Cover page

Table of Contents

Introduction

Issues

3. a Solicitor General Calida’s Petition

3. b Quo warranto under Rule 66 of Rules of Court
o Quo warranto vis a vis Impeachment
3.c Separation of Powers/ Checks and Balances in relation particularly to the case
present (Janileah)
3.d 1987 Constitution regarding Impeachment
3.e Arguments and Opinions of the Legal Experts
 INTRODUCTION

“A quo warranto (Latin for ‘by what warrant or authority?’) is a legal

procedure used to challenge an individual’s right to or authority over
the position he or she holds.”

An overwhelming majority of the legal systems in the world nowadays flowed-out of

the two main rivers of legal tradition—common law and civil law. The civil law tradition
commenced with the first legal codification of the Roman Empire known as “Lex Duodecim
Tabulae” or The Twelve Tables. While the common law legal tradition conferred the legal
systems with the following writs: habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo
warranto.

Quo Warranto is a remedy that tests the qualification of an office holder, or the de
jure entitlement to the position. It further tests the qualification of an official based on a
cause existing at the time of the issuance of the appointment, while impeachment exacts
accountability for an act done by an official during tenure. The grounds for each remedy
are mutually exclusive. Thus, the grounds for quo warranto cannot be subject of an
impeachment, and vice versa.

Last August 24, 2012, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno was appointed as the Chief Justice
of the Philippine Supreme Court. Consequently, Atty. Larry Gadon filed against CJ Sereno an
impeachment complaint, dated August 30, 2017, based on culpable violation of the
Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. During the proceedings
at the House of Representatives, the invalidity of Respondent’s appointment as Chief Justice
was exposed in view of her failure to submit the SALNs from 1986 to 2006 when she was a
Professor at the UP College of Law.

In April 2018, acting Chief Justice Antonio Carpio stressed that the Supreme Court
may rule on Solicitor General Jose Calida’s quo warranto petition against CJ Sereno. Hence
so, SG Calida’s petition, which challenges the legality of Sereno’s appointment to the high
court, was met with at least four petitions for intervention seeking its dismissal. On
Sereno’s defense, the petitioners said that only an impeachment can oust a chief justice.

Thereafter, the SG Calida, allegedly received a letter dated February 21, 2018 from
Atty. Eligio Mallari requesting the filing of quo warranto proceedings against the
Respondent. The Quo Warranto Petition was filed under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court and
Section 5(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution seeking the ouster of Respondent, CJ
Sereno.

RULE 66, Section 1 of the Rules of Court at present lays down the grounds for the issuance
of the writ of quo warranto, to wit:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. - An action for the

usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a
 verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law,
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without
being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

In the said context, the Petitioner represented that under this rule, the Solicitor
General has the authority to commence a quo warranto as he is mandated to “represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer.” A solicitor general or public prosecutor may file a quo warranto petition upon the
order of the President.

Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 11. Limitations

"Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action
against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same
be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of
the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose."

However, to this limitation, the petitioner claims that it is not applicable to the said
case. He alleged that there is an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition
under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi which means, “no time runs against the king”.
In Agcaoili v. Suguitan, G.R. No. L-24806, February 13, 1926, the Court held:

“xxx . . . in re prescription or limitation of the action, it may be said that

originally there was no limitation or prescription of action in an action
for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action
by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an
action by the Government. The ancient writ of quo warranto was a high
prerogative writ in the nature of a writ of right by the King against anyone
who usurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of the crown, to
inquire by what authority the usurper supported his claim, in order to
determine the right. Even at the present time in many of the civilized
countries of the world the action is still regarded as a prerogative writ and no
limitation or prescription is permitted to bar the action. As a general
principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal,
have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public
right. . .xxx”;

“xxx . . .The principle that acts of limitation do not bind the King (the State) or
the people, applies to proceeding by quo warranto, the rule being that the
 representative of the state may file an information on behalf of the people at
any time; and the lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding, in
conformity with the maxim Nullum tempus occurrit regi.”
On the other hand, former SC Associate Justice Vicente Mendoza, articulated that
after a justice of the Supreme Court has assumed office, he or she "can no longer be
questioned by writ of quo warranto after working or discharging the function of his office
one year from that date." He further thought that "A quo warranto proceeding filed against
a member of the court or any impeachable officer for that matter filed more than a year
after assumption of office will undermine the security of tenure guaranteed by the
Constitution to public officers who are simply removable by impeachment and ultimately
subvert the independence of the judiciary,"

Article XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and
as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath
of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of
the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed
to the public in the manner provided by law.

Furthermore, Article VIII, Section 7, par 3 of the same Constitution expresses:

Section 7, par 3 - A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven

competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Under Rule 4 of the JBC Rules, the JBC laid down the guidelines on how it will verify an
applicant’s integrity:

SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible step
to verify the applicant's record of and reputation for honesty, integrity,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and
ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit to the Council
certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government officials and
non-governmental organizations, and clearances from the courts, National
Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the Council
may require.

The petitioner noted the ruling in Francis H. Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno thus, “the Court, citing guidelines issued by the JBC, stated that integrity “is closely
related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards”.
 The JBC, in view of the aforementioned constitutional provision and their rule, and
conscious of the need to establish an applicant’s integrity, required all applicants for Chief
Justice to submit their SALNs.

SG Jose Calida, the petitioner in this petition for quo warranto, said Sereno’s
appointment could be considered void for not complying with the requirements set by the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) in submitting statement of assets, liabilities and net worth
(SALN). Since Sereno’s appointment was not valid, Calida said the high court chief could be
removed like any other unqualified government official.
At the center the case, therefore, was her supposed failure to submit her complete
records of her Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) to the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) when she vied for the top magistrate post in 2012.

CJ Sereno, instead, had asked the SC to junk the petition, saying the Court cannot
base a quo warranto proceeding on the allegation that she did not submit SALNs because it
is not a valid ground.

Article XI, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitutions maintains:

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme

Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. . .

Along this, impeachment has been defined as a process that is used to change, try,
and remove public officials for misconduct while in office. In the Philippines, it is an
expressed power of the Congress to formally charge a serving government official with an
impeachable offense.

In Corona vs. Senate, G.R. No, 200242, July 17, 2012, it has been declared:

“Impeachment, described as ‘the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of

democracy,’ was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or
highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that ‘the decision
will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt.’ Given their concededly political
character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of
utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate
branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our
government.”

Several individuals, groups, associations, and organizations have expressed their

oppositions to the Quo Warranto Petition against CJ Serreno on the ground that, as
provided in the aforementioned constitutional provision, as the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, she can only be removed from the Office by
impeachment.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for instance, has decided to formally file
an intervention with the Supreme Court in order to oppose and seek the dismissal of the
petition for quo warranto initiated by the Office of the Solicitor General against Chief Justice
Sereno. “Impeachment is the only mode of removal of an impeachable officer for an
impeachable offense,” the IBP said in a statement signed by its president Abdiel Fajardo.

Opposition Senators, Antonio Trillanes IV and Leila De Lima, filed manifestation

before the Supreme Court seeking the dismissal of the quo warranto petition against Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno. In the said manifestation filed through former Solicitor
General Florin Hilbay, the two senators again questioned SC’s jurisdiction over a case that
aimed to oust an impeachable official.
Therefore, in this research, the Authors attempt to delineate the parameters of Quo
Warranto vis a vis Impeachment in ousting public officials in the light of the provisions of
the 1987Constitution, specifically Article XI, Section 17; Article VIII, Section 7, par 3; and
Article XI, Section 2; and the Rules of Court, Rule 66, Section 11. Through the arguments
and allegations of the parties in the Petition, as well as those of some legal experts, the
Authors will determine whether or not quo warranto is valid to oust Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes Sereno.

ISSUE
Whether or not QUO WARRANTO Petition is valid and constitutional to oust CJ Sereno, an
impeachable public official:

 On the ground of her failure to submit her Statement of Assets, Liabilities and
Networth; and
 In a petition that is filed after one (1) year

I. Republic’s Petition for Quo Warranto

Solicitor General Jose Calida, (SolGen for brevity), bravely filed a quo warranto
petition1 before the Supreme Court against Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, (Sereno for
brevity).

The said petition consisting of 34 pages, at least according to the SolGen’s camp,
alleges that the quo warranto petition is the appropriate remedy to question the validity of
Sereno's appointment, stressing that the Chief Justice is "unlawfully holding" her post due
1 Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida , v. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, Petition
for Quo Warranto, Date filed March 5, 2018.
to her supposed failure to fully disclose her wealth by not filing the required Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth or SALNs.

This part of the research will seek to illuminate the reader through a thorough
summary of this quintessential quo warranto petition.
Before the substantive grounds for the petition were devolved into, it was stressed
that the nature and timelessness of the petition as argued by the SolGen is based on the
exception to the application of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts because the issues raised
are of transcendental importance 2. On the ground that the suit is of a first impression:
unprecedented, for it involves the highest position in the Judiciary, Sereno, being the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. To put it simply, no other tribunal can best resolve it than the
Supreme Court itself.
SolGen contended that the limitation provided in Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court, does not apply to the said petition. He explained that the state being the petitioner
3

it should be, “an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim
nullum tempus occurit regi which means, “no time runs against the king.”4
Moreover even assuming arguendo that the one-year bar applies to the Republic, the
SolGen maintained that petition was still filed within the reglementary period. For under
Section 1, P.D. 478,5 “there was no perceived acquiescence to or inaction on the part of
Petitioner which amounted to abandonment of his right to the petition,” which is an
exception to the statute of limitations of petitions of quo warranto. Such information of the
disqualification of Sereno only came to the Solgen during the hearings conducted by the
House of Representative’s Committee on Justice on the impeachment complaint against
former in December 2017. On such hearings, the appointment of Respondent as Chief
Justice was put into question on the basis of her failure to submit her SALNs, which,
arguably, made her unable to pass the test of integrity.
Solicitor General Calida anchors his petition on the following grounds, with regard to
the procedural aspect that the Petition for quo warranto is the appropriate remedy to
question the validity of the appointment of respondent as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. And as regards to the substantive aspect it indicated that the appointee for the
position of Chief Justice must be a person of proven integrity; respondent is unlawfully
holding the post of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines and lastly that
respondent is a de facto public officer who can be ousted through a quo warranto
proceeding.

2 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA [Per J. Leonen,
En Banc].
3 Petition for quo warranto against a public officer or employee shall be filed within one year after the cause of his
ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose
4 Republic vs Sereno, Paragraph 4 of the Petition.
5 Section 1, P.D. 478, June 4, 1974.
 In the procedural aspect of the petition the SolGen boldly stresses that Quo warranto is
the proper remedy to question the validity of Respondent’s appointment.
It cited Rule 66 of the Rules Court lays down the grounds for the issuance of the writ of
quo warranto in its Section 1, to wit:

RULE 66
Quo Warranto
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. — An action
for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the
provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his
office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act.

Accordingly, there is a distinction on the petition for quo warranto against

Respondent from the impeachment proceedings against her at the House of
Representatives. In the petition it states that, “The writ of quo warranto is being sought to
question the validity of her appointment; in turn, the impeachment complaint accuses her
of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in
office.”6.
The legal basis for the filing of the quo warranto petition may be anchored on A.M.
No. 10-4-29-SC or otherwise known as the 2010 Rules of Presidential Electoral Tribunal 7
which the Court promulgated on May 4, 2010. Under these rules an election contest is
initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the
President or Vice-President.34 Rules 14, 15, and 16.
A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC, RULE 16, reads:
Quo warranto. – A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the
election of the President or Vice- President on theground of ineligibility or
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may be filed by any registered
voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten days after the
proclamation of the winner.

6 Republic vs Sereno, Paragraph 31 of the Petition.

7 A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC, dated May 4, 2010.
 Even the though it is clear from the foregoing rules that it pertain to the President
and Vice President, SolGen contends that such rules may be applied by analogy. SolGen
further argues that the High Court recognizes the availability of quo warranto against an
impeachable officer according to the ruling of the Court in Funa v. Villar8 quo warranto may
be resorted to even against impeachable officers.
In the said case, Chairman Villar was made as an Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Audit. Thereafter, he was appointed as the Chairman. When the
Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment, appointment papers indicate
that he was to serve until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA
Commissioner. Funa then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to
challenge the constitutionality of the Villar’s appointment. Funa challenges Villar’s
appointment is proscribed by the constitutional ban on reappointment under Section 1(2),
Article IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution. Villar, for his part, initially emphasizes that his
appointment as COA Chairman is valid up to February 2, 2015 or seven years reckoned
from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to the position of Chairman.
In upholding the position of Funa9, the Court ruled:
Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the term
of office of a public official, the appointing authority is without authority to
specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer than what the law
provides. If the vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment, the President
is without discretion to extend a promotional appointment for more or for
less than seven (7) years. There is no in between. He or she cannot split
terms. It is not within the power of the appointing authority to override the
positive provision of the Constitution which dictates that the term of office of
members of constitutional [bodies shall be seven (7) years.] A contrary
reasoning "would make the term of office to depend upon the pleasure or
caprice of the [appointing authority] and not upon the framers of the
Constitution] of the legislature as expressed in plain and [undoubted
language in the law].”
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7-year appointment, as
the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar
had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term,
however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment
would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee
so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years.
To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less
than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant
as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such
8 Denis A.B. Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, Reynaldo A. Villar G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012.
9 Id.; Emphasis supplied.
appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed
to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.
Because of the Ruling in Funa, SolGen believes that the constitutional provision on
impeachment does not preclude the separation of an impeachable officer for reasons such
as the failure to prove eligibility to the position to which that officer was appointed.
In the same vein, the Court ruled Nacionalista Party v. De Vera 10 In that case, the
Court held that a quo warranto proceeding and not prohibition is the proper remedy to
inquire into validity of the appointment of then Commission on Elections Chairman Vicente
De Vera.
Thus, by virtue of the alleged void appointment, instant quo warranto petition was
filed because Respondent is performing the functions of Chief Justice on the ground that
she did not submit complete SALNs that would have determined whether she possessed the
integrity required of members of the judiciary.
And on one of the substantive aspect regarding questionable integrity of Sereno as
an appointee for the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, on the strength of the
following legal citations, the SolGen based his arguments that Sereno is not a person of a
proven integrity, to wit:
Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which declares, among
others that:
A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Accordingly, the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council in force at the time of the
questioned appointment, citing the 1987 Constitution, similarly state:

RULE 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY QUALIFICATIONS
FOR APPOINTMENT

SECTION 1. Qualifications applicable to all Members of the Judiciary and the

Ombudsman and his deputies.-
(a) No person may be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court or as Ombudsman or deputy Ombudsman unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines (CONST. Art. VIII, Section 7, par. 1; Id.,
Art. XI, Section 8)….

10 THE NACIONALISTA PARTY, MARCELO ADDURU, DOMOCAO ALONTO, PEDRO C. HERNAEZ, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA,
ALEJO MABANAG, CLARO M. RECTO, JOSE O. VERA and JOSE VELOSO, Petitioners, v. VICENTE DE VERA, as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections, Respondent. G.R. No. L-3474, December 7, 1949.
 (c) A Member of the Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity,
probity and independence (id., id., par. 3) and a member of the Philippine
Bar (id., id., par. 2).
SEC. 2. Additional qualifications for Members of the Supreme Court. - No
person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court unless he is at least
forty years of age and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (id., id., par
1).
Moreover, according to deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 11, the
framers of the Constitution actually intended to expand the qualifications required of
judicial aspirants to include what Commissioner Nolledo coined as a “moral provision” now
appearing as Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Furthermore, SolGen cites, that The United Nations Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary (“Basic Principles”) declare that, “Persons selected for
judicial office shall be individuals of integrity.”12 And several other international legal
basis to warrant that proven integrity is included to strengthen the moral fiber of justices
appointed as a servant of the public in general.

Based on the aforementioned legal basis and principles, the Solgen concludes that, “It is
ineluctable that a person’s integrity is an indispensable qualification for membership in the
Judiciary.”13 And further emphasizing that, “Her unlawful occupation of the position of Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court is a continuing violation of the Constitution and a breach of
international law that the Republic of the Philippines cannot and should not
countenance.”14
As to another substantive issue raised by the Republic through the SolGen it was
stressed that the respondent is unlawfully holding the post of Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines.

The argument to merit the approval of the petition, among others, rests on the ground
that Sereno is unlawfully holding the post as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. According
to the said petition it is the word “Proven” which relatively requires Sereno as candidate to
the office of the Chief Justice, to demonstrate the truth or existence of her integrity by
evidence.

11 IV Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 440 (July 10, 1986), emphasis and underscoring supplied.
12 See UN General Assembly Resolution 40/146, December 13, 1985.
13 Republic vs Sereno, Paragraph 52 of the Petition.
14 Id.
 Citing Jardeleza vs Sereno15 in proceedings before the JBC, the burden is on “an aspiring
judge or justice [to justify] [his/her] qualifications for the office when [he/she] presents
proof of [his/her] scholastic records, work experience and laudable citations.”
Based on the Announcement dated June 5, 2012, the JBC required all applicants for Chief
Justice to submit their SALNs:
Candidates for the Chief Justice post must submit, in addition to the foregoing, the
following documents:
All previous SALNs (up to 31 December 2011) for those in the
government or SALN as of 31 December 2011 for those from the private
sector; and (2) Waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of local and
foreign currency bank accounts under the Bank Secrecy Law and Foreign
Currency Deposits Act. Furthermore, the JBC also announced that
“[a]pplicants with incomplete or out of date documentary requirements will
not be interviewed or considered for nomination.”
Because of the failure of Sereno to account her complete SALNs as required by the
JBC, herein petitioner corollary concludes that the former has yet to prove her integrity.
Claiming, “That the JBC nominated Respondent for the Chief Justice post does not
extinguish the fact that she failed to comply with the SALN requirement under the
Constitution and relevant laws. As the filing of the SALNs is a constitutional and statutory
requirement, the existence of her previous SALNs for the years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003,
2004, 2005, and 2006 precisely would have furnished the evidence to prove, among others,
that she is meticulous in complying with the law.”16
In connection therewith, relevant to the context of quo warranto, there is “unlawful
holding” when the public officer did not meet all the legal qualifications for the office,
according to the SolGen.
SolGen further cites the case of Topacio v. Paredes,17 the Court ruled that the right to
hold public office shall be determined by quo warranto:
Where it is claimed that such an [sic] one unlawfully holds an office by reason of his lack of
a legal qualification therefor, his right should be determined by information in the nature of
quo warranto in the name of the people of the State.
To bolster this argument, according to the cited case Maquiling v. Commission on
Elections18 , ineligibility, therefore, does not only affect a candidate’s qualification but
necessarily affects the right to hold the office.

15 Francis H. Jardeleza vs. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, et al, G.R. No. 213181, 19 August 2014.
16 Republic vs Sereno, Paragraph 72 of the Petition.
17 Topacio v. Paredes, G.R. No. L-8069, 7 October 1912, citing Greenwood v. Murphy (131 Ill., 604).
18 Casan Macode Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 195649, 6 April 2013. Cited in Republic vs
Sereno, Paragraph 76 of the Petition.
 And thus, Pursuant to Maquiling, SolGen contends that Sereno, “has no right to hold the
office of the Chief Justice because of her ineligibility. She did not qualify at the outset as a
proper candidate for the position of Chief Justice.” 19
And finally Solgen maintains that Serneo is a de facto public officer whose appointment
is void ab initio and who can be ousted through a quo warranto proceeding.
A de facto public officer is one who acts under a color of authority, unlike a mere usurper or
one who has neither title nor color of right of an office:
An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer de jure, and is one who has the
reputation or appearance of being the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law,
has no right or title to the office he assumes to hold. He is distinguished from a mere usurper
or intruder by the fact that the former holds by some color of right or title while the latter
intrudes upon the office and assumes to exercise its functions without either the legal title or
color of right to such office.20
To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de facto existence, or at least
one recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color
of title or authority.21
In contrast to an officer de jure who exercises the powers of an office as a matter of
right because of a valid election or appointment, the Court held:
A judge de facto is an officer who is not fully invested with all of the powers and duties
conceded to judges, but is exercising the office of judge under some color of right. A judge de
facto may be said to be one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be and
yet is not a good officer in point of law — that is, there exists some defect in his appointment
or election and in his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time. 22
In this case, SolGen now draws the conclusion that, “Because a de facto officer holds
a colorable title of authority, his or her title cannot be collaterally or indirectly assailed. For
instance, a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent a de facto officer
from doing an act or a suit enjoining the enforcement of a judgment cannot be used to
question a de facto officer’s title.94 Such title may be questioned only in a quo warranto
proceeding.”23
On the aforcited basis, Solicitor General Calida prays 24 that Supreme Court:

19 Republic vs Sereno, Paragraph 77 of the Petition.

20 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 3, 3rd ed., pp. 376-377.) Cited in Republic vs Sereno, Paragraph 95 of the
Petition.
21 State vs. Babb, 124 W. Va. 428, 20 S.E. (2d) 683. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, supra footnote No. 11, p.
383. Cited in Republic vs Sereno, Paragraph 95 of the Petition.
22 . King vs. Bedford Level, 6 East [Eng. Com. Law Rep.] 356; Petersilea vs. Stone, 119 Mass., 465; 20 Am. Rep., 335;
State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn, 449; Am. Rep., 409. Cited in Republic vs Sereno, Paragraph 96 of the Petition.
23 Republic vs Sereno, Paragraph 97 of the Petition.
24 Republic vs Sereno. Pg. 34.
 (1) DECLARE as void Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno’s appointment on August 24,
2012 as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines; and
(2) OUST Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno from the position of Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.
In sum, the instant petition warrants its arguments on the basis that it can file a quo
warranto case against a sitting Chief Justice on the exception to the general rule that quo
warranto proceeding may be filed on the basis of transcendental importance. As such,
regardless of having been filed more than a year, such petition must be permitted. On the
substantive side of the petition, Chief Justice Sereno may be appropriately removed as such
because her appointment o the said position was void ab initio. According to the
hereinabove cited laws and jurisprudence, for one to become a Supreme Court Justice, it is a
prerequisite among others that a judge must be a person of proven integrity, and because
Sereno has not completely made an account of her SALN, the current Chief Justice is unfit
for the petition.
In other words, the petition contends that the appropriate remedy at this juncture is
a quo warranto petition and not an impeachment for the reason that Sereno from the
beginning never possessed the qualifications to be appointed as a Chief Justice. And the
appropriate remedy to question the validity of an appointment as discussed earlier, is a quo
warranto petition.

II. Quo Warranto vis a vis Impeachment

III. Solicitor General Calida’s Quo
Warranto Petition in relation to the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers

A Presidential form of government is what our country follows and the effect of
which is the incorporation of the doctrine of separation of powers into the present
Constitution which divided the powers of the government into Legislative, Executive and
Judicial. However the separation is not absolute since there is a system of checks and
balances embedded in the set-up.

The Constitutions of 1935 and 1987 have divided the three great powers of
government into the legislative, executive and judiciary- the legislative, to enact and repeal
the law; the executive to execute and implement the law; and the judiciary, to interpret or
construe the law and to resolve disputes arising from the law and from the allocation of
powers among the three branches of the government. From this division of powers and its
enforcement emerges the principle of separation of powers, whose actual workings, while
not specifically provided the Constitution, sharpens or blurs the separation, as the judiciary
construes it in actual controversies, because the principle of separation of powers is not a
fixed mathematical formula and the best of legal mid may differ 25.

The Doctrine of separation of powers was modified under the 1973 Constitution
with the establishment of a semi-parliamentary government that made the legislature
subordinate in many respects to the President, who was even vested with the ultimate
power of dissolving it. Under the new Constitution the traditional concept of the doctrine
has been restored but with several significant modifications. 26

The said doctrine was intended to prevent a concentration of authority in one

person or group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise
to the detriment of our republican institution. More specifically, according to Justice Laurel,
the doctrine is intended to secure action, to forestall over-action, to prevent despotism and
to obtain efficiency.27

To cite Justice Laurel again, the keynote of conduct of the various agencies of the
government under the doctrine of separation of powers, as properly understood, is not
independence but interdependence.28

In the case of Francisco v. Nagmamalasakit Na Mga Manananggol Ng Mga

Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.29 the Court stated:

25 Agpalo, Ruben E. Philippine Political Law, 2005 edition

26 Cruz, Isagani A. Philippine Political Law, 2014 edition
27 Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. PSC, 40 O.G., 8th Supp. 67
28 Id.
29 460 Phil. 830
 This Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of
separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge
by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has
been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of
each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government,

intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for
the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of
the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

In Ople vs. Torres30, the court explained that mingling of powers among the three
branches of government is not a novel concept. This blending of powers has become
unnecessary to properly address the complexities brought about by a rapidly developing
society and which the traditional branches of government have difficulty coping with.

It has been said that:

The true meaning of the general doctrine of the separation of powers seems
to be that the whole power of one department should not be exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other
departments, and that no one department ought to possess directly or
indirectly an overruling influence over the others. And it has been held that
this doctrine should be applied only to the powers which because of their
nature are assigned by the constitution itself to one of the departments
exclusively. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that an entire and complete
separation is either desirable or was ever intended, for such a complete
separation would be impracticable if not impossible; there may be- and
frequently are- areas in which executive, legislative, and judicial powers
blend or overlap; and many officers whose duties cannot be exclusively
placed under any of these heads.

30 354 Phil. 948

 The courts have perceived the necessity of avoiding a narrow construction of
a state constitutional provision for the division of the powers of the
government into three distinct departments, for it is impractical to view the
provision from the standpoint of a doctrinaire. Thus, the modern view of
separation of powers rejects the metaphysical abstractions and reverts
instead to a more pragmatic, flexible, functional approach, giving recognition
to the fact that there may be a certain degree of blending or admixture of the
three powers of the government. Moreover, the doctrine of separation of
powers has never been strictly or rigidly applied, and indeed could not be, to
all the ramifications of state or national governments; government would
prove abortive if it were attempted to follow the policy of separation to the
letter.31

In order to determine whether a vested power of a particular department has been

validly exercised by the latter, the nature of such power need not necessarily or always be
the test to be applied. It is whether or not the power in question, regardless of its nature,
has been constitutionally conferred upon the department claiming its exercise the grant
being ascertained, the exercise of the power sustained.

The conferment of power is usually done expressly, as in the vesture of the

legislative power in the Congress,32 the executive power in the President33 and the judicial
power in the Supreme Court and such lower courts as maybe establish by law. 34 As maybe
readily noticed, there is no problem as to the validity of the discharge of these powers
because they naturally pertain to the agencies in which they have been reposted.

But this is not always the case. To illustrate, the power to impeach, which is
essentially executive, and the power to try and decide impeachment cases, which
essentially judicial, are expressly lodged in the Congress, 35 as so too is the power of
investigation, 36 which is more executive or judicial than legislative. This powers are
nevertheless validly exercised by the legislature because the Constitution so provides. By
the same token, the Supreme Court can exercise the executive power of removal over judges
of inferior courts37 although they have been appointed by the President.38

In line with the quo warranto petition filed by Solicitor General Calida, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon its filing before the Court an intervention-

31 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 299

32 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 1,
33 Ibid., Art. VII, Sec. 1,
34 Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 1,
35 Id., Art. XI, Sec. 3,
36 Id., Art. VII, Sec. 21,
37 Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 11,
38 Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 9,
opposition regarding the matter argued that the Supreme Court may not inquire into the
Chief Justice’s alleged lack of integrity without violating the fundamental principle of
separation of powers.

The IBP said that “having been appointed to her current post, the Chief Justice is
presumed to have been previously adjudged by the President as having met the
requirement of integrity. Consistent with the separation of powers, such judgment cannot
be reviewed, much less reversed, by the Supreme Court.”

Subsequently, the Supreme Court released its decision39 and ruled that its exercise of
its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers.

It explained that:

Section 3(1) and 3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution respectively provides
that the House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. Thus, there is no argument that the
constitutionally-defined instrumentality which is given the power to try
impeachment cases is the Senate.

Nevertheless, the Court's assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo

warranto involving a person who would otherwise be an impeachable official
had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional
provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by
the Senate.

An action for quo warranto tests the right of a person to occupy a public
position. It is a direct proceeding assailing the title to a public office. 40 The issue to
be resolved by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally occupying a
public position which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally
appointed, was legally qualified and has complete legal title to the office. If
defendant is found to be not qualified and without any authority the relief that the
Court grants is the ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office. 41
39 Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May, 11, 2018
40 Sec. Defensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276, 302 (1998).
41 In Mendoza v. Atlas, 362 Phil. 238, 244-245 (1999), the possible outcome of a Petition for Quo Warranto can be
any of the.following:
If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to
the office. If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping, intruding
into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as follows:

"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding
into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be
 The court differentiated that while impeachment concerns actions that make
the officer unfit to continue exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves
matters that render him or her ineligible to hold the position to begin with. Given
the nature and effect of an action for quo warranto, such remedy is unavailing to
determine whether or not an official has committed misconduct in office nor is it the
proper legal vehicle to evaluate the person's performance in the office. Apropos, an
action for quo warranto does not try a person's culpability of an impeachment
offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such
culpability.42

The court further explained that it has the authority to issue a writ of quo warranto,
as complementary to, and not violative of, the doctrine of separation of powers, citing the
case of Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. 43 -

“And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly
complements the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in our
analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of
persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations under law. The
question of whether a franchisee is in breach of the franchise specially
enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited to a court of law, and not
for an administrative agency, much less one to which no such function has
been delegated by Congress. In the same way that availability of judicial
review over laws does not preclude Congress from undertaking its own
remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo
warranto in the instant cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its
own prerogative by abrogating the legislative franchises of respondents
should it be distressed enough by the franchisees' violation of the franchises
extended to them.”

rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or
relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the
respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action
as justice requires."

If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully
holding the same, the court may order:
(I) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;
(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;
(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or franchise of
all the parties to the action as justice requires.

42 Supra Note 39
43 602 Phil. 625, 669 (2009)
 Applying the ratio in Divinagracia, the court concluded that its exercise of its
jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its
own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the
Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally
committed power of impeachment.44

Further, as an impeachment court, the Senate is a tribunal composed of politicians

who are indubitably versed in pragmatic decision making and cognizant of political
repercussions of acts purported to have been committed by impeachable officials. 45 As
representatives of the Filipino people, they determine whether the purported acts of
highest ranking officials of the country constitute as an offense to the citizenry. Following
this premise, the impeachment tribunal cannot be expected to rule on the validity or
constitutionality of the Chief Justice's appointment, nor can their ruling be of
jurisprudential binding effect to this Court. To authorize Congress to rule on public officials'
eligibility would disturb the system of checks and balances as it would dilute the judicial
power of courts, upon which jurisdiction is exclusively vested to rule on actions for quo
warranto.46

IV. Respondent Chief Justice Sereno’s

Argument: Impeachment as an
exclusive remedy

44 Supra Note 39
45 Paolo Celeridad, Evidence of Character: The Burden qf Proving the Truth with respect to the Political Nature of
Impeachment Trials by Means of Suhstuntial Evidence, 87 PHIL. L.J. 985 (2013)
46 Republic vs. Sereno
 Section 2 and Section 3 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution 47 indicated that
impeachment in the Philippines is an expressed power of the Congress of the Philippines to
formally charge a serving government official with an impeachable offense. After being
impeached by the House of Representatives, the official is then tried in the Senate. However,
impeachment process is limited to public officers enumerated by the said law.

Coming now to the issue of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A Sereno, the House
Committee on Justice found probable cause to hold her liable for impeachment trial on the
ground of culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, corruption, and
other high crimes. Aside from the impeachment case, Sereno is also facing a separate
petition filed by the Solicitor General Jose Calida before the SC, which claimed she was unfit
to hold her post. The petition seeks to oust her from the position as Chief Justice on the
ground that she is performing the functions of Chief Justice by virtue of a void appointment.

Solicitor General Jose Calida filed the quo warranto petition against Sereno due to
missing Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs), when she was nominated
for the Chief Justice position in 2012. In other words, the theory is that the non-submission
of some of her SALNs from her days as a UP Law professor to the Judicial and Bar Council
rendered Sereno’s appointment illegal from the beginning. It must be pointed out that since
she became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court it is presumed that she has complied
with the required qualification when the Judicial and Bar Council prepared her

47 Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law,
but not by impeachment.

Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each
Member shall be recorded.
xxxx
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. x x x x.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
appointment to the President. Decisive on the matter is the pertinent provision Sec. 748
and Sec.949, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

So here, we have the unenviable situation of an impeachable official being subject of

two remedies to oust her—via impeachment and quo warrranto. The 1987 Constitution is
explicit that a member of the Supreme Court can be removed only through impeachment.
The late Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, explaining the nature of impeachment, said the
rationale behind impeachment is to maintain constitutional government, through the
removal of an unfit official from a position of public trust. 50

An impeachment trial is unique because it is a hybrid process, being both quasi-

judicial and quasi-political. The Constitution lists down certain public officials, including a
member of the Supreme Court, who can be removed from office only via impeachment. By
doing so, the Constitution precludes any other avenue to oust them. The Solicitor General
proposes another way, an alternative to impeachment, of having that same result. 51 If the
Supreme Court indulges him, so be it. But the consequences to the Justices, to the President,
and to the other impeachable officials, are enormous. When Chief Justice Corona was
impeached, a can of worms was opened. In the Sereno impeachment, an even bigger can of
worms might now be opened.

48 (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and
must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines(
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge
thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar
(3)A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

49 The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a
list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need
no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
50
See The Nature of Impeachment by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago (Delivered
at the joint annual convention of the Philippine Society of Hypertension, and Philippine Lipid and
Atherosclerosis Society, held at the Crowne Plaza Galleria in Quezon City on 8 February 2012.)
51
See also Speech of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago: Explaining his verdict on Chief Justice Renato Corona
(Delivered on May 29, 2012)

V. Arguments of Legal Experts: Impeachment against Quo Warranto

A. Arguments/Opinions: Against the Quo Warranto Petition

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the mandatory organization of lawyers
with over 50,000 members, asked the Supreme Court to dismiss the quo warranto petition
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General against Sereno. 52 A quo warranto is initiated to
remove a public officer who is not qualified to his or her position.

Solicitor General Jose Calida, in his petition for quo warranto, said Sereno’s
appointment could be considered void for not complying with the requirements set by the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) in submitting ten(10) Statement of Assets, Liabilities and
Networth (SALN).

Since Sereno’s appointment was not valid, Calida said the high court chief could be
removed like any other unqualified government official. But the IBP said Sereno’s
appointment passed the JBC twice – first when she applied as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court and second when she vied for the post as Chief Justice. The IBP added that it
was also clear that the JBC has waived the SALN requirement for the Chief Justice
candidates. The IBP added that it was also clear that the JBC has waived the SALN
requirement for the Chief Justice candidates.

The IBP said that the quo warranto petition is fatally flawed because the allegations
therein are clear that the JBC itself did not require the submission of the respondent Chief
Justice SALNs from 2001 to 2006, therefore, she had no intent of avoiding the constitutional
requirement that would purportedly taint her integrity.

The IBP further revealed that evoking a seemingly novel approach, the truth applies
a disingenuous reading that can only be deemed legitimate if the text of the Constitution is
to be deliberately twisted which is a dangerous precedent.
 Aside from IBP, the Makabayan bloc from Congress, former Senator Rene Saguisag,
cause-oriented groups as well as advocates filed separate petitions to nullify the quo
warranto case.53

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
52
Torres-Tupas,Tetch, Inquirer.net(2018), “Sereno quo warranto case ‘fatally flawed,’ IBP tells SC in plea vs CJ
Ouster”<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/977622/sereno-quo-warranto-case-fatally-flawed-ibp-tells-sc-in-plea-vs-
cj-ouster#ixzz5FBGAGfcg>(Retrieved May 19,2018).

53
Cruz, R., ABS-CBN News, “Makabayan bloc wants to intervene in 'quo warranto' plea vs. Sereno”
<http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/03/22/18/makabayan-bloc-wants-to-intervene-in-quo-warranto-plea-vs-
sereno> (Retrieved May 11,2018).

In addition, the House Committee on Justice also wants to impeach Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes Sereno for violations in her Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALN) – on top of six other grounds.

The panel's chairperson, Oriental Mindoro Rep. Reynaldo Umali, on Friday revealed
to CNN Philippines some of the articles of impeachment in the committee's draft report. The
articles of impeachment against Sereno consist of four grounds -- culpable violation of the
Constitution, corruption, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes. Quoting the draft
resolution setting forth the articles of impeachment, Umali said Sereno must be impeached
for violating the Constitution, betraying public trust, and committing other high crimes
when she "deliberately failed" to file her SALNs 17 times.

The panel said Sereno had no SALNs for the years 1987 to 1997, 1999 to 2001, and
2003 to 2006, when she was still teaching at the University of the Philippines. It also noted
that Sereno excluded from her SALN two properties she owned in Bataan and Davao City.
Umali said issues in her SALN were the strongest charges against Sereno, noting that
Sereno's predecessor, the late Renato Corona, was impeached for omissions in his SALNs.
Umali, who served as prosecutor in the Corona trial, earlier said Sereno's violations were
even worse than those of Corona's.

Umali said that this is a sequel of the previous impeachment where there were two
properties undisclosed but more than that, there were 17 SALNs not filed which is even
worse. In a phone interview with CNN Philippines, Jojo Lacanilao, a spokesperson for
Sereno, said the alleged non-filing of SALN was not relevant to the impeachment case since
it was allegedly committed when Sereno was just a UP professor and not an impeachable
official. JBC Executive Director Annaliza Ty-Capacite in a February 12 hearing told
lawmakers the body considered as "substantial compliance" Sereno's submission of three
SALNs, covering 2009, 2010, and 2011.
 In an exclusive interview with CNN Philippines on March 8[2018], the day the justice
panel found probable cause to impeach Sereno, the embattled chief justice said that many
wrong things were said about her SALN.

Umali said, another article of impeachment involved several instances of abuse of

power by Sereno as ex-officio JBC Chairperson. These include her alleged hand in excluding
Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta from the shortlist of
nominees for the position of CA presiding justice. In another article, the justice panel
accused Sereno of undermining and disregarding the separation of powers among the three
branches of government on several occasions, Umali said. The panel said Sereno interfered
when she advised CA justices on the handling of their standoff with lawmakers over the
detention of six Ilocos Norte government employees, or the "Ilocos 6," who were accused of
misusing tobacco funds.

All in all, Sereno is accused of violating the Constitution, corruption, betrayal of

public trust, and other high crimes - grounds for impeachable officials to be removed under
the Constitution. She repeatedly denied the allegations and asked for the complaint to be
junked.54

ALBAY Representative Edcel Lagman reiterated on Tuesday, March 6[2018] , that the
one-year prescriptive period within which to question the validity of Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes Sereno's appointment has already lapsed(Rule 66, Section 11 of the Rules of
Court). Lagman said the prescriptive period started from the time the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) started its deliberations on Sereno's appointment. The petitions were filed by
lawyer Oliver Lozano on March 1 and by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on March
5. The Supreme Court en banc earlier Tuesday dismissed Lozano's petition, which sought to
declare void the appointment of the Chief Justice. In its quo warranto petition, the OSG
urged the High Court to declare as invalid Sereno's appointment over her failure to submit
her Statement of Assets Liabilities and Networth to the JBC when she vied for the top post
in the judiciary in 2012.

The OSG said the suit against Sereno is seasonably filed. Section 11 Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court provides that "a petition for quo warranto against a public officer or
employee shall be filed within one year after the cause of his ouster or the right of the
petitioner to hold such office or position arose."The OSG argued that the said limitation
does not apply to the present case for the reason that the petitioner only came to know the
questionable appointment of the Chief Justice during the series of impeachment hearings at
the House of Representatives against Sereno. Lagman objected to this. He slammed Solicitor
General Jose Calida for using as excuse the OSG's belated discovery of the alleged violation
of the Chief Justice. Lagman said that it is a joke for Solicitor General Jose Calida to claim
that it was only recently during the impeachment proceedings that the government learned
that Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno failed to submit all of her prior years’ SALNs when
she was a professor in the UP College of Law. He added that this is a convenient ruse to
avoid the inevitable that the filing of the subject quo warranto petition against Sereno has
long expired under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.55
54
Santos, E.P., CNN Philippines, “Ousting Sereno: House justice panel chair reveals 3 of 7 articles of
Impeachment” < http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2018/03/16/Sereno-articles-of-impeachment-Umali.html>
(Retrieved May 11,2018)
55
Calayag, K. A., SunStar Philippines, “Prescriptive period to question Sereno appointment has lapsed, Lagman
insists”<http://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/422227/>(Retrieved May 11,2018)

B. Arguments/Opinions: In favor of the Quo Warranto Petition

Solicitor General Calida holds that the Constitution does not include ineligibility to
public position as a ground for impeachment,no one can be convicted for ineligibility. He
said the sole purpose of impeachment proceedings is to hold a public officer accountable
for wrongdoings committed in office. On the other hand, the quo warranto proceedings
instituted by the Solicitor General seeks to oust respondent because she is ineligible to be
the Chief Justice.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for quo warranto dated
March 2, 2018, questioning Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno’s qualifications for the top
judicial post. His petition for quo warranto under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution and Rule 66 of the Rules of Court seeking the ouster of Respondent as Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines. The suit was filed with the
Supreme Court as an exception to the application of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
because the issues raised are of transcendental importance.

Solicitor General Jose Calida maintained that while Section 2, Article XI

(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS) of the 1987 Constitution provides that
impeachable officers may be removed on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust, these impeachable officers may also be ousted from office through
quo warranto proceedings because they are not excluded from such proceedings under
Section 5(1), Article VIII (JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT) of the Constitution. In other words, the
Solicitor General is not asking the court (SC) to remove respondent for impeachable
offenses which is not the concern of the petition. Instead, the Solicitor General has good
reason to believe that Chief Justice Sereno has no authority to occupy the esteemed office of
the Chief Justice of the Republic of the Philippines: she had not shown that she possessed
proven integrity, an indispensable qualification for appointment to the Judiciary pursuant
to Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,” the OSG said.
The OSG filed the petition due to Sereno’s non-compliance of the mandatory requirement of
submission of Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) set forth by the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the body that screens applicants for posts in the judiciary,
when she applied for the top judicial post in 2012.

Sereno submitted only three(3) SALNs when she applied for the chief justice post:
2009, 2010, and 2011. The JBC required the submission of all SALNs of an applicant in
government service; later the substantial compliance was set at 10 years prior to
application to the top judicial post or from 2002 to 2011. The reason for this minimum 10-
year requirement is Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 (February 20, 1989. AN ACT
ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS
AND EMPLOYEES), which states, “Any statement (SALN) filed under this Act shall be
available to the public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement. After
such period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation. ”
B.1 Impeachment not mandatory
means to remove impeachable officer

While Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that impeachable

officers “may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of…” the OSG said
that this part of the provision “cannot be construed as having mandatory effect,” unlike its
counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution.

Unlike the wordings of Section 1, Article IX of the 1935 Constitution and Section 2
of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which both state, ‘shall be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of,’ the present phraseology of Section 2, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution provides ‘may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of.’ The use of the word ‘may’ in the provision is construed as permissive and
operating to confer discretion. It cannot be construed as having mandatory effect. Where
the words of a statute (or the Constitution, for that matter) are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation,” the OSG said. He explained that in cases of ineligibility, the proper means is
through quo warranto proceedings.

B.2 Gross Misrepresentation

The OSG further accused Sereno of committing “gross misrepresentation before the
JBC when she wrote to explain that she could not produce her other SALNs because she
could ‘no longer retrieve them.’ He said that Sereno’s submitted SALN’s committed
falsehoods and “perjurious act .

Sereno’s SALN dated December 31, 1998 was filed only in 2003, or five years beyond
the period required by law; her 2009 SALN reflects she was holding the SC Associate Justice
post, when it fact she was appointed to the high court only in August 2010’ when she
resigned in June 2006 as a UP professor, she should have submitted a SALN as of the same
year, however, her 2006 SALN bears no stamp receipt from UP, was only signed on July 27,
2010, the same day she submitted it to the JBC. Accordingly, Calida said that it appears that
she fabricated her 2006 SALN in an attempt to submit a SALN to the JBC during her
application for Associate Justice in 2010. These are perjurious acts further bolster Sereno’s
utter lack of integrity.

Calida reiterated his position that Sereno’s failure to file and submit her SALNs
proves that she “is not a person of proven integrity,” and “failed to prove her integrity
before the JBC.”He stressed faithfully complying with the requirement of filing of SALNs is
not an additional qualification to establish the integrity of magistrates of the judiciary,
rather it is an “implied” requirement.

B.3 State Not Bound By One-Year Prescriptive Period

Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that “a petition for quo
warranto against a public officer or employee shall be filed within one year after the cause of
his ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose.”

The OSG, however, argued that under the maxim nullum tempus occurs regi (‘no
time runs against the king’), prescription does not apply to the state, does not apply in cases
initiated by the Republic/government. In the Sereno quo warranto case, the OSG, as an
entity of the state, is not bound by the rule on prescription.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the one-year bar applies to the Republic,
the OSG insisted the petition was filed within the reglementary period, which it insists,
began at the time of discovery of Sereno’s non-filing of SALNs during the House
impeachment hearings.56
56
Reformina, I., ABS-CBN News, “Primer: The Office of the Solicitor General quo warranto plea”,
< http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/05/11/18/primer-the-office-of-the-solicitor-general-quo-warranto-plea>
(Retrieved May 11,2018).

CONCLUSION

Thus, based on the above discussion, it is concluded that a Quo Warranto Petition is
not a remedy for ousting Chief Justice Sereno but rather, a sitting impeachable officer can
be removed from office only through impeachment by Congress.

As posited above, a quo warranto procedure under Rule 66, Section 1 paragraph (a)
of Rules of Court involves matters that render any government official or public officer
ineligible to hold office.

In the case at bench, the integrity of CJ Sereno was assailed as one of the substantial
requirement of holding the highest position in the judiciary, on the ground of want of
declaration of her SALNs during her employment as a Law Professor in College of Law at
the University of the Philippines and during her appointment as a Chief Justice of the
Judiciary as provided and required in the Revised Rules of JBC under Rule 4 Section 1.
Evidence of Integrity and Probity and under Section VII, Paragraph 3 Article VIII of the
Constitution to wit:

xxxxx

Moreover it was alleged and presented in the petition of the Solicitor General Jose
Calida, that the respondent only submitted SALN for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011despite
being in the government service for 20 years (1986 – 2006) as a professor at the UP College
of Law..

It was also presented based on the certification given by UP HRD Certification based
on the 201 File: that the respondent only passed her SALNs for the following years: 1985,
1989, 1990,1991,1993,1994,1995,1996,1997, 1988 and 200250.

50Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, v. Maria Lourdes P.A. Serano, Petition
for Quo Warranto, Date filed March 5, 2018.
 Anent the validity of her appointment and “unlawfully holding” her post as the
highest official in the Judiciary, it is a political question which only JBC could answer, as the
counsel shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary as
provided in Section 8, Paragraph (5), Article VIII of the Constitution to wit:

xxxxxxx

Thereafter it was affirmed, when the name of Chief Justice was included in the
shortlist of nominees for the position of Chief Justice.

In contrary to the claim of Sol Gen that Chief Justice Sereno is a De Facto Officer, she
is not. She was shortlisted by JBC as a candidate for Chief Justice. In fact her qualification
passes through the scrutiny of the JBC and her appointment were signed by the President.

Thus, the “doctrine of regularity” applied in the case at bench.

Perhaps, the Solicitor General has no authority to question the legality of her
appointment. Her appointment can only be question if the President authorizes the Sol Gen
to file such Quo Warranto against CJ Sereno before the Court.

Besides the highest rule of the sovereign is the Constitution that the life of SC comes
from. Under the doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy to wit:

“The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other
laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of
the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however nobly intentioned, if it
conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must ever remain supreme.
All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to
sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude. Right or wrong, the
Constitution must be upheld as long as it has not been changed by the
sovereign people lest its disregard result in the usurpation of the majesty of
the law by the pretenders to illegitimate power.” 51

Under this doctrine, if a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution, that
law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or
entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without any force
and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. 52

Hence the rules of court as the remedy of the Sol Gen are a mere expansion of
Section 5 par 5, Article VIII of the constitution.

Furthermore the language of constitution is precise; therefore impeachable officer

may only be removed after the rigor of the Impeachment Court.

51Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, Central Lawbook Publishing, Co., Inc. 1991 Ed., p. 11
52Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997
 In addition, of course the issue on questionable SALN of CJ Sereno, Rule 2 (5)
(content?) may be suppletory.

On the other hand, Impeachment is concerns to actions that make the officer unfit to
exercise his or her office.

As Section 2, Article XI53 expressly provides, the word “may” connotes a permissive
meaning which may construed as a mere possibility or an option. Thus it may not foreclose
a quo warranto proceeding against the impeachable officers.

However, as a general rule of Statutory Construction under Ratio Legis or

interpretation according to the spirit or reason of the law, the spirit or intention of a statute
prevails over the letter thereof, and what is within the spirit of the statute is within the
statute although it is not within the letter thereof .

The spirit rather than the letter of the statute determined the construction thereof.
Where legislative intent apparently conflicts with the letter of the law, the former prevail
the letter.

Thus removal from office of these public officers shall only be by impeachment, and
not through any other mode. 54

Accordingly, the Constitution adopted a mechanism to safeguard the independence

of these offices, with specific regard to impeachment as a mode of removal, allowing a quo
warranto procedure under rule 66 of the rules of court as a mode to oust and nullify the
position held by any members of the judiciary would put members of the judiciary
vulnerable to all manners of charges which might be brought against them by any other
parties, for any number of reasons seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the
court.

Thus, the clear intent of the constitution is to enable the officials of these bodies to
carry out their constitutional mandate free from Political Influence and pressure.

Hence, Impeachment is the only method allowed under the constitution to remove a
member of this court. To allow any other method is to rewrite the constitution.

53 Supra notes 47
54 Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo 6th Edition 2009.