253

SUBSTATIONS PHYSICAL
SECURITY TRENDS

Working Group
B3.03

August 2004
 Substations Physical
Security Trends

Working Group
B3-03

Convenor:
Anne-Marie SAHAZIZIAN (Canada)
 CONSEIL INTERNATIONAL DES GRANDS RESEAUX ELECTRIQUES
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON LARGE ELECTRIC SYSTEMS
COMITE D’ETUDES B3 : POSTES
STUDY COMMITTEE B3 : SUBSTATIONS

Substation Physical Security Trends

In response to the growing concern for the security of substation physical assets, CIGRÉ Working Group B3-03
“Air- Insulated Substations” undertook an international survey to assess the use and effectiveness of various
security measures for the prevention, detection and control of unauthorized human intervention during the
construction, operation and maintenance of substations.

This brochure presents the results of this survey and includes case studies of security measures to prevent
unauthorized access to substation property and protect substation assets. With the results of this survey we hope
to raise awareness about substation physical security issues and to provide a basis for utilities to develop
strategies to ensure public and employee safety and to minimize asset loss.

We wish to thank and acknowledge the many scientists and engineers who were involved in this project as well
as the survey respondents for their valuable contribution.

April 2004

Auke Wiersma Sylvain Laureote

Chairman of CIGRÉ SC B3 Secretary of CIGRÉ SC B3

-2-
 SUBSTATION PHYSICAL SECURITY TRENDS

PREFACE
This technical brochure presents the results of an international survey conducted by the CIGRÉ Working Group
B3-03 in September of 2002 to examine substation physical security trends in the utility industry. The main
objective of the survey was to assess the use and effectiveness of various security measures for the prevention,
detection and control of unauthorized human intervention during the construction, operation and maintenance of
substations. Key issues addressed include:

• Type and Frequency of Security Threats

• Prevention and Detection of Security Threats
• Effectiveness of Security Measures
• Maintenance of Security Measures
• Security Incident Response

The preparation of this brochure was a joint effort of the members of CIGRÉ Working Group B3-03. The
contributing authors are:

Gunnar Adamczewski Hydro Tasmania Consulting, Australia

Jackie Bender Hydro One, Canada
Gary Engmann (Secretary) CH2M-Hill, USA
Koji Kawakita Chubu Electric Power Co., Japan
Jiri Kunt CEPS, Czech Republic
Cristina Marin Hydro One, Canada
Akira Okada Japan AE Power Systems Corporation, Japan
Anne-Marie Sahazizian (Chair) Hydro One, Canada
Slavomir Samek Energoprojekt Krakow SA, Poland
Ulrich Schwing EnBW, Germany

This brochure was developed for the following target groups:

• Technical Groups including equipment suppliers, contractors, consultants, maintenance providers, grid
planners and grid engineers.
• Operators of power systems, generation, transmission and distribution stations and asset and facility
managers.
• Science, Education and Public Groups including academic and research institutes, young engineers,
managers and others not familiar with the work of CIGRÉ as well as various authorities, the media and
NGO’s.
• International Organizations with similar scope.

This document has been approved by:

J.A. Wiersma, Chairman of CIGRÉ SC B3

A.M. Sahazizian, Chairman of CIGRÉ Working Group SC B3-03

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 Executive Summary...................................................................................................................................... 1

2.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 1

3.0 Demographics ............................................................................................................................................... 2

3.1 Substation Location......................................................... 2
3.2 Operational Aspects......................................................... 6

4.0 Security Threats............................................................................................................................................ 7

4.1 Frequency of Total System Intrusions........................................ 7
4.2 Type of Intrusions.......................................................... 8
4.3 Top Security Concerns....................................................... 9

5.0 Prevention and Detection of Security Threads........................................................................................ 10

6.0 Effectiveness of Security Measures ......................................................................................................... 11

6.1 Effectiveness of the 4 Categories of Security Measures..................... 11
6.2 Effectiveness of Fencing Methods........................................... 12
6.3 Effectiveness Electric and Electronic Measures............................. 13
6.4 Effectiveness Human Factor Security Methods................................ 14
6.5 Effectiveness of Other Methods............................................. 15

7.0 Maintenance of Security Measures........................................................................................................... 16

8.0 Managing Security Incidents ..................................................................................................................... 17

9.0 References................................................................................................................................................... 18

Appendix A: Case Studies of Physical Measures in Substations

Appendix B: Questionnaire
1.0 Executive Summary

Maintaining the security of substation physical assets has become increasingly important in recent years.
Inadequate security of substation property can result in a loss in asset value, decreased asset reliability and
increased company liability.

Fortunately, there is a range of options available to protect substation physical assets from security threats. The
final security solution adopted by a particular utility will depend on local legislation, economic feasibility and
company policy.

In September 2002, the Cigré Working Group B3-03 undertook an international survey (Appendix B) to examine
how the utility industry is dealing with the increasing need to protect substation physical assets. Specifically, the
survey was designed to assess the use and effectiveness of various security measures for the prevention,
detection and control of unauthorized human intervention during the construction, operation and maintenance of
substations. Key issues addressed in the survey include:

• Respondent Demographics
• Type and Frequency of Security Threats
• Prevention and Detection of Security Threats
• Effectiveness of Security Measures
• Maintenance of Security Measures
• Security Incident Response

2.0 Introduction

Security of substation physical assets has become a growing concern in recent years. Unauthorized access to
substation property continues to be a problem for the electric industry. Intrusions can result in loss or damage of
equipment or facilities and may create loss in asset value, decreased asset reliability and potential safety and
environmental liabilities. Terrorism has created yet another level of concern. In the USA in particular, keeping
energy infrastructure safe from terrorist attack has become a key domestic issue.

Unfortunately, transmission and distribution infrastructure is difficult to protect given its expansiveness.
Substations are often located in remote areas and are difficult to monitor. Most substations, when originally built
were equipped with security measures to protect the general public, discourage vandalism, prevent animal
intrusion and subsequent contact with energized equipment, and prevent liabilities associated with the death or
injury of an intruder. However, security took a back seat to cost cutting in the late 80’s and many security systems
were neglected. As utilities become more aware of the need to protect their physical assets they are reexamining
their practices and heightening their security measures by adding new cameras and detection systems and
working with local law enforcement to put facilities on patrol routes. The real challenge for utilities will be to find a
balance between acceptable risk and acceptable expenditure.

The purpose of this survey was to assess the use and effectiveness of various security measures for the
prevention, detection and control of unauthorized human intervention during the construction, operation and
maintenance of substations. Forty-one electric utilities from around the world participated in this survey. With the
results of this study we hope to raise awareness about substation physical security issues and to provide a basis
for utilities to develop strategies to ensure public and employee safety and to minimize asset loss.

-1-
3.0 Demographics

Forty-one worldwide companies participated in this survey. The size of the companies represented in this survey
ranges from 6 to 134,000 employees. Out of 41 participating companies, 40 were electric utilities (Q1).

E
EE
E EEE
E
EEEE
E EE E
EE
E
E
E

Figure 3.1 Participating Countries

Figure 3.1 shows the geographic distribution of the participating companies. The majority of respondents (31
out of 41) were from North America and Europe. Japan and Australia were well represented with 5 and 2
respondents, respectively. Unfortunately, there were no respondents from South America or Central Asia.

3.1 Substation Location

The majority of threats to substation physical security are the result of unauthorized personnel gaining access to
the substation. It is not surprising then that the security risk of a substation is impacted by the location of the
substation. Substations located in densely populated urban regions are at a higher risk of security threats than
substations located in rural areas far from urban centers.

In question 3 (Q3) respondents were asked to identify the percentage of substations in their systems that are
located in Urban, Suburban, Rural, and Industrial/ Commercial areas. The following figures 3.2 to 3.5 graphically
depict their responses.

-2-
 20
20
Number of Responses

15

10 10

5
6
2 0
0
<5% 5 -2 5 % 2 6 -5 0 % 5 1 -7 5 % 7 6 -1 0 0 %

Pe r c e n ta g e o f S u b s ta ti o n s Lo c a te d i n U r b a n A r e a s

Figure 3.2: Substations in URBAN Areas

18
16
Number of Responses

14 18
12
10
8 10
6 6
4 3 3
2
0
<5% 5-1 5 % 1 6 -4 0% 4 1 -7 5% 7 6 -1 0 0 %
Percenta g e o f Sub sta tio ns Lo ca ted in Su b u r b a n A r e a s

Figure3.3: Substations in SUBURBAN Areas

16
14
Number of Responses

12
10
16
8
6 11
4
4 4
2
1
0
<5% 5 -1 5 % 1 6 -4 0 % 4 1 -7 5 % 7 6 -1 0 0 %
Pe r c e n ta g e o f i ts Su b sta ti o n s Lo c a te d i n R u r a l
A rea s

Figure 3.4: Substations in RURAL Areas

-3-
 14

Number of Responses 12
10
8 14
6 10 10
4
2
1
0
0
<5% 5 -1 5 % 1 6 -4 0 % 4 1 -7 5 % 7 6 -1 0 0 %

Pe r c e n ta g e o f Su b sta i o n s Lo c a te d i n
I n d u s t r i a l / C o m m e r ci a l A r e a s

Figure 3.5: Substations in INDUSTRIAL/ COMMERCIAL Areas

The majority of respondent companies have substations located in suburban and rural environments. 30
respondents out of 38 ( representing 79%) report that fewer than 25% of their substations are located in urban
environments. It is important to note that the respondents were not provided with quantitative definitions of terms
“urban, suburban, rural, and industrial”. As such, these responses should be interpreted in relative terms.

In a typical electrical system, more than 1/3 of the substations are located in rural areas, nearly 1/3 are located in
suburban areas and about 1/6 are in the vicinity of urban or industrial areas.

In question 18 (Q18), respondents were asked to identify the degree to which substation location generated
concern for the physical security of a substation. Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which their
companies are concerned with the physical security of substations located in urban, suburban, rural or
industrial/commercial environments.

The results are represented graphically in Figure 3.6. More respondents expressed greater concern for the
physical security of substations located in urban environments than in rural environments. 32 out of 40
respondents (79%) expressed moderate to extreme concern of the physical security of substations in urban
environments and 26 out of 40 respondents (65%) expressed the same degree of concern for substations in rural
environments. Overall, the results indicate that utilities are concerned about the physical security of their
substations regardless of their geographical location.

Le v e l o f co n ce r n V s . G e o g r a p h i c Lo ca t i o n

40
10 8
35 15
Number of Responses

30 8

25 18
21
20
17 16
15

10 13
7 8 9
5
1 1 1 0
0
U rb a n Su b u r b a n Ru r a l In d u str i a l/
C o m m e rc ia l

N o t co ncerned So m e w h a t c o n c e r n e d C o ncerned V e r y to Ex tr e m e ly c o n c e r n e d

Figure 3.6 : Security Concern versus Substation Location

-4-
In question 17 (Q17) respondents were asked to identify the degree to which geographic location, load criticality,
proximity to public places, reliability of the substation, and voltage level influence or drive their company’s
decisions regarding the need for substation physical security measures.

Each of the five factors investigated (location of the substation, load criticality, proximity to public places, reliability
of the station and the voltage level of the substation) appear to be important factors that influence the need for
substation physical measures. Figure 3.7 demonstrates that substation reliability and performance requirements
generate the most concern for the physical security of a substation with 87% (i.e. 34 out of 39 respondents)
reporting moderate to extreme concern for substations that have high reliability requirements. In descending
order, 79% (i.e. 30 out of 38 respondents) report concern for substations with high load criticality, 76% (i.e. 29 out
of 38 respondents) report concern for substations with higher voltage levels, 75% (i.e. 30 out of 40 respondents)
report concern for substations based on location and 70% (i.e. 28 out of 40 respondents) report concern about
substations that are near public places.

Level of Concerns

40
35 14 12
Number of Rresponses

30 19 19 17

25
16
20 16
12
15 11 15
10 7
8 3 6
5 5 5 4
2 1 3
0
Geographic Load criticality Proximity to public Reliability of Voltage level
location ( urban, places (schools, substation
rural, etc.) community centres,
etc.)

N ot concerned Somewhat concerned Concerned Very to Extremely Concerned

Figure 3.7: Level of Concern versus Different Reasons for Security Measures

-5-
3.2 Operational Aspects

Of the forty electric utility companies who participated in this survey, 38 respondents classified themselves as
Transmission System Operators (TSO), 21 as Distribution System Operators (DSO) and 9 as Generating
Companies (GC). In the traditional utility model most companies perform more than one of the operational roles.
55% of the respondents represent Investor-Owned utilities and the remaining 45% represent Government-
Chartered organisations.
Figure 3.8 shows the role distribution in detail (Q2).

N = 40
R e spo nd en ts

19 2 10 9
TSO DSO TSO & DSO TSO & DSO & G C

Figure 3.8: Operational Role of Respondents

Traditionally, the role of a TSO is related to voltages above 100 kV and the role of a DSO is related to voltages
below 100 kV. This is reflected in our sample of respondents as 21 DSO companies responded in fields
concerning operating voltages <50 kV and 39 TSO companies responded in fields concerning voltages from 100
to 250 kV.

In question 19 (Q19) respondents were asked to identify the degree to which the voltage level of the substation
generates concern for the physical security of a substation.

Le v e l o f S e cu r it y Co n ce r n B a se d o n V o l t a g e Le v e l

40

35
18
30
Respondents

25 5
21
20 4

15 15
11 19
8
10
9
5 4 5 5
1 0 0
0
< 5 0 kV 5 0 -1 0 0 kV 1 0 0 - 2 5 0 kV > 2 5 0 kV DC

N o t co ncerned So m ew ha t co ncerned C o ncerned V ery co ncerned

Figure 3.9: Security Concern versus Operating Voltage

Respondents expressed greater concern for the physical security of substations with higher voltage levels. Five
respondents expressed extreme concern for the physical security of 50-100kV substations, while 21 respondents
expressed extreme concern for the physical security of substations rated higher than 250 kV. Eight respondents
expressed extreme concern for the physical security of DC substations (Figure 3.9).

-6-
4.0 Security Threats

4.1 Frequency of Total System Intrusions/ Year

Respondents were asked to identify the average number of total system intrusions that their company typically
experiences on a yearly basis. Respondents were asked to specify whether these intrusions occurred during pre-
construction, construction or operation of the substation (Q8).

Number of 0 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 >20 Number of

Intrusions/ respondent
Year s
Pre- 15 9 1 0 0 1 26
construction
Construction 11 14 10 0 0 2 30
Operation 5 23 1 4 3 4 40
Table 4.1: Number of Total System Intrusions/ Year based on Substation Development Phases

The results indicate that the majority of substation intrusions occur during the operation of a substation. The
frequency of substation intrusions reported by respondents during substation operation is as follows:
ƒ 23 out of 40 respondents (58%) report 1-5 intrusions/year,
ƒ 7 out of 40 respondents (18%) report experiencing between 10 and 20 intrusions/ year
ƒ 4 out of 40 respondents (10%) report experiencing greater than 20 intrusions/ year

Substation intrusions seem to be least common during the pre-construction period. In fact, 15 out of 26
respondents (58%) reported experiencing no intrusions during the pre-construction period. These responses are
shown graphically in Figure 4.1.

Intrusions vs Substation Stages

40 4
35 3
4 >20
Number of responses

30 2 1
3 16-20
11
25 11-15
20 9
14 6-10
23
15 1-5
10 15 0
11
5 5
0
Pre-construction Construction Operation

Figure 4.1: Frequency of Intrusions vs. Stage of Substation Development

-7-
4.2 Type of Intrusions

In question 9 (Q9) respondents were asked to identify the type of intrusions their company experienced as a
percentage of the total number of intrusions experienced on an annual basis. This question was answered by 37
of the 41 respondents. Figure 4.1 graphically depicts the type and frequency of intrusions relative to the total
number of intrusions experienced annually for all respondents. The most common intrusions reported are those
involving theft (32%), unauthorized personnel walking-in or crossing the perimeter fence (21%) and intruding
animals (15%).

T yp e a n d P e rc e n ta g e o f In tru s io n s

O th e r 1%
G ra ffiti 6%
A n im a ls 15%
D u m p in g 4%
C u t/C lim b fe n c e 12%
V a n d a lis m 9%
W a lk -in s 9%
P ro je c tile s 3%
T h e ft 32%
E le c tro n ic 1%
V e h ic u la r 6%
F ire a rm s 2%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%

Figure 4.2: Type and percentage of intrusions

In order to explore the potential impact of substation intrusions on the operational threat to the substation and its
equipment (Q20, Q21, Q22), respondents were asked to identify whether they perceived their company to be
concerned with incidences of intrusions that resulted in power outages, personal injury or damage to the integrity
of substation physical assets.

Number of
Not a problem A problem
respondents
Intrusions Ö Power Outages 22 19 41
Intrusions Ö Personal Injury 20 21 41

Intrusions Ö Damage of Asset 19 22 41

Table 4.2: Impact of Intrusion

The majority of respondents report that intrusions resulting in damage to substation physical assets and those
resulting in personal injury are a significant problem (Table 4.2). Intrusions resulting in power outages appear to
be slightly less of an issue for respondents. The high frequency of intrusions resulting in theft of substation
contents likely contributes to the problem of substation physical asset damage.

-8-
4.3 Top Security Concerns

In question 23 (Q23), respondents were asked to identify what their company considered to be its greatest
substation physical security threat.

Of the 41 respondents who participated in the survey, 7 did not provide an answer to this question and 9
misinterpreted the question and as a result, their responses were not included in the analysis.

Of the 25 respondents who answered this question, 9 listed terrorism as their number one security concern, 6
listed theft, 5 listed vandalism, and 2 listed sabotage as their number one concern (Figure 4.3). Other security
concerns reported by respondents include unauthorized entries (3 respondents), safety of employees (3
respondents), dumping (1 respondent) and power outages caused by animals (5 respondents).

Security Concerns

10
Number of Respondents

6
9
4
6
5
2 3
2
0
Terrorism Theft Vandalism Sabotage Other

Figure 4.3: Top Security Concerns

-9-
5.0 Prevention and Detection of Security Threads

Respondents were asked to select from a list provided the measures that their companies use to achieve
substation physical security (Q7). There were 39 responses to this question.

The most common substation physical security measures used by more than 50% of respondents are: alarm
systems, security lighting, signs, chain link fences with barbed wire, higher than normal fences, road gates and
locks. Less popular security methods used by only 5% of respondents include plastic barriers, guard dogs and
sound detectors.

Respondents were also asked to list other security measures used by their companies that were not listed in the
survey. Other security measures used by the respondents include:

ƒ Invasion surveillance equipment using infrared rays

ƒ Indoor AIS/GIS up to 123kV, outdoor AIS with solid buildings for secondary systems
ƒ Laser Ray Systems
ƒ Trench
ƒ Perimeter detection system associated to images
ƒ Passive protection (camouflage)
ƒ Enlist neighbors to monitor substation
ƒ Palisade fencing (replacing chain-link fencing)
ƒ Steel doors
ƒ Crash barriers at gates,
ƒ Windows fitted with security bars
ƒ Concrete walls to protect major transformers

Physical Security M easures

40
34
35

30
28 27
Number of respondents

24 25
25
22
20
20

15 15 15
15
15
11 9
10
10 9
7 7
6 2
5
2 2

0
te

er
rd
e

rs

rs

m tes

og
g

s
s

ns

e
em
ce
rm nce

ck

ck
er
et all
nc

tin

er
in

io

nc
ga

to
ad cto

th
ua

ig
en

D
fro Ga
ot

at
rri

am

he

Lo
rim id w

fe

gh

fe
fe

ec
s

O
S
G

rd
e

St
fo

Sy
lf

at
Ba

C
Se Det
er

et
Li
k

ay d
a

ua
y
ha Lin

e
l

er

aw oa
So

rit
D

y
m

y
tic

o
et

ne

G
rit
rit

cu
de
ar

tin und

R
cr
no

as
n

cu

an
cu

tio

re
Al

Se
he hai

on

Vi
Pe

Pl
n

Se

M
So
ss
C

M
C

rit
y

ce

pt
rt

ar

cu

ke
ac
nd

Se

ou
ig

es
co

R
ar
H

ol
Se

/P
s
ee
Tr

Figure 5.1: Substation Physical Security Measures

- 10 -
6.0 Effectiveness of Security Measures

Respondents were asked to indicate the effectiveness of the security measures used by their company (Q11).

The survey included a list of several different security measures for the respondents to rate. To facilitate
interpretation and analysis of the results, the security measures were grouped into the following four categories:

ƒ Fencing: chain link fences, higher than normal fences, secondary perimeter fence, solid walls, plastic
barriers, concrete footing around bottom of fence)
ƒ Electric/ Electronic Systems: alarm systems, security lighting, card access reader at the gates, security
video camera, sound detectors, motion detectors)
ƒ Human Factor : security guard, manned stations, routine security checks
ƒ Other: signs, road gates, locks, guard dog, trees/poles kept away from fence, and other methods suggested
by the survey participants

6.1 Effectiveness of the 4 Categories of Security Measures

The distribution of responses for each of the four categories of security measures was approximately the same.
Greater than 68% of respondents rated each type of security measure as either “Effective” or “Very/Completely
Effective”. Security measures involving some form of on-site supervision (Human Factor) and Electric/Electronic
Systems were reported to the most effective, followed by “Other” measures as illustrated in Table 6.1.

Figure 6.1 illustrates the effectiveness of the 4 categories of security measures.

somewhat very effective to

not effective effective effective completely effective
FENCING 7% 25% 40% 28%
ELECTRIC/
ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS 3% 21% 42% 34%
HUMAN FACTOR 2% 21% 42% 35%
OTHER 5% 22% 42% 31%

Table 6.1: Effectiveness of Security Measures

Ef f ec tiv enes s of Sec urity Meas ures

42% 42% 42%

4 5% 40%
40% 34% 3 5%
3 5% 3 1%
28%
30% 2 5%
Percentage of

22%
Respondants

2 1% 2 1%
2 5%
20%
15%
7%
10 % 3% 5%
2%
5%
0%
FEN C IN G ELEC TR IC / HU M A N FA C TOR OTHER
ELEC TR ON IC
SY STEM S

not ef f ec tiv e s omew hat ef f ec tiv e

ef f ec tiv e v ery ef f ec tiv e to c ompletely ef f ec tiv e
Figure 6.1: Effectiveness of Other Security Methods

- 11 -
6.2 Effectiveness of Fencing Methods

Only twenty eight percent of respondents rated fencing methods to be “Very/Completely Effective”. Of the types of
fencing methods examined, solid walls were reported to be the most effective (20 of 21 respondents) and plastic
barriers were rated as the least effective (3 of 11 respondents). Chain link fences, a popular security measure,
was rated as effective by only 15 out of 26 respondents.

FENCING
Chain Higher than Secondary Concrete
Solid Plastic
Link Normal Perimeter Footing Around
Walls Barriers
Fence Fence Fence Bottom of Fence
Not effective 1 1 0 0 5 1
Somewhat effective 10 5 3 1 3 7
Effective 12 9 9 8 2 6
Very effective to
completely effective 3 8 5 12 1 4
Number of
respondents 26 23 17 21 11 18

Table 6.2: Effectiveness of Fencing Methods

Effectiveness of Fencing Methods

12 12
12
10
10 99
8 8
8 7
6
6 5 5 5
4
4 3 3 3
2
2 1 1 00 1 1 1
0
not effective somewhat effective effective very effective to
completely effective

Chain Link Fence Higher than Normal Fence Secondary Perimeter Fence
Solid Walls Plastic Barriers Concrete Footing Around Bottom of Fence

Figure 6.2: Effectiveness of Fencing Methods

- 12 -
6.3 Effectiveness Electric and Electronic Measures

For electronic systems, 20 out of 23 respondents rated video cameras to be either “Effective” or “Very/Completely
Effective”, and 13 out of 15 rated card readers as an effective security measure. Sound detectors were
considered to be the least effective electronic security measure.

ELECTRIC/ ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS

Card Access Security
Alarm Security Sound Motion
Reader at Video
System lightning Detectors detectors
Gate Camera

Not effective 1 0 0 0 2 1
Somewhat effective 8 8 2 3 4 4
Effective 11 12 8 12 3 12
Very effective to
completely effective 16 9 5 8 2 6
Number of
respondents 36 29 15 23 11 23

Table 6.3: Effectiveness of Electric/Electronic Methods

Effectives of Electric/ Electronic Systems

16
16
14
12 1112 12 12
10 9
8 8 8 8
8
6
6 5
4 4
4
1 2 1 23 3 2
2
00 0
0
not effective somewhat effective effective very effective to
completely effective

Alarm System Security lightning Card Access Reader at Gate Security Video Camera Sound Detectors Motion detectors

Figure 6.3: Effectiveness of Electric/Electronic Systems

- 13 -
6.4 Effectiveness Human Factor Security Methods

Security measures involving on site supervision were reported to be the most effective type of security measure.
The majority (87%) of respondents rated a security guard or a manned station to be equally effective whereas
routine security checks were reported to be a less effective security measure.

HUMAN FACTOR
Routine Security
Security Guard Manned Station
Checks
Not effective 0 1 0
Somewhat effective 2 2 7
Effective 7 6 9
Very effective to completely
effective 7 7 4
Number of respondents 16 16 20
Table 6.4: Effectiveness of Human Factor Security Methods

Figure 6.4: Effectiveness of Human Factor Security Methods

Ef f e ct iv e n e s s o f H u m a n Fa ct o r S e cu r it y M e t h o d s
9

8
7 7 7 7
7
6
Number of Respondents

5 4

3 2 2
2 1

1 0
0

0
n o t e f fe c ti v e so m e w h a t e f fe c ti v e e f fe c ti v e v e r y e f fe c ti v e to c o m p le te ly
e f fe c ti v e
S e c u r i ty G u a r d M a n n e d S ta ti o n Ro u ti n e S e c u r i ty C h e c k s

- 14 -
6.5 Effectiveness of Other Methods

Security measures in the “Other” category included locks, road gates, signs, guard dogs and trees kept away from
the fence line. Of these security measures, locks were reported to be the most effective with 31 out of 34
respondents (91%) considering locks to be Effective or Very/Completely Effective. Road gates were rated by 24
of 29 respondents to be effective and only 15 out of 29 respondents (52%) considered signs to be an effective
security measure. Of the 11 respondents who reported using guard dogs, 7 consider them to be Effective or
Very/Completely Effective (64%).

OTHER
Road Trees/ Poles Kept
Signs Gates Locks Guard Dog Away from Fence Other
Not effective 5 0 0 1 1 0
Somewhat effective 9 5 3 3 7 1
Effective 11 15 18 2 7 1
Very effective to
completely effective 4 9 13 5 5 4
Number of
respondents 29 29 34 11 20 6

Table 6.5: Effectiveness of Other Security Methods

Ef f e ct i v e n e s s o f O t h e r S e cu r i t y M e t h o d s

18
18

16 15

14 13
Number of Respondents

12 11

10 9 9
8 7 7

6 5 5 5 5
4 4
4 3 3
2
2 1 1 1 1
0 0 0
0
n o t e ffe c ti v e so m e w h a t e ffe c ti v e e ffe c ti v e v e ry e ffe c ti v e to
c o m p le te ly e ffe c ti v e

Si g n s Ro a d G a te s Lo c k s G ua rd D o g Tr e e s/ Po le s K e p t A w a y fr o m Fe n c e O th e r

Figure 6.5: Effectiveness of Other Security Methods

- 15 -
7.0 Maintenance of Security Measures

Respondents were asked to indicate how frequently their companies assess the condition or functionality of
the security measures used (Q12). Respondents were asked to indicate the frequency of security checks
based on the voltage level of the substation.

<50 kV 50-100kV 100-250kV >250kV DC

Monthly 5 7 19 12 4
Bi-monthly 1 5 4 4 1
Annually 3 3 7 6 1
Not at all 0 0 0 0 0
Other * 7 7 11 10 6
Number of
16 22 41 32 12
respondents
Other* Daily; when workers enter the premises; only corrective actions (when needed to be fixed);
every 3, 72, or 6 months spontaneous; weekly; every 2 or 3 years

Table 7.1: Frequency of Security Functional Assessment

Frequency of Security Functiona l Assessment

20 19
18
16 <50 kV

14
12 50-100kV
Respondents

12 11
10
10
100-250kV
8 7 7 77
6 6
6 5 5 >250kV
4 44
4 33
2 1 1 DC
1
00000
0
Monthly Bi-monthly Annually Not at all Other *

Figure 7.1: Frequency of Security Functional Assessment

All respondents reported that their companies assess the condition or functionality of their substation security
measures. For substations with operating voltages of 50 kV to greater than 250 kV a monthly check is the
preferred frequency. A significant number of respondents reported conducting functional assessments of their
security measures at a frequency other than the options listed, ranging from daily, when workers enter the
premises, as required, spontaneous, weekly, every 3 or 6 months or every 2-3 years.

16
8.0 Managing Security Incidents

Respondents were asked to indicate whether their companies have a written policy, plan or
guidelines for managing substation incident response and to what degree their security response
efforts involved the local law enforcement (Q13 to Q16 and Q4 to Q6).

Existence of Partnership with local law

Notification of local law
policy/plan/guidelines enforcement services for
enforcement and emergency
for managing automatic intervention in the
services in the event of
substation incident event of substation security
substation security breach
response breach
Yes 21 21 14
No 19 19 25
Number of
40 40 39
Respondents

Fifty-three percent of the sample (21 of 40 respondents) reported possessing a written policy,
plan or guidelines for managing substation incident response. Of these respondents, 10 have an
incident response system that includes immediate notification of the local law enforcement in the
event of a security breach, resulting in automatic intervention and resolution of the event.

The remaining 47% of the sample do not have a written policy, plan or guidelines for managing
substation incident response. However, 5 of the 19 respondents in this category report that they
notify the local law enforcement in the event of a security breach and another 4 report having a
partnership with the local law enforcement that ensures automatic intervention in the event of a
security breach.

Looking at Q 13 to 16, through the light of company profile, the survey results show that 61% of
the Government -Chartered utilities have a written policy/plan/guidelines for managing substation
incident response, while only 41% of the Investor-Owned utilities have such a policy. Also 67% of
the Government-Chartered utilities have a system in place to notify the local law enforcement and
emergency services if there is a substation security breach, while only 36% of the Investor-
Owned utilities have such a system in place.

17
9.0 References

Oglevie, J. and Rooney, P. Physical Security. In J.D. McDonald (Ed.), Electric Power Substations
Engineering (pp16-1 – 16-13). June 2003.

IEEE Standard 1402-2000, IEEE Guide for Electric Power Substation Physical and Electronic
Security, sponsored by Substation Committee of IEEE-PES. 2000.

18
Copyright © 2002
Tout détenteur d'une publication CIGRE sur support papier ou électronique n'en possède
qu'un droit d'usage.Sont interdites,sauf accord express du CIGRE, la reproduction totale ou
partielle autre qu'à usage personnel et privé, et toute mise a disposition de tiers, dont la
diffusion sur un réseau intranet ou un réseau d'entreprise.
Copyright © 2002
Ownership of a CIGRE publication, whether in paper form or on electronic support only
infers right of use for personal purposes..Are prohibited, except if explicity agreed by CIGRE,
total or partial reproduction of the publication for use other than personal and transfer to a
third party; hence circulation on any intranet or other company network is forbidden.
Copyright © 2002
Tout détenteur d'une publication CIGRE sur support papier ou électronique n'en possède
qu'un droit d'usage.Sont interdites,sauf accord express du CIGRE, la reproduction totale ou
partielle autre qu'à usage personnel et privé, et toute mise a disposition de tiers, dont la
diffusion sur un réseau intranet ou un réseau d'entreprise.
Copyright © 2002
Ownership of a CIGRE publication, whether in paper form or on electronic support only
infers right of use for personal purposes..Are prohibited, except if explicity agreed by CIGRE,
total or partial reproduction of the publication for use other than personal and transfer to a
third party; hence circulation on any intranet or other company network is forbidden.