1 Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
162335 & 162605; August 24,
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering
of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO
626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan
1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to
Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred
EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or
his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO
626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the
EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general
welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates
due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the
judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one
area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the
same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and
explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed
to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process
is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.
2 MANOTOK vs. BARQUE[1] (G.R. Nos.
2010; VILLARAMA, JR., J.)
FACTS:
 Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate
Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar
Land.)
o The subject parcel “Lot No. 823” is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in
QC.
 On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine
Government pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. The certificate of title in the
name of the government was OCT No. 614. The Estate was placed under
the administration of the Director of Lands.
 Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire
gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988 which destroyed
records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds.
 In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 372302 covering Lot No. 823 with an area of
342,945 square meters  GRANTED  TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) was
issued in 1991.
 In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for
administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer
Barque also covering Lot 823. In support of their petition, the Barques
submitted copies of the alleged owner’s duplicate of the TCT, real estate tax
receipts, tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property.
o MANOTOKs opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.
 Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land belonging
to Lot No. 823, TCT No. 210177 actually involves 2 parcels with an
aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) pertains only to a 1 parcel of land, with a similar area of 342,945
square meters.
 1997 – Barques’ petition was DENIED.  Lot. No. 823 already registered in
the name of the Manotoks. --> Barques MR was denied  They
appealed to the LRA  LRA Reversed.
o LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent. Hence, it
ordered the Barque title to be reconstituted. BUT cancellation must 1 st be
sought in a court of competent jurisdiction of the 1991 Manotok TCT.
 The LRA denied the Manotoks’ MR and the Barques’ prayer for immediate
reconstitution. Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA
decision to the CA.
 In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the
dismissal of the cases claiming ownership of the subject property.
 2002 and 2003  2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of
QC to cancel the Reconstituted Manotok Title and to reconstitute the
Barques’ “valid, genuine and existing” TCT No. 210177.
o Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were ordered
consolidated on August 2, 2004.
 December 12, 2005, SC First Division  affirmed both decisions of the
CA.  Manotoks filed MR  Denied in April 2006 Resolution.
o Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with
their MR attached.  Denied in June 2006 Resolution. Eventually entry of
judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment on May 2, 2006. In
the meantime, the Barques filed multiple motions with the First Division for
execution of the judgment, while the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to
Refer Motion for Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for
oral arguments).  Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006.
 On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a
motion to intervene, to which was attached their petition in intervention. They
alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Manahan, was issued
Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot No. 823 and attached the findings of
the NBI that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were
purported to be. Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB
recommended to the Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok Title
should be reverted to the state.
o Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.
 2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1st division decision and entry
of judgment recalled and the CA’s Amended Decisions in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
66642 and 66700 were reversed and set aside. The En Banc remanded the
case to the CA.
o The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of WON
the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the
Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land.
PURPOSE: to decide WON the title of the Maotoks should be annulled.
 CA’s findings  None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of
Lot 823 from the government in accordance with the provisions of Act No.
1120 otherwise known as the “Friar Lands Act”. Notably lacking in the deed
of conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce as required by Section 18 of the said law. Upon close
scrutiny, the factual allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits
relating to the purchase of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the
claimants revealed badges of fraud and irregularity.
BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:
Manotoks  Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919.
They have since occupied the land, built their houses and buildings on it. The
subject land is now known as Manotok Compound.
Barques  Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano
Setosta who had a TCT in his name.
Manahans  The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently
bought by his wife. They had a caretaker on the property but she was ousted
by armed men in 1950s so they just declared the property for taxation to
protect their rights.
ISSUE: Who has the better right over Lot No. 823? NO ONE! It belongs
to the National Government.
RATIO:
 From the proceedings in the CA, it was established that while records of the
DENR-LMB indicate the original claimant/applicant of Lot 823 as a certain
Valentin Manahan, only the Manotoks were able to produce a sale certificate
in the name of their predecessors-in-interest, certified by the LMB Records
Management Division. In addition, the Manotoks submitted photocopies of
original documents entitled Assignment of Sale Certificate dated 1919, 1920
and 1923.
 Sale Certificate No. 1054 was not signed by the Director of Lands nor
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The Certificates of Assignment of
Sale contained only the signature of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks
belatedly secured from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7, 1932, which likewise lacks the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was
signed only by the Director of Lands.
Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by
the Secretary of the Interior.
 It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale
of friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of the Interior
(later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce).
 In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the
original Deed of Conveyance No. 29204, sourced from the National Archives,
shows on the second page a poorly imprinted typewritten name over the
words “Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources”, which name is
illegible, and above it an even more poorly imprinted impression of what may
be a stamp of the Secretary’s approval.
 The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance
of the RD’s task in issuing the TCT in the Manotok name. The Manotoks
contend that “we can assume that the Manotok deed of conveyance was in
fact approved by the Department Secretary because the register of deeds did
issue TCT No. 22813 in the name of the buyer Severino Manotok.”
 FURTHER, the Manotoks assert that even if we were to ignore the
presumption of validity in the performance of official duty, Department
Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on October 27, 2005 by then DENR
Secretary Michael T. Defensor, supplies the omission of approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in deeds of conveyances
over friar lands.
o NO! These arguments fail.
 Citing Alonso v. Cebu Country Club which applied the rule in the Solid State
and Liao Cases the absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce in the sale certificate and assignment of sale certificate made
the sale null and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles
issued on the basis of such sale or assignment.
o SC in the MR of the Alonso case underscored that the approval is a
MADATORY requirement. Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot
simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is explicit in its
mandate. Petitioners have not offered any cogent reason that would justify a
deviation from this rule.
 DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks and the
Manahans, states that some Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field
offices of the LMB do not bear the Secretary’s signature despite full payment
for the Friar Land. They are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by this
Memo provided that the applicant really paid the purchase price and
complied with all the requirements under the Friar Lands Act.
o The CA opined that the Manotoks cannot benefit from the above department
issuance because it makes reference only to those deeds of conveyance on
file with the records of the DENR field offices. The Manotoks’ copy of the
alleged Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 issued in 1932, was sourced from
the National Archives.
 Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the
Government ceases reservation of its title once the buyer had fully paid the
price. (They were claiming that they fully paid!) Their basis is SECTION
15[2] of the Friar Lands Act.
 Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention
however, the new rule Pugeda v. Trias,  “the conveyance executed in
favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a
conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory
condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid
for in full.
 Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate
of sale that vests title and ownership to the purchaser of friar land. Such
certificate of sale must, of course, be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, as evident from Sections 11[3], 12[4] and the 2nd
paragraph of Section 15[5], in relation to Section 18.
CONCLUSIONS
 Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had
no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the Government because their
Certificate lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
 The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of
real property taxes and construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must
be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove the existence of the title
allegedly issued in the name of Severino Mantotok after the latter had paid in
full the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to
why the only copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of
documents leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. As
to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it simply
described the copy presented as “DILAPIDATED” without stating if the
original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually existed in their records, nor any
information on the year of issuance and name of registered owner.
o As we stressed in Alonso: Prescription can never lie against the Government.
 RE: MANAHANS No copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can be
found in the records of either the DENR-NCR, LMB or National
Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of Assignment of
Sale Certificate No. 511 allegedly executed by Valentin Manahan in favor of
Hilaria de Guzman, there is no competent evidence to show that the claimant
Valentin Manahan or his successors-in-interest actually occupied Lot 823,
declared the land for tax purposes, or paid the taxes due thereon.
 Even assuming arguendo the existence and validity of the alleged Sale
Certificate No. 511 and Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 presented by
the Manahans, the CA correctly observed that the claim had become stale
after the lapse of 86 years from the date of its alleged issuance. Citing Liao
v. CA “the certificates of sale x x x became stale after 10 years from its
issuance” and hence cannot be the source documents for issuance of title
more than 70 years later.”
Dispositive:
Manotok Appeal denied
Manahan Petition for intervention denied
Petition for reconstitution of the Barque title denied
All the TCTs in the name of Manotoks, Manahans and Barque, are NULL and
VOID. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City are
hereby ordered to CANCEL the said titles.
Lot No. 823 is property of the National Government of the Philippines w/o
prejudice to Reversion proceedings

[1] EN BANC DECISION
[2] The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every parcel of land sold under the
provisions of this Act until the full payment of all installments or purchase money and interest
by the purchaser has been made, and any sale or encumbrance made by him shall be invalid as
against the Government of the Philippine Islands and shall be in all respects subordinate to its
prior claim. Xxx
[3] SECTION 11. Should any person who is the actual and bona fide settler upon, and occupant of, any portion of
said lands at the time the same is conveyed to the Government of the Philippine Islands desire to purchase the land
so occupied by him, he shall be entitled to do so at the actual cost thereof to the Government, and shall be granted
fifteen years from the date of the purchase in which to pay for the same in equal annual installments, should he so
desire paying interest at the rate of four per centum per annum on all deferred payments.
…The terms of purchase shall be agreed upon between the purchaser and the Director of Lands, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
[4] SECTION 12. ...When the cost thereof shall have been thus ascertained, the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has
agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as
provided in this Act. . .and that upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest the
Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of
conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-
two of the Land Registration Act….
[5] SECTION 15. …The right of possession and purchase acquired by certificates of sale signed under the
provisions hereof by purchasers of friar lands, pending final payment and the issuance of title, shall be considered as
personal property for the purposes of serving as security for mortgages, and shall be considered as such in judicial
proceedings relative to such security.
3Vargas vs Rilloraza
G.R. No. L-1612 February 26 1948 [Composition of the Supreme
Court, ]
FACTS:
Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act,
Commonwealth Act 682, which provided that the President could
designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or
Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in
treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the required
constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional
RULING:
No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.
Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any
composition of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice and
Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided.
And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of
the members of the Court — as in this case — are replaced by judges
of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to
this. And the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court.
Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth
Act No. 682 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution and continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but
positively violative of the organic law.
Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members
of the Supreme Court should be appointed by the President with the
consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be
construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the
composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution.
However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge
designated under Sec. 14 of PCA, there is no escaping the fact the he
would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC, as the
appellate tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any
regular Justice of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would
be a misnomer, as that position is not contemplated by the
Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice
and Associate Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed
(Sec5).
4 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after
the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that
has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement
of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days
after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in
relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof”
from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President
or Acting President from making appointments within
two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
“automatically considered” for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio;
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their
nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and
January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled
within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme
Court appointments, they could have easily expressly
stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the
prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department)
was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department);
and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII
ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power
to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its
“insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the
JBC, the specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is
whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there
being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume
its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from
the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be
it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90
days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint
the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply
to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or
to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court
shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s
or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s
or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the
same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section
16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also
applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to
cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have
easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article
VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

5 G.R.
No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL,
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a
prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of
allowing more than one member of the congress to represent
the JBC to be unconstitutional
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth
member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in
this petition. it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent
contends that the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers
that both houses of congress should have one representative
each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of
legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in
performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution
provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only
with only one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate
and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting
members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of
the constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that
the phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed
as to having only one representative that would come from
either house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only
intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body
refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the
passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two
houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a
vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This,
however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken
to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution
mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only.
FALLO: The motion was denied.
6 De La Llana vs Alba
112 SCRA 294 – Political law – Constitutional Law – Political
Question – if there is no question of law involved – BP 129
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing
the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in
Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would
be one of the judges that would be removed because of the
reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the
constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of
judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can
remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be
validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court
is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote
of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses
the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was
the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of
course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant.
In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from
the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal
and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction
that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this
Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render
advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were
the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the
action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could
do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has
been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization.
That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly
belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested
ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by
this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge
that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents
vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged
Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance
with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between
one which would save and another which would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred.”
7 OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v Court of Appeals
Case Digest
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v CA
FACTS:
This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered
by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against
the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and
controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a
private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines.
The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted
from the failure of the respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well
cement to the petitioner even it had already received payment and
despite petitioner’s several demands. The petitioner then informed the
private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant
to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he venue for
arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in
favour of the petitioner setting forth the arbitral award. To enable the
petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court
of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the
arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the
respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's
objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to
the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by
the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to
pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned
judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss
the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of
action. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals
which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the
appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not
have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign
court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed
this petition for review on certiorari,
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between
the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the
contract.
RULING:
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum
decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions
of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the
country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure
in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final
and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the
courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court
simply because our rules provide otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of
the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint before Branch
30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED,
8 Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011
Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011
(Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)
Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.”
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and
of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision
dismissing the former’s petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent
PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art
VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on
the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all
election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution.
Issue:
1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.
2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
1. Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring
that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they
 “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme
been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his
Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, certificates of service for 17 months.
Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections
contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
2. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment
Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court
into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” The set up embodied in
the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET,
Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs
what is essentially a judicial power. serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of
the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election
contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the
explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his
COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)
of the Constitution. certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into

the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation
9 Maceda vs. Vasquez (G.R. No. 102781) of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Posted: August 24, 2011 in Case Digests
Tags: Judicial Department

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision
0
over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the

Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative

alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may

and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner

Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their

administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same
to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope
of their administrative duties.
10 In Re: Demetria AM No 00-7-09-CA 27 March 2001
Facts: Court En Banc ordered an investigation of allegations that
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to
intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai,
alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to play in a Manila
casino. Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently
denied having interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. Justice Demetria
acknowledged visiting DOJ and interacting with State Prosecutor
regarding the case but claimed that was not a form of intervention.
Respondent claimed that the “help” he was requesting could well
be “within legal bounds or line of duty.”
Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Decision: Respondent violated the Rule 2.04 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with
honor, probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of
justice must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not
only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their
influence in society must be consciously and conscientiously
exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For, theirs is the
assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality and
integrity of the Judiciary. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a
judge to “refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency.” The slightest form of interference cannot be
countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere
in the regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding for the benefit
of one or any of the parties therein, public confidence in the judicial
system is diminished, if not totally eroded.
11 MERALCO vs PASAY TRANS CO (NOT SURE)
The Franchise of Meralco provides that the SC Justices, as arbitrators, would
determine the charges that would be collected by Meralco for the use of its
facilities.
Court held here that they cannot act as an arbitration panel. Arbitration is
valid provided that there be relief available to go to courts. However, here
the final appeal of the arbitral award which the SC justice would be making,
would be reviewable by the SC also. It is not a judicial function as well.
Appeal is a statutory right which can be waived by the parties. But there are
provisions of law which cannot be waived. Even if the arbitration award
provides that it shall not be appealable, if there are grounds that would
constitute grounds for vacation of the award, then the aggrieved party may
resort to the courts for the review of the arbitral award.
12
May 05, 2017
IN RE: MANZANO, A.M. NO. 8871861-
RTC OCTOBER 5, 1988
Facts:
Judge Rodolfo Manzano sent a letter to the Supreme Court
requesting to allow him to accept appointment as a member of
the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committe on Justice create pursuant
to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 as amended by EO No.
326.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Manzano can accept appointment as a
member of INPCJ.

Held:

No. The committee was created by the executive branch of the

government where its members discharge administrative
functions. Though it may be quasi-judicial, it is still
administrative in nature. Judge Manzano is not a subordinate of
an executive or legislative official, however eminent. His integrity
in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such
structure. RTC Judges may only render assistance to the
aforesaid committees when such assistance are reasonably
incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial functions.

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