VENUE

MARICRIS D. DOLOT v. RAMON PAJE, GR No. 199199, 2013-08-27

Facts:
petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa
Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorney's fees with the
RTC of Sorsogon. The petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations
being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco,
located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and
maintain the geological foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental
dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the
mining operators did not have the required... permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the
operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of
Matnog;and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code.
Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in
the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of... a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to
undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others. ... Referred by the Executive
Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental court. Case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction, the RTC[11] further ruled that: (1) there was... no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act
on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to
exhaust their... administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government
or appropriate agency, as required by the rules. Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues:
main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction... m... whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no
final court decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly... failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or
appropriate agency.
Ruling:
... At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. Special civil action for
continuing mandamus... shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred x
x x." In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog... and as such, the petition
should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin. But even then, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be
waived. Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners... is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction. A.M. No. 09-6-
8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the RTC further ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following grounds: (1) there is no final court
decree, order or decision yet that the... public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate
agency. Concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay. He writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a... distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of
environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure) similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil
actions for certiorari, prohibition... and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and
substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that
the... determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner
in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served. Sufficiency in form and substance
refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8, Section 1: When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection
with the enforcement or violation of an... environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the... proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition
concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of
acts until the... judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties
of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations.

Principles:
Writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law." The
petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation... or a right therein. Continuing mandamus is a writ issued
by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts
decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until... judgment is fully satisfied.

NOCUM V. LUCIO TAN ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., Petitioners, vs. LUCIO TAN, Respondent.

1|Page
Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question
of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. Venue relates to trial and not jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal
actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
FACTS: •Lucio Tan filed a complaint for damages (moral and exemplary) for alleged malicious and defamatory imputations against him in 2 articles
of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Petitioners Inquirer and reporter Nocum , and ALPAP and Capt. Umali, in their respective joint answers alleged that
the complaint stated no cause of action. ALPAP and Capt. Umali also alleged that the venue was improperly laid. The complaint failed to state the
residence of complainant Lucio Tan at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and
first published. •RTC of Makati: Complaint was dismissed without prejudice on the ground of improper venue •Lucio Tan filed an omnibus motion
seeking reconsideration and admission of the amended complaint now alleging that "This article was printed and first published in the City of
Makati" and that “This caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati." •RTC then set aside the previous order of dismissal stating
that the defect in the original complaint has already been cured in the Amended complaint which can still be properly admitted pursuant to Rule 10
of the 1997 Rules of CivPro since the Order of Dismissal was not yet final. Also, the amendment was merely formal. •2 petitions for certiorari were
then filed (one by Nocum and PDI, one by ALPAP and Umali) but CA dismissed the petition. The motions for reconsideration were likewise denied.
Thus, the appeal at the SC. After the filing of comment by Tan and the reply filed by PDI and Nocum, SC resolved to give due course to the petition.
•Contention of PDI and Nocum: Art 360 of RPC vests jurisdiction over all civil and criminal complaints for libel on the RTC of the place (1) where the
libelous article was printed and first published; or (2) where the complainant, if pirivate person, resides; or (3) where the complaint, if a public
official, holds office. Thus, since the original lcomplaint stated only the business adress of Lucio Tan and not his actual residence or the place of
printing and first publication, the original complaint failed to confer jurisdiction on the RTC.

iSSUE:/ HELD: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case on the basis of the original complaint? YES. RATIO: Jurisdiction is conferred by law
based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of
action. Here. RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. Tan's cause of action is for damages arising from libel,
jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Art. 360 of RPC provides that is the CFI that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Jurisdiction is
different from venue. (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case while venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried;
(b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue is a matter of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the
subject matter, venue establishes a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, or the petitioner and the respondent; and (d) Jurisdiction is
fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties while venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties. In this case, the
additional allegations in the Amended Complainant as to place of printing and first publication referred only to the question of venue and not
jurisdiction. They would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would failure to include them divest RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. Tan's
failure to allege these allegations gave the court, the power upon motion by a party, to dismiss on the ground that the venue was not properly laid.
The amendment was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court,where originally it had none. The amendment was merely to establish the
proper venue for the action. Venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction except in criminal actions. Assuming that the venue was improperly laid, the
issue would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In civil cases, venue may be waived. By dismissing the case on the ground of improper
venue, RTC had jurisdiction over the case. PDI and Nocum recognized RTC's jurisdiction by filing their answers to the complaint by questioning the
propriety of venue instead of a motion to dismiss. Objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a
question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. Venue relates to trial and not jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal
actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.

Heirs of Pedro Lopez et. al. v Honesto C. de Castro, et. al. GR No. 112905, February 3, 2000
“two applications of a parcel of land”

Facts:
The petitioners filed an application for registration of parcel of land located in Tagaytay City with the CFI in Cavite.
The Municipality of Silang, Cavite files an opposition alleging that the land is its patrimonial property. The petitioners claim that the land is a part of
the whole tract of land as their inheritance sought to be registered in Cavite but was excluded from their application upon recommendation of the
chief surveyor of the Land Reg. Office because the land is located in the Province of Laguna. The motion to dismiss by the Municipality of Silang was
denied by the court due to lack of merit on ground that the municipality has no personality to intervene because the lot was outside its territorial
limits. And even if it is a communal property of both municipalities, the incorporation of Cavite to the city of Tagaytay makes it a property of the
latter. Thus the right to action accrues to the municipality of Tagaytay. Upon deliberation, the Clerk of Court recommended to grant the application
with its report disclosing that since time immemorial, the De Los Reyes family owned and possessed the land and sold it to the father of the
applicant, Pedro Lopez who later took over the ownership and possession of the land. Upon his death, his heirs succeeded over the property and
subsequently partitioned it. The court thus approved the application and ordered the registration of the land in favor of the petitioner. While
examining the records in the course of granting the registration to the petitioners, it was found out that the land was already registered in favor of
the respondents Honesto de Castro. Apparently, de Castro filed the registration of land in the CFI of Cavite in its Branch IV in Tagaytay City and a
decision was promulgated to issue the decree of registration in his favor. The said land was allegedly owned by Hermogenes Orte who sold it to the
father of the respondent by virtue of a deed of sale that was destroyed during Japanese occupation. His father continued possession and
occupation of the land until his death and his wife and children continued the possession thereof and finally registered it in their name. 7 years
later, the petitioner files a complaint for the execution of the judgment rendered in their favor by the court and cancellation of title of the
respondents and order the respondents to vacate the property. In their counterclaim, the respondents interpose the defense of latches,
prescription and estoppel against the petitioners and asserting the indefeasibility of their title under the Torrens System.

2|Page
Lower court: held that it could not enforce the judgment against the respondents considering they were not made parties to the case. Nor can it
order the register of deeds of Tagaytay City to cancel the title of respondents since it was not also made a party to the case thus the court does not
acquire jurisdiction over it. Further, the court held that the action brought by the petitioners would be tantamount to the nature of collaterally
attacking the validity of the title of the respondents.

Court of appeals: Upon appeal to the CA, it re-affirms the lower court’s decision with emphasis on the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title while
citing the Civil Code provisions on Article 1544 on sale of property to different vendees where in case the land has been registered in the name of
two different persons, the earlier in date of registration shall prevail.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners can question the validity of the title of the respondents over the property in dispute?

Ruling:

The court held that a land registration is an in rem proceeding which involves a constructive notice against all persons including the state which is
effective through the publication of the application for land registration. The court held that when more than one certificate of title is issued over
the land, the person holding the prior certificate of title is entitled to a better right against the person who relies on the subsequent certificate. This
rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not on the date of filing the application for registration of title. In land registration proceedings,
all interested parties are obliged to take care of their interests and to zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule that
whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. The publication made with respect to the application of the respondents served as a
constructive notice against the whole world thus the court upheld the validity of their title and its indefeasibility against collateral attack from the
petitioners.

Granting that the petitioners did not have actual knowledge about the respondent’s application to the land, they waited for 7 more years after
knowing that the property was already registered in the name of the respondents to demand for the execution of judgment and cancellation of the
respondent’s title. Therefore the SC finds them guilty of latches. Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Note:

Jurisdiction issue:

The governing law when the respondent sought registration of their land was the Judiciary Act of 1948 providing permanent station of 2 district
judges in Cavite, thus the application was filed before the court in Cavite. This was later amended providing for the 4 judges to preside in
the Province of Cavite, the cities of Cavite and Tagaytay. Following the rule on jurisdiction, the court of the place where the property is located
should take cognizance over the registration of property therefore upon the creation of Tagaytay City branch of court, the application should have
been transferred from Cavite to Tagaytay branch. Retaining the venue of the application in Cavite however is in order since venue is merely
procedural not jurisdictional and may be waived in lieu of convenience to the parties. The petitioner’s assailing the jurisdiction of the Cavite branch
rendering decision in favor of the respondent’s title over the property located in Tagaytay cannot be sustained by the court.

GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE,

Petitioner,
- versus -
LUIS ESTEBAN LATORRE,
Respondent.

The facts of the case are as follows:

In October 2000, petitioner filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a Complaint [3] for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute
Sale with application for Injunction against her own son, herein respondent.

Petitioner averred that, on September 28, 1999, respondent and Ifzal entered into a Contract of Lease[4] over a 1,244-square meter real property,
situated at No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmarias Village, Makati City (subject property). Under the said contract, respondent, as lessor, declared that
he was the absolute and registered owner of the subject property. Petitioner alleged that respondent's declaration therein was erroneous because
she and respondent were co-owners of the subject property in equal shares.

Petitioner narrated that, on March 14, 1989, she and respondent executed their respective Deeds of Donation, conveying the subject property in
favor of The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc. (the Foundation). Thus, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
161963[5] was issued in the name of the Foundation. Subsequently, on September 2, 1994, petitioner and respondent executed separate Deeds of
Revocation of Donation and Reconveyance of the subject property, consented to by the Foundation, through the issuance of appropriate
corporate resolutions. However, the Deeds of Revocation were not registered; hence, the subject property remained in the name of the
Foundation. Petitioner insisted, however, that respondent was fully aware that the subject property was owned in common by both of them. To
protect her rights as co-owner, petitioner formally demanded from Ifzal the payment of her share of the rentals, which the latter, however, refused
to heed.

3|Page
Moreover, petitioner averred that, on or about August 16, 2000, she discovered that respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim on
the TCT of the subject property, claiming full ownership over the same by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale [6] dated March 21, 2000, allegedly
executed by petitioner in favor of respondent. Petitioner claimed that the deed was a falsified document; that her signature thereon was forged
by respondent.

Respondent immediately filed a Motion to Dismiss[7] on the sole ground that the venue of the case was improperly laid. He stressed that while
the complaint was denominated as one for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction, in truth
the case was a real action affecting title to and interest over the subject property. Respondent insisted that all of petitioner's claims were anchored
on her claim of ownership over one-half () portion of the subject property. Since the subject property is located in Makati City, respondent argued
that petitioner should have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City.

Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of want of jurisdiction, asserting that he was immune from suit because he was an officer of
the Asian Development Bank, an international organization.

The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order dated November 6, 2000, restraining Ifzal from paying his rentals to respondent and enjoining the
latter from receiving from the former the aforesaid rentals. The RTC also directed both Ifzal and respondent to pay petitioner her share of the
rentals, with the corresponding order against respondent not to commit any act in derogation of petitioner's interest over the subject property.

In its Order dated January 2, 2001, the RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss. The RTC ruled that the nature of an action whether real or
personal was determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the claims
asserted - a matter resolved only after, and as a result of, a trial. Thus, trial on the merits ensued.

On April 29, 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent, disposing of the case in this wise:

While the case herein filed by the plaintiff involves recovery of possession of a real property situated at 1366 Caballero St., Dasmarias Village,
Makati City, the same should have been filed and tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who, undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to hear the
matter as aforementioned the same being clearly a real action.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which the RTC denied in its Order[14] dated July 24, 2008 for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition, claiming that the RTC erred in treating the venue as jurisdiction and in treating petitioner's complaint as a real action.

While the instant case was pending resolution before this Court, petitioner passed away on November 14, 2009. Thus, petitioner's counsel prayed
that, pending the appointment of a representative of petitioner's estate, notices of the proceedings herein be sent to petitioners other son, Father
Roberto A. Latorre.[15]

As early as the filing of the complaint, this case had been marred by numerous procedural infractions committed by petitioner, by respondent,
and even by the RTC, all of which cannot be disregarded by this Court.

First. Petitioner filed her complaint with the RTC of Muntinlupa City instead of the RTC of Makati City, the latter being the proper venue in this
case.

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue of venue. [16] Actions affecting title to or possession of
real property or an interest therein (real actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area
where the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper courts
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.[17] The action in the
RTC, other than for Collection, was for the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale involving the subject property, which is located at No.
1366 Caballero St., Dasmarias Village, Makati City. The venue for such action is unquestionably the proper court of Makati City, where the real
property or part thereof lies, not the RTC of Muntinlupa City.[18]

In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its
title or heading.[19] It is also a settled rule that what determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case.[20] In her
Complaint, petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the strength of two basic claims that (1) she did not execute the deed
in favor of respondent; and (2) thus, she still owned one half () of the subject property. Indubitably, petitioner's complaint is a real action involving
the recovery of the subject property on the basis of her co-ownership thereof.
Second. The RTC also committed a procedural blunder when it denied respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.

The RTC insisted that trial on the merits be conducted even when it was awfully glaring that the venue was improperly laid, as pointed out by
respondent in his motion to dismiss. After trial, the RTC eventually dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even as it invoked, as
justification, the rules and jurisprudence on venue. Despite the conduct of trial, the RTC failed to adjudicate this case on the merits.

Third. Respondent also did not do very well, procedurally. When the RTC denied his Motion to Dismiss, respondent could have filed a petition
for certiorari and/or prohibition inasmuch as the denial of the motion was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse

4|Page
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. [21] However, despite this lapse, it is clear that respondent did not waive his objections to the fact of
improper venue, contrary to petitioner's assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss was denied, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
to contest such denial. Even in his Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his ground that the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of improper
venue.

Finally, petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil
Procedure on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v. Consul,[22] we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary
appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2)
petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the
Supreme Court.

The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of
appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[23] Our ruling in Velayo-Fong v. Velayo[24] is instructive:

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether
a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question
of fact.[25]

Accordingly, we find no merit in the instant petition. Neither do we find any reversible error in the trial courts dismissal of the case ostensibly for
want of jurisdiction, although the trial court obviously meant to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.

G.R. No. L-27033 October 31, 1969

POLYTRADE CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICTORIANO BLANCO, defendant-appellant.

Plaintiff corporation has its principal office and place of business in Makati, Rizal. Defendant is a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Defendant
moved to dismiss upon the ground of improper venue. He claims that by contract suit may only be lodged in the courts of Manila. The Bulacan
court overruled him. He did not answer the complaint. In consequence, a default judgment was rendered against him on September 21, 1966, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the following amounts:
First Cause of Action P60,845.67, with interest thereon at 1% a month from May 9, 1965 until the full amount is paid.
Second Cause of Action P51,952.55, with interest thereon at 1% a month from March 30, 1965 until the full amount is paid.
Third Cause of Action P53,973.07, with interest thereon at 1% a month from July 3, 1965 until the full amount is paid.

1. The forefront question is whether or not venue was properly laid in the province of Bulacan where defendant is a resident.
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions triable by courts of first instance — and this is one — provides that such
“actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.” Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of the same Rule which states that venue may be stipulated
by written agreement — “By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to
another.”
Defendant places his case upon Section 3 of Rule 4 just quoted. According to defendant, plaintiff and defendant, by written contracts covering the
four causes of action, stipulated that: “The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila.” This agreement is valid.3 Defendant says that
because of such covenant he can only be sued in the courts of Manila. We are thus called upon to shake meaning from the terms of the agreement
just quoted.
But first to the facts. No such stipulation appears in the contracts covering the first two causes of action. The general rule set forth in Section 2 (b),
Rule 4, governs, and as to said two causes of action, venue was properly laid in Bulacan, the province of defendant’s residence.
The stipulation adverted to is only found in the agreements covering the third and fourth causes of action. An accurate reading, however, of the
stipulation, “The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila,” does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate
that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound
themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or

5|Page
transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. They did not
waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
Illuminating on this point is Engel vs. Shubert Theatrical Co., 151 N.Y.S. 593, 594. And this, became there the stipulation as to venue is along lines
similar to the present. Said stipulation reads: “In case of dispute, both contracting parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the Vienna courts.”
And the ruling is: “By the clause in question the parties do not agree to submit their disputes to the jurisdiction of the Viennese court, and to those
courts only. There is nothing exclusive in the language used. They do agree to submit to the Viennese jurisdiction, but they say not a word in
restriction of the jurisdiction of courts elsewhere; and whatever may be said on the subject of the legality of contracts to submit controversies to
courts of certain jurisdictions exclusively, it is entirely plain that such agreements should be strictly construed, and should not be extended by
implication.”
Venue here was properly laid.

UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION, INC. vs.COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. entered into a Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services of
the former's products in Samar and Leyte Provinces.
The Agreement contained a stipulation that “All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with the proper Court of Quezon City.”
Five years later, Unimasters filed an action in the RTC of Tacloban against Kubota, Reynaldo Go and Metrobank for damages and breach of
contracts, and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order. Kubota filed two motions, one for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
improper venue, the other prayed for the transfer of the injunction hearing because its counsel is unavailable on the given date. The court issued
an order allowing the issuance of preliminary injunction. Also, said court denied the
motion to dismiss on the reason that Unimasters’ place of business is in Tacloban City while Kubota’s principal place of business is in Quezon City.
In accordance with the Rules of Court, the proper venue would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City at the election of the plaintiff. Hence, the
filing in the RTC of Tacloban is proper. Kubota appealed to both orders on the grounds they were issued with grave abuse of discretion in a special
action for certiorari and prohibition filed with the CA. Kubota asserted that RTC of Tacloban had no jurisdiction was improperly laid.
The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Kubota and it held that: “the stipulation respecting venue in
its Dealership Agreement with Unimasters did in truth limit the venue of all suits arising thereunder only and exclusively to the proper courts of
Quezon City.
Subsequently, Unimasters filed a motion for reconsideration, but was turned down by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether the venue stipulated in the contract has the effect of limiting the venue to a specified place.

HELD: NO. The Polytrade doctrine was applied in the case at bar. This doctrine enunciated that as long as the stipulation does not set forth
qualifying or restrictive words to indicate that the agreed place alone and none other is the venue of the action, the parties do not lose the option
of choosing the venue. According to the court, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, venue stipulations in a contract should be
considered merely as agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. Unless the parties make it clear, by employing
categorical and suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions between them be laid only and exclusively at a definite place, and to
disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or
complementary of said rule. In light of all the cases surveyed, and the general postulates distilled therefrom, the question should receive a negative
answer. Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and intention that actions between them
should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City -- or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and
intention -- the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits
either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff. Kubota's theory that the RTC had no jurisdiction considering that the venue
was improperly laid is not an accurate statement of legal principle. It equates venue with jurisdiction; but venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction,
except in criminal actions. This is fundamental. The action at bar, for the recovery of damages in an amount considerably in excess of P20,000.00, is
assuredly within the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court. Assuming that venue was improperly laid in the Court where the action was instituted,
the Tacloban City RTC, that would be a procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment -- precluding ventilation of the case before that Court of wrong
venue notwithstanding that the subject matter is within its jurisdiction. However, if the objection to venue is waived by the failure to set it up in a
motion to dismiss, the RTC would proceed in perfectly regular fashion if it then tried and decided the action

GOCHAN VS. GOCHAN

FACTS:

• Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and the Mactan Realty Development Corporation.
Respondents offered to sell their shares in the two corporations to the individual petitioners in consideration of the sum of P200,000,000:00.
Petitioners accepted and paid the said amount to respondents.
• Respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr., required individual petitioners to execute a "promissory note. The former drafted the promissory
note in his own handwriting and had the same signed by the petitioners. Unbeknown to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the
"promissory note" a phrase that says, "Said amount is in partial consideration of the sale."6
• Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance and damages alleging that the petitioners that offered to buy their
shares of stock,in consideration of P200M and multiple properties. Accordingly, respondents claimed that they are entitled to
the conveyance of the properties, in addition to the amount of P200,000,000.00, which they acknowledge to have received from petitioners
plus damages.

6|Page
• Petitioners filed their answer, raising the following affirmative defences one of which is the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for non-
payment of the correct docket fees;
• Trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. It cited that respondents paid the necessary filing and docket fees of at least P165K.
• MR denied. Petition for certiorari with CA dismissed. MR denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
• Did the respondent filed and paid the necessary docket fees to warrant court’s jurisdiction?
• What is the real nature of the case?
• What should be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket fees?
RULING:
• NO
• Real action not specific performance
• Assessed value of the property, or the estimated value
The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,12 this Court held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
Petitioners, that the complaint is in the nature of a real action which affects title to real properties; hence, respondents should have alleged therein
the value of the real properties which shall be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket fees.
It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in order to resolve the issue of whether or not respondents paid the correct amount
of docket fees therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the body of the
pleading or complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. The caption of the complaint below was denominated as one for "specific
performance and damages." The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of
conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case
below was actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.
Real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4 (now Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure), a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for
specific performance. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated
value thereof as alleged by the claimant
We are not unmindful of our pronouncement in the case of Sun Insurance, to the effect that in case the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive period. However, the liberal interpretation of the rules relating to the payment of docket fees as applied in the case of Sun
Insurance cannot apply to the instant case as respondents have never demonstrated any willingness to abide by the rules and to pay the correct
docket fees. Instead, respondents have stubbornly insisted that the case they filed was one for specific performance and damages and that they
actually paid the correct docket fees therefor at the time of the filing of the complaint.

SPOUSES TEODORO AND ROSARIO SARAZA AND FERNANDO SARAZA VS. WILLIAM FRANCISCO

** Same; Same; Actions; Venue; Section 2 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that personal actions „may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendantor any of the principal defendants resides or in the case of a non-
residentdefendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Section2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for therespondentÊs action. It provides that personal actions „may be commencedand
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, orwhere the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in thecase of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the electionof the plaintiff.‰ Considering the respondentÊs statement in his complaintthat he
resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.

FACTS: A complaint filed by William Francisco (respondent) against Fernando Saraza (Fernando) and Spouses Teodoro and Rosario (Rosario) Saraza
(Spouses Saraza) (petitioners). The respondent alleged in his complaint that on September 1, 1999, he and Fernando executed an Agreement that
provided for the latter’s sale of his 100-square meter share in a lot situated in Bangkal, Makati City,, for a total consideration of ₱3,200,000.00.
The amount of ₱1,200,000.00 was paid upon the Agreement’s execution, while the balance of ₱2,000,000.00 was to be paid on installments to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), to cover a loan of Spouses Saraza, Fernando’s parents, with the bank. A final deed of sale conveying the property
was to be executed by Fernando upon full payment of the PNB loan.
It was also agreed upon that should Spouses Teodoro and Rosario (Rosario) Saraza (Spouses Saraza) (petitioners). fail for any reason to transfer the
subject property to the respondent’s name, Rosario and Fernando’s property covered by encumbered to PNB to secure the loan that was to be
paid by the respondent shall be considered a collateral in favor of the respondent. Spouses Saraza signified their conformity to the Agreement.

7|Page
When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached ₱226,582.13, the respondent asked for the petitioners’ issuance of a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) that would authorize him to receive from PNB the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT upon full payment of the loan. The petitioners
denied the request.
Upon inquiry from PNB, the respondent found out that the petitioners had instead executed an Amended Authority, which provided that the
owner’s copy of TCT should be returned to the mortgagors upon full payment of the loan. Spouses Saraza also caused the eviction of the
respondent from the property covered by TCT.
These prompted the respondent to institute the civil case for specific performance, sum of money and damages with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
The Ruling of the RTC
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. The RTC considered the contents of the Agreement executed by the parties, taking into
account that it was a notarized document.
ordering [petitioner] Fernando M. Saraza as follows, viz:
1. to EXECUTE a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the 100-square meter parcel of land located in Barangay Bangkal, City of Makati and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 220530 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati in favor of [respondent] William Francisco pursuant to their Agreement
dated 01 September 1999;
2. to DELIVER to [respondent] William Francisco the Owner’s Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 220530 covering the 100-square meter parcel
of land located in Barangay Bangkal, City of Makati which is subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale; and
3. to PAY all taxes imposable by law for the transfer of the title in the name of [respondent], pursuant to the parties’ AGREEMENT dated 1
September 1999;
4. to PAY [respondent] William Francisco the following:
4.1 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 100,000.00) as and by way of damages;
4.2 One Hundred Seventy-Seven Thousand Pesos (Php 177,000.00) as and by way of attorney’s fees; and
4.3 the costs of suit.
Dissatisfied, Fernando questioned the RTC Decision before the CA.
In addition to the defenses which he raised during the proceedings before the RTC, he argued that the RTC of Imus lacked jurisdiction over the case
as it involved an adjudication of ownership of a property situated in Makati City.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the RTC rulings..
On the issue of jurisdiction, the CA cited Fernando’s failure to seasonably file before the lower court a motion to dismiss stating that the action
should have been filed in Makati City. More importantly, the Court explained that the case was a personal action since it did not involve a claim of
ownership of the subject property, but only sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of sale in the respondent’s favor. Thus, the venue for the action
was the residence of the plaintiff or the defendant, at the plaintiff’s option.
Petitioner Fernando’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON THE VENUE OF THE ACTION IS RTC MAKATI OR RTC IMUS, CAVITE?
RULING: Venue of an Action for Specific Performance
As to the issue of venue, the petitioners’ argument that the action should have been instituted with the RTC of Makati City, and not the RTC of Imus,
Cavite, is misplaced.
The suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of absolute sale based on
a contract which he had previously made.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondent’s action. It provides that personal actions "may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of
a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff."
Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.

Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals,

Civil Procedure ; Actions ; Venue ;
An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, shall be commenced and tried in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies.
The motion of respondent TRB was well founded because venue was clearly improperly laid. The action in the Regional Trial Court was for
annulment of sale involving a parcel of land located at Km. 3 Asin Road, Baguio City. The venue of such action is unquestionably within the territorial
jurisdiction of the proper court where the real property or part thereof lies. An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on real property, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area where the real
property or any part thereof lies.

On January 18, 1996, Traders Royal Bank (TRB for brevity) sold in favor of petitioner Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated (ELPI for brevity) a
parcel of land located at Km. 3 Asin, Baguio City for Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

At the time of the sale, TRB misrepresented to ELPI that the subject property was a vacant residential lot without any illegal occupants or squatters,
when it truth the subject property was dominantly a public road with only 140 square meters usable area.

ELPI, after having spent to fully ascertain the actual condition of the property, demanded from TRB the rescission and cancellation of the sale of the
property.

TRB refused, hence, on April 16, 1996, ELPI filed with the Regional Trial Court, Davao, for annulment of sale and damages against TRB.
8|Page
TRB filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

TRB filed a motion for reconsideration, the trial court denied the motion.7

TRB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
contending that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper
venue.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE RTC on ground of improper venue.”9

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON DISMISSAL WAS VALID ON THE GROUND OF IMPROPER VENUE?

In the case at bar, the trial court erred grievously amounting to ousting itself of jurisdiction. The motion of respondent TRB was well founded
because venue was clearly improperly laid. The action in the Regional Trial Court was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of land located at Km.
3 Asin Road, Baguio City.

The venue of such action is unquestionably within the territorial jurisdiction of the proper court where the real property or part thereof lies.

IN THE CASE AT BAR THE PROPERTY WAS LOCATED IN BAGUIO BUT THE COM[PLAINT WAS FILED IN RTC DAVA0

The Regional Trial Court has committed a palpable and grievous error amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of improper venue.

An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, shall be commenced and tried in the proper
court having jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies (BAGUIO CITY)

Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. and Jens Peter Henrichsen v. Klaus Schonfeld G.R. 166920

FACTS:

Respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a resident of New Westminster, British Columbia, Canada. He had been a consultant in the field of
environmental engineering and water supply and sanitation.

Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is a corporation duly established and incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The primary
purpose of PPI was to engage in the business of providing specialty and technical services both in and out of the Philippines.

It is a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan (PCIJ). The president of PPI, Jens Peter Henrichsen, who was also the director of PCIJ,
was based in Tokyo, Japan.

In 1997, PCIJ decided to engage in consultancy services for water and sanitation in the Philippines. In October 1997, respondent was employed by
PCIJ, as Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation Department. However, PCIJ assigned him as PPI sector manager in the Philippines. His
salary was to be paid partly by PPI and PCIJ.

Under the employment contract reads

Section 21 of the General Conditions of Employment appended to the letter of employment reads:

21 Arbitration

Any question of interpretation, understanding or fulfillment of the conditions of employment, as well as any question arising between the Employee
and the Company which is in consequence of or connected with his employment with the Company and which can not be settled amicably, is to be
finally settled, binding to both parties through written submissions, by the Court of Arbitration in London.5

Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed his position as PPI Sector Manager. He was accorded the status of a resident alien.

PPI applied for an Alien Employment Permit (Permit) for respondent before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The DOLE granted
the application and issued the Permit to respondent.

On May 5, 1999, respondent received a letter from Henrichsen informing him that his employment had been terminated effective August 4, 1999
for the reason that PCIJ and PPI had not been successful in the water and sanitation sector in the Philippines.

9|Page
Respondent filed with PPI several money claims, including unpaid salary, leave pay, air fare from Manila to Canada, and cost of shipment of goods
to Canada. PPI partially settled some of his claims (US$5,635.99), but refused to pay the rest.

Respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against petitioners PPI and Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter. (NLRC)

In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he was illegally dismissed; PPI had not notified the DOLE of its decision to close one of its departments,
which resulted in his dismissal; Respondent also claimed for separation pay and other unpaid benefits. He alleged that the company acted in bad
faith and disregarded his rights. He prayed for the following reliefs:

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the subject matter; and
(2) venue was improperly laid. It averred that respondent was a Canadian citizen, a transient expatriate who had left the Philippines. He was
employed and dismissed by PCIJ, a foreign corporation with principal office in Tokyo, Japan.

Since respondent’s cause of action was based on his letter of employment executed in Tokyo, Japan dated January 7, 1998, under the principle of lex
loci contractus, the complaint should have been filed in Tokyo, Japan.

Moreover, under Section 12 of the General Conditions of Employment appended to the letter of employment dated January 7, 1998, complainant
and PCIJ had agreed that any employment-related dispute should be brought before the London Court of Arbitration. hENCE, pHILIPPINE COURT HAS
NO JURISDICTION

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint.

The Labor Arbiter found, that the contract of employment between respondent and PCIJ was controlling; the Philippines was only the "duty
station" where Schonfeld was required to work under the General Conditions of Employment.

PCIJ remained respondent’s employer despite his having been sent to the Philippines. Since the parties had agreed that any differences regarding
employer-employee relationship should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of arbitration in London, this agreement is controlling.

On appeal, the NLRC agreed with the disquisitions of the Labor Arbiter

Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA

The CA reversed the decision of LA NLRC. Applying the four-fold test21 of determining an employer-employee relationship, the CA declared that
respondent was an employee of PPI.

On the issue of venue, the appellate court declared that, even under the January 7, 1998 contract of employment, the parties were not precluded
from bringing a case related thereto in other venues.

While there was, indeed, an agreement that issues between the parties were to be resolved in the London Court of Arbitration, the venue is not
exclusive, since there is no stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in any other forum other than in the Philippines.

A motion for the reconsideration of the above decision was filed by PPI and Henrichsen, which the appellate court denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON LABOR ARBITER HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPONDENT

RULING: YES PHILIPPINE COURTS (LA-NLRC) HAS JURISDICTION

The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while
they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words.

They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly
and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them.

In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court save —," "particularly," "nowhere else
but/except —," or words of equal import were stated in the contract. It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue
to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment contract.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76563 is AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the
Labor Arbiter for disposition of the case on the merits. Cost against petitioners

10 | P a g e
G.R. No. 132753. February 15, 1999
SIASOCO, ET. AL., vs. CA, ET. AL.,

FACTS: Petitioners were the registered owners of nine parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. In December 1994, they began to offer the
subject properties for sale. Petitioners made a final offer to the INC. The latter’s counsel sent a reply received by Petitioner Mario Siasoco on
December 24, 1996, stating that the offer was accepted, but that the INC was “not amenable to your proposal to an undervaluation of the total
consideration.” In their letter dated January 8, 1997, petitioners claimed that the INC had not really accepted the offer; adding that, prior to their
receipt of the aforementioned reply on December 24, 1996, they had already “contracted” with Carissa Homes for the sale of the said properties
“due to the absence of any response to their offer from INC.”
Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC demanded that the corresponding deed be executed in its favor. Petitioners refused.

Private respondent (INC) filed a civil suit for specific performance and damages against petitioners and Carissa Homes and Development &
Properties. Pending resolution of petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, private respondent negotiated with Carissa Homes which culminated in the
purchase of the subject properties of Carissa Homes by private respondent. Private respondent filed an Amended Complaint, dropping Carissa
Homes as one of the defendants and changing the nature of the case to a mere case for damages.

CA ruled that although private respondent could no longer amend its original Complaint as a matter of right, it was not precluded from doing so
with leave of court. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC had not acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting private respondent’s Amended
Complaint.

Petitioners argued that the trial court where the original Complaint for specific performance had been filed was not the proper venue. Debunking
petitioners' argument, the CA explained that the RTC nevertheless had jurisdiction over the said Complaint. The CA also held that the amended
Complaint did not substantially alter private respondent's cause of action, since petitioners were not being asked to legal obligation different from
that stated in the original Complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not action for specific performance with damages is a personal action and may be filed in the proper court where any of the
parties reside

HELD: Yes. Petitioners also insist that the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the original Complaint; hence, it did not have any
authority to allow the amendment. They maintain that the original action for specific performance involving parcels of land in Montalban, Rizal
should have been filed in the RTC of that area. Thus, they chide the CA for allegedly misunderstanding the distinction between territorial
jurisdiction and venue, thereby erroneously holding that the RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint, although the venue was improperly
laid.

We disagree. True, an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original Complaint and the purpose of the
amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court. In the present case, however, the RTC had jurisdiction because the original Complaint involved
specific performance with damages. In La Tondeña Distillers v. Ponferrada, this Court ruled that a complaint for “specific performance with
damages” is a personal action and may be filed in the proper court where any of the parties reside, viz.:

“Finally, [w]e are not also persuaded by petitioner’s argument that venue should be lodged in Bago City where the lot is situated. The
complaint is one for “specific performance with damages.” Private respondents do not claim ownership of the lot but in fact [recognize the]
title of defendants by annotating a notice of lis pendens. In one case, a similar complaint for “specific performance with damages” involving
real property, was held to be a personal action, which may be filed in the proper court where the party resides. Not being an action involving
title to or ownership of real property, venue, in this case, was not improperly laid before the RTC of Bacolod City.”

G.R. No. 198680. July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE

FACTS: On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with
Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso, In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno died intestate and childless on June 28,
1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A. Claiming
to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned
certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, to the prejudice of petitioners who are
Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from
Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no
cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as
there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.

The RTC Ruling: On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action
against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding

11 | P a g e
for the issuance of letters of administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the
contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary
evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c)
a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

HELD: Yes. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a
cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if,
admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by
the defendants.

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and
based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates
of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs
sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of
Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made
in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court,
and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding
the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special
proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard
decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of
heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether
proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out
and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA vs. MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA

FACTS: From the records, it appears that on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R.
Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et
al. "to cease and desist from framing up Petitioner for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner in
relation to the alleged ambush incident."

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the
case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During
that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.

Judge Pampilo insisted that "since no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading but answer". The judge noted that the Rules of Court
apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer.

12 | P a g e
Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to
file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing. Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the
judge also decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer.

On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.

In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.

Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
(With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45.

ISSUE: whether or not rules on summary procedure are applicable in petitions for the issuance of writs of amparo

HELD: The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and
security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among others,
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC.

First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of
Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to
life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted
on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.

Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure shall apply.

The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court has devised for the following circumstances:

SECTION 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed x x x.
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six
months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x.

It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly
apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ
of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal
action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return,
the issues could not have been properly joined.

Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.

The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not
after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is
submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.

More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself.

13 | P a g e
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of
the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the
Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate,
if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant
judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances.
Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo."

G.R. No. 198718. November 27, 2013

SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSARIO SARAZA and FERNANDO SARAZA, vs. WILLIAM FRANCISCO

FACTS: The case stems from an amended complaint filed by William Francisco against Fernando and Spouses Teodoro and Rosario (Rosario) Saraza
(Spouses Saraza). The respondent alleged in his complaint that on September 1, 1999, he and Fernando executed an Agreement that provided for
the latter’s sale of his 100-square meter share in a lot situated in Bangkal, Makati City, which at that time was still registered in the name of one
Emilia Serafico and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 40376 (later covered by TCT No. 220530), for a total consideration of
₱3,200,000.00. The amount of ₱1,200,000.00 was paid upon the Agreement’s execution, while the balance of ₱2,000,000.00 was to be paid on
installments to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), to cover a loan of Spouses Saraza, Fernando’s parents, with the bank. A final deed of sale
conveying the property was to be executed by Fernando upon full payment of the PNB loan.

It was also agreed upon that should the parties fail for any reason to transfer the subject property to the respondent’s name, Rosario and
Fernando’s 136-sq m property covered by TCT No. 156126 and encumbered to PNB to secure the loan that was to be paid by the respondent shall
be considered a collateral in favor of the respondent. Spouses Saraza signified their conformity to the Agreement. The respondent was also allowed
to take immediate possession of the property covered by TCT No. 156126 through a contract of lease. The petitioners likewise furnished PNB with
an Authority, allowing the respondent to pay their obligations to the PNB, to negotiate for a loan restructuring, to receive the owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan secured by its mortgage, and to perform such other acts as may be necessary in connection
with the settlement of the loan.

When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached ₱226,582.13, the respondent asked for the petitioners’ issuance of a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) that would authorize him to receive from PNB the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan. The
petitioners denied the request. Upon inquiry from PNB, the respondent found out that the petitioners had instead executed an Amended
Authority, which provided that the owner’s copy of TCT No. 156126 should be returned to the mortgagors upon full payment of the loan. Spouses
Saraza also caused the eviction of the respondent from the property covered by TCT No. 156126. These prompted the respondent to institute the
civil case for specific performance, sum of money and damages with the RTC of Imus, Cavite on December 7, 2004.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC of Imus lacked jurisdiction over the case as it involved an adjudication of ownership of a property situated in Makati
City.

HELD: As to the issue of venue, the petitioners’ argument that the action should have been instituted with the RTC of Makati City, and not the RTC
of Imus, Cavite, is misplaced. Although the end result of the respondent’s claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was
still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract
which he had previously made.

In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, private respondent filed a case for specific performance with damages before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that
after it accepted the offer of petitioners, they sold to a third person several parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. The Supreme Court
sustained the trial court’s order allowing an amendment of the original Complaint for specific performance with damages. Contrary to petitioners’
position that the RTC of Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the subject lots were located in Montalban, Rizal, the said RTC had
jurisdiction over the original Complaint. The Court reiterated the rule that a case for specific performance with damages is a personal action which
may be filed in a court where any of the parties reside.

Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondent’s action. It provides that personal actions "may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff." Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint
that he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.

14 | P a g e