Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.

NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS,

FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR and ROGER JALANDONI y ARI, appellants.Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision
of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Remedial Law|Evidence|Text Messages
Remedial Law; Evidence; Text Messages; Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to
the same or has personal knowledge of them.—As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in
conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are
to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi,
posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the
recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such
messages and was competent to testify on them.

Case Title : ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondents.Case Nature : MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme
Court.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Presidency|Power to Appoint|Appointments|Judicial and Bar Council

CARPIO-MORALES, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Civil Procedure; Judgments; Stare Decisis; View that in reversing Valenzuela, the Decision held that the Valenzuela
dictum did not firmly rest on Concom deliberation, yet it did not offer to cite a material Concom deliberation—it instead opted to
rely on the memory of Justice Florenz Regalado which incidentally mentioned only the “Court of Appeals.”—In
reversing Valenzuela, the Decision held that the Valenzueladictum did not firmly rest on ConCom deliberations, yet it did not
offer to cite a material ConCom deliberation. It instead opted to rely on the memory of Justice Florenz Regalado which
incidentally mentioned only the “Court of Appeals.” The Decision’s conclusion must rest on the strength of its own favorable
Concom deliberation, none of which to date has been cited.
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Power to Appoint; Appointments; View that because of the temporary nature of the
circumstance causing the impossibility of performance, the outgoing President is released from non-fulfillment of the obligation
to appoint, and the duty devolved upon the new President.—In view of the temporary nature of the circumstance causing the
impossibility of performance, the outgoing President is released from non-fulfillment of the obligation to appoint, and the duty
devolves upon the new President. The delay in the fulfillment of the obligation becomes excusable, since the law cannot exact
compliance with what is impossible. The 90-day period within which to appoint a member of the Court is thus suspended and the
period could only start or resume to run when the temporary obstacle disappears (i.e., after the period of the appointments ban;
when there is already a qu orum in the JBC; or when there is already at least three applicants).
Same; Same; Same; View that to require the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to submit to the President a shortlist of
nominees on or before the occurrence of vacancy in the Supreme Court leads to preposterous results.—To require the JBC to
submit to the President a shortlist of nominees on or before the occurrence of vacancy in the Court leads to preposterous results.
It bears reiterating that the requirement is absurd when, inter alia, the vacancy is occasioned by the death of a member of the
Court, in which case the JBC could never anticipate the death of a Justice, and could never submit a list to the President on or
before the occurrence of vacancy.
BRION, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Power to Appoint; Appointments; View that the election appointment ban under Article
VII, Section 15 of the Constitution should not apply to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court whose period for
appointment is separately provided for under Article VIII, Section 4(1).—The election appointment ban under Article VII,
Section 15 of the Constitution should not apply to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court whose period for
appointment is separately provided for under Article VIII, Section 4(1).
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Valenzuela ruling is still good law; no reason exists to touch the ruling as its main
focus—the application of the election ban on the appointment of lower court judges under Article VIII, Section 9 of the
Constitution—is not even an issue in the present case and was discussed only because the petitions incorrectly cited the ruling as
authority on the issue of the Chief Justice’s appointment.—I diverged fully from the Decision on the question of whether we
should maintain or reverse our ruling in Valenzuela. I maintained that it is still good law; no reason exists to touch the ruling as
its main focus—the application of the election ban on the appointment of lower court judges under Article VIII, Section 9 of the
Constitution—is not even an issue in the present case and was discussed only because the petitions incorrectly cited the ruling as
authority on the issue of the Chief Justice’s appointment. The Decision proposed to reverse Valenzuela but only secured the
support of five (5) votes, while my Separate Opinion in support of Valenzuela had four (4) votes. Thus, on the whole, the
Decision did not prevail in reversing Valenzuela, as it only had five (5) votes in a field of 12 participating Members of the
Court. Valenzuela should therefore remain, as of the filing of this Opinion, as a valid precedent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial and Bar Council; View that the Supreme Court cannot dictate on the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) the results of its assigned task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to use to determine who to
recommend—it cannot even direct the JBC on how and when to do its duty, but it can, under its power of supervision, direct the
JBC to “take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.”—The Court cannot dictate on the JBC
the results of its assigned task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to use to determine who to recommend. It cannot even
direct the JBC on how and when to do its duty, but it can, under its power of supervision, direct the JBC to “take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties,” if the duties are not being performed because of JBC’s fault or
inaction, or because of extraneous factors affecting performance. Note in this regard that, constitutionally, the Court can also
assign the JBC other functions and duties—a power that suggests authority beyond what is purely supervisory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the process of preparing and submitting a list of nominees is an arduous and
time-consuming task that cannot be done overnight.—I hasten to add that the JBC’s constitutional task is not as simple as some
people think it to be. The process of preparing and submitting a list of nominees is an arduous and time-consuming task that
cannot be done overnight. It is a six-step process lined with standards requiring the JBC to attract the best available candidates,
to examine and investigate them, to exhibit transparency in all its actions while ensuring that these actions conform to
constitutional and statutory standards (such as the election ban on appointments), to submit the required list of nominees on time,
and to ensure as well that all these acts are politically neutral.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) list for the Supreme Court has to be
submitted on or before the vacancy occurs given the 90-day deadline that the appointing President is given in making the
appointment.—On the time element, the JBC list for the Supreme Court has to be submitted on or before the vacancy occurs
given the 90-day deadline that the appointing President is given in making the appointment. The list will be submitted, not to the
President as an outgoing President, nor to the election winner as an incoming President, but to the President of the
Philippines whoever he or she may be. If the incumbent President does not act on the JBC list within the time left in her term,
the same list shall be available to the new President for him to act upon. In all these, the Supreme Court bears the burden of
overseeing that the JBC’s duty is done, unerringly and with utmost dispatch; the Court cannot undertake this supervision in a
manner consistent with the Constitution’s expectation from the JBC unless it adopts a pro-active stance within the limits of its
supervisory authority.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the ponencia’s ruling is out of place in the present case, since at issue here is
the appointment of the Chief Justice during the period of the election ban, not the appointment of lower court judges that
Valenzuela resolved.—The ponencia’s ruling reversing Valenzuela, in my view, is out of place in the present case, since at issue
here is the appointment of the Chief Justice during the period of the election ban, not the appointment of lower court judges
that Valenzuela resolved. To be perfectly clear, the conflict in the constitutional provisions is not confined to Article VII, Section
15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1) with respect to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court; even before
the Valenzuela ruling, the conflict already existed between Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 9—the provision on
the appointment of the justices and judges of courts lower than the Supreme Court. After this Court’s ruling in Valenzuela, no
amount of hairsplitting can result in the conclusion that Article VII, Section 15 applied the election ban over the whole Judiciary,
including the Supreme Court, as the facts and the fallo of Valenzuela plainly spoke of the objectionable appointment of two
Regional Trial Court judges. To reiterate, Valenzuela only resolved the conflict between Article VII, Section 15 and
appointments to the Judiciary under Article VIII, Section 9.
Case Title : BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., AND BIENVENIDO DOUGLAS LUKE BRADBURY JABAN, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF CEBU, CITY MAYOR ALVIN GARCIA, SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF CITY OF
CEBU, HON. RENATO V. OSMEÑA, AS PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, AND CITOM
CHAIRMAN ALAN GAVIOLA, AS CITOM CHIEF, CITOM TRAFFIC ENFORCER E. A. ROMERO, AND LITO
GILBUENA, respondents.Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|DueProcess|Notice and Hearing

Constitutional Law; Police Power; Police power is regarded as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’”—In particular, police power is regarded as “the most essential,
insistent and the
773least limitable of powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’ ” It is unquestionably “the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the same.” According to Cooley: “[The police power] embraces the whole system of
internal regulation by which the state seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences against itself, but also to
establish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens, those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to
prevent the conflict of rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as it is reasonably consistent
with the right enjoyment of rights by others.”
Same; Due Process; The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part
of the Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary.—The guaranty of due process of law
is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of the Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the
Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection essential to every inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on Constitutional
Law has vividly written: x xx. If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property, he is denied the
protection of due process. If the enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an unreasonable requirement, due process is likewise
violated. Whatsoever be the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or merely a statute, its unjustified withholding
would also be a violation of due process. Any government act that militates against the ordinary norms of justice or fair play is
considered an infraction of the great guaranty of due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation merely of the
procedure prescribed by the law or affects the very validity of the law itself.
Same; Same; Notice and Hearing; Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there
are many instances under our laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or
deprivation of due process; The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the
transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would
774be superfluous.—Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there are many instances
under our laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process.
Among the instances are the cancellation of the passport of a person being sought for the commission of a crime, the preventive
suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges, the distraint of properties to answer for tax delinquencies, the
padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, and the abatement of nuisance per se.
Add to them the arrest of a person in flagrante delicto. The clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664
(and of the vehicles of others similarly situated) was of the same character as the aforecited established exceptions dispensing
with notice and hearing. As already said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary
because the transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be
superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trial-type hearing prior to the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due process, for
giving the transgressors the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest could equally satisfy the need for a
hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of a court of law was not indispensable to ensure a compliance with the guaranty of
due process.

Case Title : ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIP-PINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO
B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO,
FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE,
TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. APRESTO, CONSUELO
M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent., ARSENIO AL. ACUÑA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FER-
RARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS’ COMMITTEE, INC.,
Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners, vs. JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents., INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner, vs. HON. PHILIP E.
JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO,
CONRADO AVANCEÑA, and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents., NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR.,
petitioners, vs. HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agra-, rian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.Case Nature : PETITIONS to review the decisions of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|AgrarianLaw|Powers of the President|Mandamus|EminentDomain|PolicePower|Equal
Protection of the Law|Classificationdefined|Statutes|Theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be
made fully in money

Constitutional Law; Elements of judicial inquiry.—In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a
declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who
took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc. And as established by judge-made doctrine, the
Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry
into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the
resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.
Same; Agrarian Law; Powers of the President; Power of President Aquino to promulgate Proclamation No. 131 and E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229, the same authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution.—The promulgation
of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v.
Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc.
No. 131 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution, quoted above.
Same; Same; Pres. Aquino’s loss of legislative powers did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by
her when she possessed it; Reasons.—The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the
Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not “midnight”
enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e.,
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be
valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by
subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the
dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino’s loss of legislative power did not have the
effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.
Same; Same; Same; Appropriation Law, defined; Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure; Reasons.—That fund, as
earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as
specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the
creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which
is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of
the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
Same; Same; Same; Section 6 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657) provides for retention
limits.—The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not
provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does
provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section
declares: Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any
public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as
commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)
created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to
each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he
is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by
Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
Same; Same; Same; Rule that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents.—The argument that E.O.
No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only
short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters
embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.
Same; Same; Same; Mandamus; Rule that mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.—Finally,
there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the
performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition
but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamuswill lie to compel the
dischrage of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to
require action only but not specific action. Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the
extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific
action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court,
public official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great detriment of all
parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction, mandamuswill
issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause.
Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain; Police Power; Property condemned under Police Power is noxious or intended for
a noxious purpose is not compensable.—There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent
domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio
v. NAWASA, for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange
for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property
involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene
materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable,
unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Cases at bar: The extent, retention limits, police power, deprivation, excess of the maximum
area under power of eminent domain.—The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution.
But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess
of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of
the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Classification defined; Requisites of a valid classification.—
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the
measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition of Equal Protection.—Equal protection simply means that all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown
that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners
of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of
Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of
the lawful subject and method.—It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only
if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as
distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the
subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has
been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the Constitutional goal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain, defined.—Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no
need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary
deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other
conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the
State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on
the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements for a proper exercise of power of eminent domain.—But for all its primacy and
urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the
constitutional injunction that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation” and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the
power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Concept of political question.—A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of
the political departments when they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in
the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: The term “political question” connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.” It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation, defined.—Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker’s
gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that
the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements of compensable taking.—As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi,
there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the
entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property
must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property
for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these
requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Determination of Just Compensation, addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped
by any other branch.—To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may
not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay resolved a challenge to several decrees
promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the
assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the
CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.—With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner
of the just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do
not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a
cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court
is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and
deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will
result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer’s hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the
spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is
not what we shall decree today.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in
money; Other modes of payment.—Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made
fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the
smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landwoner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial
instruments making up the balance of the payment are “negotiable at any time.” The other modes, which are likewise available to
the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties
or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law repeats the requisites of registration but does not provide that in case of failure or
refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes.—The
complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it appears
that Setion 4 of the Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as
embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the
valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that
the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for
in Section 16.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.—The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this
settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than those granted by P.D. No. 27 as to retention limits;
Case at bar.—In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the
petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be
examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not
own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition. Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event,
assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are
entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted
by the decree.

Case Title : AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES DAVID** and ELISEA RAMOS, respondentsCase
Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|StateImmunity|Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in
favor of the State

Constitutional Law; State Immunity; The immunity of the state from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity
or non-suability of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution; The immunity from suit is based on the
political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong.—The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine
of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, viz.: Section 3.
The State may not be sued without its consent. The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a
sovereign, can do no wrong.
Same; Same; Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State; Several
justifications have been offered to support the adoption of the doctrine in the Philippines, but that offered in Providence
Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 29 SCRA 589 (1969), is the most acceptable explanation.—Practical
considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at the
instance of every other individual, government service may be severely obstructed and public safety endangered because of the
number of suits that the State has to defend against. Several justifications have been offered to support the adoption of the
doctrine in the Philippines, but that offered in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 29 SCRA
598 (1969), is “the most acceptable explanation,” according to Father Bernas, a recognized commentator on Constitutional Law,
to wit: [A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be
caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far
greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the
well-known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to
defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined.
Same; Same; An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity
from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty.—An unincorporated government agency without any
separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty.
Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated.
However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one
performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a
necessary function of government but was essentially a business.
 Same; Same; The Court of Appeals (CA) correctly appreciated the juridical character of the Air Transportation Office
(ATO) as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function.—In our view, the CA
thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely
governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an
activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s
immunity from suit. We uphold the CA’s aforequoted holding.
Same; Same; The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation
arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the
plaintiffs’ property.—We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid
claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings
being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. Thus, in De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA 11 (1993),
the trial court’s dismissal based on the doctrine of non-suability of the State of two cases (one of which was for damages) filed by
owners of property where a road 9 meters wide and 128.70 meters long occupying a total area of 1,165 square meters and an
artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long occupying an area of 2,906 square meters had been constructed by the
provincial engineer of Rizal and a private contractor without the owners’ knowledge and consent was reversed and the cases
remanded for trial on the merits. The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for
perpetrating any injustice on a citizen.
Same; Same; The issue of whether or not the Air Transportation Office (ATO) could be sued without the State’s consent
has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008.—
The issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent has been rendered moot by the passage of
Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008.

Case Title : THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. GREGORIO PERFECTO, defendant
and appellant.Case Nature : APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Harvey, J.
Syllabi Class : ID.

1. 1.DEFAMATION, ABUSE, OR INSULT OF A MINISTER OF THE CROWN OR OTHER PERSON IN

AUTHORITY; ARTICLE 256 OF THE PENAL CODE, WHETHER IN FORCE; EFFECT OF THE LlBEL LAW
ON ARTICLE 256.—Article 256 of the Penal Code punishes "Any person who, by * * * writing, shall defame,
abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority." The Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has
had the effect of repealing so much. of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult.

1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; LIBEL OF LEGISLATURE.—While it may be proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel
charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the range of the
liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious.

1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—Where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of
antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the Legislature to give expression in it to the whole
law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication.

1. 4.ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF CHANGE FROM SPANISH TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PHILIPPINES
ON ARTICLE 256 OF THE PENAL CODE. (OPINION OF JUSTICES MALCOLM, OSTRAND, AND
JOHNS.) — Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish
to American sovereignty over the Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic principles of government.

1. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.—All those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as
treason, lésemajesté, religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are no longer
in force. Article 255 of the Penal Code is of a similar nature.

1. 6.ID.; ID.; ID.—It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations
of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise,
impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity to
receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the
constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it."
(Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 How., 210.)
 1. 7.ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF PHILIPPINE GOVEBNMENT.—The nature of the government which has been set up in
the Philippines under American sovereignty was outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine
liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. The President and Congress framed the government on
the model with which Americans are f amiliar and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public
interests and the protection of individual rights and privileges.

1. 8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect
Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a
new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in
authority of such exalted position that the citizens must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our
Constitutions and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man."
(State vs.Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)

1. 9.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—In the United States, the offense of scandalummagnatum is not known. In this country no
distinction as to persons is recognized.

1. 10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the
American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from the spirit which inspires all
penal legislation of American origin is as wide as that which separates a monarchy from a democratic republic like
that of the United States.

1. 11.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such
respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position
by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.

1. 12.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The crime of lésemajestédisappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of
Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.

Case Title : VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC), REPRESENTED BY DANTE L. JIMENEZ,
petitioner, vs. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme
Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Operative Fact Doctrine

Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; Courts; The Constitution vests judicial power in the Supreme Court (SC) and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.—The Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law. In creating a lower court, Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court,
upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of the repositories of judicial power. However, only the Court is a
constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in its exercise of the legislative power.
Same; Same; The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”—The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of
settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for
determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—What are the remedies by
which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government may be determined under the Constitution? The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining
and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions
for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the
remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used
for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and
not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court
itself.—Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from
prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the reexamination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is
directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy
issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.—With respect to the Court, the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra. Thus,
petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or
nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and
undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested
or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the
obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is
consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Requisites for the Exercise of Judicial Review.—The requisites for the exercise of
the power of judicial review are the following, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the
Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litismota of the case.
Disbursement Acceleration Program; The implementation of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) entailed the
allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by
reason or on account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication
by the Court.—An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The incompatibility of the perspectives of
the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal
rights. The issues being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness considering that the challenged executive acts were already
being implemented by the DBM, and there are averments by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter
and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of
public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on account of such challenged
executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication by the Court.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Moot and Academic; The Supreme Court (SC) cannot agree that the termination of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) as a program was a supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated
cases. Verily, the Court had in the past exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and
academic by supervening events.—A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. The Court cannot agree that the
termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court
had in the past exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and academic by supervening events,
like: (1) when there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional character and
was of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the
Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. Assuming that the petitioners’
several submissions against the DAP were ultimately sustained by the Court here, these cases would definitely come under all the
exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review,
refers to “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”— Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of
judicial review, refers to “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” The concept of legal standing, or locus
standi, was particularly discussed in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 615 SCRA 666 (2010), where the Court said: In
public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to
the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to
avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that
the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 402 SCRA 612 (2003): The question on legal standing is whether such parties have
“alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is
in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby
in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of.9
Same; Same; Same; The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 402
SCRA 612 (2003), that “standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.”—The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 402 SCRA 612 (2003),that “[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because
in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.” Except for PHILCONSA,
a petitioner in G.R. No. 209164, the petitioners have invoked their capacities as taxpayers who, by averring that the issuance and
implementation of the DAP and its relevant issuances involved the illegal disbursements of public funds, have an interest in
preventing the further dissipation of public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica)
also assert their right as citizens to sue for the enforcement and observance of the constitutional limitations on the political
branches of the Government. On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its legal standing to
bring cases upon constitutional issues. Luna, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites his additional capacity as a lawyer. The IBP,
the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by “its avowed duty to work for the rule of law and of paramount importance of the
question in this action, not to mention its civic duty as the official association of all lawyers in this country.” Under their
respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to
confer locus standi on each of them. In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of the Chief
Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of
transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As such, the determination of such important issues call
for the Court’s exercise of its broad and wise discretion “to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.”
Budget; Words and Phrases; In the Philippine setting, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 246 (Budget Act) defined “budget” as
the financial program of the National Government for a designated fiscal year, consisting of the statements of estimated receipts
and expenditures for the fiscal year for which it was intended to be effective based on the results of operations during the
preceding fiscal years.—In the Philippine setting, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 246 (Budget Act) defined “budget” as the
financial program of the National Government for a designated fiscal year, consisting of the statements of estimated receipts and
expenditures for the fiscal year for which it was intended to be effective based on the results of operations during the preceding
fiscal years. The term was given a different meaning under Republic Act No. 992 (Revised Budget Act) by describing the budget
as the delineation of the services and products, or benefits that would accrue to the public together with the estimated unit cost of
each type of service, product or benefit. For a forthright definition, budget should simply be identified as the financial plan of the
Government, or “the master plan of government.”
Same; The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a Budget Call by the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM).—The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a Budget Callby the DBM.
The Budget Call contains budget parameters earlier set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) as well as
policy guidelines and procedures to aid government agencies in the preparation and submission of their budget proposals.
The Budget Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget Call, which is addressed to all agencies, including state
universities and colleges; and (2) a Corporate Budget Call, which is addressed to all government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs).
Same; Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two categories, specifically: (1) capital
expenditures or outlays; and (2) current operating expenditures.—Public or government expenditures are generally classified
into two categories, specifically: (1) capital expenditures or outlays; and (2) current operating expenditures. Capital
expenditures are the expenses whose usefulness lasts for more than one year, and which add to the assets of the Government,
including investments in the capital of government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.Current operating
expenditures are the purchases of goods and services in current consumption the benefit of which does not extend beyond the
fiscal year. The two components of current expenditures are those for personal services (PS), and those for maintenance and
other operating expenses (MOOE). Public expendituresare also broadly grouped according to their functions into:
(1) economic development expenditures (i.e., expenditures on agriculture and natural resources, transportation and
communications, commerce and industry, and other economic development efforts); (2) social services or social development
expenditures (i.e., government outlay on education, public health and medicare, labor and welfare and others); (3) general
government or general public services expenditures (i.e., expenditures for the general government, legislative services, the
administration of justice, and for pensions and gratuities); (4) national defense expenditures (i.e., subdivided into national
security expenditures and expenditures for the maintenance of peace and order); and (5) public debt.
Same; Sources of Public Revenues.—In the Philippines, public revenues are generally derived from the following
sources, to wit: (1) tax revenues (i.e., compulsory contributions to finance government activities); (2) capital revenues (i.e.,
proceeds from sales of fixed capital assets or scrap thereof and public domain, and gains on such sales like sale of public lands,
buildings and other structures, equipment, and other properties recorded as fixed assets); (3) grants (i.e., voluntary contributions
and aids given to the Government for its operation on specific purposes in the form of money and/or materials, and do not require
any monetary commitment on the part of the recipient); (4) extraordinary income (i.e., repayment of loans and advances made
by government corporations and local governments and the receipts and shares in income of the BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas, and
other receipts); and (5) public borrowings(i.e., proceeds of repayable obligations generally with interest from domestic and
foreign creditors of the Government in general, including the National Government and its political subdivisions).
Same; Budget Legislation Phase; The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the time Congress
receives the President’s Budget, which is inclusive of the National Expenditure Program (NEP) and the Budget of Expenditures
and Sources of Financing (BESF), up to the President’s approval of the General Appropriations Act (GAA).—The Budget
Legislation Phasecovers the period commencing from the time Congress receives the President’s Budget, which is inclusive of
the NEP and the BESF, up to the President’s approval of the GAA.
Same; Reenacted Budget; If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the General
Appropriations Bill (GAB) for the ensuing fiscal year, the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the preceding fiscal year shall
be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the GAB is passed by the Congress.—The House of
Representatives and the Senate then constitute a panel each to sit in the Bicameral Conference Committee for the purpose of
discussing and harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their versions of the GAB. The “harmonized” version of the GAB is
next presented to the President for approval. The President reviews the GAB, and prepares the Veto Message where budget items
are subjected to direct veto, or are identified for conditional implementation. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall
have failed to pass the GAB for the ensuing fiscal year, the GAA for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and
shall remain in force and effect until the GAB is passed by the Congress.
Same; Budget Execution Phase; The Budget Execution Phase is primarily the function of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM).—With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next step is the implementation of the budget. The Budget
Execution Phase is primarily the function of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the following procedures, namely: (1) to issue
the programs and guidelines for the release of funds; (2) to prepare an Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release
allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement authorities.
Same; In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
issues a disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated in payment of the obligations.—In order to settle the obligations
incurred by the agencies, the DBM issues a disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated in payment of the obligations.
A cash or disbursement authority that is periodically issued is referred to as a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA), which
issuance is based upon an agency’s submission of its Monthly Cash Program and other required documents. The NCA specifies
the maximum amount of cash that can be withdrawn from a government servicing bank for the period indicated. Apart from the
NCA, the DBM may issue a Non-Cash Availment Authority (NCAA) to authorize noncash disbursements, or a Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (CDC) for departments with overseas operations to allow the use of income collected by their foreign
posts for their operating requirements.
Same; Accountability; Accountability is a significant phase of the budget cycle because it ensures that the government
funds have been effectively and efficiently utilized to achieve the State’s socio-economic goals.—Accountabilityis a significant
phase of the budget cycle because it ensures that the government funds have been effectively and efficiently utilized to achieve
the State’s socio-economic goals. It also allows the DBM to assess the performance of agencies during the fiscal year for the
purpose of implementing reforms and establishing new policies. An agency’s accountability may be examined and evaluated
through (1) performance targets and outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports; (3) review of agency performance; and
(4) audit conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA).
Same; The national budget becomes a tangible representation of the programs of the Government in monetary terms,
specifying therein the project, activity or program (PAPs) and services for which specific amounts of public funds are proposed
and allocated.—Policy is always a part of every budget and fiscal decision of any Administration. The national budget the
Executive prepares and presents to Congress represents the Administration’s “blueprint for public policy” and reflects the
Government’s goals and strategies. As such, the national budget becomes a tangible representation of the programs of the
Government in monetary terms, specifying therein the PAPs and services for which specific amounts of public funds are
proposed and allocated. Embodied in every national budget is government spending.
Same; The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution
of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country’s economic situation.—The President, in keeping with his duty to
faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the
country’s economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the
PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded
under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public
treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section
29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Same; Transfer of Funds; The power to transfer funds can give the President the flexibility to meet unforeseen events that
may otherwise impede the efficient implementation of the project, activity or programs (PAPs) set by Congress in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA).—We begin this dissection by reiterating that Congress cannot anticipate all issues and needs that may
come into play once the budget reaches its execution stage. Executive discretion is necessary at that stage to achieve a sound
fiscal administration and assure effective budget implementation. The heads of offices, particularly the President, require
flexibility in their operations under performance budgeting to enable them to make whatever adjustments are needed to meet
established work goals under changing conditions. In particular, the power to transfer funds can give the President the flexibility
to meet unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the efficient implementation of the PAPs set by Congress in the GAA.
Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating funds pursuant to the GAAs, particularly when
the funds are grouped to form lump sum accounts.It is assumed that the agencies of the Government enjoy more flexibility when
the GAAs provide broader appropriation items.This flexibility comes in the form of policies that the Executive may adopt during
the budget execution phase. The DAP — as a strategy to improve the country’s economic position — was one policy that the
President decided to carry out in order to fulfill his mandate under the GAAs.
Same; Same; Requisites for a Valid Transfer of Appropriated Funds.—The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid
under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of
the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.
Same; Constitutional Law; Section 25(5), Article VI, not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an
implementing law for it to be operative.—Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, not being a self-executing provision
of the Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be operative. That law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year.
To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the transfer of funds.
Same; Savings; For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory definition of
savings, would seriously undercut the congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had not even reached and
been used by the agency concerned vis-à-vis the project, activity or programs (PAPs) for which Congress had allocated them.—
For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory definition of savings, would seriously
undercut the congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had not even reached and been used by the agency
concerned vis-à-vis the PAPs for which Congress had allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled positions in
its plantillaand did not receive an allotment and NCA for such vacancies, appropriations for such positions, although unreleased,
may already constitute savings for that agency under the second instance. Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were
encompassed by the first part of the definition of “savings” in the GAA, that is, as “portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance.” But the first part of the definition was further qualified by the
three enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be indiscriminately
declared as savings without first determining whether any of the three instances existed. This signified that the DBM’s
withdrawal of unobligated allotments had disregarded the definition of savings under the GAAs.
Same; Impoundment; Words and Phrases; According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506
(1994), “Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is
the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type.”—According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,
235 SCRA 506 (1994): “Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by
Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type.” Impoundment under the GAA is understood to mean
the retention or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized impoundment only in case of unmanageable National
Government budget deficit.
Same; It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters of appropriations.—
Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse whenever it deliberates and acts
on the budget proposal submitted by the Executive. Its power of the purse is touted as the very foundation of its institutional
strength, and underpins “all other legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and
executive branches of government.” Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government, to
appropriate public funds, and to spend the money. Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control
by specifying the PAPs for which public money should be spent. It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress
that has the final say on matters of appropriations. For this purpose, appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1)
“a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the government are public
funds”; and (2) “a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public money without legislative
authorization.” To conform with the governing principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an
expenditure for a PAP by resorting to either public or private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting
in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms
of both appropriations will thereby be violated.
Same; Cross-Border Augmentations; Funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another
office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items.—By providing that the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional
Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA “for their respective offices,” Section 25(5), supra, has
delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another
office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border
transfers or cross-border augmentations. To be sure, the phrase “respective offices” used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the
entire Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives,
with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their
respective Chairpersons.
Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; Parties; Disbursement Acceleration Program; The denial of equal protection of any
law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few
legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of funds under the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP).—The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, which focuses on the release of funds under
the DAP to legislators, lacks factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and Congressmen being unaware of the
existence and implementation of the DAP, and about some of them having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with
relevant data. Also, the claim that the Executive discriminated against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less
than the others could not of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of equal
protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties
would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for
the requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal
protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here. Consequently, the
Court was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal protection. To have the Court do so despite the
inadequacy of the showing of factual and legal support would be to compel it to speculate, and the outcome would not do justice
to those for whose supposed benefit the claim of denial of equal protection has been made.
Constitutional Law; Operative Fact Doctrine; The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot
always be erased, ignored or disregarded; It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law
produces no effect.—The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination
of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In
short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be
invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies
only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent
conditions that will permit its application. We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of
the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related
issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone. To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or
unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including
those that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.
Same; Same; In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 707 SCRA 66 (2013), the Court
likewise declared that “for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a ‘legislative or executive measure,’ meaning a law
or executive issuance.”—In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 707 SCRA 66 (2013), the
Court likewise declared that “for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a ‘legislative or executive measure,’
meaning a law or executive issuance.” Thus, the Court opined there that the operative fact doctrine did not apply to a mere
administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, viz.: Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling
issued by the Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the Commissioner or this Court. The
reversal is not given retroactive effect. This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however, be a rule or
ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith. A mere administrative practice, not
formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice may not be uniformly and
consistently applied. An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general
public and can be availed of only by those with informal contacts with the government agency. It is clear from the foregoing
that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were executive acts. The DAP itself, as a policy,
transcended a merely administrative practice especially after the Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing various
memoranda and circulars. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP from the allotments made available to the different
agencies and departments was consistently applied throughout the entire Executive. With the Executive, through the DBM, being
in charge of the third phase of the budget cycle — the budget execution phase, the President could legitimately adopt a policy
like the DAP by virtue of his primary responsibility as the Chief Executive of directing the national economy towards growth and
development. This is simply because savings could and should be determined only during the budget execution phase.
Same; Same; Disbursement Acceleration Program; To declare the implementation of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP) unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced
consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair.—The
implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were not covered in
the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment items pertaining to other departments of the
Government in clear violation of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without
recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic
worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as
the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo everything that they had
implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity
alleviates such burden.

Case Title : GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, JOSE M. VILLEGAS, JR., JOSE L. GONZALEZ, REUBEN M.
ABANTE, and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER
ROSALIA V. DE LEON, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as
SENATE PRESIDENT, and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Separation of Powers|Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)|Pork Barrel System

Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; No question involving the constitutionality or validity
of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lismota of the
case.―The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the
act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lismota of the case. Of these requisites,
case law states that the first two are the most important and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one
which ― involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.―By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when
there is an actual case or controversy. This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently
states that “[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable x x x.” Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which “involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.” In other words, “[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.” Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of “ripeness,” meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for
adjudication. “A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of
the challenged action.” “Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they
are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.”
Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the ― Pork Barrel System.―The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is
clearly satis-
4fied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these
consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization — such as
the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential
Social Fund — are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a
result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Moot and Academic; Neither will the President’s
declaration that he had already ― abolished the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) render the issues on PDAF
moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.
By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a
repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.―As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion
that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes
moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate
the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the
2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s
declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or
nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a
declaration of unconstitutionality.
Same; Same; Same; The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries the
assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.”―The “limitation on the
power of judicial review to
5actual cases and controversies” carries the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches
of government.” Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic
formulation of Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962], applies when there is found, among others, “a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,” “a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it” or “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.” Cast against this light, respondents submit that the “[t]he political branches are in
the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their
constituents” and, as such, “urge [the Court] not to impose a solution at this stage.”
Same; Same; Same; The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom
of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act
upon.―A political question refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.” The intrinsic
constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of
government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the
contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering
precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary
the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: “The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
6excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
Same; Same; Same; When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the executive], but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution.―It must also be borne in mind that “when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution.” To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of
government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court’s avowed
intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in
fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the
people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine
solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents’ plea for judicial restraint.
Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suit; Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.―“The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.” Petitioners have come before the Court in their
respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National
Treasury.” Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System”
under which the taxes they pay have been and
7continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of
public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; Res judicata (which means a “matter adjudged”) and stare decisis non
quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which means “follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”) are
general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent
cases.―Res judicata (which means a “matter adjudged”) and stare decisis non quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which
means “follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”) are general procedural law principles which both deal
with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the
applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
Constitutional Law; Pork Barrel System; Words and Phrases; The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective
body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local
projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its
members.―Considering petitioners’ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the
Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of
lump-sum discretionary funds: First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively
control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or
8practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it
is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; and Second, there is the
Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to
determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
Same; Separation of Powers; The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government; To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make
laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial
branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws.―The principle of separation of powers refers to
the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel
in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), it means that the “Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government.” To the legislative
branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the
President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to
interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, “[e]ach department of
the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.” Thus, “the
legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the
judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.” The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and
independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any
one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally
capable of independent action in exercising their respective
8mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self interest
assertions of another or others.
Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional; Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.―The
Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national
budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that
“Congress enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, “in the
exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by
law.” Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the
Executive’s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them,
Congress must “not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive.” The foregoing cardinal postulates were
definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that “[f]rom the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of
law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.” It must be clarified, however, that since the
restriction only pertains to “any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress may still exercise its oversight
function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that
Congress’ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond
oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive
functions.10
Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; Post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release
and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution; Towards this end, the Supreme Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.―Clearly, these post-enactment measures
which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in — as Guingona,
Jr. puts it — “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds” in violation of the separation of powers principle. The
fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated — from the moment the law becomes effective,
any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority is
treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling
in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and,
as such, respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court hereby declares the 2013
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to
wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.―The Court hereby declares the 2013
PDAF Article as well as all other provisions
11of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases
of budget execution, must be deemed asacts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence,
accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed
throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here.
Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Congress; As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall
be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same; It is clear that only Congress, acting as a
bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power
and no other; Exceptions.―As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised
by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states
that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. Based on this provision, it is clear that
only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally
wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only
recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are
allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to,
by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency,
or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.12
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court observes that the 2013 Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which ― as settled in Philconsa ― is lodged in Congress.―In the cases at bar, the Court observes that
the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the
principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise thepower of appropriation,
which — as settled in Philconsa — is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: “No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the
Court, inBengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation
involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the
2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiarythat they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts
comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes
individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby
declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Checks and Balances; Veto Power; A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the
President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval
through a process known as “bill presentment.”―A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be
the President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill
13submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as “bill presentment.” The President’s item-veto power is
found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows: Sec. 27. x x x. x x x x (2) The President shall
have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object. The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he
may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” for
law-passage as specified under the Constitution. As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the
“submission [of the bill] to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The justification for the President’s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as
to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch’s role in
the budgetary process; It is meant to “increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through
haste, inadvertence, or design.”―The justification for the President’s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as
to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch’s role in
the budgetary process. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the
President’s item-power as “a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of
factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body”;
phrased differently, it is meant to “increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through
haste, inadvertence, or design.”
Same; Same; Same; What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-
sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes.―What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations
which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such
appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of
the appropria-
14tion which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law
already indicates a “specific appropriation of money” and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a
practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some
of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes.
Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing
authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation.
Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would,
in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The fact that individual legislators are given post-
enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested “observers” when
scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law; Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene
in the various phases of project implementation ― a matter before another office of government ― renders them susceptible to
taking undue advantage of their own office.―The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that
individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a
certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would,
in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept
of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: Sec. 14. No
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any
15franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his
office. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation — a matter
before another office of government — renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The gauge of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Countrywide Development
Fund (CDF) allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine
parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.―The Court, however,
finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal.” In particular, the
Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into
account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division
limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what
rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives — and in some years, even the Vice-President — who
do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the
Congressional Pork Barrel’s original intent which is “to make equal the unequal.” Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become
personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.
Same; “An appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
exists when a
16provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular
public purpose.―“An appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b)allocates the same for
a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the
word “appropriation,” which means “to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose,” and hence, if written into
the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution “does not provide or prescribe any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it
be “made by law,’” an appropriation law may — according to Philconsa — be “detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be”
for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
 Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article
cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation precisely because it contains post-enactment measures which effectively
create a system of intermediate appropriations.―It is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as
a legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment
measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur
outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79
Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are,
to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an “appropriation made by
law” since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability
principle as afore-discussed.
Same; Delegation of Powers; Malampaya Funds; The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for such other
purposes
17as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of P.D. 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.―The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s
authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the MalampayaFunds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to
“energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis,
meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include — or be restricted to — things akin to, resembling, or of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a
statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said
phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive
department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government.” Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy
development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section
8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government,” remains legally effective
18and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the
Malampaya Funds would be used — as it should be used — only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD
910.
Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Special Allotment Release Order (SARO); Words and Phrases; A
Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), as defined by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) itself in its website,
is “[a] specific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified
period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or
regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority.”―The Court agrees with petitioners’
posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be “released” under legal
contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is “[a] specific authority issued to identified agencies to
incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover
expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval
or clearance by competent authority.” Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an
obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing
public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances
which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of
the NCA, which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative
during the Oral Arguments.
Same; Same; Same; Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA); Unless a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) has been issued, public
funds should not be treated as funds which have been “released;” The disbursement of 2013 Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) funds which are only covered by obligated Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), and without any
corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and
consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of
19the general fund.―Unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been “released.” In
this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any
corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the
unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the
funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of
funds coming from an unconstitutional source. This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds
which have been obligated but not released — meaning, those merely covered by a SARO — under the phrase “and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the
Presidential Social Fund under the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” pursuant to Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should
not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus,
entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.―It must be stressed that the Court’s
pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other
Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact
doctrine. To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and
respect and should be
20properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque
Power Corporation, 707 SCRA 66 (2013), the doctrine merely “reflect[s] awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may
have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive
the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.” “In
the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative factand may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.’ ”
Same; Pork Barrel System; The Supreme Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the
inherent defects in the rules within which it operates.―The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in
the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in
view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in
varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated
the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly
violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are
not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied
the President the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators
a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system
has equally impaired public accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in
affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local
autonomy; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by
21law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad
classification of “priority infrastructure development projects,” it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

Case Title : ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary of the Department of Education, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari and Prohibition; and PETITIONS-IN-INTERVENTION.
Syllabi Class : Reproductive Health Law|Parental Consent

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.—In many cases involving
the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court
temper its exercise of judicial power
152and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear,
the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but
by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines; (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; and (c) the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The Constitution has
truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; The Constitution impresses upon the Supreme Court to respect the acts performed by a co-
equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation —
but only at a very limited and specific point — to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.—In times of social disquietude or political instability, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In order to address this, the
Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence
and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation — but only at a very limited and specific point — to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse
of discretion. Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so
where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. The Court must demonstrate its unflinching
commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutional-
153ity must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lismota of the case.—In the
scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for the maintenance
and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial
review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation — or instrument of intervention — of the judiciary in that balancing
operation. Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any
and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lismota of
the case.
Same; Same; Same; Actual Case or Controversy; Words and Phrases; An actual case or controversy means an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion.—An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The
rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable — definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand,
and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an
154immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action.—Corollary to the requirement of an actual case
or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something
has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Facial Challenges; While the Supreme Court has withheld the application of facial challenges
to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.—In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has
been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statutes, it has expandedits scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike
its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with
its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act; The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the
rights of third persons not before the court.—Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and
155substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
In relation to locus standi, the “as applied challenge” embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute
only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-
party standing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reproductive Health Law; The Reproductive Health (RH) Law drastically affects the
constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division
among a broad spectrum of society, the Supreme Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication.—In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to
the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law
drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused
deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and
the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action. The Court cannot,
and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be
violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Same; Statutes; One-Subject-One-Title Rule; The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law
must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
156informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act.”—The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced
in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.” Considering the close intimacy
between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable
human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive
the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Reproductive Health Law; The use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent
vintage.—As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent
vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled “An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices” on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, and the ratification of numerous international agreements,
the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve
long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods
evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.
Same; Life begins at fertilization.—Theponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization. In answering the
question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads: Section 12. The State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the motherand the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the
157youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Textually, the
Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn
to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life
begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life
begins. In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with “fertilization” of the female ovum
by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the “implantation” of the
fertilized ovum in the uterus.
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; It is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized
that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is,
upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum.—It is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution
emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity
of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers
of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Same; Same; Contraceptives; The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; Contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take
action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.—The Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a
contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established
evidence. From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill
158or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilizationshould be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
Same; Conception; Words and Phrases; Mosby’s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as
“the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote”; The
Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that
human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the
formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.—That
conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby’s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health
Dictionary defines conception as “the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum
and forms a viable zygote.” It describes fertilization as “the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the
embryo develops.” The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), used by medical schools in the
Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilizationwith the union of the egg and
the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages
that ensue. Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: “Human development begins after the union of male
and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that
begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei
(the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum,
known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being.”
Same; Same; In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment
159of conception, that is, upon fertilization.—In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical
parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of
conception, that is, upon fertilization.
Same; Same While the Supreme Court has opted not to make any determination when life begins, it finds that the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization.—The clear
and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to
prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it
otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. x x x
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted
not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection
be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that
embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for
implantation. Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum.
Same; Abortifacients; In carrying out its declared policy, the Reproductive Health (RH) Law is consistent in prohibiting
abortifacients.—In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section
4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as: Section 4. Definition of Terms—x x x x (a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or
device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb upon determination of the FDA. As stated above, the RH Law mandates that
protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word “or,” the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation, but also those that in-
160duce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or
device that either: (a) Induces abortion; or (b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb; or (c) Prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; As defined by the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, any drug or device that induces
abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother’s womb, is an abortifacient.—Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law,
consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty
to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first
kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum,
and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb (third kind). By
expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb is
an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon.
Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise
suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the
fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent — all the way until it reaches and implants in the
mother’s womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants —
there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation. From the
foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion.
To repeat, it is the Court’s position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the
uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And
as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or de-
161stroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb, is
an abortifacient.
Same; Contraceptives; Evidently, with the addition of the word “primarily,” in Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR) is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the Reproductive Health
(RH) Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier “primarily” will pave the
way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation
of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.—Evidently, with the addition of the word “primarily,” in Section 3.01(a) and (j) of
the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is
danger that the insertion of the qualifier “primarily” will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such
qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an “abortifacient” if its sole
known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum. For the same reason, this
definition of “contraceptive” would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fair-
sale mechanism.
Same; Same; Consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should
be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the Reproductive Health (RH) Law and its implementing rules
must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion.—Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting
abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH
Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word “primarily” in Section
3.01(a) and (j) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the RH-IRR and
prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively “open the floodgates to the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution.”162
Same; Same; With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives
that are safe are made available to the public.—The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave
intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements
are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH
Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive
drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate
safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.
Same; Same; In the distribution by the Department of Health of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.—In the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive
drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives
that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As
pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or
incidental to their use.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and
intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient.—At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate
that hormonal contraceptives and intrauterine devices are safe and non-
163abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using
the mandatory “shall” is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The
FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and
non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular
family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Church and State; Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the
church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against
another.—The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution, viz.: Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. Verily, the principle of separation of Church
and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question
its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow
its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country. Consistent with the principle that not any one religion
should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term “church” in its generic
sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the “Church” means the religious congregations collectively.
Same; Religious Freedom; Free Exercise Clause; Establishment Clause; The constitutional assurance of religious
freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.—In short, the constitutional
assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause “principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other
religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups.” Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state
religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. On the other hand, the basis of the free
164exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee,
the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one’s belief and faith.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality; In case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State,
the Supreme Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality.—In case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the
State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v.
Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 (2006), (Escritor) where it was stated “that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution.” In the same case, it was further explained
that: The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may
be allowed, not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. “The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or
institution’s religion.” “What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a
facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its ‘burdensome effect,’ whether by the legislature or the courts.” In
ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. Underlying the
compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to
strict scrutiny.
Same; Reproductive Health Law; Religious Freedom; While the Supreme Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the Reproductive Health
(RH) Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.—In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to
determine whether the use of contraceptives or one’s participation in the support of modern reproductive health measures is
moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has
declared that matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church...are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which
165are outside the province of the civil courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority.
Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it
does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
Same; Same; Same; The State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion.—In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt
their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion. Consequently, the
petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law
simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay
his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render
unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.
Same; Same; Same; Compelling Interest Test; The conscientious objector’s claim to religious freedom would warrant an
exemption from obligations under the Reproductive Health Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.—In a situation where the free exercise of
religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court’s
espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector’s claim to
religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so,
166the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
Same; Same; Same; The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the Reproductive Health Law violates
the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector.—The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by
the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his
will, refers a patient seeking information on modern reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A.
Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience. Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because
it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They
cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets
the offensive act by indirect participation.
Same; Same; Same; In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand,
and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the
Supreme Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded
primacy.—In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of
the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to
enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that
the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious
objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his
religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of “the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right to
free exercise of religion.167
Same; Same; Same; The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to
another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Supreme Court cannot allow.—The Court is not oblivious to the view that
penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere
inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law
is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service
provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a
patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
Same; Same; Same; The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical
practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector.—The conscientious objection clause should
be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be
considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply
to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to
believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires
employment in the government.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the
conscientious objectors, however few in number.—The Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger
to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show
the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. Freedom of religion means more
than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom
is violated when one is compelled to act against one’s belief or is prevented from acting according to one’s belief.
168
Same; Same; In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged
always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate.—In a conflict
situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If,
however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained: Principle of Double-
Effect.—May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-
effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a “good” effect. In a
conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save
both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both,
provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child’s life or the
mother’s life is not intentionaland, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The
mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable. Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the
life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the
medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more
than justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Same; Same; Police Power; Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage
license, the Supreme Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government; All the law requires is
for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition.—Anent the
requirement imposed under Section 15 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a
reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious
freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood,
family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included
in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As
169correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and
retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
Reproductive Health Law; Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs
to the couple, not just one of them.—Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the “right of the
spouses to found a family.” One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by bothspouses. In the same Section
3, their right “to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them” is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who
would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the
husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the
population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them.
Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children
significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses
as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the
State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
Same; Parental Consent; Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be
undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.—Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent
in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH
law provides: SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning.—x x x. No person shall be denied information and access to family planning
services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern
170methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision-making process of the minor with regard to family
planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame
population growth. It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her
own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say
that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
Same; Same; Compelling State Interest; The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents
in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a
compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.—To insist on a rule that interferes with the
right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which
very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation
of one’s privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of
maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of
marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society. The State cannot, without a compelling state interest,
take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
Same; Access to Information; Principle of Double Effect; Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Supreme
Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the
second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all,
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
171mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child.—There must be a differentiation between
access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern
family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional
objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that
would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to
enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones’ health, access to such
information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their
parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Same; Same; Right to Life; No person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the
primordial right, that is, the right to life.—As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already
suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized
that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to
life. In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement
of parental consent to “only in elective surgical procedures,” it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where
what is involved are “non-surgical procedures.” Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child
as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental
authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
Same; Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law is premature because the Department
of Educa-
172tion, Culture and Sports (DECS) has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.—
Suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate
on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict
the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular
issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
Statutes; Principle of Void for Vagueness; A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application.—
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2)
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance
with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
Constitutional Law; Reproductive Health Law; Equal Protection of the Law; To provide that the poor are to be given
priority in the government’s reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause; It should be
noted that Section 7 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number.—To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s reproductive health care
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Consti-
173tution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given
priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus: Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It should be noted that
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number.
While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(l) explains,
the “promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health.”
Same; Same; Involuntary Servitude; Clearly, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon reproductive healthcare service
providers to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Supreme Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a
necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.—The OSG counters that the
rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as
reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover,
the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right. The point of the OSG is well-taken. It should first be mentioned that the practice of
medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged
burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of
Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health,
the public morals, and the public safety; and to regu-
174late or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. Moreover, as some petitioners
put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion
and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and nongovernment
reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is
imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy
the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide
it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the
rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state
interest.
 Same; Same; From the declared policy of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the
public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.—The functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable
the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and
medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant
to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting
only food and medicines that are safe includes “service” and “methods.” From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that
Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and
effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.
Same; Same; The fact that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can
be equally applied to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The RH Law does not infringe upon its
autonomy.—The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can
175be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and
11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of
the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These
provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which
can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general
welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they
now stand, reject the notion of imperium etimperio in the relationship between the national and the regional governments. Except
for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent
and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.
Same; Same; Abortion; The Reproductive Health (RH) Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow
abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing
information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.—Unless, a
natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 (2003), the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to
examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used
sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. At any rate, as
earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only
seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Same; Same; In general, the Supreme Court does not find the Reproductive Health (RH) Law as unconstitutional insofar
as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare
services, methods, devices, and supplies.—In general, the Court does not find the RH
176Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable,
and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious
freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the
Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State. In
conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on
the rest of the society. Philippine modern society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be
tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to
question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation
that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be
necessary in the premises.—Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive
measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the
Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law. x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its
duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is
the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor
to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust
situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if
that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out
the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled
jurisprudence. The Court’s function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what
the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.