the financial
documents submitted by respondent as well as the parties’ bargaining history and respondent’s financial outlook and improvements as stated
in its website.
While a contract constitutes the law between the parties, this is so in the present case with respect to the CBA, not to the MOA in which even
the union’s signatories had expressed reservations thereto. But even assuming arguendo that the MOA is treated as a new CBA, since it is
imbued with public interest, it must be construed liberally and yield to the common good.
While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied
the principles of law governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital, is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest,
thus, it must yield to the common good. As such, it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must
place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is
intended to serve.
The petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Order dated March 16, 2006
and Resolution dated August 12, 2008 of the Secretary of Labor are REINSTATED.
NOTE: A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent. A resolution to that effect was issued on June 06, 2011 (G.R. No. 190515,
06 June 2011). The SC denied said motion.
Solidbank Corp. vs. Gamier et al

GR Nos. 159461, Nov. 15, 2010
Facts: Sometime in October 1999, petitioner Solidbank and respondent Solidbank Employees’ Union (Union) were set to renegotiate the
economic provisions of their 1997-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to cover the remaining two years thereof. Negotiations
commenced on November 17, 1999 but seeing that an agreement was unlikely, the Union declared a deadlock on December 22, 1999 and
filed a Notice of Strike on December 29, 1999. Sensing the impending strike, the Secretary of Labor and Employment “assumed jurisdiction”
over the labor dispute, pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended. The assumption order dated January 18, 2000 directed the
parties "to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that might exacerbate the situation.
In his Order4 dated March 24, 2000, Secretary Laguesma resolved all economic and non-economic issues submitted by the parties.
Not satisfied with the Secretary’s ruling, on April 3, 2000, the union officers and members decided to protest the same by holding a rally in
front of the SOLE office and the bank’s head offices, simultaneous to their filing of MR of the March 24, 2000 order. An overwhelming
majority of the employees, including the respondents, joined the “mass leave” and “protest action”. The bank’s provincial branches in Cebu,
Iloilo, Bacolod and Naga followed suit and "boycotted regular work." As a result of the employees’ concerted actions, Solidbank’s business
operations were paralyzed. The protest action lasted for three days, from April 3 until April 5, 2000.
The president of Solidbank issued a memorandum addressed to all employees to show cause why they should not be dismissed for
participating in an illegal strike. On April 5, 2000, Vistan (president of Solidbank) issued another memorandum, this time declaring that the
bank is prepared to take back employees who will report for work starting April 6, 2000 "provided these employees were/are not part of those
who led or instigated or coerced their co-employees into participating in this illegal act." Out of the 712 employees who took part in the three-
day work boycott, a total of 513 returned to work and were accepted by the bank. The remaining 199 employees insisted on defying Vistan’s
directive, which included herein respondents Ernesto U. Gamier, Elena R. Condevillamar, Janice L. Arriola and Ophelia C. De Guzman.
Thus, they were dismissed. Respondents Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Respondent Union joined by the 129 dismissed employees filed a separate suit against
petitioners for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and damages.
Issues:
1. Whether the protest rally and concerted work abandonment/boycott staged by the respondents violated the Order dated January 18, 2000
of the Secretary of Labor;
2. Whether the respondents were validly terminated; and
3. Whether the respondents are entitled to separation pay or financial assistance.
Ruling:
1. Article 212 of the Labor Code, as amended, defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment
or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.41 The term "strike"
shall comprise not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant
equipment and facilities and similar activities.42 Thus, the fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used by the striking employees to
describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling.
After a thorough review of the records, we hold that the CA patently erred in concluding that the concerted mass actions staged by respondents
cannot be considered a strike but a legitimate exercise of the respondents’ right to express their dissatisfaction with the Secretary’s resolution
of the economic issues in the deadlocked CBA negotiations with petitioners. It must be stressed that the concerted action of the respondents
was not limited to the protest rally infront of the DOLE Office on April 3, 2000. Respondent Union had also picketed the Head Office and
Paseo de Roxas Branch. About 712 employees, including those in the provincial branches, boycotted and absented themselves from work in
a concerted fashion for three continuous days that virtually paralyzed the employer’s banking operations. Considering that these mass actions
stemmed from a bargaining deadlock and an order of assumption of jurisdiction had already been issued by the Secretary of Labor to avert
an impending strike, there is no doubt that the concerted work abandonment/boycott was the result of a labor dispute.
The right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions.46 Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended,
provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. – (a) x x x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission
of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
The Court has consistently ruled that once the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute, such jurisdiction should not
be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout. A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by
the Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or certification is a prohibited activity and thus illegal.
Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, also considers it a prohibited activity to declare a strike "during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the same strike."49 There is no dispute that when respondents conducted their mass actions on April 3 to 6,
2000, the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor were still pending as both parties filed motions for reconsideration of the March 24,
2000 Order. Clearly, respondents knowingly violated the aforesaid provision by holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration
simultaneous with concerted work abandonment/boycott.
2. The court also ruled that notwithstanding the illegality of the strike, they cannot sanction petitioner’s act of indiscriminately terminating
the services of individual respondents who admitted joining the mass actions and who have refused to comply with the offer of the
management to report back to work.
The court reiterates the distinction between the liabilities of a union officer and a union member when they participate in an illegal strike,
thus:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.— x x x
xxxx
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full
back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
xxxx
The foregoing shows that the law makes a distinction between union officers and members. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike
or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment.
The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It
possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.
However, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts
during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status. We have held that the responsibility of union officers, as main players
in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore, limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation
in an illegal strike is in order. Hence, with respect to respondents who are union officers, the validity of their termination by petitioners
cannot be questioned. Being fully aware that the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor were still pending as in fact they filed a motion
for reconsideration of the March 24, 2000 Order, they cannot invoke good faith as a defense.
Fadriquelan et al., vs. Monterey Food Corp

G.R. No. 178409, June 8, 2011
Facts: On April 30, 2002 the three-year collective bargaining agreement or CBA between the union Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa Monterey-
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (the union) and Monterey Foods Corporation (the company) expired. On March 28, 2003 after the negotiation
for a new CBA reached a deadlock, the union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). To head
off the strike, on April 30, 2003 the company filed with the DOLE a petition for assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute in view of its
dire effects on the meat industry. In an Order dated May 12, 2003, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and enjoined
the union from holding any strike. It also directed the union and the company to desist from taking any action that may aggravate the situation.
On May 21, 2003 the union filed a second notice of strike before the NCMB on the alleged ground that the company committed unfair labor
practices. On June 10, 2003 the company sent notices to the union officers, charging them with intentional acts of slowdown. Six days later
or on June 16 the company sent new notices to the union officers, informing them of their termination from work for defying the DOLE
Secretary’s assumption order.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that slowdowns actually transpired at the company’s farms; and
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that union officers committed illegal acts that warranted their dismissal from work.
Ruling:
1. The law is explicit: no strike shall be declared after the Secretary of Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute. A strike conducted
after such assumption is illegal and any union officer who knowingly participates in the same may be declared as having lost his
employment. Here, what is involved is a slowdown strike. Unlike other forms of strike, the employees involved in a slowdown do not walk
out of their jobs to hurt the company. They need only to stop work or reduce the rate of their work while generally remaining in their assigned
post.
The union of course argues that it merely held assemblies to inform members of the developments in the CBA negotiation, not protest
demonstrations over it. But as the CA correctly observed, if the meetings had really been for the stated reason, why did the union officers
and members from separate company farms choose to start and end their meetings at the same time and on the same day? And if they did not
intend a slowdown, why did they not hold their meetings after work.
2.. A distinction exists, however, between the ordinary workers’ liability for illegal strike and that of the union officers who participated in
it. The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for merely participating in the strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during
its conduct. On the other hand, a union officer can be terminated upon mere proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal strike.
In termination cases, the dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the charges against him. The burden of proof rests
upon the employer to show that the employee’s dismissal was for just cause. The employer’s failure to do so means that the dismissal was
not justified. Here, the company failed to show that all 17 union officers deserved to be dismissed.
Barairo vs. Office of the President

G.R. No. 189314, June 15, 2011
Facts: Miguel Barairo (petitioner) was hired by respondent MST Marine Services (Phils.) Inc., (MST) for its principal, TSM International,
Ltd., as Chief Mate of the vessel Maritina, for a contract period of six months. He boarded the vessel and discharged his duties on July 23,
2004 but was relieved on August 28, 2004 ostensibly for transfer to another vessel, Solar. Petitioner thus disembarked in Manila on August
29. 2004.
Petitioner was later to claim that he was not paid the promised "stand-by fee" in lieu of salary that he was to receive while awaiting transfer
to another vessel as in fact the transfer never materialized.
On October 20, 2004, petitioner signed a new Contract of Employment for a six-month deployment as Chief Mate of M/T Haruna vessel. He
was paid a 1-month “stand-by fee” in connection with the Maritina contract. Petitioner boarded the M/T Haruna on October 31, 2004 then
he disembarked a week later as MST claimed that his boarding of M/T Haruna was a "sea trial" which, MST maintains, was priorly made
known to him on a "stand-by fee”. MST soon informed petitioner that he would be redeployed to the M/T Haruna on November 30, 2004,
but petitioner refused, prompting MST to file a complaint for breach of contract against him before the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).
Petitioner claimed, however, that he was placed on "forced vacation” when he was made to disembark from the M/T Haruna, and that not
wanting to experience a repetition of the previous "termination" of his employment aboard the Maritina, he refused to be redeployed to the
M/T Haruna.
However, the petitioner was found guilty of the said subject matter of the complaint thus was penalized by the POEA Administrator with one
year suspension from overseas deployment. Petitioner appealed said order of the POEA to the Secretary of Labor, who noting that it was
petitioner's first offense, modified the POEA Order by shortening the period of suspension from one year to six months.
Petitioner then appealed the order to the Office of the President (OP), who in turn dismissed the case for on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the OP’s dismissal of the case was proper.
Ruling: It was proper because for this case the appropriate remedy to question the decisions or orders of the Secretary of Labor is via Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 not via an appeal to the OP. For appeals to the OP in labor cases have indeed been eliminated, except those
involving national interest over which the President may assume jurisdiction. The rationale behind this development is grounded on the
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.
Also, the Petitioner's appeal of the Secretary of Labor's Decision to the Office of the President did not toll the running of the period, hence,
the assailed Decisions of the Secretary of Labor are deemed to have attained finality.
The Court concurred with the POEA Administrator and the Secretary of Labor that petitioner's refusal to board the M/T Haruna constituted
unjustified breach of his contract of employment. That petitioner believed that respondent company violated his rights when the period of his
earlier Maritina contract was not followed and his "stand-by fees" were not fully paid did not justify his refusal to abide by the valid and
existing Haruna contract requiring him to serve aboard M/T Haruna. For, as noted in the assailed DOLE Order, "if petitioner's rights have
been violated as he claims, he has various remedies under the contract which he did not avail of.
Parenthetically, the Undersecretary of Labor declared that the real reason petitioner refused to re-join Haruna is that he left the Philippines
on to join MT Adriatiki, a vessel of another maiming agency, which declaration petitioner has not refuted.
Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood Cooperative vs. Kilusang Manggagawa ng LGS et al.
G.R. No. 191138-39, October 19, 2011
Facts: KMLMS filed a notice of strike on March 5, 2002 and conducted its strike-vote on April 8, 2002. However, KMLMS only acquired
legal personality when its registration as an independent labor organization was granted on April 9, 2002 by the Department of Labor and
Employment.
On April 19, 2002, it became officially affiliated as a local chapter of the Pambansang Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino when its
application was granted by the Bureau of Labor Relations.
Thereafter, on May 6, 2002, KMLMS — now a legitimate labor organization (LLO) — staged a strike where several prohibited and illegal
acts were committed by its participating members.
On the ground of lack of valid notice of strike, ineffective conduct of a strike-vote and commission of prohibited and illegal acts, petitioners
filed their Petition to Declare the Strike of May 6, 2002 Illegal before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Board (RAB) No. IV in Quezon City.
Ruling of Labor Arbiter

The May 6, 2002 strike is illegal and 41 workers are declared to have lost their employment.
Ruling of the NLRC

Affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision but declared additional seven workers to have lost their employment
Ruling of the CA
Affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
Issues:
1. WON the strike was illegal
2. WON the union members are validly terminated from their employment.
Ruling:
1. There is no question that the May 6, 2002 strike was illegal, first, because when KMLMS filed the notice of strike on March 5 or 14, 2002,
it had not yet acquired legal personality and, thus, could not legally represent the eventual union and its members. And second, similarly
when KMLMS conducted the strike-vote on April 8, 2002, there was still no union to speak of, since KMLMS only acquired legal personality
as an independent LLO only on April 9, 2002 or the day after it conducted the strike-vote. These factual findings are undisputed and borne
out by the records.
Consequently, the mandatory notice of strike and the conduct of the strike-vote report were ineffective for having been filed and conducted
before KMLMS acquired legal personality as an LLO, violating Art. 263 (c), (d) and (f) of the Labor Code and Rule XXII, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
Art. 263(c):
Where to
Controversy What to File Who may File Period of Notice
File
Notice of Duly Certified or Recognized 30 days before the intended

Ministry
Strike Bargaining Agent date of strike
Bargaining
Deadlock
Notice of 30 days before the intended
Employer Ministry
Lockout lockout
Duly Certified or Recognized

Bargaining Agent
Unfair Labor Notice of 15 days before the intended
In absence of the above: Ministry
Practice Strike date of strike
Any Legitimate Labor in behalf of
its members
On the other hand, Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code likewise pertinently provides:
RULE XXII
CONCILIATION, STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 6.Who may declare a strike or lockout. — Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may declare a strike in cases
of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. The employer may declare a lockout in the same cases. In the absence of a certified
or duly recognized bargaining representative, any legitimate labor organization in the establishment may declare a strike but only on
grounds of unfair labor practice.
It is, thus, clear that the filing of the notice of strike and the conduct of the strike-vote by KMLMS did not comply with the aforequoted
mandatory requirements of law and its implementing rules. Consequently, the May 6, 2002 strike is illegal.
2. There is likewise no dispute that when the May 6, 2002 illegal strike was conducted, the members of respondent KMLMS committed
prohibited and illegal acts which doubly constituted the strike illegal.
Art. 264. Prohibited Acts:

(a) Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
(b) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from
the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
Here, the striking workers committed acts of (1) interference by obstructing the free ingress to or egress from petitioners' compound and (2)
coercion and intimidation.
Art. 264 of the Code present a substantial distinction of the consequences of an illegal strike between union officers and mere members of
the union:
Persons
Ground for Termination
Involved
Union Officers Knowingly participating in an illegal strike
Union Committed prohibited and illegal acts during the strike and there is substantial evidence or proof of their
Members participation; (mere participation is not a ground)
A total of 34 union members have been declared to have lost their employment due to their commission of prohibited and illegal acts during
the illegal strike of May 6, 2002, 27 of which are those from the judgment of the Labor Arbiter.
72 additional union members are however found by the court to have committed illegal acts to which petitioners have substantially proven
their identity. There was patent misappreciation of evidence both by the LA and the NLRC, and was not corrected by the CA, in having a
view that there is no substantial proof of the identity of the other 72 striking union members who committed prohibited and illegal activities.
Abaria et al., vs. NLRC et al.

G.R. Nos. 154113, 187778, 187861 & 196156, December 7, 2011
Facts: The consolidated cases involve the legality of mass termination of hospital employees who participated in strike and picketing
activities.
Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI), presently known as the Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC), is a non-stock, non-
profit corporation organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. It operates the Metro Cebu Community Hospital (MCCH), a
tertiary medical institution located at Osmeña Boulevard, Cebu City. MCCH is owned by the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
(UCCP) and Rev. Gregorio P. Iyoy is the Hospital Administrator.
The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCHI. Under the
previous Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs), the signatories were Ciriaco B. Pongasi, Sr. for MCCHI, and Atty. Armando M.
Alforque (NFL Legal Counsel) and Paterno A. Lumapguid as President of NFL-MCCH Chapter. In the CBA effective from January 1994
until December 31, 1995, the signatories were Sheila E. Buot as Board of Trustees Chairman, Rev. Iyoy as MCCH Administrator and Atty.
Fernando Yu as Legal Counsel of NFL, while Perla Nava, President of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa MCCH (NAMA-MCCH-NFL) signed
the Proof of Posting.
Nava wrote Rev. Iyoy expressing the union’s desire to renew the CBA, attaching to her letter a statement of proposals signed/endorsed by
153 union members. Nava subsequently requested that the following employees be allowed to avail of one-day union leave with pay.
However, MCCHI returned the CBA proposal for Nava to secure first the endorsement of the legal counsel of NFL as the official bargaining
representative of MCCHI employees.
Meanwhile, Atty. Alforque informed MCCHI that the proposed CBA submitted by Nava was never referred to NFL and that NFL has not
authorized any other legal counsel or any person for collective bargaining negotiations. The collection of union fees (check-off) was
temporarily suspended by MCCHI in view of the existing conflict between the federation and its local affiliate. Thereafter, MCCHI attempted
to take over the room being used as union office but was prevented to do so by Nava and her group who protested these actions and insisted
that management directly negotiate with them for a new CBA. MCCHI referred the matter to Atty. Alforque, NFL’s Regional Director, and
advised Nava that their group is not recognized by NFL.
The next day, several union members led by Nava and her group launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and red
armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and putting up placards, posters and streamers. Atty. Alforque immediately
disowned the concerted activities being carried out by union members which are not sanctioned by NFL. MCCHI directed the union officers
led by Nava to submit within 48 hours a written explanation why they should not be terminated for having engaged in illegal concerted
activities amounting to strike, and placed them under immediate preventive suspension. Responding to this directive, Nava and her group
denied there was a temporary stoppage of work, explaining that employees wore their armbands only as a sign of protest and reiterating their
demand for MCCHI to comply with its duty to bargain collectively. Rev. Iyoy, having been informed that Nava and her group have also been
suspended by NFL, directed said officers to appear before his office for investigation in connection with the illegal strike wherein they
reportedly uttered slanderous and scurrilous words against the officers of the hospital, threatening other workers and forcing them to join the
strike. Said union officers, however, invoked the grievance procedure provided in the CBA to settle the dispute between management and
the union.
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office No. 7 issued certifications stating that there is nothing in their records
which shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a registered labor organization, and that said union submitted only a copy of its Charter
Certificate. MCCHI then sent individual notices to all union members asking them to submit within 72 hours a written explanation why they
should not be terminated for having supported the illegal concerted activities of NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no legal personality as per
DOLE records. Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated employees against
MCCHI, Rev. Iyoy, UCCP and members of the Board of Trustees of MCCHI.
Issues:
1. Whether or not declaring private respondents MCCHI guilty of unfair labor practice and union busting
2. Whether or not the union officers and members were guilty of illegal strike and picketing activities
Ruling:
1. MCCHI is not guilty of unfair labor practice
Art. 248 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "[t]o violate the duty to bargain collectively"
as prescribed by the Code. The applicable provision in this case is Art. 253 which provides:
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. – When there is a collective bargaining
agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its
lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its
expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions
of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL charged MCCHI with refusal to bargain collectively when the latter refused to meet and convene for purposes of
collective bargaining, or at least give a counter-proposal to the proposed CBA the union had submitted and which was ratified by a majority
of the union membership. MCCHI, on its part, deferred any negotiations until the local union’s dispute with the national union federation
(NFL) is resolved considering that the latter is the exclusive bargaining agent which represented the rank-and-file hospital employees in CBA
negotiations since 1987. Records of the NCMB and DOLE Region 7 confirmed that NAMA-MCCH-NFL had not registered as a labor
organization, having submitted only its charter certificate as an affiliate or local chapter of NFL. Not being a legitimate labor organization,
NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not entitled to those rights granted to a legitimate labor organization under Art. 242, specifically:
(a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining;
(b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of
collective bargaining;
2. NAMA-MCCH-NFL and its union officers and members are guilty of illegal strike and picketing.
Art. 263 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. – x x x
(b) Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and
protection. The right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national
interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected. However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on
grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes.
As borne by the records, NAMA-MCCH-NFL was not a duly registered or an independently registered union at the time it filed the notice
of strike and when it conducted the strike. It could not then legally represent the union members. Consequently, the mandatory notice of
strike and the conduct of the strike vote report were ineffective for having been filed and conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no
legal personality as a legitimate labor organization, in violation of Art. 263 (c), (d) and (f) of the Labor Code and Rule XXII, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter and NLRC, as sustained by the appellate court,
clearly established that the striking union members created so much noise, disturbance and obstruction that the local government authorities
eventually ordered their removal for being a public nuisance. This was followed by an injunction from the NCMB enjoining the union leaders
from further blocking the free ingress to and egress from the hospital, and from committing threats, coercion and intimidation against non-
striking employees and patients/vehicles desiring to enter for the purpose of seeking medical treatment/confinement. By then, the illegal
strike had lasted for almost five months.
The Supreme Court ruled for MCCHI.
PICOP Resources Inc. vs. Dequilla et al.

G.R. no. 172666, December 7, 2011
Facts: Ricardo Dequilla, Cesar Atienza and Aniceto Orbeta (private respondents) were regular rank-and-file employees of Picop Resources,
Inc. (PICOP) and members of the NAMAPRI-SPFL, a duly registered labor organization and existing bargaining agent of the PICOP rank-
and-file employees. PICOP and NAMAPRI-SPFL had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which would expire on May 22, 2000.
On May 16, 2000, the late Atty. Proculo P. Fuentes, Jr. (Atty. Fuentes), then National President of the Southern Philippines Federation of
Labor (SPFL), advised the PICOP management to terminate about 800 employees due to acts of disloyalty, specifically, for allegedly
campaigning, supporting and signing a petition for the certification of a rival union, the Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) before the
60-day "freedom period" and during the effectivity of the CBA. Such acts of disloyalty were construed to be a valid cause for termination
under the terms and conditions of the CBA. Based on the CBA, the freedom period would start on March 22, 2000.
The employees were given an opportunity to be heard and subsequently on October 16, 2000, PICOP served a notice of termination due to
acts of disloyalty to 31 employees including herein private respondents. Thus, they filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice and Illegal
Dismissal with money claims, damages and attorney’s fees.
Issue: Whether an existing CBA can be given full force and effect in its terms and conditions, including its union security clause, even
beyond the five year period when no new CBA has been entered into.
Ruling: The petition merits a denial.

There is no question that in the CBA entered into by the parties, there is a union security clause. The clause imposes upon the workers the
obligation to join and maintain membership in the company’s recognized union as a condition for employment.
There is no dispute that private respondents were members of NAMAPRI-SPFL who were terminated by PICOP due to alleged acts of
disloyalty. It is basic in labor jurisprudence that the burden of proof rests upon management to show that the dismissal of its worker was
based on a just cause. When an employer exercises its power to terminate an employee by enforcing the union security clause, it needs to
determine and prove the following: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union
security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union.
In this case, the resolution thereof hinges on whether PICOP was able to show sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to
expel private respondents from it.
PICOP basically contends that private respondents were justly terminated from employment for campaigning, supporting and signing a
petition for the certification of FFW, a rival union, before the 60-day "freedom period" and during the effectivity of the CBA. Their acts
constitute an act of disloyalty against the union which is valid cause for termination pursuant to the Union Security Clause in the CBA.
The Court finds Itself unable to agree.
PICOP failed to show in detail how private respondents campaigned and supported FFW. Their mere act of signing an authorization for a
petition for certification election before the freedom period does not necessarily demonstrate union disloyalty. It is far from being within the
definition of "acts of disloyalty.” The act of "signing an authorization for a petition for certification election" is not disloyalty to the union
per se considering that the petition for certification election itself was filed during the freedom period which started on March 22, 2000.
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the CA, the records are bereft of proof of any contemporaneous acts of resignation or withdrawal of union
membership or non-payment of union dues. Neither is there proof that private respondents joined FFW. The fact is, private respondents
remained in good standing with their union, NAMAPRI-SPFL.
We are constrained to believe that an "authorization letter to file a petition for certification election" is different from an actual "Petition for
Certification Election." Likewise, as per records, it was clear that the actual Petition for Certification Election of FFW was filed only on May
18, 2000. Thus, it was within the ambit of the freedom period which commenced from March 21, 2000 until May 21, 2000. Strictly speaking,
what is prohibited is the filing of a petition for certification election outside the 60-day freedom period. This is not the situation in this case.
If at all, the signing of the authorization to file a certification election was merely preparatory to the filing of the petition for certification
election, or an exercise of respondents’ right to self-organization.
Moreover, PRI anchored their decision to terminate respondents’ employment on Article 253 of the Labor Code which states that "it shall be
the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement
during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties." It claimed that they are still bound by the Union Security
Clause of the CBA even after the expiration of the CBA; hence, the need to terminate the employment of respondents.
Petitioner's reliance on Article 253 is misplaced.
Following Article 256, at the expiration of the freedom period, PRI's obligation to recognize NAMAPRI-SPFL as the incumbent bargaining
agent does not hold true when petitions for certification election were filed, as in this case.
Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to the economic provisions of the CBA, and
does not include representational aspect of the CBA. An existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for certification election.
When there is a representational issue, the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a new agreement will not apply.
Otherwise, it will create an absurd situation where the union members will be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security
clause existing under the CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a petition for certification election. If we apply it, there will
always be an issue of disloyalty whenever the employees exercise their right to self-organization. The holding of a certification election is a
statutory policy that should not be circumvented, or compromised.
C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc.

G.R. No. 155109, March 14, 2012 Resolution on the Main Decision of September 29, 2010
Facts: C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc., (the Company) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and processing of plywood.
Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL (the Union) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the Company’s rank and file employees. The
other parties to these cases are the Union officers1 and their striking members.
The Company and the Union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that bound them to hold no strike and no lockout in the
course of its life. At some point the parties began negotiating the economic provisions of their CBA but this ended in a deadlock, prompting
the Union to file a notice of strike. After efforts at conciliation by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) failed, the Union
conducted a strike vote that resulted in an overwhelming majority of its members favoring it. The Union reported the strike vote to the DOLE
and, after the observance of the mandatory cooling-off period, went on strike.
During the strike, the Company filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) Ex Parte3 with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to enjoin the strikers from intimidating,
threatening, molesting, and impeding by barricade the entry of non-striking employees at the Company’s premises. The NLRC first issued a
20-day TRO and, after hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the Union and its officers and members from performing the acts
complained of. But several attempts to implement the writ failed. Only the intervention of law enforcement units made such implementation
possible. Meantime, the Union filed a petition4 with the Court of Appeals (CA), questioning the preliminary injunction order. On February
8, 1999 the latter court dismissed the petition. The Union did not appeal from such dismissal.
On June 29, 1999 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision,6 declaring the Union’s strike illegal for violating the CBA’s no strike, no lockout,
provision. As a consequence, the Labor Arbiter held that the Union officers should be deemed to have forfeited their employment with the
Company and that they should pay actual damages of P3,825,000.00 plus 10% interest and attorney’s fees. With respect to the striking Union
members, finding no proof that they actually committed illegal acts during the strike, the Labor Arbiter ordered their reinstatement without
backwages. The Labor Arbiter denied the Union’s counterclaim for lack of merit.
On November 8, 1999 the NLRC rendered a decision,8 affirming that of the Labor Arbiter insofar as the latter declared the strike illegal,
ordered the Union officers terminated, and directed them to pay damages to the Company. The NLRC ruled, however, that the Union members
involved, who were identified in the proceedings held in the case, should also be terminated for having committed prohibited and illegal acts.
The Union filed a petition for certiorari9 with the CA, questioning the NLRC decision. Finding merit in the petition, the CA rendered a
decision on March 20, 2002,10 annulling the NLRC decision and reinstating that of the Labor Arbiter. The Company and the Union with its
officers and members filed separate petitions for review of the CA decision.
On November 8, 1999 the NLRC rendered a decision,8 affirming that of the Labor Arbiter insofar as the latter declared the strike illegal,
ordered the Union officers terminated, and directed them to pay damages to the Company. The NLRC ruled, however, that the Union members
involved, who were identified in the proceedings held in the case, should also be terminated for having committed prohibited and illegal acts.
The Union filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the NLRC decision. Finding merit in the petition, the CA rendered a decision
on March 20, 2002,10 annulling the NLRC decision and reinstating that of the Labor Arbiter. The Company and the Union with its officers
and members filed separate petitions for review of the CA decision in G.R. 155109 and 155135, respectively.
Issue: Whether or not the Union staged an illegal strike
Ruling: A strike may be regarded as invalid although the labor union has complied with the strict requirements for staging one as provided
in Article 263 of the Labor Code when the same is held contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no strike clause or conclusive arbitration
clause. Here, the CBA between the parties contained a "no strike, no lockout" provision that enjoined both the Union and the Company from
resorting to the use of economic weapons available to them under the law and to instead take recourse to voluntary arbitration in settling their
disputes.
No law or public policy prohibits the Union and the Company from mutually waiving the strike and lockout maces available to them to give
way to voluntary arbitration. Indeed, no less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes in Section 3, Article XIII, preferential use of voluntary
means to settle disputes. Thus –
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA regarding the illegality of the
strike. Social justice is not one-sided. It cannot be used as a badge for not complying with a lawful agreement.
Since the Union’s strike has been declared illegal, the Union officers can, in accordance with law be terminated from employment for their
actions. This includes the shop stewards. They cannot be shielded from the coverage of Article 264 of the Labor Code since the Union
appointed them as such and placed them in positions of leadership and power over the men in their respective work units.
As regards the rank and file Union members, Article 264 of the Labor Code provides that termination from employment is not warranted by
the mere fact that a union member has taken part in an illegal strike. It must be shown that such a union member, clearly identified, performed
an illegal act or acts during the strike.
Digital Telecommunications Phils Inc. vs. Digitel Employees Union et al.

G.R. No. 184903-04, October 10, 2012
Facts: By virtue of a certification election, Digitel Employees Union (Union) became the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file
employees of Digitel in 1994. The Union and Digitel then commenced collective bargaining negotiations, which resulted in a bargaining
deadlock. The Union threatened to go on strike, but then Acting Labor Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute and eventually directed the parties to execute a CBA. However, no CBA was forged between Digitel and the Union. Some Union
members abandoned their employment with Digitel. The Union later became dormant. AICDSa
Ten (10) years thereafter or on 28 September 2004, Digitel received from Arceo Rafael A. Esplana (Esplana), who identified himself as
President of the Union, a letter containing the list of officers, CBA proposals and ground rules. 3 The officers were respondents Esplana,
Alan D. Licando (Vice-President), Felicito C. Romero, Jr. (Secretary), Arnold D. Gonzales (Treasurer), Reynel Francisco B. Garcia (Auditor),
Zosimo B. Peralta (PRO), Regino T. Unidad (Sgt. at Arms), and Jim L. Javier (Sgt. at Arms). Digitel was reluctant to negotiate with the
Union and demanded that the latter show compliance with the provisions of the Union's Constitution and By-laws on union membership and
election of officers.
On 4 November 2004, Esplana and his group filed a case for Preventive Mediation before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
based on Digitel's violation of the duty to bargain. On 25 November 2004, Esplana filed a notice of strike. On 10 March 2005, then Labor
Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas issued an Order 4 assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
During the pendency of the controversy, Digitel Service, Inc. (Digiserv), a non-profit enterprise engaged in call center servicing, filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an Establishment Termination Report stating that it will cease its business operation. The
closure affected at least 100 employees, 42 of whom are members of the herein respondent Union. Alleging that the affected employees are
its members and in reaction to Digiserv's action, Esplana and his group filed another Notice of Strike for union busting, illegal lock-out, and
violation of the assumption order.
On 23 May 2005, the Secretary of Labor ordered the second notice of strike subsumed by the previous Assumption Order. Meanwhile, on 14
March 2005, Digitel filed a petition with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) seeking cancellation of the Union's registration on the
following grounds: 1) failure to file the required reports from 1994-2004; 2) misrepresentation of its alleged officers; 3) membership of the
Union is composed of rank and file, supervisory and managerial employees; and 4) substantial number of union members are not Digitel
employees.
Issue: Whether the Secretary of Labor erred in issuing the assumption order despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of union
registration;
Ruling: The pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude collective bargaining.
The 2005 case of Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano 13 is apropos. The respondent union therein sent a letter to petitioner requesting
a negotiation of their CBA. Petitioner refused to bargain and instead filed a petition for cancellation of the union's certificate of registration.
Petitioner's refusal to bargain forced the union to file a notice of strike. They eventually staged a strike. The Secretary of Labor assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordered all striking workers to return to work. Petitioner challenged said order by contending that its
petition for cancellation of union's certificate of registration involves a prejudicial question that should first be settled before the Secretary of
Labor could order the parties to bargain collectively. When the case eventually reached this Court, we agreed with the Secretary of Labor
that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude collective bargaining, thus: SDaHEc
That there is a pending cancellation proceeding against the respondent Union is not a bar to set in motion the mechanics of collective
bargaining. If a certification election may still be ordered despite the pendency of a petition to cancel the union's registration certificate
(National Union of Bank Employees vs. Minister of Labor, 110 SCRA 274), more so should the collective bargaining process continue
despite its pendency.
We must emphasize that the majority status of the respondent Union is not affected by the pendency of the Petition for Cancellation pending
against it. Unless its certificate of registration and its status as the certified bargaining agent are revoked, the Hospital is, by express provision
of the law, duty bound to collectively bargain with the Union.
Trajano was reiterated in Legend International Resorts Limited v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legenda (KML-Independent). Legend
International Resorts reiterated the rationale for allowing the continuation of either a CBA process or a certification election even during the
pendency of proceedings for the cancellation of the union's certificate of registration.
Citing the cases of Association of Court of Appeals Employees v. Ferrer-Calleja and Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Hon.
Laguesma, it was pointed out at the time of the filing of the petition for certification election — or a CBA process as in the instant case —
the union still had the personality to file a petition for certification — or to ask for a CBA negotiation — as in the present case.
Automotive Engine Rebuilders vs. Progresibong Unyon ng mga Manggagawa sa AER

G.R. No. 160138, January 16, 2013 & July 13, 2011 Main Decision
Facts: On December 22, 1998, Unyon filed a petition for certification election before the Department of Labor and Employment(DOLE) after
organizing their employees union within AER. Resenting what they did, AER forced all of its employees to submit their urine samples for
drug testing. Those who refused were threatened with dismissal.
On January 8, 1999, the results of the drug test came out and some employees were found positive for illegal drugs and was suspended for
coming to work under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or drinking any alcoholic beverages on the premises on company time.
On January 28, 1999, eighteen (18) employees of AER, acting collectively and in concert, suddenly and without reason staged a walkout and
assembled illegally in the company premises.
Despite management’s plea for them to go back to work, the concerned employees refused and, instead, walked out of the company premises
and proceeded to the office of the AER Performance and Service Center (AER-PSC) located on another street. They threatened and forced
the company guards and some company officers and personnel to open the gate of the AER-PSC compound. They also urged the AER-PSC
employees to likewise stop working.
On February 2, 1999, the affected workers were denied entry into the AER premises by order of management. Because of this, the affected
workers staged a picket in front of company premises hoping that management would accept them back to work. When their picket proved
futile, they filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal.
On February 22, 1999, the concerned employees started a wildcat strike, barricaded company premises, and prevented the free ingress and
egress of the other employees, officers, clients, and visitors and the transportation of company equipments. They also tried to use force and
inflict violence against the other employees. Their wildcat strike stopped after the NLRC issued and served a temporary restraining
order (TRO).
Issue and Ruling:

The in pari delicto doctrine in labor cases is not novel to us. It has been applied in the case of Philippines Inter-Fashion, Inc. v
NLRC,[20] where the Court held:
The Solicitor General has correctly stated in his comment that "from these facts are derived the following conclusions which are likewise
undisputed: that petitioner engaged in an illegal lockout while the NAFLU engaged in an illegal strike; that the unconditional offer of
the 150 striking employees to return to work and to withdraw their complaint of illegal lockout against petitioner constitutes condonation
of the illegal lock-out; and that the unqualified acceptance of the offer of the 150 striking employees by petitioner likewise constitutes
condonation of the illegal strike insofar as the reinstated employees are concerned."
The issues at bar arise, however, from respondent commission's approval of its commissioner's conclusions that (1) petitioner must be
deemed to have waived its right to pursue the case of illegal strike against the 114 employees who were not reinstated and who pursued
their illegal lockout claim against petitioner; and (2) the said 114 employees are entitled to reinstatement with three months' backwages.
The Court approves the stand taken by the Solicitor General that there was no clear and unequivocal waiver on the part of petitioner and
on the contrary the record shows that it tenaciously pursued its application for their dismissal, but nevertheless in view of the undisputed
findings of illegal strike on the part of the 114 employees and illegal lockout on petitioner's part, both parties are in pari delicto and such
situation warrants the restoration of the status quo ante and bringing the parties back to the respective positions before the illegal strike
and illegal lockout through the reinstatement of the said 114 employees, as follows:
The Bisaya case (102 Phil. 438) is inapplicable to the present case, because in the former, there were only two strikers involved who
were both reinstated by their employer upon their request to return to work. However, in the present case, there were more than 200
strikers involved, of which 150 who desired to return to work were reinstated. The rest were not reinstated because they did not signify
their intention to return to work. Thus, the ruling cited in the Bisaya case that the employer waives his defense of illegality of the strike
upon reinstatement of strikers is applicable only to strikers who signified their intention to return to work and were accepted back.
Truly, it is more logical and reasonable for condonation to apply only to strikers who signified their intention to return and did return to
work. The reason is obvious. These strikers took the initiative in normalizing relations with their employer and thus helped promote
industrial peace. However, as regards the strikers who decided to pursue with the case, as in the case of the 114 strikers herein, the
employer could not be deemed to have condoned their strike, because they had not shown any willingness to normalize relations with it.
So, if petitioner really had any intention to pardon the 114 strikers, it would have included them in its motion to withdraw on November
17, 1980. The fact that it did not, but instead continued to pursue the case to the end, simply means that it did not pardon the 114 strikers.
xxx xxx xxx
The finding of illegal strike was not disputed. Therefore, the 114 strikers employees who participated therein are liable for termination
(Liberal Labor Union v. Phil. Can Co., 91 Phil. 72; Insurefco Employees Union v. Insurefco, 95 Phil. 761). On the other hard, the finding of
illegal lockout was likewise not disputed. Therefore, the 114 employees affected by the lockout are also subject to reinstatement. Petitioner,
however, contends that the application for readmission to work by the 150 strikers constitutes condonation of the lockout which should
likewise bind the 114 remaining strikers. Suffice it to say that the 150 strikers acted for themselves, not on behalf of the 114 remaining
strikers, and therefore the latter could not be deemed to have condoned petitioner's lockout.
The findings show that both petitioner and the 114 strikers are in pari delicto, a situation which warrants the maintenance of the status
quo. This means that the contending parties must be brought back to their respective positions before the controversy; that is, before the
strike. Therefore, the order reinstating the 114 employees is proper.
With such restoration of the status quo ante it necessarily follows, as likewise submitted by the Solicitor General, that the petition must be
granted insofar as it seeks the setting aside of the award of three months' backwages to the 114 employees ordered reinstated on the basis of
the general rule that strikers are not entitled to backwages (with some exceptions not herein applicable, such as where the employer is guilty
of oppression and union-busting activities and strikers ordered reinstated are denied such reinstatement and therefore are declared entitled to
backwages from the date of such denial). More so, is the principle of "no work, no pay" applicable to the case at bar, in view of the undisputed
finding of illegality of the strike.
Likewise, the in pari delicto doctrine was applied in the case of First City Interlink Transportation Co. Inc. v The Honorable Secretary, thus:
Petitioner substantially complied with the Return to Work Order. The medical examination, NBI, Police and Barangay Clearances as
well as the driver's and conductor's/conductress licenses and photographs required as conditions for reinstatement were reasonable
management prerogatives. However, the other requirements imposed as condition for reinstatement were unreasonable considering that
the employees were not being hired for the first time, although the imposition of such requirements did not amount to refusal on the part
of the employer to comply with the Return to Work Order or constitute illegal lockout so as to warrant payment of backwages to the
strikers. If at all, it is the employees' refusal to return to work that may be deemed a refusal to comply with the Return to Work Order
resulting in loss of their employment status. As both the employer and the employees were, in a sense, at fault or in pari delicto, the
nonreturning employees, provided they did not participate in illegal acts; should be considered entitled to reinstatement. But since
reinstatement is no longer feasible, they should be given separation pay computed up to March 8, 1988 (the date set for the return of the
employees) in lieu of reinstatement. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
In the case at bar, since both AER and the union are at fault or in pari delicto, they should be restored to their respective positions prior to the
illegal strike and illegal lockout. Nonetheless, if reinstatement is no longer feasible, the concerned employees should be given separation pay
up to the date set for the return of the complaining employees in lieu of reinstatement.
Holy Child Catholic School vs. Hon. Sto Tomas et al.

G.R. No. 179146, July 23, 2013
Facts: A petition for certification election was filed by private respondent Pinag Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis – Holy Child Catholic
School Teachers and Employees Labor Union (HCCSTELUPIGLAS).
Holy Child Parochial School raised that members of private respondent do not belong to the same class; it is not only a mixture of managerial,
supervisory, and rank-and-file employees – as three (3) are vice principals, one (1) is a department head/supervisor, and eleven (11) are
coordinators – but also a combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel – as twenty-seven (27) are non-teaching personnel. It insisted
that, for not being in accord with Article 245 of the Labor Code, private respondent is an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality
to file a petition for certification election
The Med-Arbiter denied the same.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground that the labor organization’s membership allegedly
consists of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
Ruling: No. Before, when the 1989 Rules was still in application, mingling will prevent an otherwise legitimate and duly registered labor
organization from exercising its right to file a petition for certification election. But then, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further
amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the
1989 Amended Omnibus Rules – that the petition for certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has
not been mingled with supervisory employees – was removed.
Petitioner argued that, in view of the improper mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel in private respondent due to the absence of
mutuality of interest among its members, the petition for certification election should have been dismissed because private respondent is not
qualified to file such petition for its failure to qualify as a legitimate labor organization, the basic qualification of which is the representation
of an appropriate bargaining unit. The Supreme Court disagreed and said that the concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization
are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit.
In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a
petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended. To reiterate, private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of
registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally.
Visayas Community Medical Center vs. Yballe, et al.

GR No. 196156, January 15, 2014
Facts: Respondents were hired as staff nurses and midwives by petitioner Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC), formerly the Metro
Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI). The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-
and-file employees of MCCHI. Under the 1987 and 1991 Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs).
On December 6, 1995, Nava wrote Rev. Iyoy expressing the union desire to renew the CBA, attaching to her letter a statement of proposals
signed/endorsed by 153 union members. Nava subsequently requested that the following employees be allowed to avail of one-day union
leave with pay on December 19, 1995. However, MCCHI returned the CBA proposal for Nava to secure first the endorsement of the legal
counsel of NFL as the official bargaining representative of MCCHI employees.
Meanwhile, Atty. Alforque informed MCCHI that the proposed CBA submitted by Nava was never referred to NFL and that NFL has not
authorized any other legal counsel or any person for collective bargaining negotiations.
On February 26, 1996, upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union members. The next
day, several union members led by Nava and her group launched a series of mass actions. Atty. Alforque immediately disowned the concerted
activities being carried out by union members which are not sanctioned by NFL. MCCHI directed the union officers led by Nava to submit
within 48 hours a written explanation why they should not be terminated for having engaged in illegal concerted activities amounting to
strike, and place them under immediate preventive suspension.
On March 13 and 19, 1996, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office No. 7 issued certifications stating that there
is nothing in their records which shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a registered labor organization, and that said union submitted only a
copy of its Charter Certificate on January 31, 1995.
The striking union members held more mass actions. With the volatile situation adversely affecting hospital operations and the condition of
confined patients, MCCHI filed a petition for injunction in the NLRC on July 9, 1996. MCCHI petition was granted and a permanent
injunction was issued on September 18, 1996 enjoining the Nava group from committing illegal acts mentioned in Art. 264 of the Labor
Code.
Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated employees against MCCHI. Rev.
Iyoy, UCCP and members of the Board of Trustees of MCCHI. Executive Labor Arbiter Reynoso A. Belarmino rendered in his decision
dismissing the claim of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal and declaring the termination of the following as an offshoot of the illegal
strike.
Issue: Whether or not respondents commit illegal acts during strike?

Ruling: The strike held by respondents were illegal.

Paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code provides that . .any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status. . .
We stress that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker merely participating in an illegal strike may
not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment
status. In contrast, a union officer may be terminated from employment for knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal
strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.
In this case, the NLRC affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter that respondents supported and took part in the illegal strike and further
declared that they were guilty of insubordination. It noted that the striking employees were determined to force management to negotiate
with their union and proceeded with the strike despite knowledge that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not a legitimate labor organization.
Are respondents then entitled to back wages? In G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante, ruled in the negative: with respect to backwages,
the principle of a fair day wage for a fair day labor remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed
by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended
or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. x x xIn Philippine Marine Officers Guild v. Compaia aritima, as affirmed in
Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, the Court stressed that for this exception to apply, it is
required that the strike be legal, a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar.
Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc. vs. Philtranco Workers Union-Association of Genuine Labor Organizations
GR No. 180962, February 26, 2014
Facts: Petitioner Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. retrenched 21 of its employees on the ground that it was suffering business losses.
Consequently, the company union, herein private respondent Philtranco Workers Union–Association of Genuine Labor Organizations (PWU–
AGLU), filed a Notice of Strike with DOLE claiming that petitioner engaged in unfair labor practices.
Unable to settle their differences before the NCMB, the case was thereafter referred to the DOLE Secretary, who issued a Decision in favor
of the PWU-AGLU.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration while private respondent, on the other hand, submitted a “Partial Appeal.” The Secretary of
Labor declined to rule on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and private respondent’s “Partial Appeal”, citing a DOLE regulation which
provided that voluntary arbitrators’ decisions, orders, resolutions or awards shall not be the subject of motions for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed before the CA an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, and sought injunctive relief. The CA dismissed the said
petition and held that, in assailing the Decision of the DOLE voluntary arbitrator, petitioner erred in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules, when it should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 thereof, which properly covers decisions of voluntary
labor arbitrators.
Issue: Is a petition for certiorari under rule 65 instead of under rule 43 of the rules of court the proper remedy to assail the decision of the
Secretary of Labor?
Ruling: Yes, Rule 65 is the proper remedy in assailing the decision of the Secretary of Labor.
It has long been settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a decision or resolution of the Secretary of Labor is to timely file a motion
for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
The authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. This wide latitude of discretion
given to the Secretary of Labor may not be the subject of appeal.
It is undeniable that the case fell within the coverage of Art 263 since the business of Philtranco, a public transportation company, is imbued
with public interest. Any representation to the contrary or that he is deciding the case in his capacity as a voluntary arbitrator notwithstanding.
Hence, Rule 65 is the proper remedy in assailing the decision of the Secretary of Labor.
Wesleyan University-Phils., vs. Wesleyan University-Phils., Faculty & Staff Asso.

GR No. 181806, March 12, 2014
Doctrine: A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a contract entered into by an employer and a legitimate labor organization concerning
the terms and conditions of employment. Like any other contract, it has the force of law between the parties and, thus, should be complied
with in good faith. Unilateral changes or suspensions in the implementation of the provisions of the CBA, therefore, cannot be allowed
without the consent of both parties.
Facts: Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution. Respondent, on the other hand is the duly registered labor organization
acting as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all ran-in-file faculties and staff employees of petitioner.
The parties signed a 5-year CBA effective June 1, 2003 until May 31, 2008. On August 16, 2005, petitioner, through its President, Atty.
Maglaya issued a Memorandum providing guidelines on the implementation of vacation and sick leave credits as well as vacation leave
commutation. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
1. VACATION AND SICK LEAVE CREDITS Vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic. They have to be earned. Monthly, a
qualified employee earns an equivalent of 1.25 days credit each for VL and SL. Vacation Leave and Sick Leave credits of 15 days become
complete at the cut off date of May 31 of each year. (Example, only a total of 5 days credit will be given to an employee for each of sick
leave [or] vacation leave, as of month end September, that is, 4 months from June to September multiplied by 1.25 days). An employee,
therefore, who takes VL or SL beyond his leave credits as of date will have to file leave without pay for leaves beyond his credit.
2. VACATION LEAVE COMMUTATION
Only vacation leave is commuted or monetized to cash. Vacation leave commutation is effected after the second year of continuous service
of an employee. Hence, an employee who started working June 1, 2005 will get his commutation on May 31, 2007 or thereabout.
Respondent's President wrote a letter to Atty. Maglaya informing him that respondent is not amenable to the unilateral changes made by
petitioner. It is violative of existing practices and the CBA, specifically Sections 1 and 2, Article XII of the CBA.
In the Labor Management Meeting that was held, petitioner announced the plan of implementing a one-retirement policy, to which respondent
also objected. Unable to settle their differences in the grievance level, the matter was submitted to a Voluntary Arbitrator. During the hearing,
respondent union submitted affidavits to prove that there is an established practice of giving 2 retirement benefits, one from the PERAA Plan
and another from the CBA Retirement Plan. The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision declaring the Memorandum and the one-retirement
policy contrary to law.
On appeal with the CA, the decision of the VA was affirmed, on the ground that the Memorandum and the one-retirement plan unilaterally
amended the CBA without Respondent’s consent.
Issue: WON the Memorandum and the one-retirement policy are valid.
Ruling: No. The Memorandum is contrary to the existing CBA. Sections 1 and 2 of Article XII of the CBA provide that all covered employees
are entitled to 15 days sick leave and 15 days vacation leave with pay every year and that after the second year of service, all unused vacation
leave shall be converted to cash and paid to the employee at the end of each school year, not later than August 30 of each year.
The Memorandum dated August 16, 2005, however, states that vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic as leave credits would be
earned on a month-to-month basis. This, in effect, limits the available leave credits of an employee at the start of the school year. For example,
for the first four months of the school year or from June to September, an employee is only entitled to five days vacation leave and five days
sick leave. Considering that the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 imposes a limitation not agreed upon by the parties nor stated
in the CBA, we agree with the CA that it must be struck down.
The provision of the CBA is clear, leaving no doubt on the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of the stipulation shall
govern. However, if there is doubt in its interpretation, it should be resolved in favor of labor, as this is mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
With regard to the one-retirement policy, the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that there is substantial evidence to prove that there is an
existing practice of giving two retirement benefits, one under the PERAA Plan and another under the CBA Retirement Plan.
There is nothing in Article XVI of the CBA to indicate or even suggest that the "Plan" referred to in the CBA is the PERAA Plan. Besides,
any doubt in the interpretation of the provisions of the CBA should be resolved in favor of respondent. In fact, petitioner's assertion is negated
by the announcement it made during the LMC Meeting regarding its plan of implementing a "one-retirement plan”. The affidavit of the
retired employees of petitioner, corroborated by the affidavits of incumbent employees, are more than sufficient to show that the granting of
two retirement benefits to retiring employees had already ripened into a consistent and deliberate practice.
Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp.
GR No. 170007, April 7, 2014
Facts: Preparing for the expiration of their 2001-2004 CBA, the parties started negotiations for a new one. Petitioners(Union) proposed a
20% annual across-the-board basic salary increase for the next three years that would be covered by the new CBA. The respondents
(Corporation) made a counter-proposal to gran all covered employees a lump sum of P80,000 yearly for the three-year period of the new
CBA.
On the 39th meeting, the union lowered its proposal to 12% annual across-the-board increase for the next three years, while the company also
increased their lump sum proposal to P88,000 yearly. The company stated that their lump sum offer was based on their affordability. Despite
being provided by the company’s audited financial statements, the union wanted additional documents, such as a copy of the comparison of
the salaries of its members and those from allied industries, which the company denied, being a confidential matter.
The union alleged that the company failed to justify its offer and was bargaining in bad faith. The company expressed its disagreement with
union’s manifestation, and on their 41st meeting, the company proposed the declaration of a deadlock and recommended that the help of a
third party be sought. The union replied that they would sign the proposal on the following day, but instead, filed a notice of strike in the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
The Company filed a petition for assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor, which was granted by the latter. Convinced that the
strike would have a large impact on the company’s various clientele, the transportation sector, and the price of commodities, the SOLE
ordered that the parties maintain the status quo and if the workers have already left their posts, they must return to work within 24hours. The
SOLE directed the parties to submit their respective position papers.
The SOLE denied the Union’s motions for reconsideration.
The union filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, alleging that the SOLE acted with grave abuse of discretion in grossly
misappreciating the facts and issues of the case, citing the main issue of bad faith bargaining by the company and not the CBA deadlock.
The CA found the grounds of the union untenable. Citing Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the SOLE may assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest.
In the very same time, it was found that the Union also filed a complaint for unfair labor practices against the company in the National Labor
Relations Commission. The company moved for its dismissal citing forum shopping and litis pendentia The NLRC granted the company’s
move for the dismissal of the case, citing that the SOLE already has jurisdiction over the case.
During the pendency of the appeal to the CA, the SOLE rendered its decision declaring that the company did not bargain in bad faith.
Regarding the economic issues, since the union failed to substantiate their demands and failed to file their position paper, the SOLE looked
at the financial statements of the company and found it equitable to give a lump sum package of P95,000 per year. In the absence of an appeal,
the decision attained finality.
The Union filed its petition to the Supreme Court to press its contentions. It insisted that the corporation is guilty of unfair labor practice
through bad faith bargaining, and that the CBA deadlock issue could not legally co-exist with the unfair labor practice since the union did
not consent to the deadlock in the first place.
Ruling: The petition fails. There are at least four (4) reasons to support the denial of the petition and each reason is sufficient to defeat the
union’s claim.
First reason: Petition is barred by res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment
Second reason: A significant consequence of the finality of the decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is that it rendered the
controversy between the union and the company moot.
Third Reason: The petition is improper as it presents questions of fact. The allegation and existence of bad faith is a question of fact and is
evidentiary. The issue on whether there was already a deadlock is likewise a question of fact.
Fourth reason: (Failure of the petition based on the merits) – TN: LABOR RELATIONS CLASS
Assuming that this court may disregard the conclusiveness of judgment and review the factual matters raised by the union, the merits are still
not in the union’s favor.
The Supreme Court did not see any reason to reverse the factual findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment that there already existed
a bargaining deadlock upon assumption of jurisdiction, and that there was no bad faith on the part of the company when it was bargaining
with the union. These were all supported by substantial evidence.
The SOLE squarely addressed the contention of the union that the company was guilty of bad faith bargaining. She correctly characterized
the nature of the duty to bargain, that is, it does not compel any party to accept a proposal or to make any concession. The laws invite and
contemplate a collective bargaining contract but do not compel one. The corporation’s unswerving position on the matter of annual lump
sum payment in lieu of wage increase, did not, by itself, constitute bad faith even if such position caused a stalemate in the negotiations, as
correctly ruled by the SOLE. The duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.
As there was no bad faith on the part of the company in its bargaining with the union, deadlock was possible and did occur. The absence of
the parties’ mutual declaration of the deadlock then existing between them did not affect the reality of the existence of such deadlock.
Sonedco Workers free Labor Union et al., vs. Universal Robina Corp.
GR No 220383, October 5, 2016 Main & July 5, 2019 Resolution
Facts: On May 6, 2002, Universal Robina Corp Sugar Division – Southern Negros Development Corporation (URC-SONEDCO) and
Philippine Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU-TUCP), then the exclusive bargaining representative of URC-
SONEDCO's rank-and-file employees, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement) effective
January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2006. Under the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement, rank-and-Cle employees were entitled to a wage
increase of P14.00/day for 2002 and P12.00/day for the succeeding years until 2006.
On May 17, 2002, days after the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement was signed, a certification election was conducted. SONEDCO
Workers Free Labor Union won and replaced PACIWU-TUCP as the exclusive bargaining representative.
PACIWU-TUCP questioned the results of the certification election before the Department of Labor and Employment. On July 8, 2002, Med-
Arbiter Romulo Sumalinog certified SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of URC-
SONEDCO. This was affirmed by the Labor Secretary in a Resolution dated December 27, 2002, which became final on April 15, 2003. 9
PACIWUTUCP elevated the same issue to the Court of Appeals and thereafter this Court, which on July 11, 2007, resolved that the
certification election was valid. SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union was declared the exclusive bargaining agent of URC-SONEDCO's
rank-and-file employees.
URC-SONEDCO consistently refused to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union,
despite several demands from SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, allegedly due to the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement, which it
signed with PACIWU-TUCP.
On August 28, 2007, with no collective bargaining agreement in effect, URCSONEDCO informed the rank-and-Cle employees that they
would be granted the following economic benefits:
(1) Wage increase of P16.00/day effective January 1, 2007;
(2) Group life insurance of P50,000.00 coverage/year;
(3) Emergency leave in lieu of bereavement leave, up to five (5) days per year; and
(4) Cash loan in lieu of emergency loan of P5,000.00, payable in 11 months.
URC-SONEDCO asked the employees who wished to avail themselves of these benefits to sign an acknowledgment receipt/waiver (2007
waiver), which stated that " [i]n the event that a subsequent [collective bargaining agreement] is negotiated between Management and Union,
the new [Collective Bargaining Agreement] shall only be effective January 1, 2008." URC-SONEDCO claimed that the 2007 waiver was
designed to avoid and/or prevent double compensation.
Several SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union members refused to sign the 2007 waiver. Hence, they did not receive the benefits given to
other members of the bargaining unit who had done so.
In 2008, another wage increase of P16.00/day effective January 1, 2008 were given to employees who signed an acknowledgment
receipt/waiver (2008 waiver). The 2008 waiver stated that "[s]a panahon na kung saan may [collective bargaining agreement] na maisasara
sa pagitan ng Management at Uniyon, ito ay magiging epektibo lamang simula January 1, 2009."
Again, several SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union members refused to sign the 2008 waiver. They did not receive the benefits from
URC-SONEDCO.
On August 20, 2008, a certification election was conducted. SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union won again and proceeded to negotiate a
new collective bargaining agreement, which became effective January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2013 (2009 Collective Bargaining
Agreement).
Labor Arbiter found that URC-SONEDCO did not commit unfair labor practice when it increased the wages of the rank-and-Cle employees
for 2007 and 2008. He found that, the requirement of a waiver aside, it was benevolent for URC-SONEDCO to give its employees additional
benefits outside the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter's Decision that the requirement of a waiver before the release of the benefits for 2007 and 2008 did not
constitute unfair labor practice. It likewise affirmed the decision to award the wage increase to the employees who initially refused to sign
the waiver.
Issue: WON petitioners, who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers, are entitled to the wage increase and other economic benefits as a
continuing employee benefit notwithstanding the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement
Ruling: Yes, the petitioners are entitled to the wage increase and other economic benefits as a continuing employee notwithstanding the 2009
CBA.
After SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union was again declared as the exclusive bargaining representative in the August 20, 2008
certification election, the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement was created to cover 2009 to 2013. Since the 2009 Collective Bargaining
Agreement did not include the years 2007 and 2008, the alleged purpose of the waivers, which was to prevent double compensation, was
already served. It would be unfair for the employees to still not receive the benefits for 2007 and 2008 simply because they refused to sign a
waiver that was already moot.
However, there is no need for the continuation of the wage increase for 2007 and 2008 since the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement
contains wage increase provisions for 2009 to 2013. As explained in Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing v. National Labor
Relations Commission, if a proposal is not printed in the collective bargaining agreement, it cannot be demanded:
The CBA is the law between the contracting parties — the collective bargaining representative and the employer-company. Compliance
with a CBA is mandated by the expressed policy to give protection to labor. In the same vein, CBA provisions should be "construed
liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due
consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve." This is founded on the dictum that a
CBA is not an ordinary contract but one impressed with public interest. It goes without saying, however, that only provisions embodied
in the CBA should be so interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised by a contracting party does not Cnd print in the CBA,
it is not a part thereof and the proponent has no claim whatsoever to its implementation. (Citations omitted)
If petitioners wanted the wage increase for 2007 and 2008 to be carried on, the proper recourse would have been to demand that this be
included in the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Frondozo et al., vs. Manila Electric Company

GR No. 178379, August 22, 2017, En Banc
Facts: The case originated from a Notice of Strike (first strike) filed on 16 May 1991 by the MERALCO Employees and Workers Association
(MEWA), composed of MERALCO's rank-and-file employees, on the ground of Unfair Labor Practice (ULP). Conciliation conferences
conducted by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) failed to settle the dispute and resulted to a strike staged by MEWA
on 6 June 1991. In an Order dated 6 June 1991, then Acting Secretary Nieves R. Confesor of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, ordered all the striking workers to return to work, and directed
MERALCO to accept the striking workers back to work under the same terms and conditions existing prior to the work stoppage.
On 26 July 1991, MERALCO terminated the services of Crispin S. Frondozo (Frondozo), Danilo M. Perez (Perez), Jose A. Zafra (Zafra),
Arturo B. Vito (Vito), Cesar S. Cruz (Cruz), Nazario C. dela Cruz (N. dela Cruz), Luisito R. Diloy (Diloy), and Danilo D. Dizon (Dizon) for
having committed unlawful acts and violence during the strike.
On 25 July 1991, MEWA filed a second Notice of Strike (second strike) on the ground of discrimination and union busting that resulted to
the dismissal from employment of 25 union officers and workers. Then DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued an Order dated 8 August
1991 that certified the issues raised in the second strike to the NLRC for consolidation with the first strike and strictly enjoined any strike or
lockout pending resolution of the labor dispute. The Order also directed MERALCO to suspend the effects of termination of the employees
and re-admit the employees under the same terms and conditions without loss of seniority rights.
The labor dispute resulted to the filing of two complaints for illegal dismissal:
(1) NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-04146-92 filed by Dizon, Diloy, Patricio Maniacop, Wilfredo Lagason, Venancio Arguzon, Jr., Rogelio
Antonio, Lauro Garcia, Alfredo Badilla, Jr., and Reynaldo Javier; and
(2) NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-06878-92 filed by MEWA, Reynaldo M. Caberte (Caberte), Alfredo dela Cruz (A. dela Cruz), Nataner
F. Pingol (Pingol), Vincent G. Rallos, Enrique T. Barrientos (Barrientos), Melchor E. Banaga (Banaga), Zafra, Perez, Vito, N. dela Cruz,
Cruz, and Frondozo.
The Resolutions of the NLRC

In a Resolution dated 28 February 2006, the NLRC granted the prayer for preliminary injunction of MERALCO. The NLRC considered the
difficulty in proceeding with the execution given the conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals' Special Second Division in CA-G.R. SP
No. 72480 and the Court of Appeals' Fourteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 that were also passed upon by this Court, respectively,
in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311 and in G.R. No. 164998. The NLRC ruled:
At the outset, it must be stated that while this Commission has broad powers within its sphere of jurisdiction, it cannot encroach on judicial
power which is the exclusive domain of the courts. The Court of Appeals has two contrasting rulings, one upholding the legality of
complainants' dismissal, and the other declaring such dismissal illegal. This Commission has no power to overrule what has been decided by
the courts. This is especially true with respect to judgments that have become final and executory not only at the level of the Court of Appeals,
but also of the Supreme Court.
Indeed, there is an insurmountable obstacle in the execution of the decision favoring complainants. If We let execution proceed, We will
disregard the Court of Appeals' ruling in the MERALCO petition. On the other hand, We cannot declare complainants to have been legally
dismissed as this will contravene the Court of Appeals' ruling in the Frondozo petition.
Confronted with this dilemma, and in deference to the exercise of the judicial power as the courts may find appropriate, this Commission has
no recourse but to enjoin all proceedings until the parties would have exhausted all available judicial remedies toward the possible
reconciliation of the contrasting decisions.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 6 March 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 28 February 2006 and 26 May 2006 Resolutions of the NLRC. According
to the Court of Appeals, MERALCO's recourse was due to the two separate petitions before it (CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 and CA-G.R. SP No.
72509) that resulted in two contradictory rulings on the matter of petitioners' dismissal. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the execution
of a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party and is mandatory and ministerial on the part of the court or tribunal
issuing the judgment. However, the Court of Appeals stated that a suspension or refusal of execution of judgment or order on equitable
grounds can be justified when there are facts or events transpiring after the judgment or order had become final and executory, thus materially
affecting the judgment obligation.
The Court of Appeals stated:

In the case at bar, finality of the CA Decision in SP No. 72480 on May 24, 2004, is a supervening event which transpiredafter the CA
Decision in SP 72509 (which was in favor of petitioners) had become final and executory, and which decision directly contradicts the ruling
in the said case. It may also be noted that the Resolution of the Supreme Court's Third Division in G.R. No. 161311 categorically declared
that the petition filed by herein petitioners is being denied for their failure to show that a reversible error has been committed by the appellate
court in rendering the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480. Hence, with the denial with finality of the petition for review in G.R. No. 161159
(161311) the CA Decision in SP 72480 upholding the dismissal of petitioners has clearly become a legal obstacle to the enforcement of the
final and executory decision in SP 72509 which in effect declared petitioners to have been illegally dismissed and upheld their right to back
wages computed from December 14, 2001 and up to the date of their actual reinstatement.
In fine, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the NLRC in granting preliminary injunction to private respondent MERALCO and
enjoining or suspending all proceedings for the implementation of the 2nd alias writ of execution earlier issued by Labor Arbiter Guerrero
with respect to the back wages/monetary award and reinstatement of petitioners pursuant to the May 29, 2002 Decision of the NLRC as
affirmed/modified by the CA Decision in SP No. 72509.
As to the contention of petitioners that the NLRC should have instead proceeded to reconcile or harmonize the conflicting decisions rendered
by the two (2) divisions of the Court, We find the same untenable and runs against established principles of immutability of final judgments
in this jurisdiction. In fact, nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable
and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court
of the land.
We cannot but concur with the NLRC's pronouncement that MERALCO has no speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
for the preservation of its rights and interests, at least insofar only and solely as to avoid the injurious consequences of the 2nd alias writ of
execution relative to the reinstatement aspect of the final decision in CA-G.R. No. SP 72509.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in upholding the NLRC in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for by MERALCO
Ruling: The petition has no merit.

The Court of Appeals cited the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which provides that "[u]pon issuance of the entry of judgment,
the Commission, motu proprio or upon motion by the proper party, may cause the execution of the judgment in the certified case." According
to the Court of Appeals, the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC did not make a distinction between decisions or resolutions
decided by the Labor Arbiter and those decided by the Commission in certified cases when an order of reinstatement is involved. Thus, even
when the employer had perfected an appeal, the Labor Arbiter must issue a writ of execution for actual or payroll reinstatement of the
employees illegally dismissed from the service. The Court of Appeals also cited Article 223 of the Labor Code which provides that the
reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter's Decision is immediately executory.
In this case, the applicable rule is Article 263 of the Labor Code and the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment, as amended by Resolution
No. 02-02, series of 2002. Section 1, Rule III of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment provides:
Section 1. Execution Upon Final Judgment or Order. Execution shall issue only upon a judgment or order that finally disposes of an
action or proceeding, except in specific instances where the law provides for execution pending appeal.
Article 263 (i) of the Labor Code,on the other hand, provides:
(i) The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall decide or resolve the dispute within thirty
(30) calendar days from the date of the assumption of jurisdiction or the certification or submission of the dispute, as the case may be.
The decision of the President, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall be final and
executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties.
A judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC may be filed before the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court but the petition shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining order is issued by the Court of
Appeals.
In this case, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment stating that the 29 May 2002 NLRC Order became final and executory on 19 June 2002;
a Writ of Execution was issued; and MERALCO complied with the payroll reinstatement of petitioners. However, with the promulgation of
the 30 May 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals' Special Second Division, finding that the 6-8 June 1991 strike was illegal, illegal acts
marred with violence and coercion were committed, and dismissing petitioners from the service, MERALCO stopped the payroll
reinstatement. This prompted petitioners to move for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of their accrued wages
arising from the recall of their payroll reinstatement which Labor Arbiter Guerrero granted on 10 June 2004. Later, a second Alias Writ of
Execution was issued.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE

General Milling Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 146728, February 11, 2004
Facts: In its plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, General Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers, who were all
members of respondent General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union (union, for brevity), a duly certified bargaining agent. On
April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation effective
for a term of three years. The CBA was effective for three years retroactive to December 1, 1988. Hence, it would expire on November 30,
1991. On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-
proposal be submitted within ten (10) days.
As early as October 1991, GMC received letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds
of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any
counter-proposal. On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the union’s officers stating that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a
union which no longer existed.
On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed Marcia Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground of incompetence. The union protested and requested
GMC to submit the matter to the grievance procedure provided in the CBA. GMC, however, advised the union to "refer to our letter dated
December 16, 1991."
Thus, the union filed, on July 2, 1992, a complaint against GMC with the NLRC, Arbitration Division, Cebu City. The complaint alleged
unfair labor practice on the part of GMC for: (1) refusal to bargain collectively; (2) interference with the right to self-organization; and (3)
discrimination.
Issues:
1. Whether or not GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct when it imposed upon the GMC the draft CBA proposes by the union for two years to
begin from expiration of the original CBA.
Ruling: GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice. Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the union’s proposals,
GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice.
On the first issue, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715, states:
ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. – Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall,
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the
incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and
Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its
execution.
The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years. The relation between labor and management should
be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year.
Hence, when the union requested for a renegotiation on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of the
workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within 5 years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The union’s
proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, just before the last day of said period.
It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to
the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the
Labor Code, which provides that:
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor
practice:
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the meaning of the phrase "duty to bargain collectively," thus:
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. – The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement....
We have held that there is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. The
effect of an employer’s or a union’s actions individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or
actions, considered as a whole.
Under Article 252, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement.
The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the
original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the
union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation.
Procedure in Collective Bargaining

It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in
ensuring lasting industrial peace.
ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. – The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:
xxxx The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.
GMC’s failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the
union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless.
We hold that GMC’s refusal to make a counter-proposal to the union’s proposal for CBA negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. Where
the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain
collectively.
Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the union’s proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively,
making it liable for unfair labor practice.
The fact that the resignations of the union members occurred during the pendency of the case before the labor arbiter shows GMC’s desperate
attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate status of the union. The ill-timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC
had interfered with the right of its employees to self-organization.
CA was correct in imposing the draft proposed by the Union on GMC following the doctrines on Kiok Loy vs. NLRC and Divine Word
University of Tacloban vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment.
ART. 253 on the duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement, mandates the parties to keep the status
quo while they are still in the process of working out their respective proposal and counter proposal. The general rule is that when a CBA
already exists, its provision shall continue to govern the relationship between the parties, until a new one is agreed upon. The rule necessarily
presupposes that all other things are equal. That is, that neither party is guilty of bad faith. However, when one of the parties abuses this grace
period by purposely delaying the bargaining process, a departure from the general rule is warranted.
In Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,Sweden Ice Cream Plant, who refused to submit any counter proposal proposed by its employees’ certified bargaining
agent, had lost its right to bargain the terms and conditions of the CBA. That Sweden’s approach and attitude – stalling the negotiation lead
to a conclusion that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at any instance, evinced good faith.
In Divine Word University of Tacloban vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, Divine Word University of Tacloban, refused to perform
its duty to bargain collectively. Thus, we upheld the unilateral imposition on the university of the CBA proposed by the Divine Word
University Employees Union.
Applying the principle in the foregoing cases to the instant case, it would be unfair to the union and its members if the terms and conditions
contained in the old CBA would continue to be imposed on GMC’s employees for the remaining two (2) years of the CBA’s duration. We
are not inclined to gratify GMC with an extended term of the old CBA after it resorted to delaying tactics to prevent negotiations.
Since it was GMC, which violated the duty to bargain collectively, based on Kiok Loy and Divine Word University of Tacloban, it had lost
its statutory right to negotiate or renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA proposed by the union.
However, that as strictly distinguished from the facts of this case, there was no pre-existing CBA between the parties in Kiok Loy and Divine
Word University of Tacloban. Nonetheless, we deem it proper to apply in this case the rationale of the doctrine in the said two cases. To rule
otherwise would be to allow GMC to have its cake and eat it too.
Thus, by imposing on GMC the provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union, in our view, the interests of equity and fair play were
properly served and both parties regained equal footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the negotiations for new economic terms of the
CBA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union vs. Confesor

G.R. No. 114974, June 16, 2004
Facts: The exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the Standard Chartered Bank is the Standard Chartered Bank
Employees Union (the Union, for brevity). Prior to the expiration of the 3-year period of their CBA, but within the 60-day freedom period,
the Union initiated the negotiations. On February 18, 1993, the Union, through its President, Eddie L. Divinagracia, sent a letter containing
its proposals covering political provisions and 34 economic provisions. Included therein was a list of the names of the members of the Union’s
negotiating panel.
The Union suggested to the Bank’s head of the negotiating panel, Cielito Diokno, that the bank lawyers should be excluded from the
negotiating team. The Bank acceded.Meanwhile, Diokno suggested to Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., the President of the National
Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the federation to which the Union was affiliated, be excluded from the Union’s negotiating panel.
However, Umali was retained as a member thereof.
On March 12, 1993, the parties met and set the ground rules for the negotiation. Diokno suggested that the negotiation be kept a "family
affair." The proposed non-economic provisions of the CBA were discussed first. Even during the final reading of the non-economic provisions
on May 4, 1993, there were still provisions on which the Union and the Bank could not agree.
On May 18, 1993, the negotiation for economic provisions commenced. Towards the end of the Bank’s presentation, Umali requested the
Bank to validate the Union’s "guestimates," especially the figures for the rank and file staff. In the succeeding meetings, Umali chided the
Bank for the insufficiency of its counter-proposal on the provisions on salary increase, group hospitalization, death assistance and dental
benefits.
In the morning of the June 15, 1993 meeting, the Union suggested that if the Bank would not make the necessary revisions on its counter-
proposal, it would be best to seek a 3rd party assistance. After the break, the Bank presented its revised counter-proposal, wherein, except
for the provisions on signing bonus and uniforms, the Union and the Bank failed to agree on the remaining economic provisions of the CBA.
The Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on June 21, 1993,
docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-06-380-93.26.
On the other hand, the Bank filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) and Damages before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in
Manila against the Union on June 28, 1993. The Bank alleged that the Union violated its duty to bargain, as it did not bargain in good faith.
It contended that the Union demanded "sky high economic demands," indicative of blue-sky bargaining.
On July 21, 1993, then SOLE Nieves R. Confesor, pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over
the labor dispute at the Bank. An order was issued that the parties execute a collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the Bank’s charge for
unfair labor practice which it originally filed with the NLRC but which is deemed consolidated herein, is dismissed for lack of merit. On the
other hand, the Union’s charge for unfair labor practice is similarly dismissed.
The parties then executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement wherein the wage increase was effected and the signing bonuses based on the
increased wage were distributed to the employees covered by the CBA.
The Union filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Procedure.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the company is guilty of unfair labor practice
2. Whether or not the Union is estopped after it executed with the company the CBA
3. Whether or not the Union is engaged in Blue-Sky Bargaining
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. The bank is not guilty of ULP.
"Interference" under Article248 (a) of the Labor Code to amount to ULP.

The petitioner asserts that respondent committed ULP, i.e., interference in the selection of the Union’s negotiating panel, when Cielito
Diokno, the Bank’s Human Resource Manager, suggested to the Union’s President Eddie L. Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., President
of the NUBE, be excluded from the Union’s negotiating panel. In support of its claim, Divinagracia executed an affidavit, stating that prior
to the commencement of the negotiation, Diokno approached him and suggested the exclusion of Umali from the Union’s negotiating panel,
and that during the first meeting, Diokno stated that the negotiation be kept a "family affair."
In U.S. Postal Service36 and Harley Davidson Motor Co., Inc., AMF, the National Labor Relations Board held that upon the employer’s
refusal to engage in negotiations with the Union for collective-bargaining contract when the Union includes a person who is not an employee,
or one who is a member or an official of other labor organizations, such employer is engaged in unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the NLRA.
In, Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association – NATU vs. Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd., the test of whether an employer
has interfered with and coerced employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization within the meaning of subsection (a)(1) is whether
the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees’ rights under
Section 3 of the Act.Further, it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements
of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-
organization and collective bargaining.
Under the International Labor Organization Convention (ILO) No. 87 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND PROTECTION OF THE
RIGHT TO ORGANIZE to which the Philippines is a signatory, "workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right
to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to job organizations of their own choosing without previous
authorization.”
Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full
freedom to organize their administration and activities and to formulate their programs. Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 98 pertaining to the
Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, provides:
Article 2
1. Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts or interference by each other or each other’s
agents or members in their establishment, functioning or administration.
2. In particular, acts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or
employers’ organizations or to support workers’ organizations by financial or other means, with the object of placing such organizations
under the control of employers or employers’ organizations within the meaning of this Article.
The aforecited ILO Conventions are incorporated in our Labor Code, particularly in Article 243 thereof, which provides:
ART. 243. COVERAGE AND EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION. – All persons employed in commercial, industrial
and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have
the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.
Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form
labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.
and Articles 248 and 249 respecting ULP of employers and labor organizations.
The 1987 Constitution, aside from making it a policy to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," devotes an entire section,
emphasizing its mandate to afford protection to labor, and highlights "the principle of shared responsibility" between workers and employers
to promote industrial peace.
Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization or the right to form association. The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to
collective bargaining.
If an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of
the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-
organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the Labor
Code is committed.
Substantial Evidence required to support the claim of ULP under the Labor Code.
In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial
evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case at
bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from the Union’s negotiating panel.
The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union
conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to
self-organization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially considering that such was undertaken previous to the commencement
of the negotiation and simultaneously with Divinagracia’s suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded from its negotiating panel.
The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process, with the inclusion of Umali in the Union’s negotiating panel,
the negotiations pushed through. The complaint was made only on August 16, 1993 after a deadlock was declared by the Union on June 15,
1993.
It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The accusation occurred after the arguments and differences over the economic
provisions became heated and the parties had become frustrated. It happened after the parties started to involve personalities. As the public
respondent noted, passions may rise, and as a result, suggestions given under less adversarial situations may be colored with unintended
meanings.49 Such is what appears to have happened in this case.
The Duty to Bargain Collectively

If at all, the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia should be construed as part of the normal relations and innocent communications,
which are all part of the friendly relations between the Union and Bank.
The Union alleges that the Bank violated its duty to bargain; hence, committed ULP under Article 248(g) when it engaged in surface
bargaining. It alleged that the Bank just went through the motions of bargaining without any intent of reaching an agreement, as evident in
the Bank’s counter-proposals. It explained that of the 34 economic provisions it made, the Bank only made 6 economic counterproposals.
Surface Bargaining
Surface bargaining is defined as "going through the motions of negotiating" without any legal intent to reach an agreement. The resolution
of surface bargaining allegations never presents an easy issue. The determination of whether a party has engaged in unlawful surface
bargaining is usually a difficult one because it involves, at bottom, a question of the intent of the party in question, and usually such intent
can only be inferred from the totality of the challenged party’s conduct both at and away from the bargaining table. It involves the question
of whether an employer’s conduct demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is merely hard bargaining.
The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts, both at and away from the bargaining table, which tend to show that it did
not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and the Union. Admittedly, the parties were not able to
agree and reached a deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession."53 Hence, the parties’ failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the
duty to bargain.
In view of the finding of lack of ULP based on Article 248(g), the accusation that the Bank made bad-faith provisions has no leg to stand on.
While the refusal to furnish requested information is in itself an unfair labor practice, and also supports the inference of surface bargaining.
We, likewise, find that the Union failed to substantiate its claim that the Bank refused to furnish the information it needed.
Umali, in a meeting dated May 18, 1993, requested the Bank to validate its guestimates on the data of the rank and file. However, Umali
failed to put his request in writing as provided for in Article 242(c) of the Labor Code. The Union, did not, as the Labor Code requires, send
a written request for the issuance of a copy of the data about the Bank’s rank and file employees. Moreover, as alleged by the Union, the fact
that the Bank made use of the aforesaid guestimates, amounts to a validation of the data it had used in its presentation.
Estoppel not Applicable In the Case at Bar

The respondent Bank argues that the petitioner is estopped from raising the issue of ULP when it signed the new CBA.
In the case, however, the approval of the CBA and the release of signing bonus do not necessarily mean that the Union waived its ULP claim
against the Bank during the past negotiations. After all, the conclusion of the CBA was included in the order of the SOLE, while the signing
bonus was included in the CBA itself. Moreover, the Union twice filed a motion for reconsideration respecting its ULP charges against the
Bank before the SOLE.
The Union Did Not EngageIn Blue-Sky Bargaining

Blue-Sky Bargaining is defined as "unrealistic and unreasonable demands in negotiations by either or both labor and management, where
neither concedes anything and demands the impossible." It actually is not collective bargaining at all. (Robert’s Dictionary of Industrial
Relations (Revised Edition, 1971, p. 51).
We do not agree that the Union is guilty of ULP for engaging in blue-sky bargaining or making exaggerated or unreasonable proposals. The
Bank failed to show that the economic demands made by the Union were exaggerated or unreasonable. The minutes of the meeting show that
the Union based its economic proposals on data of rank and file employees and the prevailing economic benefits received by bank employees
from other foreign banks doing business in the Philippines and other branches of the Bank in the Asian region.
While the approval of the CBA and the release of the signing bonus did not estop the Union from pursuing its claims of ULP against the
Bank, we find the latter did not engage in ULP. We, likewise, hold that the Union is not guilty of ULP.
Phil. Carpet Employees Association vs. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 168719, February 22, 2006
Facts: Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation is engaged in the business of manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and rugs. The
Corporation also had 100% equity investments in the following corporations: Pacific Carpet Mills Corporation (PCMC-USA) which sold
carpets and mats on wholesale basis; Pacific Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC-Clark) which manufactured hand-tufted and
machine-tufted carpets and rugs; and the Philippine Woolen Spinning Corporation (PWSC) which manufactured wool yarn. The Corporation
also owned 17.95% of the shares of stocks in DI Security and General Services, Inc., and 2.20% of such shares in the Manila Peninsula Hotel,
Inc. The Corporation employed 473 employees, 355 of whom were members of the sole bargaining unit of the employees therein, the
Philippine Carpet Employees Association (Union for brevity).
In a letter dated February 10, 2004 addressed to the Corporation’s Assistant Vice President for Administration, Manuel Ike Diaz, the Union
proposed the holding of a conference between representatives of the Union and the Corporation on February 24, 2004, to commence
negotiations. Appended to the letter were proposals on revisions of the previous CBA.
The Corporation did not respond to the letter. Diaz issued a Memorandum informing all employees that a comprehensive cost reduction
program would be implemented by the Corporation on April 15, 2004, "on account of depressed business conditions brought about by the
currency crisis in Southeast Asia, the Middle East war and the 9/11 incident in the United States of America.
Of the 88 employees who were terminated from employment, 77 were Union members, including Edgardo Villanueva, who was elected
Union officer after the personnel reduction program commenced.
Frustrated at the Corporation’s reason for retrenchment, the Union filed a notice of strike with the DOLE. Negotiations before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board ensued, but the Corporation stood pat on its stance for a moratorium on increases in wages and benefits.
The Union rejected this and accused the Corporation of union busting, as 77 of its members were dismissed.
The Union filed a petitionwith the DOLE for the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute
involving economic issues on wage increases and certain benefits and non-economic issues such as scope of bargaining unit and on the issue
of unfair labor practice.
The Union claimed that there was no valid economic reason to retrench employees, and that a "slump" in demand of the Corporation’s
products was not a valid ground to dismiss employees. The Union also charged the Corporation of resorting to a sinister scheme of re-
channeling its carpet business to its wholly owned subsidiary, PCMC-Clark, while negotiations for a new CBA were ongoing. According to
the Union, this was also to justify the dismissal of the 77 Union members and bust the Union in the process. The Union insisted that the
Corporation was guilty of unfair labor practice.
The Union maintained that in dismissing its employees, the Corporation violated the mandatory 30-day notice rule because such employees
received the notice of termination on March 13, 2004 (Saturday),
to take effect the following working day, March 15, 2004 (Monday). It stressed that the 30-day mandatory notice could not be substituted by
paying the affected employees their respective one month salaries.
Corporation alleged that based on the documents submitted to the SOLE, it suffered a sharp decline in business in terms of volume and
income derived since 2001, caused by the Asian financial crisis and later aggravated by the 9/11 incident in the U.S. and the ongoing war in
the Middle East. The Corporation went on to explain that its income from the domestic market and export operations declined sharply: from
its export operations, its income of P28,855,000.00 in 2001 dropped to P23,927,000.00 in 2002; and, thereafter, to P5,796,000.00 in 2003.
On June 23, 2004, the SOLE rendered a Decision granting wage increases totalling P8,039,330.00 to the employees for the three years of the
CBA. Relative to increased benefits for uniform, Christmas package, rice subsidy, and early retirement plan/separation pay, the SOLE ordered
the retention of the status quo. However, the SOLE denied the demand of the Union as to the scope of the bargaining unit.
The SOLE likewise affirmed the termination of the 88 employees on the ground that, if not for the personnel reduction program. The Union
thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which rendered judgmentdismissing the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court
ruled that the Corporation failed to prove that the SOLE committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the decision.
The appellate court affirmed the finding of the SOLE that there was a slump in the demand of the Corporation’s products, holding that while
low volume of work was not listed as a valid ground for dismissal under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, it
nevertheless justified the dismissal on the ground of redundancy.
The Union filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent Corporation is guilty of unfair labor practice because of dismissing the 77 union members and bust the
union in the process
Ruling: The petition is meritorious.

1. Retrenchment
Retrenchment is an authorized cause for the termination of employment under Article 283 of the Labor Code.
Retrenchment is defined as the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of the employee and without prejudice
to the latter, resorted by management during periods of business recession, industrial depression or seasonal fluctuations or during lulls over
shortage of materials. It is a reduction in manpower, a measure utilized by an employer to minimize business losses incurred in the operation
of its business.
In Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers, the phrase "to prevent losses" was defined to mean that retrenchment or
termination of the services of some employees is authorized to be undertaken by the employer sometime before the losses anticipated are
actually sustained or realized. It is not, in other words, the intention of the lawmaker to compel the employer to stay his hand and keep all his
employees until sometime after losses shall have, in fact, materialized; if such an intent were expressly written into the law, that law may
well be vulnerable to constitutional attack as taking property from one man to give to another. This is simple enough.
The prerogative of an employer to retrench its employees must be exercised only as a last resort, considering that it will lead to the loss of
the employees’ livelihood. It is justified only when all other less drastic means have been tried and found insufficient or
inadequate.48 Moreover, the employer must prove the requirements for a valid retrenchment by clear and convincing evidence; otherwise,
said ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might be merely feigning losses or reverses in their
business ventures in order to ease out employees.
The requirements are:

xxx (1) that the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de
minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by
the employer; (2) that the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least
one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (3) that the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one
month pay or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (4) that the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench
employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure; and (5)
that the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees,
such as status (i.e., whether they are temporary, casual, regular or managerial employees), efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and
financial hardship for certain workers.
What the law speaks of is serious business losses or financial reverses. Sliding incomes or decreasing gross revenues are not necessarily
losses, much less serious business losses within the meaning of the law. The bare fact that an employer may have sustained a net loss, such
loss, per se, absent any other evidence on its impact on the business, nor on expected losses that would have been incurred had operations
been continued, may not amount to serious business losses mentioned in the law.50 The employer must also show that its losses increased
through a period of time and that the condition of the company will not likely improve in the near future.
2. Redundancy
Redundancy, on the other hand, exists when the service capability of the work force is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the
demands of the enterprise. A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any number of factors, such as overhiring of workers,
decreased volume of business, dropping of a particular product line previously manufactured by the company, or phasing out of a service
activity previously undertaken by the business. Under these conditions, the employer has no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more
employees than are necessary for the operation of its business.51
For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice
served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;
(2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing
the redundant positions; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly
abolished.
3. Respondent corporation failed to produce clear evidence for valid retrenchment.

Respondents failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to prove the confluence of the essential requisites for a valid retrenchment of its
employees. We believe that respondents acted in bad faith in terminating the employment of the members of petitioner Union.
Corporation, in fact, amassed substantial earnings from 1999 to 2003. It found no need to appropriate its retained earnings except on March
23, 2001, when it appropriated P60,000,000.00 to increase production capacity.
The appropriation of P20,000,000.00 by the respondent Corporation on September 16, 2004 was made barely five months after the 77 Union
members were dismissed on the ground that respondent Corporation was suffering from "chronic depression." Cash dividends were likewise
declared on March 29, 2004, barely two weeks after it implemented its "retrenchment program."
There is likewise no justification for the hiring of more than 100 new employees, more than the number of those who were retrenched, as
well as the order authorizing full blast overtime work for six hours daily. All these are inconsistent with the intransigent claim that respondent
Corporation was impelled to retrench its employees precisely because of low demand for its products and other external causes.
Admittedly, the net income of respondent Corporation of P46,559,917.00 in 2001 decreased to P37,764,303.00 in 2002. However, such
decrease ensued because respondent Corporation declared cash dividends for its shareholders amounting to P28,000,000.00.
It also appears that respondent Corporation’s personnel costs decreased to P97,971,479.00. There was thus no reason for respondent
Corporation to implement its "retrenchment program" and terminate the 88 employees.
The net income of the respondent Corporation of P39,553,028.00 in 2002 decreased to P12,729,776.00 in 2003.It bears stressing, however,
that the stockholders received cash dividends in the total amount of P12,259,473.00.
That respondents acted in bad faith in retrenching the 77 members of petitioner is buttressed by the fact that Diaz issued his Memorandum
announcing the cost-reduction program on March 9, 2004, after receipt of the February 10, 2004 letter of the Union president which included
the proposal for additional benefits and wage increases to be incorporated in the CBA for the ensuing year.
Moreover, respondent Corporation failed to exhaust all other means to avoid further losses without retrenching its employees, such as utilizing
the latter’s respective forced vacation leaves. Respondents also failed to use fair and reasonable criteria in implementing the retrenchment
program, and instead chose to retrench 77 of the members of petitioner out of the dismissed 88 employees. Worse, respondent Corporation
hired new employees and even rehired the others who had been "retrenched."
Respondents failed to prove that there was a drastic or severe decrease in the product sales or that it suffered severe business losses within
an interval of three (3) months from January 2004 to March 9, 2004 when Diaz issued said Memorandum.
4. Since termination illegal, members are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages.
The retrenchment effected by respondent Corporation is invalid due to a substantive defect, non-compliance with the substantial requirements
to effect a valid retrenchment; it necessarily follows that the termination of the employment of petitioner Union’s members on such ground
is, likewise, illegal. As such, they (petitioner Union’s members) are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. However, in the case of
those employees-members of petitioner Union who had received their respective separation pay, the amounts of such payments shall be
deducted from the backwages due them.Where reinstatement is no longer feasible because the positions they previously held no longer exist,
respondent Corporation shall pay the employees-members of petitioner Union backwages plus, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay
equivalent to one month pay, or one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
Considering further that there was evident bad faith on the part of respondent Corporation in terminating the employment of the employees-
members of petitioner Union on the ground of retrenchment, they are entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00
each.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, Court of Appeals decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
St. John Colleges Inc., vs. St. John Academy Faculty Employees Union
G.R. Bo. 167892, October 27, 2006
Facts: Prior to 1998, petitioner offered a secondary course only. The high school, which it employed, then employed about 80 teaching and
non-teaching personnel who were members of the St. John Academy Faculty & Employees Union (Union). The Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) between SJCI and the Union was set to expire on May 31, 1997. During the ensuing collective bargaining negotiations,
SJCI rejected all the proposals of the Union for an increase in worker’s benefits. This resulted to a bargaining deadlock which led to the
holding of a valid strike by the Union on November 10, 1997. In order to end the strike, on November 27, 1997, SJCI and the Union, through
the efforts of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), agreed to refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (SOLE) for assumption of jurisdiction.
After which, the strike ended and classes resumed. Pending resolution of the labor dispute before the SOLE, the Board of Directors of SJCI
approved on February 22, 1998 a resolution recommending the closure of the high school which was approved by the stockholders on even
date because of the irreconcilable differences between the school management and the Academy’s Union particularly the safety of our
students and the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations.
Subsequently, some teaching and non-teaching personnel of the high school agreed to the closure. On April 2, 1998, SJCI informed the
DOLE that as of March 31, 1998, 51 employees had received their separation compensation package while 25 employees refused to accept
the same.
On May 4, 1998, the 25 employees conducted a protest action within the perimeter of the high school. The Union filed a notice of strike with
the NCMB only on May 7, 1998.
On May 21, 1998, the 25 employees filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits
against SJCI before the NLRC which was docketed as RAB-IV-5-10039-98-L. The Union members alleged that the closure of the high school
was done in bad faith in order to get rid of the Union and render useless any decision of the SOLE on the CBA deadlocked issues.
Labor Arbiter Antonio dismissed the Union’s complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal while granting SJCI’s petition to declare the strike
illegal coupled with a declaration of loss of employment status of the 25 Union members involved in the strike.
On June 28, 2002, the NLRC rendered judgment reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It found SJCI guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal
and ordered it to reinstate the 25 employees to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, and with full
backwages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC wherein the two month unworked summer vacation
should excluded.
Issue: Whether or not St. John Colleges is guilty of unfair labor practice through its act of closing the academy
Ruling: The petition lacks merit.

1. Closure. The closure was done to defeat the parties’ agreement to refer the labor dispute to the SOLE; to unilaterally end the bargaining
deadlock; to render nugatory any decision of the SOLE; and to circumvent the Union’s right to collective bargaining and its members’ right
to security of tenure.
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the following requisites must concur for a valid closure of the business: (1) serving a written notice on
the workers at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof; (2) serving a notice with the DOLE one month before the taking effect
of the closure; (3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month or at least one half (1/2) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher, with a fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered as a whole year; and (4) cessation of the operation must be bona
fide. It is not disputed that the first two requisites were satisfied. The third requisite would have been satisfied were it not for the refusal of
the herein private respondents to accept the separation compensation package.
The instant case, thus, revolves around the fourth requisite, i.e., whether SJCI closed the high school in good faith.
Whether or not the closure of the high school was done in good faith is a question of fact and is not reviewable by this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari save for exceptional circumstances. In fine, the finding of the NLRC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
SJCI closed the high school in bad faith is supported by substantial evidence and is, thus, binding on this Court. Consequently, SJCI is liable
for ULP and illegal dismissal.
Whether SJCI acted in bad faith depends on the particular facts as established by the evidence on record. Bad faith is, after all, an inference
which must be drawn from the peculiar circumstances of a case. The two decisive factors in determining whether SJCI acted in bad faith are
(1) the timing of, and reasons for the closure of the high school, and (2) the timing of, and the reasons for the subsequent opening of a college
and elementary department, and, ultimately, the reopening of the high school department by SJCI after only one year from its closure.
Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to discern that the closure was done to defeat the parties’ agreement to refer the labor dispute to
the SOLE; to unilaterally end the bargaining deadlock; to render nugatory any decision of the SOLE; and to circumvent the Union’s right to
collective bargaining and its members’ right to security of tenure. By admitting that the closure was due to irreconcilable differences between
the Union and school management, specifically, the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations, SJCI in effect admitted that it wanted
to end the bargaining deadlock and eliminate the problem of dealing with the demands of the Union. This is precisely what the Labor Code
abhors and punishes as unfair labor practice since the net effect is to defeat the Union’s right to collective bargaining.
SJCI contends that these circumstances do not establish its bad faith in closing down the high school. Rather, it claims that it was forced to
close down the high school due to alleged difficult labor problems that it encountered while dealing with the Union since 1995, specifically,
the Union’s illegal demands in violation of R.A. 6728 or the "Government Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private Education Act."
Under R.A. 6728, the income from tuition fee increase is to be used as follows: (a) 70% of the tuition fee shall go to the payment of salaries,
wages, allowances, and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel, and (b) 20% of the tuition fee increase shall go to the
improvement or modernization of the buildings, equipment, and other facilities as well as payment of the cost of operations.
We are not persuaded. These alleged difficult labor problems merely show that SJCI and the Union had disagreements regarding workers’
benefits which are normal in any business establishment. If SJCI found the Union’s demands excessive, its remedy under the law is to refer
the matter for voluntary or compulsory dispute resolution. Besides, this incident complained of occurred in 1995, which could hardly establish
the good faith of SJCI or justify the closure in 1998.
Anent the Union’s claim for the unimplemented 20% tuition fee increase in 1996, suffice it to say that it is erroneous to rule on said issue
since the same was submitted before the Voluntary Arbitrator and is not on appeal before this Court. Besides, by referring the labor dispute
to the Voluntary Arbitrator, the parties themselves acknowledged that there is a sufficient mechanism to resolve the said dispute. Again, we
fail to see how this alleged labor problem in 1996 shows the good faith of SJCI in closing the high school in 1998.
At any rate, even assuming that the Union’s demands were illegal or excessive, the important and crucial point is that these alleged illegal or
excessive demands did not justify the closure of the high school and do not, in any way, establish SJCI’s good faith. The employer cannot
unilaterally close its establishment on the pretext that the demands of its employees are excessive. As already discussed, neither party is
obliged to give-in to the other’s excessive or unreasonable demands during collective bargaining, and the remedy in such case is to refer the
dispute to the proper tribunal for resolution. This was what SJCI and the Union did when they referred the 1997 CBA bargaining deadlock
to the SOLE; however, SJCI pre-empted the resolution of the dispute by closing the high school. SJCI disregarded the whole dispute
resolution mechanism and undermined the Union’s right to collective bargaining when it closed down the high school while the dispute was
still pending with the SOLE.
The Labor Code does not authorize the employer to close down the establishment on the ground of illegal or excessive demands of the Union.
Instead, aside from the remedy of submitting the dispute for voluntary or compulsory arbitration, the employer may file a complaint for ULP
against the Union for bargaining in bad faith. If found guilty, this gives rise to civil and criminal liabilities and allows the employer to
implement a lock out, but not the closure of the establishment resulting to the permanent loss of employment of the whole workforce.
In fine, SJCI undermined the Labor Code’s system of dispute resolution by closing down the high school while the 1997 CBA negotiations
deadlock issues were pending resolution before the SOLE. The closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of defeating the Union’s right
to collective bargaining. Besides, as found by the NLRC, the alleged illegality and excessiveness of the Union’s demands were not sufficiently
proved by SJCI. Even on the assumption that the Union’s demands were illegal or excessive, SJCI’s remedy was to await the resolution by
the SOLE and to file a ULP case against the Union. However, SJCI did not have the power to take matters into its own hands by closing
down the school in order to get rid of the Union.
2. Circumstances lead to the inescapable conclusion that SJCI merely used the alleged safety and well-being of the students as a subterfuge
to justify its actions.
SJCI next argues that the Union unduly endangered the safety and well-being of the students who joined the valid strike held on November
10, 1997, thus it closed down the high school on March 31, 1998. It claims that the Union coerced the students to join the protest actions to
pressure SJCI to give-in to the demands of the Union.
The Union categorically denied that it put the students in harm’s way or pressured them to join the protest actions. Given this denial by the
Union, it was incumbent upon SJCI to prove that the students were actually harmed or put in harm’s way and that the Union coerced them to
join the protest actions. The reason for this is that the employer carries the burden of proof to establish that the closure of the business was
done in good faith. In the instant case, SJCI had the burden of proving that, indeed, the closure of the school was necessary to uphold the
safety and well-being of the students.
There is insufficient evidence to hold that the safety and well-being of the students were endangered and/or compromised, and that the Union
was responsible therefor. Even assuming arguendo that the students’ safety and well-being were jeopardized by the said protest actions, the
alleged threat to the students’ safety and well-being had long ceased by the time the high school was closed. Moreover, the parents were
vehemently opposed to the closure of the school because there was no basis to claim that the students’ safety was at risk. Taken together,
these circumstances lead to the inescapable conclusion that SJCI merely used the alleged safety and well-being of the students as a subterfuge
to justify its actions.
3. Pieces of evidence regarding the subsequent reopening of the high school after only one year from its closure further show that the high
school’s closure was done in bad faith.
SJCI next contends that the subsequent reopening of the high school after only one year from its closure did not show that the previous
decision to close the high school was tainted with bad faith because the reopening was done due to the clamor of the high school’s former
students and their parents. It claims that its former students complained about the cramped classrooms in the schools where they transferred.
The contention is untenable.
First, the fact that after one year from the time it closed its high school, SJCI opened a college and elementary department, and reopened its
high school department showed that it never intended to cease operating as an educational institution. Second, there is evidence on record
contesting the alleged reason of SJCI for reopening. Finally, when SJCI reopened its high school, it did not rehire the Union members.
Evidently, the closure had achieved its purpose, that is, to get rid of the Union members.
Clearly, these pieces of evidence regarding the subsequent reopening of the high school after only one year from its closure further show that
the high school’s closure was done in bad faith.
Lastly, SJCI asserts that the strike conducted by the 25 employees on May 4, 1998 was illegal for failure to take the necessary strike vote and
give a notice of strike. However, protest actions of the Union cannot be considered a strike because, by then, the employer-employee
relationship has long ceased to exist because of the previous closure of the high school on March 31, 1998.
In sum, the timing of, and the reasons for the closure of the high school and its reopening after only one year from the time it was closed
down, show that the closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of circumventing the Union’s right to collective bargaining and its members’
right to security of tenure. Consequently, SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal.
San Miguel Foods Inc., vs. San Miguel Corp Employees Union-PTGWO
G.R. No. 168569, October 5, 2007
Facts: On November 9, 1992, some employees of San Miguel Foods, Inc’s Finance Department, through the Union represented by Edgar
Moraleda, brought a grievance against Finance Manager Gideon Montesa (Montesa), for "discrimination, favoritism, unfair labor practices,
promoting divisiveness, etc, before SMFI Plant Operations Manager George Nava in accordance with Step 1 of the grievance machinery.
The Union sought the "1. review, evaluat[ion] & upgrad[ing of] all Finance staff and 2. promot[ion of] G.Q. Montesa to other SMC affiliate[s]
& subsidiaries."
SMFI informed the Union that it planned to address the grievance through a "work management review" to be completed by March 1993.
However, it was not completed by March 1993, prompting the Union to, elevate the grievance to Step 2.
Almost 9 months after the grievance meeting was held or on October 6, 1993, SMFI rendered a "Decision on Step 1 Grievance" stating that
it was still in the process of completing the "work management review," hence, the Union’s requests could not be granted.
The Union filed a complaint on October 20, 1993 before the NLRC, Arbitration Branch, against SMFI, its President Amadeo P. Veloso, and
its Finance Manager Montesa for "unfair labor practice, [and] unjust discrimination in matters of promotion . . . " It prayed that SMFI et al.
be ordered to promote the therein named employees "with the corresponding pay increases, etc.”
SMFI et al. filed a motion to dismiss,8contending that the issues raised in the complaint were grievance issues and, therefore, "should be
resolved in the grievance machinery. The Labor Arbiter granted SMFI et al.’s motion to dismiss and ordered the remand of the case to the
grievance machinery for completion of the proceedings.
On appeal, to the NLRC by "Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal", such was granted and accordingly ordered the Labor Arbiter to continue
the proceedings on the Union’s complaint. Hence, SMFI filed a petition for certiorari with SC which they referred the case to the CA pursuant
to St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.
Court of Appeals denied SMFI et al.’s petition for certiorari, it holding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the complaint of the Union,
they having violated the seniority rule under the CBA by appointing and promoting certain employees which amounted to a ULP.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not SMFI is guilty of unfair labor practice.
Ruling:
1. Section 1 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court should thus not be strictly applied to a case filed before a Labor Arbiter. In determining jurisdiction
SMFI argues that the allegations in the Union’s complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter do not establish a cause of action for ULP, the Union
having merely contended that SMFI was guilty thereof without specifying the ultimate facts upon which it was based. It cites Section 1 of
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court as applying suppletorily to the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Thus, SMFI concludes that the Labor
Arbiter has no jurisdiction over its complaint.
The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters, enumerated in Article 217 of the Labor Code, includes complaints for ULP.
Indeed, the particular acts of ULP alleged to have been committed by SMFI were not specified; neither were the ultimate facts in support
thereof. In its Position Paper, however, the Union detailed the particular acts of ULP attributed to SMFI and the ultimate facts in support
thereof.
Section 7, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides: The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in
nature. The technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto. The Labor Arbiter
may avail himself of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy speedily, including ocular inspection and examination of
well-informed persons.
2. SMFI is guilty of ULP but only on the ground of violation of the CBA Agreement.
ULP on the ground of discrimination which must allege that that they were done to encourage or discourage membership in a labor
organization.
Based on Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor
practices: (e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
On the questioned promotions, the Union did not allege that they were done to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization.
In fact, those promoted were members of the complaining Union. The promotions do not thus amount to ULP under Article 248(e) of the
Labor Code.
ULP on the ground of violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement –

As for the alleged ULP committed under Article 248(i), for violation of a CBA, this Article is qualified by Article 261 of the Labor Code,
the pertinent portion of which latter Article reads: x x x violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in
character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
In Silva v. NLRC, for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, the allegations
in the complaint should show prima facie theconcurrence of two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; AND (2) the violation
pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA.
First, Thegrievance machinery provision in the CBA is not an economic provision, however, hence, the second requirement for a Labor
Arbiter to exercise jurisdiction of a ULP is not present.
Second, the Union alleges that violated the Job Security provision in the CBA, specifically the seniority rule, in that SMFI "appointed less
senior employees to positions at its Finance Department, consequently intentionally by-passing more senior employees who are deserving of
said appointment."
Since the seniority rule in the promotion of employees has a bearing on salary and benefits, it may, following a liberal construction (following
the rule on construction in favor of labor) of Article 261 of the Labor Code, be considered an "economic provision" of the CBA.
The Union charges SMFI to have promoted less senior employees, thus bypassing others who were more senior and equally or more qualified.
It may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA, a ULP over which the
Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals having affirmed the NLRC decision finding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the Union’s complaint and
thus remanding it to the Labor Arbiter for continuation of proceedings thereon, the appellate court’s said finding may be taken to have been
made only for the purpose of determining jurisdiction.
Purefoods Corp vs. Nagkakaisang Samahang Manggagawa ng Purefoods Rank and File
G.R. No. 150896, August 28, 2008
Facts: The respondents in this case, 3 labor organizations and a federation: NAGSAMA-Purefoods), the exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file workers of Purefoods’ meat division throughout Luzon; STFWU, in the farm in Sto. Tomas, Batangas; PGFWU, of those in
the poultry farm in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. These organizations were affiliates of the federation, Purefoods Unified Labor Organization (PULO).
STFWU, NAGSAMA-Purefoods, and PGFWU submitted their respective proposals for CBA renewal, and their general membership
resolutions which, affirmed the organizations’ affiliation with PULO. Purefoods refused to negotiate with the unions should a PULO
representative be in the panel. The parties then agreed to postpone the negotiations indefinitely.
On July 24, 1995, however, the petitioner company concluded a new CBA with another union in its farm in Malvar, Batangas. 5 days
thereafter, at around 8:00pm, 4 company employees facilitated the transfer of around 23,000 chickens from the poultry farm in Sto. Tomas,
Batangas (where STFWU was the exclusive bargaining agent) to that in Malvar.The next day, the regular rank-and-file workers in the Sto.
Tomas farm were refused entry in the company premises; and on July 31, 1995, 22 STFWU members were terminated from employment.
The farm manager, supervisors and electrical workers of the Sto. Tomas farm, who were members of another union, were nevertheless
retained by the company in its employ.
Aggrieved by these developments, the respondent labor organizations jointly instituted a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal
lockout/dismissal and damages, docketed with the Labor Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
In the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, Purefoods interposed, among others, the 114efences that PULO was not a legitimate labor
organization or federation for it did not have the required minimum number of member unions; that the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was
not arbitrary but was the result of the financial non-viability of the operations; STFWU, lost its status as bargaining representative when the
Sto. Tomas farm was closed.
LA rendered a Decisiondismissing the complaint.
NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA, saying that the company’s refusal to recognize the labor organizations’ affiliation with PULO was
unjustified considering that the latter had been granted the status of a federation by the Bureau of Labor Relations; and that this refusal
constituted undue interference in, and restraint on the exercise of the employees’ right to self-organization and free collective bargaining.
The real motive of the company in the sudden closure and the mass dismissal was union busting, as only the union members were locked out,
and the company subsequently resumed operations of the closed farm under a new contract with the landowner.
The petitioner corporation filed a Rule 65 petition before the CA who dismissed the petition outright for no proof of authority to act for and
on behalf of the corporation was submitted by the corporation’s senior vice-president who signed the non-forum shopping.
Petitioner instituted before us the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of ULP.
2. Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion.
Ruling: The petition is denied.

When the petitioner is a corporation, the certification shall be executed by a natural person authorized by the corporation's board of directors.
While technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice, they are provided to effect the proper and orderly
disposition of cases and effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court mandates that the petition for certiorari shall be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping. When the petitioner is a corporation, the certification shall be executed by a natural person authorized by the corporation's board
of directors, and proof of such authority must be attached to the petition. Failure to attach to the certification any proof of the signatory's
authority is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
In the instant case, the senior vice-president of the petitioner corporation signed the certificate of non-forum shopping. No proof of his
authority to sign the said certificate was, however, attached to the petition. Thus, applying settled jurisprudence, we find that the CA
committed no error when it dismissed the petition.
The Court cannot even be liberal in the application of the rules because liberality is warranted only in instances when there is substantial
compliance with the technical requirements in pleading and practice, and when there is sufficient explanation that the non-compliance is for
a justifiable cause, such that the outright dismissal of the case will defeat the administration of justice. Here, the petitioner corporation did
not present a reasonable explanation for its non-compliance with the rules. Further, it cannot be said that petitioner substantially complied
therewith, because it did not attach to its motion for reconsideration any proof of the authority of its signatory. It stands to reason, therefore,
that this Court now refuses to condone petitioner's procedural transgression.
We must reiterate that the rules of procedure are mandatory, except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice.While technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice, they are provided to effect
the proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.
1. Petitioner is guilty of ULP.

It is crystal clear that the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was made in bad faith. Badges of bad faith are evident from the following acts of
the petitioner: it unjustifiably refused to recognize the STFWU's and the other unions' affiliation with PULO; it concluded a new CBA with
another union in another farm during the agreed indefinite suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations; it surreptitiously transferred
and continued its business in a less hostile environment; and it suddenly terminated the STFWU members, but retained and brought the non-
members to the Malvar farm.
Petitioner presented no evidence to support the contention that it was incurring losses or that the subject farm's lease agreement was pre-
terminated. Ineluctably, the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm circumvented the labor organization's right to collective bargaining and violated
the members' right to security of tenure.
2. There is a need to prove grave abuse of discretion of the NLRC.

It was incumbent for petitioner to prove before the appellate court that the labor commission capriciously and whimsically exercised its
judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, or that it exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and that its abuse of discretion is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. Here, as aforesaid, no such proof was adduced by petitioner. We, thus, declare that the NLRC ruling is not characterized
by grave abuse of discretion.
3. Award of moral and exemplary damages due to existence of ULP.

We deem as proper the award of moral and exemplary damages. We hold that the sudden termination of the STFWU members is tainted with
ULP because it was done to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. Thus, the petitioner
company is liable for the payment of the aforesaid damages. Correcting the dispositive portion of the NLRC ruling, payment of P500,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages should be made to the illegally dismissed STFWU members.
As to the order of reinstatement, since it is no longer feasible considering the length of time that the employees have been out of petitioner's
employ, the company is ordered to pay the illegally dismissed STFWU members separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay, or one-half
(1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
The releases and quitclaims, as well as the affidavits of desistance, signed by the employees, who were then necessitous men at the time of
execution of the documents, are declared invalid and ineffective.
Gen. San. Coca-Cola Plant Free Workers Union-TUPAS vs. CCBPI (Gen. Santos City) et al.
G.R. No. 178647, Feb. 13, 2009
Facts: CCBPI experienced a decline in profitability due to the Asian economic crisis, decrease in sales, and tougher competition. It
implemented 3 waves of an Early Retirement Program. Meanwhile, there was an inter-office memorandum mandating officers to put on hold
“all requests for hiring to fill in vacancies in both regular and temporary positions in the Head Office and in the Plants.” Because several
employees availed of the early retirement program, vacancies were created in some departments, including the production department of
CCBPI Gen San, where members of petitioner Union worked.
Faced with the “freeze hiring” directive, CCBPI engaged the services of JLBP Services Corporation (JLBP), a company in the business of
providing labor and manpower services, including janitorial services, messengers, and office workers.
The Union petitioner filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), a Notice of Strike on the ground of alleged unfair
labor practice for contracting-out services regularly performed by union members (“union busting”). The parties failed to come to an amicable
settlement. CCBPI filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The Secretary
of Labor issued an Order enjoining the threatened strike and certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
NLRC ruled that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice for contracting out jobs to JLBP. The NLRC anchored its ruling on the
validity of the “Going-to-the-Market” (GTM) system implemented by the company, which called for restructuring its selling and distribution
system, leading to the closure of certain sales offices and the elimination of conventional sales routes. The NLRC held that petitioner failed
to prove by substantial evidence that the system was meant to curtail the right to self-organization of petitioner’s members. The CA upheld
the NLRC’s finding that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice. It found that JLBP was an independent contractor and that the decision
to contract out jobs was a valid exercise of management prerogative to meet exigent circumstances.
Issue: Whether or not CCBPI was guilty of unfair labor practice for contracting out jobs.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. Hence, we deny the Petition.

First, an examination of the issues raised by petitioner reveals that they are questions of fact. The issues raised, i.e., whether JLBP is an
independent contractor, whether CCBPI’s contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to unfair labor practice, and whether such action was a
valid exercise of management prerogative, call for a re-examination of evidence, which is not within the ambit of this Court’s jurisdiction.
Moreover, factual findings of the NLRC, an administrative agency deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within its jurisdiction, are
generally accorded not only respect but finality especially when such factual findings are affirmed by the CA. The company’s action to
contract did not constitute unfair labor practice as this was not directed at the members’ right to self-organization.
Second, the NLRC found – and the same was sustained by the CA – that the company’s action to contract-out the services and functions
performed by Union members did not constitute unfair labor practice as this was not directed at the members’ right to self-organization.
Article 248 of the Labor Code provides: It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices: x x x (c)
To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization; x x x
Unfair labor practice refers to “acts that violate the workers’ right to organize.” The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-
organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor practices.
Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove its charge of unfair labor practice. It was the Union that had the burden
of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations of unfair labor practice, which burden it failed to discharge.
De La Salle University et al., vs. De La Salle University Employees Association

GR No. 177283, April 7, 2009
Facts: In 2001, a group of respondents led by one Belen Aliazas (Aliazas group) filed a petition for conduct of elections with the DOLE,
alleging that the then incumbent officers of respondent had failed to call for a regular election since 1985.
Disputing the Aliazas group’s allegation, respondent claimed that an election was conducted in 1987 but by virtue of the enactment of
Republic Act 6715, which amended the Labor Code, the term of office of its officers was extended to 5 years or until 1992 during which a
general assembly was held affirming their hold-over tenure until the termination of collective bargaining negotiations; and that a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) was executed only on March 30, 2000.
The DOLE-NCR held that the holdover authority of respondent’s incumbent set of officers had been extinguished by virtue of the execution
of the CBA. It accordingly ordered the conduct of elections to be placed under the control and supervision of its Labor Relations
Division[3] and subject to pre-election conferences.
Notwithstanding the conduct of election imposed, respondent called for a regular election on July 9, 2001, without prior notice to the DOLE
and without the conduct of pre-election conference, prompting the Aliazas group to file an Urgent Motion for Intervention with the Bureau
of Labor Relations (BLR) of the DOLE. The BLR granted the Aliaza’s group’s motion for intervention directing to cease and desist from
holding the general election of DLSUEA officers.
The Aliazas group thereupon, via letter of August 7, 2001 to Brother Rolando Dizon, FSC, President of petitioner DLSU, requested the
University “to please put on escrow all union dues/agency fees and whatever money considerations deducted from salaries of concerned co-
academic personnel until such time that an election of union officials has been scheduled and subsequent elections has been held.
Thus, DLSU decided that, the hold-over authority of your incumbent set of officers has been considered extinguished and an election of new
union officers, to be conducted and supervised by the DOLE has been directed to be held. It decided the following saying that it does not
want itself to be unnecessarily involved in your intra-union dispute. This is the only way that the University can maintain neutrality on this
matter of grave concern.
1. Establish a savings account for the Union where all collected union dues and agency fees will be deposited and held in trust; and
2. Discontinue normal relations with any group within the Union including the incumbent set of officers.
Consequently, respondent to file a complaint against petitioners for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP complaint), claiming that petitioners unduly
interfered with its internal affairs and discriminated against its members.
During the pendency of its ULP complaint, respondent filed its First Notice of Strike with the Office of the Secretary of Labor (OSL),
charging petitioners for 1) gross violation of the CBA and 2) bargaining in bad faith which was certified for compulsory arbitration to the
NLRC (certified case). The certified case, docketed as NLRC-NCR CC000222-02, was raffled to the NLRC Third Division.
In the meantime, Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati, by Decision of July 12, 2002, dismissed respondent’s ULP complaint. Respondent appealed to
the NLRC, and was lodged at the NLRC Second Division.
While the dismissal of its ULP complaint was pending appeal before the NLRC Second Division, respondent, on behalf of some of its
members, filed four other cases against petitioners which were lodged at the NLRC Second Division.
Respondent thereafter filed in the certified case which was lodged at the NLRC Third Division a motion to have its four other cases and its
ULP complaint thenpending appeal before the NLRC Second Division to have these cases “subsumed” in the certified
case. The NLRC Third Division granted respondent’s motion.
The NLRC Second Division, in the meantime, affirmed the dismissal by the Arbiter of respondent’s ULP complaint. The Court of
Appeals Tenth Division, REVERSED the said Order of the NLRC Third Divisiom with respect to the “subsuming” of respondent’s ULP
complaint, the ULP complaint having been, at the time the NLRC Third Division Order was issued, “already disposed of” (dismissed) by the
Arbiter and was in fact pending appeal before the NLRC Second Division.
The Court of Appeals First Division SET ASIDE the NLRC Second Division Order affirming the dismissal of respondent’s ULP complaint
and ordered NLRC Second Division to transmit the entire records of the ULP complaint to the NLRC Third Division where the ULP
complaint had been ordered consolidated.
Hence, petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari at bar.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA’s tenth division’s decision was correct in declaring the act of subsuming wrong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice.
Ruling: The petition is partly meritorious.

1. To transmit the records of respondent’s ULP complaint to the NLRC Third Division, the same can no longer be effected, the
CA’s Tenth Division ruling having become final.
The appellate court’s Tenth Division Decision had become final and executory on July 11, 2004. Therefore, with respect to the herein
challenged Decision of the appellate court’s First Division ordering the NLRC Second Division to transmit the records of respondent’s ULP
complaint to the NLRC Third Division, the same can no longer be effected, the appellate court’s Tenth Division ruling having, it bears
repeating, become final.
2. Pending the final resolution of the intra-union dispute, respondent’s officers remained duly authorized to conduct union affairs.
On the other matter raised by petitioners – that their acts of withholding union and agency dues and suspension of normal relations with
respondent’s incumbent set of officers pending the intra-union dispute did not constitute interference, the Court finds for respondent.
Pending the final resolution of the intra-union dispute, respondent’s officers remained duly authorized to conduct union affairs. The
clarification letter by BLR Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac enlightens:
We take this opportunity to clarify that there is no void in the DLSUEA leadership. The Decision of DOLE-NCR Regional Director should
not be construed as an automatic termination of the incumbent officers’ tenure of office. As duly-elected officers of the DLSUEA, their
leadership is not deemed terminated by the expiration of their terms of office, for they shall continue their functions and enjoy the rights and
privileges pertaining to their respective positions in a hold-over capacity, until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.
It bears noting that at the time petitioners’ questioned moves were adopted, a valid and existing CBA had been entered between the parties. It
thus behooved petitioners to observe the terms and conditions thereof bearing on union dues and representation. It is axiomatic in labor
relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor organization and an employer becomes the law between the parties, compliance with
which is mandated by express policy of the law.
3. The grant of nominal damages in order. No basis for exemplary damages.

Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. While the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, respondent must show proof of
entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the Court may consider awarding exemplary damages. No such damages
were prayed for, however, hence, the Court finds no basis to grant the prayer for exemplary damages.
The grant of nominal damages and attorney’s fees is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals First Division Decision ordering the transmittal by the NLRC Second Division of the records of
respondent’s ULP complaint to the NLRC Third Division is concerned, has become moot. In so far as the the
NLRC Second Division Decision is REVERSED finding petitioners liable for Unfair Labor Practice, and to pay respondent nominal damages
in the amount of P250,000 and attorney’s fees in the amount ofP50,000.
Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery vs. Asia Brewery Inc.

GR No. 162025, Aug. 3, 2010
Facts: Asia Brewery, Inc. (ABI) is engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of beer, shandy, bottled water and glass products. ABI
entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with Bisig at Lakas ng mga Manggagawa sa Asia-Independent (BLMA-
INDEPENDENT), the exclusive bargaining representative of ABI’s rank-and-file employees.
Article I of the CBA defined the scope of the bargaining unit, as follows:
Section 1.Recognition. The COMPANY recognizes the UNION as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-
and-file daily paid employees within the scope of the appropriate bargaining unit with respect to rates of pay, hours of work and other terms
and conditions of employment. The UNION shall not represent or accept for membership employees outside the scope of the bargaining unit
herein defined.
Section 2.Bargaining Unit. The bargaining unit shall be comprised of all regular rank-and-file daily-paid employees of the COMPANY.
However, the following jobs/positions as herein defined shall be excluded from the bargaining unit, to wit:
1. Managers
2. Assistant Managers
3. Section Heads
4. Supervisors
5. Superintendents
6. Confidential and Executive Secretaries
7. Personnel, Accounting and Marketing Staff
8. Communications Personnel
9. Probationary Employees
10. Security and Fire Brigade Personnel
11. Monthly Employees
12. Purchasing and Quality Control Staff
Subsequently, a dispute arose when ABI’s management stopped deducting union dues from eighty-one (81) employees, believing that their
membership in BLMA-INDEPENDENT violated the CBA. Eighteen (18) of these affected employees are QA Sampling
Inspectors/Inspectresses and Machine Gauge Technician who formed part of the Quality Control Staff. Twenty (20) checkers are assigned at
the Materials Department of the Administration Division, Full Goods Department of the Brewery Division and Packaging Division. The rest
are secretaries/clerks directly under their respective division managers.
BLMA-INDEPENDENT claimed that ABI’s actions restrained the employees’ right to self-organization and brought the matter to the
grievance machinery. As the parties failed to amicably settle the controversy, BLMA-INDEPENDENT lodged a complaint before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The parties eventually agreed to submit the case for arbitration to resolve the issue of
"[w]hether or not there is restraint to employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization."
Voluntary Arbitrator sustained the BLMA-INDEPENDENT after finding that the positions of the subject employees qualify under the rank-
and-file category because their functions are merely routinary and clerical. On appeal, the CA reversed the Voluntary Arbitrator.
BLMA-INDEPENDENT filed a motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, a certification election was held on August 10, 2002 wherein
petitioner Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia (TPMA) won. As the incumbent bargaining representative of ABI’s rank-and-file
employees claiming interest in the outcome of the case, petitioner filed with the CA an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the decision
and intervention, with attached petition signed by the union officers.11 Both motions were denied by the CA.12
Issues:
1. Whether or not the 81 employees are excluded from and are not eligible for inclusion in the bargaining unit as defined in the CBA;
2. Whether or not the ABI committed an act in restraining the employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
Ruling:
1. Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees,
jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required
to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.
Confidential employees are thus excluded from the rank-and-file bargaining unit. The rationale for their separate category and disqualification
to join any labor organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees because if allowed to be affiliated with a Union, the latter
might not be assured of their loyalty in view of evident conflict of interests and the Union can also become company-denominated with the
presence of managerial employees in the Union membership. Having access to confidential information, confidential employees may also
become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act as a spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.
In Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that petitioner’s "division secretaries, all Staff of General Management,
Personnel and Industrial Relations Department, Secretaries of Audit, EDP and Financial Systems" are confidential employees not included
within the rank-and-file bargaining unit. Earlier, in Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Roldan-Confesor, the court declared that
legal secretaries who are tasked with, among others, the typing of legal documents, memoranda and correspondence, the keeping of records
and files, the giving of and receiving notices, and such other duties as required by the legal personnel of the corporation, fall under the
category of confidential employees and hence excluded from the bargaining unit composed of rank-and-file employees.
Also considered having access to "vital labor information" are the executive secretaries of the General Manager and the executive secretaries
of the Quality Assurance Manager, Product Development Manager, Finance Director, Management System Manager, Human Resources
Manager, Marketing Director, Engineering Manager, Materials Manager and Production Manager.
In the present case, the CBA expressly excluded "Confidential and Executive Secretaries" from the rank-and-file bargaining unit, for which
reason ABI seeks their disaffiliation from the union. Petitioner, however, maintains that except for Daisy Laloon, Evelyn Mabilangan and
Lennie Saguan who had been promoted to monthly paid positions, several secretaries/clerks are deemed included among the rank-and-file
employees of ABI. It is rather curious that there would be several secretaries/clerks for just one (1) department/division performing tasks
which are mostly routine and clerical. ABI insisted they fall under the "Confidential and Executive Secretaries" expressly excluded by the
CBA from the rank-and-file bargaining unit.
However, perusal of the job descriptions of these secretaries/clerks reveals that their assigned duties and responsibilities involve routine
activities of recording and monitoring, and other paper works for their respective departments while secretarial tasks such as receiving
telephone calls and filing of office correspondence appear to have been commonly imposed as additional duties.
ABI failed to indicate who among these numerous secretaries/clerks have access to confidential data relating to management policies that
could give rise to potential conflict of interest with their Union membership. Clearly, the rationale under our previous rulings for the exclusion
of executive secretaries or division secretaries would have little or no significance considering the lack of or very limited access to confidential
information of these secretaries/clerks.
We thus hold that the secretaries/clerks, numbering about forty (40), are rank-and-file employees and not confidential employees.
With respect to the Sampling Inspectors/Inspectresses and the Gauge Machine Technician, there seems no dispute that they form part of the
Quality Control Staff who, under the express terms of the CBA, fall under a distinct category. But we disagree with ABI’s contention that
the twenty (20) checkers are similarly confidential employees being "quality control staff" entrusted with the handling and custody of
company properties and sensitive information.
Again, the job descriptions of these checkers assigned in the storeroom section of the Materials Department, finishing section of the Packaging
Department, and the decorating and glass sections of the Production Department plainly showed that they perform routine and mechanical
tasks preparatory to the delivery of the finished products. Consequently, we hold that the twenty (20) checkers may not be considered
confidential employees under the category of Quality Control Staff who were expressly excluded from the CBA of the rank-and-file
bargaining unit.
Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and
effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two (2) criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to
be considered a confidential employee – that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the
supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in
the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be
accomplished by the "confidential employee rule.
There is no showing in this case that the secretaries/clerks and checkers assisted or acted in a confidential capacity to managerial employees
and obtained confidential information relating to labor relations policies. Not being confidential employees, the secretaries/clerks and
checkers are not disqualified from membership in the Union of respondent’s rank-and-file employees.
2. Unfair labor practice refers to "acts that violate the workers’ right to organize." The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self
organization and to the observance of a CBA. For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that ABI was motivated by
ill will, "bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of
course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety resulted from ABI’s act in discontinuing the union dues deduction from
those employees it believed were excluded by the CBA. Considering that the herein dispute arose from a simple disagreement in the
interpretation of the CBA provision on excluded employees from the bargaining unit, respondent cannot be said to have committed unfair
labor practice that restrained its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, nor have thereby demonstrated an anti-union
stance.
Manila Mining Corp. Employees Association-FFW vs. Manila Mining Corp.

GR No. 178222-23, Sept. 29, 2010
Facts: Respondent Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) is a publicly-listed corporation engaged in large-scale mining for gold and copper
ore. MMC is required by law to maintain a tailings containment facility to store the waste material generated by its mining operations.
Consequently, MMC constructed several tailings dams to treat and store its waste materials. One of these dams it constructed in 1993 and
was operated under a permit issued by the DENR, through its Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) in Butuan City, Agusan del Norte.
Eleven (11) rank-and-file employees of MMC, who later became complainants before the labor arbiter, attended the organizational meeting
of MMC-Makati Employees Association-Federation of Free Workers Chapter (Union). The Union filed with the DOLE all the requirements
for its registration, acquired its legitimate registration status and subsequently, submitted letters to MMC relating its intention to bargain
collectively. The Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) proposal to MMC.
Upon expiration of the tailings permit, DENR-EMB did not issue a permanent permit due to the inability of MMC to secure an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC). MMC was compelled to temporarily shut down its mining operations, resulting in the temporary lay-off of
more than 400 employees in the mine site.
MMC called for the suspension of negotiations on the CBA with the Union until resumption of mining operations.
Among the employees laid-off, the 11 complainants, together with the Union filed a complaint before the labor arbiter praying for
reinstatement, recognition of the Union as the sole and exclusive representative of its rank-and-file employees, and payment of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of MMC and held that the temporary shutdown of the mining operation, as well as the temporary lay-off of
the employees, is valid. The NLRC modified the judgment of the labor arbiter and ordered the payment of separation pay equivalent to one
month pay for every year of service. It ratiocinated that the temporary lay-off, which exceeded more than six (6) months, had the effect of
severance of the employer-employee relationship. The Court of Appeals maintained the order to pay separation pay but set aside the MMC
liability to pay the Union attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the award.
Issue: Whether or not MMC is guilty of unfair labor practice
Ruling: The lay-off is neither illegal nor can it be considered as unfair labor practice.
Despite all efforts exerted by MMC, it did not succeed in obtaining the consent of the residents of the community where the tailings pond
would operate, one of the conditions imposed by DENR-EMB in granting its application for a permanent permit. It is precisely MMC’s
faultless failure to secure a permit which caused the temporary shutdown of its mining operations. As aptly put by the Court of Appeals:
The evidence on record indeed clearly shows that MMC’s suspension of its mining operations was bonafide and the reason for such
suspension was supported by substantial evidence. MMC cannot conduct mining operations without a tailings disposal system. For this
purpose, MMC operates TP No. 7 under a valid permit from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) through its
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB). In fact, a "Temporary Authority to Construct and Operate" was issued on January 25, 2001 in
favor of MMC valid for a period of six (6) months or until July 25, 2001. The NLRC did not dispute MMC’s claim that it had timely filed an
application for renewal of its permit to operate TP No. 7 but that the renewal permit was not immediately released by the DENR-EMB, hence,
MMC was compelled to temporarily shut down its milling and mining operations. Here, it is once apparent that the suspension of MMC’s
mining operations was not due to its fault nor was it necessitated by financial reasons. Such suspension was brought about by the non-issuance
of a permit for the continued operation of TP No. 7 without which MMC cannot resume its milling and mining operations. x x x.21 [Emphasis
supplied.]
Unfair labor practice cannot be imputed to MMC since, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, the call of MMC for a suspension of the CBA
negotiations cannot be equated to "refusal to bargain."
Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the phrase "duty to bargain collectively," to wit:
ARTICLE 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work
and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreements
[and executing a contract incorporating such agreements] if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a
proposal or to make any concession.
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that the employer was motivated by ill-will, bad faith or fraud, or was
oppressive to labor. The employer must have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy causing social humiliation,
wounded feelings or grave anxiety. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain collectively with
each other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates
is that both parties should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement.
The Union based its contention on the letter request by MMC for the suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations until it resumes
operations. Verily, it cannot be said that MMC deliberately avoided the negotiation. It merely sought a suspension and in fact, even expressed
its willingness to negotiate once the mining operations resume. There was valid reliance on the suspension of mining operations for the
suspension, in turn, of the CBA negotiation. The Union failed to prove bad faith in MMC’s actuations.
Nota Bene:
The validity of its act of suspending its operations does not excuse it from paying separation pay. Case falls under Art. 283 of the LC on
authorized causes.
Prince Transport et al., vs. Garcia et al.

G.R. No. 167291, January 12, 2011
Facts: Prince Transport, Inc. (PTI) is a company engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land.
Respondents alleged in their complaints that: that they were hired by petitioner either as drivers, conductors, mechanics or inspectors, except
for respondent Diosdado Garcia, who was assigned as Operations Manager.; in addition to their regular monthly income, they also received
commissions equivalent to 8 to 10% of their wages.
Sometime in October 1997, the said commissions were reduced to 7 to 9%; this led respondents and other employees of PTI to hold a series
of meetings to discuss the protection of their interests as employees; these meetings led Renato Claros, who is the president of PTI, to suspect
that respondents are about to form a union; he made known to Garcia his objection to the formation of a union; in December 1997, PTI
employees requested for a cash advance, but the same was denied by management which resulted in demoralization on the employees' ranks.
Later, PTI acceded to the request of some, but not all, of the employees; the foregoing circumstances led respondents to form a union for
their mutual aid and protection; in order to block the continued formation of the union, PTI caused the transfer of all union members and
sympathizers to one of its sub-companies, Lubas Transport (Lubas); despite such transfer, the schedule of drivers and conductors, as well as
their company identification cards, were issued by PTI; the daily time records, tickets and reports of the respondents were also filed at the
PTI office; and, all claims for salaries were transacted at the same office; later, the business of Lubas deteriorated because of the refusal of
PTI to maintain and repair the units being used therein, which resulted in the virtual stoppage of its operations and respondents' loss of
employment.
Petitioners, on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the complaints contending that herein respondents were no longer their
employees, since they all transferred to Lubas at their own request; petitioners have nothing to do with the management and operations of
Lubas as well as the control and supervision of the latter's employees; petitioners were not aware of the existence of any union in their
company and came to know of the same only in June 1998 when they were served a copy of the summons in the petition for certification
election filed by the union; that before the union was registered on April 15, 1998, the complaint subject of the present petition was already
filed; that the real motive in the filing of the complaints was because PTI asked respondents to vacate the bunkhouse where they (respondents)
and their respective families were staying because PTI wanted to renovate the same.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners are not guilty of unfair labor practice in the absence of evidence to show that they violated
respondents' right to self-organization. The Labor Arbiter also held that Lubas is the respondents' employer and that it is an entity which is
separate, distinct and independent from PTI. Nonetheless, the Labor Arbiter found that Lubas is guilty of illegally dismissing respondents
from their employment. The NLRC partly sustained the Labor Arbiter’s ruling.
The CA granted respondents' petition, ruling that petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice; that Lubas is a mere instrumentality, agent
conduit or adjunct of PTI; and that petitioners' act of transferring respondents' employment to Lubas is indicative of their intent to frustrate
the efforts of respondents to organize themselves into a union.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Lubas is a separate and independent entity from PTI
2. Whether or not PTI is guilty of unfair labor practice
Ruling:
1. The Court agrees with the CA that Lubas is a mere agent, conduit or adjunct of PTI. A settled formulation of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil is that when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when
necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that these two entities are distinct and treat them as identical or as
one and the same. In the present case, it may be true that Lubas is a single proprietorship and not a corporation. However, petitioners' attempt
to isolate themselves from and hide behind the supposed separate and distinct personality of Lubas so as to evade their liabilities is precisely
what the classical doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity seeks to prevent and remedy.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observations of the CA, to wit:
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, if Lubas were truly a separate entity, how come that it was Prince Transport who made the
decision to transfer its employees to the former? Besides, Prince Transport never regarded Lubas Transport as a separate entity. In the
aforesaid letter, it referred to said entity as "Lubas operations." Moreover, in said letter, it did not transfer the employees; it "assigned"
them. Lastly, the existing funds and 201 file of the employees were turned over not to a new company but a "new management."
The Court also agrees with respondents that if Lubas is indeed an entity separate and independent from PTI why is it that the latter decides
which employees shall work in the former?
Moreover, petitioners failed to refute the contention of respondents that despite the latter's transfer to Lubas of their daily time records,
reports, daily income remittances of conductors, schedule of drivers and conductors were all made, performed, filed and kept at the office of
PTI. In fact, respondents' identification cards bear the name of PTI. It may not be amiss to point out at this juncture that in two separate illegal
dismissal cases involving different groups of employees transferred by PTI to other companies, the Labor Arbiter handling the cases found
that these companies and PTI are one and the same entity; thus, making them solidarily liable for the payment of backwages and other money
claims awarded to the complainants therein.
Petitioners likewise aver that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered petitioners to reinstate respondents to
their former positions, considering that the issue of reinstatement was never brought up before it and respondents never questioned the award
of separation pay to them.
2. As to whether petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA that
respondents' transfer of work assignments to Lubas was designed by petitioners as a subterfuge to foil the former's right to organize
themselves into a union. Under Article 248 (a) and (e) of the Labor Code, an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice if it interferes with,
restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or if it discriminates in regard to wages, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
Indeed, evidence of petitioners' unfair labor practice is shown by the established fact that, after respondents' transfer to Lubas, petitioners left
them high and dry insofar as the operations of Lubas was concerned. The Court finds no error in the findings and conclusion of the CA that
petitioners "withheld the necessary financial and logistic support such as spare parts, and repair and maintenance of the transferred buses
until only two units remained in running condition." This left respondents virtually jobless.
Park Hotel et al., vs. Soriano et al.

G.R. No. 17118, September 10, 2012
Facts: Petitioner Park Hotel is a corporation engaged in the hotel business. Petitioners Gregg Harbutt and Bill Percy are the General Manager
and owner, respectively, of Park Hotel. Percy, Harbutt and Atty. Roberto Enriquez are also the officers and stockholders of Burgos
Corporation a sister company of Park Hotel.
Respondent Manolo Soriano was hired by Park Hotel in July 1990 as Maintenance Electrician, and then transferred to Burgos in 1992.
Respondent Lester Gonzales was employed by Burgos as Doorman, and later promoted as Supervisor. Respondent Yolanda Badilla was a
bartender of J's Playhouse operated by Burgos.
In October of 1997, Soriano, Gonzales and Badilla were dismissed from work for allegedly stealing company properties. As a result,
respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
before the Labor Arbiter. In their complaints, respondents alleged that the real reason for their dismissal was that they were organizing a
union for the company's employees. On the other hand, petitioners alleged that aside from the charge of theft, Soriano and Gonzales have
violated various company rules and regulations contained in several memoranda issued to them.
Issues:
1. Whether the respondents were validly dismissed
2. If petitioners are liable, whether Park Hotel, Percy and Harbutt are jointly and severally liable with Burgos for the dismissal of respondents
Ruling:
1. Soriano and the other employees were illegally dismissed.
The requisites for a valid dismissal are: (a) the employee must be afforded due process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and
defend himself; and (b) the dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code, or for any of the authorized
causes under Articles 283 and 284 of the same Code. In the case before us, both elements are completely lacking. Respondents were dismissed
without any just or authorized cause and without being given the opportunity to be heard and defend themselves.
2. As to whether Park Hotel may be held solidarily liable with Burgos, the Court rules that before a corporation can be held accountable for
the corporate liabilities of another, the veil of corporate fiction must first be pierced. Thus, before Park Hotel can be held answerable for the
obligations of Burgos to its employees, it must be sufficiently established that the two companies are actually a single corporate entity, such
that the liability of one is the liability of the other.
In the case at bar, respondents utterly failed to prove by competent evidence that Park Hotel was a mere instrumentality, agency, conduit or
adjunct of Burgos, or that its separate corporate veil had been used to cover any fraud or illegality committed by Burgos against the
respondents. Accordingly, Park Hotel and Burgos cannot be considered as one and the same entity, and Park Hotel cannot be held solidary
liable with Burgos.
Nonetheless, although the corporate veil between Park Hotel and Burgos cannot be pierced, it does not necessarily mean that Percy and
Harbutt are exempt from liability towards respondents. Verily, a corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors,
officers and employees. Obligations incurred by them, while acting as corporate agents, are not their personal liability but the direct
accountability of the corporation they represent.
However, corporate officers may be deemed solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employees if they acted with
malice or bad faith. In the present case, the lower tribunals unanimously found that Percy and Harbutt, in their capacity as corporate officers
of Burgos, acted maliciously in terminating the services of respondents without any valid ground and in order to suppress their right to self-
organization. Thus, they can be deemed solidarily liable with the corporation being its corporate agents who acted in malice and bad faith in
the termination of Soriano and his company.
Goya Inc. vs. Goya Inc. Employees Union-FFW

G.R. No. 170054, January 21, 2013
Facts: Sometime in January 2004, petitioner Goya, Inc. (Company), a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, importation, and
wholesale of top quality food products, hired contractual employees from PESO Resources Development Corporation (PESO) to perform
temporary and occasional services in its factory in Parang, Marikina City. This prompted respondent Goya, Inc. Employees Union-FFW
(Union) to request for a grievance conference on the ground that the contractual workers do not belong to the categories of employees
stipulated in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). 5 When the matter remained unresolved, the grievance was referred to
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for voluntary arbitration.
During the hearing on July 1, 2004, the Company and the Union manifested before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) Bienvenido E. Laguesma that
amicable settlement was no longer possible; hence, they agreed to submit for resolution the solitary issue of "[w]hether or not [the Company]
is guilty of unfair labor acts in engaging the services of PESO, a third party service provider[,] under the existing CBA, laws[,] and
jurisprudence." 6 Both parties thereafter filed their respective pleadings.
The Union asserted that the hiring of contractual employees from PESO is not a management prerogative and in gross violation of the CBA
tantamount to unfair labor practice (ULP). It noted that the contractual workers engaged have been assigned to work in positions previously
handled by regular workers and Union members, in effect violating Section 4, Article I of the CBA, which provides for three categories of
employees in the Company, to wit:
Section 4.Categories of Employees. — The parties agree on the following categories of employees:
(a)Probationary Employee. — One hired to occupy a regular rank-and-file position in the Company and is serving a probationary period.
If the probationary employee is hired or comes from outside the Company (non-Goya, Inc. employee), he shall be required to undergo
a probationary period of six (6) months, which period, in the sole judgment of management, may be shortened if the employee has
already acquired the knowledge or skills required of the job. If the employee is hired from the casual pool and has worked in the same
position at any time during the past two (2) years, the probationary period shall be three (3) months.
(b)Regular Employee. — An employee who has satisfactorily completed his probationary period and automatically granted regular
employment status in the Company.
(c)Casual Employee. — One hired by the Company to perform occasional or seasonal work directly connected with the regular
operations of the Company, or one hired for specific projects of limited duration not connected directly with the regular operations of
the Company.
It was averred that the categories of employees had been a part of the CBA since the 1970s and that due to this provision, a pool of casual
employees had been maintained by the Company from which it hired workers who then became regular workers when urgently necessary to
employ them for more than a year. Likewise, the Company sometimes hired probationary employees who also later became regular workers
after passing the probationary period. With the hiring of contractual employees, the Union contended that it would no longer have
probationary and casual employees from which it could obtain additional Union members; thus, rendering inutile Section 1, Article III (Union
Security) of the CBA, which states:
Section 1.Condition of Employment. — As a condition of continued employment in the Company, all regular rank-and-file employees
shall remain members of the Union in good standing and that new employees covered by the appropriate bargaining unit shall
automatically become regular employees of the Company and shall remain members of the Union in good standing as a condition of
continued employment.
The Union moreover advanced that sustaining the Company's position would easily weaken and ultimately destroy the former with the latter's
resort to retrenchment and/or retirement of employees and not filling up the vacant regular positions through the hiring of contractual workers
from PESO, and that a possible scenario could also be created by the Company wherein it could "import" workers from PESO during an
actual strike.
In countering the Union's allegations, the Company argued that: (a) the law expressly allows contracting and subcontracting arrangements
through Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Order No. 18-02; (b) the engagement of contractual employees did not, in any way,
prejudice the Union, since not a single employee was terminated and neither did it result in a reduction of working hours nor a reduction or
splitting of the bargaining unit; and (c) Section 4, Article I of the CBA merely provides for the definition of the categories of employees and
does not put a limitation on the Company's right to engage the services of job contractors or its management prerogative to address
temporary/occasional needs in its operation.
Issue: Whether or not the voluntary artbitrator committed an error in declaring that the engagement of PESO is not keeping with the intent
and spirit of the CBA
Ruling: We confirm that the VA ruled on a matter that is covered by the sole issue submitted for voluntary arbitration. Resultantly, the CA
did not commit serious error when it sustained the ruling that the hiring of contractual employees from PESO was not in keeping with the
intent and spirit of the CBA. Indeed, the opinion of the VA is germane to, or, in the words of the CA, "interrelated and intertwined with," the
sole issue submitted for resolution by the parties. This being said, the Company's invocation of Sections 4 and 5, Rule IV 20 and Section 5,
Rule VI 21 of the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings dated October 15, 2004 issued by the
NCMB is plainly out of order.
Likewise, the Company cannot find solace in its cited case of Ludo & Luym Corporation v. Saornido. 22 In Ludo, the company was engaged
in the manufacture of coconut oil, corn starch, glucose and related products. In the course of its business operations, it engaged the arrastre
services of CLAS for the loading and unloading of its finished products at the wharf. The arrastre workers deployed by CLAS to perform the
services needed were subsequently hired, on different dates, as Ludo's regular rank-and-file employees. Thereafter, said employees joined
LEU, which acted as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. When LEU entered into a CBA with Ludo, providing
for certain benefits to the employees (the amount of which vary according to the length of service rendered), it requested to include in its
members' period of service the time during which they rendered arrastre services so that they could get higher benefits.
Lastly, the Company kept on harping that both the VA and the CA conceded that its engagement of contractual workers from PESO was a
valid exercise of management prerogative. It is confused. To emphasize, declaring that a particular act falls within the concept of management
prerogative is significantly different from acknowledging that such act is a valid exercise thereof. What the VA and the CA correctly ruled
was that the Company's act of contracting out/outsourcing is within the purview of management prerogative. Both did not say, however, that
such act is a valid exercise thereof. Obviously, this is due to the recognition that the CBA provisions agreed upon by the Company and the
Union delimit the free exercise of management prerogative pertaining to the hiring of contractual employees. Indeed, the VA opined that "the
right of the management to outsource parts of its operations is not totally eliminated but is merely limited by the CBA," while the CA held
that "[t]his management prerogative of contracting out services, however, is not without limitation. . . . [These] categories of employees
particularly with respect to casual employees [serve] as limitation to [the Company's] prerogative to outsource parts of its operations
especially when hiring contractual employees." acIHDA
A collective bargaining agreement is the law between the parties:

It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its
provisions. We said so in Honda Phils., Inc. v. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda:
A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer
concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a
CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties
and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
Moreover, if the terms of a contract, as in a CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning
of their stipulations shall control.
Baptista et al., vs. Villanueva et al.,

G.R. No. 194709, July 31, 2013
Facts: Petitioners were former union members of Radio Philippines Network Employees Union (RPNEU), a legitimate labor organization
and the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of Radio Philippines Network (RPN), a government-sequestered
corporation involved in commercial radio and television broadcasting affairs, while the respondents were the union’s elected officers and
members.
On suspicion of union mismanagement, petitioners, together with some other union members, filed a complaint for impeachment of their
union president, Reynato Siozon, before the executive board of RPN, which was eventually abandoned. They later re-lodged the impeachment
complaint, this time, against all the union officers and members of RPNEU before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). They
likewise filed various petitions for audit covering the period from 2000 to 2004.
Thereafter, cases were filed against the petitioners and several others for alleged violation of the union’s constitution and by-laws. Petitioners
were served an expulsion notice from the union.
RPNEU’s officers informed their company of the expulsion of petitioners and the 12 others from the union and requested the management
to serve them notices of termination from employment in compliance with their CBA’s union security clause.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed three (3) separate complaints for ULP against the respondents, which were later consolidated, questioning legality
of their expulsion from the union and their subsequent termination from employment.
Issue: Whether or not respondents committed unfair labor practices

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.

The primary concept of ULP is embodied in Article 247 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof.––Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right
of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to
bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder
the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.
In essence, ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers’ right to organize. As specified in Articles 248 and 249 of the
Labor Code, the prohibited acts must necessarily relate to the workers' right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Absent the
said vital elements, the acts complained, although seemingly unjust, would not constitute ULP.
Based on RPNEU’s Constitution and By-Laws, the charges against petitioners were not mere internal squabbles, but violations that demand
proper investigation because, if proven, would constitute grounds for their expulsion from the union.
Besides, any supposed procedural flaw in the proceedings before the Committee was deemed cured when petitioners were given the
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.
In this case, RPNEU’s Constitution and By-Laws expressly mandate that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is
a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the internal remedies within the organization. Petitioners were found to have violated the
provisions of the union’s Constitution and By-Laws when they filed petitions for impeachment against their union officers and for audit
before the DOLE without first exhausting all internal remedies available within their organization. This act is a ground for expulsion from
union membership. Thus, petitioners’ expulsion from the union was not a deliberate attempt to curtail or restrict their right to organize, but
was triggered by the commission of an act, expressly sanctioned by Section 2.5 of Article IX of the union’s Constitution and By-Laws.
For a charge of ULP against a labor organization to prosper, the onus probandi rests upon the party alleging it to prove or substantiate such
claims by the requisite quantum of evidence. In labor cases, as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. Moreover, it is indubitable that all the prohibited
acts constituting unfair labor practice should materially relate to the workers' right to self-organization.
Unfortunately, petitioners failed to discharge the burden required to prove the charge of ULP against the respondents. Aside from their self-
serving allegations, petitioners were not able to establish how they were restrained or coerced by their union in a way that curtailed their right
to self-organization. The records likewise failed to sufficiently show that the respondents unduly persuaded management into discriminating
against petitioners. other than to bring to its attention their expulsion from the union, which in turn, resulted in the implementation of their
CBA' s union security clause.
TH Shopfitters Corp., et al., vs. T&H Shopfitters Corp., Union

GR No. 191714, Feb 26, 2014
Facts: Respondent Union filed a case for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) by way of union busting, and Illegal Lockout, against Petitioners.
Apparently, a day after Respondents held their first formal meeting to discuss the formation of a union, 17 employees were barred from
entering petitioners' factory premises located in Zambales, and ordered to transfer to Petitioner's warehouse at Subic purportedly because of
its expansion. Afterwards, the said 17 employees were repeatedly ordered to go on forced leave due to the unavailability of work.
Respondents contended that the affected employees were not given regular work assignments, while subcontractors were continuously hired
to perform their functions. Meanwhile, the business was relocated to another site. However, respondents discovered that the new site was a
"talahiban" or grassland. Later, they were made to work as grass cutters. Due to these circumstances, the employees did not report for work.
The other employees who likewise failed to report were meted out with suspension.
Subsequently, petitioners sponsored a field trip for its employees. The officers and members of the Union were purportedly excluded from
the field trip. On the evening of the field trip, a sales officer of petitioners campaigned against the union in the forthcoming certification
election.
Come election day, the employees were escorted from the field trip to the polling center. Due to the heavy pressure exerted by petitioners,
the votes for "no union" prevailed. Respondents averred that the following week after the certification elections were held, petitioners
retrenched the Union officers and members assigned at the new site. Respondents claimed that the work weeks of those employees who
remained were drastically reduced to only 3 days in a month.
In its defense, Petitioners claimed that due to the decrease in orders from its customers, they had to resort to cost cutting measures to avoid
anticipated financial losses. Thus, it assigned work on a rotational basis. It further argued that the transfer to another site was due to expiration
of the lease with its lessor.
Issue: Whether ULP acts were committed by petitioners against respondents

Ruling: Yes. In the case at bar, petitioners are being accused of violations of paragraphs (a), (c), and (e) of Article 257 of the Labor Code, to
wit:
Article 257. Unfair labor practices of employers. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor
practices:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. . . .
The concept of ULP is embodied in Article 256 of the LC, which provides:
Article 256. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof. — Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional
right of workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including
their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial
peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.
xxx xxx xxx
In essence, ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers' right to organize. As specified in Articles 257 and 258, the
prohibited acts must necessarily relate to the workers' right to self-organization . . . .that is, whether the employer has engaged in conduct
which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights; and that it is not necessary that there be direct
evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that
anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining.
The questioned acts of petitioners, namely:

1) sponsoring a field trip for its employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the scheduled certification election;
2) the active campaign by the sales officer of petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent during the field trip;
3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling center;
4) the continuous hiring of subcontractors performing respondents' functions;
5) assigning union members to work as grass cutters; and
6) the enforcement of work on a rotational basis for union members all reek of interference on the part of petitioners.
Indubitably, the various acts of petitioners, taken together, reasonably support an inference that, indeed, such were all orchestrated to restrict
respondents' free exercise of their right to self-organization.
Phil Electric Corp., vs. Court of Appeals

GR No. 168612, Dec. 10, 2014
Facts: Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and repairs of high voltage
transformers. PWU members were selected for a promotion and they were ordered to undergo training. They would then eventually receive
allowance until the training is completed.
PWU is a legitimate labor organization and the exclusive bargaining representative of PHILEC’s rank-and-file employees. PHILEC and its
rank-and-file employees were governed by collective bargaining agreement providing for the steps in increasing the employee’s basic salary
in case of promotion.
PWU members claimed that schedule of training allowance did not conform to Article X of their CBA. PWU and PHILEC decided to settle
their grievance to voluntary arbitration. PHILEC contends that they applied Modified “SGV” pay grades to avoid salary distortion.
However, Voluntary Arbitrator held that PHILEC violated its CBA with PWU, therefore ordering the PHILEC to pay the PWU members
allowance based on their CBA. PHILEC filed a petition for certiorari on Court of Appeals (CA), alleging that Voluntary Arbitrator gravely
abused its discretion in rendering his decision, but the CA affirmed the decision of Voluntary Arbitrator. PHILEC filed its petition before the
SC for review on certiorari insisting that they did not violate their CBA with PWU.
Issue: Whether or not the Voluntary Arbitrator gravely abuse its discretion in directing PHILEC to pay the training allowance based on CBA
with PWU
Ruling: No, the Voluntary Arbitrator did not gravely abuse its discretion.
The Voluntary Arbitrator correctly awarded training allowances based on the amounts and formula of the CBA. A Collective Bargaining
Agreement is “a contract executed upon the request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees
incorporating the agreement reached after the negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of
employment, including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement.”
A collective bargaining agreement being a contract, its provisions “constitute the law between the parties” and must be complied with in
good faith. Therefore, the allowance of the members of the PWU must be computed based on Article X of their CBA.
Moreover, PHILEC allegedly applied the “Modified SGV” pay grade scale to prevent any salary distortion within PHILEC’s enterprise. This,
however, does not justify PHILEC’s non-compliance with the collective bargaining agreement. This pay grade scale is not provided in the
collective bargaining agreement. It could have invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code, to incorporate the “Modified SGV” pay grade scale
in its collective bargaining agreement with PWU. But it did not.
Therefore PHILEC cannot insist on the “Modified SGV” pay grade scale’s application.
Zambrano et al., vs. Phil Carpet Corp.

GR No. 224099, June 21, 2017
Facts: A petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners seeking to reverse and set aside the resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
affirmed the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for five (5) consolidated complaints for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice.
The petitioners averred that they were employees of private respondent Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (Phil Carpet) and that
they were notified of the termination of their employment on January 3, 2011 effective February 3, 2011 on the ground of cessation of
operation due to serious business losses.
They were of the belief that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation of due process because the closure of Phil Carpet was a
mere pretense to transfer its operations to its wholly owned and controlled corporation, Pacific Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (Pacific
Carpet). They claimed that the job orders of some regular clients of Phil Carpet were transferred to Pacific Carpet; and that from October to
November 2011, several machines were moved from the premises of Phil Carpet to Pacific Carpet. They asserted that their dismissal
constituted unfair labor practice as it involved the mass dismissal of all union officers and members of the Philippine Carpet Manufacturing
Employees Association (PHILCEA).
In its defense, Phil Carpet countered that it permanently closed and totally ceased its operations because there had been a steady decline in
the demand for its products due to global recession, stiffer competition, and the effects of a changing market. Phil Carpet likewise faithfully
complied with the requisites for closure or cessation of business under the Labor Code. The petitioners were also paid their separation pay
and they voluntarily executed their respective Release and Quitclaim before the DOLE officials.
Issue: WON the petitioners’ termination from the employment constitutes unfair labor practice
Ruling: The court ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners did not amount to unfair labor practice. Unfair labor practice refers to acts that
violate the workers' right to organize. There should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence
relate to the workers' right to self-organization (Article 259 of the Labor Code).
Thus, an employer may only be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his
employees to self-organize. The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty imposed upon them. They did not identify the acts of Phil
Carpet which, they claimed, constituted unfair labor practice. They did not even point out the specific provisions which Phil Carpet violated.
Thus, they would have the Court pronounce that Phil Carpet committed unfair labor practice on the ground that they were dismissed from
employment simply because they were union officers and members. The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice, however,
cannot be understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor.
In this case, as far as the pieces of evidence offered by the petitioners are concerned, there is no showing that the closure of the company was
an attempt at union-busting.
REVISED GUIDELINES OF THE NCMB FOR THE CONDUCT OF VOLUNTARY

ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
Sanyo Philippine Workers Union-PSSLU vs. Canizares
211 SCRA 361 [1992]
Facts: PSSLU had an existing CBA with Sanyo Philippines Inc. effective July 1, 1989 to June 30, 1994. The same CBA contained a union
security clause which provided: xxx members must retain their membership in good standing in the union as condition of his/her continued
employment with the company. The union shall have the right to demand from the company the dismissal of the members of the union by
reason of xxx their having formed, organized, joined, affiliated, supported another labor organization xxx
PSSLU through its national and local presidents, wrote another letter to Sanyo recommending the dismissal of the following non-union
workers: Bernardo Yap, Arnel Salvo, Renato Baybon, Reynaldo Ricohermoso, Salvador Solibel, Benito Valencia, and Allan Misterio,
allegedly because: 1) they were engaged and were still engaging in anti-union activities; 2) they willfully violated the pledge of cooperation
with PSSLU which they signed and executed on February 14, 1990; and 3) they threatened and were still threatening with bodily harm and
even death the officers of the union.
Also recommended for dismissal were the following union members who allegedly joined, supported and sympathized with a minority union,
KAMAO: Gerardo Lasala, Legardo Tangkay, Alexander Atanacio, and Leonardo Dionisio.
As per the attached letter from the local union President SPWU and the federation President, PSSLU, requesting management to put the
respondent employees on preventive suspension, effective immediately, and the company having received no information on whether said
employees appealed to PSSLU, it considered them dismissed as of March 23, 1991.
On May 20, 1991, the dismissed employees filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal. Named respondent were PSSLU and
Sanyo. On June 20, 1991, PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Labor Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the
case, relying on Article 217 (c) of P.D. 442, as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6715 which provides that cases arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreements shall be disposed of by the labor arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.
On August 7, 1991, the respondent Labor Arbiter issued the first questioned order. It held that: xxx xxx xxx While there are seemingly
contradictory provisions in the aforecited article of the Labor Code, the better interpretation will be to give effect to both, and termination
dispute being clearly spelled as falling under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, the same shall be respected. The jurisdiction of the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration shall cover other controversies. However, the resolution of the instant issue shall be suspended
until both parties have fully presented their respective positions.
PSSLU filed another motion to resolve motion to dismiss complaint with a prayer that the Labor Arbiter resolve the issue of jurisdiction. On
September 4, 1991, the respondent Labor Arbiter issued the second questioned order, which held that it was assuming jurisdiction over the
complaint of private respondents, in effect, holding that it had jurisdiction over the case.
PSSLU filed this petition alleging that public respondent Labor Arbiter cannot assume jurisdiction over the complaint of public respondents
because it had no jurisdiction over the dispute subject of said complaint. It is their submission that under Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code,
in relation to Article 261 thereof, as well as Policy Instruction No. 6 of the Secretary of Labor, respondent Arbiter has no jurisdiction and
authority to take cognizance of the complaint brought by private respondents which involves the implementation of the union security clause
of the CBA. The function of the Labor Arbiter under the same law and rule is to refer this case to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration.
In its comment, private respondents argue that Article 217(a) 2 and 4 of the Labor Code is explicit, to wit:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide . .
. the following cases involving all workers, . . . :
xxx xxx xxx
2) Termination disputes,
xxx xxx xxx
4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations.
Issue: Whether or not the resolution between an employee versus the union and the employer need to be referred to the labor arbiter
Ruling:
Only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
It is clear from Article 217 that termination cases fall under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It should be noted however that said article
at the outset excepted from the said provision cases otherwise provided for in other provisions of the same Code, thus the phrase "Except as
otherwise provided under this Code . . . ." Under paragraph (c) of the same article, it is expressly provided that "cases arising from the
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation and enforcement of company
personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as
may be provided in said agreements.
It was provided in the CBA executed between PSSLU and Sanyo that a member's voluntary resignation from membership, willful refusal to
pay union dues and his/her forming, organizing, joining, supporting, affiliating or aiding directly or indirectly another labor union shall be a
cause for it to demand his/her dismissal from the company. The demand for the dismissal and the actual dismissal by the company on any of
these grounds is an enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. This act is authorized by law provided that enforcement should not
be characterized by arbitrariness (Manila Mandarin Employee Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76989, 29 Sept. 1987, 154 SCRA 368) and always
with due process (Tropical Hut Employees Union v. Tropical Food Market, Inc., L-43495-99, Jan. 20, 1990).
The reference to a Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitrators for the adjustment or resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of their CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies is
mandatory. The law grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising
from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement
of company personnel policies (Art. 261, Labor Code).
The failure of the parties to the CBA to establish the grievance machinery and its unavailability is not an excuse for the Labor Arbiter to
assume jurisdiction over disputes arising from the implementation and enforcement of a provision in the CBA. In the existing CBA between
PSSLU and Sanyo, the procedure and mechanics of its establishment had been clearly laid out. All that needs to be done to set the machinery
into motion is to call for the convening thereof. If the parties to the CBA had not designated their representatives yet, they should be ordered
to do so.The procedure introduced in RA 6715 of referring certain grievances originally and exclusively to the grievance machinery and
when not settled at this level, to a panel of voluntary arbitrators outlined in CBA's does not only include grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the CBA but applies as well to those arising from the implementation of company personnel policies. No
other body shall take cognizance of these cases.
The last paragraph of Article 261 enjoins other bodies from assuming jurisdiction thereof:
The commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain
disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators
and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration provided in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
In the instant case, however, we hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction
to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon
the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA, we are of the opinion that THESE FACTS DO
NOT COME WITH IN THE PHRASE "grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of (their) Collective Bargaining
Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the
Grievance Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that "(t)he parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement
shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the
adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies." It is further provided in said article that the parties to a CBA
shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level, it shall
automatically be referred to voluntary arbitrators (or panel of voluntary arbitrators) designated in advance by the parties. It need not be
mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and the company shall be
referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
In the instant case, both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of private respondents.
No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a grievance machinery. The problem or dispute in the present case is between
the union and the company on the one hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed, on the other hand. The dispute
has to be settled before an impartial body. The grievance machinery with members designated by the union and the company cannot be
expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. Due process demands that the dismissed workers grievances be ventilated before
an impartial body.
Since there has already been an actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
Navarro III vs. Damasco

246 SCRA 260 [1995]
Facts: Petitioner Navarro was employed as typist of private respondent at its plant in Bukidnon. Petitioner went to visit Mercy Baylas, a co-
employee, at the ladies' dormitory inside the compound of private respondent. Upon seeing petitioner, Baylas hid behind the divider at the
reception room. Rosemarie Basa and Isabel Beleno, co-boarders of Baylas, told petitioner that Baylas was not at the dormitory and advised
him to stop courting her because she had no feelings towards him.
Afterwards, the two left leaving petitioner alone in the room. When he peeped behind the divider, he saw Baylas, followed her, and after
taking hold of her left hand, pulled her towards him. The force caused her to fall on the floor. He then placed himself on top of her. She
resisted and futilely struggled to free herself from his grasp. The dormitory housekeeper, responded to Baylas' shouts for help, and saw
petitioner embracing and kissing Baylas. She tried to separate petitioner from Baylas but to no avail. So she went outside and asked Basa,
Beleno and Subong to help Baylas. According to the medical report issued by Dr. Letecia P. Maraat, Baylas complained of pains on her
shoulder and left foot.
Petitioner was informed of the complaint against him and was placed under preventive suspension. In the report of Densing who was the one
who investigated the incident, he recommended that the maximum penalty be meted out against petitioner. Petitioner was then dismissed
from the service for having violated paragraph 3.B (Conduct and Behavior) of the Code of Employee Discipline.
A decision was rendered by the Voluntary Arbitrator dismissing petitioner from his employment and holding that private respondent did not
violate the provisions of the grievance procedure under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner filed
the instant petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Voluntary Arbitrator exceeded in his authority in taking cognizance of the labor case?
2. Whether or not petitioner Navarro was denied due process of law because no hearing was held and he was not given an opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses.
3. Whether or not the quarrel between Baylas and him was a purely private affair.
Ruling:
1. No, the Voluntary Arbitrator did not exceed in his authority.
The instant case is not a grievance that must be submitted to the grievance machinery. What are subject of the grievance procedure for
adjustment and resolution are grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreement. The acts
of petitioner involved a violation of the Code of Employee Discipline, particularly the provision penalizing the immoral conduct of
employees. Consequently, there was no justification for petitioner to invoke the grievance machinery provisions of the CBA.
The case of petitioner was submitted to voluntary arbitration by agreement of the president of the labor union to which petitioner belongs,
and his employer, through its personnel officer. Petitioner himself voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator when
he, through his counsel, filed his position paper with the Voluntary Arbitrator and even submitted additional documentary evidence. In
addition thereto, during the initial conference on March 27, 1991, the parties manifested that they were not questioning the authority of the
Voluntary Arbitrator.
It is the policy of the State to promote voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling labor.
2. No, he was not denied of due process.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in
all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing.
Concerning the allegation that petitioner was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses, the record shows that the parties had agreed not to
cross-examine their witnesses anymore.
3. No, the quarrel was not a private affair.

The incident happened within the company premises, i.e. the ladies' dormitory which was located inside the plant site, but both of them are
employees of private respondent. Management would then be at the mercy of its employees if it cannot enforce discipline within company
premises solely because the quarrel is purely personal matter. The harassment of an employee by a co-employee within the company premises
even after office hours is a work-related matter considering that the peace of the company is thereby affected. The Code of Employee
Discipline is very clear that immoral conduct "within the company premises regardless of whether or not [it is] committed during working
time" is punishable.
The pretext of petitioner that he was merely helping Baylas is belied by the eyewitnesses. Petitioner admitted that it took Subong to pull him
away from Baylas. His alleged act of chivalry is nothing more than a chance to gratify his amorous feelings.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the respondent Voluntary Arbitrator is AFFIRMED.
San Miguel Corp., vs. NLRC

255 SCRA 140 [1996]
Facts: Private respondents, employed by petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) as mechanics, machinists, and carpenters, were and still
are, bona fide officers and members of private respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa.
On or about July 31, 1990, private respondents were served a Memorandum from petitioner Angel G. Roa, Vice-President and Manager of
SMC’s Business Logistics Division (BLD), to the effect that they had to be seperated from the service effective October 31, 1990 on the
ground of “redundancy or excesss personnel.” Respondent union, in behalf of private respondents, opposed the intended dismissal and asked
for a dialogue with management.
On February 25, 1991, respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practices, with a prayer for
damages and attorney’s fees, with the Arbitration Branch of respondent National Labor Relations Commission. The complaint[1] was
assigned to Labor Arbiter Eduardo F. Carpio for hearing and proper disposition.
On April 15, 1991, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint, and that respondent Labor Arbiter must defer consideration of the unfair labor practice complaint until after
the parties have gone through the grievance procedure provided for in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Respondent
Labor Arbiter denied this motion.
The petitioners appealed the denial to respondent Commission and were unimpressed by the grounds therefor, thus, dismissed the appeal.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the labor arbiter can exercise jurisdiction over the alleged illegal termination and ULP cases without prior resort to the
grievance and arbitration provided under the CBA.
2. Whether or not the strong state policy on the promotion of voluntary modes of settlement of labor disputes crafted in the Constitution and
the Labor Code dictates the submission of the CBA dispute to grievance and arbitration.
Ruling:
1. LABOR ARBITER has original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes and unfair labor practices and the exceptions not
present in the case at bar.
The CBA between the petitioners and respondent union provides, under Section 1, Article V entitled ARBITRATION, that “wages, hours of
work, conditions of employment and/or employer-employee relations shall be settled by arbitration.” Petitioners’ thesis is that the dispute as
to the termination of the union members and the unfair labor practice should first be settled by arbitration, and not directly by the labor arbiter,
following their CBA, which ought to be treated as the law between the parties thereto.
The argument is unmeritorious. The law in point is Article 217 (a) of the Labor Code. It is elementary that this law is deemed written into
the CBA. In fact, the law speaks in plain and unambiguous terms that termination disputes, together with unfair labor practices, are matters
falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
The sole EXCEPTION to the above rule can be found under Article 262 of the same Code, which provides:
“Aricle 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes - The voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, upon agreement of the
parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.” (As added by R.A.
6715)
Based on the CBA, Section 1, Article V of the CBA does not provide that petitioners and the respondent union conform to the submission of
termination disputes and unfair labor practices to voluntary arbitration. Hence, consistent with the general rule under Article 217 (a) of the
Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter properly has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the respondent union on February 25, 1991 for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice.
Petitioners point however to Section 2, Article III of the CBA, under the heading Job Security, to show that the dispute is a proper subject of
the grievance procedure, viz:
“x x x The UNION, however, shall have the right to seek reconsideration of any discharge, lay-off or disciplinary action, and such
requests for reconsideration shall be considered a dispute or grievance to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure outlined in
Article IV hereof [on Grievance Machinery] x x x[3]” (Emphasis ours)
Petitioners fail miserably to prove that, indeed, the respondent union requested for a reconsideration or review of the management decision
to dismiss the private respondents. The filing of a request.for reconsideration by the respondent union, which is the condition sine qua non to
categorize the termination dispute and the ULP complaint as a grievable dispute, was absent in the case at bench.
The only relevant provision under Article III that may need interpretation or implementation is Section 2 which was cited herein. However,
as patiently pointed out by this court, said provision does not come into play considering that the union never exercised its right to seek
reconsideration of the discharges effected by the company. It would have been different had the union sought reconsideration. Such recourse
under Section 2 would have been treated as a grievance under Article IV (Grievance Machinery) of the CBA, thus calling for the possible
interpretation or implementation of the entire provision on Grievance Machinery as agreed upon by the parties. This was not the case
however. The union brought the termination dispute directly to the Labor Arbiter rendering Articles III and IV of the CBA inapplicable for
the resolution of this case.
Hence, the respondent union acted well within their rights in filing their complaint for illegal dismissal and ULP directly with the Labor
Arbiter under Article 217 (a) of the Labor Code.
A. There is no connection whatsoever between SMC’s management prerogative to effect the discharges and the interpretation or
implementation of Articles III and IV of the CBA.
Second. Petitioners insist that involved in the controversy is the interpretation and implementation of the CBA which is grievable and
arbitrable by law under Article 217(c) of the Labor Code which xxx shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.” (As amended by R.A. 6715).
Petitioners questions whether SMC had the management right or prerogative to effect the discharges on the ground of redundancy, and this
necessarily calls for the interpretation or implementation of Article III (Job Security) in relation to Article IV Grievance Machinery)of the
CBA.
Petitioner’s theory does not hold water. There is no connection whatsoever between SMC’s management prerogative to effect the discharges
and the interpretation or implementation of Articles III and IV of the CBA, except the one stated above if a reconsideration was filed.
B. The questioned discharges due to alleged redundancy can hardly be considered company personnel policies and therefore need not directly
be subject to the grievance machinery nor to voluntary arbitration.
The discharges, petitioners also contend, call for the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies, particularly SMC’s
personnel policies on lay-offs arising from redundacy, and so, they may be considered grievable and arbitrable by virtue of Article 2 17(c).
Not necessarily so. Company personnel policies are guiding principles stated in broad, long-range terms that express the philosophy or
beliefs of an organization’s top authority regarding personnel matters. They deal with matters affecting efficiency and well-being of
employees and include, among others, the procedure in the administration of wages, benefits, promotions, transfer and other personnel
movements which are usually not spelled out in the collective agreement. The usual source of grievances, however, is the rules and
regulations governing disciplinary actions. Judging therefrom, the questioned discharges due to alleged redundancy can hardly be considered
company personnel policies and therefore need not directly be subject to the grievance machinery nor to voluntary arbitration.
C. We find that based on the circumstances surrounding this case, the complaint filed by the private respondents on alleges facts sufficient
to constitute a bona fide case of ULP, and cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. This is consistent with the rule that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
Third. Petitioners would like to persuade us that respondents’ ULP claims are merely conclusory and cannot serve to vest jurisdiction to the
Labor Arbiters. Petitioners maintain that respondents’ complaint does not allege a genuine case for ULP.
The Court is not convinced.
The complaint alleges that:

“5. Individual complainants are bona fide officers and members of complainant Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM).
xxx xxx xxx
23. The dismissal or lock-out from work of the individual complainants clearly constitutes an act of unfair labor practices in the light of
the fact that the work being performed by the individual complainants are being contracted out by the respondent company.
xxx xxx xxx
25. The acts of the respondent company in economically coercing employees to accept payment of separation and/or retirement benefits,
pending final resolution of the labor xxxx there is undue interference, restraint, and coercion of employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization and collective bargaining.”
Short of pre-empting the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the above complaint, makes Out a genuine case for ULP.
In Manila Pencil Co. v. CIR, where business conditions justified a lay-off of employees, unfair labor practices were committed in the form
of discriminatory dismissal where only unionists were permanently dismissed. This was despite the valid excuse given by the Manila Pencil
Company that the dismissal of the employees was due to the reduction of the company’s dollar allocations for importation and that both
union members and non-union members were laid-off.
A similar ruling was made by this Court in People’s Bank and Trust Co. v. People’s Bank and Trust Co. Employees Union involving the lay-
off by a bank of 65 employees who were active union members allegedly by reason of retrenchment. The Court likewise found the employer
in that case to have committed ULP in effecting the discharges.
This Court was more emphatic however in Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. v. NLRC, et al.:
Under the circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the company had indeed been discriminatory in selecting the employees who
were to be retrenched. All of the retrenched employees are officers and members of the NAFLU. As such, the action taken by the firm
becomes highly suspect. It leads us to conclude that the firm had been discriminating against membership in the NAFLU, an act which
amounts to interference in the employees’ exercise of their right of self-organization. Under Art. 249 (now Art. 248) of the Labor Code
of the Philippines, such interference is considered an act of unfair labor practice on the part of the Company x x x. (Emphasis ours)
It matters not that the cause of termination in the above cited cases was retrenchment while that in the instant case was redundancy. The
important fact is that in all of these cases, including the one at bar, all of the dismissed employees were officers and members of their
respective unions, and their employers failed to give a satisfactory explanation as to why this group of employees was singled out.
It may be the case that employees other than union members may have been terminated also by petitioner SMC on account of its redundancy
program. If that is true, the discharges may really be for a bona fide authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code. On the other
hand, it is also possible that such may only be a clever scheme of the petitioner company to camouflage its real intention of discriminating
against union members particularly the private respondents. In any case, these matters will be best ventilated in a hearing before the Labor
Arbiter.
It is for the above reason that we cannot hold the petitioners guilty of the ULP charge. This will be the task of the Labor Arbiter. We however
find that based on the circumstances surrounding this case, the complaint filed by the private respondents on February 25, 1991 alleges facts
sufficient to constitute a bona fide case of ULP, and therefore properly cognizable by the Labor Arbiter under Article 2 17(a) of the Labor
Code. This is consistent with the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
2. Finally, petitioners try to impress on this Court the strong State policy on the promotion of voluntary modes of settlement of labor disputes
crafted in the Constitution and the Labor Code which dictate the submission of the CBA dispute to grievance and arbitration.
In the absence of an express legal conferment thereof, jurisdiction cannot be appropriated by an official or tribunal no matter how well-
intentioned it is, even in the pursuit of the clearest substantial right.
In the same manner, petitioners cannot arrogate into the powers of voluntary arbitrators the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters over unfair labor practices, termination disputes, and claims for damages, in the absence of an express agreement between the parties
in order for Article 262 of the Labor Law to apply in the case at bar.
Pantranco North Express Inc., vs. NLRC

259 SCRA 161 [1996]
Facts: Private respondent Suñiga was hired by petitioner as a bus conductor, and joined the Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO. He
continued in petitioner’s employ until he retired at the age of fifty-two (52) after having rendered twenty five years’ service. The basis of his
retirement was the compulsory retirement provision of the CBA between the petitioner and the union. Private respondent received P49,300.00
as retirement pay. Suñiga filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner with the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch of the respondent
Commission. LA found that the three complainants are illegally and unjustly dismissed and ordered the respondent to reinstate them to their
former or substantially equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages and other benefits.
The amounts already received by complainants shall be considered as advanced payment of their retirement pay which shall be deducted
when they shall actually retire or (be) separated from the service. The order of reinstatement was immediately 133xecutor even pending
appeal. Petitioner appealed to public respondent, which issued the questioned Resolution affirming the labor arbiter’s decision in toto.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction
2. Whether or not the CBA stipulation on compulsory retirement after twenty-five years of service is legal and enforceable.
Ruling:
1. Pantranco contends that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction because the dispute concerns a provision of the CBA and its interpretation. It
claims that the case falls under the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators under Article 261 of the Labor Code. The
Labor Arbiter believed otherwise.
First, this is a complaint of illegal dismissal of which original and exclusive jurisdiction under Article 217 has been conferred to the Labor
Arbiters. The interpretation of the CBA or enforcement of the company policy is only corollary to the complaint of illegal
dismissal. Otherwise, an employee who was on AWOL, or who committed offenses contrary to the personnel polices (sic) can no longer file
a case of illegal dismissal because the discharge is premised on the interpretation or enforcement of the company polices.
Second. Respondent voluntarily submitted the case to the jurisdiction of this labor tribunal. It adduced arguments to the legality of its act,
whether such act may be retirement and/or dismissal, and prayed for reliefs on the merits of the case. A litigant cannot pray for reliefs on the
merits and at the same time attacks (sic) the jurisdiction of the tribunal. A person cannot have one's cake and eat it too. x x x."
The Court agrees with the public respondent's affirmance of the arbiter's decision in respect of the question of jurisdiction.
In Sanyo Philippines Workers Union — PSSLU vs. Cañizares

“x x x Hence, only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
In the instant case, both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of private respondents.
No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a grievance machinery. The problem or dispute in the present case is between
the union and the company on the one hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed, on the other hand. The dispute
has to be settled before an impartial body. The grievance machinery with members designated by the union and the company cannot be
expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. Due process demands that the dismissed workers’ grievances be ventilated before
an impartial body. Since there has already been an actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter."
Applying the same rationale to the case at bar, it cannot be said that the "dispute" is between the union and petitioner company because both
have previously agreed upon the provision on "compulsory retirement" as embodied in the CBA. Also, it was only private respondent on his
own who questioned the compulsory retirement. Thus, the case is properly denominated as a "termination dispute" which comes under the
jurisdiction of labor arbiters.
Therefore, public respondent did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in upholding the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over this case.
2. Yes, the CBA stipulation on compulsory retirement after twenty-five years of service is legal and enforceable.
Article XI, Section 1 (e) (5) of the CBA states:

"Section 1. The COMPANY shall formulate a retirement plan with the following main features:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The COMPANY agrees to grant the retirement benefits herein provided to regular employees who may be separated from the
COMPANY for any of the following reasons:
xxx xxx xxx
A CBA incorporates the agreement reached after negotiations between employer and bargaining agent with respect to terms and
conditions of employment. A CBA is not an ordinary contract. "(A)s a labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital, (it) is not merely contractual in nature but impressed
with public interest, thus it must yield to the common good. As such, it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically,
and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated
and purpose which it is intended to serve.”
Being a product of negotiation, the CBA between the petitioner and the union intended the provision on compulsory retirement to be beneficial
to the employees-union members, including herein private respondent. When private respondent ratified the CBA with the union, he not
only agreed to the CBA but also agreed to conform to and abide by its provisions. Thus, it cannot be said that he was illegally dismissed
when the CBA provision on compulsory retirement was applied to his case.
Incidentally, we call attention to Republic Act No. 7641, known as "The Retirement Pay Law," which went into effect on January 7,
1993. Although passed many years after the compulsory retirement of herein private respondent, nevertheless, the said statute sheds light on
the present discussion when it amended Art. 287 of the Labor Code, to make it read as follows:
"ART. 7. Retirement. — Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age establish in the collective bargaining
agreement or other applicable employment contract.
xxx xxx xxx
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon
reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement
age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment may retire x x x."
The aforequoted provision makes clear the intention and spirit of the law to give employers and employees a free hand to determine and
agree upon the terms and conditions of retirement. Providing in a CBA for compulsory retirement of employees after twenty-five (25) years
of service is legal and enforceable so long as the parties agree to be governed by such CBA. The law presumes that employees know what
they want and what is good for them absent any showing that fraud or intimidation was employed to secure their consent thereto.
On this point then, public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the labor arbiter. The compulsory
retirement of private respondent effected in accordance with the CBA is legal and binding.
Silva et al., vs. NLRC

274 SCRA 159 [1997]
Facts: Petitioners, then rank-and-file employees and members of Philtread Workers Union (PWU), volunteered for, and availed of, the
retrenchment program instituted by Philtread with the understanding that they would have priority in re-employment in the event that the
company recovers from its financial crisis, in accordance with their CBA. Philtread, apparently having recovered from its financial reverses,
expanded its operations and hired new personnel.
Upon discovery of this development, petitioners filed their respective applications for employment with Philtread, which however, merely
agreed to consider them for future vacancies. Subsequent demands for re-employment made by petitioners were ignored. Even the request
of the incumbent union for Philtread to stop hiring new personnel until petitioners were first hired failed to elicit any favorable response.
Thus, petitioners lodged a complaint with the NCR Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for unfair labor practice, damages and attorney’s fees
against Philtread.
LA dismissed the complaint but directing Philtread to give petitioners priority in hiring, as well as those former employees similarly situated
for available positions provided they meet the necessary current qualifications. Petitioners duly appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to
the NLRC. Philtread opted not to interpose an appeal despite the Labor Arbiter’s failure to rule squarely on the question of jurisdiction.
NLRC revered the decision of the LA. It directed Philtread to re-employ petitioners and other employees similarly situated, regardless of
age qualifications and other pre-employment conditions, subject only to existing vacancies and a finding of good physical condition.
Atty. Borreta filed with the NLRCVan ex parte manifestation explaining that he was returning the copy of the resolution rendered on April
15, 1992, which, according to him, was erroneously served on him by the process server of the NLRC. NLRC, acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Atty. Gutierrez, promulgated one of its challenged resolutions dismissing the complaint of petitioners. It ruled that
while petitioners had standing to sue, the complaint should have been filed with the voluntary arbitrator, pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor
Code, since the primary issue was the implementation and interpretation of the CBA.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. NLRC affirmed its earlier resolution, ruling that even before the amendatory law took effect, matters
involving bargaining agreements were already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, as set forth in Article 262 of the
Labor Code. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Did NLRC act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing 2 resolutions, which reconsidered a resolution it rendered on April 15, 1992,
despite that the latter became final and executory when Philtread failed to seasonably file a motion for reconsideration within the ten-day
reglementary period required by Article 223 of the Labor Code?
2. Who has jurisdiction, the voluntary arbitrator or LA and NLRC? Can RA 6715 be applied retroactively?
Ruling:
1. Yes, NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration within the 10-day reglementary period following the receipt by a party of any order,
resolution or decision of the NLRC, is a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such order, resolution or decision. The statutory
bases for this are found in Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. Philtread’s
counsel filed a motion for reconsideration 31 days after receipt of said resolution. It was thus incumbent upon the NLRC to have dismissed
outright Philtread’s late motion for reconsideration. By doing exactly the opposite, its actuation was not only whimsical and capricious but
also a demonstration of its utter disregard for its very own rules. Certiorari, therefore, lies.
2. NLRC, as an administrative and quasi-judicial body, is not bound by the rigid application of technical rules of procedure in the conduct of
its proceedings. However, the filing of a motion for reconsideration and filing it ON TIME are not mere technicalities of procedure. These
are jurisdictional and mandatory requirements, which must be strictly complied with. Although there are exceptions to said rule, the case at
bar presents no peculiar circumstances warranting a departure therefrom.
According to PhilTread, jurisdiction lies instead with the voluntary arbitrator so that when the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC took cognizance
of the case, their decisions thereon were null and void and, therefore, incapable of attaining finality. In short, Philtread maintains that the
ten-day reglementary period could not have started running and, therefore, its motion could not be considered late.
The argument is not tenable. While we agree with the dictum that a void judgment cannot attain finality, said rule, however, is only relevant
if the tribunal or body which takes cognizance of a particular subject matter indeed lacks jurisdiction over the same. In this case, the rule
adverted to is misapplied for it is actually the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which possess jurisdiction over petitioners’ complaint and NOT
the voluntary arbitrator, as erroneously contended by Philtread.
There is confusion in the minds of both Philtread and the NLRC with respect to the proper jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. When the
issue concerns an interpretation or implementation of the CBA, one cannot immediately jump to the conclusion that jurisdiction is with the
voluntary arbitrator. There is an equally important need to inquire further if the disputants involved are the union and the employer; otherwise,
the voluntary arbitrator cannot assume jurisdiction.
In Sanyo Philippines Workers Union - PSSLU v. Canizares, we clarified the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator:
We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the
complaints of the private respondents. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation
of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA, We are of the opinion that these facts do not come within the
phrase ’grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of (their) CBA and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies,’ the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that ‘(t)he parties to a CBA shall include therein
provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and
resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their CBA and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies.’ The parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance
machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitrators (or panel of voluntary
arbitrators) designated in advance by the parties. It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the company. Hence,
only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.”
In the case at bar, since the contending parties in the instant case are not the union and Philtread, then pursuant to the Sanyo doctrine, it is
not the voluntary arbitrator who can take cognizance of the complaint, notwithstanding Philtread’s claim that the real issue is the interpretation
of the CBA provision on re-employment.
If the voluntary arbitrator could not have assumed jurisdiction over the case, did the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC validly acquire jurisdiction
when both of them entertained the complaint?
At the time petitioners filed their complaint for unfair labor practice, damages and attorney’s fees, the governing provision of the Labor Code
with respect to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC was Article 217:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving
all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation
pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees’ compensation, social security, medicare
and maternity benefits;
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
Articles 261 and 262, on the other hand, defined the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, viz.:
ART. 261. Grievance machinery. - Whenever a grievance arises from the interpretation or implementation of a collective
agreement, including disciplinary actions imposed on members of the bargaining unit, the employer and the bargaining representative
shall meet to adjust the grievance. Where there is no collective agreement and in cases where the grievance procedure as provided herein
does not apply, grievances shall be subject to negotiation, conciliation or arbitration as provided elsewhere in this Code.
ART. 262. Voluntary arbitration. - All grievances referred to in the immediately preceding Article which are not settled through the
grievance procedure provided in the collective agreement shall be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in said
agreement: Provided, That termination disputes shall be governed by Article 278 of this Code, as amended, unless the parties agree to
submit them to voluntary arbitration.
Under the above provisions then prevailing, one can understand why petitioners lodged their complaint for ULP with the Labor
Arbiter. To their mind, Philtread’s refusal to re-employ them was tantamount to a violation of the re-employment clause in the 1983
CBA which was also substantially reproduced in the 1986 CBA. At the time, any violation of the CBA was unqualifiedly treated as
ULP of the employer falling within the competence of the Labor Arbiter to hear and decide.
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor
practice:
xxx xxx
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.”
On March 21, 1989, however, Republic Act 6715, or the so-called “Herrera-Veloso Amendments,” took effect, amending several
provisions of the Labor Code, including the respective jurisdictions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the voluntary arbitrator.
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation
or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery
and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
ART. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those,
which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or
malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. x x x
ART. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the
parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
With the amendments introduced by RA 6715, it can be gleaned that the Labor Arbiter still retains jurisdiction over ULP cases. There is,
however, a significant change: The unqualified jurisdiction conferred upon the Labor Arbiter prior to the amendment by RA 6715 has been
narrowed down so that “violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated
as unfair labor practice but as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. It is further stated that “gross violations of Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.”
For a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint
should show prima facie the concurrence of two things, namely:
RA 6715 is in the nature of a curative statute. Thus, it can be applied retroactively to pending cases.
Briad Agro Development Corporation v. Dela Cerna - Republic Act No. 6715 has retroactive application. Thus, when this new law divested
Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims, the divestment affected pending litigations. (Note that under par. 6, where the claim
does not exceed P5,000.00, regional directors have jurisdiction)
Garcia v. Martinez - The lack of jurisdiction was cured by the issuance of the amendatory decree which is in the nature of a curative statute
with retrospective application to a pending proceeding, like Civil Case No. 9657.
With the Briad ruling in place, the implication is that the qualified jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have been
applied when the ULP complaint was still pending. This means that petitioners should have been required to show in their complaint the gross
nature of the CBA violation, as well as the economic provision violated, without which the complaint would be dismissible.
Thus, given the foregoing considerations, may the Briad doctrine be applied to the instant case and cause its dismissal for want of jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC?
NO, it cannot be applied.
We adopt instead the more recent case of Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, where we refused to give retroactive
application to Executive Order No. 797 which created the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Under said law, POEA
was vested with “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising
out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment,” which jurisdiction was originally conferred
upon the Labor Arbiter. As in the instant case, the Labor Arbiter’s assumption of jurisdiction therein was likewise questioned in view of the
subsequent enactment of E.O. 797.
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. On
March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No.
1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with ‘original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment.’ At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over
the same.
E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter’s authority to hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws
should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used. We fail to perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect.
E.O. No. 111, amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to widen the worker’s access to the government for redress of grievances by giving
the Regional Directors and Labor Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money claims. This amendment, however, created a
situation where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters overlapped. As a remedy, R.A. 6715 further amended
Article 217 by delineating their respective jurisdictions. Under R.A. 6715, the Regional Director has exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases involving money claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service, or
househelper under the Code; (2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and (3) the aggregate money claim of
the employee or househelper does not exceed P5,000.00. All other cases within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter. E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 are therefore curative statutes. A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate
legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal
requirements.
The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. x x x.”
Hence, RA 6715 cannot be applied retroactively.
In Briad, the underlying reason for applying RA 6715 retroactively was the fact that prior to its amendment, Article 217 of the Labor Code,
as amended by then E.O. 111, created a scenario where the Labor Arbiters and the Regional Directors of the (DOLE) had overlapping
jurisdiction over money claims. This situation was viewed as a defect in the law so that when RA No. 6715 was passed and delineated the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and Regional Directors, the Court deemed it a rectification of such defect; hence, the conclusion that it was
curative in nature and, therefore, must be applied retroactively.
The same thing cannot be said of the case at bar. Like in Erectors, the instant case presents no defect in the law requiring a remedy insofar
as the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator is concerned. There is here no overlapping of jurisdiction to speak of
because matters involving interpretation and implementation of CBA provisions, as well as interpretation and enforcement of company
personnel policies, have always been determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator even prior to RA 6715. Similarly, all ULP cases were
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. What RA 6715 merely did was to re-apportion the jurisdiction over ULP cases by
conferring exclusive jurisdiction over such ULP cases that do not involve gross violation of a CBA’s economic provision upon the voluntary
arbitrator.
We do not see anything in the act of re-apportioning jurisdiction curative of any defect in the law as it stood prior to the enactment of RA
6715. The Court view it as merely a matter of change in policy of the lawmakers, especially since the 1987 Constitution adheres to the
preferential use of voluntary modes of dispute settlement. This, instead of the inherent defect in the law, must be the rationale that prompted
the amendment.
Hence, we uphold the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter which attached to this case at the time of its filing on December 5, 1988.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Union of Nestle Workers Cagayan De Oro Factory vs. Nestle Phils., Inc.
G.R. No. 148303, October 17, 2002
Facts: On August 1, 1999, Nestle Philippines, Inc. adopted Policy No. HRM 1.8, otherwise known as the "Drug Abuse Policy." Pursuant to
this policy, the management shall conduct simultaneous drug tests on all employees from different factories and plants.
However, there was resistance to the policy in the Nestle Cagayan de Oro factory. Out of 496 employees, only 141 or 28.43% submitted
themselves to drug testing. On August 20, 1999, the Union of Nestle Workers Cagayan de Oro Factory and its officers, petitioners, wrote
Nestle challenging the implementation of the policy and branding it as a mere subterfuge to defeat the employees’ constitutional rights.
Nestle claimed that the policy is in keeping with the government’s thrust to eradicate the proliferation of drug abuse, explaining that the
company has the right: (a) to ensure that its employees are of sound physical and mental health and (b) to terminate the services of an
employee who refuses to undergo the drug test.
On August 23, 1999, petitioners filed with the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, a complaint for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order against Nestle.
On August 24, 1999, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents. Nestle filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it involves a labor dispute or enforcement of a company personnel policy
cognizable by the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Petitioners filed their opposition, contending that the RTC has
jurisdiction since the complaint raises purely constitutional and legal issues.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction since the constitutional issue is closely related or intertwined with the labor issue, so
much so that this Court is inclined to believe that it has no jurisdiction but the NLRC. Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure but was referred to the Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Court rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for petitioners xxx submitted themselves to the drug test required by
management and was confirmed free from illegal drug abuse. In view thereof, the instant petition, which prays for an injunction had become
moot and academic. The remedy of injunction could no longer be entertained because the act sought to be prevented had been consummated.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over petitioners’ suit for injunction
2. Whether or not petitioners’ resort to certiorari under Rule 65 is in order.
Ruling:
1. Considering that the Drug Abuse Policy is a company personnel policy, it is the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators,
not the RTC, which exercises jurisdiction over this case.
On the first issue, we hold that petitioners’ insistence that the RTC has jurisdiction over their complaint since it raises constitutional and legal
issues is sorely misplaced. The fact that the complaint was denominated as one for injunction does not necessarily mean that the RTC has
jurisdiction. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint.
It is indubitable from the allegations in the complaint that petitioners are not per se questioning "whether or not the person will undergo the
drug test" or the constitutionality or legality of the Drug Abuse Policy. They are assailing the manner by which respondents are implementing
the policy. According to them, it is "arbitrary in character" because: (1) the employees were not consulted prior to its implementation; (2) the
policy is punitive inasmuch as an employee who refuses to abide with the policy may be dismissed from the service; and (3) such
implementation is subject to limitations provided by law which were disregarded by the management.
Is the complaint, on the basis of its allegations, cognizable by the RTC?

Respondent Nestle’s Drug Abuse Policy is a guiding principle adopted by Nestle to safeguard its employees’ welfare and ensure their
efficiency and well-being. To our minds, this is a company personnel policy. In San Miguel Corp. vs. NLRC, this Court held: "Company
personnel policies are guiding principles stated in broad, long-range terms that express the philosophy or beliefs of an organization’s top
authority regarding personnel matters. They deal with matter affecting efficiency and well-being of employees and include, among others,
the procedure in the administration of wages, benefits, promotions, transfer and other personnel movements which are usually not spelled
out in the collective agreement."
Considering that the Drug Abuse Policy is a company personnel policy, it is the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, not
the RTC, which exercises jurisdiction over this case. Article 261 of the Labor Code, as amended, pertinently provides:
Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. – The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies x x x."
2. No, what they should have interposed is an appeal to the Court of Appeals, not a petition for certiorari which they initially filed with this
Court, since the assailed RTC order is final. Certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal. For certiorari to prosper, it is not enough that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as alleged by petitioners. The requirement that there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law must likewise be satisfied.
We must stress that the remedy of appeal was then available to petitioners, but they did not resort to it. And while this Court in exceptional
instances allowed a party’s availment of certiorari instead of appeal, we find that no such exception exists here.
Tabigue, et al. vs. International Copra Export Corp.

G.R. No. 183335, December 23, 2009
Facts: Juanito Tabigue and his 19 co-petitioners, employees of International Copra Export Corp-oration (INTERCO), filed a Notice of
Preventive Mediation with the Department of Labor and Employment – National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Regional
Branch No. XI, Davao City against respondent, for violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and failure to sit on the grievance
conference/meeting.
As the parties failed to reach a settlement before the NCMB, petitioners requested to elevate the case to voluntary arbitration. The NCMB
thus set a date for the parties to agree on a Voluntary Arbitrator.
Before the parties could finally meet, respondent presented before the NCMB a letter stating that petitioners “are not duly authorized by [the]
board or the officers to represent the union, [hence] . . . all actions, representations or agreements made by these people with the management
will not be 139 honoured or recognized by the union.” Respondent thus moved to dismiss petitioners’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The parties having failed to arrive at a settlement, NCMB Director Teodorico O. Yosores wrote petitioner Alex Bibat and respondent’s plant
manager Tangente of the lack of willingness of both parties to submit to voluntary arbitration, which willingness is a pre-requisite to submit
the case thereto; and that under the CBA forged by the parties, the union is an indispensable party to a voluntary arbitration but that since
Tan informed respondent that the union had not authorized petitioners to represent it, it would be absurd to bring the case to voluntary
arbitration.
The NCMB Director thus concluded that “the demand of [petitioners] to submit the issues . . . to voluntary arbitration CAN NOT BE
GRANTED.” He thus advised petitioners to avail of the compulsory arbitration process to enforce their rights.
On petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the NCMB Director, by letter of April 11, 2007 to petitioners’ counsel, stated that the NCMB
“has no rule-making power to decide on issues [as it] only facilitates settlement among the parties to . . . labor disputes.”
Via Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals, it dismissed said petition, x x x x Considering that NCMB is not a quasi-judicial agency
exercising quasi-judicial functions but merely a conciliatory body for the purpose of facilitating settlement of disputes between parties, its
decisions or that of its authorized officer cannot be appealed either through a petition for review under Rule 43 or under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the NCMB, when exercising adjudicative powers acts as a quasi-judicial agency.
2. Whether or not final judgments of RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies like the NCMB are appealable by petition for review to the CA.
Ruling: The petition fails.

Section 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that:
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees,
the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (underscoring and emphasis supplied)
Petitioners claim that they had completed the payment of the appellate docket fee and other legal fees when they filed their motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. While the Court has, in the interest of justice, given due course to appeals despite the belated
payment of those fees, petitioners have not proffered any reason to call for a relaxation of the above-quoted rule. On this score alone, the
dismissal by the appellate court of petitioners’ petition is in order.
But even if the above-quoted rule were relaxed, the appellate court’s dismissal would just the same be sustained. Under Section 9 (3) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,the Court of Appeals exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court under applies to awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
A[n agency] is said to be exercising judicial function where [it] has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term
which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature.
Given NCMB’s following functions, as enumerated in Section 22 of Executive Order No. 126 (the Reorganization Act of the Ministry of
Labor and Employment), viz:
(a) Formulate policies, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation and guidelines pertaining to effective mediation and
conciliation of labor disputes;
(b) Perform preventive mediation and conciliation functions;
(c) Coordinate and maintain linkages with other sectors or institutions, and other government authorities concerned with matters relative
to the prevention and settlement of labor disputes;
(d) Formulate policies, plans, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation and guidelines pertaining to the promotion of
cooperative and non-adversarial schemes, grievance handling, voluntary arbitration and other voluntary modes of dispute settlement;
(e) Administer the voluntary arbitration program; maintain/update a list of voluntary arbitrations; compile arbitration awards and
decisions;
(f) Provide counseling and preventive mediation assistance particularly in the administration of collective agreements;
(g) Monitor and exercise technical supervision over the Board programs being implemented in the regional offices; and
(h) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the Minister;
It cannot be considered a quasi-judicial agency.
Petitioners have not, been duly authorized to represent the union. Apropos is this Court’s pronouncement in Atlas Farms, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, viz: x x x Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their
respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the
voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA. Consequently only disputes involving the union and the company shall be
referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
Clutching at straws, petitioners invoke the first paragraph of Article 255 of the Labor Code which states: Art. 255. The labor organization
designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of
the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
To petitioners, the immediately quoted provision “is meant to be an exception to the exclusiveness of the representative role of the labor
organization/union.”
St. Louis University vs. Cobarrubias

GR No. 187104, Aug. 3, 2010
Facts: Evangeline C. Cobarrubias is an associate professor of ST. Louis University, College of Human Sciences. She is an active member of
the Union of Faculty and Employees of Saint Louis University (UFESLU).
The 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) between SLU and UFESLU contain the following common
provision on forced leave:
Section 7.7. For teaching employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) Teaching employees who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years shall be on forced leave for one (1) regular
semester during which period all benefits due them shall be suspended.
SLU placed Cobarrubias on forced leave for the first semester of School Year (SY) 2007-2008 when she failed the evaluation for SY 2002-
2003, SY 2005-2006, and SY 2006-2007, with the rating of 85, 77, and 72.9 points, respectively, below the required rating of 87 points.
To reverse the imposed forced leave, Cobarrubias sought recourse from the CBA’s grievance machinery. Despite the conferences held, the
parties still failed to settle their dispute, prompting Cobarrubias to file a case for illegal forced leave or illegal suspension with the NCMB.
When circulation and mediation again failed, the parties submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary
Arbitrator (VA) Daniel T. Fariñas.
The voluntary arbitrator dismissed the case. He noted that the CBA clearly authorized SLU to place its teaching employees on forced leave
when they fail in the evaluation for three (3) years within a five-year period, without a distinction on whether the three years fall within one
or two CBA periods.
Cobarrubias filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, but failed to pay the required filing fees and to attach
to the petition copies of the material portions of the record.
SLU insisted that the VA decision had already attained finality for Cobarrubias’ failure to pay the docket fees on time.
The CA brushed aside SLU’s insistence on the finality of the VA decision and annulled it, declaring that the "three (3) cumulative years in
five (5) years" phrase in Section 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA means within the five-year effectivity of the CBA. Thus, the CA ordered SLU
to pay all the benefits due Cobarrubias for the first semester of SY 2007-2008, when she was placed on forced leave.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition despite her failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period,
and in reversing the VA decision
Ruling: Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set
by law.25 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for
review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of judgment.26 Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall
pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground
for the petition’s dismissal. Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
It is an essential requirement, without which, the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed.
As early as the 1932 case of Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres we stressed that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In Lee v. Republic, we decided that even though half of the appellate court docket fee was
deposited, no appeal was deemed perfected where the other half was tendered after the period within which payment should have been made.
In Aranas v. Endona, we reiterated that the appeal is not perfected if only a part of the docket fee is deposited within the reglementary period
and the remainder is tendered after the expiration of the period.
In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on December 5, 2007, fifteen (15) days from receipt of the VA decision on
November 20, 2007, but paid her docket fees in full only after seventy-two (72) days, when she filed her motion for reconsideration on
February 15, 2008 and attached the postal money orders for P4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late, and without payment of
the full docket fees, Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period.
Exceptions to the Rule on Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees not applicable
Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to and enhance the
efficiency of our judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's
substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed. However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such
as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence
of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10)
peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of
the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant circumstances.52 Thus, there should be
an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with
the rules.
In Cobarrubias' case, no such explanation has been advanced. Other than insisting that the ends of justice and fair play are better served if the
case is decided on its merits, Cobarrubias offered no excuse for her failure to pay the docket fees in full when she filed her petition for review.
To us, Cobarrubias’ omission is fatal to her cause.
We, thus, find that the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition for review despite the nonpayment of the requisite docket fees within
the reglementary period. The VA decision had lapsed to finality when the docket fees were paid; hence, the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain
the appeal except to order its dismissal.
Teng vs. Pahagac, et al.

G.R. No. 169704, November 17, 2010
Facts: Albert Teng Fish Trading is engaged in deep sea fishing and, for this purpose, owns boats (basnig), equipment, and other fishing
paraphernalia. As owner of the business, Teng claims that he customarily enters into joint venture agreements with master fishermen
(maestros) who are skilled and are experts in deep-sea fishing; they take charge of the management of each fishing venture, including the
hiring of the members of its complement. He avers that the maestros hired the respondent workers as checkers to determine the volume of
the fish caught in every fishing voyage.
On February 20, 2003, the respondent workers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Albert Teng Fish Trading, Teng, and Chua
before the NCMB, Region Branch No. IX, Zamboanga City.
The VA rendered a decision in Teng’s favor and declared that no employer-employee relationship existed between Teng and the respondent
workers. The respondent workers received the VA’s decision on June 12, 2003. They filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied
in an order dated June 27, 2003 and which they received on July 8, 2003. The VA reasoned out that Section 6, Rule VII of the 1989 Procedural
Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings (1989 Procedural Guidelines) does not provide the remedy of a motion for
reconsideration to the party adversely affected by the VA’s order or decision.
Respondent-workers elevated the case to the CA, which reversed the decision of the VA. Teng moved to reconsider the CA’s decision, but
the CA denied the motion in its resolution of September 1, 2005. He, thereafter, filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, claiming that:
a. the VA’s decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration; and
b. no employer-employee relationship existed between Teng and the respondent workers.
Teng contends that the VA’s decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration in the absence of any specific provision allowing this
recourse under Article 262-A of the Labor Code. He cites the 1989 Procedural Guidelines, which, as the VA declared, does not provide the
remedy of a motion for reconsideration. He claims that after the lapse of 10 days from its receipt, the VA’s decision becomes final and
executory unless an appeal is taken. He argues that when the respondent workers received the VA’s decision on June 12, 2003, they had 10
days, or until June 22, 2003, to file an appeal. As the respondent workers opted instead to move for reconsideration, the 10-day period to
appeal continued to run; thus, the VA’s decision had already become final and executory by the time they assailed it before the CA on July
21, 2003.
Issue: Whether or not the VA’s decision is subject to a motion for reconsideration
Ruling:
Article 262-A of the Labor Code does not prohibit the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
These rulings fully establish that the absence of a categorical language in Article 262-A does not preclude the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the VA’s decision within the 10-day period. Teng’s allegation that the VA’s decision had become final and executory by
the time the respondent workers filed an appeal with the CA thus fails. We consequently rule that the respondent workers seasonably filed a
motion for reconsideration of the VA’s judgment, and the VA erred in denying the motion because no motion for reconsideration is allowed.
By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the
party adversely affected by the VA’s decision to seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. For this reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires
exhaustion of available remedies as a condition precedent to a petition under that Rule.
The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is based on the doctrine that in providing for a remedy before an administrative
agency, every opportunity must be given to the agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all opportunities for a resolution under the given
remedy before bringing an action in, or resorting to, the courts of justice. Where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial
discretion governs,[38] guided by congressional intent.
By disallowing reconsideration of the VA’s decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines
went directly against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A of the Labor Code. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct himself
and compel the courts of justice to prematurely intervene with the action of an administrative agency entrusted with the adjudication of
controversies coming under its special knowledge, training and specific field of expertise. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for
specialized administrative agencies with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review, is indispensable.
In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy
will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
Caong, Jr. vs. Begualos

GR No. 179428, Jan. 26, 2011
Facts: Petitioners Primo E. Caong, Jr. (Caong), Alexander J. Tresquio (Tresquio), and Loriano D. Daluyon (Daluyon) were employed by
respondent Avelino Regualos under a boundary agreement, as drivers of his jeepneys. In November 2001, they filed separate complaints for
illegal dismissal against respondent who barred them from driving the vehicles due to deficiencies in their boundary payments.
Labor Arbiter decided in favor of respondent. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which agreed with the decision of the LA and dismissed the
appeal. The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. They filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioners thus elevated the case to the Supreme Court arguing that they were illegally dismissed and were not afforded due process of law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed
2. Whether or not the policy of suspending drivers pending payment of arrears in their boundary obligations is reasonable.
Ruling:
1. We have no reason to deviate from such findings. Indeed, petitioners’ suspension cannot be categorized as dismissal, considering that there
was no intent on the part of respondent to sever the employer-employee relationship between him and petitioners. In fact, it was made clear
that petitioners could put an end to the suspension if they only pay their recent arrears. As it was, the suspension dragged on for years because
of petitioners’ stubborn refusal to pay. It would have been different if petitioners complied with the condition and respondent still refused to
readmit them to work. Then there would have been a clear act of dismissal. But such was not the case. Instead of paying, petitioners even
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent.
2. Respondent’s policy of suspending drivers who fail to remit the full amount of the boundary was fair and reasonable under the
circumstances. Respondent explained that he noticed that his drivers were getting lax in remitting their boundary payments and, in fact, herein
petitioners had already incurred a considerable amount of arrears. He had to put a stop to it as he also relied on these boundary payments to
raise the full amount of his monthly amortizations on the jeepneys. Demonstrating their obstinacy, petitioners, on the days immediately
following the implementation of the policy, incurred deficiencies in their boundary remittances.
It is acknowledged that an employer has free rein and enjoys a wide latitude of discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including
the prerogative to instill discipline on his employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal, if warranted, upon erring employees. This
is a management prerogative. Indeed, the manner in which management conducts its own affairs to achieve its purpose is within the
management’s discretion. The only limitation on the exercise of management prerogative is that the policies, rules, and regulations on work-
related activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable, and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, commensurate to
the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction.
A company policy must be implemented in such manner as will accord social justice and compassion to the employee. In case of
noncompliance with the company policy, the employer must consider the surrounding circumstances and the reasons why the employee failed
to comply. When the circumstances merit the relaxation of the application of the policy, then its noncompliance must be excused.
Estate of Dulay vs. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc. et al.

G.R. No. 172642, June 13, 2012
Facts: Nelson R. Dulay (Nelson, for brevity) was employed by [herein respondent] General Charterers, Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of co-
petitioner [herein co-respondent] Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc. since 1986. He initially worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on
a contractual basis. From September 3, 1999 up to July 19, 2000, Nelson was detailed in petitioners' vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle.
On August 13, 2000, or 25 days after the completion of his employment contract, Nelson died due to acute renal failure secondary to
septicemia. At the time of his death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seaman's Union of the Philippines
(AMOSUP), GCI's collective bargaining agent. Nelson's widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance
procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between AMOSUP and GCI. However, on January 29, 2001, the grievance
procedure was "declared deadlocked" as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the widow.
On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in General Santos City against GCI for
death and medical benefits and damages.
On March 8, 2001, Joven Mar, Nelson's brother, received P20,000.00 from [respondents] pursuant to article 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed
a "Certification" acknowledging receipt of the amount and releasing AMOSUP from further liability. Merridy Jane contended that she is
entitled to the aggregate sum of Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00) pursuant to [A]rticle 20 (A)1 of the CBA. Merridy Jane averred that
the P20,000.00 already received by Joven Mar should be considered advance payment of the total claim of US$90,000.[00].
Respondents, on the other hand, asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the action on account of the absence of employer-employee
relationship between GCI and Nelson at the time of the latter's death. Nelson also had no claims against petitioners for sick leave
allowance/medical benefit by reason of the completion of his contract with GCI. They further alleged that private respondent is not entitled
to death benefits because petitioners are only liable for such "in case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract pursuant to the
POEA contract" and the cause of his death is not work-related. Petitioners admitted liability only with respect to article 20(A)2 [of the CBA].
However, as petitioners stressed, the same was already discharged.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondent. It took cognizance of the case by virtue of Article 217 (a), paragraph 6 of the Labor
Code and the existence of a reasonable causal connection between the employer-employee relationship and the claim asserted. It ordered the
petitioner to pay P4,621,300.00, the equivalent of US$90,000.00 less P20,000.00, at the time of judgment. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that
the proximate cause of Nelson's death was not work-related.
On appeal, [the NLRC] affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision as to the grant of death benefits under the CBA but reversed the latter's ruling
as to the proximate cause of Nelson's death.
Issue: Whether or not the CA committed error in ruling that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: Petitioner contends that Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, vests jurisdiction on the appropriate branches of the NLRC to entertain disputes regarding the interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement involving migrant or overseas Filipino workers. Petitioner argues that the abovementioned Section amended Article
217 (c) of the Labor Code which, in turn, confers jurisdiction upon voluntary arbitrators over interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
The pertinent provisions of Section 10 of R.A. 8042 provide as follows:

SEC. 10.Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code, on the other hand, states that:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation
or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery
and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
On their part, respondents insist that in the present case, Article 217, paragraph (c) as well as Article 261 of the Labor Code remain to be the
governing provisions of law with respect to unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation and implementation of collective bargaining
agreements. Under these provisions of law, jurisdiction remains with voluntary arbitrators.
Article 261 of the Labor Code reads, thus:

ARTICLE 261.Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. — The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which
are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes,
grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall
immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
The petition is without merit.
It is true that R.A. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino workers. However, a careful reading of this special law would readily
show that there is no specific provision thereunder which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved grievances regarding the
interpretation or implementation of a CBA. Section 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner, simply speaks, in general, of "claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages." On the other hand, Articles 217 (c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very
specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements. Stated differently, the instant case involves a situation where the special statute (R.A. 8042) refers to a subject in
general, which the general statute (Labor Code) treats in particular. 5 In the present case, the basic issue raised by Merridy Jane in her
complaint filed with the NLRC is: which provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as death benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are
concerned. The Court agrees with the CA in holding that this issue clearly involves the interpretation or implementation of the said CBA.
Thus, the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern.
In any case, the Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the CBA is the law or contract between the parties. Article 13.1 of the CBA
entered into by and between respondent GCI and AMOSUP, the union to which petitioner belongs, provides as follows:
The Company and the Union agree that in case of dispute or conflict in the interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this
Agreement, or enforcement of Company policies, the same shall be settled through negotiation, conciliation or voluntary arbitration.
The Company and the Union further agree that they will use their best endeavor to ensure that any dispute will be discussed, resolved
and settled amicably by the parties hereof within ninety (90) days from the date of filing of the dispute or conflict and in case of failure
to settle thereof any of the parties retain their freedom to take appropriate action.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties, in the first place, really intended to bring to conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute
or conflict in the interpretation or application of the provisions of their CBA. It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a
procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed.
It may not be amiss to point out that the abovequoted provisions of the CBA are in consonance with Rule VII, Section 7 of the present
Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by Republic Act No.
10022, which states that "[f]or OFWs with collective bargaining agreements, the case shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in
accordance with Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code." The Court notes that the said Omnibus Rules and Regulations were promulgated
by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and that these departments were
mandated to consult with the Senate Committee on Labor and Employment and the House of Representatives Committee on Overseas
Workers Affairs.
In the same manner, Section 29 of the prevailing Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board
Ocean Going Vessels, promulgated by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), provides as follows:
Section 29.Dispute Settlement Procedures. — In cases of claims and disputes arising from this employment, the parties covered by a
collective bargaining agreement shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators. If the parties are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the parties may at their option submit the claim
or dispute to either the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), pursuant to Republic
Act (RA) 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or to the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If there is no provision as to the voluntary arbitrators to be appointed by the parties,
the same shall be appointed from the accredited voluntary arbitrators of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department
of Labor and Employment.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
disciplinary action on cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations of recruitment laws, rules and
regulations involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino seafarers. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the above that the interpretation of the DOLE, in consultation with their counterparts in the respective committees of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes involving claims of Filipino
seafarers wherein the parties are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the dispute or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction
of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. It is only in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement that parties may opt to submit
the dispute to either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration. It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. 8 Such rules and regulations
partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. 9 In the instant case, the Court finds
no cogent reason to depart from this rule.
The above interpretation of the DOLE, DFA and POEA is also in consonance with the policy of the state to promote voluntary arbitration as
a mode of settling labor disputes.
No less than the Philippine Constitution provides, under the third paragraph, Section 3, Article XIII, thereof that "[t]he State shall promote
the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace." Consistent with this constitutional
provision, Article 211 of the Labor Code provides the declared policy of the State "[t]o promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective
bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes."
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the instant
case.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. The Lepanto Capataz Union

G.R. No. 157086, February 18, 2013
Facts: As a domestic corporation authorized to engage in large-scale mining, Lepanto operated several mining claims in Mankayan, Benguet.
On May 27, 1998, respondent Lepanto Capataz Union (Union), a labor organization duly registered with DOLE, filed a petition for consent
election with the Industrial Relations Division of the Cordillera Regional Office (CAR) of DOLE, thereby proposing to represent 139
capatazes of Lepanto.
In due course, Lepanto opposed the petition, contending that the Union was in reality seeking a certification election, not a consent election,
and would be thereby competing with the Lepanto Employees Union (LEU), the current collective bargaining agent. Lepanto pointed out
that the capatazes were already members of LEU, the exclusive representative of all rank-and-file employees of its Mine Division.
On May 2, 2000, Med-Arbiter Michaela A. Lontoc of DOLE-CAR issued a ruling to the effect that the capatazes could form a separate
bargaining unit due to their not being rank-and-file employees.
On the day of the certification election, however, Lepanto presented an opposition/protest. Hence, on February 8, 2001, a hearing was held
on Lepanto's opposition/protest. Although the parties were required in that hearing to submit their respective position papers, Lepanto later
opted not to submit its position paper, and contended that the issues identified during the hearing did not pose any legal issue to be addressed
in a position paper.
On April 26, 2001, Med-Arbiter Florence Marie A. Gacad-Ulep of DOLE-CAR rendered a decision certifying the Union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all capatazes of Lepanto. On May 18, 2001, Lepanto appealed the decision of Med-Arbiter Gacad-Ulep to the
DOLE Secretary.
By her Resolution dated September 17, 2002, 15 DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas affirmed the decision dated April 26, 2001, holding
and disposing thus:
Appellant accused Med-Arbiter Ulep of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction based on her failure to resolve appellant's
motion to modify order to submit position papers and on rendering judgment on the basis only of appellee's position paper.
We deny.
Section 5, Rule XXV of Department Order No. 9, otherwise known as the New Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code, states that
"in all proceedings at all levels, incidental motions shall not be given due course, but shall remain as part of the records for whatever they
may be worth when the case is decided on the merits".
Further, the motion to modify order to submit position papers filed by appellant is without merit. Appellant claimed that the issues over which
Med-Arbiter Ulep directed the submission of position papers were: (1) failure to challenge properly; (2) failure (especially of LEU) to
participate actively in the proceedings before the decision calling for the conduct of certification election; and (3) validity of earlier arguments.
According to appellant, the first issue was for appellee LCU to reply to in its position paper, the second issue was for the LEU and the third
issue for appellant company to explain in their respective position paper. It was the position of appellant company that unless the parties filed
their position paper on each of their respective issues, the other parties cannot discuss the issues they did not raise in the same position papers
and have to await receipt of the others' position paper for their appropriate reply.
Section 9, Rule XI of Department Order No. 9, which is applied with equal force in the disposition of protests on the conduct of election,
states that "the Med-Arbiter shall in the same hearing direct all concerned parties, including the employer, to simultaneously submit their
respective position papers within a non-extendible period of ten days". The issues as recorded in the minutes of 28 February 2001 hearing
before the Med-Arbiter are clear. The parties, including appellant company were required to submit their respective positions on whether
there was proper challenge of the voters, whether LEU failed to participate in the proceedings, if so, whether it should be allowed to participate
at this belated stage and whether the arguments raised during the pre-election conferences and in the protests are valid. The parties, including
appellant company were apprised of these issues and they agreed thereto. The minutes of the hearing even contained the statement that "no
order will issue" and that "the parties are informed accordingly". If there is any matter that had to be clarified, appellant should have clarified
the same during the said hearing and refused to file its position paper simultaneously with LCU and LEU. It appears that appellant did not
do so and acquiesced to the filing of its position paper within fifteen days from the date of said hearing.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF LABOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, [O]R WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE DECISION DATED
SEPTEMBER 17, 2002, WHEN SHE DELIBERATELY IGNORED THE FACTS AND RULED IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT
UNION, DESPITE HER OWN FINDING THAT THERE HAD BEEN A PREMATURE CANVASS OF VOTES.
Ruling: The filing of the motion for reconsideration is a pre-requisite to the filing of a petition for certiorari to assail the decision of the
DOLE Secretary.
We hold to be untenable and not well taken Lepanto's submissions that: (1) a motion for reconsideration was not an available remedy from
the decision of the DOLE Secretary because of Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as
amended; and (2) the ruling in National Federation of Labor v. Laguesma 21 (recognizing the remedy of certiorari against the decision of the
DOLE Secretary to be filed initially in the CA) actually affirms its position that an immediate recourse to the CA on certiorari is proper even
without the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration.
To start with, the requirement of the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration as a precondition to the filing of a petition for certiorari
accords with the principle of exhausting administrative remedies as a means to afford every opportunity to the respondent agency to resolve
the matter and correct itself if need be.
And, secondly, the ruling in National Federation of Labor v. Laguesma reiterates St. Martin's Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations
Commission, where the Court has pronounced that the special civil action of certiorari is the appropriate remedy from the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in view of the lack of any appellate remedy provided by the Labor Code to a party aggrieved
by the decision of the NLRC. Accordingly, any decision, resolution or ruling of the DOLE Secretary from which the Labor Code affords no
remedy to the aggrieved party may be reviewed through a petition for certiorari initiated only in the CA in deference to the principle of the
hierarchy of courts.
Agreeing with Med-Arbiter Lontoc's findings, then DOLE Undersecretary Baldoz, acting by authority of the DOLE Secretary, observed in
the resolution dated July 12, 2000, thus:
The bargaining unit sought to be represented by the appellee are the capataz employees of the appellant. There is no other labor
organization of capatazes within the employer unit except herein appellant. Thus, appellant is an unorganized establishment in so far as
the bargaining unit of capatazes is concerned. In accordance with the last paragraph of Section 11, Rule XI, Department Order No. 9
which provides that "in a petition filed by a legitimate labor organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall,
pursuant to Article 257 of the Code, automatically order the conduct of certification election after determining that the petition has
complied with all requirements under Sections 1, 2 and 4 of the same rules and that none of the grounds for dismissal thereof exists",
the order for the conduct of a certification election is proper.
We cannot undo the affirmance by the DOLE Secretary of the correct findings of her subordinates in the DOLE, an office that was undeniably
possessed of the requisite expertise on the matter in issue. In dealing with the matter, her subordinates in the DOLE fairly and objectively
resolved whether the Union could lawfully seek to be the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit of capatazes in the company. Their
factual findings, being supported by substantial evidence, are hereby accorded great respect and finality. Such findings cannot be made the
subject of our judicial review by petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, because:
The office of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that it shall raise only questions of law. The
factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Employment, when supported by substantial evidence, are
entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their respective field. Judicial review of labor cases does not go far as to evaluate the
sufficiency of evidence on which the labor official's findings rest. It is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence,
testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to an appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court (here, the DOLE
Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter coincide, as in this case at bar. The Rule limits that function of the Court to review or revision
of errors of law and not to a second analysis of the evidence. Here, petitioners would have us re-calibrate all over again the factual basis and
the probative value of the pieces of evidence submitted by the Company to the DOLE, contrary to the provisions of Rule 45. Thus, absent
any showing of whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the appellate court
may be amply demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.
In any event, we affirm that capatazes or foremen are not rank-and-file employees because they are an extension of the management, and as
such they may influence the rank-and-file workers under them to engage in slowdowns or similar activities detrimental to the policies,
interests or business objectives of the employers.
7K Corp. vs. Albarico

G.R. No. 182295, June 26, 2013
Facts: Respondent Eddie Albarico (Albarico) was a regular employee (salesman) of petitioner 7K Corporation, a company selling water
purifiers. Because of his good performance, his employment was regularized and also promoted several times: from salesman, he was
promoted to senior sales representative and then to acting team field supervisor.
In 1992, he was awarded the President’s Trophy for being one of the company’s top water purifier specialist distributors.
In April of 1993, the chief operating officer of petitioner 7K Corporation terminated Albarico’s employment allegedly for his poor sales
performance. He subsequently submitted his money claims against petitioner for arbitration before the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB).
While the NCMB arbitration case was pending, respondent Albarico filed a Complaint against petitioner corporation with the Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal with money claims for overtime pay, holiday
compensation, commission, and food and travelling allowances.
The Complaint was decided by the labor arbiter in favor of respondent Albarico, who was awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
backwages and attorney’s fees.On appeal by petitioner, the labor arbiter’s Decision was vacated by the NLRC for forum shopping on the part
of respondent Albarico, because the NCMB arbitration case was still pending.
On 12 January 2005, almost 12 years after the filing of the NCMB case, both parties appeared in a hearing before the NCMB. Respondent
manifested that he was willing to settle the case amicably with petitioner based on the decision of the labor arbiter ordering the payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, backwages and attorney’s fees.
On 18 November 2005, the NCMB voluntary arbitrator rendered a Decision finding petitioner corporation liable for illegal dismissal. The
termination of respondent Albarico, by reason of alleged poor performance, was found invalid.
The arbitrator explained that the promotions, increases in salary, and awards received by respondent belied the claim that the latter was
performing poorly. Mere absence was not sufficient, according to the arbitrator, but must have been accompanied by overt acts pointing to
the fact that the employee did not want to work anymore. It was noted that, in the present case, the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal against the employer, with a prayer for reinstatement, showed that the employee was not abandoning his work. The voluntary
arbitrator also found that Albarico was dismissed from his work without due process. However, it was found that reinstatement was no longer
possible because of the strained relationship of the parties.
Thus, in lieu of reinstatement, the voluntary arbitrator ordered the corporation to pay separation pay for two years at P4,456 for each year, or
a total amount of P8,912.
Issue: Whether the CA committed reversible error in finding that the voluntary arbitrator properly assumed jurisdiction to decide the issue
of the legality of the dismissal of respondent as well as the latter's entitlement to backwages, even if neither the legality nor the entitlement
was expressedly claimed in the Submission Agreement of the parties.
Ruling: The Petition is denied for being devoid of merit

Voluntary arbitrators may, by agreement of the parties, assume jurisdiction over a termination dispute such as the present case contrary to
the assertion of petitioner that they may not.
We rule that although petitioner correctly contends that separation pay may in fact be awarded for reasons other than illegal dismissal, the
circumstances of the instant case lead to no other conclusion than that the claim of respondent Albarico for separation pay was premised on
his allegation of illegal dismissal. Thus, the voluntary arbitrator properly assumed jurisdiction over the issue of the legality of his dismissal.
True, under the Labor Code, separation pay may be given not only when there is illegal dismissal. In fact, it is also given to employees who
are terminated for authorized causes, such as redundancy, retrenchment or installation of labor-saving devices under Article 283of the Labor
Code. Additionally, jurisprudence holds that separation pay may also be awarded for considerations of social justice, even if an employee
has been terminated for a just cause other than serious misconduct or an act reflecting on moral character. The Court has also ruled that
separation pay may be awarded if it has become an established practice of the company to pay the said benefit to voluntarily resigning
employees or to those validly dismissed for non-membership in a union as required in a closed-shop agreement.
Having established that the issue of the legality of dismissal of Albarico was in fact necessarily – albeit not explicitly – included in the
Submission Agreement signed by the parties, this Court rules that the voluntary arbitrator rightly assumed jurisdiction to decide the said
issue.
Consequently, we also rule that the voluntary arbitrator may award backwages upon a finding of illegal dismissal, even though the issue of
entitlement thereto is not explicitly claimed in the Submission Agreement. Backwages, in general, are awarded on the ground of equity as a
form of relief that restores the income lost by the terminated employee by reason of his illegal dismissal.
Baronda vs. CA
GR No. 161006, October 14, 2015
Doctrine: The reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator's award or decision is immediately executory from its receipt by the parties.
Facts: The employer in this case is Hideco Sugar Milling Co. (HIDECO – the respondent). The employee here is Mr. Rogelio Baronda (the
petitioner) who worked as mud press truck driver with a daily salary of PhP 281. One day, he hit HIDECO’s transmission lines while operating
a dump truck, which caused a 5-hour factory blackout in the next day. HIDECO incurred 26,481.11 to restore the power. Subsequently,
HIDECO served a notice of offense on which Baronda complied. After the investigation conducted by the management, Baronda was fired.
Baronda, together with another employee who was also dismissed, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Office of Voluntary
Arbitrator of the NCMB. The decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator is in favor of the employees who were found to be illegally dismissed.
The decision ordered for reinstatement. HIDECO filed for motion for reconsideration on which the voluntary arbitrator denied. Thereafter,
HIDECO heed with the order.
Baronda filed for a writ of execution. He insisted that he is entitled of backwages in the amount of Php 192,268.66. HIDECO’s computations
yield an amount of just 26,484.41. This time, the VA rendered a decision in favor of HIDECO. After that, Bardoda filed another motion for
execution praying that a writ of execution requiring HIDECO to pay to him unpaid wages, 13th month pay and bonuses from January 16,
2001, the date when his reinstatement was effected, until his actual reinstatement. HIDECO opposed the petitioner's second motion for
execution because "the items prayed for by the complainant in his Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution are not included in the dispository
portion of the decision of the voluntary arbitrator, neither are the said items mentioned in any part of the same decision." Now, it is Baronda
who got a favorable decision.
HIDECO went to CA by filing a petition for certiorari. The CA ruled that the writ of execution was proper only when the decision to be
executed carried an award in favor of the movant; that the Voluntary Arbitrator had issued the writ of execution for backwages despite his
decision lacking such award for backwages; and that the reliance by the Voluntary Arbitrator on Article 223 of the Labor Code was misplaced
because said provision referred to decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter, not the Voluntary Arbitrator. Hence, the order was
annulled. Baronda went to the SC.
Issue: Is the order of reinstatement of the petitioner by the Voluntary Arbitrator immediately executory?
Ruling: Voluntary Arbitrator's order of reinstatementof the petitioner was immediately executory.
Although the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration or of an appeal forestalls the finality of the decision or award of the Voluntary
Arbitrator, the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or award remains executory regardless of the filing of such motion
for reconsideration or appeal.
The immediate reinstatement of the employee pending the appeal has been introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which
amended Article 223 of the Labor Code, to wit:
SEC. 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as follows:
Art. 223. Appeal. —
xxx xxx xxx
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.
The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
The normal consequences of a finding that an employee was illegally dismissed are, firstly, that the employee becomes entitled to
reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights; and, secondly, the payment of wages corresponding to the period from
his illegal dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement. These two consequences give meaning and substance to the constitutional right of
labor to security of tenure. Reinstatement pending appeal thus affirms the constitutional mandate to protect labor and to enhance social
justice, for, as the Court has said in Aris (Phil.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission:
In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987
Constitution on labor and the working-man.
xxx xxx xxx
These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and
meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal
intensity. Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation's progress and stability.
If in ordinary civil actions execution of judgment pending appeal is authorized for reasons the determination of which is merely left to
the discretion of the judge, We find no plausible reason to withhold it in cases of decisions reinstating dismissed or separated employees.
In such cases, the poor employees had been deprived of their only source of livelihood, their only means of support for their family their
lifeblood. To Us, this special circumstance is far better than any other which a judge, in his sound discretion, may determine. In short,
with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending
appeal.
. . . Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of
a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal
may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated
employee and its family.
We also see no reason to obstruct the reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary Arbitrator, or to treat it any less than the reinstatement that is
ordered by the Labor Arbiter. Voluntary arbitration really takes precedence over other dispute settlement devices. Such primacy of voluntary
arbitration is mandated by no less than the Philippine Constitution, and is ingrained as a policy objective of our labor relations law. The
reinstatement order by the Voluntary Arbitrator should have the same authority, force and effect as that of the reinstatement order by the
Labor Arbiter not only to encourage parties to settle their disputes through this mode, but also, and more importantly, to enforce the
constitutional mandate to protect labor, to provide security of tenure, and to enhance social justice.
The 2001 Procedural Guidelines in the Execution of Voluntary Arbitration Awards/Decisions (Guidelines), albeit not explicitly discussing
the executory nature of the reinstatement order, seems to align with the Court's stance by punishing the noncompliance by a party of the
decision or order for reinstatement. Section 2, Rule III of the Guidelines states:
Sec. 2. Issuance, Form and Contents of a Writ of Execution. —
xxx xxx xxx
b) If the execution be for the reinstatement of any person to any position, office or employment, such writ shall be served by the sheriff
upon the losing party or in case of death of the losing party upon his successor-in-interest, executor or administrator and such party or
person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such decision or order for reinstatement.
The 2005 NCMB Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings also supports this Court's position, for
Section 6 of its Rule VIII reads:
Sec. 6. Effect of Filing of Petition for Certiorari on Execution. — The filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a temporary restraining order or injunction is issued by the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court pending resolution of such petition.
We declare, therefore, that the reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary Arbitrator was immediately executory upon the receipt of the award
or decision by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REINSTATES the order dated July 25, 2001 of the Voluntary
Arbitrator; and ORDERS respondent Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. to pay the costs of suit.
Coca-Cola FEMSA Phils vs. Bacolod Sales Force Union

GR No. 220605, Sept. 21, 2016
Facts: In 2001, Cosmos Bottling Corporation ceded its sales functions to petitioner which resulted in the integration of a number of Cosmos’
salesmen into petitioner’s workforce as route salesmen. When herein petitioner changed its manner of production distribution from direct
selling, which was the job of a route salesman, to route-to-market system, this abolished the route salesman position, being replaced by the
Account developer(AD) position. Fortunately, through internal selection process, the cosmos integrated employees were eventually
designated as ADs.
Petitioner, however, hired new Account Developers. These newly hired personnel were subjected to a different qualification from the
internally selected account developers. With this, the new ADs received a higher basic monthly pay. They were also given, upon union
membership, a monthly 45-kg rice provision with a corresponding monthly deduction of the amount of P550 from their salaries.
Aggrieved by the difference in treatment, respondent union, the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file sales personnel of
petitioner’s bacolod plant, submitted its concerns to the grievance machinery in accordance with the CBA demanding:
(A) Readjustment of the salaries of cosmos integrees to equal that of the newly hired ADs
(B) Conversion of P550/month deduction from salaries for 45-kgs of rice as a violation of the non-diminution rule of the Labor
Code
(C) Employees concerned be reimbursed for the amounts illegally deducted
After the grievance process failed, the parties agreed to submit the unresolved matters to Voluntary Arbitration.
For its part, petitioner contended that the fixing of hiring rates is a management prerogative, since newly hired ADs were not similarly situated
due to the apparent variance in the manner of employment, qualifications, skills, and responsibilities. Citing further that the cosmos integrees
failed to meet such qualifications. Regarding the salary deduction for rice provision, it contended that in reality, it is valued more than the
amount of said subsidy and, thus, was not tantamount to any diminution of benefits.
RULING OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR: (February 3, 2012)

(A) Disparity in wages was discriminatory, lacking substantial valid criteria
(B) Petitioner should readjust basic salaries of complainants at par with the new ADs salaries
(C) P550 monthly salary deduction was a violation of Art. X of the CBA (Free rice provision)
(D) Cease and desist from further P550/month deductions
PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS:

Petitioner received notice of VA decision on may 21, 2012; Filed petition for review with CA on June 5, 2012.
Respondent Union: VA Decision had become final and executory after ten(10) calendar daysfrom receipt thereof
CA Decision: (December 22, 2014)

-Petition denied; VA Decision already attained finality pursuant to sec 5,Art. 5 of the CBA, which explicitly provides:
“The decision of the Arbitration Committee shall be final and binding upon the COMPANY and the UNION, and the employees and may be
enforced in any court of competent jurisdiction.”
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE VA DECISION CAN NO LONGER BE THE
SUBJECT OF ITS REVIEW FOR HAVING ATTAINED FINALITY PURSUANT TO THE EXPRESS PROVISION UNDER SECTION
– ARTICLE 5 OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Ruling: Voluntary Arbitrators act in a quasi-judicial capacity; their judgments or final orders which are declared final by law are not so
exempt from judicial review when so warranted. Any agreement stipulating that ‘the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable’
and ‘that no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or any part of the arbitrator’s award may be availed of’ cannot
be held to preclude in proper cases the power of judicial review which is inherent in courts.
There is prima facie reasonableness of petitioner’s asseverations and finds that the merits of its case, based on such argumentation, properly
warrant judicial review. SC remanded the case back to the CA, and stated that the latter should look into the soundness of the VA rulings in
relation to the nuances averred, particularly, the impact of the differences in the selection processes applied and relevant qualifications
between the employees.
CA should also determine the proper application of the “equal work, equal pay” compensation scheme. CA also left untouched the issue on
the conversion of the P550/month salary deduction for 45-kgs of rice, if indeed it is a violation, and whether or not the petition for review
was filed out of time.

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ATTY.

LABOR RELATIONS LAW

CIRTEX EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-FFW VS. CIRTEX ELECTRONICS INC. 84

GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS

Ruling of the CA is reversed.

Diokno vs. Cacdac

Ruling: There is merit in petitioner's contentions.

Dong Seung Inc., vs. Bureau of Labor Relations

G.R. No. 162356, April 14, 2008

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

S.S. Ventures International Inc., vs. SS Ventures Labor Union

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

Ruling: The petition lacks merit.

Inguillo et al, vs. First Phil Scales Inc., et al.

GR No. 165407, June 5, 2009

Ruling: Yes, the enforcement justified petitioner’s dismissal.

Sta Lucia East Commercial Corp., vs. SOLE et al.

Legitimate Labor Organization

A Legitimate Labor Organization Representing an Inappropriate Bargaining Unit

SLECCs Voluntary Recognition of SMSLEC

Employers Participation in a Petition for Certification Election

Mariwasa Siam Ceramics Inc. vs. Secretary of DOLE, et al.

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).

Ruling: The petition should be denied.

General Milling Corp vs. Casio et al.

The CBA contained the following union security provisions:

Legend International Resorts Ltd., vs. Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legenda

BPI vs. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter

Ruling: Yes. They are covered by the Union Shop Clause.

Octavio vs. Phil Long Distance Telephone Company

Ruling: The Petition has no merit.

National Union of bank Employees vs. Philnabank Employees Association

Takata Phils Corp. vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, et al.

2. No. Respondent did not misrepresent and no fraud was committed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.

University of Immaculate Concepcion vs. Office of SOLE

Held: YES. The Secretary and CA believe it is not. We reverse.

Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard vs. BLR, et al

And Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution also states:

No misrepresentation on the part of Samahan to warrant cancellation of registration

HSBC Employees Union vs. NLRC

Article 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts, x x

Hijo Resources Corp.vs. Mejares

Ramirez et al., vs. Polyson Industries Inc.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s dismissal from employment is valid.

Peninsula Employees Union vs. Esquivel

Asian Institute of Management vs. Asian Institute of Management Faculty Association

Sumifru (Phils) Corp vs. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm

Ruling: The Petition is denied.

United Polyresins, Inc. vs. Pinuela

Ruling: The Court denied the Petition.

RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION

Rivera vs. Espiritu

The questioned proviso of the agreement reads:

Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union vs. Court of Appeals

University of Immaculate Concepcion vs. Sec. Of Labor

The decision of the CA is affirmed.

Capitol Medical Center vs. NLRC

Light Railway Transit vs. Venus, Jr.

Issue: Whether or not private respondents were illegally dismissed.

Decision of the CA is affirmed.

Sukhotai Cuisine & Restaurant vs. Court of Appeals

Art. 264. Prohibited Activities – (a) x x x