8. G.R. No.

L-53373
June 30, 1987
MARIO FL. CRESPO vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF
LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR
GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL.

FACTS: An information for Estafa was filed by the Fiscal against Crespo in the Criminal Circuit Court of
Lucena. When the case was set for arraignment, Crespo filed a Motion To Defer Arraingment on the
ground that there was a pending Petition for Review with the Department of Justice. Said Motion was
denied by Judge Mogul. Crespo‘s Motion For Reconsideration also having been denied, he filed a TRO
with the CA, which granted the same. Thereafter, the CA granted Crespo‘s Writ of Injucntion and
perpetually restrained Judge Mogul from having Crespo arrainged until the Sec. of Justice finally made
his decision and ordered the Fiscal to move for dismissal of the case. The Fiscal then filed a Motion
attaching the Secretary‘s Resolution calling for the dismissal of the case. Judge Mogul denied the Motion
and set Crespo‘s arraignment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may refuse to grant a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Fiscal under
orders from the Secretary of Justice and still insist on the arraignment of the accused.

HELD: Yes, it is within the power of the trial court to refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the
fiscal. Once an information is filed in court, the court‘s prior permission must be secured if fiscal wants
to reinvestigate the case. While it is true that it is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that
the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case,
the filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. The
Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
10. G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
SALVADOR ARROJADO

FACTS:
The accused, Salvador Arrojado, and the victim, Mary Ann Arrojado was living in the same roof along
with the victim’s father. The accused was helping in taking care of the victim’s father.
One day, the accused went to the house of his cousin, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that
the victim has committed suicide. Erlinda along with his husband and father went to the victim’s house
and there they saw the already lifeless body of the victim.
Upon examination, it was revealed that the victim suffered multiple stab wounds all over her body,
negating the theory of suicide.
On hearing, several witnesses testified on the strained relationship between the victim and the
accused. The accused was found guilty of murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, though not alleged in the
information, may be appreciated in the case.

HELD:
No, an aggravating circumstance to be appreciated must be alleged in the information.

The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993 which
increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death to reclusion perpetua to
death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and in
accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the penalty
of death on accused-appellant. However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure took effect, requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but
also the aggravating circumstances. This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the
well settled rule that “statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent.” The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not having been
alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to raise accused-appellant’s
sentence to death.
11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO DALISAY Y
DESTRESA - G.R. No. 188106
G.R. No. 188106 November 25, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ANTONIO DALISAY Y DESTRESA

FACTS:
Antonio Dalisay was charged and convicted with the crime of rape perpetrated against the 16 years old
daughter of his live in partner.
It was alleged that even prior to the commission of rape, the accused was already repeatedly molesting
the victim by inserting his fingers in her genitalia.
An information charging the accused of the crime of rape in relation to Republic Act 7610 was then
instituted before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The Regional Trial Court convicted the
accused for the crime of qualified rape. The Court of Appeals only found the accused guilty of the
crime of simple rape.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the special qualifying circumstance of minority, though not alleged in the information,
may be appreciated in the case at bar.

HELD:
No, the special qualifying circumstance of minority may not be appreciated as it is not alleged in the
information charging the accused of the crime.

While it has been proven that appellant was the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim and
the child was a minor at the time of the incident, the Court cannot convict appellant of qualified rape
because the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were not sufficiently alleged
in the information. To recall, the information here erroneously alleged that appellant was the
stepfather of the victim. Proven during the trial, however, was that appellant was not married to the
victim’s mother, but was only the common-law spouse of the latter. Following settled jurisprudence,
appellant is liable only of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
12. CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR. vs. HON. JOB B. MADAYAG
- G.R. No. 103102
G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR.
vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Petitioner, Tehankee, Jr. was charged with the crime of frustrated murder for the act of shooting
Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, which would have caused her death if not for the timely
medical intervention.
Trial ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for
leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro
Hultman died.
The prosecution then filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended information. The
amended information was filed, however, the petitioner refused to be arraigned on the said amended
information for lack of preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary
investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be
admitted.

HELD:
Yes, the amendment is legal and valid.

Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the trial but only as to matters of form and
provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. An objective appraisal of the
amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the
offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the
supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining
the proper penalty for the crime. Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the
amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed even during
the trial of the case. It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and
introduced in the second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be
demanded by the accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary
investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the
trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
13. Leviste v. Alameda, et. al., G.R. No. 182677, Aug. 3, 2010
Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:

On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with
homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private
complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the Order granting the motion
by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial court
issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not guilty"
for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela,
which the trial court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is not strong.
The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the Amended Information. Then, the trial court found the
petitioner guilty of homicide. From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The
appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a
preliminary investigation.

Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to whether a
defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally
stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.

An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein
does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. here is no
substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted
in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.

What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of
murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner
did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed
amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and
declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.
14. G.R. No. 175091 July 13, 2011
P/CHIEF INSPECTOR FERNANDO BILLEDO, SPO3 RODRIGO DOMINGO, PO3 JORGE LOPEZ, FERDINAND
CRUZ, and MARIANO CRUZ, vs. WILHELMINA WAGAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Branch III, Pasay City, ALBERTO MINA, NILO JAY MINA AND FERDINAND CAASI

FACTS: Private respondents were charged for violating a city ordinance that prohibits the drinking of
liquor in public places. Thereafter, the private respondents filed a civil case against the petitioners,
criminal complaints were also filed against the petitioners before the City Prosecutor Office and the
Office of the Ombudsman for unlawful arrest and violation of Republic Act No. 7348. Both of the
criminal actions against the petitioners were dismissed, however, the civil action proceeded with the
trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.

HELD: Yes, the civil case falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. The subject civil case
does not fall within the purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 as the latter part of this provision
contemplates only two (2) situations. First, a criminal action has been instituted before the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts after the requisite preliminary investigation, and the
corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously instituted with it. Second, the civil case, filed ahead
of the criminal case, is still pending upon the filing of the criminal action, in which case, the civil case
should be transferred to the court trying the criminal case for consolidation and joint determination.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 finds no application in this case. No criminal action has been filed before the
Sandiganbayan or any appropriate court. Thus, there is no appropriate court to which the subject civil
case can be transferred or consolidated as mandated by the said provision .It is also illogical to consider
the civil case as abandoned simply because the criminal cases against petitioners were dismissed at the
preliminary stage. A reading of the latter part of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8294 suggests that the civil case
will only be considered abandoned if there is a pending criminal case and the civil case was not
transferred to the court trying the criminal case for joint determination. The criminal charges against
petitioners might have been dismissed at the preliminary stage for lack of probable cause, but it does
not mean that the civil case instituted prior to the filing of the criminal complaints is already baseless as
the complainants can prove their cause of action in the civil case by mere preponderance of evidence
G.R. No. 172060
September 13, 2010 JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL vs. MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

FACTS: On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On 7
February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City
for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. On 11 February
2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a
bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City held that
the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case before it. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However,
The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be
declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution of the action of annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case of frustrated parricide.

HELD: No, there is no prejudicial question in the case at bar. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In the
case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was
not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. The relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any
person ―who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.‖ However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not
similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The
issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner‘s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.