1)
Braulio filed their opposition on October
[G.R. No. 120066. September 9, 1999]
OCTABELA ALBA Vda. De RAZ, Spouses MANUEL and SUSANA
BRAULIO, RODOLFO, LOURDES and BEATRIZ all surnamed ALBA,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE LACHICA,
respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari from a decision rendered by the Court
of Appeals dated August 18, 1992 affirming in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch I, in Land Registration Case
No. K-101, LRC Record No. K. 15104, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The parcel of land described in Plan Psu-161277 and the improvements
thereon situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga, Province of
Aklan, Philippines, with an area of 4,845 square meters is brought under
the operation of the property registration decree (PD No. 1529) and the
title thereto is registered and confirmed in the name of applicant Jose
Lachica, married to Adela Raz of Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines;
2. A ten (10) meter road width along the national road mentioned in the
application be segregated for future road widening program upon payment
of just compensation to be annotated at the back of the title;
3. For lack of merit, the opposition filed by the spouses Manuel and
Susana Braulio, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba
and Beatriz Alba are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The factual antecedents of the case as summed by the trial court and
adopted by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to land on April 28,
1958 with the claim that the land applied for was purchased by him and
his wife, Adela Raz from, from one Eulalio Raz. The documents attached to
the application are: technical description, surveyors certificate, certification
by the chief deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277.
The initial hearing was scheduled for October 31, 1958 and the certificate
of publication in the Official Gazette was issued on September 23, 1958.
The certification of posting of the notice of initial hearing was issued on
October 13, 1958.
The land applied for is residential, situated in the Poblacion of Banga,
Aklan, with an area of 4,845 square meters, bounded on the northeast by
the property of the Municipality of Banga (Sketch, Exh. F).
The initial hearing was held on October 31, 1958. An order of general
default was issued but those who presented their opposition, namely,
Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel and Susana Braulio, Jose Rago,
representing Apolonia Rebeco, the Director of Lands and the Municipality
of Banga represented by the Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30) days
to file their written opposition.
Page 1 of 74
Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P.
31, 1958. They opposed the registration of the southeastern portion of the
240 square meters of the land applied for alleging that they are the
owners in fee simple and possessors of said portion and all the
improvements thereon for not less than 70 years together with their
predecessor-in-interest deriving their title by purchase from the original
owners. They prayed for the Court to declare them the true and absolute
owners of the disputed portion of the same in their names.
On October 31, 1958, Octabela Vda. de Raz filed her opposition.
Jose Rago filed his opposition on November 29, 1958 as the duly
constituted attorney-in-fact of Apolonia Rebeco although no special power
of attorney was attached. He opposed the registration of the northeastern
portion of the land applied for, with an area of 43.83 square meters. He
alleged that his principal is the owner by right of succession and is in the
possession of said portion with all its improvements for more than 80
years together with his predecessor-in-interest, continuously, peacefully
and openly under claim of ownership. He prayed that his principal be
declared the true and absolute owner of the disputed portion of 43.83
square meters.
On March 22, 1966, the Court issued an Order allowing the applicant to
hire another surveyor to segregate the non-controversial portion of the
land applied for and to notify the oppositors and their counsels.
On January 12, 1970, a motion to lift the order of general default and to
admit the attached opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz
Alba, as well as a motion to admit the attached amended petition of
Octabela Vda. de Raz were filed. The Court in its order dated March 21,
1970 admitted said opposition and set aside the order of default.
In their opposition, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz, alleged that they are the co-
owners of a portion of the land applied for with an area of 2,262 square
meters bounded on the north by Januario Masigon, Nicolas Realtor,
Agustina Rebeldia and Apolonia Rebeco, on the south by Eulalio Raz and
on the west by the public market of Banga. They claimed to have inherited
the above-mentioned portion from their late father, Eufrosino M. Alba, who
purchased the same from Dionisia Regado in 1918. Hence, they have been
in possession continuously, openly and peacefully under claim of
ownership of the above-mentioned portion for not less 70 years. They
prayed that the disputed portion of 2,262 square meters be registered as
their pro-indiviso property.
In her amended opposition, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz opposed the
registration of the southeastern portion of the land applied for with an area
of 331.44 square meters. She claimed to have been in peaceful,
continuous and open possession together with her deceased husband,
Eulalio Raz, under claim of ownership of the above-mentioned portion for
not less than 70 years, by purchase from its owners. She likewise opposed
the registration of the western portion of the land applied for, with an area
of 676 square meters, having purchased the same from its original owners
on (sic) her predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful and
continuous under claim of ownership for a period of not less than 70 years.
She prayed that the portion of 331.44 square meters be registered in her
name and that of the heirs of Eulalio Raz, pro indiviso., and the other
portion of 676 square meters be registered solely in her name.
On February 25, 1970, the applicant Dr. Jose Lachica filed his consolidated
opposition and reply to the motion to lift order of default stating that there
is no reason to do so under the Rules of Court, and that the opposition of
Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as the amended
opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz are without merit in law and in
fact.
On March 21, 1970, the motion to lift the order of general default was
granted and the opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba,
as well as the opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz were all admitted.
In the hearing of March 3, 1972, applicant offered for admission exhibits A
to I and the testimonies of Pedro Ruiz (April 20, 1971), Jose Rago (Oct.
23, 1970) and Dr. Jose Lachica (July 16, 1971; Feb. 10, 1972). The Court
admitted the same.
On March 13, 1974, the Court issued an order appointing Engr. Angeles
Relor to act as Commissioner and delimit the portions claimed by the three
sets of oppositors and submit an amended approved plan together with
the technical description for each portion.
The Commissioners report and sketch was submitted on December 4,
1974. The applicant filed his opposition to the Commissioners report on
December 12, 1974. The Court in its order of December 13, 1974 required
the Commissioner to submit an amended report and amended sketch.
The Commissioners corrected report and sketch was submitted on
February 24, 1975 which the Court approved on February 25, 1975 there
being no objection from the parties.
On March 15, 1977, the Court issued an order whereby the testimony of
oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off the record for her
failure to appear in the scheduled hearing on March 15, 1977.
Again, in its order dated May 27, 1977 the testimony of Octabela Alba Vda.
de Raz was stricken off record because the latter was bedridden and can
not possibly appear for cross-examination.
Oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz substituted by her heirs filed a formal
offer of exhibits on August 24, 1988. Applicant filed his comments thereto
on August 29, 1988. The Court admitted said exhibits and the testimony of
their witness on March 1, 1989.
In this applicaton for title to land filed by applicant Jose Lachica, four
oppositions were filed by the following:
1. Jose Rago, in representation of Apolonia Rebeco;
2. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio;
3. Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz; and
4. Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.
Page 2 of 74
In the hearing of October 23, 1970, counsel for oppositor Jose Rago
manifested that he would file a motion for withdrawal of opposition and
Jose Rago himself declared his conformity (Tsn, Oct. 23, 1970, p. 5).
Although no formal motion to withdraw was actually filed, oppositor Rago
has not presented evidence on his behalf; hence, his opposition must be
disregarded.
As regards oppositor Manuel C. Braulio ans Susana Braulio, a deed of sale
supposedly executed by Susana Braulio and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz in
1956 was identified by Felimon Raz, a witness for the oppositors (Tsn,
Sept. 29, 1977, pp. 3 to 4). However, said deed cannot be found in the
records. Even so, the Braulios have not presented evidence to show that
by the time this application was filed, they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous
possession of the land claimed, in concept of owner, for at least 10 years
sufficient to acquire title thereto (Arts. 1117, 1118, 1134, Civil Code of the
Philippines). As such, the opposition of Manuel C. Braulio and Susana
Braulio must be dismissed.[2]
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by
the applicant and the oppositor Raz, the court a quo rendered judgment in
favor of the applicant as stated at the outset. In dismissing the claim of
the remaining oppositors Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba,
represented by Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz
herself, the trial court in sum noted that said oppositors have never
offered any explanation as to the non-payment of realty taxes for the
disputed portions of the subject property from 1941 to 1958 while the
respondent/applicant continuously paid taxes under Tax Declaration No.
14181 covering said property from 1945-1958 when the case was filed per
certification issued by the Municipal Treasurers Office of Banga.[3] In
rendering judgment in favor of respondent/applicant, the trial court
stressed that while it is true that tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for tax purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession.
Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Unfazed, petitioners now come to this Court arguing that
1. The Civil law provisions on prescription are inapplicable.
2. The applicable law is Section 48 [a] of the Public Land Law or Act 141,
as amended.
3. Private respondent has not acquired ownership in fee simple, much less
has he met the conditions for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48 [a] of Act 141, as amended, except perhaps for a 620 square
meter portion of the land applied for because:
3.1. There is absolutely no proof of the alleged sales made by Raz and
Alba.
3.2. There is absolutely no reliable proof of the alleged theft of the deeds
of sale.
3.3. The identity of the land has not been established.
3.4. The Court of Appeals misapplied the basic rules governing the
introduction of secondary evidence.
3.5. The applicant/respondents Tax Declaration No. 14181 is a doctored
tax declaration.
3.6. Applicant/respondents tax declarations have no probative value.
3.7. Applicant/respondent has not satisfied the required quantum of
evidence in land registration cases.
3.8. Petitioners-oppositors have proven their right over the subject
property.
In rendering judgment in favor of private respondent, the Court of Appeals
reasoned, inter alia, as follows:
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by
the applicant, the trial court did not err in confirming that the applicant is
the absolute owner in fee simple of the property subject of the application
for registration entitling him to register the same in his name under the
operation of PD 1529.
It is of no moment that the applicant failed to produce the originals of
those other deeds/documents of conveyances, for he was able to present
sufficient substantial secondary evidence, in accordance with the
requirements of Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, now
Section 5, same Rule of the Revised Rules on Evidence, and the doctrines
in point.
Thus, Government vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817, explained that when the
original writing is not available for one reason or another which is the best
or primary evidence, to prove its contents is the testimony of some one
who has read or known about it. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA
148, laid out the foundation before secondary evidence is introduced, that
the due execution, delivery and reason for non-production of the original
writing must first be produced. Raylago vs Jarabe, 22 SCRA 1247, ruled
that it is not necessary to prove the loss of the original document beyond
all possibility of mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is sufficient
and this may be shown by a bonafide (sic) and diligent search, fruitlessly
made, for it in places where it is likely to be found. After proving the due
execution and delivery of the document, together with the fact that the
same has been lost or destroyed, its contents may be proved, among
others, by the recollection of witnesses. And Beall vs. Dearing, 7 ala. 126;
and Bogardas vs. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. (Nn.y.) 639, are of the view
that that where the lost documents are more than thirty (30) years old
and would thus prove themselves if produced, secondary evidence of their
contents is admissible without proof of their execution.
In the case at bar, petitioner acquired the property in 1940-1941. He
presented the Deed (Exh. G) executed by the vendor Faustino Martirez.
While he failed to present the other deeds of sale covering the other
portions of the property, he has sufficiently established that they were
notarized documents and were taken by his mother-in-law sometime in
1956. He reported the loss to the authorities and even filed a case of theft.
Page 3 of 74
He further exerted efforts and made a diligent search of those documents
from the notary public but in vain. He presented the clerk of the Municipal
Treasurers Office of Banga, who testified having seen those deeds as they
were presented to him by the applicant and which were used as basis for
the preparation and issuance of Tax Declaration No. 14181 in the name of
the tax declarant. Tax Declaration No. 14181 (Exh. H) was presented in
Court, proving that the land was declared for tax purposes in the name of
the applicant and his wife. The applicant has been paying the realty tax
covering the property since 1945 and beyond 1958, when the application
for registration was filed in court, per certification of the Municipal
Treasurer of Banga (Exh. 1).
In resume, We find and so hold as did the trial court that Dr. Jose Lachica
is the abolute owner in fee simple of the land described in his application
for its original registration in his name. The land contains an area of 4,845
square meters, more or less, situated in Banga, Aklan, and
Bounded on the NE., along line1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; on the
SE., along line 2-3, by National road; on the SW., along line 3-4, by
property of the Mpl. Government of Banga (Public Market); and on the
NW., along line 4-1, by property of the Municipal Government of Banga
(Public Market). Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being N. 45 deg.
02 E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;
thence, S. 33 deg. 46 E., 87.66 m. to point 2
thence, S. 56 deg. 42 W., 63.81 m. to point 3
thence, N. 37 deg. 22 W., 59.26 m. to point 4
thence, N. 33 deg. 42 E., 73.08 m. to the point of
beginning, xxx All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are
marked on the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date of the
survey, January 25, 1957, and that of the approval, October 3, 1957.
The applicant has been in public, open, continuous and adverse possession
of the property since 1940-41 up to the present to the exclusion of all, and
thereby also acquired the property by acquisitive prescription, in
accordance with Sections 40 and 43 of Act 190, otherwise known as the
Code of Civil Procedure, having been in actual and adverse possession
under claim of ownership for over ten (10) years, and thus in whatever
way his occupancy might have commenced or continued under a claim of
title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants,
resulted in the acquisition of title to the land by acquisitive prescription
(Vda. de Delima vs. Tio, 32 SCRA 516).
Indeed, to borrow the apt words of the ponente in the Delima case, such
proof of ownership of, and the adverse, continuous possession of the
applicant since 1940, strongly xxx militate against any judicial cognizance
of a matter that could have been withheld in its ken, hence, whatever right
oppositors may have had over the property or any portion thereof was
thereby also lost through extinctive prescription in favor of the applicant
who had been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession of the
land applied for in the concept of owner for over 10 years when the
application for registration was filed in court.[4]
It is a fundamental and settled rule that findings of fact by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are final, binding or conclusive on the parties and
upon this Court,[5] which will not be reviewed[6] or disturbed on appeal
unless these findings are not supported by evidence[7] or unless strong and
cogent reasons dictate otherwise.[8]
More explicitly, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are as a
general rule deemed conclusive, may be reviewed by this Court in the
following instances:
1.] When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court
are contradictory;[9]
2.] When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures;[10]
3.] When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of
fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd[11] or impossible;
4.] Where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts;[12]
5.] When the appellate court in making its findings went beyond the issues
of the case, and such findings are contrary to the submission of both
appellant and appellee;
6.] When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts;[13]
7.] When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion;[14]
8.] When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
9.] When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; and
10.] When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on
record.[15]
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether or not the private
respondent/applicant is entitled to the confirmation of his ownership in fee
simple for the 4, 845 square meter parcel of land he applied for.
In sum, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals adjudicated and
confirmed private respondent/applicants title to the land on the basis of
the findings that: 1.] the private respondent/applicant purchased the land
from Faustino Martirez; 2.] the subject land is covered by Tax Declaration
No. 14181; 3.] the private respondent/applicant has paid the realty taxes
on the land from 1945 up to the filing of his application in 1958; 4.] the
private respondent/applicant has been in actual, open and continuous
possession of the subject land in the concept of owner since 1945, and 5.]
the private respondent/applicant has acquired the land by prescription.
As stated earlier, a review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is
not a function that this Court normally undertakes[16] unless the appellate
courts findings are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or
unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.[17]A
thorough review of the record convinces this Court that the general rule
Page 4 of 74
with regard to the conclusiveness of the trial courts and appellate tribunals
factual findings should not be applied because there are material
circumstances which, when properly considered, would have altered the
result of the case.
First, a circumspect scrutiny of the evidence extant on record reveals that
with the exception of 620 square meters, there has been no satisfactory
showing of how private respondent/applicant acquired the remainder of
the subject land.
As can be gathered from the discussion of the appellate court, as well as
the arguments proffered by private respondent, he acquired the land in
question from three (3) sources, namely: a.] A Deed of Sale dated August
13, 1941 allegedly executed by Faustino Martirez covering 840 square
meters; b.] 300 square meters allegedly purchased from private
respondents father-in-law Eulalio Raz, and c.] 3,725 square meters private
respondent allegedly bought in 1940 from Eufrocino Alba.
The sale involving the first parcel of land covering 840 square meters, was
not questioned by petitioners as its technical description delineated in the
Escritura De Venta Absoluta dated August 13, 1941,[18] to wit:
Un terreno solar residencia antes palayero regado, actuado en el casco
central del municipio de Banga, Capiz. Sin ninguna mejora, de una
extension superficial de ochocientos cuarenta metros cuadrados (840 mts.
cds.) 6 sean cuarenta metros de frente por otros veinte y unmetrode
fondo, cuyos linderos por el Norte con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y con
Eulalio Raz; por Este con Eulalio Raz y con la carretera provincial de Kalibo
a Banga; por Sur con la misma carretera provincial y con terreno del
municipio para mercado; y por al Oeste con al terreno del mercado
municipal de Banga y con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y al terreno tienes
sus mojones de cemento en todos sus cuatro cantos de linderia y sin otro
limite visible de linderia mas que dichos mojones y esta amillarado a mi
nombre en una sola hoja declaratoria de propiedad Tax No. 12374 en la
Oficina del Tasador Provincial de Capiz, cuyo valor amilarado actual es
veinte pesos (P20.00) xxx
leaves no room for doubt as to its identity, total area of 840 square meters
as well as its dimensions of 40 meters in front and 21 meters at the base.
How this parcel was further reduced to 620 square meters is explained by
the fact that the Municipal Government of Banga appropriated 220 square
meters thereof for the Banga Public Market Road.
What, however, is seriously contested are the alleged purchases of the
other two parcels from Eulalio Raz measuring 300 square meters and from
Eufrocino Alba measuring 3,725 square meters owing to the questionable
circumstances surrounding their acquisition.
The records disclose that the subject land was originally owned by Dionisia
Regado under Tax Declaration No. 802.[19] The records further reveal that
Dionisia Regado sold: [1.] 1,850 square meters of the land to the
Municipality of Banga evidenced by a Spanish document denominated as a
deed of sale dated April 29, 1914;[20] [2.] 1,320 square meters to Eulalio
Raz evidenced by a document entitled Escritura de Venta Absoluta dated
September 6, 1918,[21] and [3.] 2,938 square meters to Eufrocino Alba
evidenced by a deed of conveyance dated September 6, 1918 written in
Spanish.[22]
Faustino Martirez acquired a portion of 840 square meters from Eulalio Raz
on January 15, 1933.[23] Raz retained 480 square meters, however, he and
his wife Octabela Alba conveyed a 240 square meter portion thereof to
Susana Braulio on November 5, 1956.[24] Subsequently on May 29, 1969,
the heirs of Eufrocino Alba sold a 676 square meter portion of the parcel
purchased by Eufrocino to Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.[25] The deed of
conveyance was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Aklan
pursuant to Act No. 334 on June 17, 1969 [26] and is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 332 in the name of Eulalio Raz, her husband.[27]
Other than the foregoing transactions involving the subject land which are
borne out by the documentary evidence on record, private
respondent/applicant did not produce the alleged deeds of conveyances
evidencing the purported transfers made by Eulalio Raz and Eufrocino Alba
in his favor. Instead he relied chiefly on secondary evidence to prove the
existence thereof which was sustained by both the trial and the appellate
courts. Such reliance on secondary evidence vis--vis the peculiar facts
prevailing in this case rests on infirm legal bases much more so in the face
of the overwhelming documentary evidence of petitioners arrayed against
it because
. . . [a] contract of sale of realty cannot be proven by means of witnesses,
but must necessarily be evidenced by a written instrument, duly
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent, or by secondary
evidence of their contents. No other evidence, therefore, can be received
except the documentary evidence referred to, in so far as regards such
contracts, and these are valueless as evidence unless they are drawn up in
writing in the manner aforesaid.[28]
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing
his title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of his title but the
identity of the land therein referred to. The document in such a case is
either a basis of his claim for registration or not at all. If , as in this case,
he only claims a portion of what is included in his title, he must clearly
prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title.[29]
Second, there are glaring variances in the identities and technical
descriptions of the land applied for by private respondent/applicant and
the land he purportedly purchased from Eufrocino Alba.
Private respondent/applicant alleged that he purchased the remainder of
the subject land measuring 3,725 square meters from Eufrocino Alba
sometime in 1940 averring that this parcel is listed as Item No. 5 of his
Exhibit I which is denominated as an Inventory And Appraisal Of The
Properties Of The Spouses Adela Raz De Lachica (Deceased) and Dr. Jose
Lachica. Item No. 5[30] of the said inventory described the parcel of land
mentioned therein as follows:
5. Una parcela de terreno cocal secano, amillarado en nombre de Eufrocino
Alba bajo el Tax No. 12792 por valor de P390.00, situado en el municipio
Page 5 of 74
de Banga, Capiz, que linda el Norte con Lorenzo Retiro, y Silverio Relis; al
Este con la carretera provincial Banga-Libacao; al sur con Bienvenido M.
Alba y al Oeste con Cirilo rala y Adela Raz; con una extension aproximada
de una (1) hectarea (20) areas y (35) centiareas poco mas o menos.
(Note: Said property was purchased by the spouses Jose Lachica and
Adela Raz Lachica from Eufrocino M. Alba in the amount of P500.00 as
evidenced by a Escritura de Compraventa executed on November 25,
1940, at Himamaylan, Negros Occidental and notarized by Atty. Conrado
Gensiano, as Reg. Not. 122, Pag. 67, Libro VIII, Serie 1940).
On the other hand, the land applied for is described technically per Psu
161277 as
A parcel of land (as shown on Plan Psu-161277), situated in Poblacion,
Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-
2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; on the SE., along line 2-3, by National
Road; on the SW., along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl. Government of
Banga (Public Market); and on the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the
Municipal Government of Banga (Public Market). Beginning at a point
marked 1 on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02 E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp.
of Banga, Aklan;
thence S. 33 deg. 46 E. 87.66 m. to point 2
thence S. 56 deg. 42 W., 63.81 m. to point 3
thence N. 37 deg. 22 W., 59.26 m. to point 4
thence N. 33 deg. 42 E., 73.08 m. to the point of
beginning, containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND
FORTY FIVE (4,845) SQUARE METERS. All points referred to are indicated
on the plan and are marked on the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons.
Bearings true date of survey, January 25, 1957, and that of the approval,
October 3, 1957.[31]
It will be readily noted vis--vis the foregoing that: a.] the land applied for
is covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181 while the parcel allegedly
purchased from Eufrocino Alba is covered by Tax Declaration No. 15792;
b.] the land applied for is palayero whereas the land allegedly acquired
from Eufrocino Alba is cocal secano. Palay is unhusked rice,[32] thus, the
term palayero refers to land devoted to the planting of rice; cocal, on the
other hand, means coconut tree plantation[33] while secano denotes
unwatered land or a dry sand bank;[34] c.] the land applied for has an area
of 4,845 square meters whereas the land supposedly sold by Eufrocino
Alba measures 12,035 square meters; d.] the land applied for is bounded
on the NE by the Banga Public Market, on the SE by Apolonia Rimate, on
the SW by the Banga-Kalibo National Road; and on the NW by the Banga
Public Market whereas the land allegedly obtained from Eufrocino Alba is
bounded on the N by Ernesto Retino and Silverio Relis, on the E by the
Banga-Libacao Carretera Provincial, on the S by Bienvenido Alba and on
the W by Cirilo Rala and Adela Raz. It needs be stressed in this regard that
a person who claims that he has better right to real property must prove
not only his ownership of the same but also must satisfactorily prove the
identity thereof.[35]
Third, both trial and appellate courts placed undue reliance on Tax
Declaration No. 14181 considering that there is no satisfactory explanation
of how the area of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181
geometrically ballooned from a modest 620 square meter lot to a huge
parcel measuring 4, 845 square meters.
As pointed out by petitioners, Tax Declaration No. 14181 was preceded by
1954 Tax Declaration No. 13578 in the name of private
respondent/applicant and his spouse which shows that the land declared
therein for taxation purposes covers an area of 620 square meters. Tax
Declaration No. 13578 was preceded by 1953 Tax Declaration No. 13040
in the name of Adela Raz, private respondents wife. The land declared for
taxation purposes therein also has an area of 620 square meters. Tax
Declaration No. 134040 was preceded by 1947 Tax Declaration No. 6528
in the name of private respondents wife, Adela Raz. The land declared
therein for taxation purposes likewise measures 620 square meters.
It appears that the quantum leap from 620 square meters in 1947 to
4,845 square meters in 1956 came about on account of an affidavit dated
November 17, 1956 wherein private respondent/applicant requested [36]
the Municipal Assessor of Banga to issue a revised tax declaration covering
4,845 square meters on the bare claim that the area has been decreased
to only 620 square meters. The timing of the revision and its proximity to
the date of filing of the application can not but engender serious doubts on
the application more so considering that prior thereto realty tax payments
covering the period 1945 to 1956 covered an area measuring 620 square
meters and private respondent/applicant is banking on said payments to
claim possession and ownership over the same period for an infinitely
larger area of 4,845 square meters.
A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of ownership. [37] Tax
declarations for a certain number of years, although constituting proof of
claim of title to land,[38] is not incontrovertible evidence of ownership
unless they are supported by other effective proof.[39] It was, thus, held in
one case[40] that where realty taxes covering thirty-one (31) years were
paid only a few months prior to the filing of an application, such payment
does not constitute sufficient proof that the applicant had a bona fide claim
of ownership prior to the filing of the application. Still in another case,[41]
the claim that the applicant had been in continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the disputed land was not given credence because it was
negated by the fact that he declared the land for taxation purposes in
October 1959 when he filed his application for registration although he
could have done so in 1937 when he allegedly purchased the land. A
belated declaration is, furthermore, indicative that the applicant had no
real claim of ownership over the subject land prior to the declaration [42]
and where there are serious discrepancies in the tax declarations as in this
case, registration must be denied.[43] If at all, the foregoing facts only
serves to underscore private respondent/applicants crafty attempt to cloak
with judicial color his underhanded scheme to seize the adjoining parcels
of land and to enrich himself at the expense of its rightful owners.
Page 6 of 74
Fourth, the lower courts reliance on prescription is not well-taken given
the peculiar facts prevailing in this case.
The law in force at the time an action accrues is what governs the
proceeding consistent with the fundamental dictum that laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is proved.[44] Basic is the rule that
no statute, decree, ordinance, rule, regulation or policy shall be given
retrospective effect unless explicitly stated so.[45] Along the same vein, a
courts jurisdiction depends on the law existing at the time an action is
filed[46]and a law continues to be in force with regard to all rights which
accrued prior to the amendment thereof.[47]
In this case, the controlling statute when the private respondent/applicant
filed his application for registration on April 28, 1958 is Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by RA Nos. 1942 and 6236, [48] which
states that:
SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant
of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in
force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection
therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any
other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and
their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the
filing of their applications.[49]
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.[50]
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona
fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof.[51]
A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows that in
affirming the ruling of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the
provisions of Section 19 of Act 496[52] in relation to the Civil Codes
provisions on prescription on the assumption that the subject land is
private land. Therein lies the flaw in the appellate courts postulate. The
application for registration of private respondent is for the judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title considering that the land is presumed
under the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public domain.
Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable lands;
and, 2.] Inalienable or non-disposable public lands. Non-disposable public
lands or those not susceptible of private appropriation include a.] Timber
lands; and, b.] Mineral lands.[53] For purposes of administration and
disposition, the lands of the public domain classified as disposable or
alienable are further sub-classified into a.] Agricultural; b.] Residential,
commercial, industrial or for similar productive purposes; c.] Educational,
charitable or other similar purposes, and d.] Reservations for town sites
and for public and quasi-public purposes.[54]
From the foregoing classifications, public agricultural land may be defined
as those alienable portions of the public domain which are neither timber
nor mineral lands. Thus the term includes residential, commercial and
industrial lands for the reason that these lands are neither timber nor
mineral lands.[55]
On the other hand, Section 19 of Act No. 496, as amended, permits the
registration of private lands claimed to be owned by the applicant in fee
simple which refer to:
1.] Lands acquired by various types of titles from the government during
the Spanish Regime by way of grants by the Spanish crown namely the:
a.] Titulo real or royal grant; b.] Concession especial or special grant; c.]
Composicion con el estado title or adjustment title; d.] Titulo de compra or
title by purchase and; e.] Informacion posesoria or possessory information
title, which could become a Titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title;[56]
2.] Lands that are claimed to be owned by accession, i.e. accretion,
avulsion, formation of islands, abandoned river beds, as provided for in
Articles 457, 461 and 464 of the Civil Code; and
3.] Lands which have been acquired in any other manner provided by law.
Suffice it to state that the land sought to be registered by private
respondent hardly falls under any of the latter classifications of land
referred to by Act No. 496, as amended. Given the foregoing facts,
prescription in the manner invoked by both courts can not be pleaded to
bolster private respondent/applicants claim because
. . . [N]o public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be
a showing of title from the state . . . .[57]
xxxxxxxxx
Indeed, the possession of public agricultural land, however, long the
period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor.[58] The reason, to reiterate our ruling, is because the statute of
limitations with regard to public agricultural land does not operate against
the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State.[59]
Page 7 of 74
Fifth, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that prescription can be applied
in the manner invoked by the trial court and the appellate court, it must
be pointed out that
. . . [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that (o)wnership and
other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years, this provision of law must be
read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states
that xxx (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in
good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Hence, a
prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof
under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession
was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good
faith).[60] The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief
that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof,
and could transmit his ownership.[61] For purposes of prescription, there is
just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the recognized modes of acquisition of ownership or other
real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any
right.[62]
It can not be said that private respondents possession was con justo titulo
y buena fe. On the contrary, private respondent/applicants act of
appropriating for himself the entire area of 4,845 square meters to the
exclusion of petitioners who have been occupying portions of the disputed
land constituted acts of deprivation of the latters rights which is
tantamount to bad faith. Indeed this Court has ruled that the
. . . [c]oncealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other
persons had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific
allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and
intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical
possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud. [63]
Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which
benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.[64]
Suffice it to state in this regard that to allow private respondent/applicant
to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo
malo non oritur actio - no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his
own wrongdoing.[65]
It need not be overemphasized that extraordinary acquisitive prescription
can not similarly vest ownership over the property upon private
respondent/applicant because Article 1137 of the Civil Code states in no
uncertain terms that
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of good faith.
Needless to state, private respondent/applicants possession of thirteen
(13) years falls way below the thirty-year requirement mandated by Article
1137.
Sixth, petitioners/oppositors have, in stark contrast to the secondary proof
of private respondent, adduced overwhelming evidence to prove their
ownership of the portions they claim in the subject land. The evidence on
record clearly points to the fact that private respondent/applicants right, if
at all, is confined to only 620 square meters or what has been left of the
840 square meters he purchased from Faustino Martirez after 220 square
meters thereof were appropriated by the Municipality of Banga for the
Public Market Road.[66]
The records further bear out that the original owner of the whole area was
one Dionisia Regado who executed three (3) deeds of sale covering certain
portions of the disputed lands, namely: 1.] the Deed of Sale dated April
29, 1914 covering 1,850 square meters executed in favor of the
Municipality of Banga;[67] 2.] the Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1915
covering 1,320 square meters executed in favor of Eulalio Raz; [68] and, 3.]
the Deed of Sale dated September 6, 1918 covering the balance with an
area of 2,938 square meters in favor of Eufrocino Alba.[69]
Faustino Martirez acquired only an 840 square meter portion of the land by
purchase from Eulalio Raz on January 15, 1933 as confirmed in paragraph
2 of the Escritura De Venta Absoluta executed by him on August 13,
1941.[70] After selling 840 square meters to Faustino Martirez, Eulalio Raz
retained 480 square meters but on November 5, 1956 Eulalio Raz and his
wife Octabela Alba conveyed 240 square meters to Susana Braulio [71]
leaving a balance of 240 square meters which remained undisposed.
On May 29, 1969, Virginia Alba, Inocentes Alba and Estrella Alba, children
of the deceased Eufrocino Alba, sold a 676 square meter portion of the
2,938 square meter lot purchased by their father from Dionisia Regado to
petitioner/oppositor Octabela alba Vda. De Raz.[72] This Deed was duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Aklan in accordance with Act No.
3344 on June 17, 1969.[73] The land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 332
in the name of Octabela Alba Vda. De Razs husband.[74]
Petitioner/oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. De Razs ownership of the
remaining 240 square meter portion which she and her husband Eulalio
Raz bought from Dionisia Regado[75] and the 676 square meter portion
which they bought from the heirs of Eufrocino Alba[76] is fully substantiated
by documentary proof.[77] Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Albas
ownership of a portion measuring 1,335 square meters [78] and another
portion measuring 2,262 square meters[79] is likewise backed by
documentary evidence. Susana Braulios ownership of a 240 square meter
portion[80] which she acquired from Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz on
November 11, 1956[81] is also documented, her predecessor-in-interest
having acquired the same from Dionisia Regado on September 6, 1918.[82]
The foregoing only serves to underscore the paucity of the proof of private
respondent/applicant to support his claim of ownership over the entire 4,
845 square meter area. He has not adduced evidence to show how and
when he was able to acquire, with the exception of 840 square meters
further reduced to 620 square meters on account of 220 square meters
Page 8 of 74
appropriated for the market road, the bigger area of 3,755 square meters
from anybody let alone the ancestral owner, Dionisia Regado.
His claim is anchored mainly on Revised Tax Declaration No. 14181 which
he was able to procure from the Municipal Assessor of Banga in 1956 on
the basis of a self-serving affidavit which proffered the lame excuse that
there was error in the statement of the area of the land which he claimed
to be 4,845 square meters instead of 620 square meters which was the
area reflected in earlier tax declarations namely, 1954 Tax Declaration No.
13578; 1953 Tax Declaration No. 13043; and 1947 Tax Declaration No.
6528.
Be that as it may, the Court has reservations on the propriety of
adjudicating to petitioners the contested portions of the subject land, in
view of their failure to present the technical descriptions of these areas.
Furthermore, there is no sufficient evidence showing that petitioners have
been in open, adverse, exclusive, peaceful and continuous possession
thereof in the concept of owner, considering that the testimony of
Octabela Alba vda. De Raz was stricken off the record.
WHEREFORE, based on foregoing premises, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1 dated August 18, 1992 in Land
Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No. K-15104 is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
1.] The 620 square meter portion on which private respondent Jose N.
Lachicas house is situated, clearly delineating its metes and bounds, is
hereby ORDERED segregated from the parcel of land described in Psu-
161277 situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga, Province of
Aklan, Philippines with an area of 4,484 square meters, to be registered
and confirmed in the name of private respondent;
2.] A ten (10) meter road width along the National road mentioned in the
application be segregated for future road widening programs upon the
payment of just compensation to be annotated at the back of the title.
3.] Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the subject land is
concerned, the case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the
reception of further evidence for the petitioners to establish the other
requisites for the confirmation of title and registration in their names of
the areas they respectively claim.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.
2)
[G.R. No. 76371. January 20, 2000]
MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL
MAGALA substituted by his Heirs, OTILIO DAMASEN and
SEGUNDINA DAMASEN, ANTONIO ESCALANTE, METODIO TULLAS,
FLORA LABUGUEN and JUANA LABUGUEN, LOURDES SINDON
BAYUBAY, MANUEL MEDRANO and JOSE MEDRANO,** petitioners,
vs., ROSARIO VALERA and the HONORABLE COURT of
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
More than half a century ago,[1] private respondent applied for the
registration of two parcels of land located in Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra
described in Plan PSU-119561 with a total land area of 232,908 square
meters. The first lot (hereinafter referred to as Lot 1) has an area of
210,767 square meters whereas the other lot (Lot 2) has an area of
22,141 square meters. In support of her application, private respondent
presented documents showing that when she was still single, she bought
Lot 1 during the years 1929-1932 from Cristeta Trangued and the heirs of
Juan Valera Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof since the
Spanish regime in the concept of owners and who declared it in their name
for taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued possession of said land in
the concept of owner and continued to pay the tax thereon in her name.
Notices of the application for registration were published in the Official
Gazette, with copies thereof sent to persons mentioned therein and posted
in the proper places.
The Director of Lands together with petitioners and other
persons[2] opposed the application of private respondent. These oppositors
were excluded from the order of general default issued by the lower court
on June 16, 1950.[3] In the course of the hearing, the oppositors (except
the Director of Lands) aver that their lands were included in Lot 1 which
private respondent sought to register in her name. In support thereof,
they contend that the land embraced by Lot 1 at the time it was bought by
private respondent is not the same land covered in her application for
registration. To avoid confusion, oppositors moved for an ocular inspection
in order to determine the correct boundary limits of the lands they
respectively claim, however, the same was not allowed by the court a quo.
For his part, the Director of Lands opposition was denied for failure to
substantiate his claim that the subject lands were part of the public
domain. The opposition of the oppositors other than the herein petitioners
Page 9 of 74
were likewise denied for various reasons including failure to present their
evidence.
After trial, in a decision dated April 23, 1956, the lower court disposed of
the application for registration as follows:
In view of all the foregoing, the applicant Rosario Valera
married to Juan Valera, a resident of Bangued, Abra, has
proven that she has a registerable title to Lot 1, Psu-
119561, with an area of 210,767 square meters as her
exclusive property, subject to the encumbrance in favor of
the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P1,000.00; and
to Lot 2 in the same plan, with an area of 22,141 square
meters, without liens or encumbrances, as conjugal
partnership property with her husband, Juan Valera.
After this decision has become final, let the corresponding
decree be entered and the corresponding title issue in
accordance with law.[4]
Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is
concerned, arguing, among others, that the trial court erred in not
granting their motion for new trial and their demand for ocular inspection.
On March 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals set aside the appealed decision
and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, and
ordered the conduct of an ocular inspection. The dispositive portion of the
CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and
set aside. This case shall be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings which shall include an ocular
inspection of the land applied with a view to determine its
identity, location and boundary limits whether the latter
have been included in Lot 1 of the applicants plan to
warrant their exclusion from the plan, or their registration
in the names of the oppositors who have presented
evidence in support of their claim. Thereafter judgment
shall be accordingly rendered.[5]
In accordance with the CA directive, three commissioners were appointed
by the trial court to conduct the ocular inspection. The commissioners
found:
That the property sought to be registered under survey
plan Psu-119561 was relocated and the extent and bounds
of the portions claimed by the oppositors were pointed to
by them personally or by their supposed representative,
the results of which are clearly shown in the accompanying
 sketch plan marked as Annex "A" of their report by the
corresponding names, area and dimensions.
That the survey of the claims was continued the following
day, January 29, 1967.
OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS
1. The claims of Manuel Magala, Abraham Lalugan, and
Layao, Juan Medrano and Eugenio Medrano as shown now
in the sketch plan Annex "A" are not shown in the original
survey plan Psu-119561;
2. That claims of Otilio Damasen, Nicolas Bigornia, Ricardo
Bersamira, Bonifacio Brangan, Cristeta Medrano, Matias
Turdil, Mariano Turqueza, Flora Labuguen, Cornelio
Bayubay, Ponce Talape, and Metodio Tullar, appeared in
the original survey plan Psu-119561 and likewise in sketch
plan Annex "A" although three of these claims bear
different identifying names in the sketch Annex "A";
3. That out of the original area of 210,767 square meters
in original survey plan Psu-119561, the remaining portion
not subject of opposition as appearing in sketch plan
Annex "A" is 69,683 square meters;
4. That the "Calle para Collago" which according to the
decision of the Court of Appeals and is stoutly maintained
until the present by the oppositors to be the extent or
boundary of the property of the applicant on the South
side is existing and still is the boundary on the South and
on the Southeast side, as shown in the Sketch Plan, Exh.
"A";
That the property of Francisco Santua abound also the
applicants property sought to be registered on the South
sides, at present as was the case during the original
survey.[6]
The oppositors filed an opposition to the commissioners report, whereupon
a second ocular inspection was ordered by the trial court. After the second
inspection, the trial court, on August 28, 1967 again rendered judgment
reiterating its original decision ordering the registration of the aforesaid
Lot 1 of PSU 119561 with an area of 210,767[7] square meters in the name
of private respondent. The judge made the following observations based
on the ocular inspection:
The Commissioners and the Presiding Judge, upon their
ocular inspection, found out a visible boundary on the
South-east side of Lot 1 known as "Calle para Collago"
Page 10 of 74
which is represented in the relocation plan Exh. HH
running from the intersection to Lagayan between points
22 and 21 down to point 18. This, in the opinion of the
Court, is the extension of the "Calle para Collago" referred
to by the applicant Rosario Valera as boundary exactly on
the South but which was converted into ricefields by
Francisco Santua. This circumstance now could explain the
presence of Francisco Santua as boundary owner on the
South which the parties stoutly maintained in the former
proceedings that the "Calle para Collago" was on the South
but which oppositors now repudiate claiming that the
"Calle para Collago" is on the East. Taking a good view
over Lot 1, it could safely be concluded that the existing
"Calle para Collago" is more to the South than to the East.
With respect to the claim of the Damasens over Lot A
mentioned in Exh. D which the Court inadvertently failed to
pass upon, the Court has found that it is within the
property of the applicant.[8]
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court reiterates its former decision
ordering the registration of Lot 1 of Plan Psu-119561, Exh.
D, with an area of 210,767 square meters in the name of
applicant ROSARIO VALERA of Bangued, Abra, and a
conjugal property with her husband Juan Valera of the
same municipality. The encumbrance with the Philippine
National Bank in the amount of P1,000.00 having already
been settled (Exh. JJ-1) same shall no longer be annotated
on the title henceforth to be issued.
Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding
decree issue.
The applicant Rosario Valera is hereby directed to pay
within seventy two hours from notice hereof the sum of
P182.00 as fees for the commissioner Santiago Alejandre
who made the relocation survey.[9]
The case was again appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR. 40796-R) by
the oppositors, some of whom are now the petitioners in this case.[10] They
argue that the lower court erred in not excluding the areas they claimed as
their own which were wrongfully included in Lot 1 but was ordered
registered in private respondents name. Disposing of the appeal, the CA
ruled:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with the
modification that the registration of Lot 1 of appellees
(private respondent herein) should be confined to the
extent only as indicated in the sketch annexed to the
Commissioners report, Exhibit HH, and excluding
therefrom the landholding of the oppositors, as indicated in
the same sketch, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
This decision became final and executory for which a corresponding entry
of judgment was issued by the Court of Appeals.[12] Later, private
respondent filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of writ of
possession over two lots respectively tenanted by Trium Donato and Rudy
Donato which were likewise respectively claimed by Santiago Partolan (not
an oppositor in the land registration case) and Crispin Baltar (one of the
oppositors).[13] In an Order issued on September 14, 1981, the court a
quo denied the motion.[14] When her subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied in another Order dated November 25,
1981,[15] private respondent appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC) which reversed the said two orders and forthwith issued a
decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the ORDERS
appealed from are hereby REVERSED and judgment is
hereby entered ordering:
1. The issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of
applicant-appellant covering the landholding claimed by
oppositor Crispin Baltar and tenanted by Rudy Donato;
2. Confirming the word "Landholding" in the dispositive
portion of the decision in CA-G.R. No. 40796-R as singular
and referring only to the landholding opposed by
oppositors Segundina and Otilio Damasen as the only
landholding excluded from lot 1; and
3. Ordering the issuance of the WRIT OF POSSESSION in
favor of the applicant-appellant covering the landholdings
opposed by the other oppositors who did not appeal the
decision of the lower court dated August 28, 1967.
Without any special pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by
the Court of Appeals.[17] Hence this petition for review initiated by some of
the oppositors in the trial court. The petition was initially denied by the
Page 11 of 74
Court. On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the case was
reinstated and respondent was required to submit her comment to the
petition.[18]
After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and after
deciphering the ambiguous discussions in the petition,[19] the assailed
ruling of the respondent court cannot be sustained. The burden of proof in
land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant [20] who must show
that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied
for.[21] On him also rests the burden to overcome the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain[22] considering that the inclusion in a title of a part of the public
domain nullifies the title.[23] Undoubtedly, a land registration proceeding is
one which is in rem in character, so that the default order issued by the
court binds the whole world and all persons whether known or
unknown,[24] except those who have appeared and filed their pleadings in
the registration case.[25] In the case at bar, those exempted from the order
of general default are the petitioners and the other oppositors mentioned
in footnote number 2.
There is no dispute that the lands occupied and claimed by oppositors-
petitioners Segundina and Otilio Damasen were already finally adjudged
excluded from Lot 1 and cannot be registered in private respondents
name. In other words, the Damasens were declared to have a rightful and
registrable right over their claims of specific portions of Lot 1. What private
respondent wants is that she be installed in possession of the area claimed
by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar. Of these two, only Baltar entered
his opposition to private respondents application for land registration.
Being a proceeding in rem, Partolan is charged with knowledge of the
application of private respondent since the notice was published in
accordance with law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled
to a writ of possession of that portion of Lot I occupied by Partolan and
Baltar. No evidence was shown that private respondent had a rightful
claim whether possessory or proprietary with respect to those areas. Even
if Partolan was excluded by the order of general default and Baltar did not
appeal from the trial courts decision of April 23, 1956, the applicant must
still prove and establish that she has registrable rights over the land which
must be grounded on incontrovertible evidence and based on positive and
absolute proof. The declaration by the applicant that the land applied for
has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-interest for a certain
period, does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and
"conclusive" evidence required in land registration.[26] Allegations of her
predecessors ownership of the lot during the Spanish period is self-
serving[27] and the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on
the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. [28] It
should be noted that tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive
evidence of ownership in land registration cases.[29] Private respondent
should have substantiated her claim with clear and convincing evidence
specifically showing the nature of her claim. Her description of the
circumstances of her own possession in relation to that of her predecessor-
in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require further factual
support and substantiation. If an applicant does not have any rightful
claim over real property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or
record nothing.[30]
Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one
who relies on some documents enforcing her alleged title thereto, must
prove not only the genuineness of said title but also the identity of the
land therein referred to,[31] inasmuch as this is required by law. The
dispute in this case pertains to the correctness of the survey of specific
areas of lands. It must be borne in mind that what defines a piece of land
is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries
therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its
limits.[32] Considering that the writ of possession was sought by private
respondent against persons who were in "actual possession under claim of
ownership," the latters possession raises a disputable presumption of
ownership.[33] This unrebutted presumption militates against the claim of
private respondent, especially considering the evidentiary rule under
Article 434 of the Civil Code that a claimant of a parcel of land, such as
private respondent, must rely on the strength of his title and not on the
weakness of the defendants claim.[34]
Private respondents contention that the dispositive portion of the CA
decision on April 30, 1979 in CA GR 40796-R which mentioned only
"landholding" and not "landholdings", thus referring only to that area
claimed by the Damasen spouses, is too trivial. A reading of the said
decision and the foregoing discussions clearly indicates that the land to be
registered in private respondents name is limited to a certain area stated
in the sketch annexed to the Commissioners report. It categorically
excluded those portions pertaining to the oppositors. Since private
respondent failed to show that she has a proprietary right over the
excluded areas, such as the portions occupied by those against whom the
writ of possession was sought for, then the trial court was correct in
refusing to grant the writ as the same has no basis.
Page 12 of 74
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court
dated September 14, 1981 and November 25, 1981 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
3)
[G.R. No. 107427. January 25, 2000]
JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 58, in LRC Case No. M-77,[1] which was reversed by
respondent Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1992 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 26122.[2] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
respondent court on September 30, 1992.[3]
The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven
(9,657) square meters of land located in Las Pias, Metro Manila. The facts
show that sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell,
Sr., acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and Jimenez
families of Las Pias; after which corresponding Tax Declarations were
issued in the name of Maria Cailles. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles
sold the said parcels of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed
of Sale which was duly annotated and registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name
of petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria
Cailles.
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.[4] The case was docketed as
L.R.C. Case No.4328. On February 21, 1964, the Director of Lands,
represented by the Solicitor General, opposed petitioners application on
the grounds that neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed
sufficient title to the subject land nor have they been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for at least
thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the subject land is part
of the public domain.[5]
The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an
action filed by Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles before the then
Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal. The case was finally disposed of by
this Court in G.R. No. 5263 where the rights of Maria Cailles were upheld
over those of the oppositor Leonardo.[6]
On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were
forwarded to the Makati Regional Trial Court [7] where it was docketed as
Land Registration Case No. M-77. The Solicitor General resubmitted his
opposition to the application on July 22, 1985,[8] this time alleging the
following additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time; and (2) that the tax
declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute acquisition of the
lands applied for.
On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application
of petitioner.[9] The Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent
Court which, on June 29, 1992, reversed and set aside the lower courts
Order.[10] It also denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its
Resolution of September 30, 1992.[11]
Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following grounds -
"I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in finding that the
commencement of thirty 30) year period mandated under Sec. 48 (b )
shall commence only on March 27, 1972 in accordance with the
classification made by the Bureau of Forestry in First (1st) Indorsement
dated August 20, 1986.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an ERROR in DRAWING
conclusion and inference that prior to the declaration by the Bureau of
Forestry in Marc 27; 1972, the parcels of land sought to be registered by
Applicant was part of the forest land or forest reserves.
III. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED and failed to consider VESTED
RIGHTS of the applicant-appellant and his predecessors-in-interest land
occupied from 1908."[12]
The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title
to the subject land under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
having by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since 1908. On the other hand it is the respondents position
that since the subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or
disposable on March 27, 1972,[13] petitioner did not have any title to
confirm when he filed his application in 1963. Neither was the requisite
thirty years possession met.
We agree with respondents.
In Republic vs. Doldol,[14] the requisites to acquire title to public land
were laid down, as follows --
"x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded b R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As
amended, Section 48(b) now reads: Maniks
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
Page 13 of 74
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter." (italicized in the original)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public
Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same must be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued."
Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that
the land is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with respondents
that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his
application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively
shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable
or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and
his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still
cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject
parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of
private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a
grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or
disposable portions of the public domain.[15]
A similar situation existed in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[16]
where a homestead patent issued to the petitioners predecessor-in-
interest was cancelled on the ground t at at the time it was issued, the
subject land was still part of the public domain. In the said case, this Court
ruled as follows --
"Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership
in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same
doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Director of
Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340). Manikan
Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. This petitioners failed to do.
We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent was issued
to petitioners predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong to the
inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title
issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at
the time the homestead parent was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-
interest of the original patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not then
authorized to dispose of the same because the area was not yet classified
as disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to herein
petitioners by the Bur au of Lands is void ab initio."
Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified
as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the
subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to
be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable.[17] In
the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land
until released therefrom and open to disposition.[18] Indeed, it has been
held that the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.[19]
Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative
Order recognizes private or vested rights under which his case may fall.
We only find on record the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest
Development[20] from which no indication of such exemption may be
gleaned.
Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for
confirmation of imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the other errors
raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ.,
concur.2/17/00 9:46 AM
4)
[G.R. No. 150413. July 1, 2003]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ALEXANDRA LAO,
respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 56230, which affirmed the judgment [2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-
719.
On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, an application for the registration
of title over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D,
Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, consisting of nine thousand three
hundred forty nine (9,349) square meters under Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. Respondent
alleged that she acquired the land by purchase from the siblings
Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela, who inherited it from
Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father,
Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer.
In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her
under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, also
Page 14 of 74
known as the Public Land Act, based on her and her predecessors open,
public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession
and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty
(30) years.
At the hearing in the lower court, respondent presented the following
witnesses: Candido Amoroso, who testified on the ownership of the land
by Edilberto Perido in 1932; Vicente Laudato, who testified on respondents
purchase of the property from Raymundo and Ma. Victoria; and Fina
Victoria So-Liwanag, who assisted respondent in her application for
registration. Respondent likewise presented in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale[3] dated April 19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and Victoria
in her favor, the survey plan and technical description of the property, and
the tax declarations in the name of respondent as well as her
predecessors-in-interest.
On June 28, 1996, the trial court made the following findings, to wit:
x x x the applicant acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from
Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela in 1994, and that
applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and in the concept of an owner
possession of the subject parcel of land for more than thirty (30) years
now; and that the same parcel was declared for taxation purposes; that
the realty taxes due thereon have been duly paid; that the land involved in
this case is not covered by any land patent. Likewise, this Court could
well-discern from the survey plan covering the same property, as well as
technical description and other documents presented, that the land sought
to be registered is agricultural and not within any forest zone or public
domain; and that tacking her predecessors-in-interests possession to hers,
applicant appears to be in continuous and public possession thereof for
more than thirty (30) years.[4]
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration
and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan
Ap-04-007770 and containing an area of nine thousand three hundred
forty-nine (9,349) square meters as supported by its technical description
now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of legal age, married to
NELSON O. LAO, Filipino citizen, with residence at 1648 Yakal Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree
of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 56230. On October 15, 2001, the appellate court affirmed
the judgment of the trial court.[6] Hence, this petition for review raising the
following errors:
THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF
RESPONDENT.[7]
A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGALLY REQUIRED
PERIOD AND ACTS OF POSSESSION.[8]
B. THE TAX DECLARATIONS PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT DO NOT
CORROBORATE HER CLAIM OF THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD OF
POSSESSION.[9]
C. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT A CERTIFICATION FROM THE
APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF HER
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.[10]
In sum, the issues presented before us are (a) whether or not respondent
was able to prove, by the quantum of evidence mandated by law, that she
met the required period of open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession, in the concept of an owner, of the subject parcel of land; and
(b) whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of
her application was disposable and alienable land of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions
shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-
interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945.
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant
must show that (a) he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Respondent submits that Section 48 (b) of CA 141 was amended by
Republic Act No. 6940, which reduced the required period of possession to
thirty years immediately prior to the filing of the application. Said law
became effective on April 15, 1990. However, petitioner maintains that the
required period of possession remained the same. RA 6940 explicitly
states that its provisions amended sections 44, 45 and 47 of CA 141.
Page 15 of 74
Nothing in RA 6940 amends Section 48 (b). In other words, the requisites
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title set forth therein
remains the same, namely, (1) possession of the subject land from June
12, 1945, and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain. In Public Estates Authority v. Court of
Appeals,[11] we held that:
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required
possession en concepto de dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26,
1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained. However, on
June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No.
141. This later enactment required adverse possession for a period of only
thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No.
1073, further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
December 31, 1987. Under this decree, the provisions of Section 48 (b)
and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable land of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[12]
thus:
This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol [295 SCRA 359, (1998)] that,
originally, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended
Section 48 (b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Petitioner argues that respondent failed to prove by incontrovertible
evidence that she had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land, in the concept of an owner,
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. According to petitioner, respondents
witnesses did not state the exact period when respondents predecessors-
in-interest started occupying the subject land. They only made sweeping
statements to the effect that respondent had been in possession of the
property for more than thirty years. Hence, it can not be conclusively
determined whether respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have
truly been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Furthermore, respondent failed to show how the property was transferred
from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A.
Valenzuela. No extrajudicial settlement of property was established.
Consequently, respondent can not tack her possession with those of
Generosa Medina and her predecessors-in-interest.
There is merit in the petition.
Candido Amoroso, respondents first witness, testified that he first knew of
the property in 1932 and that it was owned by a certain Edilberto Perido.
However, no evidence was presented to support his claim. Respondent
submitted the tax declarations in the name of her predecessors-in-
interest, including that of Edilberto. However, the earliest of these
documents pertained to the year 1948 only, three years short of the
required period. Respondents other witness, Vicente Laudato, claimed that
he had known about the property since he was ten years old, which was in
1945, and that Edilberto Perido owned the property. On cross-
examination, however, he testified that he based his information on
Edilbertos ownership of the land on the fact that the latter used to greet
him and his family whenever he passed by their house. Vicente later on
admitted that he did not know with certainty whether Edilberto was indeed
the owner and possessor of the property.[13]
Finally, respondent failed to present the extrajudicial settlement or other
document evidencing the transfer of the land from Generosa Medina to
Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. She likewise did not
show the relationship between these parties.She only presented the deed
of sale between her and the latter, where it was stated that Raymundo and
Ma. Victoria inherited the property from Generosa. Hence, respondent can
not tack her possession with those of Generosa and her predecessors-in-
interest. At most, respondents possession can only be reckoned from the
time that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria claimed possession of the property.
Respondent having thus failed to show by incontrovertible evidence that
her possession of the land commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier, she
failed to meet the first requisite under the pertinent provisions of PD 1529
and CA 141.
Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land
subject of her application is classified as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our
Constitution,[14] all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.[15] All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State.[16] Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain.[17] To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.[18]
Page 16 of 74
In De Ocampo v. Arlos,[19] it was held that:
x x x a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public
Land Act only if it pertains to alienable lands of the public domain. Unless
such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable,
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential
Decree No. 1073 clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by
specifically declaring that the latter applied only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate government
agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land as alienable and
disposable was presented by respondent. Respondent merely submitted
the survey map and technical descriptions of the land, which contained no
information regarding the classification of the property. These documents
are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain.
Respondent argues that she was not required to present any certification
stating that the land is open for disposition because no opposition to her
application was ever made by the appropriate government agencies. She
claims that in the absence of any proof to the contrary, lands of the public
domain are agricultural in nature and thus susceptible to private
ownership.
As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent had the
initial obligation to show that the property involved is agricultural. Being
the interested party, it was incumbent upon her to prove that the land
being registered is indeed alienable or disposable.She cannot rely on the
mere presumption that it was agricultural and, therefore, alienable part of
the public domain.[20] Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtilar,[21] we held:
It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an
applicant files his application for registration, the burden shifts totally to
the government to prove that the land forms part of the unclassified forest
zone. The ruling in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA
69) governs applications for confirmation of imperfect title. The applicant
shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought
to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government agencies is of
no moment because the State cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents.[22]
It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and its
conversion into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes requires an express and positive act from the government.[23] It
cannot be presumed; but must be established by convincing proof.[24]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The application for original registration of title over Lot
No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, which was
docketed as Land Registration Case No. TG-719 before the Regional Trial
Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
5)
[G.R. No. 151212. September 10, 2003]
TEN FORTY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Represented by its
President, VERONICA G. LORENZANA, petitioner, vs. MARINA
CRUZ, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In an ejectment suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled
upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de
facto. In the present case, both parties base their alleged right to possess
on their right to own. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in passing
upon the question of ownership to be able to decide who was entitled to
physical possession of the disputed land.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to nullify the August 31, 2001 Decision[2] and December 19, 2001
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- GR SP No. 64861. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the Decision dated May 4, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED. [4]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:
A complaint for ejectment was filed by [Petitioner Ten Forty Realty and
Development Corporation] against x x x [Respondent Marina Cruz] before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Olongapo City, docketed as
Civil Case 4269, which alleged that: petitioner is the true and absolute
owner of a parcel of lot and residential house situated in #71 18th Street,
E.B.B. Olongapo City, particularly described as:
A parcel of residential house and lot situated in the above-mentioned
address containing an area of 324 square meters more or less bounded on
the Northeast by 041 (Lot 255, Ts-308); on the Southeast by 044 (Lot
255, Ts-308); on the Southwest by 043 (Lot 226-A & 18th street) and on
the Northwest by 045 (Lot 227, Ts-308) and declared for taxation
purposes in the name of [petitioner] under T.D. No. 002-4595-R and 002-
4596.
having acquired the same on December 5, 1996 from Barbara Galino by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale; the sale was acknowledged by said
Barbara Galino through a 'Katunayan'; payment of the capital gains tax for
the transfer of the property was evidenced by a Certification Authorizing
Registration issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; petitioner came to
Page 17 of 74
know that Barbara Galino sold the same property on April 24, 1998 to
Cruz, who immediately occupied the property and which occupation was
merely tolerated by petitioner; on October 16, 1998, a complaint for
ejectment was filed with the Barangay East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City but
for failure to arrive at an amicable settlement, a Certificate to File Action
was issued; on April 12, 1999 a demand letter was sent to [respondent] to
vacate and pay reasonable amount for the use and occupation of the
same, but was ignored by the latter; and due to the refusal of
[respondent] to vacate the premises, petitioner was constrained to secure
the services of a counsel for an agreed fee of P5,000.00 as attorneys fee
and P500.00 as appearance fee and incurred an expense of P5,000.00 for
litigation.
In respondents Answer with Counterclaim, it was alleged that: petitioner is
not qualified to own the residential lot in dispute, being a public land;
according to Barbara Galino, she did not sell her house and lot to
petitioner but merely obtained a loan from Veronica Lorenzana; the
payment of the capital gains tax does not necessarily show that the Deed
of Absolute Sale was at that time already in existence; the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter because the complaint was filed
beyond the one (1) year period after the alleged unlawful deprivation of
possession; there is no allegation that petitioner had been in prior
possession of the premises and the same was lost thru force, stealth or
violence; evidence will show that it was Barbara Galino who was in
possession at the time of the sale and vacated the property in favor of
respondent; never was there an occasion when petitioner occupied a
portion of the premises, before respondent occupied the lot in April 1998,
she caused the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Barbara
Galino and a new one issued in respondents name; petitioner obtained its
tax declaration over the same property on November 3, 1998, seven (7)
months [after] the respondent [obtained hers]; at the time the house and
lot [were] bought by respondent, the house was not habitable, the power
and water connections were disconnected; being a public land, respondent
filed a miscellaneous sales application with the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office in Olongapo City; and the action for
ejectment cannot succeed where it appears that respondent had been in
possession of the property prior to the petitioner.[5]
In a Decision[6] dated October 30, 2000, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) ordered respondent to vacate the property and surrender to
petitioner possession thereof. It also directed her to pay, as damages for
its continued unlawful use, P500 a month from April 24, 1999 until the
property was vacated, P5,000 as attorneys fees, and the costs of the suit.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court[7] (RTC) of Olongapo City (Branch 72)
reversed the MTCC. The RTC ruled as follows: 1) respondents entry into
the property was not by mere tolerance of petitioner, but by virtue of a
Waiver and Transfer of Possessory Rights and Deed of Sale in her favor; 2)
the execution of the Deed of Sale without actual transfer of the physical
possession did not have the effect of making petitioner the owner of the
property, because there was no delivery of the object of the sale as
provided for in Article 1428 of the Civil Code; and 3) being a corporation,
petitioner was disqualified from acquiring the property, which was public
land.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioner had failed to make a case
for unlawful detainer, because no contract -- express or implied -- had
been entered into by the parties with regard to possession of the property.
It ruled that the action should have been for forcible entry, in which prior
physical possession was indispensable -- a circumstance petitioner had not
shown either.
The appellate court also held that petitioner had challenged the RTCs
ruling on the question of ownership for the purpose of compensating for
the latters failure to counter such ruling. The RTC had held that, as a
corporation, petitioner had no right to acquire the property which was
alienable public land.
Hence, this Petition.[8]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals had clearly erred in not holding that
[r]espondents occupation or possession of the property in question was
merely through the tolerance or permission of the herein [p]etitioner;
[2.] The Honorable Court of Appeals had likewise erred in holding that the
ejectment case should have been a forcible entry case where prior physical
possession is indispensable; and
[3.] The Honorable Court of Appeals had also erred when it ruled that the
herein [r]espondents possession or occupation of the said property is in
the nature of an exercise of ownership which should put the herein
[p]etitioner on guard.[9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Alleged Occupation by Tolerance
Petitioner faults the CA for not holding that the former merely tolerated
respondents occupation of the subject property. By raising this issue,
petitioner is in effect asking this Court to reassess factual findings. As a
general rule, this kind of reassessment cannot be done through a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, because this
Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law. [10] Petitioner
has not given us ample reasons to depart from the general rule.
On the basis of the facts found by the CA and the RTC, we find that
petitioner failed to substantiate its case for unlawful detainer. Admittedly,
no express contract existed between the parties. Not shown either was the
corporations alleged tolerance of respondents possession.
While possession by tolerance may initially be lawful, it ceases to be so
upon the owners demand that the possessor by tolerance vacate the
property.[11] To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or
Page 18 of 74
tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the possession.[12]
Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Sarona v. Villegas[13]
elucidates thus:
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word tolerance
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible
entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And
for two reasons. First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to
the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy
redress in the inferior court provided for in the rules. If one year from the
forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy
ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his
right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in
the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the
result may well be that no action for forcible entry can really prescribe. No
matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will
merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of
tolerance to prevent prescription to set in and summarily throw him out of
the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind
the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
summary in nature, and that the one year time bar to suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action.[14]
In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any
averment of fact that would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz.
The Complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent
immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action
merely tolerated by petitioner;[15] and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of
the premises was by mere tolerance.[16]
These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory that
its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance
the view that respondents occupation of the property was unlawful at its
inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful
detainer cases that petitioners supposed act of sufferance or tolerance
must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to
be recovered.[17]
As the bare allegation of petitioners tolerance of respondents occupation of
the premises has not been proven, the possession should be deemed
illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment
case should have been for forcible entry -- an action that had already
prescribed, however, when the Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The
prescriptive period of one year for forcible entry cases is reckoned from
the date of respondents actual entry into the land, which in this case was
on April 24, 1998.
Second Issue:
Nature of the Case
Much of the difficulty in the present controversy stems from the legal
characterization of the ejectment Complaint filed by petitioner.
Specifically, was it for unlawful detainer or for forcible entry?
The answer is given in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which we
reproduce as follows:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any
such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one
(1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring
an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.
While both causes of action deal only with the sole issue of physical or de
facto possession,[18] the two cases are really separate and distinct, as
explained below:
x x x. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In
unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal
from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to
possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such
action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of
action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants entry into
the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against
the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other
hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the
case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from
the date of the last demand.[19]
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint [20]
and the character of the relief sought.[21]
In its Complaint, petitioner alleged that, having acquired the subject
property from Barbara Galino on December 5, 1996,[22] it was the true and
absolute owner[23] thereof; that Galino had sold the property to
Respondent Cruz on April 24, 1998;[24] that after the sale, the latter
immediately occupied the property, an action that was merely tolerated by
Page 19 of 74
petitioner;[25] and that, in a letter given to respondent on April 12,
1999,[26] petitioner had demanded that the former vacate the property,
but that she refused to do so.[27] Petitioner thereupon prayed for judgment
ordering her to vacate the property and to pay reasonable rentals for the
use of the premises, attorneys fees and the costs of the suit.[28]
The above allegations appeared to show the elements of unlawful detainer.
They also conferred initiatory jurisdiction on the MTCC, because the case
was filed a month after the last demand to vacate -- hence, within the
one-year prescriptive period.
However, what was actually proven by petitioner was that possession by
respondent had been illegal from the beginning. While the Complaint was
crafted to be an unlawful detainer suit, petitioners real cause of action was
for forcible entry, which had already prescribed. Consequently, the MTCC
had no more jurisdiction over the action.
The appellate court, therefore, did not err when it ruled that petitioners
Complaint for unlawful detainer was a mere subterfuge or a disguised
substitute action for forcible entry, which had already prescribed. To
repeat, to maintain a viable action for forcible entry, plaintiff must have
been in prior physical possession of the property; this is an essential
element of the suit.[29]
Third Issue:
Alleged Acts of Ownership
Petitioner next questions the CAs pronouncement that respondents
occupation of the property was an exercise of a right flowing from a claim
of ownership. It submits that the appellate court should not have passed
upon the issue of ownership, because the only question for resolution in an
ejectment suit is that of possession de facto.
Clearly, each of the parties claimed the right to possess the disputed
property because of alleged ownership of it. Hence, no error could have
been imputed to the appellate court when it passed upon the issue of
ownership only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession de
facto.[30] The CAs holding is moreover in accord with jurisprudence and the
law.
Execution of a Deed of Sale
Not Sufficient as Delivery
In a contract of sale, the buyer acquires the thing sold only upon its
delivery in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any
other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred
from the vendor to the vendee.[31] With respect to incorporeal property,
Article 1498 lays down the general rule: the execution of a public
instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing that is the
object of the contract if, from the deed, the contrary does not appear or
cannot be clearly inferred.
However, ownership is transferred not by contract but by tradition or
delivery.[32] Nowhere in the Civil Code is it provided that the execution of a
Deed of Sale is a conclusive presumption of delivery of possession of a
piece of real estate.[33]
This Court has held that the execution of a public instrument gives rise
only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is
destroyed when the delivery is not effected because of a legal
impediment.[34] Pasagui v. Villablanca[35] had earlier ruled that such
constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, was deemed
negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land
sold.
It is undisputed that petitioner did not occupy the property from the time
it was allegedly sold to it on December 5, 1996 or at any time thereafter.
Nonetheless, it maintains that Galinos continued stay in the premises from
the time of the sale up to the time respondents occupation of the same on
April 24, 1998, was possession held on its behalf and had the effect of
delivery under the law.[36]
Both the RTC and the CA disagreed. According to the RTC, petitioner did
not gain control and possession of the property, because Galino had
continued to exercise ownership rights over the realty. That is, she had
remained in possession, continued to declare it as her property for tax
purposes and sold it to respondent in 1998.
For its part, the CA found it highly unbelievable that petitioner -- which
claims to be the owner of the disputed property -- would tolerate
possession of the property by respondent from April 24, 1998 up to
October 16, 1998. How could it have been so tolerant despite its
knowledge that the property had been sold to her, and that it was by
virtue of that sale that she had undertaken major repairs and
improvements on it?
Petitioner should have likewise been put on guard by respondents
declaration of the property for tax purposes on April 23, 1998, [37] as
annotated in the tax certificate filed seven months later. [38] Verily, the tax
declaration represented an adverse claim over the unregistered property
and was inimical to the right of petitioner.
Indeed, the above circumstances derogated its claim of control and
possession of the property.
Order of Preference in Double
Sale of Immovable Property
The ownership of immovable property sold to two different buyers at
different times is governed by Article 1544 of the Civil Code, which reads
as follows:
Article 1544. x x x
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person
who in good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to
the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
Galino allegedly sold the property in question to petitioner on December 5,
1996 and, subsequently, to respondent on April 24, 1998. Petitioner thus
argues that being the first buyer, it has a better right to own the realty.
However, it has not been able to establish that its Deed of Sale was
Page 20 of 74
recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Olongapo City.[39] Its claim of an
unattested and unverified notation on its Deed of Absolute Sale [40] is not
equivalent to registration. It admits that, indeed, the sale has not been
recorded in the Registry of Deeds.[41]
In the absence of the required inscription, the law gives preferential right
to the buyer who in good faith is first in possession. In determining the
question of who is first in possession, certain basic parameters have been
established by jurisprudence.
First, the possession mentioned in Article 1544 includes not only material
but also symbolic possession.[42] Second, possessors in good faith are
those who are not aware of any flaw in their title or mode of acquisition.[43]
Third, buyers of real property that is in the possession of persons other
than the seller must be wary -- they must investigate the rights of the
possessors.[44] Fourth, good faith is always presumed; upon those who
allege bad faith on the part of the possessors rests the burden of proof.[45]
Earlier, we ruled that the subject property had not been delivered to
petitioner; hence, it did not acquire possession either materially or
symbolically. As between the two buyers, therefore, respondent was first
in actual possession of the property.
Petitioner has not proven that respondent was aware that her mode of
acquiring the property was defective at the time she acquired it from
Galino. At the time, the property -- which was public land -- had not been
registered in the name of Galino; thus, respondent relied on the tax
declarations thereon. As shown, the formers name appeared on the tax
declarations for the property until its sale to the latter in 1998. Galino was
in fact occupying the realty when respondent took over possession. Thus,
there was no circumstance that could have placed the latter upon inquiry
or required her to further investigate petitioners right of ownership.
Disqualification from Ownership
of Alienable Public Land
Private corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain, as provided under Section 3 of Article XII of the Constitution,
which we quote:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited
to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold
such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may not lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead, or grant. x x x. (Italics supplied)
While corporations cannot acquire land of the public domain, they can
however acquire private land.[46] Hence, the next issue that needs to be
resolved is the determination of whether the disputed property is private
land or of the public domain.
According to the certification by the City Planning and Development Office
of Olongapo City, the contested property in this case is alienable and
disposable public land.[47] It was for this reason that respondent filed a
miscellaneous sales application to acquire it.[48]
The antecedents were summarized by the CA as follows:
On the other hand, petitioner has not presented proof that, at the time it
purchased the property from Galino, the property had ceased to be of the
public domain and was already private land. The established rule is that
alienable and disposable land of the public domain held and occupied by a
possessor -- personally or through predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously, and exclusively for 30 years -- is ipso jure converted to
private property by the mere lapse of time.[49]
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the appellate courts ruling that
respondent is entitled to possession de facto. This determination, however,
is only provisional in nature.[50] Well-settled is the rule that an award of
possession de facto over a piece of property does not constitute res
judicata as to the issue of its ownership.[51]
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), on official leave.
6)
G.R. No. 157306 November 25, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - ANATALIA ACTUB TIU
ESTONILO and ANDREA ACTUB TIU PO (in Substitution of NAZARIA
BOMBEO), Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To segregate portions of the public domain as reservations for the use of
the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, like the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, all that is needed is a presidential proclamation
to that effect. A court judgment is not necessary to make the proclamation
effective or valid.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the February 21, 2003
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 66807. The
assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:
Page 21 of 74
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered,
the ruling of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.[3]
The Facts
This case originated from an application for
registration of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 of
the cadastral survey of Cagayan de Oro consisting [of] an
area of 357,866 square meters, filed by [the] original
[a]pplicant, Nazaria Bombeo with the defunct Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental on July 22, 1954. In her
application, Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was
previously owned and possessed by a certain Rosendo
Bacas since 1894 until it was sold to her by the heirs of
Rosendo Bacas, represented by their attorney-in-fact and
heir himself, Calistro Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of
Realty (Exhibit A) on June 14, 1954.
After due notice and publication of said application,
only the Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, in behalf of
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
[AFP] and the Director of [the] Bureau of Land[s] filed its
opposition thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is not a
registrable land pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No.
265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, and which
declared Lot 4318 reserved for the use of the Philippine
Army, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 265.
RESERVING FOR THE USE OF THE
PHILIPPINE ARMY THREE PARCELS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE
BARRIOS OF BULUA AND CARMEN,
MUNICIPALITY OF CAGAYAN, PROVINCE
OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, ISLAND OF
MINDANAO.
Upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
and pursuant to the provision of section
eighty-three of Commonwealth Act Number
 One Hundred and Forty-one, I hereby
withdraw from sale of settlement and
reserve for the use of the Philippine Army,
under the administration of the Chief of
Staff subject to private rights, if any
thereby, the following described parcels of
public domain, situated in the barrios of
Bulua and Carmen, Municipality of
Cagayan, Province of Misamis Oriental,
Island of Mindanao, and particularly
described in Bureau of Lands SWO-15234,
to wit:
Lot No. 4318. x x x.
Containing an area of 354,377
square meters.
During the initial hearing set on February 12, 1955,
an Order of General Default was issued by the lower court.
On July 29, 1959, Bombeo died and was substituted by her
daughter Cipriana Actub Tiu who eventually died on
December 5, 1990. Thereafter, due to intervening deaths of
the parties, the case literally went to slumber until it was
re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 17) of Misamis
Oriental on October 16, 1991 and was pursued anew by the
daughters of Cipriana Actub Tiu, namely, Anatalia Actub Tiu
Estonilo and Andrea Actub Tiu Po. On the other hand,
Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines; were represented by the Provincial Prosecutor
Florencia Abbu and Major Raul Llacuna of JAGO [Judge
Advocate Generals Office]. On May 27, 1994, the trial court
confirmed title over Lot 4318 to Nazaria Bombeo
substituted by her heirs Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and
Andrea Actub Tiu Po and ordered registration thereof under
the names of the latter. Consequently, Oppositors Bureau
of Lands and Chief of Staff of Armed Forces of the
Philippines, through the Solicitor Generals Office; filed an
appeal to said decision x x x.
Page 22 of 74
During the pendency of the appeal, however,
Presidential Proclamation No. 330[4] took effect on June 20,
2000, excluding Lot 4318 from the operation of Presidential
Proclamation No. 265[.]
xxxxxxxxx
In view of the aforesaid decree, x x x [respondents
urged the CA] to finally put to rest the controversy in their
favor considering that the opposition of the Republic has no
longer any basis.[5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that Presidential Proclamation No. 265
(Proc 265) failed to segregate effectively Lot 4318 as part of the military
reservation. The CA said that the proclamation was not self-executory and
self-adjudicating considering that there is a need to determine private
rights of claimants over lands sought to be reserved.
Moreover, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that
respondents were able to establish with sufficient evidence their right to
have the land registered under their names. It acknowledged that
possession by respondents predecessors-in-interest had ripened into an
imperfect title of ownership, subject to judicial confirmation. It added that
ownership of the land would still be deemed vested in respondents, in view
of their almost half a century of open, continuous, adverse and peaceful
possession, even if possession by their predecessors-in-interest were not
taken into consideration.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
holding that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 did not
effectively segregate Lot 4318 from the public domain.
II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
finding that respondents were able to establish that they
 have already acquired private right over Lot 4318 which
already amounted to a title.
III.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
holding that the passage of Presidential Proclamation No.
330 which excludes from the operation of Presidential
Proclamation No. 265 Lot 4318 negates the claim of the
AFP that the land in dispute is actively possessed and used
by it.[7]
In short, the main issue is whether respondents have duly proven
their title to the subject land and may thus register it under the Public
Land Act.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue: Validity of Respondents Title
The Public Land Act[8] requires applicants for confirmation of
imperfect titles to prove (1) that the land is alienable public land; [9] and
(2) that their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the property has taken place either since time immemorial
or for the period prescribed by law. When the legal conditions are complied
with, the possessor of the land -- by operation of law -- acquires a right to
a government grant, without necessitating the issuance of a certificate of
title.[10]
After a meticulous review of the Decisions of both the trial and the
appellate courts, as well as of the evidence on record, the Court finds that
respondents failed to satisfy the above legal requirements.
Nature of Lot 4318
It is not disputed that Proc 265 specifically reserved Lot 4318 for
the use of the Philippine Army. Respondents maintain, though, that the
land was not effectively segregated as a military reservation by the
Proclamation. Relying on Baloy v. CA,[11] they allege that a petition for
reservation or a court judgment declaring the reservation is necessary to
make Proc 265 effective. They maintain that the provision in the
Page 23 of 74
Proclamation subjecting the reservation to private rights presumes that
notice and hearing will be afforded to all persons claiming ownership rights
over the land. Otherwise, the reservation would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law. They further allege that the AFP
failed to observe these requirements, thus causing the reservation to be
ineffectual.
Petitioner, however, argues that the Public Land Act does not
require a judicial order to create a military reservation. It contends that
the proviso requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights means
that persons claiming rights over the reserved land are not precluded from
proving their claims. It contends further that respondents were afforded
due process when their application for registration of title to Lot 4318 was
heard by the lower courts.
We agree with petitioner. The segregation of land for a public
purpose is governed by the Public Land Act, the pertinent provisions of
which are as follows:
SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
President may designate by proclamation any tract or
tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the
use of the Republic of the Philippines or of any of its
branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with
regulations prescribed for this purposes, or for quasi-public
uses or purposes when the public interest requires it,
including reservations for highways, rights of way for
railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems,
communal pastures or leguas comunales,
public parks, public quarries, public fishponds,
workingmen's village and other improvements for the
public benefit.
SECTION 86. A certified copy of every
proclamation of the President issued under the provisions
of this title shall be forwarded to the Director of Lands for
record in his office, and a copy of this record shall be
forwarded to the Register of Deeds of the province or city
where the land lies. Upon receipt of such certified copy,
the Director of Lands shall order the immediate survey of
the proposed reservation if the land has not yet been
 surveyed, and as soon as the plat has been completed, he
shall proceed in accordance with the next following section.
SECTION 87. If all the lands included in the
proclamation of the President are not registered under the
Land Registration Act, the Solicitor General, if requested to
do so by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall proceed in accordance with the provision
of Section fifty-three of this Act.
SECTION 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of
Lands, whenever in the opinion of the President the public
interests shall require it, to cause to be filed in the proper
Court of First Instance, through the Solicitor General or the
officer acting in his stead, a petition against the holder,
claimant, possessor, or occupant of any land who shall not
have voluntarily come in under the provisions of this
chapter or of the Land Registration Act, stating in
substance that the title of such holder, claimant,
possessor, or occupant is open to discussion; or that the
boundaries of any such land which has not been brought
into court as aforesaid are open to question; or that it is
advisable that the title to such lands be settled and
adjudicated, and praying that the title to any such land or
the boundaries thereof or the right to occupancy thereof
be settled and adjudicated. The judicial proceedings under
this section shall be in accordance with the laws on
adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.
Clearly, under the above provisions, only a positive act of the
President is needed to segregate a piece of land for a public purpose. It
must be noted that while Section 53 grants authority to the director of
lands -- through the solicitor general -- to file a petition against claimants
of the reserved land, the filing of that petition is not mandatory. The
director of lands is required to file a petition only whenever in the opinion
of the President public interest requires it.
Inapplicable is the ruling in Baloy v. CA[12] requiring, after due
notice and hearing, a judicial declaration of reservation. The subject of the
application for registration in Baloy was originally private land, as
evidenced by a possessory information title issued in the applicants favor
Page 24 of 74
during the Spanish era. As will be explained shortly, Lot 4318 in the
present case is unquestionably public land. The only issue is whether
respondents have acquired title to the property.
Moreover, the governing law in Baloy was Act 627.[13] Under the
provisions of that law, the private character of the land shall be respected
absent any court order declaring that the property has become public. In
the case before us, Proc 265 was issued pursuant to Commonwealth Act
(CA) No. 141. Accordingly, only a positive act of the President is required
to create a government reservation.
Verily, the Proclamation successfully segregated Lot 4318 as a
military reservation. Consequently, respondents could not have validly
occupied it in 1954, because it was considered inalienable [14] since its
reservation in 1938.
Respondents Period of Possession
Notwithstanding the reservation in 1938 of Lot 4318 for military
use, respondents maintain their entitlement to have it registered under
their names. They allege that their predecessors-in-interest were already
in adverse, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the property for
over 30 years prior to 1938. Thus, they conclude that their imperfect title
had already attached long before the issuance of the Proclamation
segregating the land as a military reservation.
We are not convinced. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding on
this Court. To this rule, however, there are settled exceptions; for
instance, when the judgment assailed is not supported by sufficient
evidence or is based on a misapprehension of facts.[15] We find that these
exceptions apply here.
Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belongs to the State as part of the public
domain.[16] For this reason, imperfect titles to agricultural lands are
subjected to rigorous scrutiny before judicial confirmation is granted.[17] In
the same manner, persons claiming the protection of private rights in
order to exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear
and convincing evidence that the pieces of property in question have been
acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands.[18]
 In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect
title, the trial and the appellate courts gave much weight to the tax
declarations presented by the former. However, while the tax declarations
were issued under the names of respondents predecessors-in-interest, the
earliest one presented was issued only in 1954.[19] The Director, Lands
Management Bureau v. CA[20] held thus:
x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are
mere indicia of [a] claim of ownership. In Director of Lands
vs. Santiago:
x x x [I]f it is true that the original
owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago,
had been in possession since 1925, why
were the subject lands declared for
taxation purposes for the first time only in
1968, and in the names of Garcia and
Obdin? For although tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership, they constitute at least proof
that the holder had a claim of title over the
property.[21]
In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession
by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas, from whom respondents predecessors had
purportedly bought the property. This alleged prior possession, though,
was totally devoid of any supporting
evidence on record. Respondents evidence hardly supported the conclusion
that their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since
time immemorial.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, the evidence on record merely established the transfer of the
property from Calixto Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo. The evidence did not
show the nature and the period of the alleged possession by Calixto and
Rosendo Bacas. It is important that applicants for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate
their claims; they cannot simply offer general statements that are mere
conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession.[22]
Page 25 of 74
It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the
burden of proving that they have an imperfect title to Lot 4318. Even the
absence of opposition from the government does not relieve them of this
burden.[23] Thus, it was erroneous for the trial and the appellate courts to
hold that the failure of the government to
dislodge respondents, judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject land
since 1954 already amounted to a title.
In this connection, the Court reiterates the following ruling
in Director of Lands v. Agustin:[24]
x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to
have the land registered under the Torrens system simply
because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose
the registration of his land. He must show, even though
there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that
he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not
justified in registering property under the Torrens system,
simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may,
even in the absence of any opposition, deny the registration
of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that
the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the
owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to
have registered.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The segregation of
Lot 4318 as part of a military reservation is declared VALID. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 155080. February 5, 2004]
SOLEDAD CALICDAN, represented by her guardian GUADALUPE
CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. SILVERIO CENDAA, substituted by his
legal heir CELSA CENDAA-ALARAS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the April 4, 2002
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67266,[1] which set
aside the November 12, 1996 decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City, Branch 44 in Civil Case No. D-10270.[2]
The instant controversy involves a 760 square meter parcel of
unregistered land located in Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The land
was formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate on November 4,
1941. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and three children, namely,
petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno, all surnamed Calicdan.[3]
On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter
vivos whereby she conveyed the land to respondent Silverio
Cendaa,[4] who immediately entered into possession of the land, built a
fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house
thereon sometime in 1949, where he resided until his death in 1998.[5]
On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe
Castillo, filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and
Damages against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that
respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and
that she merely tolerated respondents possession of the land as well as
the construction of his house thereon.[6]
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, respondent alleged, by way of
affirmative defenses, that the land was donated to him by Fermina in
1947; and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and
adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years. Moreover, he
argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment in the special
proceedings for the Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad
Calicdan, where the court decreed the exclusion of the land from the
inventory of properties of the petitioner.[7]
On November 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the
defendant as follows:
Page 26 of 74
1. Ordering defendant Silverio Cendaa to vacate the land in
question and surrender ownership and possession of the
same to plaintiff; and
2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00
by way of attorneys fees and other litigation expenses,
plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On appeal by the respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
courts decision and declared that the donation was valid. Furthermore, it
held that petitioner lost her ownership of the property by prescription.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:
(1) whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid; and
(2) whether or not petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription.
As a rule, our jurisdiction in cases brought from the Court of Appeals
is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed
by the appellate court. This is because its findings of fact are deemed
conclusive and we are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.[9]
The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions:
(1) when the findings are grounded on speculation, surmises or
conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(4) when the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are
conflicting;
(5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond
the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a
misapprehension of facts or when it has failed to consider certain relevant
facts which, if properly taken into account, will justify a different
conclusion;
(7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence upon which they are based; and
(8) when findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.[10]
In the case at bar, the factual findings of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals are conflicting; thus, we are constrained to review the findings
of facts.
The trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina
was not the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from
his parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the
spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil
Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse
had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased
spouse. Consequently, respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina,
only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only right which the latter
could convey.
After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the Court of
Appeals ruling that the donation was valid was not supported by
convincing proof. Respondent himself admitted during the cross
examination that he had no personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan
in fact purchased the subject land from Felomino Bautista. Pertinent
portions of his testimony read:
Q. And Sixto Calicdan inherited this property from his parents?
A. No, sir.
Q. What do you mean by no?
A. To my knowledge and information, Sixto Calicdan bought the
property from his cousin, I think Flaviano or Felomino
Bautista.
Q. So, in other words, you have no personal knowledge about
how Sixto Calicdan acquired this property?
A. I think it was by purchase.
Q. According to information, so you have no actual personal
knowledge how Sixto Calicadan acquired this property?
Page 27 of 74
A. Yes, because when the property was bought by my uncle, I
was not yet born, so information only.
Q. So when you were born, you came to know already that Sixto
Calicdan is the owner of this property?
A. Yes, thru the son of Felomino Bautista who is now, I think, in
Baguio.
Q. You have not seen any document to show that Sixto Calicdan
purchased the property from one Felomino Bautista?
A. None, sir.[11]
In People v. Guittap,[12] we held that:
Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e.,
which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony
would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as evidence not of what the
witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others. The hearsay
rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone
else has told him, whether orally or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we
held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the
witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently
hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is
inadmissible as evidence.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in ruling based on respondents bare
hearsay testimony as evidence of the donation made by Fermina.
Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find that
respondent has become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary
acquisitive prescription.
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real
rights over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the
manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription
ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years without
need of title or of good faith.[13]
The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that
the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and
could transmit his ownership.[14] For purposes of prescription, there is just
title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right.[15]
Assuming arguendo that ordinary acquisitive prescription is unavailing
in the case at bar as it demands that the possession be in good faith and
with just title,[16] and there is no evidence on record to prove respondents
good faith, nevertheless, his adverse possession of the land for more than
45 years aptly shows that he has met the requirements for extraordinary
acquisitive prescription to set in.
The records show that the subject land is an unregistered land. When
the petitioner filed the instant case on June 29, 1992, respondent was in
possession of the land for 45 years counted from the time of the donation
in 1947. This is more than the required 30 years of uninterrupted adverse
possession without just title and good faith. Such possession was public,
adverse and in the concept of an owner. Respondent fenced the land and
built his house in 1949, with the help of Guadalupes father as his
contractor.His act of cultivating and reaping the fruits of the land was
manifest and visible to all. He declared the land for taxation purposes and
religiously paid the realty taxes thereon.[17]Together with his actual
possession of the land, these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of
ownership of the land occupied by him. As we said in the case of Heirs of
Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano Santiago:[18]
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having
been executed by one who was not the owner of the property donated,
may still be used to show the exclusive and adverse character of
respondents possession. Thus, in Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of
Appeals,[19] we held:
Even assuming that the donation propter nuptias is void for failure to
comply with formal requisites, it could still constitute a legal basis for
adverse possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession, a
Page 28 of 74
private document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of
ownership. In Pensader v. Pensader we ruled that while the verbal
donation under which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the lands in question is not effective as a transfer of
title, still it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive
character of the possession. (Underscoring ours)
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the dismissal of Civil
Case No. D-10270 before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch
44, and declared respondent the rightful owner of the subject property,
not on the basis of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, which is hereby
declared void, but on extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 4, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No.
67266, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. D-10270 before the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G. R. No. 158449. October 22, 2004]
LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN, JOSE REYES IGTIBEN,
JOSE DEL ROSARIO IGTIBEN, JR. and THERESA TOPACIO MEDINA,
petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68546,[1]
which set aside the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-
Amadeo, Cavite in LRC Case No. 98-133 (LRA Record No. N-69787)[2] and
dismissed petitioners application for registration of a parcel of land.
On 08 January 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court an application for
registration of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a
parcel of land with an area of 2,988 square meters, situated in Barangay
Malabag, Silang, Cavite, and more particularly described as Lot 5442, Cad
452-D, Silang Cadastre, Ap-04-007007 (hereinafter referred to as the
Subject Property). Petitioners alleged that they acquired the Subject
Property by purchase, and that they, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted,
open, public, and adverse possession of the Subject Property in the
concept of owner for more that 30 years.[3]
No opposition was filed against the application and so petitioners
proceeded with the presentation of their evidence. The State was
represented in the proceedings by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose M.
Velasco, Jr.[4]
Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, the trial
court traced the history of possession of the Subject Property back to
1958, when the Subject Property was first declared for tax purposes by
Justina Hintog.[5]
Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject Property in 1968. In
the same year, the Subject Property was transferred to spouses Alfredo
Tonido and Agatona Calanog. Agatona Calanog allegedly inherited the
Subject Property from Teodoro Calanog, her father; on the other hand,
Alfredo Tonido supposedly purchased the same property also from Teodoro
Calanog, his father-in-law. Alfredo Tonido planted the Subject Property
with palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano and other fruit bearing trees. After
the demise of Agatona Calanog, the rest of the Tonido family, consisting of
Alfredo and his children, Samuel, Elizabeth, Benjamin, Imelda and Esther,
shared possession of the Subject Property.[6]
On 21 November 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject Property to
petitioners, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.[7]
The history of possession of the Subject Property, as related above, was
supported by tax declarations in the name of petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest from 1958 to 1998.[8]
On 15 August 2000, the trial court rendered a decision approving
petitioners application for registration of the Subject Property. The
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
In its appeal, the Republic alleged that the trial court erred in approving
the application for registration despite petitioners failure to prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
Subject Property since 12 June 1945, or earlier, as required by Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, as amended by PD No. 1073. Moreover, petitioners also failed to
produce muniments of title to tack their possession to those of their
predecessors-in-interest in compliance with the prescriptive period
required by law.[9]
On 20 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finding
the appeal meritorious, setting aside the decision of the trial court, and
dismissing the application for registration of petitioners. [10] The Court of
Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its resolution
dated 22 May 2003.[11]
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals be set
aside and that the decision of the trial court, approving petitioners
application for registration of the Subject Property, be reinstated.[12]
In the original application filed by petitioners before the trial court, they
claim that they are entitled to confirmation and registration of their title to
the Subject Property in accordance with Section 14 of the Property
Page 29 of 74
Registration Decree, although they had not identified under which specific
paragraph of the said Section.[13]
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree reads
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned
river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.
By the allegation of petitioners in their application of actual, continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the Subject
Property in the concept of owner, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, for a given period of time, it can be logically
presumed that their claim to the right to register the Subject Property was
based on Section 14, paragraph (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
However, subsequent pleadings filed by both petitioners and respondent
Republic before the Court of Appeals and this Court, discuss mainly the
Public Land Act, thus, establishing that the application for registration filed
by petitioners before the trial court is essentially an application for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject
Property, governed by Sections 47 to 57 of the Public Land Act.
Proceedings under the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land
Act are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the
nature of judicial proceedings, and the decree of registration issued for
both is conclusive and final. They differ mainly in that under the Property
Registration Decree, there already exists a title which the court only needs
to confirm. On the other hand, under the Public Land Act, there exists a
presumption that the land applied for still pertains to the State, and that
the occupants and possessors can only claim an interest in the land by
virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious
possession thereof. Nonetheless, in the end, the two laws arrive at the
same goal, namely, a Torrens title, which aims at complete
extinguishment, once and for all, of rights adverse to the record title.[14]
In general, an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title under the Public Land Act must be able to prove that: (1)
the land is alienable public land; and (2) his open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.[15]
The finding of fact of the trial court that the Subject Property is alienable
public land is undisputed. What is to be determined herein is whether
petitioners have complied with the period of possession and occupation
required by the Public Land Act.
The provision of the Public Land Act that is particularly relevant to
petitioners application is Section 48(b). Through the years, Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act has been amended several times. The case of
Republic v. Doldol[16] provides a summary of these amendments, as
follows
x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As
amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073,
presently requires, for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title, the possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicants,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June
1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioners
have failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation of the
Subject Property, as required by both the Property Registration Decree
and the Public Land Act. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that
Indeed, the earliest period that the applicants could claim ownership over
the property is in 1958, which is the earliest date Justina Hintog, the
previous owner/occupant, declared the property for taxation purposes.
This is far later than June 12, 1945, the date prescribed by law that the
applicants possession under claim of ownership should have begun at the
latest.[17]
Petitioners maintain, however, that RA No. 6940, enacted on 28 March
1990, has repealed by implication Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by PD No. 1073, and has effectively reduced the required period
of possession and occupation of the land to thirty years prior to the filing
of the application for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
Petitioners arguments are without merit. This Court has already laid down
the standard for repeals by implication, as follows
Page 30 of 74
It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by implication
are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the
legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States
v. Reyes, a 1908 decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal is
deemed to exist, that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions
deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with
the former. There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing
in character. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to
render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An
inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is
needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal.[18]
In herein case, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the provisions of
RA No. 6940 do not even address the same subject matter.
In the Public Land Act, the ways by which the State may dispose of
agricultural lands is enumerated, to wit
SEC. 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of
only as follows
1. For homestead settlement;
2. By sale;
3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization;
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of
the Public Land Act since the specific requirements and application
procedure differ for every mode. More particularly, the confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles may be done two ways, either by: (a)
administrative legalization or free patents under Chapter VII of the Public
Land Act; or (b) judicial legalization or judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles under Chapter VIII of the same Act. Having filed their
application before the courts, petitioners have pursued a judicial
legalization or judicial confirmation of their title to the Subject Property.
Petitioners primarily base their arguments on the amendment by RA No.
6940 of Section 44 of the Public Land Act, to read as follows
SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner
of more than twelve (12) hectares and who, for at least thirty (30) years
prior to the effectivity of this amendatory Act, has continuously occupied
and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a
tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject to disposition, who shall
have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been
occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this
Chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of
such land not to exceed twelve (12) hectares.
While the above-quoted provision does provide for a 30-year period of
occupation and cultivation of the land, Section 44 of the Public Land Act
applies to free patents, and not to judicial confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title to which Section 48(b) applies.
The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public Land Act was
recognized by Mr. Justice Puno, in his separate opinion in the case of Cruz
v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[19] in which he
discussed the development of the Regalian doctrine in the Philippine legal
system
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act
recognizes the concept of ownership under the civil law. This ownership is
based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section
44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of
imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48(b) and (c) of the same Act
on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The remaining provisions of RA No. 6940 amend Sections 44 and 47 of the
Public Land Act by extending the periods for filing of applications for free
patents and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles,
respectively, to 31 December 2000. Except for extending the period for
filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles, RA No. 6940 does not touch on the other provisions under Chapter
VIII of the Public Land Act, such as Section 48(b) and the prescriptive
period provided therein.
Consequently, applying the standard provided by this Court on repeal by
implication, there can be no conflict or inconsistency between Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act and the provisions of RA No. 6940 that would
give rise to a repeal of the former by the latter.
The subsequent effectivity of RA No. 9176 on 01 January 2001 does not
affect the position of this Court on the issues discussed herein. Once
again, Section 47 is the only provision under Chapter VIII of the Public
Land Act amended by RA No. 9176 by further extending the period for
filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles to 31 December 2020. The other provisions of the Public Land Act
amended by RA No. 9176, such as Sections 44 and 45, already refer to
free patents under Chapter VII. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by PD No. 1073, and the prescriptive period provided therein still
remain unchanged.
IN ALL:
(1) Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA No. 6940, which
provides for a prescriptive period of thirty (30) years possession, applies
only to applications for free patents;
(2) The case at bar is a judicial application for confirmation of an imperfect
or incomplete title over the Subject Property covered by Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act; and
(3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for judicial confirmation
of an imperfect or incomplete title the continuous possession of the land
since 12 June 1945, or earlier, which petitioners herein failed to comply
with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court
AFFIRMS the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68546, which reversed the decision of the lower court in LRC Case No. 98-
Page 31 of 74
133 (LRA Record No. N-69787) and dismissed the application for land title
of petitioners. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146527. January 31, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MANNA
PROPERTIES, INC., Represented by its President, JOSE TANYAO,
respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals
Decision[2] dated 20 December 2000. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union
(trial court) dated 21 February 1996 in Land Registration Case No. N-2352
(LRC No. N-2352) approving the application of respondent Manna
Properties, Inc. (Manna Properties) for the registration in its name of a
parcel of land located in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union.
Antecedent Facts
As culled by the Court of Appeals from the evidence, the facts of the case
are as follows:
On September 29, 1994, applicant-appellee filed an Application for the
registration of title of two (2) parcels of land, specifically:
a) Lot No. 9515, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434; and
b) Lot No. 1006, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434, located in Barangay
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union measuring around 1,480 square
meters.
Initial hearing was set on February 16, 1995 by the court a quo.
Copies of the application, postal money orders for publication purposes
and record were forwarded to the Land Registration Authority by the Court
a quo on October 7, 1994.
However, per Report dated November 21, 1994 of the Land Registration
Authority, the full names and complete postal addresses of all adjoining lot
owners were not stated for notification purposes. As a result thereto, per
Order dated December 5, 1994, the applicant was directed to submit the
names and complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners of Lots
9514 and 9516. On December 14, 1994, the applicant filed its compliance,
which was forwarded to the Land Registration Authority on December 22,
1994 together with the notice of the Initial Hearing, which was reset to
April 13, 1995.
On January 31, 1995, the Land Registration Authority requested for the
resetting of the initial hearing since April 13, 1995 fell on Holy Thursday, a
non-working day to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353 or ninety
(90) days from date of the Order to allow reasonable time for possible mail
delays and to enable them to cause the timely publication of the notice in
the Official Gazette.
The initial hearing was, accordingly, reset to April 20, 1995 by the court a
quo.
On March 14, 1995, the court a quo received a letter dated March 6, 1995
from the LRA with the information that the notice can no longer be
published in the Official Gazette for lack of material time since the National
Printing Office required submission of the printing materials 75 days before
the date of the hearing. It was again requested that the initial hearing be
moved to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353.
Per Order dated March 15, 1995, the initial hearing was reset to July 18,
1995.
The Opposition to the application stated, among others, that the applicant
is a private corporation disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution
to hold alienable lands of public domain.
Per Certificate of Publication issued by the LRA and the National Printing
Office, the Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the June 12, 1995
issue of the Official Gazette officially released on June 19, 1995. The same
notice was published in the July 12, 1995 issue of the The Ilocos Herald.
Applicant-appellee presented its president Jose [Tanyao], who testified on
the acquisition of the subject property as well as Manuel Sobrepea, co-
owner of the subject property, who testified on the possession of the
applicant-appellees predecessors-in-interest.
The [documentary] evidence presented were:
1. Plan AS-013314-001434 of Lots No. 9515 and 1006;
2. Technical Description of Lot No. 9515;
3. Technical Description of Lot No. 1006;
4. Certificate in lieu of Lost Surveyors Certificate;
5. Certificate of Latest Assessment;
6. Notice of Initial Hearing;
7. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the
LRA;
8. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the
National Printing Office;
9. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the
Circulation Manager of the Ilocos Herald;
10. Clipping of the Notice of Initial Hearing;
11. Whole Issue of the Ilocos Herald dated July 12, 1995;
12. Page 3 of Ilocos Herald dated January 12, 1995;
13. Sheriffs Return of Posting;
14. Certificate of Notification of all adjoining owners of the Notice of
Initial Hearing on July 18, 1995.
Thereafter, the court a quo rendered a Decision dated February 21, 1996
granting the application. (sic)[3]
The Office of the Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), promptly appealed the trial courts
Page 32 of 74
decision to the Court of Appeals. On 20 December 2000, the Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal.
Hence, this petition.
The Regional Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court found that Manna Properties has substantiated by clear and
competent evidence all its allegations in the application for original land
registration. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) did not present any
evidence in opposition to the application. The trial court ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby approves the
application, and orders that the parcels of land identified as Lots 9515 and
1006 of Cad. 5[3]9-D San Fernando Cadastre with a total area of One
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters, situated in
Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union and embraced in Plan AS-
1331434 (Exh. A and the technical description described in Exhibit B and
B-1) shall be registered in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree in the name of the
applicant Manna Properties, Inc., represented by its President Jose
[Tanyao], Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to Marry [Tanyao] with
residence and postal address at Jackivi Enterprises, Pagdaraoan, San
Fernando, La Union, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1529.[4]
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts ruling and dismissed
petitioners argument that the applicant failed to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1529 [5] (PD 1529).
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the 90-day period for setting the
initial hearing under Section 23 of PD 1529 is merely directory and that it
is the publication of the notice of hearing itself that confers jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals stated that the records of the case reveal that the
testimony of Manuel Sobrepea was not the sole basis for the trial courts
finding that Manna Propertiess predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land in question as early as 1953. The Court of Appeals
added that while tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership,
they are the best indicia of possession.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION; and
2. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES HAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE REQUISITE
PERIOD.
The Ruling of the Court
On Whether Manna Properties Failed
to Comply with the Jurisdictional
Requirements for Original Registration
Petitioner contends that PD 1529 sets a 90-day maximum period between
the court order setting the initial hearing date and the hearing itself.
Petitioner points out that in this case, the trial court issued the order
setting the date of the initial hearing on 15 March 1995, but the trial court
set the hearing date itself on 18 July 1995. Considering that there are 125
days in between the two dates, petitioner argues that the trial court
exceeded the 90-day period set by PD 1529. Thus, petitioner concludes
the applicant [Manna Properties] failed to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements for original registration.
The petitioner is mistaken.
The pertinent portion of Section 23 of PD 1529 reads:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication etc. The court shall, within
five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and
hour of initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor
later than ninety days from the date of the order.
xxx
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land
registration court. After an applicant has filed his application, the law
requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The
notice of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is
signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court
to the LRA. This involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely
has no participation.
Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases, the applicant must
strictly comply with the jurisdictional requirements. In this case, the
applicant complied with the jurisdictional requirements.
The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing
date was set beyond the 90-day maximum period. The records show that
the Docket Division of the LRA repeatedly requested the trial court to reset
the initial hearing date because of printing problems with the National
Printing Office, which could affect the timely publication of the notice of
hearing in the Official Gazette. Indeed, nothing in the records indicates
that Manna Properties failed to perform the acts required of it by law.
We have held that a party to an action has no control over the
Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right
to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of
his duties.[6] A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive
power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial
court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an
applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither
responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all
the requirements of the law.
Petitioner limited itself to assailing the lapse of time between the issuance
of the order setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial
hearing itself. Petitioner does not raise any other issue with respect to the
sufficiency of the application. Petitioner does not also question the
sufficiency of the publication of the required notice of hearing.
Page 33 of 74
Consequently, petitioner does not dispute the real jurisdictional issue
involved in land registration cases compliance with the publication
requirement under PD 1529. As the records show, the notice of hearing
was published both in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general
circulation well ahead of the date of hearing. This complies with the legal
requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice of the
registration proceedings.
On Whether Manna Properties Sufficiently
Established Possession of the Land
For the Period Required by Law
Petitioner asserts that Manna Properties has failed to prove its possession
of the land for the period of time required by law. Petitioner alleges that
the trial court and the Court of Appeals based their findings solely on their
evaluation of the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties.
The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is limited to the review and revision of errors of law. [7] This
Court is not bound to analyze and weigh evidence already considered in
prior proceedings. Absent any of the established grounds for exception,
this Court is bound by the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.
The issue of whether Manna Properties has presented sufficient proof of
the required possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership, raises a
question of fact.[8] It invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record.
Petitioner invites us to re-evaluate the evidence and substitute our
judgment for that of the trial and appellate courts. Generally, Rule 45 does
not allow this. Matters of proof and evidence are beyond the power of this
Court to review under a Rule 45 petition, except in the presence of some
meritorious circumstances.[9] We find one such circumstance in this case.
The evidence on record does not support the conclusions of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application of Manna Properties
that, as a private corporation, Manna Properties is disqualified from
holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease. Petitioner
cites the constitutional prohibition in Section 3 of Article XII in the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still part of
the public domain.
On the other hand, Manna Properties claims that it has established that
the land in question has been in the open and exclusive possession of its
predecessors-in-interest since the 1940s. Thus, the land was already
private land when Manna Properties acquired it from its predecessors-in-
interest.
The governing law is Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141) otherwise
known as the Public Land Act. Section 48(b) of the said law, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from
the public domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. We have held that
open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by CA 141 ipso jure converts such land into private
land.[10] Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely
confirms the earlier conversion of the land into private land, the
conversion having occurred in law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete.[11]
Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-
in-interest of Manna Properties have been in possession of the land in
question since this date, or earlier, Manna Properties may rightfully apply
for confirmation of title to the land. Following our ruling in Director of
Lands v. IAC,[12] Manna Properties, a private corporation, may apply for
judicial confirmation of the land without need of a separate confirmation
proceeding for its predecessors-in-interest first.
We rule, however, that the land in question has not become private land
and remains part of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.[13] Any applicant for confirmation of
imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified to have the
land titled in his name.[14] Although Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise to a
right that is only subject to formal recognition, it is still incumbent upon
any claimant to first prove open, continuous and adverse possession for
the requisite period of time.[15] It is only when the applicant complies with
this condition that he may invoke the rights given by CA 141.
The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length
of possession consists of the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-
interest, Manuel Sobrepea (Manuel),[16] transferees affidavits, and several
tax declarations covering the land in question.
We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to
prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring
possession.[17] However, the tax declarations presented by Manna
Properties do not serve to prove their cause. Although Manna Properties
claimed during trial that they were presenting the tax declaration proving
possession since 12 June 1945,[18] a scrutiny of the tax declaration reveals
that it is not the tax declaration Manna Properties claimed it to be. Exhibit
Q-16 was in fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly issued on 28
November 1950. The annotation at the back of this tax declaration
indicates that it was issued to replace the 1945 tax declaration
covering the land in question. A substitute is not enough.
Page 34 of 74
The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12
June 1945, is material to this case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12
June 1945 or earlier. A tax declaration simply stating that it replaces a
previous tax declaration issued in 1945 does not meet this standard. It is
unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on,
before or after 12 June 1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of
the year. A tax declaration issued in 1945 may have been issued in
December 1945. Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is
stated, compliance with the reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be
established.
There is another reason why the application for registration of Manna
Properties must fail. The tax declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and
marked as Exhibit Q-16 bears several irregularities. A small annotation
found at the bottom of the back page of Exhibit Q-16 states it cancels a
previous tax declaration. Beyond stating that the cancelled tax declaration
was issued in 1945, Exhibit Q-16 does not provide any of the required
information that will enable this Court or any interested party to check
whether the original 1945 tax declaration ever existed.19 The blanks left by
Exhibit Q-16 render any attempt to trace the original tax declaration futile.
Moreover, on its face Exhibit Q-16 lacks any indication that it is only a
substitute or reconstituted tax declaration. The net effect is an attempt to
pass off Exhibit Q-16 as the original tax declaration.
The form used to prepare the tax declaration marked as Exhibit Q-16
states that it was FILED UNDER SECTION 202 OF R.A. 7160. Republic Act
No. 7160 is the Local Government Code of 1991. The sworn undertaking
by the Deputy Assessor who allegedly prepared the tax declaration reads,
Subscribed and sworn before me this 28 (sic) day of Nov. 1950 This
means that the tax declaration was issued more than forty (40)
years before the form used came into existence. Manna Properties
gave no explanation why its tax declaration used a form that did not exist
at the time of the alleged issuance of the tax declaration. The totality of
these circumstances leads this Court to conclude that Exhibit Q-16 was
fabricated for the sole purpose of making it appear that Manna Properties
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land in question
since 12 June 1945.
The earliest of the un-cancelled tax declarations presented by Manna
Properties is dated 1950. This is clearly insufficient to prove possession of
the land since 12 June 1945. The same can be said of the transferees
affidavit, which was dated 1955. Manna Properties reliance on Manuels
testimony is similarly misplaced. Not only is such evidence insufficient and
self-serving on its own but, Manuel did not also specifically testify that he,
or his parents or predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the land
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The only clear assertion of possession made
by Manuel was that his family used to plant rice on that piece of land.20
Other than the mentioned pieces of evidence, Manna Properties did not
present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in question since 12
June 1945. At best, Manna Properties can only prove possession since
1952. Manna Properties relied on shaky secondary evidence like the
testimony of Manuel and substitute tax declarations. We have previously
cautioned against the reliance on such secondary evidence in cases
involving the confirmation of an imperfect title over public land.21 Manna
Properties evidence hardly constitutes the well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse occupation under CA
141.22
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We REVERSE the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No.
52562. The Application for Registration filed by Manna Properties, Inc.
over Lots No. 9515 and 1006 of Cad. 539-D, with a total area of One
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters situated in
Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HANOVER WORLDWIDE
TRADING CORP.
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision[1]
dated May 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70077,
which affirmed the August 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56, in LAND REG. CASE NO. N-281.
Petitioner also assails the CA Resolution[2] dated March 30, 2006, denying
its Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On October 15, 1993, Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation filed an
application for Registration of Title over Lot No. 4488 of Consolacion Cad-
545-D (New) under Vs-072219-000396, situated in Barrio Sacsac,
Consolacion, Cebu, containing an area of One Hundred Three Thousand
Three Hundred Fifty (103,350) square meters, more or less, pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree. The application stated that Hanover is the owner in
fee simple of Lot No. 4488, its title thereto having been obtained through
purchase evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Attached to the petition are: 1) a Verification Survey Plan; 2) a copy of the
approved Technical Description of Lot 4488; 3) a copy of the Deed of Sale
in favor of Hanovers President and General Manager; 4) a copy of a
Waiver executed by the President and General Manager of Hanover in
Page 35 of 74
favor of the latter; 5) a Geodetic Engineer's Certificate attesting that the
property was surveyed; 6) a Tax Declaration; 7) a tax clearance; 8) a
Municipal Assessor's Certification stating, among others, the assessed
value and market value of the property; and 9) a CENRO Certification on
the alienability and disposability of the property.
Except for the Republic, there were no other oppositors to the application.
The Republic contended, among others, that neither Hanover nor its
predecessors-in-interest are in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto; the muniments of title, tax declarations and receipts of tax
payments attached to or alleged in the application do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands
applied for; Hanover is a private corporation disqualified under the
Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain; the parcels of
land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the
Republic and are not subject to private appropriation.
The case was then called for trial and respondent proceeded with the
presentation of its evidence. The Republic was represented in the
proceedings by officers from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On August 7, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision[3] approving Hanovers
application for registration of the subject lot. It held that from the
documentary and oral evidence presented by Hanover, the trial court was
convinced that Hanover and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
public, continuous, notorious and peaceful possession, in the concept of an
owner, of the land applied for registration of title, and that it had
registrable title thereto in accordance with Section 14 of P.D. 1529.
On appeal by the State, the judgment of the RTC was affirmed by the CA
via the presently assailed Decision and Resolution.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I
THE DEFECTIVE AND/OR WANT OF NOTICE BY PUBLICATION OF THE
INITIAL HEARING OF THE CASE A QUO DID NOT VEST THE TRIAL COURT
WITH JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE THEREOF.
II
DEEDS OF SALE AND TAX DECLARATIONS/CLEARANCES DID NOT
CONSTITUTE THE WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE NECESSARY
TO ACQUIRE TITLE THROUGH ADVERSE OCCUPATION.[4]

Petitioner claims that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
It avers that the RTC set the initial hearing of the case on September 25,
1995 in an Order dated June 13, 1995. Petitioner contends, however, that,
pursuant to Section 23 of P.D. 1529, the initial hearing of the case must
be not earlier than forty-five (45) days and not later than ninety (90) days
from the date of the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing.
Since the RTC Order was issued on June 13, 1995, the initial hearing
should have been set not earlier than July 28, 1995 (45 days from June
13, 1995) and not later than September 11, 1995 (90 days from June 13,
1995). Unfortunately, the initial hearing was scheduled and actually held
on September 25, 1998, some fourteen (14) days later than the
prescribed period.
Petitioner also argues that respondent failed to present incontrovertible
evidence in the form of specific facts indicating the nature and duration of
the occupation of its predecessor-in-interest to prove that the latter has
been in possession of the subject lot under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The petition is meritorious.
As to the first assigned error, however, the Court is not persuaded by
petitioners contention that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case. It is true that in land registration cases, the applicant must strictly
comply with the jurisdictional requirements. In the instant case, though,
there is no dispute that respondent complied with the requirements of the
law for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
With respect to the setting of the initial hearing outside the 90-day period
set forth under Section 23 of P.D. 1529, the Court agrees with the CA in
ruling that the setting of the initial hearing is the duty of the land
registration court and not the applicant. Citing Republic v. Manna
Properties, Inc.,[5] this Court held in Republic v. San Lorenzo Development
Corporation[6] that:
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land
registration court. After an applicant has filed his application, the law
requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The
notice of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is
signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court
to the LRA [Land Registration Authority]. This involves a process to which
the party-applicant absolutely has no participation. x x x
xxxx
Page 36 of 74
x x x a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the
Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly
with the business of such official in the performance of his duties. A party
cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court.
No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters
within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or
omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control,
especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the
law.
Moreover, it is evident in Manna Properties, Inc. that what is more
important than the date on which the initial hearing is set is the giving of
sufficient notice of the registration proceedings via publication. x x x
In the instant case, there is no dispute that sufficient notice of the
registration proceedings via publication was duly made.
Moreover, petitioner concedes (a) that respondent should not be entirely
faulted if the initial hearing that was conducted on September 25, 1995
was outside the 90-day period set forth under Section 23 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, and (b) that respondent substantially complied with the
requirement relating to the registration of the subject land.
Hence, on the issue of jurisdiction, the Court finds that the RTC did not
commit any error in giving due course to respondents application for
registration.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court agrees with petitioner on the
more important issue that respondent failed to present sufficient evidence
to prove that it or its predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the
subject property for the period required by law.
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529, as amended, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[7]
Likewise, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by
Section 4 of P.D. 1073, states:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance
of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.[8]
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for
30 years or more is not sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of P.D.
1073 on January 25, 1977, it must now be shown that possession and
occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. This
provision is in total conformity with Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529.[9]
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of law, applicants for
registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
It is true, as respondent argues, that an examination of these requisites
involve delving into questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for
review on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are generally
binding on this Court, except for certain recognized exceptions,[10] to wit:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
Page 37 of 74
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial Court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.[11]
The Court finds that the instant case falls under the third and ninth
exceptions.
A careful reading of the Decisions of the RTC and the CA will show that
there is neither finding nor discussion by both the trial and appellate
courts which would support their conclusion that respondents
predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the disputed parcel of land since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
No testimonial evidence was presented to prove that respondent or its
predecessors-in-interest had been possessing and occupying the subject
property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Hanovers President and General
Manager testified only with respect to his claim that he was the former
owner of the subject property and that he acquired the same from the
heirs of a certain Damiano Bontoyan; that he caused the payment of realty
taxes due on the property; that a tax declaration was issued in favor of
Hanover; that Hanover caused a survey of the subject lot, duly approved
by the Bureau of Lands; and that his and Hanovers possession of the
property started in 1990.[12]
The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by respondent neither
show that its predecessors possession and occupation of the subject land
is for the period or duration required by law. The earliest date of the Tax
Declarations presented in evidence by respondent is 1965, the others
being 1973, 1980, 1992 and 1993. Respondent failed to present any
credible explanation why the realty taxes due on the subject property were
only paid starting in 1965. While tax declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. [13] In
the present case, the payment of realty taxes starting 1965 gives rise to
the presumption that respondents predecessors-in-interest claimed
ownership or possession of the subject lot only in that year.
Settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests
on the applicant who must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence
that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and
duration required by law.[14]Unfortunately, as petitioner contends, the
pieces of evidence presented by respondent do not constitute the well-nigh
incontrovertible proof necessary in cases of this nature.
Lastly, the Court notes that respondent failed to prove that the subject lot
had been declared alienable and disposable by the DENR Secretary.
the contents of the Certification as proof of the facts stated therein. The
contents of the Certification are hearsay, because Hanovers President and
General Manager was incompetent to testify on the truth of the contents of
such Certification. Even if the subject Certification is presumed duly issued
and admissible in evidence, it has no probative value in establishing that
the land is alienable and disposable.[20]

The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of

Moreover, the CENRO is not the official repository or legal
private dominion presumably belong to the State.[15] The onus to overturn,
custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability
by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an
and disposability of public lands.[21] Thus, the CENRO Certification should
application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the
have been accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretarys
applicant.[16]
issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
In the present case, to prove the alienability and disposability of the
Respondent, however, failed to comply with the foregoing
subject property, Hanover submitted a Certification issued by the
requirements.
Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO) attesting
that lot 4488, CAD-545-D, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THREE
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 6, 2005 Decision and
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY (103,350) square meters, more or
March 30, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
less, situated at Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu was found to be within
70077 and the August 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Alienable and Disposable Block-1, land classification project no. 28, per
Mandaue City, Branch 56 in Land Registration Case No. N-281 are SET
map 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu. However, this certification is not
ASIDE. Respondent Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporations application
sufficient.
for registration of Lot No. 4488 of Consolacion Cad-545-D (New), under
Vs-072219-000396, Barrio Sacsac, Consolacion, Cebu, is DENIED.
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.[17] this Court held that it is
not enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable, thus:
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 173088
x x x The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Petitioner, - versus - IMPERIAL CREDIT CORPORATION
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
Respondent.
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
DECISION
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
TINGA, J.:
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of
of Court, assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land
No. 78240. The Court of Appeals Decision affirmed the Decision of the
is alienable and disposable x x x.[18]
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Antipolo City which granted
respondents application for land registration in LRC Case No. 00-2493.
In the instant case, even the veracity of the facts stated in the
CENRO Certification was not confirmed as only the President and General The following factual antecedents are matters of record.
Manager of respondent corporation identified said Certification submitted Herein respondent Imperial Credit Corporation is a corporation duly
by the latter. It is settled that a document or writing admitted as part of organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. On 07 March
the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated 1966, respondent purchased from a certain Jose Tajon a parcel of land
therein.[19] In the present case, Hanovers President and General Manager, situated in Barrio Colaique (now Barangay San Roque), Antipolo City, Rizal
who identified the CENRO Certification, is a private individual. He was not for the sum of P17,986.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Mortgage.
the one who prepared the Certification. The government official who issued Upon full payment of the balance of P1,909.00 through judicial
the Certification was not presented before the RTC so that he could have consignation, ownership of the property was consolidated in the name of
testified regarding its contents. Hence, the RTC should not have accepted respondent and the mortgage constituted thereon released in December
Page 38 of 74
1997. The property was thereafter privately surveyed under PSU-178075
and approved on 25 January 2000.
On 14 February 2000, respondent filed before the RTC of Antipolo City an
application for registration of a parcel of land, as shown on Plan PSU-
178075 containing an area of 8,993 square meters. The application was
docketed as LRC Case No. 00-2493 and raffled off to Branch 74 of said
RTC. The application alleged, among others, that respondent subrogated
former owner Jose Tajon, who has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the parcel of land, being a part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, by virtue of Deed of Sale with
Mortgage executed on 07 March 1966,
After respondent presented evidence establishing the jurisdiction facts, the
RTC issued an order of general default against the whole world allowing
respondent to present its evidence ex parte.
At the hearing, Ricardo Santos, respondents legal researcher and duly
authorized attorney-in-fact, testified on the fact of respondents actual
possession through its caretaker, Teodisia Palapus, who had been
overseeing said property since its acquisition from Jose Tajon. Palapus also
corroborated Santos testimony and added that except for some
trespassers, no one else had laid possessory claim on the property. Aside
from the transfer documents, the other documentary evidence submitted
consisted of a 1993 tax declaration, the tracing cloth plan, survey
description, a certification from the Land Management Sector in lieu of the
geodetic engineers certificate and the report by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office that the property falls within
the alienable and disposable zone.
On 21 November 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting respondents
application for registration. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, from the evidence presented both testimonial and
documentary, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has a registerable
title over the parcel of land applied for and after affirming the order of
general default against the whole world, hereby adjudicates the parcel of
land more specifically identified in Plan Psu 178075 containing an area of
EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY THREE (8,993) SQUARE
METERS in favor of the applicant IMPERIAL CREDIT CORPORATION with
business address at Unit 3-C-2, JMT Corporate Condominium, ADB Ave.,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
Once this decision becomes final, let an Order issue directing the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City, to issue the
corresponding Decree of Registration.
Page 39 of 74
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), seasonably appealed from the RTCs Decision to the Court
of Appeals, contending that respondent failed to present incontrovertible
evidence that respondent and its predecessor-in-interest have been in
open continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision on 02 June 2006, dismissing the
appeal by the OSG.
Hence, the instant petition, assigning the lone error, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC DECISION WHICH
GRANTED RESPONDENTS APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF
TITLE, HOLDING AS BASIS THEREOF PARAGRAPHS (2) AND (4) OF
SECTION 14 OF PD 1529 (THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE).[3]
Petitioner argues that contrary to the Court of Appeals ruling that
respondent was able to prove its claim under paragraphs (2) and (4) of
Section 14, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, respondents application
for registration was actually based on paragraph (1) of Section 14, P.D.
No. 1529, the conditions under which were not sufficiently established by
respondents evidence. Although petitioner concedes that respondent was
able to show that the land applied for has been declassified from the forest
or timber zone and is an alienable public agricultural land, respondents
evidence failed to satisfy the requirement under paragraph (1) of Section
14, P.D. No. 1529, that is, respondents possession and occupation of the
property for the length of time and in the manner required by law.
The petition is meritorious.
Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Any applicant for confirmation of
imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified to have the
land titled in his name.[4]
The reckoning date under the Public Land Act for the acquisition of
ownership of public lands is June 12, 1945 or earlier, and that evidence of
possession from that date or earlier is essential for a grant of an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[5]
While a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may
serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.[6] However,

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED and
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78240 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142913. August 9, 2005]
ESTATE OF SALVADOR SERRA SERRA (SPEC. PROC. NO. 242) AND
ESTATE OF GREGORIO SERRA SERRA (SPEC. PROC. NO. 240), BOTH
REPRESENTED BY THE JUDICIAL CO-ADMINISTRATOR LUIS ISASI,
MARGARITA SERRA SERRA, FRANCISCA TERESA SERRA SERRA and
FRANCISCO JOSE SERRA SERRA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
PRIMITIVO HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY PRESENTACION HERNAEZ
BELBAR, HEIRS OF LUISA HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY WILFREDO
GAYARES, LOLITA GAYARES, JULIETA FORTALEZA AND ROSAURO
FORTALEZA, HEIRS OF ROGACIANA HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY
LOURDES MONCERA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure assails the March 3, 2000 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52817, and its April 17, 2000 resolution
denying reconsideration thereof.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On December 27, 1967, a petition for reconstitution of alleged lost original
certificates of title (OCT) and owners duplicate copies in the name of
Eleuterio Hernaez covering Lot No. 1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot
Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre, in the Province of Negros Occidental,
was filed by his successors-in-interest Primitivo, Rogaciana and Luisa, all
surnamed Hernaez (Hernaez) with then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Bacolod City.
On April 6, 1968, the CFI granted the petition and ordered the
reconstitution of the subject OCTs and its duplicate copies. [1] Accordingly,
the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental issued reconstituted OCT Nos.
RO-10173, RO-10174, and RO-10175, for Lot Nos. 1316, 2685, and 717,
respectively. These reconstituted OCTs were cancelled on May 29, 1969
upon presentation by Hernaez of a declaration of heirship and in lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-51546, T-51547, and T-
51548 were issued in their names.
Upon learning of the existence of the above TCTs, Salvador Serra Serra,
for and in behalf of his co-heirs, registered their adverse claim and moved
for the cancellation of the reconstituted titles. They averred that they are
holders of valid and existing certificates of title over the subject properties
and have been in continuous and actual possession thereof.
Page 40 of 74
The trial court denied petitioners motion to cancel the reconstituted titles
and granted instead Hernaez prayer that they be placed in possession of
the subject properties, which petitioners challenged before the Court of
Appeals in a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-00139.[2]
On June 7, 1971, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction[3] which was ordered lifted in a resolution dated August 3, 1971.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence they filed before
this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, docketed as
G.R. No. L-34080 and consolidated with G.R. No. L-34693,[4] seeking to
annul the resolution lifting the writ of preliminary injunction.
On March 22, 1991, this Court rendered judgment the decretal portion of
which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are GRANTED. The questioned order of the
respondent Court of Appeals lifting the writ of preliminary injunction is SET
ASIDE. The writ of possession issued in Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO
Records No. 163 is declared NULL and VOID. The records of this case and
of CA-G.R. No. 00139 are remanded to the trial court for hearing of the
motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles. Private respondents are
ordered to return to petitioners the possession of the properties in
question. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
February 15, 1972, enjoining private respondents from interfering in any
manner, with petitioners right of possession of the properties in question,
shall remain effective until the issue of ownership and/or possession of the
properties is finally settled by a competent court.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Pursuant thereto, the trial court heard petitioners motion for cancellation
of certificates of title and on November 25, 1998, rendered judgment the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises and considerations, the
court hereby renders judgment in favor of the oppositors and hereby
orders the following:
1) The petition filed by movants Serra Serra dated November 4, 1968 is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit;
2) Declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27644 covering Lot No.
1316, Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot No. 2685, Ilog Cadastre, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-22344 covering Lot No. 717-A, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-22351, Ilog Cadastre, all issued in the name of
movants Serra Serra NULL and VOID for being issued to foreigners;
3) Declaring the oppositors Hernaez as owners of Lot No. 1316,
Kabankalan Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51546;
Lot No. 2685, Ilog Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
51547; and Lot No. 717, Ilog Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certiticate of
Title No. T-51548; and
4) Ordering the movants Serra Serra to return possession of said lots to
the oppositors Hernaez.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners assailed the lower
courts decision before the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. On
March 3, 2000, the appellate court rendered the herein assailed judgment
which dismissed the petition for lack of merit, pertinent portion of which
reads:
In the case at bench, We find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed
decision denying petitioners motion for cancellation of the reconstituted
titles, especially after the court a quo found that the evidence presented is
sufficient and proper to uphold the reconstituted certificates of title in
question. A perusal of the assailed order shows that the trial court
correctly applied the established legal principle that in cases of annulment
and/or reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely
by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that
the land sought to be reconveyed is his.
Petitioners (Serra Serra), however, as noted by the court a quo in its
Order dated November 25, 1998, failed to present in court as evidence the
original certificates of title of the aforementioned lots, Lot No. 1316, Lot
No. 2685 and Lot No. 717. Petitioners were also found to be of Spanish
citizenship and, hence, as aliens, disqualified to acquire lands in the
Philippines under the 1935 Constitution.[7]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied, hence the
instant petition based on the following assigned errors:
I allegation that they acquired the subject lots from Salvador Serra Serra
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ... DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR THE
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION BY THIS HONORABLE COURT,
IN THAT:
THE RULE THAT THE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE PREVIOUSLY FILED A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH THE LOWER COURT BEFORE HE
MAY AVAIL HIMSELF OF THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF
THE RULES OF COURT IS SUBJECT TO WELL-SETTLED EXCEPTIONS ...
...
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ... HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN
A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26, OR
WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN SERRA
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-34080, MARCH 22, 1991.[8]
Petitioners assail the dismissal of their petition on the ground that they
failed to file a motion for reconsideration with the lower court before filing
a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. While admitting
procedural lapse on their part, they argue that the rule is subject to well-
settled exceptions, such as, when the questions raised before the Supreme
Court are the same as those which have been squarely raised and passed
upon by the trial court, or when the petitioner has been deprived of due
process of law, or when the writ is urgent under the circumstances.[9]
The petition is denied. Other than citing general exceptions to the rule
requiring a motion for reconsideration as a pre-condition to instituting a
Page 41 of 74
petition for certiorari, the petitioners did not offer valid reason why their
particular case fall under any of the specified exceptions.
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non
condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari. The purpose is to grant
an opportunity to public respondent to correct any actual or perceived
error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case.[10] Petitioners failure to file a motion for
reconsideration deprived the trial court of the opportunity to rectify an
error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly
imputed. Besides, a motion for reconsideration under the present
circumstances is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy to the adverse
judgment of the trial court.
Granting arguendo that certiorari is the proper remedy, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless did not err in dismissing the petition.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners are
Spanish citizens and as such, disqualified from acquiring lands in the
Philippines. As a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in the
Philippines and the only instances when a foreigner can own private lands
are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino
citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship. The records are bereft of any
showing that petitioners derived their title by any mode which would
qualify them to acquire private lands in the country. Petitioners bare
has no probative value lacking sufficient proof that the latter is not
disqualified to own or hold private property and was able to legally
transmit to petitioners title thereto.
Petitioners alleged possession of TCTs and actual possession of the subject
lands, although strong proof of ownership, are not necessarily conclusive
where the assertion of proprietary rights is founded on dubious claim of
ownership. They claimed that their title over the subject properties
emanated from Salvador Serra Serra; yet they failed to present in
evidence the OCT in the name of the latter. Since petitioners impugn the
proprietary claim of Hernaez over the properties, the burden rests on them
to establish their superior right over the latter. To recall, the trial court
found that the evidence they presented have not established superior
proprietary rights over the respondents on the subject lots. It held that the
non-presentation of the OCTs cast doubt on the veracity of their claim. He
who asserts must prove.
It is also undisputed that petitioners are all Spanish citizens. Under
Philippine law, foreigners can acquire private lands only by hereditary
succession or when they were formerly natural-born Filipinos who lost
their Philippine citizenship. In this case, petitioners did not present proof
that they acquired the properties by inheritance. Neither did they claim to
be former natural-born Filipinos. On the contrary, they declare in this
petition that they are all Spanish citizens residing in Mallorca, Spain.
It is axiomatic that factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive and will not
be disturbed on appeal. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not its
function to examine and determine the weight of the evidence supporting
the assailed decision. Moreover, well entrenched is the prevailing
jurisprudence that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by
this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which applies with greater force to the petition
under consideration because the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are in full agreement with what the trial court found.[11]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 3, 2000 decision and the
April 17, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52817
are AFFIRMED.
THIRD DIVISION
SPS. GABRIEL LLANES AND MARIA LLANES VS. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated 31 January 2007 and Resolution[2] dated 11 April 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80021. In its assailed Decision, the
appellate court granted the appeal of herein respondent, Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), and dismissed the Application for Registration of
Title of herein petitioners, Spouses Gabriel and Maria Llanes (Spouses
Llanes); consequently, it set aside the Decision[3] dated 10 July 2003 of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Malvar-Balete, Batangas, in LRC
Case No. N-073. In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied the
Spouses Llanes Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
The Spouses Llanes applied for registration of their title over a parcel of
land known as Lot No. 5812 of Plan AP-04-009967, Malvar Cadastre, with
an area of 4,014 square meters, located in San Juan, Malvar, Batangas
(subject property).
The subject property had been in the possession of Gabriels grandmother,
Eugenia Valencia (Eugenia), since the 1930s. She declared the said
property for taxation purposes as evidenced by Tax Declarations No.
3470[4] (1948); No. 8942[5] (1955); and No. 12338,[6] No. 12365,[7] and
No. 12371[8] (1963). It was classified as agricultural land and was being
cultivated by Eugenias son and Gabriels father, Francisco Llanes
(Francisco). Francisco planted the subject property with rice.[9]
Page 42 of 74
In 1965, Gabriels brother, Servillano Llanes (Servillano), purchased the
subject property from Eugenia. Servillano personally cultivated the subject
property by planting it with rice, and then later with coconut.[10] Servillano,
together with his wife, Rita Valencia (Rita), declared the subject property
for taxation purposes under Tax Declarations No. 14051 [11] (1966), No.
1788[12] (1969), No. 1341[13] (1974), No. 0220[14] (1980), No. 00645[15]
(1982), and No. 011-00310[16] (1994).
On 29 December 1995, the subject property came into the possession of
the Spouses Llanes when they purchased the same from Servillano and
Rita. The said transaction was evidenced by a Kasulatan ng Bilihan.[17]
Gabriel himself cultivated the subject property and planted it with rice,
coffee, and black pepper.[18] The Spouses Llanes religiously paid[19] real
property taxes on the subject property, as evidenced by their current Tax
Declaration No. 011-00474[20] and Tax Clearance[21] issued by the Office of
the Municipal Treasurer of Malvar, Batangas.
In 1996, however, the Spouses Llanes conveyed the subject property to
ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.[22]
On 10 April 1997, ICTSI filed an application for registration of title over the
subject property before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan,
Batangas, where the case was docketed as LRC Case No. T-349.[23]
On 12 May 1999, ICTSI filed before the RTC a Motion with Leave of Court
to Amend Application for Registration of Title together with the Amended
Application. It alleged that due to technicality, the sale between ICTSI and
the Spouses Llanes could not push through. The tax declaration covering
the subject property was still in the names of the Spouses Llanes and
could not be transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI. Hence, there
was a need to amend the application for registration of title to substitute
ICTSI with the Spouses Llanes as party applicants.[24] In an Order dated
24 May 1999,[25] as modified by the Order dated 15 June 1999,[26] the RTC
granted the Motion with Leave of Court to Amend Application for
Registration of Title and admitted the Amended Application for Registration
of Title, thus substituting the Spouses Llanes as the party applicants in
LRC Case No. T-349.[27]
When LRC Case No. T-349 was called for initial hearing, the Spouses
Llanes presented several documents[28] to show compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements of notice, posting, and publication, which were
admitted by the RTC.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed before the RTC its Notice of
Appearance[29] as counsel for the Republic and deputized the public
prosecutor to assist it in the proceedings in LRC Case No. T-349.
The Republic submitted to the RTC its Opposition[30] to the Spouses Llanes
application, anchored on the grounds that (1) neither the Spouses Llanes
nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since 12
June 1945 or earlier; and (2) the muniments of title and/or tax
declaration(s) and tax payment receipt(s) of the Spouses Llanes appeared
to be of recent vintage and cannot constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land or of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the
concept of an owner.[31]
Considering that no private opposition to the Spouses Llanes application
was registered, an Order of General Default was issued by the RTC against
the whole world with the exception of the Director of Lands (on behalf of
the Republic), as represented by the OSG.[32]
On 21 April 1993, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 64-93
delegating to first level courts the jurisdiction to hear and decide cadastral
and land registration cases. Pursuant thereto, the RTC issued an Order
dated 5 November 2001[33] remanding the entire records of the Spouses
Llanes application to the MCTC, where the case was docketed as LRC Case
No. N-073.
The Spouses Llanes filed their formal offer of evidence before the MCTC.
Among the evidence they submitted were the Certifications issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) IV, Forest
Management Bureau (FMB)[34] dated 9 March 2000 and by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Batangas City[35]
dated 15 June 2000, both declaring the subject property as alienable and
disposable.
On 10 July 2003, the MCTC rendered a Decision granting the Application
for Registration of Title of the Spouses Llanes, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, and confirming the [O]rder of [G]eneral [D]efault, this Court
hereby adjudicates and decrees the parcel Lot No. 5812 subject matter of
this application in the names of applicants, [Spouses Llanes], both of legal
age, Filipinos, with residence and postal address at Brgy. Paligawan,
Balete, Batangas as the true and absolute owners thereof.
Once this DECISION shall have become final let the corresponding decree
of registration be issued.[36]
Unsatisfied with the aforesaid Decision, the Republic appealed to the Court
of Appeals, arguing that the MCTC erred in granting the Application for
Page 43 of 74
Registration of Title of the Spouses Llanes because the latter failed to
comply with the statutory requirement of possession for 30 years, the
subject property becoming alienable and disposable only on 22 December
1997 per the CENRO Certification. The appeal of the Republic was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 80021.
It was only at this point that the Spouses Llanes realized that the
Certifications issued to them by the government agencies concerned
stated different dates when the subject property became alienable and
disposable. Based on the DENR-FMB Certification, the subject property
became alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928. However, according
to the CENRO Certification, the subject property became alienable and
disposable only on 22 December 1997. The Spouses Llanes then verified
the correctness of the CENRO Certification and found that CENRO
committed a mistake therein. CENRO itself rectified its gaffe by issuing
another Certification dated 20 July 2004,[37] consistent with the DENR
Certification, that the subject property became alienable and disposable on
26 March 1928. The Spouses Llanes attached the corrected CENRO
Certification as Annex A to their Appellees Brief submitted to the Court of
Appeals, but the appellate court, without providing any reason, did not
consider the same.
On 31 January 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision granting
the appeal of the Republic, setting aside the MCTC Decision dated 10 July
2003, and dismissing the Application for Registration of Title of the
Spouses Llanes. The appellate court referred to the CENRO Certification
stating that the subject property became alienable and disposable only on
22 December 1997 and, on the basis thereof, found that the subject
property became alienable and disposable only after the original
application for registration was filed on 10 April 1997. The Court of
Appeals further held that the evidence presented by the Spouses Llanes on
the nature of their possession could hardly be considered incontrovertible.
The Spouses Llanes failed to discharge the burden of proving that the
subject property was already alienable and disposable at the time they
filed their application for registration of title. Similarly, the Spouses Llanes
failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
occupied the subject property in the concept of an owner since 12 June
1945 or for the period required by law.
The Spouses Llanes moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Court
of Appeals Decision but their motion was denied by the appellate court in
its Resolution dated 11 April 2007.
Hence, the present Petition raising the sole issue of whether the Court of
Appeals erred[38] in reversing and setting aside the grant by the MCTC of
the Spouses Llanes Application for Registration of Title based on its finding
that the subject property became alienable and disposable only on 22
December 1997.
The Court rules in the affirmative and, thus, finds merit in the Petition at
bar.
Primarily, the Spouses Llanes Application for Registration of Title was filed
under Presidential Decree No. 1529 otherwise known as Property
Registration Decree.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original
registration proceedings, expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the aforequoted provisions, the three requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title are: (1) that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation; and
(3) that such possession has been under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Thus, Section 14(1) requires that the
property sought to be registered should already be alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. [39]
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, or an administrative action, investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. A certification
by the CENRO of the DENR stating that the land subject of an application
is found to be within the alienable and disposable site per a land
classification project map is sufficient evidence to show the real character
of the land subject of the application.[40]
In the instant case, the Spouses Llanes submitted to the MCTC
Certifications from DENR Region IV and CENRO, Batangas City, to prove
the alienability and disposability of the subject property. However, the two
Certifications contained different dates as to when the subject property
became alienable and disposable: 26 March 1928 per the DENR
Certification, but 22 December 1997 according to the CENRO
Certification. The discrepancy between the two Certifications was
overlooked by the parties during the trial stage of the case before the
MCTC. The MCTC granted the Spouses Llanes Application for Registration
of Title without mentioning the said discrepancy between the two
Page 44 of 74
Certifications. The discrepancy was discovered only when the present case
was already before the Court of Appeals. The Spouses Llanes immediately
verified and secured a corrected Certification from the CENRO, which
confirmed the DENR Certification that the subject property became
alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928. The appellate court,
however, did not consider the corrected CENRO Certification and, in ruling
against the Spouses Llanes application, still relied on the first CENRO
Certification which incorrectly stated that the subject property became
alienable and disposable only on 22 December 1997.
To determine whether the Court of Appeals properly disregarded the
corrected CENRO Certification as evidence for the Spouses Llanes, the
Court refers to the relevant rules on evidence. Section 34, Rule 132 the
Rules of Court explicitly provides:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified.
If the Court strictly applies the aforequoted provision of law, it would
simply pronounce that the Court of Appeals could not have admitted the
corrected CENRO Certification because it was not formally offered as
evidence before the MCTC during the trial stage. Nevertheless, since the
determination of the true date when the subject property became alienable
and disposable is material to the resolution of this case, it behooves this
Court, in the interest of substantial justice, fairness, and equity, to
consider the corrected CENRO Certification even though it was only
presented during the appeal to the Court of Appeals. Since rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it
is well recognized that the Court is empowered to suspend its rules or to
exempt a particular case from the application of a general rule, when the
rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of
justice.[41]
Moreover, the Spouses Llanes should not be made to suffer the grave
consequences, which include the possibility of losing their right to their
property, arising from the mistake of CENRO, a government agency.
CENRO itself admitted its blunder and willingly issued a corrected
Certification. Very conspicuously, no other objection to the corrected
CENRO Certification was raised except as to its late presentation; its
issuance and authenticity were not challenged or placed in doubt.
Since both the DENR Certification and the corrected CENRO Certification
state that the subject property became alienable and disposable on 26
March 1928, and there is no evidence to the contrary, then the Court
accepts it to be so.
 Reviewing the evidence on record, the Court finds that the subject
property has been in the possession of the Spouses Llanes and their
predecessors-in-interest even prior to 12 June 1945. The Spouses Llanes
presented the testimony of Servillano to support this. Servillano, Gabriels
brother, was born in 1927 and was already 73 years old by the time he
testified before the RTC.[42] By 1935, he was already 8 years old and
capable of perceiving the concept of ownership. To his knowledge, the
subject property was then owned by his grandmother, Eugenia, and
cultivated and planted with rice by his father, Francisco. The perimeter of
the subject property was also planted with madre cacao and acacia
trees.[43] He personally knew of these information because he was always
with his father during the time that the latter cultivated the subject
property. The subject property was subsequently transferred by way of
sale from Eugenia to Servillano and his wife, Rita, in 1965; [44] and from
Servillanoand Rita to the Spouses Llanes in 1995.[45] Servillanos testimony
is evidence. He is testifying as the former owner of the subject property
and Gabriels predecessor-in-interest. His testimony was coherent and
detailed, and contained no implausible claims. His relationship alone with
Gabriel does not render his testimony suspect, and his credibility as a
witness was not at all impeached by the Republic, which did not bother at
all to cross-examine him.
In addition, generations of Gabriels family have declared the subject
property under their names and paid real property taxes thereon. The
earliest tax declaration was in the name of Eugenia, issued as early as
1948. While tax declarations and receipts are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes not only manifests ones sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces an adverse claim
against the State and all other interested parties with an intention to
contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens
ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[46] Tax declarations are
good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession.[47] Moreover, while tax declarations and receipts
are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the
land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute
evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership
through prescription.[48]
The evidence submitted by the Spouses Llanes, taken as a whole,
establishes that the subject property became alienable and disposable as
early as 26 March 1928; and the Spouses Llanes and their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the subject property, in the concept of an owner, even prior
to 12 June 1945. In contrast, the Republic did not present any evidence to
refute that of the Spouses Llanes. To the Court, therefore, the Spouses
Page 45 of 74
Llanes were able to sufficiently discharge the burden of proof that they
have an imperfect title to the subject property capable of judicial
confirmation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31
January 2007 and 11 April 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80021,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 10 July 2003
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Malvar-Balete, Batangas, in LRC Case
No. N-073, granting the application for registration of title to the subject
property of the Spouses Gabriel and Maria Llanes, is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 157306
Petitioner, - versus - ANATALIA ACTUB TIU ESTONILO
and ANDREA ACTUB TIU PO Promulgated:
(in Substitution of NAZARIA BOMBEO), November 25, 2005
Respondents
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To segregate portions of the public domain as reservations for the use of
the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, like the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, all that is needed is a presidential proclamation
to that effect. A court judgment is not necessary to make the proclamation
effective or valid.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the February 21, 2003 Decision[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 66807. The assailed CA Decision
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the ruling of the trial
court is hereby AFFIRMED.[3]
The Facts
The antecedents were summarized by the CA as follows:
This case originated from an application for
registration of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 of
the cadastral survey of Cagayan de Oro consisting [of] an
area of 357,866 square meters, filed by [the] original
[a]pplicant, Nazaria Bombeo with the defunct Court of First
 Instance of Misamis Oriental on July 22, 1954. In her
application, Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was
previously owned and possessed by a certain Rosendo
Bacas since 1894 until it was sold to her by the heirs of
Rosendo Bacas, represented by their attorney-in-fact and
heir himself, Calistro Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of
Realty (Exhibit A) on June 14, 1954.
After due notice and publication of said application,
only the Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, in behalf of
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
[AFP] and the Director of [the] Bureau of Land[s] filed its
opposition thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is not a
registrable land pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No.
265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, and which
declared Lot 4318 reserved for the use of the Philippine
Army, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 265. RESERVING FOR THE USE OF
THE PHILIPPINE ARMY THREE PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
SITUATED IN THE BARRIOS OF BULUA AND CARMEN, MUNICIPALITY OF
CAGAYAN, PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, ISLAND OF MINDANAO.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
and pursuant to the provision of section eighty-three of Commonwealth
Act Number One Hundred and Forty-one, I hereby withdraw from sale of
settlement and reserve for the use of the Philippine Army, under the
administration of the Chief of Staff subject to private rights, if any thereby,
the following described parcels of public domain, situated in the barrios of
Bulua and Carmen, Municipality of Cagayan, Province of Misamis Oriental,
Island of Mindanao, and particularly described in Bureau of Lands SWO-
15234, to wit:
Lot No. 4318. x x x.
Containing an area of 354,377 square meters.
During the initial hearing set on February 12, 1955,
an Order of General Default was issued by the lower court.
On July 29, 1959, Bombeo died and was substituted by her
daughter Cipriana Actub Tiu who eventually died on
December 5, 1990. Thereafter, due to intervening deaths of
the parties, the case literally went to slumber until it was
re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 17) of Misamis
Oriental on October 16, 1991 and was pursued anew by the
daughters of Cipriana Actub Tiu, namely, Anatalia Actub Tiu
Estonilo and Andrea Actub Tiu Po. On the other hand,
Page 46 of 74
Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines; were represented by the Provincial Prosecutor
Florencia Abbu and Major Raul Llacuna of JAGO [Judge
Advocate Generals Office]. On May 27, 1994, the trial court
confirmed title over Lot 4318 to Nazaria Bombeo
substituted by her heirs Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and
Andrea Actub Tiu Po and ordered registration thereof under
the names of the latter. Consequently, Oppositors Bureau
of Lands and Chief of Staff of Armed Forces of the
Philippines, through the Solicitor Generals Office; filed an
appeal to said decision x x x.
During the pendency of the appeal, however,
Presidential Proclamation No. 330[4] took effect on June 20,
2000, excluding Lot 4318 from the operation of Presidential
Proclamation No. 265[.]
xxxxxxxxx
In view of the aforesaid decree, x x x [respondents
urged the CA] to finally put to rest the controversy in their
favor considering that the opposition of the Republic has no
longer any basis.[5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 (Proc
265) failed to segregate effectively Lot 4318 as part of the military
reservation. The CA said that the proclamation was not self-executory and
self-adjudicating considering that there is a need to determine private
rights of claimants over lands sought to be reserved.
Moreover, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondents
were able to establish with sufficient evidence their right to have the land
registered under their names. It acknowledged that possession by
respondents predecessors-in-interest had ripened into an imperfect title of
ownership, subject to judicial confirmation. It added that ownership of the
land would still be deemed vested in respondents, in view of their almost
half a century of open, continuous, adverse and peaceful possession, even
if possession by their predecessors-in-interest were not taken into
consideration.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
 I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding
that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 did not effectively
segregate Lot 4318 from the public domain.
II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding
that respondents were able to establish that they have already
acquired private right over Lot 4318 which already amounted
to a title.
III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding
that the passage of Presidential Proclamation No. 330 which
excludes from the operation of Presidential Proclamation No.
265 Lot 4318 negates the claim of the AFP that the land in
dispute is actively possessed and used by it.[7]
In short, the main issue is whether respondents have duly proven their
title to the subject land and may thus register it under the Public Land Act.
The Courts Ruling: The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Validity of Respondents Title
The Public Land Act[8] requires applicants for confirmation of imperfect
titles to prove (1) that the land is alienable public land; [9] and (2) that
their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the property has taken place either since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed by law. When the legal conditions are complied with, the
possessor of the land -- by operation of law -- acquires a right to a
government grant, without necessitating the issuance of a certificate of
title.[10]
After a meticulous review of the Decisions of both the trial and the
appellate courts, as well as of the evidence on record, the Court finds that
respondents failed to satisfy the above legal requirements.
Nature of Lot 4318
It is not disputed that Proc 265 specifically reserved Lot 4318 for the use
of the Philippine Army. Respondents maintain, though, that the land was
not effectively segregated as a military reservation by the Proclamation.
Relying on Baloy v. CA,[11] they allege that a petition for reservation or a
court judgment declaring the reservation is necessary to make Proc 265
effective. They maintain that the provision in the Proclamation subjecting
the reservation to private rights presumes that notice and hearing will be
afforded to all persons claiming ownership rights over the land. Otherwise,
the reservation would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law. They further allege that the AFP failed to observe these
requirements, thus causing the reservation to be ineffectual.
Page 47 of 74
Petitioner, however, argues that the Public Land Act does not require a
judicial order to create a military reservation. It contends that the proviso
requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights means that
persons claiming rights over the reserved land are not precluded from
proving their claims. It contends further that respondents were afforded
due process when their application for registration of title to Lot 4318 was
heard by the lower courts.
We agree with petitioner. The segregation of land for a public purpose is
governed by the Public Land Act, the pertinent provisions of which are as
follows:
SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, the President may designate by proclamation any
tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of
the Republic of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the
inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this
purposes, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest
requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads,
hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas
comunales,
public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen's village and
other improvements for the public benefit.
SECTION 86. A certified copy of every proclamation of the President issued
under the provisions of this title shall be forwarded to the Director of
Lands for record in his office, and a copy of this record shall be forwarded
to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. Upon
receipt of such certified copy, the Director of Lands shall order the
immediate survey of the proposed reservation if the land has not yet been
surveyed, and as soon as the plat has been completed, he shall proceed in
accordance with the next following section.
SECTION 87. If all the lands included in the proclamation of the President
are not registered under the Land Registration Act, the Solicitor General, if
requested to do so by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall proceed in accordance with the provision of Section fifty-three of this
Act.
SECTION 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands, whenever in the
opinion of the President the public interests shall require it, to cause to be
filed in the proper Court of First Instance, through the Solicitor General or
the officer acting in his stead, a petition against the holder, claimant,
possessor, or occupant of any land who shall not have voluntarily come in
under the provisions of this chapter or of the Land Registration Act, stating
in substance that the title of such holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant
is open to discussion; or that the boundaries of any such land which has
not been brought into court as aforesaid are open to question; or that it is
advisable that the title to such lands be settled and adjudicated, and
praying that the title to any such land or the boundaries thereof or the
right to occupancy thereof be settled and adjudicated. The judicial
proceedings under this section shall be in accordance with the laws on
adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.
Clearly, under the above provisions, only a positive act of the President is
needed to segregate a piece of land for a public purpose. It must be noted
that while Section 53 grants authority to the director of lands -- through
the solicitor general -- to file a petition against claimants of the reserved
land, the filing of that petition is not mandatory. The director of lands is
required to file a petition only whenever in the opinion of the President
public interest requires it.
Inapplicable is the ruling in Baloy v. CA[12] requiring, after due notice and
hearing, a judicial declaration of reservation. The subject of the application
for registration in Baloy was originally private land, as evidenced by a
possessory information title issued in the applicants favor during the
Spanish era. As will be explained shortly, Lot 4318 in the present case is
unquestionably public land. The only issue is whether respondents have
acquired title to the property.
Moreover, the governing law in Baloy was Act 627.[13] Under the provisions
of that law, the private character of the land shall be respected absent any
court order declaring that the property has become public. In the case
before us, Proc 265 was issued pursuant to Commonwealth Act (CA) No.
141. Accordingly, only a positive act of the President is required to create
a government reservation.
Verily, the Proclamation successfully segregated Lot 4318 as a military
reservation. Consequently, respondents could not have validly occupied it
in 1954, because it was considered inalienable [14] since its reservation in
1938.
Respondents Period of Possession
Notwithstanding the reservation in 1938 of Lot 4318 for military use,
respondents maintain their entitlement to have it registered under their
names. They allege that their predecessors-in-interest were already in
adverse, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the property for
over 30 years prior to 1938. Thus, they conclude that their imperfect title
had already attached long before the issuance of the Proclamation
segregating the land as a military reservation.
We are not convinced. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding on this
Court. To this rule, however, there are settled exceptions; for instance,
Page 48 of 74
when the judgment assailed is not supported by sufficient evidence or is
based on a misapprehension of facts.[15] We find that these exceptions
apply here.
Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase
or by grant, belongs to the State as part of the public domain. [16] For this
reason, imperfect titles to agricultural lands are subjected to rigorous
scrutiny before judicial confirmation is granted.[17] In the same manner,
persons claiming the protection of private rights in order to exclude their
lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the pieces of property in question have been acquired by a
legal method of acquiring public lands.[18]
In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect title, the
trial and the appellate courts gave much weight to the tax declarations
presented by the former. However, while the tax declarations were issued
under the names of respondents predecessors-in-interest, the earliest one
presented was issued only in 1954.[19] The Director, Lands Management
Bureau v. CA[20] held thus:
x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership. They are mere indicia of [a] claim of ownership. In Director
of Lands vs. Santiago:
x x x [I]f it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa
Santiago, had been in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands
declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the
names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of
title over the property.[21]
In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession by
Calixto and Rosendo Bacas, from whom respondents predecessors had
purportedly bought the property. This alleged prior possession, though,
was totally devoid of any supporting
evidence on record. Respondents evidence hardly supported the conclusion
that their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since
time immemorial.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
evidence on record merely established the transfer of the property from
Calixto Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo. The evidence did not show the nature
and the period of the alleged possession by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas. It
is important that applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles
must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claims; they
cannot simply offer general statements that are mere conclusions of law
rather than factual evidence of possession.[22]

It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the burden of
proving that they have an imperfect title to Lot 4318. Even the absence of
opposition from the government does not relieve them of this burden. [23]
Thus, it was erroneous for the trial and the appellate courts to hold that
the failure of the government to
dislodge respondents, judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject land
since 1954 already amounted to a title.
In this connection, the Court reiterates the following ruling in Director of
Lands v. Agustin:[24]
x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered
under the Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his
title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show, even though
there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the
absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering
property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition
offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the
registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that
the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee
simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The segregation of Lot
4318 as part of a military reservation is declared VALID. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118436. March 21, 1997]
HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE
ROXAS (in substitution of original petitioner), petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, substituted by her heirs,[1] instituted this
petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision dated December 8,
1994 in "Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and
Development: Corporation," (CA G.R. CV No. 38328), alleging reversible
error committed by respondent appellate court when it affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. The issue presented before
us is whether or not private respondent Maguesun Corporation committed
actual fraud in obtaining a decree of registration over two unregistered
Page 49 of 74
parcels of land in Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to
reopen or review a decree of registration.
The facts of the case are narrated below:
On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and
Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for
Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in Barangay
Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, Cad-355, Tagaytay
Cadastre) with an area of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively.
The original registration case was docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, presided over by Judge Julieto
Tabiolo. In support of its application for registration, Maguesun
Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990,
executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to
be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the
original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00
two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March
26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority
(the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of Maguesun
Corporation's application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de
Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse
claimant, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings. Publication was
made in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly.[2] After an Order
of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land
registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration Authority
reported, among other things, that the subject parcels of land had
previously been applied for registration in Land Registration Case No. 500,
GLRO Record No. 55072 at the Court of First Instance of Cavite by Manuel
A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been rendered
thereon.[3] Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court
granted Maguesun Corporation's application for registration (Land
Registration Case No. TG-373) in a three-page decision with the following
dispositive portion:[4]
"WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the application for
registration of said lands described in plan As-04-000108? Lot Nos. 7231
and 7239, one with an area of 3,641 and the other with an area of 10,674
square meters, as supported and shown by the corresponding technical
descriptions now forming part of the records, in the name of Maguesun
Management and Development Corporation, with office address at 521
Edsa, Quezon City, free from all liens and encumbrances and from any
other adverse claims of any kind and nature.
Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso facto becomes executory,
upon which eventuality the corresponding decree of registration may thus
be issued.
SO ORDERED."
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the
Decree on March 14, 1991, after the afore-mentioned Decision in LRC No.
TG-373 became final[5] but not before it ordered, on February 14, 1991,
Land Registration Case No. 500 (GLRO Record No. 55072) applied for by
Manuel A Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate
the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale
and the registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name.
Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the
Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the
decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation
committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the
properties she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A.
Roxas, who died on April 15, 1946 and that her family had been in open,
continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject property
in the concept of owner for more than thirty years before they applied for
its registration under the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further
denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met
before and that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her claims, she also listed a
number of irregularities in the documents to prove actual fraud. In
addition, and perhaps more significantly, she claimed that Maguesun
Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant,
occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to
the Land Registration Authority such that the latter could not send her a
Notice of Initial Hearing. As result, an order of general default was issued
and Maguesun Corporation's application for registration was granted. She
charged Maguesun Corporation with knowledge or authorship of the fraud
owing to the fact that Maguesun Corporation's president, Manolita
Guevarra Suntay after whom the corporation was named, was her niece.
Manolita Suntay is the daughter of Lourdes Guevarra Suntay, a deceased
cousin of petitioner Vda. de Roxas who used to help with the latter's
business affairs. Manolita Suntay used to take care of the registration and
insurance of the latter's cars.[6]
Page 50 of 74
The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial court after the pre-
trial, was whether or not Vda. de Roxas' signatures on the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication in favor of Zenaida
Melliza were forged.[7] Petitioner, who was then already 92 years of age,
testified in open court on February 11, 1992 that she has never met
Zenaida Melliza, that she did not sell the subject lots and that her
signatures on the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were
forged.[8] A document examiner from the Philippine National Police (PNP)
concluded that there was no forgery.[9] Upon petitioner's motion, the
signatures were re-examined by another expert from the National Bureau
of Investigation The latter testified that the signatures on the questioned
and sample documents were not written by the same person.[10] Despite
the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial court dismissed
the petition for review of decree of registration on April 15, 1992. [11]
Placing greater weight on the findings and testimony of the PNP document
examiner, it concluded that the questioned documents were not forged
and if they were, it was Zenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation,
who was responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did not commit
actual fraud. The court further noted that petitioner Mrs. Trinidad Roxas
had not been paying taxes for several years, which fact "exhibited what
appeared to be unmistakeable signs of not actually owning (the lots) any
more," and that her application for registration was "previously dismissed
and abandoned," thus indicating that "petitioner herself is aware that she
had already lost . x x interest, if not actually her rights, over the property
in question."[12]
In a decision dated December 8, 1994,[13] respondent court denied the
petition for review and affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals held that petitioner failed to demonstrate that there was actual or
extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for
purposes of annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration.
Additionally, respondent court stated that the discrepancies or
irregularities in the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed
out by petitioner are not patent or obvious, involve matters that are too
trivial, requiring knowledge of the intricacies of the law and are "not
necessarily and exclusively indicia of extrinsic fraud and/or bad faith
especially when considered in the light of circumstances hereinafter
discussed." The records also show, according to the appellate court, that
Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court either the
existence of petitioner or any interest she may have had in the registration
proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that publication of the
initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the court.[14]
Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual
fraud warranting the setting aside of the registration decree and in
resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's good faith.
Petitioners pray that the registration of the subject lots in the name of
Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that said property be adjudicated in
favor of petitioners and that respondent corporation pay moral damages
not less than P100,000.00, exemplary damages not less than P36,000.00
and attorney's fees of P60,000.00.
We find the petition for review impressed with merit.
1. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which
amended and codified laws relative to registration of property.[15]
Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become
final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of
the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains under the control
and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after
hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to
another party.[16] Absence, minority or other disability of any person
affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are not
considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of
a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is
recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a valid
and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration.[17] It is
further required that a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree,
that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not
yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.[18]
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud
proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.[19] Constructive fraud
is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public
interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done
or committed with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon
other persons.[20]
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as
intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the
original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have
Page 51 of 74
been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or
where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to
the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of
the controversy.[21] Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the
transaction sued upon.[22]
The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud
has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this
case, a decree of registration reopened and reviewed.[23] In the oft-cited
Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation case, the Court
drew from American jurisprudence stating that "relief has been granted on
the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking
relief against the judgment or decree, (and) that party has been prevented
from presenting all of his case to the court."[24] The "fraud" contemplated
by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No. 1529) is actual and extrinsic,
which includes, an intentional omission of fact required by law.[25] For
fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and
the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in
the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.[26]
Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in
the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of
registration.
In Ramirez v. CA,[27] this Court adopted the Court of Appeals' ruling that
the suppression of the fact that the applicant spouses possessed the
subject ricefield merely as antichretic creditors and the fraudulent
concealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other
persons had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific
allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and
intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical
possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud.[28]
Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which
benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.[29]
The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed
actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed
by petitioner.
Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation
intentionally omitted their name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a
claim to or as an occupant of the subject property. In the corporation's
application for registration filed with the trial court in LRC No. TG-373, the
following declaration appears:
"6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the
undersigned, of the owners of all adjoining properties; of the persons
mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5 (mortgagors, encumbrancers, and
occupants) and of the person shown on the plan as claimants are as
follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil. Leon Luna. Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City
(no house No.)"[30]
The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the
first five letters of the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid.
Magesun Corporation, however, annexed a differently-worded application
for the petition to review case (Civil Case No. TG-1183, "Trinidad de Leon
Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, et
al."). In the copy submitted to the trial court, the answer to the same
number is as follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas.[31]
The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word
"Roxas" were indeed erased and replaced with "Provincial Road all at
Tagaytay City (no house No.)" in the original application submitted in LRC
No. TG-373 but the copy with the word "Roxas" was submitted to the trial
court in Civil Case No. TG-1183, it is reasonable to assume that the reason
is to mislead the court into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original
application as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant or claimant,
the same application which formed the basis for the Land Registration
Authority in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of
Presidential Decree No 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to
state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those
of adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the extent of the search
made to find them. Respondent corporation likewise failed to comply with
this requirement of law.
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property
uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez.[32] Respondent
Maguesun Corporation also declared in number 5 of the same application
that the subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas
family caretaker resided in the subject property. Respondent corporation is
likewise charged with the knowledge of such possession and occupancy,
for its President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the property, knew
fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas owned the
property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected the
property prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current
possessors or occupants could have been made facilely. Respondent
corporation's intentional concealment and representation of petitioner's
Page 52 of 74
interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes
actual fraud justifying the reopening and review of the decree of
registration. Through such misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept
ignorant of the registration proceedings involving their property, thus
effectively depriving them of their day in court.
2. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had not
concealed from the court either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de
Roxas or any interest she may have in the registration proceedings for the
records are replete with references by Maguesun Corporation itself to
petitioner.[33] Mention of the late President's name as well as that of
petitioner was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for
respondent corporation, in a Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and 7239, tax
declarations and as predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient
compliance with what the law requires to be stated in the application for
registration. Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and
possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the
application for registration, otherwise, the persons concerned will not be
sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the opportunity
to present their opposition or claims.
3. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official
Gazette and in the Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of
general circulation. The Court of Appeals held that pursuant to Section 23
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly states that
"the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial
hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. x x x"
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in
mandatory terms, it is a component of procedural due process and aimed
at giving "as wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an
adverse-interest in the land subject of the registration proceedings may be
notified thereof.[34] Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the
fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general circulation is
material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.
4. The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in the documentary, as
well as in the testimonial evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial
to this case, compelled the Court to undertake a careful review of the facts
of the case.[35] A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court
to the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case
at bar. Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun Corporation's
direct participation in the execution and preparation of the forged
instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun
Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value" who merits the
protection of the law.
In response to the questions fielded by the trial counsel and by counsel for
petitioner, PNP Document Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all
the differences pointed out in the questioned signatures and in the sample
signatures as having been caused merely by "natural variation."[36] He
concluded that the questioned signatures were not forged. In contrast,
Chief of the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Arcadio Ramos testified with more specificity as befits an
expert that the questioned and sample signatures were not written by one
and the same person because of "(t)he manner of execution of strokes the
personalized proportional characteristics of letters; the linking/connecting
between letters the structural pattern of letters and other minute details x
x x."[37] Moreover, petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas categorically
declared that she has never met Zenaida Melliza and did not sell the
subject property.[38] Petitioner, then over ninety years old, has no motive
to attest to a falsehood. Petitioner and her family also own several other
pieces of property, some of which are leased out as restaurants, e.g. Leo's
Restaurant and Ma Mon Luk Restaurant.[39] This is an indication that
petitioner is not unaware of the value of her properties. Hence, it is
unlikely that she would sell over thirteen thousand square meters of prime
property in Tagaytay City to a stranger for a measly P200,000.00. Finally,
even to a layman's eye, the documents, as well as the enlarged
photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal forgery. The questioned
signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
are starkly different from the sample signatures in several documents
executed by petitioner. The questioned signatures are smooth and
rounded, and have none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's
signatures, characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons.
There are also added considerations reflective of the dubious character of
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication purportedly executed by petitioner.[40] In
it she declares that she is a resident of 22 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, when she actually lives in 2 Park Road, North Forbes Park, Makati.
She also states that she is the "sole heir of the late Manuel De Roxas who
died sometime on the year 1944 at Manila." Petitioner's husband is
President Manuel A. Roxas and she refers to herself as Trinidad de Leon
Page 53 of 74
vda. de Roxas. President Roxas was survived by petitioner and their two
children, Ma. Rosario Roxas and Gerardo Roxas (who predeceased
petitioner). The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the
general public, as well as the demise of the late President on April 15,
1946 while delivering a speech at Clark Field, Pampanga. The
aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have been ignored. If
petitioner did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why she
should state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning herself
and her family.
Additionally, Zenaida Melliza's non-appearance raises doubt as to her
existence. Her given address was Matina, Davao City. How was she related
to petitioner and what led her to purchase the subject property?
Respondent corporation could very well have presented her to prove the
legitimacy of their transaction. If petitioner were selling said property,
would she not have offered them first to interested relatives such as
Manolita G. Suntay? Would an ordinary person sell more than thirteen
thousand square meters of prime property for P170,000.00 when it was
earlier purchased for P200,000.00? These questions highlight several
implausibilities in the alleged sale of the subject property by herein
petitioner. As Maguesun Corporation's President who is related to
petitioner, Manolita G. Suntay should have verified the sale of the subject
property by Zenaida Melliza. Manolita G. Suntay's closeness to petitioner
Vda. de Roxas, as one who even registered the latter's car, suggests
acquaintance with the late petitioner's properties as well as the possibility
that she took advantage of such knowledge.
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot
tack its possession to that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida
Melliza conveyed no title over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun
Corporation as she was not the owner thereof.[41] Maguesun Corporation is
thus not entitled to the registration decree which the trial court granted in
its decision. Palpably, petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than
thirty years of open, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession in
the concept of an owner over the subject lots by the irregular transaction
to Zenaida Melliza. She therefore retains title proper and sufficient for
original registration over the two parcels of land in question pursuant to
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.[42]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon Vda. de
Roxas v. Maguesun Management & Development Corporation, et al.")
promulgated on December 8, 1994 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of land, described
in Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and
10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and supported by the
corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the Records of
LRC No. TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de
Roxas and her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners. Upon finality of this
Decision, the Land Registration Authority is hereby directed to ISSUE with
reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and
certificate of title pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND
DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November
2002,[1] which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,[2] granting the application
for land registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias
and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single
application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to
be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from
their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June
1976.[3] Together with their application for registration, respondents
submitted the following set of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent
Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of
respondent David;[4]
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5]
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyors Certificates for
the Subject Lots;[6]
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of
certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;[7]
Page 54 of 74
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are
alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-
1063, dated 25 June 1963;[8]
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No.
941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in
1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No.
8423, also issued in 1994;[9] and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio
Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements
thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for
P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to
David.[10]
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
filed an Opposition to the respondents application for registration of the
Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the
period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2)
Respondents muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject
Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to
the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.[11]
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.[12] All
owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the
Notice of Initial Hearing.[13] A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27
July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the
bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the
Subject Lots were located.[14] Finally, the Notice was also published in the
Official Gazette on 02 August 1999[15] and The Freeman Banat News on 19
December 1999.[16]
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order
of Special Default,[17] with only petitioner Republic opposing the application
for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their
counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove
jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive
further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC
after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot
No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently
issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for
the Subject Lots.[18]
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,
to the Court of Appeals.[19] The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22
November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be
registered has been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone
since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil
Code, respectively provides that All things which are within the commerce
of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property
of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be
the object of prescription and that Ownership and other real rights over
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already
acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application,
since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with
jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December
21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or their
predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject land
openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently,
even assuming arguendo that appellees possession can be reckoned only
from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had been classified
as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the
appellant does not hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as
shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of
prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of
Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for
its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows
individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even
considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned from
1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein
appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in open,
continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when
they filed the instant application for registration of title to the land in
1998. As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court
a quo.[20]
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of
the following arguments:
Page 55 of 74
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the
Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior
to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the
periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENROs certification.
It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year
acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v.
Doldol,[21] where this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently
phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be
from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the
subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and
separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is
implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for
registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple
applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners.
While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when
the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in
case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the
same province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred
by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory,
it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void.
Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land
registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held
before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
I
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had
no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration
filed by the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by
petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents
application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots
even though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David
were actually seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No.
8422 and 8423, respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by
the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction
to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject
Lots, based on this Courts pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals,[22] to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance
with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have
not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with
the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as
prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly
followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This
procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for
registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and expressly allows the
following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several
applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to
be registered;[24] and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of
several parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same
province.[25] The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the
present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two
parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of
the parcels of land in their respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a
situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the
proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree
itself provides that, [t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and
cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance
with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the
defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with
the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead
of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and
David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for
registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Page 56 of 74
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of
jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case.[26] They are not
even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.[27] Instead, under the Rules
of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied
admission of the courts jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the
court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own
initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be
proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action);
and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said
misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of
misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may
have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the
petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to
detect the misjoinder when the application for registration was still
pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did
not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for
severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of
misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication
requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree,
thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land
registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present
Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration
proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from
assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents application for
registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and jurisdiction in rem
cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land
through publication and service of notice.[29]
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be
given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by
means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the
Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner:
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing,
the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial
hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. Said notice shall
also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and
time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be
granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the
Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v.
Court of Appeals[30] that publication in a newspaper of general circulation
is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and register
the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property
Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements
of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all
such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of
general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly
complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason
behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation, thus
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation
should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by
publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of
which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is
due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read
and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation,
such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested
parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of
neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In
sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible
demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication,
mailing and posting.[31]
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in
fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof
was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and
officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman
Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the
Page 57 of 74
province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only
on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial
hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the
Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to
the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for
him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose
respondents application for registration, and to present his claim and
evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states,
should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of
initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from
contesting respondents application for registration and even the
registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC
did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of
general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same
ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the
MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire
jurisdiction over respondents application for registration thereof.
Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and
David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC
Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December
1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a
decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for
having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the
Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or
incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction
to hear and proceed with respondents application for registration, this
Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the
required period of possession for acquiring title to public land.
Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory
basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they
obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses
Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent
Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950.[32]
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents
themselves, the Subject Lots are within Alienable and Disposable, Block I,
Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise,
it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per
Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992. [33] The Subject
Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and
disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government;[34] and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to
public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[35]
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain,
except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands
which reverted to the State.[36] It explicitly enumerates the means by
which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[37]
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of
the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and
application procedure for every mode.[38] Since respondents herein filed
their application before the MTC,[39] then it can be reasonably inferred that
they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect
or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land,
not exceeding 144 hectares,[40] may be availed of by persons identified
under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, which reads
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
Page 58 of 74
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall
be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b)
hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may
only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots
became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of
possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never
ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable
and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply
thereto.[41] It is very apparent then that respondents could not have
complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to
the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals was based
on the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the
Subject Lots under the Property Registration Decree. According to the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4)
of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any
other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having
possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when
they filed their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by
extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137,
both of the Civil Code.[42]
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property
Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the
court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the
land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and
possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect
title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.[43] As established by
this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish
to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the
provisions of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may
acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public
Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof
must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section
50 of the Public Land Act reads
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or
successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the
provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application to the
proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title
or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them
under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.[44]
Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots must
have complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the Property
Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and
other real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land
Act specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one
another, the Public Land Act may be considered a special law[45] that must
take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established
rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special
law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.[46]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22
November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion,
Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order,
Page 59 of 74
dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents
application for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 45664 January 29, 1993
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALEJANDRO MAMOT, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of February 2,
1977 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order of November 25, 1971 of
the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan which denied the National
Power Corporation's petition for the review of the decree of registration
previously issued by the said lower court.
On August 21, 19681 private respondent Alejandro Mamot filed with the
then Court of First Instance of Bulacan at Malolos, 2 an application for
registration of title over six parcels of land or Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
of Psu-162460-Amd. with a total area of 417,251 square meters situated
in San Mateo, Norzagaray Bulacan (Land Registration Case No. N-2581-M).
Copies of the application were thereafter duly published and posted in
conspicuous places in the municipality. As no one opposed the application,
on May 6, 1969, the court issued an order of general default. 3
Mamot then submitted his evidence ex-parte before the Deputy Clerk of
Court who had been so commissioned by the lower court. On June 23,
1969, the same court promulgated a decision confirming the order of
general default and ordering the registration of the six parcels of land in
favor of Mamot and the issuance of the corresponding decree of
registration after the decision shall have become final. 4
On the same date, however, one Pedro Sarmiento filed a motion praying
that he be allowed to file an opposition to Mamot's application for
registration of title. 5 Mamot moved to strike the motion from the records.
Later, Sarmiento filed a motion to set aside the order of general default.
Acting on these motions, the lower court issued the Order of September
23, 1969 granting Sarmiento ten days within which to file his written
opposition.6 In the meantime, however, Mamot and Sarmiento tried to
settle amicably the dispute between them. Their effort resulted in the
execution of a deed of sale involving Lot 4 in favor of Sarmiento.
Accordingly, Sarmiento withdrew his opposition and moved that the
Decision of June 23, 1969 be amended by adjudicating Lot 4 to him. 7
Thus, on November 13, 1969, the lower court rendered an amended
decision awarding Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 to Mamot and Lot No. 4 to
Sarmiento. 8
Mamot having moved for the issuance of a decree of registration, on
December 17, 1969, the lower court issued an "Order for the Issuance of
Decree" directing the Commissioner of Land Registration "to comply with
Section 41 of Act 496 as amended by Section 21 of Act
2347." 9 Thereafter, the Chief Surveyor and Chief of the Division of
Original Registration, acting for the Commissioner, rendered a report
stating that "the platting of said Lots 1 to 6 of Psu-162460-Amd., on our
Municipal Index Map, shows that they are inside Proclamation No. 599
(National Power Corporation)."10
The lower court then summoned the National Power Corporation (NPC for
brevity) to a hearing on the report. Upon learning at the hearing that a
decision had been rendered in favor of Mamot, on February 25, 1970, the
NPC filed a petition for relief from judgment.11 The NPC alleged therein
that the hearing for the application for registration was conducted without
proper notice having been given it; that Mamot committed fraud in failing
to allege in his application that the lots he applied for are covered by
Proclamation No. 599, that the Angat access road traversed the lots he
applied for, and that NPC had rights and interests over the properties
involved; that had Mamot not committed said fraudulent act, the court
would have discovered that he had no lawful rights over the property; and
that it had good and strong evidence to counteract Mamot's claim.
Alleging that the NPC had no personality to file a petition for relief from
judgment because an order of general default had been issued in the case
and that the decision of the lower court having become final and
executory, what remained to be done was the ministerial act of the Land
Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration, Mamot
moved to strike out the petition for relief from judgment.12
However, finding merit in the said petition, the lower court granted the
prayer for relief from judgment in its Order of March 17, 1970 which also
lifted the general order of default and directed the NPC to file its
opposition.13Consequently, the NPC filed its opposition to the application
for registration alleging that neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-
interest possessed sufficient title over the parcels of land involved as they
had not acquired them either by composition title from the Spanish
government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894; that neither Mamot nor his predecessors-in-interest
Page 60 of 74
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
application, and that the parcels of land involved are within the Angat
Reservation pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 599 and as such,
they are under the administration of the NPC. 14 The Solicitor General,
appearing for the Director of Lands, also filed an opposition to the
application alleging basically the same grounds as the NPC.15
Mamot objected to these oppositions and moved for the reconsideration of
the Order of March 17, 1970. Another claimant to the land, one Fabian
Castillo, filed a motion to lift the general order of default.
On February 3, 1971, the lower court issued an order denying Castillo's
motion and dismissing the petition for relief from judgment filed by the
NPC. 16 The order is premised on the following:
Movants Fabian Castillo, et al. may advance the argument
that, at this stage, the judgment in this case is considered
reopened because the Court granted the petition for relief
from judgment of oppositor National Power Corporation. It
appears, however, that the Court was not aware yet of any
decree in the instant application when it granted the
petition for relief of the National Power Corporation on
March 17, 1970, for the decree in this case was issued by
the Land Registration Commission on May 7, 1970. The
petition for relief from judgment is, therefore, also no
longer available at this stage. However, oppositor National
Power Corporation may likewise resort to a petition for
review which it can file within one year from the issuance
of the decree on the ground of actual fraud.
Heeding the court's advice, the NPC filed a petition for the review of the
decree of registration. 17 Dated May 7, 1971, the petition reiterated the
NPC's allegations in its petition for relief from judgment charging Mamot
with fraud. Mamot moved for the dismissal of the said petition.
On November 25, 1971, the lower court issued an Order denying NPC's
petition for review of the decree of registration.18 Pertinent portions of the
two-page Order states:
Assuming that applicant Alejandro C. Mamot failed to
notify the National Power Corporation of the filing of his
application for original registration of title to land, such
failure or omission does not constitute actual fraud as
contemplated under Act 496. Besides, it cannot be claimed
 by the National Power Corporation that it was not notified
of said application since there was proper publication.
As regards the claim of the National Power Corporation
that the lots involved are covered by Proclamation No. 599
dated June 23, 1951, in its favor, said proclamation
expressly provides that the land described therein is
withdrawn "from sale of (sic) settlement and reserved for
the Angat River Project of the National Power Corporation
under its administration, subject to private rights, if any
there be . . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
It appearing that applicant Alejandro C. Mamot was in
actual possession of the subject lots long before the
Proclamation, his rights are respected and recognized by
the very proclamation, not to mention the fact that the
National Power Corporation has instituted Civil Case No.
2526 before Branch II of this Court, an action for eminent
domain, against several persons occupying the area
covered by the proclamation.
This Court also noted that the petition for review was filed
after the lapse of one year from the issuance of the
decree, and on this score alone, the petition could be
dismissed.
Its motion for reconsideration of the Order of November 25, 1971 having
been denied, NPC appealed to the Court of Appeals. It assailed as
erroneous the trial court's holding that: (a) the registration of the parcels
of land was not procured through fraud; (b) the decree of registration was
valid even if it was based on a decision which had been set aside, and (c)
the parcels of land are registerable under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended.
In its decision of February 2, 1977, the Court of Appeals 19 affirmed the
decision of the lower court. Noting that the appeal was from the Order of
the trial court denying the NPC's petition for review of decree and not from
the judgment decreeing the registration of the subject parcels of land in
favor of Mamot and Sarmiento, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary
to discuss the second and third assigned errors as "they do not relate to
the dismissal of the petition for review of decree."
Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that actual fraud alone does not warrant
the review of a decree of registration as it must be coupled with a showing
of the petitioner's dominical right over the subject properties. Emphasizing
that Proclamation No. 599 is "not an absolute grant of reservation" as it is
Page 61 of 74
subject to private rights, the Court of Appeals held that the NPC "failed to
show its real dominical right over the subject lots" and that, on such
failure alone, the appeal could not succeed. The Court of Appeals added
that the issue of actual fraud had become moot and academic because
"whether there is actual fraud or none, this Court cannot order the
reopening of the final decree."
Dissatisfied, the NPC instituted the instant petition for review
on certiorari based on the following grounds: (a) the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan as land registration court lacked jurisdiction to decree
the registration of the six parcels of land as they are within the Angat
River Watershed Reservation reserved to the NPC by presidential
proclamation; (b) the procurement of a decree over lands which are non-
alienable is equivalent to actual fraud in the procurement of a decree, and
(c) the decree of registration based on a decision previously set aside by
the court is absolutely null and void.20
We opt to settle first the third ground for the petition, a procedural one, to
facilitate the determination of the substantive issues raised herein.
Petitioner contends that since the decree of registration was issued on May
7, 1970 by the Land Registration Commission (LRC) after the amended
Decision of November 13, 1969 had been set aside by the allowance of its
petition for relief from judgment by the lower court on March 17, 1970,
the decree of registration was a complete nullity. Although this contention
appears to be meritorious on its face, the circumstances of the case point
to a negative conclusion.
Rule 38, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court provides that where a judgment is
set aside or when a petition for relief from judgment is granted, the court
"shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if timely motion for a
new trial had been granted therein." Thus, an order granting a petition for
relief is interlocutory unlike an order denying such petition which is final
and appealable.21 When the LRC issued the decree of registration, the
decision directing such issuance had been set aside by virtue of the
granting of the petition for relief from judgment. It should be recalled that
when a new trial is granted, "the original judgment shall be vacated, and
the action shall stand for trial de novo."22 Consequently, the instant case
reverted back to its status prior to the promulgation of the amended
decision. It follows, therefore, that no valid decree of registration could
have sprung from the proceedings in the lower court because the situation
became one where there was as yet no existing decision directing the
issuance of such decree.
However, when the lower court subsequently denied the same petition for
relief from judgment, an action which was still well within its discretion to
take as no new judgment had as yet been rendered subsequent to the
grant of said petition, the case returned to its status of being a decided
one. Was the denial based on a valid ground? According to the
aforequoted portion of the February 3, 1971 Order, the denial or
"dismissal" of the petition was based on the LRC's issuance of the May 7,
1970 decree of registration, which, to the mind of the court, terminated
the proceeding before it. While this may not be a valid ground as it only
shows that the LRC issued the decree of registration because it had not
been notified of the Order granting the petition for relief from judgment,
the denial nonetheless is proper: a close scrutiny of the records reveals
that the NPC's petition for relief from judgment should have been denied in
the first instance.
The NPC raised therein the issue of lack of due process by its allegation
that no proper notice about the registration proceedings had been given it.
Lack of personal notice in a registration proceeding to persons who may
claim certain rights or interests in the property, however, cannot vitiate or
invalidate the decree or title issued therein because proceedings to
register land under Act No. 496 are in rem and not in
personam.23 Defendants by publication, including the Government and its
branches and instrumentalities, are bound by a decree of registration
because all interested parties are considered as notified by the publication
required by law.24 Moreover, the NPC's contention that it had not been
given proper notice appears to be grounded on its stand that Mamot knew
that the land he was trying to register was embraced by Proclamation No.
599. This contention does not, however, substantiate the NPC's claim of
lack of due process in view of the uncontroverted fact of publication of
Mamot's application for registration.
By alleging that Mamot committed fraud in failing to state in his
application that the lots are covered by Proclamation No. 599 despite his
knowledge of NPC's rights and interests on the land, the NPC appears to
have forgotten the established fact that Mamot had been in possession of
the property long before the issuance of Proclamation No. 599. In the
absence of any evidence that the omission was deliberate, Mamot cannot
be faulted for his failure to allege in the complaint that the parcels of land
are within the area covered by said proclamation. That Mamot was indeed
a prior possessor of the land is best shown by the fact that, as found by
the trial court, the NPC even made Mamot one of the respondents in the
eminent domain case it had filed to pursue its purposes under said
proclamation by constructing the Angat access road.
The bases for the NPC's petition for relief from judgment being
unmeritorious, the lower court correctly denied it. However, by upholding
the lower court's second and belated action on the said petition, the Court
does not stamp its approval on the manner by which the said petition was
Page 62 of 74
handled. A thorough study of its grounds would have prevented the court's
clearly
flip-flopping stand on the matter, particularly because the petition was one
for relief from judgment. It bears stressing that a petition for relief from
judgment, being an "act of grace," is not regarded with favor and it should
be availed of only in exceptional circumstances or when the demands of
equity and justice should prompt the court to give the petitioner a last
chance to defend his right or to protect his interest.25 The petitioner must
satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the
provisions of Rule 38.26 Moreover, to obtain relief from judgment, it is
necessary to determine not only the existence of any of the grounds relied
on, whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but
also whether the petitioner has a good cause of
action.27 In this case, the substantive issues raised by the NPC in its
petition for relief from judgment are similar, if not identical to those raised
in its petition for review of the decree of registration, the denial of which is
the very subject of the instant petition for review on certiorari. It is proper,
therefore, that they be discussed simultaneously.
Proclamation No. 599, which was issued by then President Carlos P. Garcia
on June 23, 1959, provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and pursuant to the provisions of
Section 83 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, I,
CARLOS P. GARCIA, President of the Philippines, do hereby
withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the
Angat River Project of the National Power Corporation
under its administration, subject to private rights, if any
there be, a certain parcel of the public domain situated
partly in the municipality of Norzagaray, and partly in the
municipality of San Jose, province of Bulacan, Island of
Luzon, and more particularly described as follows: . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
As correctly interpreted by the Court of Appeals, this provision of the
presidential proclamation does not bestow upon the NPC absolute
dominical or proprietary rights. The NPC's powers over the area designated
as the Angat River reserve are "subject to private rights, if any there be."
This particular provision cannot but be interpreted to mean that the NPC's
administrative jurisdiction over the area is delimited by then existing
private rights. Was the claim of Mamot "existing" at the time of the
issuance of the proclamation? We quote from the uncontroverted findings
of the lower court in its November 13, 1969 decision:
 From the evidence presented, it appears that portions of the
parcels of land which are sought to be registered were originally
owned and possessed publicly, peacefully, continuously and
adversely by Domingo Mamot and Damasa Calubag, parents of the
herein applicant, for more than seven (7) years until the death of
Domingo Mamot on July 22, 1924, whereupon his ownership and
possession thereof was (sic) continued by his wife, Damasa
Calubag, and the herein applicant who immediately succeeded
him; that Damasa Calubag and the herein applicant, commonly
possessed the portions of the subject parcels of land which were
left by Domingo Mamot, peacefully, publicly and continuously,
adversely and in the concept of owners until January 23, 1944,
when Damasa Calubag died and was immediately succeeded in the
possession and ownership thereof by the herein applicant who
continued the possession of the same, peacefully, notoriously,
publicly and uninterruptedly up to the present and who executed
an affidavit of adjudication of the property unto himself (Exhibit
"I"); that the other portion of said parcels of land was acquired by
the herein applicant thru cultivation and peaceful, adverse, open,
and continuous possession thereof from 1928 to the present which
is now more than thirty (30) years; that there are some persons
who tried to claim the subject parcels of land but they have never
been in possession of the same, and Isidro Ordoña, Pedro
Sarmiento, Consolacion Duya and Simeon Patawaran were even
named in the application and were served with copies of the Notice
of Initial Hearing (Exhibit "A") by ordinary mail on January 9,
1969, by the Commissioner of Land Registration (Exhibit "B") but
have not interposed any opposition to the present application with
the exception of Pedro Sarmiento who, however, later withdrew his
opposition for Lot 4 of plan Psu-162460-Amd. which was being
claimed by him (and) was conveyed to him by the applicant,
Alejandro Mamot, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale which was
executed and entered into by applicant Alejandro Mamot and said
Pedro Sarmiento on September 25, 1969, and acknowledged on
the same date before Nicasio Bartolome, a notary public of
Norzagaray, Bulacan, and registered in his notarial book as
Document No. 644, Page No. 51, Book No. II and Series of 1969;
that the subject parcel of land is not within any military or naval
reservation; and that the land tax for the current year has been
paid (Exhibit "J").
With these factual findings, the lower court cannot be faulted for
confirming Mamot's imperfect title because under Sec. 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942,28 proven occupation and cultivation for more than thirty (30) years
by an applicant and by his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such
applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. When
Page 63 of 74
the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. As such, the land ceases
to be part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. An application for confirmation of title,
therefore, becomes a mere formality.29
The law, however, may not be applied in all cases. The circumstances of a
particular case may require an applicant for confirmation of an imperfect
title under Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, to prove that the land
involved no longer forms part of the inalienable public domain. 30 Such is
the case in this instant petition. The land sought to be confirmed as under
the ownership of private respondent is within the area covered by
Proclamation No. 599 creating a reservation for the Angat River Project of
the NPC. Mamot knew about the NPC's authority over the area inasmuch
as he had even been named a respondent in the eminent domain
proceeding that the NPC had filed. While the filing of such proceeding may
be construed as a recognition on the part of the government that the land
is indeed privately owned, the fact that the land is part of the watershed
area reserved for the Angat River Project should be the paramount
consideration. As such, extreme caution should be exercised in the
determination of claims of ownership by private persons which the
proclamation itself recognizes. All claimants must prove by clear, positive
and absolute evidence that they have complied with all the requirements
of the law for confirmation of an imperfect title to the land applied for.31
Hence, Mamot bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
land still forms part of the nondisposable public domain. The classification
of public lands being an exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department,32presentation of evidence issued by the Director of Lands
that the land he sought to be confirmed as his has been classified as
disposable for private ownership would have helped Mamot in obtaining
approval of his application. Since he failed to present such evidence,
whatever possession he might have had, and however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership.33
This case has been pending for more than twenty-four years. To remand it
below for a determination of the validity of NPC's claims under its petition
for review of decree would not serve any purpose except to further delay
the resolution of the application for registration.34 Moreover, the peculiar
circumstances attending this case demand its immediate resolution. As
discussed above, the NPC has no vested absolute dominical right over the
whole area reserved for the Angat River Project. Its administrative
authority over lands embraced by the proclamation is delimited by vested
private rights. On the other hand, Mamot had not satisfactorily proven his
right to a confirmation of his imperfect title and to the registration of the
land in his name subject to the rights of Sarmiento who had acquired Lot 4
by virtue of a deed of sale. Nor had he presented any proof that the said
land has been declared disposable by the proper government authority.
The land in question must, therefore, remain where it can be of better use
to the general public — as part of the inalienable public domain.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE
insofar as it affirms the order of the lower court allowing the issuance of a
decree of registration in favor of private respondent Alejandro Mamot. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
28 As amended by Republic Act No. 1942 which took effect on June 22,
1957, Section 48(b) states:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter."
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125154. September 28, 2001]
DIGNA VERGEL, EDUARDO SALVACRUZ, BEATRIZ MANACOP,
FELICISIMA FLORES, GENEROSO SALVACRUZ, BLANDINO
SALVACRUZ, MILAGROS SALVACRUZ and THE HEIRS OF CORAZON
SANTIAGO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DOROTEA
TAMISIN GONZALES, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] setting aside the orders[2] of the trial court that denied
petitioners motion to set aside the order of general default [3] in an
application for registration of a parcel of land, consisting of one thousand,
one hundred seventy six (1,176), situated in barrio Batong Malake,
municipality of Los Baos, province of Laguna.[4]
Page 64 of 74
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,[5] are as follows:
On May 26, 1994, Digna Vergel, Eduardo Salvacruz, Beatriz Maacop,
Felicisima Flores, Generoso and Blandino Salvacruz, Milagros Evangelista
and the heirs of Corazon Santiago, namely: Leocadio, Jr. and Concepcion
Santiago (petitioners herein) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Calamba,
Laguna an application for registration of a parcel of land (for titling
purposes).
On July 20, 1994, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application for registration.
On December 15, 1994, the trial court issued an order of general default
against the whole world with the exception of Republic of the Philippines x
x x.
On October 3, 1995, respondent Dorotea Tamisin Gonzales filed with the
trial court an Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Order of General Default
alleging, inter alia, in her affidavit that she is claiming the land in question
subject of this petition as an owner x x x which motion was opposed by
the petitioners herein.
On October 12, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a reply to the
opposition interposed by the petitioners and, at the same time, filed an
Urgent Motion praying for the suspension of the proceedings.
On October 18, 1995, the trial court issued the first assailed order, the
dispositive portion of which is quoted, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motion to set aside the Order of default as well as the
motion to suspend the proceedings filed by the movant through counsel is
hereby denied for lack of merit.
On October 20, 1995, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to
Strike Out Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceeding.
On November 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the motion to set aside the order of
general default, which motion petitioners opposed.
On November 28, 1995, the trial court issued its second questioned order,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration,
dated November 16, 1995, is hereby denied for lack of merit.
On December 13, 1995, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals [6] a
petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court judge acted capriciously
and without or in excess of his jurisdiction and gravely abused the exercise
of his discretion in issuing the two aforementioned orders.[7]
On April 02, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision annulling
the trial courts orders dated October 18, 1995 and November 28, 1995,
and consequently, setting aside the trial courts order of general default
dated December 15, 1994, in Land Registration Case No. 88-94-C with
respect to respondent.[8]
Hence, this appeal.[9]
The Issue
The issue presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside
the trial courts order of general default in the land registration case
involved without making a specific finding of fraud, negligence, accident or
excusable mistake but relying on its view that substantial justice and
speedy determination of the controversy would be better attained in lifting
the order of general default, to enable a claimant to oppose and to
establish a case of ownership in herself.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition. The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set aside the trial
courts order of general default without factual basis save for its own gut
feeling, ipse dixit.[10] Respondents failure to file timely opposition to the
application for land registration because she missed reading the
publication of the notice in the Official Gazette [11] or in the newspaper
Malaya issue of August 8, 1994,[12] in itself may not be considered
excusable negligence.
In respondents motion to set aside order of general default, she alleged
that petitioners were aware of her claim of ownership over the subject
property, but did not give her personal notice of the filing of the
application. She learned about the application by accident. In the petition
for certiorari she filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent alleged that
petitioners filed the application in bad faith, surreptitiously and without
notice to her.[13] The Court of Appeals did not make a finding on this.
Hence, we find that the appellate court erred in setting aside the order of
general default in the Land Registration Case No. 88-94-C, without making
a specific finding of fraud, accident or excusable neglect that prevented
respondent from timely opposing the application.
We are not a trier of facts. Consequently, we have to remand the case to
the Court of Appeals for it to make findings of fact constituting fraud,
accident or excusable neglect sufficient for the court to lift the order of
general default in the land registration case involved.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G. R. SP No. 39239.
Let the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings
with instructions to determine whether there exists facts warranting the
Page 65 of 74
lifting of the order of general default in LRC Case No. 88-94-C of the trial
court.
No costs.
[G.R. No. 146262. January 21, 2005]
HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. ALFREDO R.
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA
CITY, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] to reverse the Decision[2] dated 29
November 2000 of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 55993. The appellate court affirmed the Resolution[3] dated 21 May
1999 issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) in Consulta No.
2879. The LRA ruled that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion is not
registrable.
The Facts
Alfonso Sandoval (Sandoval) and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. (Ozaeta) filed an
application for registration of title before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 152 (land registration court), docketed as Case No. 2858,
Land Registration Case No. N-18887 (LRC No. N-18887). The land
registration court issued an order of general default and hearings on the
application followed. On 31 May 1966, the land registration court granted
the application. The decision became final and executory, and the land
registration court issued a certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991.[4]
The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA) issued
on 20 October 1977 Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 in the names of
Sandoval and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome
Lao.[5]
On 16 July 1997, petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez, Oscar
Lopez, and Presentacion L. Psinakis (petitioners), heirs of Eugenio Lopez,
Sr., filed a motion[6] in LRC No. N-18887. The motion alleged that
Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application to the late
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September 1970. Petitioners prayed that the
court consider in the land registration case the Deed of Absolute
Sale[7] over the lots executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and their respective
spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Invoking Section 22 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529),[8] petitioners also prayed that the court issue
the decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of
Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
 The land registration court gave due course to the motion and
conducted hearings.[9]
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT
Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their
spouses only on 18 August 1998.[10] The pertinent entries[11] in the
Decrees read:
This Decree is issued pursuant to the Decision dated 31st day of May,
1966 of the Hon. Pedro C. Navarro, Judge of [Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal], and the Honorable Briccio C. Ygaa,
this 3rd day of July, 1998.
Issued at the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration,
Quezon City, this 20th day of October, in the year of Our Lord
nineteen hundred and ninety-seven at 8:01 a.m.
(signed)
ALFREDO R.
ENRIQUEZ
ADMINISTRATOR
National Land Titles
and Deeds
Registration
Administration
Entered in the Registration Book for
Marikina, pursuant to the provisions of section
39 of PD No. 1529, on the 18th day of August
nineteen hundred and ninety-eight, at 1:16
p.m.
(signed)
EDGAR D. SANTOS
Register of Deeds
(Emphasis added)
Petitioners filed another motion on 25 November 1998 to declare void
Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) Nos. O-1603 and O-1604. Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs
show that incumbent Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez signed the Decrees
on 20 October 1997, before he assumed office on 8 July 1998 and even
before Hon. Briccio C. Ygaa issued the Order of 3 July 1998.[12]
Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and requested
the LRA to recall the decrees. The LRA Administrator denied the request
Page 66 of 74
and explained the inconsistencies in the dates in a letter [13] dated 1
December 1998. The entire letter states:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Quezon City
1 December 1998
Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
Quiason Makalintal Barot Torres & Ibarra Law Offices
2nd Floor Benpres Building
Exchange Road corner Meralco Ave.
Ortigas Center, Pasig City
Sir:
This concerns your letter requesting the recall of Decree Nos. N-217643
and N-217644 issued in Land Registration Case No. N-2858, LRC Record
No. N-18887, both in the names of Alfonso Sandoval and his wife, Rosa
Ruiz, and Roman Ozaeta, Jr., and his wife, Ma. Salome Lao.
Records of this Authority show that aforesaid decrees of registration were
prepared on October 20, 1977 pursuant to the decision of the court dated
May 31, 1966 and the order for issuance of decree dated August 24, 1993.
Said decrees were forwarded to the Office of the Administrator on August
8, 1998 and was [sic] released therefrom on August 13, 1998.
Consequently, said decrees were signed sometime between August 8 and
13 1998 and definitely not on October 20, 1997 as what is reflected
thereon because the undersigned Administrator assumed office only on
July 8, 1998. Apparently, at the time the decrees were signed it was not
noticed, through oversight, that they were dated October 20, 1977. It is
therefore hereby clarified that Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 were
actually issued sometime between August 8 and 13 1998 and not on
October 20, 1997.
Regarding the claim that these decrees were prematurely issued as the
motion for the issuance of the decrees in favor of the Heirs of Eugenio
Lopez, the properties involved having been sold to him by the applicants,
is still pending with the court, it is informed that no copy of said motion
nor of the order directing this Office to comment thereon appears on file in
the records of the case. Hence, these matters could not have been taken
into consideration in the issuance of the decrees. Had the Administration
been apprised of these incidents, perhaps the issuance of the decrees
could have been held in abeyance until the court has resolved the same.
As to the recall of the decrees of registration, we regret to inform you that Pursuant to Sec. 76, PD No. 1529[,] the contents of the notice are the
since the certificates of title transcribed pursuant to said decrees have name[s] of the parties, the court where the action is pending, the date the
already been issued and released by the Registrar of Deeds concerned, it action was instituted and a copy of the compalint [sic] in order to
is now beyond our authority to recall them unless duly authorized by the determine if the person named in the title is impleaded.
court.
We regret to inform you that the application, bereft of the original petition
We hope that we have satisfactorily disposed of the concerns raised in or compaint [sic] upon which this office will base its action, is DENIED.
your letter.
If you do not agree with our findings, you can, without withdrawing the
Very documents you submitted, elevate the matter en consulta five (5) days
truly yours, from receipt hereof to the Office of the Administrator, Land Registration
(sig Authority, East Avenue cor. NIA Road, Quezon City.
ned)
ALFREDO R. Very truly
ENRIQUEZ yours,
Admi
nistrator
(signe
On 25 November 1998, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of d)
Marikina City an application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the EDGA
back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 on the ground that petitioners have R D. SANTOS
filed with the land registration court a motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 Regist
and O-1604 void.[14] Petitioners attached to the application a copy of the er of Deeds
25 November 1998 motion and the pertinent OCTs.
On 14 January 1999, three days after receipt of the letter, petitioners
In a letter[15] dated 15 December 1998, the Register of Deeds of elevated the denial in consulta to the LRA. The case was docketed as
Marikina City denied the application to annotate the notice of lis pendens. Consulta No. 2879.
The entire letter states:
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
Republic of the Philippines
In its resolution[16] dated 21 May 1999, the LRA stated that the sole
Department of Justice
question for resolution is whether a notice of lis pendens is registrable
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
based on a motion to declare void the decrees and titles. The LRA agreed
Registry of Deeds, Marikina City
with the Register of Deeds that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion
is not registrable. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the
15 December 1998 LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a
notice of lis pendens relative to the pending case.
Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
2nd Floor, Benpres Bldg. The LRA focused on petitioners standing in LRC No. N-18887. The LRA
Exchange Road cor. Meralco Avenue declared that petitioners are not parties in LRC No. N-18887. Since a land
Pasig City registration case is a proceeding in rem, an order of general default binds
the whole world as a party in the case. Petitioners are mere movants
whose personality the court has not admitted. Based on Section 26 of PD
Sir: 1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should have filed a motion to lift the
order of general default. Pertinent portions of the LRA decision read:
This is in connection to [sic] your application to have a Notice of Lis
Pendens [annotated] at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 issued Until and after the Order of General Default in LRC Case No. 18887 is
in the name of ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND SPOUSE. lifted, petitioners cannot be clothed with personality as oppositors in said
Page 67 of 74
land registration case by merely filing a motion after a judgement has
been rendered. Such being the case, a notice of lis pendens on the basis of
the motion filed by petitioners cannot be admitted for registration. To rule
otherwise would preempt the judgment of the Court in so far as the
personalities of the movants as oppositors in the land registration case is
concerned.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Authority is of the opinion and so
holds that the notice of lis pendens is not registrable.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Undaunted, petitioners filed before the appellate court a petition for
review of the LRAs decision. Petitioners filed the petition on the ground of
manifest error and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the LRA
Administrator when he ruled in Consulta No. 2879 that the notice of lis
pendens is not registrable.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The
appellate court reiterated the LRAs ruling that only a party to a case has
the legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens. Petitioners have no
legal personality because they failed to file a motion to lift the order of
general default in the land registration case.
Issues
Petitioners present the following issues for resolution of this Court:
1. WHETHER PETITIONERS MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE
DECREES ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
IS A PROPER BASIS FOR FILING THE NOTICE OF LIS
PENDENS, and
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS CAN FILE THE MOTION TO DECLARE
VOID THE DECREES ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION
COURT IN LRC CASE NO. N-18887 DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE COURT HAS NOT LIFTED THE GENERAL ORDER OF
DEFAULT.[18]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
We agree with the observation of the appellate court that the
pleadings filed by petitioners, public respondents and the Office of the
Solicitor General cite more or less the same provisions of the laws as
applicable in support of their respective contentions but differ x x x only
with respect to their interpretation thereof.[19] With this observation in
Page 68 of 74
mind, we quote the pertinent provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and of PD 1529.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the
right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when
affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the
registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice
of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the
parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing
such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency
of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by
their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only
upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real
estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof,
or for partition or other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting
the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon,
and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment,
shall have any effect upon registered land as against persons other than
the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the institution
of such action or proceeding and the court wherein the same is pending,
as well as the date of the institution thereof, together with a reference to
the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the
land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and
registered.
Notice of Lis Pendens
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis
pendens refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires
over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action,
and until final judgment.[20]
The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party
causing the registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third persons
who purchase or contract on the subject property that they do so at their
peril and subject to the result of the pending litigation.[21]
 The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it
keeps the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court
until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final
judgment by successive alienations. Second, it binds a purchaser, bona
fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree
that the court will promulgate subsequently. However, the filing of a notice
of lis pendens does not create a right or lien that previously did not
exist.[22]
Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the
property after relying only on the certificate of title is a purchaser in good
faith. Against such third party, the supposed rights of a litigant cannot
prevail, because the former is not bound by the property owners
undertakings not annotated in the transfer certificate of title.[23] Thus, we
have consistently held that
The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the
intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an
incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the
merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all
people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own
risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any
voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well
be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and
laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is
therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the
Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or
removal x x x is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the
action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.[24]
A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only with
title or possession of a property, but also with the use or occupation of a
property.[25] The litigation must directly involve a specific property which is
necessarily affected by the judgment. Magdalena Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[26] enumerated the cases where a
notice of lis pendens is appropriate:
[A] notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
Page 69 of 74
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting
the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the
buildings thereon.
On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application in the
following cases:
a) Preliminary attachments;
b) Proceedings for the probate of wills;
c) Levies on execution;
d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons; and
e) Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of a
money judgment.[27]
As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should
contain a statement of the institution of an action or proceeding, the court
where the same is pending, and the date of its institution. A notice of lis
pendens should also contain a reference to the number of the certificate of
title of the land, an adequate description of the land affected and its
registered owner.
The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis pendens
because the application was bereft of the original petition or complaint
upon which this office will base its action.[28] In consulta to the LRA,
petitioners pointed out that they have complied with the requirements for
the registration of the notice of lis pendens, as follows:
7.2.1 The Notice of Lis Pendens contains a statement of the filing by the
Heirs of Eugenio Lopez of a motion to declare Original Certificates of Title
Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null and void;
7.2.2 It contains the name of the court wherein the motion is pending
which is the registration court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 152, Pasig
City. The date of the filing of the motion is shown on the motion itself
wherein the receipt of said motion by the land registration court
on November 25, 1998 is duly stamped;
7.2.3 The numbers of the Original Certificates of Title Nos. O-1603 and O-
1604 are clearly indicated in the notice;
7.2.4 There is adequate description of the land affected in the Notice of Lis
Pendens;
7.2.5 The names of the registered owners are indicated in Paragraph 4 of
the Motion attached to the Notice;
7.2.6 A copy of the motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null
and void, dated November 25, 1998 upon which the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Rizal will base its action is attached as Annex A of the
Notice of Lis Pendens. (Emphasis in the original)[29]
Petitioners enumeration readily reveals that they have not complied
with the requisites. Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the
application for a notice of lis pendens because petitioners are mere
movants, and not original parties, in LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are
not parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they
failed to present the requisite pleading to the Register of Deeds of Marikina
City. We hold that the Register of Deeds correctly denied the application
for a notice of lis pendens.
Reconveyance
Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when they filed a
motion in LRC No. N-18887 on 16 July 1997. The remedy of petitioners is
an action for reconveyance against Sandoval, Ozaeta and their spouses.
Reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act
No. 3322, which states that xxx in all cases of registration procured by
fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against
the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any
innocent holder for value of a certificate of title xxx.
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a
person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens
system in anothers name. Although the decree is recognized as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not
necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance
is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with
the land registration court.[30] Reconveyance is always available as long as
the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice
of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the certificate of title immediately
upon the institution of the action in court. The notice of lis pendens will
avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim
of the real owner.[31]
Necessity of a Motion to Lift the Order of General Default
In its comment,[32] the LRA states that under Section 26 of PD 1529
the order of default includes petitioners. Therefore, petitioners failure to
Page 70 of 74
move to lift the default order did not give them standing in the case. As
long as the court does not lift the order of general default, petitioners have
no legal standing to file the motion to declare void the decrees of
registration issued to the applicant. Section 26 of PD 1529 provides thus:
Sec. 26. Order of default; effect. If no person appears and answers within
the time allowed, the court shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason
to the contrary appearing, order a default to be recorded and require the
applicant to present evidence. By the description in the notice To All Whom
It May Concern, all the world are made parties defendant and shall be
concluded by the default order.
Where an appearance has been entered and an answer filed, a default
order shall be entered against persons who did not appear and answer.
Petitioners justification for filing a motion to annul the decrees and
titles, as opposed to filing a motion to lift the order of general default,
rests on two related assumptions. First, with the filing of the 16 July 1997
motion and giving of due course to the motion by the land registration
court, petitioners assert that they acquired legal standing in the
registration proceedings. Second, buyer Eugenio Lopez, Sr. stepped into
the shoes of the sellers-applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta when applicants
sold the property to him. As successors-in-interest of the buyer,
petitioners contend that they are not strangers to the proceedings.
To justify their two assumptions, petitioners traced the antecedent of
Section 22 of PD 1529 to Section 29 of Act 496 [33] and its judicial
interpretation in Mendoza v. Court of Appeals.[34]
Section 22 of PD 1529 provides:
SECTION 22. Dealings with land pending original registration.After the
filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of
registration, the land therein described may still be the subject of dealings
in whole or in part, in which case the interested party shall present to the
court the pertinent instruments together with the subdivision plan
approved by the Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof,
and the court, after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered
subject to the conveyance or encumbrance created by said instruments, or
order that the decree of registration be issued in the name of the person
to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments.
The pertinent portion of Section 29 of Act 496 provides:
SECTION 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of
the decree of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the
land therein described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto
shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds at any time before
issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner as if no application had
been made. The interested party may, however, present such instruments
to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of
the Register of Deeds, together with a motion that the same be considered
in relation with the application, and the court, after notice to the parties
shall order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by
said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of
the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by
said instruments. x x x
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals[35] explains the procedure in cases of
conveyance of the land subject of a registration proceeding by an
instrument executed between the time of filing of the application for
registration and the issuance of the decree of title.
The law does not require that the application for registration be amended
by substituting the buyer or the person to whom the property has been
conveyed for the applicant. Neither does it require that the buyer or the
person to whom the property has been conveyed be a party to the case.
He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The
only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to
the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be
considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be
given to the parties to the case xxx.[36]
Petitioners also assert that they do not dispute the judgment of the
land registration court. However, this position is in conflict with their 25
November 1998 motion to have the decree and the titles declared void.
Petitioners now assume the roles of both successors-in-interest and
oppositors. This confusion of roles brought about petitioners grave error in
procedure.
The land registration court granted the application in LRC No. N-
18887 on 31 May 1966 and issued a certificate of finality dated 8 March
1991. Petitioners filed their motion to consider the deed of sale in the
registration on 16 July 1997. Petitioners filed their motion to have the
decrees and the corresponding certificates of title declared void on 25
November 1998. Petitioners filed both motions long after the decision in
LRC No. N-18887 became final and executory. Neither petitioners nor even
the applicants from whom they base their claim presented the Deed of
Sale before the land registration court while the action was pending.
Considering the facts and arguments as presented above, we hold
that the motion filed by petitioners is insufficient to give them standing in
the land registration proceedings for purposes of filing an application of a
Page 71 of 74
notice of lis pendens. However, we disagree with the LRA and the
appellate courts observation that petitioners need to file a motion to lift
the order of general default. A motion to lift the order of general default
should be filed before entry of final judgment. The land registration court
granted the application for registration of title on 31 May 1966 and issued
a certificate of finality on 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed their motion on
16 July 1997. Thus, even if petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of
general default, the order of default could not be set aside because the
motion was filed out of time.
In Lim Toco v. Go Fay,[37] this Court explained the effect of an order
of default to the party defaulted. A party declared in default loses his
standing in court. As a result of his loss of standing, a party in default
cannot appear in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or be entitled to
notice. A party in default cannot even appeal from the judgment rendered
by the court, unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default
under the grounds provided in what is now Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Indeed, in its comment before this Court, the LRA stated thus:
Under Section 26, PD 1429, petitioners are deemed to have been included
by the default order. Those who did not file an answer should be
considered as having lost their standing in court from that stage (Republic
v. Dela Rosa, 173 SCRA 12) except when they file a motion to set aside
the order [of] default on the grounds mentioned in Section 3, Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court (Toco v. Fay, 80 Phil. 166).
In land registration cases (as in the said LRC No. N-18887), an order of
general default was deemed to have been issued based on the
presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings (Pascual, et al. v. Ortega,
et al., 58 O.G. 12 March 1962 C.A.). Petitioners failed to adduce any
evidence showing that the order of general default was lifted. Records
disclosed that without first filing a motion to lift the order of general
default, petitioners filed a motion to declare as null and void the decrees
and titles. Until the order of general default is lifted by the court, petitioner
could not be considered as a party to the action. They are deemed
movants whose personality as far as the case is concerned is not yet
admitted by the court considering that the order of default has not been
lifted.[38]
One should be careful, however, to distinguish between movants as
mere interested parties prescribed under Section 22 of PD 1529 and
movants as intervenors-oppositors to the land registration proceedings. It
is only in the latter case that a motion to lift the order of general default is
required. It is only in the latter case that the doctrine pronounced
in Serrano v. Palacio,[39] as repeatedly invoked by the LRA and OSG, is
applicable:
x x x [P]etitioners committed an error of procedure when they filed a
motion to intervene in the x x x land registration case for the proper
procedure would have been for them to ask first for the lifting of the order
of general default, and then, if lifted, to file an opposition to the
application of the applicants. This is so because proceedings in land
registration are in rem, and not in personam, the sole object being the
registration applied for, and not the determination of any right not
connected with the registration (Estila vs. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498).
Petitioners are not mere interested parties in this case. By filing their
motion to have the decrees and the corresponding certificates of title
declared void, they took the role of oppositors to the application for land
registration.
The appellate court stated that in as much as it would want to oblige
to the plea of petitioners to hasten or expedite the proceedings and to
avoid further expenses on the part of the petitioners, however[,] (it) could
not.[40] Indeed, it requires a delicate balancing act between the objective
of the Rules of Court to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding[41] and the strict requirements for a notice
of lis pendens. The facts in this case show that petitioners have not
complied with the requirements.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993 dated 29 November 2000.
[G.R. No. 151259. October 13, 2004]
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner vs. HON. NAZAR[1] U.
CHAVES, RTC, BR. 18, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY
and SPS. JUANITO & AGUSTINA OBEDENCIO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the
Decision[2] dated February 29, 2000 and
the Resolution[3] dated December 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 38152.
Private respondents, spouses Juanito and Agustina Obedencio, filed
Civil Case No. 94-211 for Specific Performance at the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18. They prayed that the
Social Security System (SSS) be ordered (1) to cancel the mortgage on
the properties of the spouses; (2) to release the documents covering the
said properties; and (3) to pay the spouses moral damages in the sum
Page 72 of 74
of P80,000; litigation expenses in the sum of P5,000; and attorneys fees in
the sum of P20,000.
The petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim alleging that the
private respondents had an unpaid obligation in the amount of P48,188.72
as of September 1, 1994.[4]
After the issues were joined, a pre-trial conference was scheduled
on February 16, 1995. Atty. Rodrigo B. Filoteo, acting assistant branch
manager of the SSS in Cagayan de Oro City and allegedly the only lawyer
of the said branch, entered his appearance as counsel for the petitioner.
He manifested that he had filed his pre-trial brief through registered
mail. The hearing was, however, cancelled because the respondent judge
was indisposed. The hearing of the case was reset on April 18, 1995. This
time, Atty. Filoteo failed to attend because of an official mission
to Zamboanga City from April 7 to May 8, 1995 involving SSS cases.
On motion of Atty. Alberto Bacal, counsel of the respondent spouses,
respondent judge issued an Order dated April 18, 1995 declaring
petitioner in default and allowed private respondents to present their
evidence ex-parte.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for the
lifting of the order of default. The motion was denied for lack of merit in an
Order dated May 22, 1995. On August 16, 1995, the petitioner appealed
the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration to the Court of Appeals
by way of a petition for certiorari.[5]
In its Decision of February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition.[6] We deny the petition.
There is no question that it is the discretion of the trial judge to declare a
party-defendant as in default for failure to appear at a pre-trial
conference. The declaration of default for non-appearance at a pre-trial
conference is sanctioned by Rule 20, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, thus:
- A party who fails to appear at a pretrial conference may be non-suited or
considered as in default.
To be relieved of the effects of the order of default, Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court provides that the defendant must file a motion under oath
to set aside the order of default; that he must show that his failure to
appear at the pre-trial was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect and accompany the motion with affidavit of merit.
A motion to lift order of default should be under oath, verified and
accompanied with an affidavit of merit.
Aside from the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the
motion to lift the order of default must further show that the defendant
has a meritorious defense or that something would be gained by having
the order of default set aside. Otherwise, and if the motion is not
accompanied by affidavits of merits, it may properly be denied.
A perusal of petitioners motion to lift order of default shows that it is
neither under oath nor accompanied by an affidavit of merit. There was no
notice of hearing. There was also no showing, save in the instant petition,
that it has meritorious defense or that something would be gained by
having the order of default set aside. Thus, the trial Court correctly denied
petitioners motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.[7]
On March 16, 2000, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, which
was denied. Hence, petitioner through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) now assails the Decision and Resolution of the appellate court,
alleging that,
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION HAS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH WAS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. Rules of Procedure should be liberally construed pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court in order to protect the
substantive rights of the parties.
B. Petitioner has the right to have its day in court in order to
present its meritorious defense against the unfounded and
baseless claim of respondent spouses.[8]
The core issue particular to this case is whether the default order of
the lower court should be lifted, so that substantial justice would prevail
over technical rules.
Seeking relief from Section 2, Rule 1 (now Section 6 [9]), and Section
2, Rule 20 (now Section 4, Rule 18[10]) of the Revised Rules of Court, and
invoking our pronouncements in Rinconada Telephone Company, Inc. v.
Buenviaje,[11] Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[12] and Alonso v. Villamor,[13] the petitioner asserts that although
respondent judge has the discretion to declare a defendant in default for
failure to appear during pre-trial conference, the strict, rigid and arbitrary
application thereof denied the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to
present its meritorious defense, refute the evidence of the private
Page 73 of 74
respondents, present his own, and exercise his right to due process. The
petitioner contends that the rules should be liberally construed in order to
protect the substantive rights of the parties.
Citing further Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete[14] and Lucero v.
Dacayo, [15] petitioner suggests that its Motion for Reconsideration was in
substance legally adequate, whether or not it was verified with an affidavit
of merit since the form of the motion by which the default was sought to
be lifted is secondary and the requirements of Section 3, Rule 18 [16] of the
Rules of Court need not be strictly complied with, unlike in cases of default
for failure to answer. In sum, petitioner begs for the liberal construction of
the rules.
Petitioner further avers that contrary to the unsubstantiated claim of
private respondents, their obligation amounting to P48,188.72 as
of September 1, 1994, remains outstanding. This is evidenced by the
statement of account prepared by the SSS Real Estate Loans
Department. Consequently, petitioner concludes, private respondents had
yet no legal right to demand from petitioner the release of the mortgage
over their property.
Private respondents, in turn, insist that petitioner violated Section 2,
Rule 20, (now Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 18 [17]) of the Revised Rules of
Court and Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 as amended on July 1, 1997.[18]
Sadly, the records reveal that petitioner failed to comply not only with
one rule. Other than failing to appear during pre-trial, petitioner does not
deny that its Motion for Reconsideration to lift the order of default lacked
verification, notice of hearing and affidavit of merit. If not accompanied by
affidavits of merit, the trial court has no authority to consider the
same. [19] A motion to lift an order of default is fatally flawed and the trial
court has no authority to consider the same where it was not under oath
and unaccompanied by an affidavit of merit. In effect, the petitioner failed
to set aside the order of default and must suffer the consequences
thereof.[20]
Procedural rules are not to be disregarded or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys
substantive rights. Like all rules they are to be followed, except only when
for the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[21] Here,
the petitioner has not shown any persuasive reason why he should be
exempt from abiding by the rules. Accordingly, the order declaring the
petitioner in default and the denial of the motion to lift the order of default
are juridically unassailable.
We must stress, however, that a judgment of default against the
petitioner who failed to appear during pre-trial or, for that matter, any
defendant who failed to file an answer, does not imply a waiver of all of
their rights, except their right to be heard and to present evidence to
support their allegations. Otherwise, it would be meaningless to request
presentation of evidence every time the other party is declared in default.
If it were so, a decision would then automatically be rendered in favor of
the non-defaulting party and exactly to the tenor of his prayer.[22] The law
also gives the defaulting parties some measure of protection because
plaintiffs, despite the default of defendants, are still required to
substantiate their allegations in the complaint.[23]
In the instant case, private respondents claim that they had fully paid
their obligation with the SSS. They allege that they already paid P63,000,
an amount that exceeded their supposed accountability of P56,427. In
their prayer in Civil Case No. 94-211 for Specific Performance filed before
the Regional Trial Court, they ask that petitioner be ordered to cancel the
mortgage on their properties, to release the documents covering the said
properties and to pay them damages, litigation expenses and attorneys
fees.
We note, though, that petitioner had earlier filed an answer stating
that the private respondent spouses had an unpaid obligation amounting
to P48,188.72 as of September 1, 1994. Likewise, before the petitioner
was declared in default its counsel, Atty. Filoteo, had manifested that he
had filed his pre-trial brief by registered mail. We also note that when the
respondent judge issued the default order, it allowed private respondents
to present their evidence ex parte. With the pre-trial brief and answer of
petitioner, the trial court could then proceed to evaluate the evidence like
receipts, if any, of the private respondents against the allegations of the
petitioner, to determine the private respondents outstanding obligation, a
crucial factual question in this case. The petitioners averment that the
private respondents outstanding balance is P48,188.72 as of September 1,
1994 should be weighed against the private respondents own evidence
that they had fully paid their obligation to petitioner.
In a civil case, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his
case through a preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or
created by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that
of his opponent.[24] The private respondents cannot railroad the release of
the mortgage through a default order. The determination of the accurate
outstanding balance of the private respondents should first be resolved
before the release of the subject mortgage can be demanded. In this case,
when the evidence during trial proves unsatisfactory and inconclusive as to
the full payment of private respondents obligation to SSS, then the
mortgage should not yet be cancelled prematurely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated February 29, 2000, and the Resolution dated December 12, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the
Page 74 of 74
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18,
for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
[9] Rule 1, SEC. 6. Construction.These Rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (2a)
[10] Rule 18, SEC. 4. Appearance of parties.It shall be the duty of the
parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-
appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is
shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully
authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to
submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. (n)
[16] Rule 18, SEC. 3. Relief from order of default.A party declared in default
may at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment file a
motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper
showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect and that he has a meritorious
defense. In such case the order of default may be set aside on
such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest
of justice. [Now Section 3 (b), Rule 9.]
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear.The failure of the plaintiff to appear
when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be
cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with
prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure
on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to
present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on
the basis thereof. (2a R20)
[18] Rule 15
SEC. 4. Hearing of motion.Except for motions which the court may act
upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every
written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt
by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on
shorter notice. (4a)
SEC. 5. Notice of hearing.The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the
hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing
of the motion. (5a)