Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
On this page
Teaching as a Profession
Teachers as Professionals
Professional Self-Governance
Conclusion
[2012]
In its broadest sense, teaching is a process that facilitates learning. Teaching is the specialized
application of knowledge, skills and attributes designed to provide unique service to meet the
educational needs of the individual and of society. The choice of learning activities whereby the
goals of education are realized in the school is the responsibility of the teaching profession.
1. Its members have an organized body of knowledge that separates the group from all others.
Teachers are equipped with such a body of knowledge, having an extensive background in the
world and its culture and a set of teaching methods experientially derived through continuous
research in all parts of the world.
2. It serves a great social purpose. Teachers carry responsibilities weighted with social purpose.
Through a rigid and self-imposed adherence to the Code of Professional Conduct, which sets out
their duties and responsibilities, teachers pass on their accumulated culture and assist each
student under their care in achieving self-realization.
4. There is a formal period of preparation and a requirement for continuous growth and
development. Teachers are required to complete a defined teacher preparation program followed
by a period of induction or internship prior to being granted permanent certification. This period
includes support for the formative growth of teachers and judgments about their competence.
Teachers are devoted to continuous development of their ability to deliver their service.
5. There is a degree of autonomy accorded the professional. Teachers have opportunities to make
decisions about important aspects of their work. Teachers apply reasoned judgment and
professional decision making daily in diagnosing educational needs, prescribing and
implementing instructional programs, and evaluating the progress of students. Teacher judgment
unleashes learning and creates the basis for experience.
6. The profession has control or influence over education standards, admissions, licensing,
professional development, ethical and performance standards, and professional discipline. As
professionals, teachers are governed in their professional relationships with other members,
school boards, students and the general public by rules of conduct set out in the Association’s
Code of Professional Conduct. The code stipulates minimum standards of professional conduct
for teachers, but it is not an exhaustive list of such standards. Unless exempted by legislation,
any member of the Association who is alleged to have violated the standards of the profession,
including the provisions of the code, may be subject to a charge of unprofessional conduct under
the Discipline Bylaws of the Association.
The competence of teachers is governed by the Practice Review Bylaws of the Association. The
expectations for the professional practice of teachers related to interim and permanent
certification are found in the Teaching Quality Standard Applicable to the Provision of Basic
Education in Alberta. The Teaching Quality Standard defines the knowledge, skills and attributes
all teachers are expected to demonstrate as they complete their professional preparation, enter the
profession and progress through their careers. Additionally, the Department of Education’s
Teacher Growth, Supervision and Evaluation Policy (Policy 2.1.5) supports and reinforces the
Teaching Quality Standard by setting out basic expectations for teacher growth, supervision and
evaluation.
Teachers as ProfessionalsTop of page
The certificated teacher is the essential element in the delivery of instruction to students,
regardless of the mode of instruction. A teacher has professional knowledge and skills gained
through formal preparation and experience. Teachers provide personal, caring service to students
by diagnosing their needs and by planning, selecting and using methods and evaluation
procedures designed to promote learning. The processes of teaching include understanding and
adhering to legal and legislated frameworks and policies; identifying and responding to student
learning needs; providing effective and responsive instruction; assessing and communicating
student learning; developing and maintaining a safe, respectful environment conducive to student
learning; establishing and maintaining professional relationships; and engaging in reflective
professional practice. These processes must be free of discriminatory practices and should
contribute to the holistic development of students who are actively engaged, responsible and
contributing members of a democratic society. The educational interests of students are best
served by teachers who practise under conditions that enable them to exercise professional
judgment. Teachers have a right to participate in all decisions that affect them or their work, and
have a corresponding responsibility to provide informed leadership in matters related to their
professional practice.
The Alberta Teachers’ Association is a self-governing body financed through membership fees
established in accordance with the bylaws of the Association. The legal framework through
which the Association functions is the Teaching Profession Act. The Association, through the
democratic interaction of its members, is the collective voice of Alberta teachers. It is a unilateral
organization that includes as active members certificated individuals employed in public
education as classroom teachers, as well as school- and district-based administrators. The
profession believes that all professional educators should be members of the Association and
strives to accomplish this through an amendment to the Teaching Profession Act that would
include superintendents and deputy superintendents appointed by school boards.
As a professional teachers’ association, the Alberta Teachers’ Association performs a wide range
of activities related to the enhancement of teaching as a profession, the improvement of public
education and the well-being of its members. The Association furthers the professional status of
teaching by policing the conduct and competence of its members through its Discipline Bylaws
and Practice Review Bylaws, ensuring high levels of practice for students and public assurance
in the teaching profession. The Association also has a responsibility to appraise the expectations
of society and to recommend changes to Alberta’s education system to meet changing needs.
Thus, it maintains an active interest and a position of leadership in all areas of public education.
This includes systematic long-range planning in such matters as the processes of teaching,
working conditions for professional service, organization and administration of schools, teacher
education and certification, curriculum, educational research and development, early childhood
education, and education finance. Through its committees dealing with these topics, as well as
through representation on many departmental committees and boards, the Association stays at
the forefront of the most recent developments and represents the interests of its members. To
accomplish this, the Association should have adequate representation on all Department of
Education committees, boards and advisory bodies dealing with matters related to teaching and
learning, and all members representing the profession on government advisory bodies, boards
and committees should be named by the Association.
A common criterion for measuring the degree of public acceptance achieved by a professional
organization is its ability and willingness to exercise rigorous control over membership
standards. This means that the professional body has control over the educational, certification,
practice and competence standards to determine who enters into and remains in the profession. A
long-standing goal of the profession is to have jurisdiction over teacher certification in Alberta.
The Association’s having such authority would parallel the established practice of other
professions.
As the authoritative voice of the teaching profession in the province, the Association must play a
role in making decisions related to teacher preparation, recruitment, selection, admission,
institutional preparation, internship, placement and programs of support in the early years of
practice. It should have direct and formal representation in the process that accredits institutions
that grant degrees in education.
Finally, the Association believes that teachers require one teaching certificate and that all
teachers have the same certificate. As previously mentioned, the profession, through the
Association, should have full responsibility for the issuance of teaching certificates and the
suspension or cancellation of certificates on grounds of incompetence or unprofessional conduct.
ConclusionTop of page
Alberta is recognized for having one of the best public education systems in the world. Central to
the system are caring, highly competent professional teachers who are supported by a
professional association that recognizes as its core responsibilities stewardship of the profession,
services to its members and commitment to public education. The continued efforts of teachers
to strive to improve their professional practice, supported by the collective through the Alberta
Teachers’ Association, will ensure that Alberta students will continue to receive quality teaching
resulting in enriched educational experiences.
From a classical sociological perspective, the self is a relatively stable set of perceptions of who
we are in relation to ourselves, others, and to social systems. The self is socially constructed in
the sense that it is shaped through interaction with other people. As with socialization in general,
the individual is not a passive participant in this process and have a powerful influence over how
this process and its consequences develop.
George Herbert Mead, a sociologist from the late 1800s, is well known for his theory of the
social self, which includes the concepts of 'self,' 'me,' and 'I.' In this lesson, we will explore
Mead's theory and gain a better understanding of what is meant by the terms 'me' and 'I.' We will
also discuss the concept, derived out of Mead's work, of the looking-glass self.
Mead's work focuses on the way in which the self is developed. Mead's theory of the social
self is based on the perspective that the self emerges from social interactions, such as observing
and interacting with others, responding to others' opinions about oneself, and internalizing
external opinions and internal feelings about oneself. The social aspect of self is an important
distinction because other sociologists and psychologists of Mead's time felt that the self was
based on biological factors and inherited traits. According to Mead, the self is not there from
birth, but it is developed over time from social experiences and activities.
Development of Self
According to Mead, three activities develop the self: language, play, and games.
Language develops self by allowing individuals to respond to each other through symbols,
gestures, words, and sounds. Language conveys others' attitudes and opinions toward a subject or
the person. Emotions, such as anger, happiness, and confusion, are conveyed through language.
Play develops self by allowing individuals to take on different roles, pretend, and express
expectation of others. Play develops one's self-consciousness through role-playing. During role-
play, a person is able to internalize the perspective of others and develop an understanding of
how others feel about themselves and others in a variety of social situations.
Games develop self by allowing individuals to understand and adhere to the rules of the activity.
Self is developed by understanding that there are rules in which one must abide by in order to
win the game or be successful at an activity.
The concept of the person, like other comparative concepts such as kinship or the state,
designates a zone of enquiry within which there is enough commonality across societies to
ensure that comparison is reasonable, yet enough variation between them to make enquiry
fruitful. Enquiries in this zone concern conceptions of the human psychophysical individual. This
is territory for the psychologist and the philosopher as well, of course, but anthropologists are
guided by two special considerations. First, we expect that a society’s conceptions of people as
individuals, of how people work, can be related com-pellingly to its forms of social institution, of
how society works. Second, we have come to learn that other societies’ ways of anatomizing
individuals’ thought and form may be profoundly, and startlingly, different from those we take
for granted.
Indeed the differences between versions of the person are a matter not only of thought but of
feeling and experience as well. Consider, for example, "Godfrey Lienhardt’s (1961)
ethnographic account of the Dinka, in which he shows that Dinka regard themselves, indeed
experience themselves, very differently to the way people of the North Atlantic do. In the matter
of a bad debt, for example, North Atlantic peoples assume that the power to recollect a bad debt -
the faculty of the conscience, in other words — is wholly internal to the thinking subject, the
person. But among the Dinka such recollection is not a property of the debtor’s own mind or
conscience. Rather, the debtor who owns up to his debt does so because the spirit Mathiang Gok
has laid hold of her and forced her to recollect the debt and respond to it. Rather than an internal
conscience directing her, in other words, the debtor experiences an external power. Similarly,
members of certain clans among the Dinka have as a special divinity, the spirit which Lienhardt
translates as Flesh. The divinity Flesh appears within them as their own flesh when their muscles
begin to quiver and they become possessed during ritual sacrifices. In other words, their own
body becomes at once spiritual and subject to another power, neither of which properties are
familiar in a North Atlantic perspective. To this extent, the person is very differently conceived
and experienced in the two societies.
The binary of self and other is perhaps one of the most basic theories of human consciousness
and identity, claiming, in short, that the existence of an other, a not-self, allows the possibility or
recognition of a self. In other words: I see you. I do not control your body or hear your thoughts.
You are separate. You are not me. Therefore, I am me. The self/other binary seems to be an
accepted division of how the modern individual comprehends who s/he is, by recognizing what
s/he is not. Variations of this binary appear in the work of numerous thinkers2 , including media
theorist Niklas Luhmann and racial theorist W.E.B. Du Bois. Luhmann uses the terms self-
reference and otherreference to discuss the system of the mass media, while Du Bois uses the
term doubleconsciousness to discuss the position of black people in white-controlled America at
the turn of twentieth century. This essay seeks go beyond binary thinking to explore what
Self, Other, Other-Self The idea of double-consciousness, of the existence of both/and within the
psychology and identity of an individual, complicates the stark boundaries of the Journal of
Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 4
self/other binary. This idea is support by psychological research in which “the self is often
viewed as fundamentally interpersonal, composed of a repertoire of relational selves” (Kenny
and West 120). In the humanities and other social sciences, as Hancock indicates, the concept of
both/and sitting just below the surface of the theory of doubleconsciousness, has been picked up
and used by a variety of other thinkers, particularly feminist, black feminist, class and racial
theorists. Deborah K. King uses double and triple jeopardy in relation to black women and black
working class women (King 297). Gloria Anzaldúa develops a theory of mestiza consciousness
for Mexican, Mexican American and Chicana women (Anzaldúa). Chen Xu writes about the
existence of a third consciousness in the novelist Richard Wright’s black male characters (Xu
40). In many ways, the use of this both/and, non-binary thinking is not unique, yet I am
proposing an approach which takes a broad enough stance to be applicable to multiple groups at
once, not exclusively those which are multiple marginalized in a traditional identity politics
sense.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4615-7834-5_3
The 1980s have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the self. Not only have new models
proliferated, but a number of investigators have sought theoretical guidance from historical
scholars of the past. In our own work, we have drawn upon the insights of William James
(1892) and Charles Horton Cooley (1902). In this chapter we build upon the legacy of James
and Cooley, particularly with regard to an understanding of the determinants of self-regard or
self-worth. We adopt a developmental perspective in that we focus on how the child’s sense of
overall worth as a person is constructed. A major goal of our research has been to
operationalize the formulations of both James and Cooley, in order to provide a test of their
appropriateness in accounting for individual differences in self-worth. We have also sought to
examine the issue of whether self-worth is merely an epiphenomenal construct or whether it
plays a role in mediating one’s affect and one’s motivational level. Since a detailed description
of this work has appeared elsewhere (see Harter, 1986b, 1987), this chapter merely summarizes
the model and supporting evidence.
The 1980s have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the self. Not only have new models
proliferated, but a number of investigators have sought theoretical guidance from historical
scholars of the past. In our own work, we have drawn upon the insights of William James (1892)
and Charles Horton Cooley (1902). In this chapter we build upon the legacy of James and
Cooley, particularly with regard to an understanding of the determinants of self-regard or self-
worth. We adopt a developmental perspective in that we focus on how the child's sense of overall
worth as a person is constructed. A major goal of our research has been to operationalize the
formulations of both James and Cooley, in order to provide a test of their appropriateness in
accounting for individual differences in self-worth. We have also sought to examine the issue of
whether self-worth is merely an epiphenomenal construct or whether it plays a role in mediating
one's affect and one's motivational level. Since a detailed description of this work has appeared
elsewhere (see Harter, 1986b, 1987), this chapter merely summarizes the model and supporting
evidence. Following this description, we examine the extent to which children and adolescents
are able to conserve the self over time as well as across the various roles that they must adopt.
We also discuss the mechanisms through which children and adolescents attempt to protect and
enhance the self. Finally, this more Western approach to the self is contrasted to a more Eastern,
Buddhist perspective, and the implications of each are explored. I -Self Versus Me-Self The
majority of scholars who have devoted thoughtful attention to the self have come to the
conclusion that two conceptually distinct, but experientally intertwined, aspects of the self can be
meaningfully identified, the I-self and the Me-self. From a historical perspective, James (1892)
was perhaps the most articulate on this issue, although Mead (1934) also pur
CHAPTER X.
The Consciousness of Self.
Let us begin with the Self in its widest acceptation, and follow it up to its most delicate and
subtle form, advancing from the study of the empirical, as the Germans call it, to that of the pure,
Ego.
The Empirical Self or Me.
The Empirical Self of each of us is all that he is tempted to call by the name of me. But it is clear
that between what a man calls me and what he simply callsmine the line is difficult to draw. We
feel and act about certain things that are ours very much as we feel and act about ourselves. Our
fame, our children, the work of our hands, may be as dear to us as our bodies are, and arouse the
same feelings and the same acts of reprisal if attacked. And our bodies themselves, are they
simply ours, or are they us? Certainly men have been ready to disown their very bodies and to
regard them as mere vestures, or even as prisons of clay from which they should some day be
glad to escape.
We see then that we are dealing with a fluctuating material. The same object being sometimes
treated as a part of me, at other times as simply mine, and then again as if I had nothing to do
with it at all. In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self is the sum total of all that
he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his
wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and
yacht and bank-account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper,
he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down, - not necessarily in the
same degree for each [p. 292] thing, but in much the same way for all. Understanding the Self in
this widest sense, we may begin by dividing the history of it into three parts, relating respectively
to -
1. Its constituents;
2. The feelings and emotions they arouse, -- Self-feelings;
3. The actions to which they prompt, -- Self-seeking and Self-preservation.
1. The constituents of the Self may be divided into two classes, those which make up respectively
-
An equally instinctive impulse drives us to collect property; and the collections thus made
become, with different degrees of intimacy, parts of our empirical selves. The parts of our wealth
most intimately ours are those which are saturated with our labor. There are few men who would
not feel personally annihilated if a life-long construction of their hands or brains - say an
entomological collection or an extensive work in manuscript - were suddenly swept away. The
miser feels similarly towards his gold, and although it is true that a part of our depression at the
loss of possessions is due to our feeling that we must now go without certain goods that we
expected the possessions to bring in their train, yet in every case there remains, over and above
this, a sense of the shrinkage of our personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness,
which is a psychological phenomenon by itself. We are all at once assimilated to the tramps and
poor devils whom we so despise, and at the same time removed farther than ever away from the
happy sons of earth who lord it over land and sea and men in the full-blown lustihood that wealth
and power can give, and before whom, stiffen ourselves as we will by appealing to anti-snobbish
first principles, we cannot escape an emotion, open or sneaking, of respect and dread.
(b) A man's Social Self is the recognition which he gets from his mates. We are not only
gregarious animals, liking to be in sight of our fellows, but we have an innate propensity to get
ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our kind. No more fiendish punishment could be
devised, were such a thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society
and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof. If no one turned round when we
entered, answered when we spoke, or minded what we did, but if every person we met 'cut us
dead,' and acted as if we were non-existing things, a kind of rage and impotent despair would ere
long well up in us, from which the [p. 294] cruellest bodily tortures would be a relief; for these
would make us feel that, however bad might be our plight, we had not sunk to such a depth as to
be unworthy of attention at all.
Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize
him and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of these his images is to wound
him.[2] But as the individuals who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may
practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons
about whose opinion he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these
different groups. Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents and teachers, swears
and swaggers like a pirate among his 'tough' young friends. We do not show ourselves to our
children as to our club-companions, to our customers as to the laborers we employ, to our own
masters and employers as to our intimate friends. From this there results what practically is a
division of the man into several selves; and this may be a discordant splitting, as where one is
afraid to let one set of his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may be a perfectly
harmonious division of labor, as where one tender to his children is stern to the soldiers or
prisoners under his command.
The most peculiar social self which one is apt to have is in the mind of the person one is in love
with. The good or bad fortunes of this self cause the most intense elation and dejection -
unreasonable enough as measured by every other standard than that of the organic feeling of the
individual. To his own consciousness he is not, so long as this particular social self fails to get
recognition, and when it is recognized his contentment passes all bounds.
A man's fame, good or bad, and his honor or dishonor, are names for one of his social selves.
The particular social self of a man called his honor is usually the result of one of those splittings
of which we have spoken. It is his image in the eyes of his own 'set,' which exalts or con- [p.
295] demns him as he conforms or not to certain requirements that may not be made of one in
another walk of life. Thus a layman may abandon a city infected with cholera; but a priest or a
doctor would think such an act incompatible with his honor. A soldier's honor requires him to
fight or to die under circumstances where another man can apologize or run away with no stain
upon his social self. A judge, a statesman, are in like manner debarred by the honor of their cloth
from entering into pecuniary relations perfectly honorable to persons in private life. Nothing is
commoner than to hear people discriminate between their different selves of this sort: "As a man
I pity you, but as an official I must show you no mercy; as a politician I regard him as an ally,
but as a moralist I loathe him;" etc., etc. What may be called 'club-opinion' is one of the very
strongest forces in life.[3] The thief must not steal from other thieves; the gambler must pay his
gambling-debts, though he pay no other debts in the world. The code of honor of fashionable
society has throughout history been full of permissions as well as of vetoes, the only reason for
following either of which is that so we best serve one of [p. 296] our social selves. You must not
lie in general, but you may lie as much as you please if asked about your relations with a lady;
you must accept a challenge from an equal, but if challenged by an inferior you may laugh him
to scorn: these are examples of what is meant.
(c) By the Spiritual Self, so far as it belongs to the Empirical Me, I mean a man's inner or
subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions, taken concretely; not the bare principle of
personal Unity, or 'pure' Ego, which remains still to be discussed. These psychic dispositions are
the most enduring and intimate part of the self, that which we most verily seem to be. We take a
purer self-satisfaction when we think of our ability to argue and discriminate, of our moral
sensibility and conscience, of our indomitable will, than when we survey any of our other
possessions. Only when these are altered is a man said to be alienatus a se.
Now this spiritual self may be considered in various ways. We may divide it into faculties, as
just instanced, isolating them one from another, and identifying ourselves with either in turn.
This is an abstract way of dealing with consciousness, in which, as it actually presents itself, a
plurality of such faculties are always to be simultaneously found; or we may insist on a concrete
view, and then the spiritual self in us will be either the entire stream of our personal
consciousness, or the present 'segment' or 'section' of that stream, according as we take a broader
or a narrower view - both the stream and the section being concrete existences in time, and each
being a unity after its own peculiar kind. But whether we take it abstractly or concretely, our
considering the spiritual self at all is a reflective process, is the result of our abandoning the
outward-looking point of view, and of our having become able to think of subjectivity as such, to
think ourselves as thinkers.
This attention to thought as such, and the identification of ourselves with it rather than with any
of the objects which it reveals, is a momentous and in some respects a rather mysterious
operation, of which we need here only say that as a matter of fact it exists; and that in everyone,
at an early age, the distinction between thought as such, [p. 297] and what it is 'of' or 'about,' has
become familiar to the mind. The deeper grounds for this discrimination may possibly be hard to
find; but superficial grounds are plenty and near at hand. Almost anyone will tell us that thought
is a different sort of existence from things, because many sorts of thought are of no things - e.g.,
pleasures, pains, and emotions; others are of non-existent things - errors and fictions; others
again of existent things, but in a form that is symbolic and does not resemble them - abstract
ideas and concepts; whilst in the thoughts that do resemble the things they are 'of' (percepts,
sensations), we can feel, alongside of the thing known, the thought of it going on as an altogether
separate act and operation in the mind.
Now this subjective life of ours, distinguished as such so clearly from the objects known by its
means, may, as aforesaid, be taken by us in a concrete or in an abstract way. Of the concrete way
I will say nothing just now, except that the actual 'section' of the stream will ere long, in our
discussion of the nature of the principle of unity in consciousness, play a very important part.
The abstract way claims our attention first. If the stream as a whole is identified with the Self far
more than any outward thing, a certain portion of the stream abstracted from the rest is so
identified in an altogether peculiar degree, and is felt by all men as a sort of innermost centre
within the circle, of sanctuary within the citadel, constituted by the subjective life as a whole.
Compared with this element of the stream, the other parts, even of the subjective life, seem
transient external possessions, of which each in turn can be disowned, whilst that which disowns
them remains. Now, what is this self of all the other selves?
Probably all men would describe it in much the same way up to a certain point. They would call
it the active element in all consciousness; saying that whatever qualities a man's feelings may
possess, or whatever content his thought may include, there is a spiritual something in him which
seems to go out to meet these qualities and contents, whilst they seem to come in to be received
by it. It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the perception of sensations, and by giving
or withholding its
[p. 298] assent it influences the movements they tend to arouse. It is the home of interest, - not
the pleasant or the painful, not even pleasure or pain, as such, but that within us to which
pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the painful, speak. It is the source of effort and attention, and
the place from which appear to emanate the fiats of the will. A physiologist who should reflect
upon it in his own person could hardly help, I should think, connecting it more or less vaguely
with the process by which ideas or incoming sensations are 'reflected' or pass over into outward
acts. Not necessarily that it should be this process or the mere feeling of this process, but that it
should be in some close way related to this process; for it plays a part analogous to it in the
psychic life, being a sort of junction at which sensory ideas terminate and from which motor
ideas proceed, and forming a kind of link between the two. Being more incessantly there than
any other single element of the mental life, the other elements end by seeming to accrete round it
and to belong to it. It becomes opposed to them as the permanent is opposed to the changing and
inconstant.
The 'I' and the 'me' are terms central to the social philosophy of George Herbert Mead, one of
the key influences on the development of the branch of sociology called symbolic interactionism.
The terms refer to the psychology of the individual, where in Mead's understanding, the "me" is
the socialized aspect of the person, and the "I" is the active aspect of the person.[1]
One might usefully 'compare Mead's "I" and "me", respectively, with Sartre's "choice" and
"the situation". But Mead himself matched up the "me" with Freud's "censor", and the "I" with
his "ego"; and this is psychologically apt'
The "Me" is what is learned in interaction with others and (more generally) with the
environment: other people's attitudes, once internalized in the self, constitute the Me.[3] This
includes both knowledge about that environment (including society), butalso about who the
person is: their sense of self. "What the individual is for himself is not something that he
invented. It is what his significant others have come to ...treat him as being."[4] This is because
people learn to see who they are (man or woman, old or young, etc.) by observing the responses
of others themselves or their actions. If others respond to a person as (for instance) a woman, the
person develops a sense of herself indeed as a woman.
At the same time, 'the "Me" disciplines the "I" by holding it back from breaking the law of the
community'.[5] It is thus very close to the way in a man Freud's 'ego-censor, the
conscience...arose from the critical influence of his parents (conveyed to him by the medium of
the voice), to whom were added, as time went on, those who trained and taught him and the
innumerable and indefinable host of all the other people in his environment—his fellow-men—
and public opinion'.[6] It is 'the attitude of the other in one's own organism, as controlling the
thing that he is going to do'.[7]
By contrast, 'the "I" is the response of the individual to the attitude of the community'.[8] The "I"
acts creatively, though within the context of the me. Mead notes that "It is only after we have
acted that we know what we have done...what we have said."[8]People, he argues, are not
automatons; Mead states that "the "I" reacts to the self which arises though the taking of the
attitude of others."[9] They do not blindly follow rules. They construct a response on the basis of
what they have learned, the "me". Mead highlighted accordingly those values that attach
particularly to the "I" rather than to the me, "...which cannot be calculated and which involve a
reconstruction of the society, and so of the 'me' which belongs to that society."[10] Taken
together, the "I" and the "me" form the person or the self in Mead's social philosophy. According
to Mead, there would be no possibility of personality without both the "I" and the "Me".[11]
Fusion[edit]
Mead explored what he called 'the fusion of the "I" and the "me" in the attitudes of religion,
patriotism, and team work', noting what he called the "peculiar sense of exaltation" that
belongs[12] to them. He also considered that 'the idea of the fusion of the "I" and the "me" gives a
very adequate explanation of this exaltation...in the aesthetic experience'.[13]
In everyday life, however, 'a complete fusion of the "I" and the "me" may not be a good thing...it
is a dynamic sort of balance between the "I" and the "me" that is required'.[14]
Conventionality[edit]
When there is a predominance of the "me" in the personality, 'we speak of a person as a
conventional individual; his ideas are exactly the same as those of his neighbours; he is hardly
more than a "me" under the circumstances'[15]—"...the shallow, brittle, conformist kind of
personality..." that is "all persona, with its excessive concern for what people think."[16] The
alternative—and in many ways Mead's ideal—was the person who has a definite personality,
who replies to the organized attitude in a way that makes a significant difference. With such a
person, the I is the most important phase of the experience.[15]
Dissociation[edit]
Mead recognised that it is normal for an individual to have 'all sorts of selves answering to all
sorts of different social reactions', but also that it was possible for 'a tendency to break up the
personality' to appear: 'Two separate "me's" and "I's", two different selves, result...the
phenomenon of dissociation of personality'.[17]
Literary examples[edit]
Walt Whitman 'marks off the impulsive "I", the natural, existential aspect of the self, from
critical sanction. It is the cultured self, the "me", in Mead's terms, that needs re-mediation'.[18]
Psychological Differentiation
What is Psychological Differentiation?
There are four key steps to psychological differentiation. The first steps involve becoming aware
of the various ways we have been influenced by destructive individuals and experiences from our
past. The next steps involve taking actions to break with these old identities in order to ultimately
become our truest selves. As Dr. Firestone points out, “Becoming a differentiated person is a
lifelong project.” So be patient and compassion toward yourself as you move through these steps.
Step 1:
The first step of psychological differentiation involves breaking with destructive thoughts and
attitudes toward ourselves that we internalized based on painful early life experiences. We can
start by identifying these negative thought processes, which Dr. Firestone calls the critical inner
voice, that are harmful or negative toward the self. Some of these thoughts may seem positive at
first (either self-soothing or self-aggrandizing), while others will seem hostile, self-hating,
paranoid, or suspicious. Once we become aware of these “voices,” we can develop insight into
the sources of these destructive thoughts. We can develop this insight by thinking about which
specific individuals or experiences may have lead us to feel these negative ways about
ourselves. Then we can try to answer back to these skewed thoughts in our own point of view.
By learning to challenge this inner critic, we separate from the “parent” we’ve internalized, a
step that may cause us anxiety but will ultimately free us to become who we strive to be.
Step 2:
The second step of differentiation involves recognizing and changing negative personality traits
in ourselves that are an incorporation of the negative traits of our parents, caregivers, or other
influential figures. Many individuals are surprised to find that, despite their best intentions, they
often act in the same negative ways a parent did — reenacting the very actions or personality
patterns that they swore they would never repeat themselves. Altering these unpleasant or toxic
personality characteristics — addictions, vanity, phoniness, self-centeredness, a victimized
orientation toward life, attitudes of superiority and contempt, among others – is a powerful way
of saying goodbye to our past. It is important to be proactive about changing these negative
personality traits without being self-hating or falling back into your critical inner voices.
Understand that you came by these faults honestly and that you have the full power to change
them.
Step 3:
The third step of differentiation involves looking into the psychological defenses we
developed as an adaptation to the pain and distress we experienced growing up. To differentiate
from the more childish aspects of our personality, we need to identify and then give up the
patterns of defense we formed to deal with pain early in our lives. We need to recognize that the
defenses we formed to protect ourselves as children often limit us in our adult lives. For
example, if we were intruded on as children, we may feel excessively guarded as adults. If we
were rejected as kids, we may feel distrusting in our relationships. People tend to cling to these
defended ways of responding to others and remain emotionally trapped in cycles from their past.
As adults, it’s important to give up the hope of ever filling the vast voids we felt as children. In
order to become psychologically differentiated, we need to, in effect, say goodbye to our “child
selves” and live fully as the adults we are now.
Step 4:
The final step of psychological differentiation involves developing our own values, ideals, and
beliefs rather than automatically accepting the beliefs that we grew up with or those of our
culture. We should strive to lead a life of integrity, according to our own ideals, in spite of social
pressures to conform to the standards of others. We should resist influences that are oppressive
or restrictive of individual human rights. It is also important to formulate transcendent goals,
those that go beyond ourselves and our immediate family, and to take steps toward fulfilling
these goals that give personal meaning to our life.
A person is said to be in a state of incongruence if some of the totality of their experience is
unacceptable to them and is denied or distorted in the self-image.
The humanistic approach states that the self is composed of concepts unique to ourselves. The
self-concept includes three components:
Self-worth
Self-worth (or self-esteem) comprises what we think about ourselves. Rogers believed feelings
of self-worth developed in early childhood and were formed from the interaction of the child
with the mother and father.
Self-image
How we see ourselves, which is important to good psychological health. Self-image includes the
influence of our body image on inner personality.
At a simple level, we might perceive ourselves as a good or bad person, beautiful or ugly. Self-
image affects how a person thinks, feels and behaves in the world.
Ideal-self
This is the person who we would like to be. It consists of our goals and ambitions in life, and is
dynamic – i.e., forever changing.
The ideal self in childhood is not the ideal self in our teens or late twenties etc.
How we think about ourselves, our feelings of self-worth are of fundamental importance both to
psychological health and to the likelihood that we can achieve goals and ambitions in life and
achieve self-actualization.
Self-worth may be seen as a continuum from very high to very low. For Carl Rogers (1959) a
person who has high self-worth, that is, has confidence and positive feelings about him or
herself, faces challenges in life, accepts failure and unhappiness at times, and is open with
people.
A person with low self-worth may avoid challenges in life, not accept that life can be painful and
unhappy at times, and will be defensive and guarded with other people.
Rogers believed feelings of self-worth developed in early childhood and were formed from the
interaction of the child with the mother and father. As a child grows older, interactions with
significant others will affect feelings of self-worth.
Rogers believed that we need to be regarded positively by others; we need to feel valued,
respected, treated with affection and loved. Positive regard is to do with how other people
evaluate and judge us in social interaction. Rogers made a distinction between unconditional
positive regard and conditional positive regard.
Unconditional Positive Regard
Unconditional positive regardis where parents, significant others (and the humanist therapist)
accepts and loves the person for what he or she is. Positive regard is not withdrawn if the person
does something wrong or makes a mistake.
The consequences of unconditional positive regard are that the person feels free to try things out
and make mistakes, even though this may lead to getting it worse at times.
People who are able to self-actualize are more likely to have received unconditional positive
regard from others, especially their parents in childhood.
Conditional Positive Regard
Conditional positive regard is where positive regard, praise, and approval, depend upon the child,
for example, behaving in ways that the parents think correct.
Hence the child is not loved for the person he or she is, but on condition that he or she behaves
only in ways approved by the parent(s).
At the extreme, a person who constantly seeks approval from other people is likely only to have
experienced conditional positive regard as a child.
Congruence
A person’s ideal self may not be consistent with what actually happens in life and experiences of
the person. Hence, a difference may exist between a person’s ideal self and actual experience.
This is called incongruence.
Where a person’s ideal self and actual experience are consistent or very similar, a state of
congruence exists. Rarely, if ever, does a total state of congruence exist; all people experience a
certain amount of incongruence.
The development of congruence is dependent on unconditional positive regard. Carl Rogers
believed that for a person to achieve self-actualization they must be in a state of congruence.
According to Rogers, we want to feel, experience and behave in ways which are consistent with
our self-image and which reflect what we would like to be like, our ideal-self.
The closer our self-image and ideal-self are to each other, the more consistent or congruent we
are and the higher our sense of self-worth. A person is said to be in a state of incongruence if
some of the totality of their experience is unacceptable to them and is denied or distorted in the
self-image.
Incongruence is "a discrepancy between the actual experience of the organism and the self-
picture of the individual insofar as it represents that experience.
As we prefer to see ourselves in ways that are consistent with our self-image, we may
use defense mechanisms like denial or repression in order to feel less threatened by some of what
we consider to be our undesirable feelings. A person whose self-concept is incongruent with her
or his real feelings and experiences will defend because the truth hurts.
our real self is the person you are in reality, at present. Your ideal self is the ought self - that
which you desire to be. It comprises your image of yourself - both in terms of your physical
(body image) as well as psychological traits. It could be that you are very short tempered (your
real self) however you desire to be someone who is in control of his/ her situational temper (ideal
self). Similarly you may be short and a bit flabby but your ideal image of yourself is being a bit
taller and more lean. The greater the discrepancy between your real and ideal self , the greater
will be your frustration and distress. Hence we should aim at reducing this discrepancy , so as to
reduce the cognitive dissonance. You can reduce the discrepancy either by directly addressing
the issue if possible (exercising) or trying to be more accepting of the issue if it cannot be solved
(for example being short in terms of height).
James’ piece elaborates on the constituents, or selves, that create one cohesive “self. What
people associate with the terms “I,” “me,” and “mine,” can all in some way or another be
associated with an investment of self to some degree or another. James claims that the
understanding of Self can be separated into three categories: “1. Its constituents; 2. The feelings
and emotions they arouse,—Self-feelings; 3. The actions to which they prompt,—Self-seeking
and Self-preservation” (James 1890, 162). The first category, the constituents that constitute Self
can then be further divided into sub-categories of “a. The material Self; b. The social Self; c. The
spiritual Self; and d. The pure Ego” (James 1890, 162). James then further explicates each of the
four aforementioned sub-categories.
The material Self is constituted by: our bodies, clothes, immediate family, and home. It is it to
these things, according to James, that we are the most deeply affected by because of our
investments of self within these things. The more we invest of ourselves in these objects, the
more attached to them we inevitably are to them.
A man’s social Self is configured based upon our interactions with society and the reactions of
others that are analyzed in order to contribute to our idea of a social Self. Within this notion of
the social Self, there are multiple divergences; which version of Self is present is contingent
upon which of a particular social group one finds one’s self in. Seemingly, possessing multiple
social Selves and maintaining the right face depending on social situation can be chaotic or
harmonious. In attempts to maintain order between different variations of social Self, an
individual’s sense of “fame” or “honor” regulates and determines what behaviors are or not
moral, reasonable or honorable.
The next constituent is said by James to be the most intimate self, the spiritual Self. James claims
that it is the most intimate version of self because the satisfaction experienced when one thinks
of one’s “ability to argue and discriminate, of our [one’s] moral sensibility, and conscience, of
our indomitable will” (James 1890, 164) is more pure than other sentiments of satisfaction. Then,
James describes a number of bodily processes in which becoming introspective can make the
acts entirely mindful, conscious processes—furthering our understanding of an intimate, spiritual
self.
Finally, James addresses the last and “most puzzling aspect of the self,” (1980, 165) the Pure
ego. While different schools of thought have all reached differing conclusions regarding the Ego,
James begins to describe it by first addressing the deciphering of a personal identity. The first
part of understanding the Ego comes with understanding that it can recognize its own thoughts;
the thoughts that belong to one’s own Ego can be recognized and possess a warmth that thoughts
possessed by a separate ego does not. This constructed consciousness then works in conjunction
with subjective synthesis, a concept that is essential to thinking and is the act of bringing
thoughts together (even if only to contrast them and realize the thoughts no longer belong
together). In understanding the entirety of the Ego’s functions, however, one must recall that
personal identity is perceived sameness and can ultimately be feeling—not fact.
True self (also known as real self, authentic self, original self and vulnerable self) and false
self (also known as fake self, idealized self, superficial self and pseudo self) are psychological
concepts often used in connection with narcissism.
They were introduced into psychoanalysis in 1960 by D. W. Winnicott.[1] Winnicott used true
self to describe a sense of self based on spontaneous authentic experience, and a feeling of being
alive, having a real self.[2]
The false self, by contrast, Winnicott saw as a defensive façade[1] – one which in extreme cases
could leave its holders lacking spontaneity and feeling dead and empty, behind a mere
appearance of being real.[1]
To maintain their self-esteem, and protect their vulnerable true selves, narcissists need
to control others' behavior – particularly that of their children, seen as extensions of
themselves.[3]
Philosophical views[edit]
hideThis section has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss
these issues on the talk page. (Learn how and when to remove these
template messages)
Churchland's work is in the school of analytic philosophy in western philosophy, with interests
in epistemology and thephilosophy of science, and specific principal interests in the philosophy
of mind and in neurophilosophy and artificial intelligence.[citation needed] His work has been
described as being influenced by the work of W. V. O. Quine, Thomas Kuhn,Russell
Hanson, Wilfred Sellars, and Paul Feyerabend[2] as well as by Karl Popper.[citation needed]
Along with his wife, Churchland is a major proponent of eliminative materialism,[10] the belief
that
everyday, common-sense, ‘folk’ psychology, which seeks to explain human behavior in terms of
the beliefs and desires of agents, is actually a deeply flawed theory that must be eliminated in
favor of a mature cognitive neuroscience.[3]
where by folk psychology is meant everyday mental concepts such as beliefs, feelings, and
desires, which are viewed as theoretical constructs without coherent definition, and thus destined
to be obviated by a scientific understanding of human nature.[according to whom?][citation needed] From the
perspective of Zawidzki, Churchland's concept of eliminativism is suggested as early as his
book Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979), with its most explicit formulation
appearing in a Journal of Philosophy essay, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional
Attitudes" (1981, see Written works section below).[3]
Churchland holds that beliefs are not ontologically real; that is, he maintains that a future, fully
matured neuroscience is likely to have no need for "beliefs" (see propositional attitudes), in the
same manner that modern science discarded such notions as legends or witchcraft.[according to
whom?][citation needed]
According to Churchland, such concepts will not merely be reduced to more
finely grained explanation and retained as useful proximate levels of description, but will be
strictly eliminated as wholly lacking in correspondence to precise objective phenomena, such as
activation patterns across neural networks.[this quote needs a citation] He points out that the history of
science has seen many posits once considered real entities, such as phlogiston, caloric,
the luminiferous ether, and vital forces, thus eliminated.[citation needed]
Moreover, in The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul Churchland hypothesizes that
consciousness might be explained in terms of a recurrent neural network with its hub in
the intralaminar nucleus of the thalamus, and feedback connections to all parts of the cortex.[full
citation needed]
He acknowledges that this proposal will likely be found in error with regard to the
neurological details, but states his belief that it is on the right track in its use of recurrent neural
networks to account for consciousness.[citation needed] This has been described, notably,[by whom?] as
a reductionist rather than eliminativist account of consciousness.[citation needed]
The way you responded to the Sharing the Rewards exercise tells you something about how you
feel regarding individual achievement and reward. Most Americans choose to divide the
available pool in a disproportionate way; they do not generally divide the money equally. This
tendency to stress either individuality or a more collective response is one of the most widely
distributed traits around the world. Not every culture is at one end or the other of the spectrum,
but the majority tend to favor one over the other in everyday life. Knowing about the basis of this
Collectivism versus Individualism construct will help you to recognize, understand, and
anticipate attitudes in different types of cultures.
Individualist—
The individual identifies primarily with self, with the needs of the
individual being satisfied before those of the group. Looking after
and taking care of oneself, being self-sufficient, guarantees the well-
being of the group. Independence and self-reliance are greatly
stressed and valued. In general, people tend to distance themselves
psychologically and emotionally from each other. One
may choose to join groups, but group membership is not essential to
one’s identity or success. Individualist characteristics are often
associated with men and people in urban settings.
Collectivist—