People of the Philippines vs Orlito Villacorta Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 06 in Criminal Case No.
al Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 06 in Criminal Case No. VI-892 finding petitioner Roo
657 SCRA 270 – Criminal Law – Criminal Liability – Proximate Cause – Efficient Intervening
Cause
On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store to buy bread. Out of nowhere,
Orlito Villacorta appeared and thereafter stabbed the left part of the body of Cruz with a
sharpened bamboo stick. After that, Villacorta fled.
Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital where he was
treated as out-patient. He was discharged on the same day but on February 14, 2002, or 21
days after the stabbing incident, he returned to the same hospital where he was treated for
severe tetanus. The next day on February 15, 2002, Cruz died. The medical report states
that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted Villacorta for murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of murder.
HELD: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death is not the stabbing done by
Villacorta upon Cruz. There was an efficient intervening cause which appeared between the
time of the stabbing and the time of the death of Cruz.
In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that severe tetanus
(the kind of tetanus which causes immediate death) has an incubation period of 14 days or
less. In this case, the stabbing made by Vilalcorta could not have caused the tetanus
infection as 22 days already lapsed from the time of the stabbing until the date of death of
Cruz. Something else caused the tetanus other than the stabbing – in short, Cruz acquired
the tetanus 14 days or less before February 15, 2003 and not on the date of stabbing.
The court explained further:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time [Cruz] was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical injuries based on the facts. Neither is he guilty
of attempted nor frustrated murder, his intent to kill was not proven by the prosecution.
Seguritan vs People
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on
appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record.[1] It is only in
exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that
this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below. In this case, we hold that
the trial court did not overlook such factual matters; consequently, we find no necessity to review,
much less, overturn its factual findings.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February
24, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25069 which affirmed with modification the Judgment[3] of the Regional
Seguritan y Jara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Likewise impugned is the
Resolution[4] dated May 23, 2006 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
Factual Antecedents
On October 1, 1996, petitioner was charged with Homicide in an Information, [6] the accusatory portion
of which reads as follows:
That on or about November 25,1995, in the municipality of Gonzaga,
province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, ROO SEGURITAN y JARA alias Ranio, with intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and box one
Lucrecio Seguritan, inflicting upon the latter head injuries which caused his death.
Contrary to law.
During the arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
In the afternoon of November 25, 1995, petitioner was having a drinking session with his uncles
Lucrecio Seguritan (Lucrecio), Melchor Panis (Melchor) and Baltazar Panis (Baltazar), in the house of
Manuel dela Cruz in Barangay Paradise, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Petitioner, who was seated beside
Lucrecio, claimed that Lucrecios carabao entered his farm and destroyed his crops. A heated
discussion thereafter ensued, during which petitioner punched Lucrecio twice as the latter was about
to stand up. Petitioners punches landed on Lucrecios right and left temple, causing him to fall face-up
to the ground and hit a hollow block which was being used as an improvised stove.
Lucrecio lost consciousness but was revived with the assistance of Baltazar. Thereafter, Lucrecio rode
a tricycle and proceeded to his house in the neighboring barangay of Calayan, Cagayan.Upon his
arrival, his wife noticed blood on his forehead. Lucrecio explained that he was stoned, then went
directly to his room and slept.
At around 9 oclock in the evening, Lucrecios wife and daughter noticed that his complexion has
darkened and foamy substance was coming out of his mouth. Attempts were made to revive Lucrecio
but to no avail. He died that same night.
After the burial of Lucrecio on December 4, 1995, his wife learned of petitioners involvement
in her husbands death. Thus, she sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Antonio Vertido (Dr. Vertido) exhumed Lucrecios body and
performed the autopsy. Dr. Vertido found hematomas in the scalp located in the right parietal and left
occipital areas, a linear fracture in the right middle fossa, and a subdural hemorrhage in the right and
left cerebral hemisphere. Dr. Vertido concluded that Lucrecios cause of death was traumatic head
injury.[7]
On May 21, 1996, Melchor executed a sworn statement before the Gonzaga Police Station recounting
the events on that fateful day, including the punching of Lucrecio by petitioner.
At the time of Lucrecios death, he was 51 years old and earned an annual income of P14,000.00 as a
farmer.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 5, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of homicide. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Judgment of the RTC.
Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is partly AFFIRMED,
WITH MODIFICATION, to read as follows: The Court finds the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and sentences the accused to
an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor,
as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. The accused Roo Seguritan is ordered to pay the heirs of the late
Lucrecio Seguritan the amount of P 30,000.00 as actual damages, the amount
of P135,331.00 as loss of earning capacity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution
dated May 23, 2006.
Issues
Thus, this petition for review raising the following issues:
I The notation in the Certificate of Death of Lucrecio that he died of a heart attack has no
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts judgment of conviction.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the accused of the crime of homicide.[11]
Our Ruling
The petition is denied.
Petitioner disputes the conclusion that the fracture on the right middle fossa of the skull, beneath the
area where a hematoma developed was due to the blow he delivered because according to the
testimony of Dr. Vertido, the fracture may also be caused by one falling from a height. Petitioner also
maintains that the punches he threw at Lucrecio had nothing to do with the fatal head injuries the latter
suffered. According to him, Lucrecio sustained the head injuries when he accidentally hit the hollow
block that was used as an improvised stove, after falling from the opposite end of the bench. Petitioner
insists that Lucrecio died due to a fatal heart attack.
In fine, petitioner contends that the appellate court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court,
overlooked material and relevant factual matters which, if considered, would change the outcome of
the case.
We are not persuaded.
It is on record that Lucrecio suffered two external injuries and one internal injury in his
head. The autopsy report showed that Lucrecio died of internal hemorrhage caused by injuries located
at the upper right portion of the head, left side of the center of his head, and a fracture, linear, right
middle fossa, hemorrhage, subdural, right and left cerebral hemisphere.
We find no reason to doubt the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that
petitioner punched Lucrecio twice causing him to fall to the ground. Melchor categorically testified that
petitioner punched Lucrecio twice and as a result, Lucrecio fell to the ground and lost
consciousness. Melchor would not have testified falsely against petitioner, who was his nephew. He
even hesitated to testify as shown by his execution of a sworn statement just after the autopsy of
Lucrecio which revealed that the cause of death was traumatic head injury attributed to petitioner.
Melchors eyewitness account of the fist blows delivered by petitioner to Lucrecio and the manner by
which the latter fell from the bench and hit his head on the improvised stove is consistent with the
autopsy findings prepared and testified to by Dr. Vertido. Thus:
We find no merit in petitioners argument that he could not be held liable for the head fracture
suffered by Lucrecio. The height from which he stood to deliver the fist blows to Lucrecios head is
sufficient to cause the fracture.
The testimony of Dr. Vertido also ruled out petitioners contention that Lucrecio died of a
heart attack. The fact that Lucrecios cause of death is internal hemorrhage resulting from the head
injuries suffered during his encounter with the petitioner and the certainty that he had no heart problem
are evident in the following portion of Dr. Vertidos testimony:
weight in evidence. Dr. Corazon Flor, who signed said document testified that she did not examine the
cadaver of Lucrecio. She stated that a circular governing her profession did not require her to conduct
an examination of Lucrecios corpse, as long as the informant tells her that it is not a medico-legal
case. Renato Sidantes (Renato), the brother-in-law of Lucrecio who applied for the latters death
certificate, had no knowledge of the real cause of his death. Thus, Dr. Flor was mistakenly informed by
Renato that the cause of Lucrecios death was heart attack.
The petitioner belatedly contends that the delay in the autopsy of Lucrecios body and its
embalming compromised the results thereof. To substantiate his claim, he quotes the book entitled
Legal Medicine authored by Dr. Pedro Solis, viz:
a dead body must not be embalmed before the autopsy. The
embalming fluid may render the tissue and blood unfit for toxilogical analyses. The
embalming may alter the gross appearance of the tissues or may result to a wide
variety of artifacts that tend to destroy or obscure evidence.

the body must be autopsied in the same condition when found at the
crime scene. A delay in the performance may fail or modify the possible findings
thereby not serving the interest of justice.[17]
Petitioners reliance on this citation is misplaced. Petitioner failed to adduce evidence that the
one month delay in the autopsy indeed modified the possible findings. He also failed to substantiate
his claim that the embalming fluid rendered the tissue and blood of Lucrecio unfit for toxilogical
analysis.
Further, it is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally
offered.[18] The allegation that the results of the autopsy are unworthy of credence was based on a
book that was neither marked for identification nor formally offered in evidence during the hearing of
the case. Thus, the trial court as well as the appellate court correctly disregarded them. The
prosecution was not even given the opportunity to object as the book or a portion thereof was never
offered in evidence.[19]
A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To rule otherwise would
deprive the opposing party of his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. The
appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court
below.[20] Any evidence which a party desires to submit to the courts must be offered formally because
a judge must base his findings strictly on the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.[21]
We are not impressed with petitioners argument that he should be held liable only for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide due to the absence of intent to kill Lucrecio. When death
resulted, even if there was no intent to kill, the crime is homicide, not just physical injuries, since with
respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following
the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.[22] Accordingly,
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 4. Criminal liability Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
xxxx
Petitioner committed an unlawful act by punching Lucrecio, his uncle who was much older than him,
and even if he did not intend to cause the death of Lucrecio, he must be held guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for killing him pursuant to the above-quoted provision. He who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused.[23]
Considering the foregoing discussion, we find that both the trial court and the appellate court correctly
appreciated the evidence presented before them. Both courts did not overlook facts and
circumstances that would warrant a reevaluation of the evidence. Accordingly, there is no reason to
digress from the settled legal principle that the appellate court will generally not disturb the assessment
of the trial court on factual matters considering that the latter as a trier of facts, is in a better position to
appreciate the same.
Further, it is settled that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded greatest respect by the appellate
court absent any abuse of discretion.[24] There being no abuse of discretion in this case, we affirm the
factual findings of the trial court.
Penalty and Damages
The penalty for Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal the range
of which is from 12 years and one day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor the range of which is from six years and one day to 12
years. In this case, we find that the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed, attended the commission of the crime. Thus, the appellate court correctly imposed
the indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years and one
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As regards the amount of damages, civil indemnity must also be awarded to the heirs of Lucrecio
without need of proof other than the fact that a crime was committed resulting in the death of the victim
and that petitioner was responsible therefor.[25] Accordingly, we award the sum of P50,000.00 in line
with current jurisprudence.[26]
The award of P135,331.00 for the loss of earning capacity was also in order.[27] The prosecution
satisfactorily proved that the victim was earning an annual income of P14,000.00 from the harvest of
pineapples. Besides, the defense no longer impugned this award of the trial court.
However, the other awards of damages must be modified. It is error for the trial court and the appellate
court to award actual damages of P30,000.00 for the expenses incurred for the death of the
victim. We perused the records and did not find evidence to support the plea for actual damages. The
expenses incurred in connection with the death, wake and burial of Lucrecio cannot be sustained
without any tangible document to support such claim. While expenses were incurred in connection
with the death of Lucrecio, actual damages cannot be awarded as they are not supported by
receipts.[28]
In lieu of actual damages, the heirs of the victim can still be awarded temperate damages. When
pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with
certainty, temperate damages may be recovered. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases
where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the
court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss.[29] In this regard, the amount
of P25,000.00 is in accordance with recent jurisprudence.[30]
Moral damages was correctly awarded to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
fact that a crime was committed resulting in the death of the victim and that the accused was
responsible therefor.[31] The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages conforms to existing
jurisprudence.[32]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
25069 finding petitioner Roo Seguritan y Jara guilty of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Lucrecio Seguritan the amounts of P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P135,331.00 as loss of earning capacity is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that petitioner is further ordered to pay P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of
actual damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.
MELBA QUINTO, petitioner, vs. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER
PACHECO, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4
elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about eleven years
old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson
to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert.[1] Wilson assented. When Garcia saw
that it was dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from
the entrance of the drainage system.[2]
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson,
entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and
a meter wide, with water about a foot deep.[3] After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was
holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left [4] without saying a word.
Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time,
carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the boys lifeless body
down in the grassy area.[5]Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the
scene.[6] For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto,
Wilsons mother, and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the
drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.[7]
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been
conducted. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint
against the respondents for Wilsons death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner
Quinto.[8] Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage system
catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared that he saw Wilson
already dead when he passed by the drainage system while riding on his carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of the
NBI performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy report
containing the following postmortem findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with white long sleeves
and dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a niche-apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.
Laryngo tracheal lumina congested and edematous containing muddy particles
with bloody path.
Lungs hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains bloody
froth.
Brain autolyzed and liquefied.
Stomach partly autolyzed.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory. [9]
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and
Pacheco in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for homicide
by doloagainst the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac,
charging the respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:
That at around 8 oclock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the Municipality of Tarlac,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy, conspiring,
confederating, and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were
fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who testified
on direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the victims head and the abrasion
on the latters left forearm could have been caused by a strong force coming from a blunt
instrument or object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea also indicated that the victim died
of drowning, as some muddy particles were also found on the lumina of the larynx and
trachea (Nakahigop ng putik). Dr. Aguda stated that such injury could be caused when a
person is put under water by pressure or by force. [11] On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda
declared that the hematoma on the scalp was caused by a strong pressure or a strong force
applied to the scalp coming from a blunt instrument. He also stated that the victim could
have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilsons
head could have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of water,
the boy could have died by drowning.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared that the
4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilsons face could have also been caused by
rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He also
stated that the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation. [12]
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had admitted
the pictures showing the drainage system including the inside portions thereof, [13] the
prosecution rested its case.
 The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also held that it
could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant
evidence to prove their liability for Wilsons death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil
aspect of the case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING THAT NO
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON QUINTO.[14]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on December 21,
2001. It ruled as follows:
The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding
that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant
to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper.
Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of
acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v.
Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)[15]
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the following issues:
I the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL LIABILITY,
LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENTS
CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.[16]
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities, surmises and
speculations when it held that Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his head hitting
the stones in the drainage system since the culvert was slippery; or (b) he might have been
bitten by a snake which he thought was the prick of a fish fin, causing his head to hit hard
on the top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost consciousness due to some ailment, such
as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges that the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution
failed to prove any ill motive on the part of the respondents to kill the victim, and in
considering that respondent Andres even informed her of Wilsons death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the Medico-Legal
Expert, Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and number of the injuries sustained by the victim
which caused his death; as well as the locus criminis. The petitioner insists that the behavior
of the respondents after the commission of the crime betrayed their guilt, considering that
respondent Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent Andres to bring out Wilsons
cadaver, while respondent Andres returned inside the drainage system only when he saw
Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting for his friend Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to show that
either or both the respondents caused the death of her son and, as such, are jointly and
severally liable therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the prosecution failed
to adduce any evidence to prove that they committed the crime of homicide and caused the
death of Wilson, they are not criminally and civilly liable for the latters death.
The petition has no merit.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. [17] The civil liability of
such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code includes
restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential
damages.[18] When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. [19] With the implied institution of the
civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite
proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. [20]
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him
and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to
reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. [21] The sole purpose of
for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the
accused.[22] While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove the cause of action of the private
complainant against the accused for damages and/or restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in
a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may
arise does not exist.[23]
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.[24] Natural refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human
life or events, while logical means that there is a rational connection between the act of the
accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be the proximate
cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor.[25]
There must be a relation of cause and effect, the cause being the felonious act of the
offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The cause and
effect relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as
the pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones patologica del lesionado); the
predisposition of the offended party (la predisposicion del ofendido); the physical condition
of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent
conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al
herido); or the conditions supervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary
infection or gangrene.[26]
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the
resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely
foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim. [27]
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in
jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its
nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the
factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act
caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. [28] A different doctrine would
tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential
safeguard.[29] This Court has emphasized that:
Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the
treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to
raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which
persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment. [30]
In People v. Quianzon,[31] the Supreme Court held:
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case similar to the
present, the following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act
and in this case, the physical condition and temperament of the offended party nowise
lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means
employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant
inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his death, without his being
able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in question should be qualified as
homicide, etc.[32]
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. In People v.
Delim,[33] the Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused for homicide or murder:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists
of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendants agency in the commission of the
act. Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the
subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is
burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was
produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of
accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was
in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the
felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or
circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there
was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the
words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the
victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.[34]
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private
complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of
evidence. Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that presented by
the defendant, he is not entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his
cause of action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of that of the defendants.[35]
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how preponderance of
evidence is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining
where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the
court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. [36]
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the prosecution
failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the
respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for
damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective testimonies of
Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr. Dominic
Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp. But as to how
the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He presented two possibilities:
(a) that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied with full
force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard object:
COURT:
The trial court took into account the following facts:
Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that there were
stones inside the culvert. (See Exhibit D to D-3). The stones could have caused the victim to
slip and hit his head on the pavement. Since there was water on the culvert, the portion
soaked with water must be very slippery, aside from the fact that the culvert is round. If the
victim hit his head and lost consciousness, he will naturally take in some amount of water
and drown.[40]
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its conclusion
based on the said findings.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its assessment of probative weight of the evidence of the parties, and
its conclusion anchored on such findings, affirmed no less by the CA, are given conclusive
effect by this Court, unless the trial court ignored, misapplied or misconstrued cogent facts
and circumstances which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case. The
petitioner failed to show any justification to warrant a reversal of the findings or conclusions
of the trial and appellate courts.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia
testified that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he
refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco inside. [41] Respondent Andres had no
flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had one.
Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused the abrasion
on the left forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether the abrasions on
the face and left forearm of the victim were made ante mortem or post mortem.
The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both the
respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently, any
blunt object or instrument that might have been used by any or both of the respondents in
hitting the deceased.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes
for no reason at all.[42] However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is
relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated on the
person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive
on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited to
join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent Andres used to go to
their house and play with her son before the latters death:
[43]
When the petitioners son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent Andres
who brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her sons death. Even
after informing the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent Andres followed the
petitioner on her way to the grassy area where the deceased was:
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause of
action for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS MARCO
Lessons Applicable: Proximate cause, Conspiracy
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
• November 5, 1964 2:30 pm: It was raining and there was a fiesta being celebrated within
the vicinity of the market place of Barrio Subang, Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur.
Constancio Sabelbero was approached by Simeon Marco who asked him if he was the one
who boxed the latter's brother the previous year. Constancio denied. Then Simeon asked if
he had cigarettes and when he said he had none, Simeon said, "I have cigarettes; here is
my cigarette", as he pulled out a one-foot long hunting knife. Frightened, Constancio ran
away and Simeon chased him. As Constancio was passing by Rafael Marco, father of
Simeon, he struck Constancio with a round cane, hitting him on the left ear and left
shoulder.
• Vicente, the father of Constancio, who was in the crowd heard a shout of "Fight!
Fight!". He saw Simeon about to stab Constancio, so he grabbed the hand of Simeon that
was holding the knife. Then, Rafael Marco approached him armed with a cane and a
hunting knife. Sensing danger, Vicente shouted to Constancio and his other son
Bienvenido, who appeared on the scene, to run away. Vicente and Constancio was able to
run away but Bienvenido was chased and stabbed by Rafael which wounded his left
hand. Bienvenido tried to run Vicente, but his foot got caught in a vine on the ground and
he fell. Out of nowhere, Dulcisimo Beltran, who was accused arrived and stabbed
Bienvenido near his anus while he had his two hands touching the floor and both feet in a
forward position. Beltran was followed by Simeon who stabbed Bienvenido on the left
breast and the upper part of the left arm. Then, Rafael, Simeon and Beltran ran
away. Bienvenido got up slowly and walked zigzagly towards the store of Pinda where he
fell to the ground. Vicente asked him what happened and he said he was ganged up then
died.
• Criminal Case No. 2758: Rafael Marco was convicted of slight physical injuries and his
son, Simeon, was acquitted
• Criminal Case No, 2757: Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran, and Simeon Marco, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by abuse of superior
strength. Sentenced Rafael Marco to reclusion perpetua. While, Dulcisimo Beltran and
Simeon Marco who surrendered voluntarily sentenced EACH to an indeterminate penalty
consisting of 10 YEARS and 1 DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 YEARS, 4
MONTHS, and 1 DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum
ISSUE: W/N Rafael Marco should be guilty of murder.
HELD: NO. modified Rafael Marco guilty of slight physical injuries
• while it is true that Rafael started by stabbing Bienvenido on the left hand, there is no
clear evidence connecting his act with those of Beltran and Simeon. If Rafael had any
intention to really kill Bienvenido, he did not have to await for Simeon and Beltran to do it.
• The stabbing by the 3 was not simultaneous. Rather, it was successive. The manner in
which the incident occurred indicates that there was no pre-conceived plan among the
3. There is absolutely no showing that Rafael knew of the criminal intentions of Dulcisimo
Beltran or Simeon Marco as to the decedent. Neither is there any showing that after the
decedent was able to run away that Rafael shouted to Dulcisimo Beltran or Simeon Marco
for assistance. Or that he gave them any inciting or encouraging words, or that he even
joined them
• The accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design
entertained by the slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal
design. It is not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and
those attributed to the person charged as co-principal or accomplice; it is furthermore,
necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the former's criminal intent, should cooperate
with moral or material aid in the consummation of the crime.
• The ensuing death was not the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wound
inflicted by Rafael. There was an active intervening cause, which was no other than the
sudden and appearance and participation of Simeon Marco and Beltran.
GEMMA JACINTO vs PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 162540 13July2009 592SCRA26
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T.
Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of
Qualified Theft, and its Resolution[2] dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera
and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of CaloocanCity, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in
Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM
INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y
CO, and as such had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with
grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their
own account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in
the sum of P10,000.00, representing payment made by customer Baby
Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible,
reveals the events that transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed
petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the
amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega
Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check
was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline
Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and
inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call
sometime in the middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer
wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of
issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by
Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that
time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela
Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle
that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega
Foam, asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank
regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the
message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be
reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at
Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed
Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told
Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca,
petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's
accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter
indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment
for her purchases from Mega Foam.[4] Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July
1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check
bounced.[5] Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the
subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega
Foam P10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check. [6]
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO
check in his bank account, but explained that the check came into his possession when
some unknown woman arrived at his house around the first week of July 1997 to have the
check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even
bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by
the bank that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didnt know where to find
the woman who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided
by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the
bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along
with Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who
was then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They
originally intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash,
but the plan did not push through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioners house, where she met petitioner
and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita
Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go
shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded
petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the
jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from
Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises was
the P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the
money and upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been
watching the whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found
fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed
that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for
qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline
Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the
following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30,
1997, but claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite
some time before her resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of
the arrest, Ricablanca came to her mothers house, where she was staying at that time, and
asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was
going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch
a ride with the former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place
in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their
jeep, which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when
Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned
on June 30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect payments from
customers.According to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up
on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of
Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-
examination that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to
said house. They then met at the house of petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner
and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place,
Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes,
Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even
asked, What is this? Then, the NBI agents arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC
rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma
Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11)
DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND
TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated,
the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial
court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is
reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for
petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated March 5,
2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not
charged in the information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt
beyond
reasonable doubt.[8]
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements
of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the
Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that
petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to her
employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to
another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she
made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain this is presumed from the act of unlawful
taking and further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of
petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owners consent petitioner hid the fact
that she had received the check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the
check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by
the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it was done with
grave abuse of confidence petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments
from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal
Code, the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the
intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by
Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is
dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the
same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question
arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals[9] is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod,
the accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latters bedroom with bullets, but since
the intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the
CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged
guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in
relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of
producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be
incurred:
xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which
would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate to
ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime
because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When
the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts
for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not
produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one
of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such
person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him,
the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality
shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto
mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an
offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate
or ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime
under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court
in Intod[10] in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible
crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,
would not amount to a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. x x x [11]
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given
in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere
act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be
unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received
the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the
extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the
time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner
turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and
Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which
she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The
Court held in Valenzuela v. People[12] that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in
theft ─ the taking of personal property of another. Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308,
there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law that
theft is already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of another
without the latters consent.
xxxx
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain
unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from
that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the
offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able
or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation
from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. x
xx

xxxx
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is
deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property,
is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x
x [13]
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner
took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this
case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed
replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the
crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as
replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the
drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving
the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the
fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating
evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced
with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since
said scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court
cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process
clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible
source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004,
are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE
CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal
Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto
mayor, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED
Intod vs CA
FACTS:
• February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig
went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of
Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who
told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between
them and that Mandaya should accompany them. Otherwise, he would also be killed.
• February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and
fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
• RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness
ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)
HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer
the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties
provided by the law, and to pay the costs
• Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
• The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender
his formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
• Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount
to a crime
• Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
• Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime – this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty
• United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot
be held liable for any crime