IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The
1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which
he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief
which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community." 3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE

ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate
for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made
by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring
(petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner
that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of
time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila
on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day.
In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing
the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run
for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter
stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as
a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to
the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in
the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative
district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass
the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is
obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First
District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution
1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues,
namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy,
and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an
"honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be
allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not
residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood."
In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which
she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her
memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of
the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would
be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed
when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and
not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of
Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin"
which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of
Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not
easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the
Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v.
COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the
"inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended
primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of
form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent
seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those
intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To
admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by
claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The
arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be
gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she
is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said
accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila
only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up
to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was
an error.

xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the
one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not
only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or
for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-
Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she
chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not
Tacloban.
 This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more
than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in
the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for
some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was
elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she
lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang
Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could
not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her
certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro
Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered
or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a
resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a
voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her
school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in
other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a
new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to
remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi
with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her
intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she
is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of
domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention.
Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any
evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what
was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than
one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No.
18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the
municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it
refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of
Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the
district for six months only. 15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial
matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that
she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that
she obtains the highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the
36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public
respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general
areas:
 I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at
the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period
mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of
"Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the
concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for
election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's
"permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a
person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes
such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his
purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile,
but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile
for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside
in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26
reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of
domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the
principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
 Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt
to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my
question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the
proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. 29

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same
point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather
than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in
the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the
original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously
adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by
Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating
her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is
or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would
be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his
or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for
the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the
subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in
the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo
opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual
residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close
look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by
the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it
appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and
Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified.
This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by
means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the
COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of
the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according
to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following
the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter,
she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she
had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in
different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from
legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not
constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In
Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a
municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his
family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as
an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and
that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is
to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot
but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or
business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to
give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections.
Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken
him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not
been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire
and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth
must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of
(actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the
deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from
the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from
high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In
1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her
husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in
San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In
November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and
filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro
Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for
different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of
origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents.
She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various
reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her
home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base
where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her
influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos
power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know
what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until
she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and .
. . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of
the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

37
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case
at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that
an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary
act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage
to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
"domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area
where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between
a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent
of the necessity of physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon
marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's
choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo,
podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais
extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes
to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a
family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su
residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of
relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which
is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as
the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family,
recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the
sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:

Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render
mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations
where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their
residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110
refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the
husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous
with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the
purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.

xxx xxx xxx

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can
have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in
place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is
that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if
residence is also established in some other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In
cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations
42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different

from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new
one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife
either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil
Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that
the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of
justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights
at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory
decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the
other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to
enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree
for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by
imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act
(1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be
procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical
payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted
to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife
was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The
decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar
to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
 fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by
process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia
Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do
so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from
the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for
the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would
be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to
that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of
the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had
several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places
Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence,
what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference
between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in
an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes
revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another
thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and
wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose
a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but
expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequi vocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral
house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47
Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her
home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following
her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and
proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or
chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her
original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the
subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the
facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the
First District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on
April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner
contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of
members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory,
49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would

have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity.
Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the
reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
 In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days
within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which
may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those
which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or
some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in
the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then
refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the
respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even
after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications
after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53
Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the
question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make
distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground
here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-
EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of
principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the
mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995
are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner
as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR.,

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the proof required to establish the domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen who seeks election as governor of a
province.

The Facts and the Case

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years
old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with
his brother, Romeo, Jr., in Barangay Veteran’s Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration.1 On September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same 2 in
compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225.3

From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village where he lived and a fishpond in San Isidro,
Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Dan Erasmo, Sr., the
Barangay Captain of Barangay Veteran’s Village, opposed the same. Acting on the application, the Election Registration Board
approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) voters list for Precinct 0051F of Barangay
Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.4

Undaunted, Erasmo filed before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T. Lim in Ipil a petition for the
exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the official voters list. After hearing, the MCTC rendered a decision, denying the petition. 5 On appeal,6
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MCTC decision. The RTC decision became final and executory.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10,
2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC 7 on the ground that the latter made
material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency
requirement of the Local Government Code.

After hearing, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that, while Jalosjos had regained Philippine citizenship by complying with the
requirements of R.A. 9225, he failed to prove the residency requirement for a gubernatorial candidate. He failed to present ample proof
of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc
affirmed the Second Division’s decision, ruling that Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient visitor in his brother’s house and, for
this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.

Acting on Jalosjos’ prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the Court resolved on May 7, 2010 to issue a status quo
ante order, enjoining the COMELEC from enforcing its February 11, 2010 decision pending further orders. Meanwhile, Jolosjos won the
election and was proclaimed winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race in the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay. 8

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.

The Court’s Ruling

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at
least one year before the election.9 For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, 10
meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.11

There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is a
question of intention.12 Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence
somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile
at a time.13
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial
governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

One. The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos failed to prove that he successfully changed his domicile to Zamboanga
Sibugay. The COMELEC points out that, since he was unable to discharge the burden of proving Zamboanga Sibugay to be his righ tful
domicile, it must be assumed that his domicile is either Quezon City or Australia.

But it is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he
effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian
citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. 14

On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that
Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his
allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else
except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City)
and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or
residence somewhere.

Two. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his
brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is
not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live
there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. 15 To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives
would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in
Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Jalosjos presented the affidavits of next-door neighbors, attesting to his physical presence at his residence in Ipil. These adjoining
neighbors are no doubt more credible since they have a better chance of noting his presence or absence than his other neighbors,
whose affidavits Erasmo presented, who just sporadically passed by the subject residence. Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos
bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed
correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered
voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.1âwphi1

Three. While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from
exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations.16 The evidence
Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
holding otherwise.

Four. Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the
decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated February 11,
2010 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated May 4, 2010 that disqualified petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking
election as Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

SO ORDERED.
MANUEL B. JAPZON, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rules 641 and 652 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Resolution3 dated 31 July 2007 of the First Division of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Resolution 4
dated 28 September 2007 of COMELEC en banc, in SPA No. 07-568, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.

On 15 June 2007, Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition 5 to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born
Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to
the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed
his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In fact, even after filing his application for
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006
lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he
continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign
citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or
related laws. Hence, Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for public office
and the cancellation of the latter’s Certificate of Candidacy.

In his Answer6 to Japzon’s Petition in SPA No. 07-568, Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work
and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts:
(1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine
Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October
2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his
residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty’s application was
approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his
address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. Given the aforementioned facts, Ty argued that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more
than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon’s Petition in SPA No. 07-568.

Pending the submission by the parties of their respective Position Papers in SPA No. 07-568, the 14 May 2007 elections were already
held. Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007. 7

Following the submission of the Position Papers of both parties, the COMELEC First Division rendered its Resolution 8 dated 31 July
2007 in favor of Ty.

The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and
reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and
our country or a unit of territory thereof. Evidences revealed that [Ty] executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice
Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is [Ty] a candidate for or occupying public
office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was
naturalized citizen.9

The COMELEC First Division also held that Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that
he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14 May
2007. It reasoned that:

Although [Ty] has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his
Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy[.]

As held in Coquilla vs. Comelec:

"The term ‘residence’ is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to ‘dwelling’ or ‘habitation,’ but rather to ‘domicile’
or legal residence, that is, ‘the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).’ A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new
domicile (domicile of choice).

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From
then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in
the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.

Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8, §1427(a) of the United States Code
provides:

Requirements of naturalization: Residence

(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1) year immediately
preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his petition
has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State or within the
district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) has resided
continuously within the United States from the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all period
referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. (Emphasis added)

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a ‘greencard,’ which entitles one to
reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization
in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

Records showed that after taking an Oath of Allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General on October 2, 2005,
[Ty] applied and was issued a Philippine passport on October 26, 2005; and secured a community tax certificate from the Municipality
of General Macarthur on March 8, 2006. Evidently, [Ty] was already a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar for more than one (1) year before the elections on May 14, 2007. 10 (Emphasis ours.)

The dispositive portion of the 31 July 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.11

Japzon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. On 28 September 2007, the
COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution12 denying Japzon’s Motion for Reconsideration and affirming the assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, on the basis of the following ratiocination:

We have held that a Natural born Filipino who obtains foreign citizenship, and subsequently spurns the same, is by clear acts of
repatriation a Filipino Citizen and hence qualified to run as a candidate for any local post.

xxxx

It must be noted that absent any showing of irregularity that overturns the prevailing status of a citizen, the presumption of regularity
remains. Citizenship is an important aspect of every individual’s constitutionally granted rights and privileges. This is essential in
determining whether one has the right to exercise pre-determined political rights such as the right to vote or the right to be elected to
office and as such rights spring from citizenship.
Owing to its primordial importance, it is thus presumed that every person is a citizen of the country in which he resides; that citizenship
once granted is presumably retained unless voluntarily relinquished; and that the burden rests upon who alleges a change in citizenship
and allegiance to establish the fact.

Our review of the Motion for Reconsideration shows that it does not raise any new or novel issues. The arguments made therein have
already been dissected and expounded upon extensively by the first Division of the Commission, and there appears to be no reason to
depart from the wisdom of the earlier resolution. We thus affirm that [Ty] did not commit any material misrepresentation when he
accomplished his Certificate of Candidacy. The only ground for denial of a Certificate of Candidacy would be when there was material
misrepresentation meant to mislead the electorate as to the qualifications of the candidate. There was none in this case, thus there is
not enough reason to deny due course to the Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent James S. Ty. 13

Failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, relying on the
following grounds:

A. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WANTONLY DISREGARDED THE PARAMETERS SET BY LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A NEW DOMICILE OF CHOICE AND RESIDENCE.14

B. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WANTONLY REFUSED TO CANCEL [TY’S] CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY, AND CONSEQUENTLY DECLARE [JAPZON] AS THE DULY ELECTED MAYOR OF GEN. MACARTHUR, EASTERN
SAMAR.15

Japzon argues that when Ty became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his domicile of origin. Ty did not establish his residence in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, just because he reacquired his Philippine citizenship. The burden
falls upon Ty to prove that he established a new domicile of choice in General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, a burden which he failed to
discharge. Ty did not become a resident of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by merely executing the Oath of Allegiance under
Republic Act No. 9225.

Therefore, Japzon asserts that Ty did not meet the one-year residency requirement for running as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May
2007 local elections. The one-year residency requirement for those running for public office cannot be waived or liberally applied in
favor of dual citizens. Consequently, Japzon believes he was the only remaining candidate for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, and is the only placer in the 14 May 2007 local elections.

Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First
Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy; and to
declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

As expected, Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove
that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The
Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the
COMELEC are binding on the Court. Ty disputes Japzon’s assertion that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the assailed Resolutions, and avers that the said Resolutions were based on the evidence presented by the parties and
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. Even assuming that Ty, the winning candidate for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, is indeed disqualified from running in the local elections, Japzon as the second
placer in the same elections cannot take his place.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement set by
law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections. The OSG opines that Ty was unable to prove that
he intended to remain in the Philippines for good and ultimately make it his new domicile. Nonetheless, the OSG still prays for the
dismissal of the instant Petition considering that Japzon, gathering only the second highest number of votes in the local elections,
cannot be declared the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, even if Ty is found to be
disqualified from running for the said position. And since it took a position adverse to that of the COMELEC, the OSG prays from this
Court to allow the COMELEC to file its own Comment on Japzon’s Petition. The Court, however, no longer acted on this particular
prayer of the COMELEC, and with the submission of the Memoranda by Japzon, Ty, and the OSG, it already submitted the case for
decision.

The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.

There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He was born and raised in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines. However, he left to work in the USA and eventually became an American citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired
his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. 16 At this
point, Ty still held dual citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his American
citizenship before a notary public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain 17 his
Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close
scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage
of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor
does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-
born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the
general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and
foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.

Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.

Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.

That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely
his Philippine citizenship.

The other requirement of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 pertains to the qualifications required by the Constitution and existing
laws.

Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution left it to Congress to enact a local government code which shall provide, among other things, for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

Pursuant to the foregoing mandate, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, Section 39 of
which lays down the following qualifications for local elective officials:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. – (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

xxxx

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at
least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

The challenge against Ty’s qualification to run as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, centers on his purported failure to meet the one-year residency requirement in the said municipality.

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile"
or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."18

A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the
same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, 19 the Court already acknowledged that for an
individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a
naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice.

As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not
necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again
establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of
choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact
to the time of his birth.

How then could it be established that Ty indeed established a new domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines?

In Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 20 the Court provided a summation of the different principles and concepts in
jurisprudence relating to the residency qualification for elective local officials. Pertinent portions of the ratio in Papandayan are
reproduced below:

Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the issue of whether or not a candidate has complied with the
residency requirement for elective positions. The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has
an "intention to return" to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an
"abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court set
aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor
of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent’s immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of
the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent
was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was proclaimed the duly elected representative
of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against claims that
he was not a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this Court,
citing Faypon v. Quirino, applied the concept of animus revertendi or "intent to return," stating that his absence from his residence in
order to pursue studies or practice his profession as a certified public accountant in Manila or his registration as a voter other than in
the place where he was elected did not constitute loss of residence. The fact that respondent made periodical journeys to his home
province in Laoag revealed that he always had animus revertendi.

In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on Elections, it was explained that the determination of a person’s
legal residence or domicile largely depends upon the intention that may be inferred from his acts, activities, and utterances. In that
case, petitioner Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained the highest number of votes in the local elections of February 1, 1988 and who
had thus been proclaimed as the duly elected governor, was disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence and registration
qualifications, not being a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. The COMELEC ruled that the attempt of petitioner
Larrazabal to change her residence one year before the election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of
governor of the province of Leyte was proof that she considered herself a resident of Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the ruling of the
COMELEC and held that petitioner Larrazabal had established her residence in Ormoc City, not in Kananga, Leyte, from 1975 up to the
time that she ran for the position of Provincial Governor of Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no evidence to show that she and her
husband maintained separate residences, i.e., she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City. The fact that she occasionally
visited Kananga, Leyte through the years did not signify an intention to continue her residence after leaving that place.

In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as
used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or
for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G. Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980’s in
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the sudden departure from the country of petitioner, because of the EDSA People’s
Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United States until favorable conditions had been established, was not voluntary
so as to constitute an abandonment of residence. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.

Ultimately, the Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. that it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or
not an individual has satisfied the residency qualification requirement.

As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he complied with the one-year residency requirement for running for public office is a question
of fact. Its determination requires the Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by
the parties before the COMELEC.
The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence presently before this Court, found that Ty was a resident of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. It is axiomatic that factual
findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, which have acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on
the Court. An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to patent and substantial denial of due process, considering that the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters falling
within its domain.21

The Court even went further to say that the rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice,
except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings, should be applied with greater force
when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC—created and explicitly made
independent by the Constitution itself—on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The factual finding of the COMELEC en
banc is therefore binding on the Court.22

The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in the specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are
accorded by this Court not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Only substantial, not
preponderance, of evidence is necessary. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.23

The assailed Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively, were
both supported by substantial evidence and are, thus, binding and conclusive upon this Court.

Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, became apparent
when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his
application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For
the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as A. Mabini St., Barangay
6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct
0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, since his arrival on 4
May 2006, inarguably, just a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. Japzon maintains that Ty’s trips abroad during
said period, i.e., to Bangkok, Thailand (from 14 to 18 July 2006), and to the USA (from 31 October 2006 to 19 January 2007), indicate
that Ty had no intention to permanently reside in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. The COMELEC
First Division and en banc, as well as this Court, however, view these trips differently. The fact that Ty did come back to the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, after said trips, is a further manifestation of his animus manendi and animus
revertendi.

There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for
the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the
Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in
the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. 24 The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries,
Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months
preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of
residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty’s avowed intent in the instant case to establish
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4
May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007
elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,25 the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an
elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law
purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he
had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to
the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number
of votes.

Finally, when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive
and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor’s right to the office, the will of the
electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters.26 To
successfully challenge Ty’s disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty’s ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would
ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
ROSELLER DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANGELINA DG. DELA CRUZ, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition1 for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution 2
of the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 07-211, disqualifying petitioner Roseller De Guzman from
running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Also assailed is the October 9, 2007
Resolution3 of the COMELEC En Banc denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the
May 14, 2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private respondent filed against petitioner a petition 4 for disqualification docketed as SPA No.
07-211, alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America.

In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.5 Upon
approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that,
having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-
mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent won as vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of
irregularities and massive cheating. The case was filed before Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija and was
docketed as Election Protest No. 07-01.

Meanwhile, in SPA No. 07-211, the COMELEC First Division rendered its June 15, 2007 Resolution disqualifying petitioner, which
reads as follows:

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 states:

"Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic: x x x"

Hence, under the provisions of the aforementioned law, respondent has validly reacquired Filipino citizenship. By taking this Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006 before Mary Jo Bernardo Aragon, Deputy Consul General at the
Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California respondent was deemed a dual citizen, possessing both Filipino and American
citizenship.

However, subparagraph (2), Section 5 of the aforementioned Act also provides:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities -- Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

As can be gleaned from the above cited provision, respondent [herein petitioner] should have renounced his American citizenship
before he can run for any public elective position. This respondent did not do. The Oath of Allegiance taken by respondent was for the
purpose of re-acquiring Philippine citizenship. It did not, at the same time, mean that respondent has renounced his American
citizenship. Thus, at the time respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija he was,
and still is, a dual citizen, possessing both Philippine and American citizenship. For this reason alone, respondent is disqualified to run
for the abovementioned elective position.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the instant
petition finding it IMBUED WITH MERIT. Hence, respondent (petitioner herein) Roseller T. De Guzman is disqualified to run as Vice-
Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.6
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was dismissed on October 9, 2007 by the COMELEC En Banc for having been
rendered moot in view of private respondent’s victory.

Thereafter, the trial court in Election Protest No. 07-01 rendered a Decision,7 dated November 26, 2007, declaring petitioner as the
winner for the Vice-Mayoralty position. It held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring protestant ROSELLER T. DE GUZMAN, as the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty
position with a plurality of 776 votes over the protestee, ANGELINA D.G. DELA CRUZ, in the May 14, 2007 Local Elections in Guimba,
Nueva Ecija. With costs against the protestee.

There being no evidence presented as to the damages by both parties, the same are hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying him
from running as Vice-Mayor because of his failure to renounce his American citizenship, and in dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being moot.

Petitioner invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections 9 and Mercado v. Manzano,10 that the filing by a person with dual
citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, constituted as a renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
Moreover, he claims that the COMELEC En Banc prematurely dismissed the motion for reconsideration because at that time, there was
a pending election protest which was later decided in his favor.

Meanwhile, private respondent claims that the passage of R.A. No. 9225 effectively abandoned the Court’s rulings in Frivaldo and
Mercado; that the current law requires a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship; and that petitioner, having
failed to renounce his American citizenship, remains a dual citizen and is therefore disqualified from running for an elective public
position under Section 4011 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).

The issues for resolution are: 1) whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for being moot; and 2) whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May
14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225.

An issue becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical
use and value.12 In this case, the pendency of petitioner’s election protest assailing the results of the election did not render moot the
motion for reconsideration which he filed assailing his disqualification. Stated otherwise, the issue of petitioner’s citizenship did not
become moot; the resolution of the issue remained relevant because it could significantly affect the outcome of the election protest.
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must
be a citizen of the Philippines."13 It bears stressing that the Regional Trial Court later ruled in favor of petitioner in the election protest
and declared him the winner. In view thereof, a definitive ruling on the issue of petitioner’s citizenship was clearly necessary. Hence, the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s motion for reconsideration solely on the ground that the same
was rendered moot because he lost to private respondent.

Anent the second issue, we find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his
American citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.14

Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an
American citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of
allegiance on September 6, 2006. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those
who wish to seek elective public office, as follows:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Contrary to petitioner’s claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A.
No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

Thus, in Japzon v. COMELEC,15 the Court held that Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires the twin requirements of swearing to an
Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship, viz:

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.1awphi1

Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,16 the Court ruled that a candidate’s oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his
Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Thus:

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who
reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to
administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign
country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to
qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship)
requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they
have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the
discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on
18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur
Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign
citizenship:

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. "Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath." I think it’s very good, ha? No problem?

REP. JAVIER. … I think it’s already covered by the oath.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. Ah… but he has taken his oath already.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. No…no, renouncing foreign citizenship.

xxxx

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. What’s your problem, Boy? Those seeking elective office in the Philippines.

REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano…

CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?

CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.

REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship. When he runs for office, he will have only one.
(Emphasis ours.)
There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce
their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos
must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one contained
in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic
Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates
in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or
reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship.

In the instant case, petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 which
further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in
the May 14, 2007 elections.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioner is declared DISQUALIFIED from running for Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija
in the May 14, 2007 elections because of his failure to renounce his foreign citizenship pursuant to Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

SO ORDERED.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek
medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His
application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however,
whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May
2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the
Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar
must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006,
petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be
allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. 3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the
legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the
courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege. 4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in
good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen
of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce
before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of
court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means continued
membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the annual professional tax;12
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal
profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired
pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed
never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant
to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise, before
a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the
authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated
above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be
a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic
of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:

SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or
events:

xxx

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of
service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of
allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines:
Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and
taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country;
And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the
period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said
foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of
his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5,
1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. 3 He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing
margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.1âwphi1.nêt

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. 4

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. 6

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that
private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss
and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
 2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered
private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such
reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.7

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship
when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens
are those who are from birth with out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase
"from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority,
and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to
the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.9

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." 10

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and
none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has
(1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announced policies.14

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act.
No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. 15

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. 16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications 17 and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A.
473.18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; 20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine
citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last
resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship
will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he
lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However,
he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-
born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is
untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of
the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have
to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those
who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at birth
and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973
Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of
Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-
born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor
is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship
and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the House. 29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In the absence thereof, there is
no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement
for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.