BEFORE A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH CAN BE OBTAINED, IT MUST BE SHOWN

THAT THE PRIOR SPOUSE HAD BEEN ABSENT FOR FOUR CONSECUTIVE YEARS AND THE PRESENT
SPOUSE HAD A WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF THAT THE PRIOR SPOUSE WAS ALREADY DEAD.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NILDA B. TAMPUS

G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016

Perlas-Bernabe, J.:

Facts: Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was married to Dante L. Del Mundo (Dante) on November 29, 1975 in
Cordova, Cebu. On December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children.

Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante,. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved
futile. Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively
dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any
kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.

Nilda presented evidence ​ex parte​ affirming that she exerted efforts to find Dante by inquiring from his
parents, relatives, and neighbors, who, unfortunately, were also not aware of his whereabouts. She
averred that she intends to remarry and move on with her life.

Issue: Whether or not, based on the evidence presented by Nilda, it is proper to declare Dante as
presumptively dead.

Ruling: No. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been
missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the
present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the foregoing requisites under Article
41 of the Family Code exist. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden
of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence of the
spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still
alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.

In this case, the court deemed that, other than making inquiries to Dante’s parents and relatives, Nilda
did not exert any effort in locating her husband.
AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE HAS TWO INDISPENSABLE REQUISITES WHICH MUST CONCUR, NAMELY:
(1) THE PLAINTIFF OR COMPLAINANT HAS A LEGAL OR AN EQUITABLE TITLE TO OR INTEREST IN THE
REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE ACTION; AND (2) THE DEED, CLAIM, ENCUMBRANCE OR
PROCEEDING CLAIMED TO BE CASTING CLOUD ON HIS TITLE MUST BE SHOWN TO BE IN FACT INVALID
OR INOPERATIVE DESPITE ITS PRIMA FACIE APPEARANCE OF VALIDITY OR LEGAL EFFICACY.

HEIRS OF DELFIN and MARIA TAPPA vs. HEIRS OF JOSE BACUD, et. al.,

G.R. No. 187633, April 4, 2016

Jardeleza, J.:

Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of title against respondents. They alleged that they are
the registered owners of the subject lot, having been issued an Original Certificate of Title on September
18, 1992, by virtue of a Free Patent. Delfin allegedly inherited said lot from his father, Lorenzo Tappa
(Lorenzo). Petitioners claimed that both Delfin and Lorenzo were in open, continuous, notorious,
exclusive possession of the lot since time immemorial.

Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that the original owner was Genaro Tappa (Genaro) who had
two children, Lorenzo and Irene. Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene by
operation of law; and they became ipso facto co-owners of the property. As co-owners, Lorenzo and
Irene each owned 10,939 square meters of the lot as their respective shares. Respondent Bacud anchor
his claim over the lot as heirs of Irene, while the other respondents claim title over certain deeds of sale
executed by the siblings of Delfin.

Respondents presented a 1963 affidavit acknowledging Genaro’s ownership of the lot as well as
Lorenzo’s ½ ownership. The affidavit further provided that the whole lot was declared in he name of
Lorenzo for taxation purposes only.

Issue: Whether or not the action for quieting of title should prosper?

Ruling: No. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1)
the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy. Petitioners failed to meet these two requisites.

First, Spouses Tappa's claim of legal title over Lot No. 3341 by virtue of the free patent and a certificate
of title issued in their name cannot stand. The certificate of title indicates that it was issued by virtue of
Patent No. 021519-92-3194. However, at the time of the application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had
already become private land by virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by
respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the coverage of the Public Land Act, which
governs public patent applications.

The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. A cloud on a title exists when (1)
there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is
apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be
prejudicial to the title.
IN THE CASE OF BANKS, THE DEGREE OF DILIGENCE REQUIRED IS MORE THAN THAT OF A GOOD
FATHER OF A FAMILY. CONSIDERING THE FIDUCIARY NATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR
DEPOSITORS, BANKS ARE DUTY BOUND TO TREAT THE ACCOUNTS OF THEIR CLIENTS WITH THE
HIGHEST DEGREE OF CARE.

DRA. MERCEDES OLIVER v. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK and LILIA CASTRO

G.R. No. 214567, April 4, 2016

Mendoza, J.:

Facts: Oliver alleged that sometime in 1997, she made an initial deposit of P12 million into her PSBank
account. During that time, Castro convinced her to loan out her deposit as interim or bridge financing for
the approved loans of bank borrowers who were waiting for the actual release of their loan proceeds.

Under this arrangement, Castro would first show the approved loan documents to Oliver. Thereafter,
Castro would withdraw the amount needed from Oliver’s account. However, beginning September 1998,
Castro stopped rendering an accounting for Oliver. The latter then demanded the return of her
passbook. When Castro showed her the passbook sometime in late January or early February 1995, she
noticed several erasures and superimpositions therein.

Issue: 1.) Whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the loans.

Ruling:

1.) YES. There was an implied agency between Oliver and Castro, hence, the loans were properly
acquired. A contract of agency may be inferred from all the dealings between Oliver and Castro. Agency
can be express or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure
to repudiate the agency knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority. The
question of whether an agency has been created is ordinarily a question which may be established in the
same way as any other fact, either by direct or circumstantial evidence. The question is ultimately one of
intention. Article 1881 of the New Civil Code provides that the agent must act within the scope of his
authority. He may do such acts as may be conducive to the accomplishment of the purpose of the
agency. Thus, as long as the agent acts within the scope of the authority given by his principal, the
actions of the former shall bind the latter.

In this case, the claim of Oliver that she never authorized such loans will not prosper. Her signatures
appearing on the loan documents does not appear to be forged. Hence, the loan documents were
reliable and these proved that the loans were processed by Castro within the scope of her authority.
EASEMENT PROHIBITING PROPRIETOR FROM COMMITTING NUISANCE

TEOFILO ALOLINO v. FORTUNATO FLORES AND ANASTACIA MARIE FLORES

G.R. No. 198774, April 04, 2016

Brion, J.:

Facts: Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land. He initially constructed a
bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the structure. He also
extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are terraces on both floors. There
are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on the ground floor and another three (3) on
the second floor.

In 1994, respondents constructed their house/sari sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road
immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's house. Since they were constructing on a
municipal road, the respondents could not secure a building permit. The structure is only about two (2)
to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino's house, covering five windows and the exit door. The
respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and
prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.

Alolino demanded that the respondent spouses remove their structure but the latter refused.

Issues: Whether or not petitioner has a right to easement of light and way by virtue of his title.

Ruling: NO. Section 3 (Articles 649-657) governs legal easements of right of way. Article 649 creates a
legal easement in favor of an owner or any person entitled to use any immovable, which is landlocked
by other immovables pertaining to other persons without an adequate access to a public highway.
Article 652 creates a legal easement in favor of an isolated piece of land acquired by sale, exchange,
partition, or donation when it is surrounded by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner, or
donor. Article 653 grants the same right of way. in favor of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner, or donor
when his property is the one that becomes isolated. Article 656 grants the owner of an estate, after
payment of indemnity, a right of way to carry materials through the estate of another when it.is
indispensable for the construction or repair of a building in his estate. Finally, Article 657 governs right
of way easements for the passage of livestock.

However, none of these provisions actually create a legal easement of light and view which can only be
acquired through prescription or a by virtue of a voluntary title.

From the foregoing, we agree with the respondents that Alolino does not have an easement of light and
view or an easement of right of way over the respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on. This
does not mean, however, that the respondents are entitled to continue occupying the barrio road and
blocking the rear of Alolino's house. Every building is subject to the easement which prohibits the
proprietor or possessor from committing nuisance under Art. 694.
ALLUVION MUST BE THE EXCLUSIVE WORK OF NATURE AND NOT A RESULT OF HUMAN
INTERVENTION.

REX DACLISON vs. EDUARDO BAYTION

G.R. No. 219811, April 6, 2016

Mendoza, J.:

On January 27, 2009, respondent Eduardo Baytion (Baytion) filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry and
Damages against petitioner Rex Daclison.

Baytion alleged that he was a co-owner of a parcel of land consisting of 1,500 square meters, covered by
Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 221507. The said property was inherited by him and his siblings from
their parents and, as agreed upon, was being administered by him. As administrator, he leased portions
of the property to third persons.

Erected on the said property was a one-storey building which was divided into seven units or stalls. One
of the stalls was leased to a certain Leonida Dela Cruz (Leonida) who used it for her business of selling
rocks, pebbles and similar construction materials. When the lease of Nida expired sometime in May
2008, Daclison and other persons acting under her took possession of the portion leased and occupied
by Leonida without the prior knowledge and consent of Baytion. Since then, Daclison had been
occupying the contested portion and using it for his business of selling marble and other finishing
materials without paying anything to Baytion.

Upon learning of Daclison’s unauthorized entry into the subject portion of the property, sometime in
June 2008, Baytion demanded that he vacate it. Despite oral and written demands to vacate, Daclison
refused to do so. This prompted Baytion to file the complaint for forcible entry and damages.

Baytion basically posits that although the disputed portion is outside the description of his property, it
forms an integral part of the latter because it is an accretion, construction, or improvement on the
property and, under the law, any accretion or anything built thereon belongs to him and his co-owners.

Issue: Whether or not the Baytion has a claim over the property by virtue of accretion.

Ruling: No. The contested portion cannot be considered an accretion. Baytion’s contention that he owns
that portion by reason of accretion is misplaced. Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belongs the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.

In other words, the following requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be considered, namely:
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current
of the water; and, (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. In this
case, the land came about not by reason of a gradual and imperceptible deposit. The deposits were
artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current from the creek adjacent to his
property. Baytion failed to prove the attendance of the indispensable requirement that the deposit was
due to the effect of the current of the river or creek. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and
not a result of human intervention.
BY THE CLEAR DICTATE OF EQUITY, WHEN THE VENDOR REMAINS IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY
SOLD AS LESSEE OR OTHERWISE, OR THE PRICE OF THE SALE IS UNUSUALLY INADEQUATE, AS IN THIS
CASE, THE LAW DEEMS THE CONTRACT AS AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.

SPOUSES GEORGE A. GALLENT, SR. and MERCEDES M. GALLENT vs. JUAN G. VELASQUEZ

G.R. No. 203949 and G.R. No. 205071, April 6, 2016

Reyes, J.:

Facts: Gallent, Sr. was the registered owner of a residential property. On December 20, 1996, the
Spouses Gallent mortgaged the said property to Allied Bank as security for a loan of Pl.5 Million. The
Spouses failed to pay their loan, which had ballooned to P4,631,97 4.66; thus, Allied Bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgaged property. At the public auction, Allied Bank emerged as the highest bidder
and was issued a corresponding certificate of sale. Since the Spouses Gallent failed to redeem the
subject property after one year, Allied Bank consolidated its ownership over the subject property. On
June 11, 2003, Allied Bank agreed to sell back the foreclosed property to the Spouses Gallent for P4
Million, thus the Spouses paid a down payment of P3.5 Million. However due to financial difficulties, the
Spouses t sought the help of their close family friend, Juan Velasquez (Velasquez), to help them settle
their remaining monthly amortizations. As an inducement, they agreed that Velasquez would have the
subject property registered under his name until they have repaid him. On October 24, 2003, the
Spouses Gallent executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights whereby they assigned to Velasquez all their
rights, interests, and obligations under their Agreement to Sell with Allied Bank. Velasquez paid Allied
Bank the remaining balance amounting to P216,635.97.

It is the Spouses’ contention that the Deed of Assignment of Rights which they executed in favor of
Velasquez was in reality an equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of the New Civil Code. The Spouses
Gallent maintained that their true agreement with Velasquez was an equitable mortgage and not an
assignment of their interest in the subject property.66 Having substantially paid the repurchase price of
their property, that is, P3,790,500.00 out of the price of P4 Million, they insisted that they had virtually
recovered full ownership of the house when they entered into an equitable mortgage with Velasquez.

Issue: Whether Spouses Gallent were deprived of their right as owners when they “assigned” their
property to Velasquez for P216, 635.97.

Ruling: No. There was no assignment of rights but merely an equitable mortgage. An equitable
mortgage has been defined as one which although lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other
requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real
property as security for a debt, there being no impossibility nor anything contrary to law in this intent.

The substantial payment for the repurchase from Allied Bank of the subject property, P3,790,500.00 out
of the price of P4 Million, as against Velasquez's assumption of the remaining balance of P216,635.97,
entitles the Spouses Gallent to the legal presumption that their assignment to Velasquez of all their
interest under their Contract to Sell with Allied Bank was an equitable mortgage. In a contract of
mortgage, the mortgagor retains possession of the property given as security for the payment of the
sum borrowed from the mortgagee. By the clear dictate of equity, when the vendor remains in
possession of the property sold as lessee or otherwise, or the price of the sale is unusually inadequate,
as in this case, the law deems the contract as an equitable mortgage.

A FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OF THE COURT IS APPLICABLE NOT ONLY TO THE PARTIES
THERETO BUT ALSO TO THEIR SUCCESSORS-ININTEREST.

SPOUSES RODRIGO IMPERIAL, JR. and JOCELYN IMPERIAL, and FE IMPERIAL vs. SPOUSES ROGELIO
AND ASUNCION PINIGAT

G.R. No. 193554, April 13, 2016

Brion, J.:

Facts: Rodrigo Imperial, Jr. (Rodrigo Jr.), testifying for Rodrigo Sr., claimed that the subject property was
sold by his grandfather, Isabelo, to his father, as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale dated
September 28, 1979. Following the sale, however, Isabelo stayed in the house with him while his father
left for Manila. When the time came that Rodrigo Jr. needed to go to Manila to pursue college studies,
Isabelo allowed Juan and Betty to stay with him in the house, with the agreement that they will leave
upon demand. In 1985, Isabelo died. Rodrigo Sr. asked Juan and Betty to stay in the house until Rodrigo
Jr. finishes college. Soon, thereafter, Spouses Rogelio and Asuncion Pinigat (respondents), who were the
son-in-law and daughter of Juan and Betty, respectively, were also allowed to move in to the house.

In 1997, Rodrigo Jr. and his father were surprised to learn that there was already a deed of sale over
one-half portion of the subject property in favor of the respondents registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Camarines Sur. Rodrigo Sr. lodged a complaint with Barangay Captain Edwin Bedural of Baao,
Camarines Sur but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute.

The MTC gave credence to Betty’s testimony that she purchased ½ of the property from Isabelo but
without being evidenced by a deed of sale. The said decision became final and executory when Rodrigo
Sr.’s appeal was dismissed by the RTC. Petitioners contend that the decision of the RTC recognizing
Betty’s right over said property should not be made to apply to them since they are not parties to that
case.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the RTC may affect persons who are not parties thereto.

Ruling: Indeed, Civil Case No. 627 was between Rodrigo Sr. and the respondents. A final and executory
decision of the court, however, is applicable not only to the parties thereto but also to their
successors-ininterest. Thus, in Cabresos v. Tiro, the Court upheld the validity of the writ of execution
issued against the successors-in-interest of the losing litigant despite the fact that these
successors-in-interest were not mentioned in the judgment and were never parties to the case. The
Court explained that an action is binding on the privies of the litigants even if such privies are not
literally parties to the action. Their inclusion in the writ of execution does not vary or exceed the terms
of the judgment.24 The Court ratiocinated:

By "third party" is meant a person who is not a party to the action under consideration. We agree with
the private respondents that the petitioners are privies to the case for recovery of ownership and
possession filed by the former against the latter’s predecessors-in-interest, the latter being the
daughter-in-law and grandchildren of the losing party in Civil Case No. 3150. By the term "privies" is
meant those between whom an action is deemed binding although they are not literally parties to the
said action. There is no doubt that the assailed decision is binding on the petitioners.

THE RULE THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WOULD CONSTITUTE AN OPEN AND
CLEAR REPUDIATION OF ANY TRUST APPLIES ONLY WHEN THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT IN POSSESSION OF
THE PROPERTY, SINCE IF A PERSON CLAIMING TO BE THE OWNER THEREOF IS IN ACTUAL POSSESSION
OF THE PROPERTY, THE RIGHT TO DEMAND PARTITION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE.

HEIRS OF FELICIANO YAMBAO vs. HEIRS OF HERMOGENES YAMBAO

G.R. No. 194260, April 13, 2016

Reyes, J.:

Facts: Both parties are heirs of Hermogenes. When Hermogenes died, he allowed his heirs to harvest
fruits from his property. However, sometime in 2005, the communal and mutual use of the subject
property by the heirs of Hermogenes ceased when petitioners, heirs of one of Hermogenes’ son,
feliciano, prohibited them from entering the property.

Respondents alleged that they and the petitioners are co-owners of the subject property, having
inherited the right thereto from Hermogenes. Petitioners denied the allegations and claimed that their
father, Feliciano, was in possession of the subject property in the concept of owner since time
immemorial. They also averred that the cause of action in the complaint filed by the heirs of
Hermogenes, which questioned the validity of the original certificate of title granted to Feliciano
prescribed after the lapse of one year from its issuance on November 29, 1989.

RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by the heirs of Hermogenes. On appeal, CA
reversed and set aside the RTC decision.

Issue: Whether or not prescription ran against co-owners, respondents in this case.

Ruling: No. As a rule, co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other.
Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse
because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Prescription may nevertheless
run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open, continuous and exclusive possession of the co-owned
property by the other co-owner/s.

The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear repudiation of any trust. In
such a case, an action to demand partition among co-owners prescribes in 10 years, the point of
reference being the date of the issuance of certificate of title over the property. But this rule applies
only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner
thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to demand partition does not prescribe.

Although OCT No. P-10737 was registered in the name of Feliciano on November 29, 1989, the
prescriptive period within which to demand partition of the subject property, contrary to the claim of
the heirs of Feliciano, did not begin to run. At that time, the heirs of Hermogenes were still in possession
of the property. It was only in 2005 that the heirs of Feliciano expressly prohibited the heirs of
Hermogenes from entering the property. Thus the right of the heirs of Hermogenes to demand the
partition of the property had not yet prescribed.
THE VALIDITY OF A MARRIAGE AND ALL ITS INCIDENTS MUST BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE LAW IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF ITS CELEBRATION.

SPOUSES PRIMO INALVEZ AND

INALVEZ vs. BAYANG NOOL, et.al

G.R. No. 188145, April 18, 2016

Reyes, J. :

Facts:

A certain parcel of land belonged to Spouses Nool and Spouses Bayang. The latter subsequently sold a
portion of their share over the subject property to the petitioners and one Zamora. Hence, the
co-owners of the property were as follows; Spouses Nool (1/2); Zamora (1/40; Bayang (1/8)’ Petitioners
(1/8).

Spouses Nool then sold all their share to Macayanan. The property was subsequently mortgaged by all
the co-owners to Tarlac Development Bank (TDB). Unfortunately, the property was foreclosed and the
title was consolidated with TDB. TDB subsequently sold the property to petitioners and Spouses Baluyot.

Petitioners then enetered into am agreement to subdivide the lot and declared their portion for tax
purposes. Petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents alleging that the latter were
allowed to cultivate a portion of the property only upon the condition that they deliver to petitioners a
part of the produce, to which respondents did not comply.

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that she and her late husband were the actual and registered
co-owners of the subject property, which they inherited from her father, together with the petitioners.
Bayang denied having sold portions of their property to the petitioners and Zamora. Also, respondents
argued that they are deemed to have already acquired the subject property through ordinary acquisitive
prescription since they have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property
for more than 30 years.

Issue: Whether respondents have a right over the subject property by virtue of prescription.

Ruling: Yes. Where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the
property to occupy a definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a period too long to be
ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or right than said transferees. (Potior est conditio
possidentis). Such undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial partition of the co-owned property
which entitles the possessor to the definite portion which he occupies. Conformably, the respondents
are entitled to the subject property, having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for more than 35
years.
RENATO A. CASTILLO vs. LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO

G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6
January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato). On 28 May 2001,
Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to
Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null
and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged

Respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. RTC subsequently declared
that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued
a Certificate of Finality saying that said decision had become final and executory.

Respondent filed a demurrer to evidence claiming that the proof adduced by petitioner was insufficient
to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. In his
Opposition, petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and
regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still
could not deny that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and
subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect
at the time of its celebration.25 In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages
was the Civil Code.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void
marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage,
the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a
voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be
collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage,
there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable
marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are
considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.

The court emphasized the importance of the fifth distinction, as applied in the present case. Citing
several decisions, the court reiterated that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity
of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.

In sum, the court held that the first marriage of private respondent was void for lack of license and
consent, and since there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before she could contract a
second marriage, therefore, respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.