Consti Digests
relevant constitutional provisions;
Laissez Faire vs. Welfare State
A welfare state is a concept of government where the state plays a key role in the
protection and promotion of the economic and social well-being of its citizens. It is
based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth,
and public responsibility for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal
provisions for a good life. The general term may cover a variety of forms of economic
and social organization.
"Laissez Faire" is French for "leave alone" which means that the government
leaves the people alone regarding all economic activities. It is the separation of
economy and state.
There are two ways that a government typically is tempted to interfere with the
economy. The first is through the initiation of force, and the second is through
socialized industries. Neither of these activities are aligned with the proper role of
government, and are both unacceptable.
"Laissez Faire Capitalism" is actually redundant, due to the nature of Capitalism.
Therefore, simply "Capitalism" is sufficient to get the point across although
historically it has been misrepresented as compatible with government economic
interference.
1. Magalona vs. Ermita
Facts: In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines
of the Philippines was enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This
law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend,
among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence
the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary
treaties – this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as
“archipelagic” waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts
(overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in
the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not
a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to
do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What
controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law
principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it.
Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular
lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical
miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic
zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image
below for comparison) If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which
States parties exercise treaty-based rights the Philippine Baselines. Anent their
particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of
Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it
as our “internal waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty
over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our
observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of
innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely
forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international
law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal,
as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under
the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own
maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the
main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do
that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the
provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of
the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
through effective occupation.
NOTES: Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime
zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise
sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have
the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by
Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
2. PVTA vs. CIR
Facts: This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the
increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.
In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime
services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with
CA No. 444.
Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this
petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental
functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.
PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising
governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth
Act No. 444.
Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
Ruling: YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of
the government has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the
welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent
and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time:
“The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government obsolete.”
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve
scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency.
As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading
ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the
distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth
in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because
petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor
controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is
the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-
Hour Labor Law persuasive.
A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders
clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial
burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not
have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be
surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed
be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection
based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent
Court must be sustained.
3. CIR vs. Campos Rueda
FACTS: In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an international
zone [foreign country] in North Africa). At the time of her death, she was a Spanish
citizen and was a resident of Tangier. She however left some personal properties
(shares of stocks and other intangibles) in the Philippines. The designated
administrator of her estate here is Antonio Campos Rueda.
In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for
deficiency tax amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda refused to pay the
assessed tax as he claimed that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes
pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code.
Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between Tangier and the
Philippines.
However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of the estate as it averred
that Tangier is not a “state” as contemplated by Section 22 of the Tax Code and that
the Philippines does not recognize Tangier as a foreign country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tangier is a state.
HELD: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country.
A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally
supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime
of law. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory,
politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over
the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence
(Collector vs De Lara) which provides that even a tiny principality, that of
Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under the
exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus, recognition is not
necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier provides such exemption to
personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor the
exemption as provided for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of reciprocity.
4. Bacani vs. Nacoco
Herein petitioners are stenographers in Branch VI of the CIF Manila.
In a pending civil case where the public respondents are involved, they requested
for the services of the stenographers and thereby paid them for the said transcript
at the rate of P1 per page, amounting to P714 in total.
However, upon inspecting the books of the corporation, the Auditor General
disallowed the payment of such fees and sought for the recovery of the amounts
paid. Consequently, the AG required the petitioners to reimburse the amounts
invoking that the National Coconut Corporation is a government entity within the
purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which states that:
“‘The Government of the Philippine Islands’ is a term which refers to the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in said
Islands, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or
municipal branches or other form of local government.”, hence, exempted from the
payment of the fees in question.
ISSUE: Whether the NCC is a government entity and is exempted from the
payments in question?
RULING: The Court held No. Discussing, there are two-fold functions of the
government namely: constituent and ministrant. The constituent function refers to
the bonds of society and are compulsory in nature, while ministrant is more on public
welfare like public works, education, charity, health and safety. From such, we may
infer that there are functions which our government is required to exercise to
promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by
it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely
the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people.
The NCC has that function because the corporation promotes certain aspects of the
economic life of the people. In short, NCC belongs to what we call the government-
owned and controlled corporation which is governed by Corporation Law.
Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the people’s welfare, however,
it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was
made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned.
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the
Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that
government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as
an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which
political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other
form of local government.
Therefore, NCC is not a government entity and is not exempted from the payment
of fees in question; petitioners are not subject to reimbursement.
5. GPI vs. Monte de Piedad
FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place.
The Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as received by the National Treasury
as relief of the victims of the earthquake. The government used the money as such
but $80,000 was left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank,
which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same amount.
In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the
$80,000 deposited from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this
order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the
Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement because the
Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various petitions of
the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a
recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and
their heirs. Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a
reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in respondent bank.
HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a
complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae. The government is the sole protector of the rights of the people thus,
it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which promote public interest.
The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro people. The
government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its
general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is
entrusted with it.
Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court
ordered that respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest in
gold or coin in Philippine peso.
6. Cabanas vs. Pilapil
FACTS: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that
his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is
still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother,
Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so
Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the
child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint
seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared
as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that
as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties
and intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the
terms of the insurance policy.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic
social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would
be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been
filed should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The uncle
here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate
relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care
towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in
consonance with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family
hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.
7. Lawyer’s League vs. Aquino
Facts: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the
New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
Issues: Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Discussions: In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show
that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favourable action.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the
people that made the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the
Supreme Court held its legitimacy.
Rulings: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of
action. The holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding
that they did not have a cause of action.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made
the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto
government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community
of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
8. Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of
Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the
case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that
the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all
judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct
Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the
Japanese occupation were no de facto government.
Issues:
1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the
Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and
Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General
MacArthur declaring that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending
before them, if the said judicial acts and proceedings were not invalidated
by MacArthur’s proclamation.
Discussions:
 Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a
de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese
occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the
military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. The doctrine
upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International
Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the
territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents
of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not
look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority
to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession,
during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such
government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are
derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the world,
and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine,
from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or
the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military
occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts
of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de
facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws
or make new ones.”
 General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his
proclamation October 23, 1944, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
 If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the
Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese
 military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-
called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts,
which had become re-established and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue
of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may
continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue
said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said
principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a
foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a
law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original
shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same
exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.”
Rulings:
1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The
governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de
facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the court of justice of those governments, which are not of
a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also
legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political
complexion, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of
the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur.
2. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer
not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative,
as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or
other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the
Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above
indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all
judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military
occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied
territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be
presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other
government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation
of said principles of international law.
3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration
is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes
place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of
justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to
administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely
prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the
Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not
usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered
by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation.
This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical
point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to
substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government,
legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice
such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which
compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as
military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted
in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be
unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially
provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient
character.
9. People vs. Perfecto (1922)
FACTS: This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the
records of testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies.
The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article
about it to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from
the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain
Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery." Consequently, the
Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an
information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and
again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
ISSUEs: Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with
the change from Spanish to American sovereignty.
HELD: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the
previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political"
being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the
inhabitants to the sovereign.
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the
Military Commander, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for
the punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in
force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things.
Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who
were the representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new
government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No
longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted
position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article is
contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and
system of government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United
States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.
"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes
contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover
the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place
in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in
monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent
and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect
and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and
jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect
and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place
around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the
people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous
remarks."
DECISION: To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the
opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and
the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio.
10. Macariola vs. Asuncion (1982)
FACTS: A decision in a civil case was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion of
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Leyte for lack of an appeal from the parties
involved. Among the parties thereto was herein petitioner Macariola. Subsequently,
respondent and his spouse conveyed their shares and interests in one of the
properties mentioned in the project partition in said case which respondent
previously handled. Petitioner alleges that respondent judge violated Article 14 of
the Code of Commerce prohibiting the members of the Judiciary who are in active
service to engage in commerce or have any direct administrative or financial
intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts or
provinces in which they discharge their duties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has legal and binding
effect thus holding respondent liable for a violation thereof.
HELD: NO. Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and,
therefore, cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the CFI of Leyte, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Although incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial
laws of the Philippines, said provision partakes of the nature of a political law as it
regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and
employees, like justices and judges.
The Supreme Court stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States (US) and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article
14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because
there is a change of sovereignty. The political laws of the former sovereign, whether
compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly re-enacted by the affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It
is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the
aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from
Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply
to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals.
11. Laurel vs. Misa
FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation,
theaccusedadhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that
hecannot be tried fortreason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended
at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty
over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced
already by the Republic.
HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and
permanentallegiance tohis government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was
made; hence, it ispresumed that thePhilippine government still had the power.
Moreover, sovereignty cannot besuspended; it is eithersubsisting or eliminated and
replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather,it was theexercise of
sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspendedallegiance. Regarding
thechange of government, there is no such change since the sovereign – the
Filipinopeople – is still thesame. What happened was a mere change of name of
government, fromCommonwealth to theRepublic of the Philippines.DISSENT:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of
thePhilippineswere suspended. Thus, treason under the Revised Penal Code
cannot be punishablewhere the lawsof the land are momentarily halted. Regarding
the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasn’t sovereign at the time
of the Commonwealth since it was underthe United States. Hence, the acts of
treason done cannot carry over to the new Republicwhere thePhilippines is now
indeed sovereign.
12. Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff
FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were
assigned at designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese
forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains
and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio
relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by
the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt.
Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the
offense was committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.
HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since
members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act,
Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of
an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held
petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating
officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.
In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed.
Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED.
13. Bayan vs. Zamora
FACTS: The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty
on August 30, 1951, To further strengthen their defense and security relationship.
Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their
territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty
of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things,
the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a
series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13,
1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively
signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through
respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the
Senate of the Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President
and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners – as legislators, non-governmental
organizations, citizens and taxpayers – assail the constitutionality of the VFA and
impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose
if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so
that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in
by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
ISSUES AND RULING:
1. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?
NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit
challenging the Constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid,
but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. Petitioners have failed to show that they are in any danger of direct
injury as a result of the VFA.
As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's suit refers to a case where
the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must
specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has
merely a general interest common to all members of the public. Clearly, inasmuch
as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence
of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally
expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of
the VFA.
Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the
requisite locus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury
to their person or to the institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases.
The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution
from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the
present action.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional
significance of the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier
and takes cognizance of the petitions.
2. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of
the Constitution?
Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the
presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.
The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on
treaties or international agreements.
Section 21, Article VII reads: “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.”
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:”[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people
in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State.”
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in
which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the
Senate is required to make the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This
provision lays down the general rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject
matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence
of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a
special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the
concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with
the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the
Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities”
may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that
purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting
state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops
visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military
personnel, and further defines the rights of the US and RP government in the matter
of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of
equipment, materials and supplies. Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which
specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities,
should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent, however, the provisions of
Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to determining the number of
votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.
It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient
agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the
establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no distinction between
“transient” and “permanent”. We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires
foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
When no distinction is made by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not
subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no
foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the
VFA. The proscription covers “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.” Stated
differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without
any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to “foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities” collectively but treats them as separate and independent
subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated — a military treaty
the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign
facilities — any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section
25, Article XVIII.
3. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?
YES
thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they
have in common use.
The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has
stated that the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as
long as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further
to comply with its treaty obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of
the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and the
concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression
of our nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to
uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is
generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through
which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its
domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. In our jurisdiction, the
power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent,
or concurrence, to the ratification.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
(a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum; and
With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our
part, under principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the
terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations.

(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the
VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred.

As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means
that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.
To require the US to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to
its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the
principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance