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This document contains a summary of key cases related to public officers and public corporations. It discusses definitions of public office and the essential elements that constitute a public office. It also summarizes several cases that discuss whether certain positions constitute public offices and whether individuals in those positions are considered public officers. The cases examined whether organizations performed sovereign functions and were created by law to carry out government policies. The document also discusses the presumption of regularity that public officers enjoy in carrying out their duties.
This document contains a summary of key cases related to public officers and public corporations. It discusses definitions of public office and the essential elements that constitute a public office. It also summarizes several cases that discuss whether certain positions constitute public offices and whether individuals in those positions are considered public officers. The cases examined whether organizations performed sovereign functions and were created by law to carry out government policies. The document also discusses the presumption of regularity that public officers enjoy in carrying out their duties.
This document contains a summary of key cases related to public officers and public corporations. It discusses definitions of public office and the essential elements that constitute a public office. It also summarizes several cases that discuss whether certain positions constitute public offices and whether individuals in those positions are considered public officers. The cases examined whether organizations performed sovereign functions and were created by law to carry out government policies. The document also discusses the presumption of regularity that public officers enjoy in carrying out their duties.
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS / PUBLIC of the position, scope of duties, and the
CORPORATIONS SYLLABUS designation of the position as an office.—The
characteristics of a public office, according to PERTINANT LAWS Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign 1. The 1987 Constitution functions, its creation by law and not by 2. Revised Administrative Code of 1987 contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the (E.O. 292) position, scope of duties, and the designation 3. Local Government Code of the position as an office. 4. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Same; Same; Same; Court holds that the Employees (R.A. 6713) National Centennial Commission (NCC) 5. The Revised Penal Code performs executive functions.—We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The 6. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act executive power “is generally defined as the (R.A. 3019) power to enforce and administer the laws. It 7. The Ombudsman (R.A. 6770) is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, I. DEFINITIONS, DISTINCTIONS, therefore, concerns the implementation of the CLASSIFICATIONS policies as set forth by law. a. What is Public Office? b. Essential Elements Same; Same; Same; The NCC was precisely c. Creation created to ensure a more coordinated and d. Classification synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-government or private CASES organizations and to rationalize the relevance 1. LAUREL VS. DESIERTO of historical links with other countries and to carry them into effect.—E.O. No. 128, Constitutional Law; Ombudsman; Public reconstituting the Committee for the National Officers; The Ombudsman has the power to Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance “need to strengthen the said Committee to and non-feasance by a public officer or ensure a more coordinated and synchronized employee of the government, or of any celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and subdivision, agency or instrumentality wider participation from the government and thereof, including government-owned or non-government or private organizations.” It controlled corporations; Public Officer also referred to the “need to rationalize the Defined.—In sum, the Ombudsman has the relevance of historical links with other power to investigate any malfeasance, countries.” The NCC was precisely created to misfeasance and non-feasance by a public execute the foregoing policies and objectives, officer or employee of the government, or of to carry them into effect. any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or Same; Same; Same; The promotion of controlled corporations. Neither the industrialization and full employment is a Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of fundamental state policy.—There can hardly 1989, however, defines who public officers be any dispute that the promotion of are. A definition of public officers cited in industrialization and full employment is a jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a fundamental state policy. recognized authority on the subject: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created Same; Same; Same; The NCC performs and conferred by law, by which, for a given sovereign functions; It is a public office and period, either fixed by law or enduring at the petitioner is a public officer.—Clearly, the pleasure of the creating power, an individual NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, is invested with some portion of the sovereign therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its functions of the government, to be exercised Chair, is a public officer. by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. Same; Same; Same; Fact that petitioner did not receive any compensation during his Same; Same; Same; The characteristics of a tenure is of little consequence.—That public office include the delegation of petitioner allegedly did not receive any sovereign functions, its creation by law and compensation during his tenure is of little not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature responsive to the needs of the people they of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary are called upon to serve. is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the Same; Presumption of Regularity; The office is provided for it is a naked or honorary presumption of regularity enjoyed by public office, and is supposed to be accepted officers in the performance of their duties merely for the public good. Hence, the office necessarily obtains in favor of the Bureau of of petitioner as NCC Chair may be Internal Revenue (BIR) and Bureau of characterized as an honorary office, as Customs (BOC) officials and employees.— opposed to a lucrative office or an office of Public officers enjoy the presumption of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation regularity in the performance of their duties. or fees are attached. But it is a public office, This presumption necessarily obtains in favor nonetheless. of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and 2. ABAKADA VS PURISIMA reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging Judicial Review; A constitutional question is the officials and employees of the BIR and the ripe for adjudication when the governmental BOC to exceed their revenue targets and act being challenged has a direct adverse optimize their revenue-generation capability effect on the individual challenging it.—An and collection. The presumption is disputable actual case or controversy involves a conflict but proof to the contrary is required to rebut of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal it. It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture claims susceptible of judicial adjudication. A or denied in advance (as petitioners would closely related requirement is ripeness, that have the Court do) specially in this case is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. where it is an underlying principle to advance And a constitutional question is ripe for a declared public policy. adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect Same; Attrition Act of 2005 (R.A. No. 9335); on the individual challenging it. Thus, to be Judicial Review; To invalidate RA 9335 ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner based on baseless supposition is an affront must show a personal stake in the outcome to the wisdom not only of the legislature that of the case or an injury to himself that can be passed it but also of the executive which redressed by a favorable decision of the approved it.—A law enacted by Congress Court. enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, Same; Where an action of the legislative there must be a clear and unequivocal breach branch is alleged to have infringed the of the Constitution, not a doubtful and Constitution, it becomes not only the right but equivocal one. To invalidate RA 9335 based in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the on petitioners’ baseless supposition is an dispute.—This notwithstanding, public affront to the wisdom not only of the interest requires the resolution of the legislature that passed it but also of the constitutional issues raised by petitioners. executive which approved it. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of Same; Same; A system of incentives for constitutionality in favor of the law. And where exceeding the set expectations of a public an action of the legislative branch is alleged office is not anathema to the concept of public to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes account-ability.—Public service is its own not only the right but in fact the duty of the reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by judiciary to settle the dispute. law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of Public Officers; Public Accountability; Public incentives for exceeding the set expectations office is a public trust—it must be discharged of a public office is not anathema to the by its holder not for his own personal gain but concept of public accountability. In fact, it for the benefit of the public for whom he holds recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, it in trust.—Public office is a public trust. It industry, efficiency and loyalty to public must be discharged by its holder not for his service of deserving government personnel. own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By Same; Same; Equal Protection; Equality demanding accountability and service with guaranteed under the equal protection clause responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, is equality under the same conditions and patriotism and justice, all government officials among persons similarly situated—it is and employees have the duty to be equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified national government through the collection of based on substantial differences in relation to taxes, customs duties, fees and charges. the object to be accomplished.—Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause Delegation of Powers; Test; A law is is equality under the same conditions and complete when it sets forth therein the policy among persons similarly situated; it is to be executed, carried out or implemented equality among equals, not similarity of by the delegate and lays down a sufficient treatment of persons who are classified standard when it provides adequate based on substantial differences in relation to guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the object to be accomplished. When things the boundaries of the delegate’s authority or persons are different in fact or and prevent the delegation from running circumstance, they may be treated in law riot.—Two tests determine the validity of differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope delegation of legislative power: (1) the Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), this completeness test and (2) the sufficient Court declared: The guaranty of equal standard test. A law is complete when it sets protection of the laws is not a guaranty of forth therein the policy to be executed, carried equality in the application of the laws upon all out or implemented by the delegate. It lays citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a down a sufficient standard when it provides requirement, in order to avoid the adequate guidelines or limitations in the law constitutional prohibition against inequality, to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s that every man, woman and child should be authority and prevent the delegation from affected alike by a statute. Equality of running riot. To be sufficient, the standard operation of statutes does not mean must specify the limits of the delegate’s indiscriminate operation on persons merely authority, announce the legislative policy and as such, but on persons according to the identify the conditions under which it is to be circumstances surrounding them. It implemented. guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things Same; Civil Service; Security of Tenure; which are different in fact be treated in law as Inefficiency; Incompetence; The guarantee of though they were the same. The equal security of tenure only means that an protection clause does not forbid employee cannot be dismissed from the discrimination as to things that are different. service for causes other than those provided It does not prohibit legislation which is limited by law and only after due process is accorded either in the object to which it is directed or by the employee; RA 9335 lays down a the territory within which it is to operate. reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by Same; Same; Same; The equal protection at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all clause recognizes a valid classification, that relevant factors affecting the level of is, a classification that has a reasonable collection, a standard analogous to foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary; inefficiency and incompetence in the Since the subject of the law is the revenue- performance of official duties, a ground for generation capability and collection of the disciplinary action under civil service laws.— Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the RA 9335 in no way violates the security of Bureau of Customs (BOC), the incentives tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and/or sanctions provided in the law should and the BOC. The guarantee of security of logically pertain to the said agencies.—The tenure only means that an employee cannot equal protection clause recognizes a valid be dismissed from the service for causes classification, that is, a classification that has other than those provided by law and only a reasonable foundation or rational basis and after due process is accorded the employee. not arbitrary. With respect to RA 9335, its In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a expressed public policy is the optimization of reasonable yardstick for removal (when the the revenue-generation capability and revenue collection falls short of the target by collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all subject of the law is the revenue-generation relevant factors affecting the level of capability and collection of the BIR and the collection. This standard is analogous to BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions inefficiency and incompetence in the provided in the law should logically pertain to performance of official duties, a ground for the said agencies. Moreover, the law disciplinary action under civil service laws. concerns only the BIR and the BOC because The action for removal is also subject to civil they have the common distinct primary service laws, rules and regulations and function of generating revenues for the compliance with substantive and procedural due process. At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient departments to appear before and be heard standards: “public interest,” “justice and by either of its Houses on any matter equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and pertaining to their departments and its power “simplicity, economy and welfare.” In this of confirmation and (2) investigation and case, the declared policy of optimization of monitoring of the implementation of laws the revenue-generation capability and pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or with public interest. step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Separation of Powers; Legislative Veto; Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this Congressional oversight is not class. unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on Same; Same; Words and Phrases; the executive power to implement laws nor Legislative veto is a statutory provision undermines the constitutional separation of requiring the President or an administrative powers, but to forestall the danger of agency to present the proposed congressional encroachment “beyond the implementing rules and regulations of a law legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes to Congress which, by itself or through a two basic and related constraints on committee formed by it, retains a “right” or Congress—it may not vest itself, any of its “power” to approve or disapprove such committees or its members with either regulations before they take effect; Congress executive or judicial power, and, when it has two options when enacting legislation to exercises its legislative power, it must follow define national policy within the broad the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively horizons of its legislative competence—it can considered, procedures” specified under the itself formulate the details or it can assign to Constitution, including the procedure for the executive branch the responsibility for enactment of laws and presentment; Any making necessary managerial decisions in post-enactment congressional measure conformity with those standards.— should be limited to scrutiny and Legis-lative veto is a statutory provision investigation—any action or step beyond that requiring the President or an administrative will undermine the separation of powers agency to present the proposed guaranteed by the Constitution.—It is clear implementing rules and regulations of a law that congressional oversight is not to Congress which, by itself or through a unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither committee formed by it, retains a “right” or necessarily constitutes an encroachment on “power” to approve or disapprove such the executive power to implement laws nor regulations before they take effect. As such, undermines the constitutional separation of a legislative veto in the form of a powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks congressional oversight committee is in the and balances inherent in a democratic form of an inward-turning delegation system of government. It may in fact even designed to attach a congressional leash enhance the separation of powers as it (other than through scrutiny and prevents the over-accumulation of power in investigation) to an agency to which the executive branch. However, to forestall Congress has by law initially delegated broad the danger of congressional encroachment powers. It radically changes the design or “beyond the legislative sphere,” the structure of the Constitution’s diagram of Constitution imposes two basic and related power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role constraints on Congress. It may not vest in enforcing, applying or implementing its own itself, any of its committees or its members laws. Congress has two options when with either executive or judicial power. And, enacting legislation to define national policy when it exercises its legislative power, it must within the broad horizons of its legislative follow the “single, finely wrought and competence. It can itself formulate the details exhaustively considered, procedures” or it can assign to the executive branch the specified under the Constitution, including the responsibility for making necessary procedure for enactment of laws and managerial decisions in conformity with those presentment. Thus, any post-enactment standards. In the latter case, the law must be congressional measure such as this should complete in all its essential terms and be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In conditions when it leaves the hands of the particular, congressional oversight must be legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based branch or the concerned administrative primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation agency when it formulates rules and and the budget hearings conducted in regulations implementing the law is to fill up connection with it, its power to ask heads of details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised actual operation (contingent rule-making). neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Congress; Statutes; Congress, in the guise of Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative assuming the role of an overseer, may not veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto pass upon their legality by subjecting them to and a congressional committee legislative its stamp of approval without disturbing the veto are invalid. calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution—in exercising discretion to Same; Same; Same; Every bill passed by approve or disapprove the Implementing Congress must be presented to the President Rules and Regulations based on a for approval or veto and in the absence of determination of whether or not they presentment to the President, no bill passed conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, by Congress can become a law.—Every bill Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, passed by Congress must be presented to a power exclusively vested in this Court by the President for approval or veto. In the the Constitution.—Administrative regulations absence of presentment to the President, no enacted by administrative agencies to bill passed by Congress can become a law. implement and interpret the law which they In this sense, law-making under the are entrusted to enforce have the force of law Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and are entitled to respect. Such rules and and of the Executive. Assuming that regulations partake of the nature of a statute legislative veto is a valid legislative act with and are just as binding as if they have been the force of law, it cannot take effect without written in the statute itself. As such, they have such presentment even if approved by both the force and effect of law and enjoy the chambers of Congress. presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an Same; Same; Publication; Subject to the appropriate case by a competent court. indispensable requisite of publication under Congress, in the guise of assuming the role the due process clause, the determination as of an overseer, may not pass upon their to when a law takes effect is wholly the legality by subjecting them to its stamp of prerogative of Congress—as such, it is only approval without disturbing the calculated upon its effectivity that a law may be executed balance of powers established by the and the executive branch acquires the duties Constitution. In exercising discretion to and powers to execute the said law.—Where approve or disapprove the IRR based on a Congress delegates the formulation of rules determination of whether or not they to implement the law it has enacted pursuant conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, to sufficient standards established in the said Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, law, the law must be complete in all its a power exclusively vested in this Court by essential terms and conditions when it leaves the Constitution. the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the Same; Same; Principle of Bicameralism; legislature when it becomes effective Presentment Clause; The requirement that because it is only upon effectivity of the the implementing rules of a law be subjected statute that legal rights and obligations to approval by Congress as a condition for become available to those entitled by the their effectivity violates the cardinal language of the statute. Subject to the constitutional principles of bicameralism and indispensable requisite of publication under the rule on presentment; A valid exercise of the due process clause, the determination as legislative power requires the act of both to when a law takes effect is wholly the chambers—it can be exercised neither solely prerogative of Congress. As such, it is only by one of the two chambers nor by a upon its effectivity that a law may be executed committee of either or both chambers.—The and the executive branch acquires the duties requirement that the implementing rules of a and powers to execute the said law. Before law be subjected to approval by Congress as that point, the role of the executive branch, a condition for their effectivity violates the particularly of the President, is limited to cardinal constitutional principles of approving or vetoing the law. bicameralism and the rule on presentment. x x x Legislative power (or the power to Same; Same; Same; From the moment the propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) is law becomes effective, any provision of law vested in Congress which consists of two that empowers Congress or any of its chambers, the Senate and the House of members to play any role in the Representatives. A valid exercise of implementation or enforcement of the law legislative power requires the act of both violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.—From the published in full if their purpose is to enforce moment the law becomes effective, any or implement existing law pursuant to a valid provision of law that empowers Congress or delegation.—To be effective, administrative any of its members to play any role in the rules and regulations must be published in full implementation or enforcement of the law if their purpose is to enforce or implement violates the principle of separation of powers existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. and is thus unconstitutional. Under this The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May principle, a provision that requires Congress 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general or its members to approve the implementing circulation and became effective 15 days rules of a law after it has already taken effect thereafter. Until and unless the contrary is shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision shown, the IRR are presumed valid and that allows Congress or its members to effective even without the approval of the overturn any directive or ruling made by the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. members of the executive branch charged Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima, 562 with the implementation of the law. SCRA 251, G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008 Same; Statutes; Partial Unconstitutionality; Separability Clause; The general rule is that 3. FIGUEROA VS PEOPLE where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, Criminal Law; Defamation; Words and the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, Phrases; Defamation means injuring a may stand and be enforced; The presence of person’s character, fame or reputation a separability clause in a statute creates the through false and malicious statements; presumption that the legislature intended Defamation, which includes libel and slander, separability, rather than complete nullity of means injuring a person’s character, fame or the statute.—In Tatad v. Secretary of the reputation through false and malicious Department of Energy, 282 SCRA 361 statements.—Defamation, which includes (1997), the Court laid down the following libel and slander, means injuring a person’s rules: The general rule is that where part of a character, fame or reputation through false statute is void as repugnant to the and malicious statements. It is that which Constitution, while another part is valid, the tends to injure reputation or to diminish the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in may stand and be enforced. The presence of the complainant or to excite derogatory a separability clause in a statute creates the feelings or opinions about him. It is the presumption that the legislature intended publication of anything which is injurious to separability, rather than complete nullity of the good name or reputation of another or the statute. To justify this result, the valid tends to bring him into disrepute. portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that Same; Same; In libel cases, the question is the legislature would have enacted it by itself not what the writer of the libelous material if it had supposed that it could not means, but what the words used by him constitutionally enact the other. Enough must mean.—In libel cases, the question is not remain to make a complete, intelligible and what the writer of the libelous material valid statute, which carries out the legislative means, but what the words used by him intent. x x x The exception to the general rule mean. Here, the defamatory character of the is that when the parts of a statute are so words used by the petitioners is shown by the mutually dependent and connected, as very recitals thereof in the questioned article. conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant Administrative Law; A public office is the a belief that the legislature intended them as right, authority and duty, created and a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the conferred by law, by which an individual is rest. In making the parts of the statute invested with some portion of the sovereign dependent, conditional, or connected with functions of the government, to be exercised one another, the legislature intended the by him for the benefit of the public.—A public statute to be carried out as a whole and would office is the right, authority and duty, created not have enacted it if one part is void, in which and conferred by law, by which an individual case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the is invested with some portion of the sovereign other provisions thus dependent, conditional, functions of the government, to be exercised or connected must fall with them. by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. The Administrative Law; To be effective, most important characteristic which administrative rules and regulations must be distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring most certainly exposed him to public of an office involve a delegation to the contempt and ridicule. As found by the trial individual of some of the sovereign functions court in its judgment of conviction. of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the 4. JAVIER VS SANDIGANBAYAN sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, to be Criminal Procedure; Motions to Quash; Well- exercised for the public benefit. Unless the established is the rule that when a motion to powers conferred are of this nature, the quash in a criminal case is denied, the individual is not a public officer. remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to Same; The operation of a public market is not reiterating the special defenses invoked in a governmental function but merely an their motion to quash—remedial measures as activity undertaken by the city in its private regards interlocutory orders, such as a proprietary capacity.—Rivera cannot be motion to quash, are frowned upon and often considered a public officer. Being a member dismissed.—A motion to quash an of the market committee did not vest upon Information is the mode by which an accused him any sovereign function of the assails the validity of a criminal complaint or government, be it legislative, executive or Information filed against him for insufficiency judicial. As reasoned out by the CA, the on its face in point of law, or for defects which operation of a public market is not a are apparent in the face of the Information. governmental function but merely an activity Well-established is the rule that when a undertaken by the city in its private motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, proprietary capacity. Furthermore, Rivera’s the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but membership in the market committee was in for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice representation of the association of market to reiterating the special defenses invoked in vendors, a non-governmental organization their motion to quash. Remedial measures as belonging to the private sector. regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often Defamation; Article 354(2) of the Revised dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is Penal Code expressly requires that it be a to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single “fair and true report, made in good faith, action. The above general rule, however without any comments or remarks.”—Even if admits of several exceptions, one of which is we were to pretend that Rivera was a public when the court, in denying the motion to officer, which he clearly is not, the subject dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in article still would not pass muster as Article excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of 354(2), supra, of the Revised Penal Code discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. expressly requires that it be a “fair and true The reason is that it would be unfair to require report, made in good faith, without any the defendant or accused to undergo the comments or remarks.” Even a mere cursory ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has glance at the article reveals that it is far from no jurisdiction over the subject matter or being that. offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or Same; Moral Damages; Article 2219(7) of the motion to quash is made with grave abuse of Civil Code is express in stating that moral discretion or a whimsical and capricious damages may be recovered in case of libel, exercise of judgment. In such cases, the slander or any other form of defamation for ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain from the very publication and circulation of and adequate. the subject defamatory and libelous material itself, there can be no doubt as to the Public Officers; National Book Development resulting wounded feelings and besmirched Board (NBDB); Book Publishing Industry reputation sustained by complainant.— Development Act (Republic Act No. 8047); Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code is express in Words and Phrases; A public office is the stating that moral damages may be right, authority and duty, created and recovered in case of libel, slander or any conferred by law, by which, for a given period, other form of defamation. From the very either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure publication and circulation of the subject of the creating power, an individual is defamatory and libelous material itself, there invested with some portion of the sovereign can be no doubt as to the resulting wounded functions of the government, to be exercised feelings and besmirched reputation by him for the benefit of the public.—The sustained by complainant Rivera. The NBDB is the government agency mandated branding of defamatory names against him to develop and support the Philippine book publishing industry. It is a statutory the Anti-Graft Law, which provides that a government agency created by R.A. No. public officer includes elective and appointive 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure officials and employees, permanent or the full development of the book publishing temporary, whether in the classified or industry as well as for the creation of unclassified or exempt service receiving organization structures to implement the said compensation, even nominal, from the policy. To achieve this end, the Governing government; Under the Anti-Graft Law, the Board of the NBDB was created to supervise nature of one’s appointment, and whether the the implementation. The Governing Board compensation one receives from the was vested with powers and functions, to wit: government is only nominal, is immaterial x x x A perusal of the above powers and because the person so elected or appointed functions leads us to conclude that they is still considered a public officer.—The Court partake of the nature of public functions. A is not unmindful of the definition of a public public office is the right, authority and duty, officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, which created and conferred by law, by which, for a provides that a public officer includes elective given period, either fixed by law or enduring and appointive officials and employees, at the pleasure of the creating power, an permanent or temporary, whether in the individual is invested with some portion of the classified or unclassified or exempt service sovereign functions of the government, to be receiving compensation, even nominal, from exercised by him for the benefit of the public. the government. Thus, pursuant to the Anti- The individual so invested is a public officer. Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office. Same; Same; Same; The fact that the Petitioner was appointed by the President to accused was appointed as member of the the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though National Book Development Board (NBDB) her term is only for a year that does not make from the public sector and not from the other her private person exercising a public branches or agencies of the government function. The fact that she is not receiving a does not take her position outside the monthly salary is also of no moment. Section meaning of a public office; The purpose of the 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of law for appointing members from the private the Governing Board shall receive per diem sector is to ensure that they are also properly and such allowances as may be authorized represented in the implementation of for every meeting actually attended and government objectives to cultivate the book subject to pertinent laws, rules and publishing industry.—Notwithstanding that regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, petitioner came from the private sector to sit the nature of one’s appointment, and whether as a member of the NBDB, the law invested the compensation one receives from the her with some portion of the sovereign government is only nominal, is immaterial functions of the government, so that the because the person so elected or appointed purpose of the government is achieved. In is still considered a public officer. this case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has a Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The significant role in the national development. Revised Penal Code defines a public officer Hence, the fact that she was appointed from as any person who, by direct provision of the the public sector and not from the other law, popular election, popular election or branches or agencies of the government appointment by competent authority, shall does not take her position outside the take part in the performance of public meaning of a public office. She was functions in the Government of the Philippine appointed to the Governing Board in order to Islands, or shall perform in said Government see to it that the purposes for which the law or in any of its branches public duties as an was enacted are achieved. The Governing employee, agent, or subordinate official, of Board acts collectively and carries out its any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a mandate as one body. The purpose of the law public officer.—The Revised Penal Code for appointing members from the private defines a public officer as any person who, by sector is to ensure that they are also properly direct provision of the law, popular election, represented in the implementation of popular election or appointment by government objectives to cultivate the book competent authority, shall take part in the publishing industry. performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall Same; Same; Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt perform in said Government or in any of its Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019); Words branches public duties as an employee, and Phrases; The Court is not unmindful of agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or the definition of a public officer pursuant to classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer. Where, as in this case, petitioner that this petition involves an election protest performs public functions in pursuance of the heard by a regional trial court, the Comelec objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a Rules of Procedure are controlling. In view of public officer who takes part in the the fact that the subject election contest was performance of public functions in the filed on May 26, 1992, Section 2, Rule 17 and government whether as an employee, agent, Section 11, Rule 35 of the aforementioned subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In Comelec rules are applicable. Rule 17 treats fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in of Hearings whereas Rule 35 treats of the drafting and promulgation of several rules Election Contests Before Courts of General and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. Jurisdiction. She was supposed to represent the country in the canceled book fair in Spain. Same; Same; Same; No law or rule authorizes a procedure in which the revision Criminal Law; Double Jeopardy; Requisites; of the ballots in the counter-protested It is elementary that for double jeopardy to precincts should be revised only if it is shown attach, the case against the accused must after the revision of the ballots in the have been dismissed or otherwise terminated protested precincts that protestant leads the without his express consent by a court of protestee by at least one (1) vote.—The competent jurisdiction, upon valid information record shows that the revision of ballots in the sufficient in form and substance and the 22 protested precincts was completed accused pleaded to the charge.—Records sometime in September 1992. Judge Lopez show that the Informations in Criminal Case issued a ruling on the said revision almost a Nos. 25867 and 25898 refer to offenses year later, or on August 18, 1993. In the penalized by different statues, R.A. No. 3019 interim, private respondent failed to and RPC, respectively. It is elementary that commence the revision of the ballots in the for double jeopardy to attach, the case counter-protested precincts, stubbornly against the accused must have been maintaining the position that said precincts dismissed or otherwise terminated without his should be revised only if it is shown after the express consent by a court of competent revision that petitioner leads private jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient respondent by at least one (1) vote. No law or in form and substance and the accused rule authorizes such a procedure. pleaded to the charge. In the instant case, Consequently, private respondent must be petitioner pleaded not guilty to the deemed to have waived or abandoned his Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. counter-protest. The applicable Comelec She was not yet arraigned in the criminal rules provide for the presentation of evidence case for malversation of public funds by the parties in succession in the order or because she had filed a motion to quash the sequence provided under Sec. 2, rule 17 latter information. Double jeopardy could not, (Comelec Rules) which must be submitted therefore, attach considering that the two within a reasonable time, if not immediately cases remain pending before the after the revision of the precincts covered by Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner the protest proper. By insisting that the had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases counter-protested precincts should be against her. It is well-settled that for a claim revised only if it is shown after the revision of of double jeopardy to prosper, the following the protested precincts that petitioner, his requisites must concur: (1) there is a opponent, leads by at least one (1) vote, complaint or information or other formal private respondent is adopting a selfserving charge sufficient in form and substance to rule without legal sanction calculated to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed unduly prolong the litigation. before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the Same; Same; Same; Nowhere in the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or COMELEC Rules is it indicated that acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed presentation of evidence by the protestee or terminated without his express consent. may continue after the court has ruled on the The third and fourth requisites are not present evidence of the protestant and determine the in the case at bar. number of votes obtained by the latter.— Furthermore, it is readily apparent from the 5. ABEJA VS TANADA provisions of the applicable Comelec Rules that the court shall render its decision after Elections; Election Contests; Pleadings and both parties shall have presented their Procedure; The COMELEC Rules of respective evidence. Nowhere in the said Procedure are controlling in election protests provisions is it indicated that presentation of heard by a regional trial court.—Considering evidence by the protestee may continue after the court has ruled on the evidence of the also find as erroneous the substitution of the protestant and determine the number of votes deceased Rosauro Radovan’s widow, obtained by the latter. Otherwise, it would be Ediltrudes Radovan, on the ground that possible for the protestee to prolong the private respondent had a counter-claim for protest and render it moot by expiration of the damages. “Public office is personal to the term of office contested. incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs” (Santos vs. Secretary of Labor, Same; Same; Same; Laches; The private 22 SCRA 848 [1968]; De la Victoria vs. respondent is guilty of laches for having Comelec, 199 SCRA 561 [1991]). The heirs unreasonably failed to cause the revision of may no longer prosecute the deceased the counter-protested precincts despite being protestee’s counter-claim for damages afforded ample time to do so.—There is against the protestant for that was likewise merit to petitioner’s claim that private extinguished when death terminated his right respondent is guilty of laches, which, in a to occupy the contested office (Dela Victoria, general sense, is a failure or neglect, for an supra). unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due II. ELIGIBILITY, QUALIFICATIONS, diligence could or should have been done DISQUALIFICATIONS earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, a. Power of the congress to prescribe warranting a presumption that a party entitled qualifications / disqualifications to assert it either has abandoned it or b. Qualifying to public office declined to assert it (Republic v. Caballero, c. Particular qualifications / 79 SCRA 177 [1977]). In the case at bar, disqualifications private respondent unreasonably failed to cause the revision of the counter-protested precincts despite being afforded ample time III. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT OR TITLETO to do so and must be deemed to have OFFICE abandoned it. a. Appointments in general Same; Same; Same; Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the b. Vacancy Rules of Court allows execution pending c. Nepotism appeal in election cases upon good reasons.—Under the circumstances and for CASE reasons discussed above, the order of Judge DEBULGADO VS CSC Lopez dated August 18, 1993 which resolved the party litigants’ objections to the revised ballots may very well be the subject of a valid Administrative Law; Civil Service Law; decision to resolve the instant electoral Nepotism; The original appointment of a civil protest based on the revised ballots of the 22 service employee and all subsequent protested precincts. In the event petitioner is personnel actions undertaken by or in respect declared the winning candidate, she should, of that employee must comply with the upon proper motion, be allowed to prohibition against nepotism.—Under the immediately assume the contested office. We abovequoted provisions of the Implementing say this because in their pleadings, petitioner Rules, both an original appointment and a and private respondent have amply promotion are particular species of personnel discussed their respective arguments in the action. The original appointment of a civil applicability of Garcia v. De Jesus and the service employee and all subsequent accompanying case of Tobon Uy v. Comelec personnel actions undertaken by or in respect (206 SCRA 779 [1992]) and the possibility is of that employee such as promotion, transfer, not remote that private respondent may once reinstatement, re-employment, etc., must again resort to dilatory tactics. Section 2, comply with the Implementing Rules Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows including, of course, the prohibition against execution pending appeal in election cases nepotism in Rule XVIII. To the extent that all upon good reasons (Garcia v. De Jesus, personnel actions occurring after an original supra; in relation to Rule 43, Sec. 1, appointment, require the issuance of a new COMELEC Rules of Procedure) which we appointment to another position (or to the find obtaining in the case before us. original position in case of reinstatement), we believe that such appointment must comply Same; Same; Same; Public Officers; Public with all applicable rules and prohibitions, office is personal to the incumbent and is not including the statutory and regulatory a property which passes to his heirs.—We prohibition against nepotism. To limit the thrust of the prohibition against nepotism to Same; Same; Same; The purpose of the the appointment issued at the time of initial prohibition against nepotism is precisely to entry into the government service, and to take out of the discretion of the appointing or insulate from that prohibition appointments recommending authority the matter of subsequently issued when personnel actions appointing or recommending for appointment are thereafter taken in respect of the same a relative.—The purpose of Section 59 which employee, would be basically to render that shines through the comprehensive and prohibition, in the words of Laurel V, etc. v. unqualified language in which it was cast and Civil Service Commission, “meaningless and has remained for decades, is precisely to toothless.” take out of the discretion of the appointing and recommending authority the matter of Same; Same; Same; The purpose of the appointing or recommending for appointment prohibition against nepotism is to ensure that a relative. In other words, Section 59 insures all appointments and other personnel actions the objectivity of the appointing or in the civil service should be based on merit recommending official by preventing that and fitness and should never depend on how objectivity from being in fact tested. The close or intimate an appointee is to the importance of this statutory objective is appointing power.—Inquiry into the basic difficult to overstress in the culture in which purpose or objective of the prohibition against we live and work in the Philippines, where nepotism also strongly indicates that that family bonds remain, in general, compelling prohibition was intended to be a and cohesive. comprehensive one. Section 1, Book V, E.O. No. 292 sets out the basic policy which Same; Same; Same; Civil Service pervades all the provisions of our Civil Commission; Security of Tenure; Due Service Law, including Section 59 thereof: Process; Where the Civil Service “Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy.—The State Commission disapproves an appointment, shall insure and promote the Constitutional based on its non-conformity to applicable mandate that appointments in the Civil provisions of law and on the qualifications of Service shall be made only according to merit the appointee, the appointee need not be and fitness; x x x.” (Italics supplied) Put previously heard since the action does not succinctly, that purpose is to ensure that all involve the imposition of an administrative appointments and other personnel actions in disciplinary measure.—We turn to the second the civil service should be based on merit and issue where petitioners contend that when fitness and should never depend on how the promotional appointment of petitioner close or intimate an appointee is to the Victoria was approved by Director Escobia, appointing power. CSC Field Office, Bacolod City, that appointment became complete. When Same; Same; Same; The prohibition against petitioner Victoria took her oath of office and nepotism applies quite without regard to the commenced the discharge of the duties of a actual merits of the proposed appointee and General Services Officer, she acquired a to the good intentions of the appointing or vested right to that position and cannot, recommending authority.—A major difficulty according to petitioners, be removed from with petitioners’ argument is that it tends to that position without due process of law. This prove too much. For the appointee, whether argument misconceives the nature of the in an original or a promotional appointment, action taken by the respondent Commission. may in fact be quite loyal and efficient and That action was not the imposition of an hard-working; yet that circumstance will not administrative disciplinary measure upon prevent the application of the prohibition petitioner Victoria, nor upon petitioner Mayor. certainly in respect of the original There were no administrative charges in appointment. The Court is not unaware of the respect of which petitioner Victoria would difficulties that the comprehensive prohibition have been entitled to notice and hearing. The against nepotism would impose upon Commission, in approving or disapproving an petitioner Victoria and others who may be in appointment, only examines the conformity of the same position. It is essential to stress, the appointment with applicable provisions of however, that the prohibition applies quite law and whether the appointee possesses all without regard to the actual merits of the the minimum qualifications and none of the proposed appointee and to the good disqualifications. At all events, as the Solicitor intentions of the appointing or recommending General has noted, petitioner Victoria was authority, and that the prohibition against afforded an opportunity to be heard when she nepotism in appointments whether original or filed a motion for reconsideration with the promotional, is not intended by the legislative Commission and there challenged the authority to penalize faithful service. disapproval by the Commission. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A Division Chief or above, such as the position promotional appointment that violates the of General Services Officer. We hold that the prohibition against nepotism is null and void, respondent Commission had authority, and a void appointment cannot give rise to indeed the duty, to recall on its own initiative security of tenure on the part of the holder of the erroneous initial approval of the such appointment.—The action of the promotional appointment extended to Commission was, in other words, taken in petitioner Victoria, and to review the same de implementation of Section 59, Book V, E.O. novo. No. 292 and the relevant Implementing Regulations. Because the promotional d. Midnight Appointments appointment in favor of petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section 59, it was null and void CASES as being contra legem. Section 9 of Rule V of 1. QUIROG VS. AUMENTADO the Omnibus Implementing Regulations sets out the principal legal consequence of an Administrative Law; Civil Service appointment issued in disregard of the Commission; Appointments; Parties; Both the statutory prohibition: “Sec. 9. An appointment appointing authority and the appointee are accepted by the appointee cannot be equally real parties in interest who have the withdrawn or revoked by the appointing requisite legal standing to bring an action authority and shall remain in force and effect challenging a Civil Service Commission until disapproved by the Commission. (CSC) disapproval of an appointment.—In However, an appointment may be void from the recent case of Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service the beginning due to fraud on the part of the Commission, 442 SCRA 507 (2004), the appointee or because it was issued in Court declared that both the appointing violation of law.” (Italics supplied) A void authority and the appointee are equally real appointment cannot give rise to security of parties in interest who have the requisite legal tenure on the part of the holder of such standing to bring an action challenging a CSC appointment. disapproval of an appointment. In said case, we held that: The CSC’s disapproval of an Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil appointment is a challenge to the exercise of Service Commission is authorized to recall an the appointing authority’s discretion. The appointment initially approved in disregard of appointing authority must have the right to applicable provisions of the Civil Service law contest the disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of and regulations.—The Commission is Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. empowered to take appropriate action on all 1998 is justified insofar as it allows the appointments and other personnel actions, appointing authority to request e.g., promotions. Such power includes the reconsideration or appeal. authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of applicable Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; provisions of Civil Service law and Since the retroactive application of a law regulations. usually divests rights that have already become vested, the rule in statutory Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission construction is that all statutes are to be may review motu proprio personnel actions construed as having only a prospective involving the position of a Division Chief or operation unless the purpose and intention of above, and there is no law or regulation that the legislature to give them a retrospective requires that a letter-complaint should first be effect is expressly declared or is necessarily subscribed under oath before the implied from the language used.—Records Commission may act thereon.—Petitioners disclose that on May 28, 2001, the PSB of the have also complained that the letter of Human Resource Management and Congressman Carmona which had Development Office of Bohol, issued a precipitated action on the part of respondent certification that Quirog was one of two Commission, was not a verified letter. They candidates qualified for the position of contend that the Commission could not or PGDH-OPA. On the same day, Quirog was should not have acted upon the charges appointed by then Governor Relampagos raised in that letter. We are not aware of any and on June 1, 2001, she took her oath of law or regulation requiring the letter written by office. CSC Resolution No. 010988 was the Congressman to be subscribed under issued three days later, or on June 4, 2001. oath before the Commission could act Evidently, the CSCROVII should not have thereon. Under its own rules and regulations, subjected Quirog’s appointment to the the Commission may review motu proprio requirements under said resolution, as its personnel actions involving the position of a application is against the prospective application of laws. Having no provision 2. DE RAMA VS CA regarding its retroactive application to appointments made prior to its effectivity, Political Law; Civil Service Commission; CSC Resolution No. 010988 must be taken to Appointments; In truth and in fact, there is no be of prospective application. As we have law that prohibits local elective officials from held time and again: Since the retroactive making appointments during the last days of application of a law usually divests rights that his or her tenure.—The records reveal that have already become vested, the rule in when the petitioner brought the matter of statutory construction is that all statutes are recalling the appointments of the fourteen to be construed as having only a prospective (14) private respondents before the CSC, the operation unless the purpose and intention of only reason he cited to justify his action was the legislature to give them a retrospective that these were “midnight appointments” that effect is expressly declared or is necessarily are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of implied from the language used. the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition Same; Same; Same; Midnight Appointments; applies only to presidential appointments. In The constitutional prohibition on so-called truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits midnight appointments, specifically, those local elective officials from making made within two (2) months immediately prior appointments during the last days of his or to the next presidential elections, applies only her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise to the President or Acting President; The the issue of fraud on the part of the outgoing ruling in De Rama v. Court of Appeals, 353 mayor who made the appointments. Neither SCRA 95 (2001), does not mean that the did he allege that the said appointments were raison d’être behind the prohibition against tainted by irregularities or anomalies that midnight appointments may not be applied to breached laws and regulations governing those made by chief executives of local appointments. His solitary reason for government units.—It cannot also be said recalling these appointments was that they that Quirog’s appointment was a midnight were, to his personal belief, “midnight appointment. The constitutional prohibition appointments” which the outgoing mayor had on so-called midnight appointments, no authority to make. specifically, those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next Same; Same; Same; Upon the issuance of an presidential elections, applies only to the appointment and the appointee’s assumption President or Acting President. As the Court of the position in the civil service, “he acquires ruled in De Rama v. CA, 353 SCRA 95 a legal right which cannot be taken away (2001): The records reveal that when the either by revocation of the appointment or by petitioner brought the matter of recalling the removal except for cause and with previous appointments of the fourteen (14) private notice and hearing”; It is well-settled that the respondents before the CSC, the only reason person assuming a position in the civil service he cited to justify his action was that these under a completed appointment acquires a were midnight appointments that are legal, not just an equitable, right to the forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the position.—It has been held that upon the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and issuance of an appointment and the correctly so, that the said prohibition applies appointee’s assumption of the position in the only to presidential appointments. In truth and civil service, “he acquires a legal right which in fact, there is no law that prohibits local cannot be taken away either by revocation of elective officials from making appointments the appointment or by removal except for during the last days of his or her tenure. We, cause and with previous notice and hearing.” however, hasten to add that the Moreover, it is well-settled that the person aforementioned ruling does not mean that the assuming a position in the civil service under raison d’être behind the prohibition against a completed appointment acquires a legal, midnight appointments may not be applied to not just an equitable, right to the position. This those made by chief executives of local right is protected not only by statute, but by government units, as here. Indeed, the the Constitution as well, which right cannot be prohibition is precisely designed to taken away by either revocation of the discourage, nay, even preclude, losing appointment, or by removal, unless there is candidates from issuing appointments merely valid cause to do so, provided that there is for partisan purposes thereby depriving the previous notice and hearing. incoming administration of the opportunity to make the corresponding appointments in line Same; Same; Same; It is the CSC that is with its new policies. authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of Same; Same; Same; Same; The raising of applicable provisions of the civil service law factual issues for the first time in a pleading and regulations.—Rule V, Section 9 of the which is supplemental only to an appeal is Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the barred by estoppel.—Failure of the petitioner Revised Administrative Code specifically to raise said grounds and to present provides that “an appointment accepted by supporting documents constitute a waiver the appointee cannot be withdrawn or thereof and the same arguments and revoked by the appointing authority and shall evidence can no longer be entertained on remain in force and in effect until disapproved appeal before the CSC, nor in the Court of by the Commission.” Thus, it is the CSC that Appeals, and much less in a petition for is authorized to recall an appointment initially review before the Supreme Court. In fine, the approved, but only when such appointment raising of these factual issues for the first time and approval are proven to be in disregard of in a pleading which is supplemental only to an applicable provisions of the civil service law appeal is barred by estoppel. and regulations. MENDOZA, J., Dissenting: Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practices; Parties may file supplemental Political Law; Civil Service Commission; pleadings to supply deficiencies in aid of an Appointments; After the appointing authority original pleading, but which should not has lost the elections, his is the duty of a entirely substitute the latter; Supplemental prudent caretaker of the office, and therefore, pleadings must be with reasonable notice, he should not fill positions in the government and it is discretionary upon the court or unless required by the imperatives of public tribunal to allow the same or not.—There is service.—What the majority overlooks is that no question that parties may file Art. VII, §15 is simply an application of a supplemental pleadings to supply broader principle that after the appointing deficiencies in aid of an original pleading, but authority has lost the elections, his is the duty which should not entirely substitute the latter. of a prudent caretaker of the office, and, The propriety and substance of supplemental therefore, he should not fill positions in the pleadings are prescribed under Rule 10, government unless required by the Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil imperatives of public service. This rule binds Procedure, x x x Supplemental pleadings all, including mayors, who are vested with the must be with reasonable notice, and it is power of appointment, and it flows from the discretionary upon the court or tribunal to principle that a public office is a public trust. allow the same or not. Thus, the CSC was under no obligation to admit the supplemental e. Section 16, Article VII pleading, or even to consider the averments therein. 1. SARMIENTO VS. MISON
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; It is well- Statutory Construction; Constitution; Intent of
settled that issues or questions of fact cannot the framers of the constitution and of the be raised for the first time on appeal.—Be that people adopting it must be given effect.—The as it may, these alleged irregularities were fundamental principle of constitutional considered by the CSC and the Court of construction is to give ef fect to the intent of Appeals as new issues which were raised for the framers of the organic law and of the the first time on appeal. It is rather too late for people adopting it. The intention to which petitioner to raise these issues for the first force is to be given is that which is embodied time on appeal. It is well-settled that issues or and expressed in the constitutional provisions questions of fact cannot be raised for the first themselves. The Court will thus construe the time on appeal. We have consistently held applicable constitutional provisions, not in that matters, theories or arguments not accordance with how the executive or the brought out in the original proceedings legislative department may want them cannot be considered on review or appeal construed, but in accordance with what they where they are raised for the first time. To say and provide. consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly in the supplemental pleading Same; Same; Same; 1935 Constitution to the appeal at this very late stage in the requires confirmation by the Commission on proceedings would amount to trampling on Appointments of all presidential the basic principles of fair play, justice and appointments, under the 1973 constitution due process. the president has absolute power of appointment while under the 1987 Constitution, only the first group of appointments requires confirmation of the in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16 Commission on Appointments.—In the 1935 Article VII.—Therefore, the third sentence of Constitution, almost all presidential Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely appointments required the consent that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the (confirmation) of the Commission on Congress may by law vest their appointment Appointments, It is now a sad part of our in the President, in the courts, or in the heads political history that the power of confirmation of various departments of the government. In by the Commission on Appointments, under short, the word "alone" in the third sentence the 1935 Constitution, transformed that of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 commission, many times, into a venue of Constitution, as a literal import from the last "horse-trading" and similar malpractices. On part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant consistent with the authoritarian pattern in in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, which it was molded and re-molded by Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot successive amendments, placed the prevail over the clear and positive intent of the absolute power of appointment in the framers of the 1987 Constitution that President with hardly any check on the part of presidential appointments, except those the legislature. Given the above two (2) mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not the Commission on Appointments. difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people Commission on Appointments; Confirmation adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by of the appointment of Commissioners of the requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Bureau of Customs by the Commission on Commission on Appointments for the first Appointments not required.—Coming now to group of appointments and leaving to the the immediate question before the Court, it is President, without such confirmation, the evident that the position of Commissioner of appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not second and third groups as well as those in one of those within the first group of the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the 1987 a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while Constitution, the clear and expressed intent the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of of its framers is to exclude presidential bureaus" among those officers whose appointments from confirmation on the appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments except Commission on Appointments, the 1987 appointments to offices mentioned in the first Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately sentence of Sec. 16 Article VII.—In the 1987 excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" Constitution, however, as already pointed from appointments that need the consent out, the clear and expressed intent of its (confirmation) of the Commission on framers was to exclude presidential Appointments. appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except Same; Same; Appointment of respondent appointments to offices expressly mentioned Savlador Mison as Commissioner of the in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Bureau of Customs without submitting his Consequently, there was no reason to use in nomination to the Commission on the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the Appointments is within the constitutional word "alone" after the word "President" in authority of the President of the providing that Congress may by law vest the Philippines.—Consequently, we rule that the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President of the Philippines acted within her President alone, or in the courts, or in the constitutional authority and power in heads of departments, because the power to appointing respondent Salvador Mison, appoint officers whom he (the President) may Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, be authorized by law to appoint is already without submitting his nomination to the vested in the President, without need of Commission on Appointments for confirmation by the Commission on confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise Appointments, in the second sentence of the the full authority and functions of the of fice same Sec. 16, Article VII. and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16 Art. 2. BAUTISTA VS. SALONGA VII of the 1987 Constitution is a redundancy Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Commission on Appointments or any other Appointing Power of the President; kind of appointment to the same office of Commission on Appointments; Chairman. Commission on Human Rights Administrative Law; The appointment by the that called for confirmation by the President of the Chairman of the Commission Commission on Appointments. The Court, on Human Rights is to be made without the with all due respect to both the Executive and review and participation of the Commission Legislative Departments of government, and on Appointments.–––Since the position of after careful deliberation, is constrained to Chairman of the Commission on Human hold and rule in the negative. When Her Rights is not among the positions mentioned Excellency, the President converted in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the petitioner Bautista’s designation as Acting 1987 Constitution, appointments which are to Chairman to a permanent appointment as be made with the confirmation of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Commission on Appointments, it follows that Rights on 17 December 1988, significantly the appointment by the President of the she advised Bautista (in the same Chairman of the CHR is to be made without appointment letter) that, by virtue of such the review or participation of the Commission appointment, she could qualify and enter on Appointments. To be more precise, the upon the performance of the duties of the appointment of the Chairman and Members office (of Chairman of the Commission on of the Commission on Human Rights is not Human Rights). All that remained for Bautista specifically provided for in the Constitution to do was to reject or accept the appointment. itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of Obviously, she accepted the appointment by the Civil Service Commission, the taking her oath of office before the Chief Commission on Elections and the Justice of the Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo Commission on Audit, whose appointments B. Fernan and assuming immediately are expressly vested by the Constitution in thereafter the functions and duties of the the President with the consent of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Commission on Appointments. The President Rights. Bautista’s appointment therefore on appoints the Chairman and Members of the 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to Commission on Human Rights was a the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, completed act on the part of the President. To that is, without the confirmation of the paraphrase the great jurist, Mr. Chief Justice Commission on Appointments because they Marshall, in the celebrated case of Marbury are among the officers of government “whom vs. Madison. x x x “The answer to this he (the President) may be authorized by law question seems an obvious one. The to appoint.” And Section 2(c), Executive appointment being the sole act of the Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the president, must be completely evidenced, President to appoint the Chairman and when it is shown that he has done everything Members of the Commission on Human to be performed by him. x x x Some point of Rights. It provides: “(c) The Chairman and the time must be taken when the power of the Members of the Commission on Human executive over an officer, not removable at Rights shall be appointed by the President for his will must cease. That point of time must a term of seven years without reappointment. be when the constitutional power of Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for appointment has been exercised. And this the unexpired term of the predecessor.” power has been exercised when the last act, required from the person possessing the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; power, has been performed. x x x But having Same; Appointments; Acceptance of; once made the appointment, his (the Petitioner’s appointment on December 17, President’s) power over the office is 1988 as Chairman of the Commission on terminated in all cases, where by law the Human Rights was a completed act on the officer is not removable by him. The right to part of the President.–––The threshold the office is then in the person appointed, and question that has really come to the fore is he has the absolute, unconditional power of whether the President, subsequent to her act accepting or rejecting it. of 17 December 1988, and after petitioner Bautista had qualified for the office to which Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; she had been appointed, by taking the oath Same; Same; Same; Same; No new or of office and actually assuming and further appointment can be made to a discharging the functions and duties thereof, position already filled by a previously could extend another appointment to the completed appointment which had been petitioner on 14 January 1989, an “ad interim accepted by the appointee through a valid appointment” as termed by the respondent qualification and assumption of duty.–––It is respondent Commission’s submission that can confer no power of participation in the the President, after the appointment of 17 Commission on Appointments over other December 1988 extended to petitioner appointments exclusively reserved for her by Bautista, decided to extend another the Constitution. The exercise of political appointment (14 January 1989) to petitioner options that finds no support in the Bautista, this time, submitting such Constitution cannot be sustained. Nor can the appointment (more accurately, nomination) to Commission on Appointments by the actual the Commission on Appointments for exercise of its constitutionally delimited confirmation. And yet, it seems obvious power to review presidential appointments, enough, both in logic and in fact, that no new create power to confirm appointments that or further appointment could be made to a the Constitution has reserved to the position already filled by a previously President alone. Stated differently, when the completed appointment which had been appointment is one that the Constitution accepted by the appointee, through a valid mandates is for the President to make without qualification and assumption of its duties. the participation of the Commission on Appointments, the executive’s voluntary act Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; of submitting such appointment to the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the Commission on Appointments and the latter’s appointment is one that the Constitution act of confirming or rejecting the same are mandates is for the President to make without done without or in excess of jurisdiction. the participation of the Commission on Appointments, the Executive’s act of Same; Administrative Law; Appointments; Ad submitting such appointment to the Interim Appointments; Appointments that are Commission on Appointments, and the for the President solely to make, without the latter’s act of confirming or rejecting the participation of the Commission on same, are done without or in excess of Appointments, cannot be ad interim jurisdiction.–––Respondent Commission appointments.–––Nor can respondents vigorously contends that granting that impressively contend that the new petitioner’s appointment as Chairman of the appointment or re-appointment on 14 Commission on Human Rights is one that January 1989 was an ad interim appointment, under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, as because, under the Constitutional design, ad interpreted in the Mison case, is solely for the interim appointments do not apply to President to make, yet, it is within the appointments solely for the President to president’s prerogative to voluntarily submit make, i.e., without the participation of the such appointment to the Commission on Commission on Appointments. Ad interim Appointment for confirmation. The mischief in appointments, by their very nature under the this contention, as the Court perceives it, lies 1987 Constitution, extend only to in the suggestion that the President (with appointments where the review of the Congress agreeing) may, from time to time Commission on Appointments is needed. move power boundaries, in the Constitution That is why ad interim appointments are to differently from where they are placed by the remain valid until disapproval by the Constitution. The Court really finds the above Commission on Appointments or until the contention difficult of acceptance. next adjournment of Congress; but Constitutional Law, to begin with, is appointments that are for the President solely concerned with power not political to make, that is, without the participation of convenience, wisdom, exigency, or even the Commission on Appointments, can not be necessity. Neither the Executive nor the ad interim appointments. Legislative (Commission on Appointments) can create power where the Constitution Same; Same; Same; Tenure in Office as confers none. The evident constitutional Distinguished from Term of Office; As the intent is to strike a careful and delicate term of office of the Chairman of the balance in the matter of appointments to Commission on Human Rights is 7 years, public office, between the President and without reappointment as provided by Exec. Congress (the latter acting through the Order 163, the tenure in office of said Commission on Appointments). To tilt one Chairman cannot be later made dependent side or the other of the scale is to disrupt or on the pleasure of the President, hence, E.O. alter such balance of power. In other words, 163-A providing that the tenure of said to the extent that the Constitution has blocked Chairman and the members of the CHR shall off certain appointments for the President to be at the pleasure of the President is make with the participation of the unconstitutional.–––Executive Order No. Commission on Appointments, so also has 163-A, 30 June 1987, providing that the the Constitution mandated that the President tenure of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be at the Chairman and Members is made dependent pleasure of the President is unconstitutional. on the pleasure of the President. Executive x x x It is to be noted that, while the earlier Order No. 163-A, being anti thetical to the executive order (No. 163) speaks of a term of constitutional mandate of independence for office of the Chairman and Members of the the Commission on Human Rights has to be Commission on Human Rights–––which is declared unconstitutional. seven (7) years without reappointment–––the later executive order (163-A) speaks of the Same; Same; Same; Removal; Due Process; tenure in office of the Chairman and Petitioner can certainly be removed from her Members of the Commission on Human office even before the expiration of the seven- Rights, which is “at the pleasure of the year term, but such removal must be for President.” Tenure in office should not be cause and with her right to due process confused with term of office. As Mr. Justice properly safeguarded.–––To hold, as the (later, Chief Justice) Concepcion in his Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the concurring opinion in Alba vs. Evangelista, lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of stated: “The distinction between ‘term’ and the Commission on Human Rights by virtue ‘tenure’ is important, for, pursuant to the of her appointment, as such, by the President Constitution, ‘no officer or employee in the on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance Civil Service may be removed or suspended thereof, is not to say that she cannot be except for cause, as provided by law’ (Art. XII, removed from office before the expiration of section 4), and this fundamental principle her seven (7) year term. She certainly can be would be defeated if Congress could legally removed but her removal must be for cause make the tenure of some officials dependent and with her right to due process properly upon the pleasure of the President, by safeguarded. In the case of NASECO vs. clothing the latter with blanket authority to NLRC, this Court held that before a rank-and- replace a public officer before the expiration file employee of the NASECO, a government- of his term.” When Executive Order No. 163 owned corporation, could be dismissed, she was issued, the evident purpose was to was entitled to a hearing and due process. comply with the constitutional provision that How much more, in the case of the Chairman “the term of office and other qualifications and of a constitutionally mandated disabilities of the Members of the INDEPENDENT OFFICE, like the Commission (on Human Rights) shall be Commission on Human Rights. If there are provided by law” (Sec. 17(2), Art. XIII, 1987 charges against Bautista for misfeasance or Constitution). As the term of office of the malfeasance in office, charges may be filed Chairman (and Members) of the Commission against her with the Ombudsman. If he finds on Human Rights, is seven (7) years, without a prima facie case against her, the re-appointment, as provided by Executive corresponding information or informations Order No. 163, and consistent with the can be filed with the Sandiganbayan which constitutional design to give the Commission may in turn order her suspension from office the needed independence to perform and while the case or cases against her are accomplish its functions and duties, the pending before said court. This is due tenure in office of said Chairman (and process in action. This is the way of a Members) cannot be later made dependent government of laws and not of men. on the pleasure of the President. GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An independent office like the CHR cannot truly Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; function with independence and Appointment; Confirmation of Appointments; effectiveness, if the tenure in office of its The Court has no power to add by implication Chairman and its members is made to the list of presidential appointees whom the dependent on the pleasure of the President.– Constitution, in clear and categorical ––Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult language declares as not needing to conceptualize how an office conceived and confirmation.–––The Constitution specifies created by the Constitution to be clearly the presidential appointees who do independent–––as the Commission on not need confirmation by the Commission. Human Rights–––and vested with the The reason for non-confirmation is obvious. delicate and vital functions of investigating The members of the Supreme Court and all violations of human rights, pinpointing lower courts and the Ombudsman and his responsibility and recommending sanctions deputies are not confirmed because the as well as remedial measures therefor, can Judicial and Bar Council screens nominees truly function with independence and before their names are forwarded to the effectiveness, when the tenure in office of its President. The Vice-President as a cabinet member needs no confirmation because the applies to the present case. Significantly, the Constitution says so. He or she is chosen by Commission on Appointments, which was the nation’s entire electorate and is only a also aware of Mison, has as clearly rejected breath away from the Presidency. Those it by acting on the appointment. These falling under the third sentence of Section 16, meaningful developments must give us Article VII do not have to be confirmed pause. We may have committed an error in because the Constitution gives Congress the Mison, which is bad enough, and may be authority to free lower ranking officials whose persisting in it now, which is worse. positions are created by law from that requirement. I believe that we in the Court Same; Same; Same; Confirmation; Ad have no power to add by implication to the list Interim Appointments; What President of presidential appointees whom the Aquino extended to the petitioner on Dec. 17, Constitution in clear and categorical words 1988 was an ad interim appointment that declares as not needing confirmation. although immediately effective upon acceptance was still subject to confirmation.– Same; Same; Same; Same; The Chairman of ––Coming now to the theory of the majority, I the Human Rights Commission should be regret I am also unable to accept it. included in the first paragraph of Sec. 16, Art. Consistent with my view in Mison, I submit VII i.e. “other officers whose appointments that what President Aquino extended to the are vested in him in this Constitution,” whose petitioner on 17 December 1988 was an ad appointments need the confirmation of the interim appointment that although Commission on Appointments.–––Again, I immediately effective upon acceptance was fail to see why the captain of a naval boat still subject to confirmation. I cannot agree ordered to fire broadsides against rebel that when the President said the petitioner concentrations should receive greater could qualify and enter into the performance scrutiny in his appointment than the of her duties, “all that remained for Bautista to Chairman of the Human Rights Commission do was to reject or accept the appointment.” who has infinitely more power and In fact, on the very day it was extended, the opportunity to bring the rebellion to a just and ad interim appointment was submitted by the satisfactory end. But even if I were to agree President of the Philippines to the with the Sarmiento III v. Mison ruling, I would Commission on Appointments “for still include the Chairman of the Human confirmation.” x x x I repeat my view that the Rights Commission as one of the “other Chairman of the Commission on Human officers whose appointments are vested in Rights is subject to confirmation by the him in this Constitution” under the first Commission on Appointments, for the sentence of Section 16, Article VII. Certainly, reasons stated in my dissent in Mison. the chairman cannot be appointed by Accordingly, I vote to DENY the petition. Congress or the Supreme Court. Neither should we read Article XIII of the Constitution GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting: as classifying the chairman among the lower ranking officers who by law may be appointed Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; by the head of an executive department, Appointments; Confirmation; The agency, commission, or board. The appointments of the Chairman and the Constitution created the independent office. members of the Commission on Human The President was intended to appoint its Rights shall be made by the President with chairman. I, therefore, regretfully reiterate my the consent of the Commission on dissent from the Sarmiento III v. Mison ruling Appointments.–––I believe that the and join in the call for a reexamination of its appointments of the chairman and the doctrine. members of the Commission on Human Rights by the President require review and CRUZ, J., dissenting: confirmation by the Commission on Appointments in view of the following Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; provision of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Appointments; The submission of the Constitution: “Sec. 16. The President shall petitioner’s appointment to the Commission nominate and, with the consent of the on Appointments is a clear indication that the Commission on Appointments, appoint the President no longer agrees with the Mison heads of the executive departments, ruling.–––As I see it, the submission of the ambassadors, other public ministers and petitioner’s appointment to the Commission consuls, or officers of the armed forces from on Appointments is a clear indication that the the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other President of the Philippines no longer agrees officers whose appointments are vested in with the Mison ruling, at least insofar as it him in this Constitution. x x x.” In my view, the “other officers” whose appointments are appointments is part of the power of vested in the President in the Constitution are appointment itself. It is, therefore, executive the constitutional officers, meaning those rather than legislative in nature. In giving this who hold offices created under the power to an organ of the legislative Constitution, and whose appointments are department, the Constitution merely provides not otherwise provided for in the Charter. a detail in the scheme of checks and Those constitutional officers are the chairmen balances between the executive and and members of the Constitutional legislative organs of the government.” (Phil. Commissions, namely: the Civil Service Political Law by Sinco, 11th Ed., p. 266). Commission (Art. IX-B), the Commission on Elections (Art. IX-C), the Commission on 3. CALDERON VS. CARALE Audit (Art. IX-D), and the Commission on Human Rights (Sec. 17, Art. XIII). These Constitutional Law; Appointments; The constitutional commissions are, without Chairman and Members of the National exception, declared to be “independent,” but Labor Relations Commission are not among while in the case of the Civil Service the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Commission, the Commission on Elections Section 16, Article VII whose appointments and the Commission on Audit, the 1987 requires confirmation by the Commission on Constitution expressly provides that “the Appointments.—Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and the Commissioners shall be Chairman and Commissioners fall within the appointed by the President with the consent second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of of the Commission on Appointments” (Sec. the Constitution, more specifically under the 1[2], Art. IX-B; Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-C and Sec. “third groups” of appointees referred to in 1[2], Art. IX-D), no such clause is found in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be Section 17, Article VIII creating the authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Commission on Human Rights. Its absence, Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not however, does not detract from, or diminish, among the officers mentioned in the first the President’s power to appoint the sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose Chairman and Commissioners of the said appointments requires confirmation by the Commission. The source of that power is the Commission on Appointments. first sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution for: (1) the Commission on 4. TARROSA VS SINGSON Human Rights is an office created by the Constitution, and (2) the appointment of the Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Quo Chairman and Commissioners thereof is Warranto; Quo warranto as a special civil vested in the President by the Constitution. action can only be commenced by the Therefore, the said appointments shall be Solicitor General or by a person claiming to made by the President with the consent of the be entitled to a public office or position Commission on Appointments, as provided in unlawfully held or exercised by another.— Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of Same; Same; Same; Same; Checks and respondent Singson and alleges that the Balances; The power of the Commission on latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the Appointments to review and confirm powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral appointments made by the President is not a (Cf. Castro v. Del Rosario, 19 SCRA 196 derogation of the Chief Executive’s [1967]). Such a special civil action can only appointing power, but is merely a part of the be commenced by the Solicitor General or by system of checks and balances in the a “person claiming to be entitled to a public democratic form of government provided in office or position unlawfully held or exercised our Constitution.–––It is not quite correct to by another” (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 66, argue, as the petitioner does, that the power Sec. 6; Acosta v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18 [1905]). of the Commission on Appointments to review and confirm appointments made by Same; Same; Same; Petitioner who did not the President is a “derogation of the Chief aver entitlement to the office cannot bring the Executive’s appointing power.” That power is action for quo warranto.—In Sevilla v. Court given to the Commission on Appointments as of Appeals, 209 SCRA 637 (1992), we held part of the system of checks and balances in that the petitioner therein, who did not aver the democratic form of government provided that he was entitled to the office of the City for in our Constitution. As stated by a Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not bring respected constitutional authority, former the action for quo warranto to oust the U.P. Law Dean and President Vicente G. respondent from said office as a mere Sinco: “The function of confirming usurper. Same; Same; Same; Question of title to an 5. MANALO VS SISTOZA office may not be determined in a suit to restrain the payment of salary to the person Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; holding office, brought by one not claiming to Separation of Powers; Statutory be entitled to said office.—Likewise in Construction; Courts have the inherent Greene v. Knox, 175 N.Y. 432 (1903), 67 N.E. authority to determine whether a statute 910, it was held that the question of title to an enacted by the legislature transcends the office, which must be resolved in a quo limit delineated by the fundamental law, and warranto proceeding, may not be determined when it does, they will not hesitate to strike in a suit to restrain the payment of salary to down such unconstitutional law.–Petitioner the person holding such office, brought by theorizes that Republic Act 6975 enjoys the someone who does not claim to be the one presumption of constitutionality and that entitled to occupy the said office. every statute passed by Congress is presumed to have been carefully studied and Same; Same; Same; The action was considered before its enactment. He improvidently brought by the petitioner.—It is maintains that the respect accorded to each obvious that the instant action was department of the government requires that improvidently brought by petitioner. To the court should avoid, as much as possible, uphold the action would encourage every deciding constitutional questions. The Court disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, agrees with petitioner. However, it is equally thereby causing incalculable mischief and demanded from the courts, as guardians of hindrance to the efficient operation of the the Constitution, to see to it that every law governmental machinery (See Roosevelt v. passed by Congress is not repugnant to the Draper, 7 Abb. Pr. 108, 23 N.Y. 218). organic law. Courts have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute Constitutional Law; Judicial Inquiry; Principle enacted by the legislature transcends the that bars judicial inquiry into a constitutional limit delineated by the fundamental law. question unless the resolution thereof is When it does, the courts will not hesitate to indispensable for the determination of the strike down such unconstitutional law. case.—Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of petitioner collapses. Same; Same; Same; Appointments; Hence, there is no need to resolve the Commission on Appointments; Congress question of whether the disbursement of cannot by law expand the power of public funds to pay the salaries and confirmation of the Commission on emoluments of respondent Singson can be Appointments and require confirmation of enjoined. Likewise, the Court refrains from appointments of other government officials passing upon the constitutionality of Section not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the principle 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.–It is that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional well-settled that only presidential question unless the resolution thereof is appointments belonging to the first group indispensable for the determination of the require the confirmation by the Commission case (Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489 on Appointments. The appointments of [1992]). respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Same; Commission on Appointments; Commission on Appointments. As held in the Confirmation Powers; Congress cannot by case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress law expand the confirmation powers of the cannot by law expand the power of Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of the Commission on appointment of other government officials not Appointments and require confirmation of expressly mentioned in the first sentence of appointments of other government officials Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.— not mentioned in the first sentence of Section However, for the information of all concerned, 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. we call attention to our decision in Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992), with Justice Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Isagani A. Cruz dissenting, where we ruled Republic Act 6975; Sections 26 and 31 of that Congress cannot by law expand the Republic Act 6975 which empower the confirmation powers of the Commission on Commission on Appointments to confirm the Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of public officials whose appointment of other government officials not appointments are not required by the expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Constitution to be confirmed are Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. unconstitutional.–Unconstitutional are Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on Constitutional Law; Appointments; Executive Appointments to confirm the appointments of Department; Congress; The power to appoint public officials whose appointments are not is essentially executive in nature, and the required by the Constitution to be confirmed. legislature may not interfere with the exercise But the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid of this executive power except in those sections notwithstanding, the rest of Republic instances when the Constitution expressly Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when allows it to interfere.—The power to appoint provisions of law declared void are severable is essentially executive in nature, and the from the main statute and the removal of the legislature may not interfere with the exercise unconstitutional provisions would not affect of this executive power except in those the validity and enforceability of the other instances when the Constitution expressly provisions, the statute remains valid without allows it to interfere. Limitations on the its voided sections. executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Philippine the legislature’s interference in the National Police; The Philippine National executive’s power to appoint is limited to the Police is separate and distinct from the power to prescribe the qualifications to an Armed Forces of the Philippines.–It is appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a petitioner’s submission that the Philippine person to an office in the guise of prescribing National Police is akin to the Armed Forces of qualifications to that office. Neither may the Philippines and therefore, the Congress impose on the President the duty appointments of police officers whose rank is to appoint any particular person to an office. equal to that of colonel or naval captain require confirmation by the Commission on Same; Same; Commission on Appointments; Appointments. This contention is equally Even if the Commission on Appointments is untenable. The Philippine National Police is composed of members of Congress, the separate and distinct from the Armed Forces exercise of its powers is executive and not of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less, legislative.—Even if the Commission on sets forth the distinction. Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; executive and not legislative. The Directors and chief superintendents of the Commission on Appointments does not PNP do not fall under the first category of legislate when it exercises its power to give presidential appointees requiring the or withhold consent to presidential confirmation by the Commission on appointments. Thus: x x x The Commission Appointments.–The police force is different on Appointments is a creature of the from and independent of the armed forces Constitution. Although its membership is and the ranks in the military are not similar to confined to members of Congress, said those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, Commission is independent of Congress. directors and chief superintendents of the The powers of the Commission do not come PNP, such as the herein respondent police from Congress, but emanate directly from the officers, do not fall under the first category of Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of presidential appointees requiring the Congress. In fact, the functions of the confirmation by the Commission on Commissioner are purely executive in nature. Appointments. xxx
6. MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO Same; Same; Same; Considering the
independence of the Commission on Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Prohibition; Appointments from Congress, it is error for As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to petitioners to claim standing in the present enjoin acts already done.—As a rule, the writ case as members of Congress.— of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already Considering the independence of the done. However, as an exception to the rule Commission on Appointments from on mootness, courts will decide a question Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet standing in the present case as members of evading review. In the present case, the Congress. President Arroyo’s issuance of mootness of the petition does not bar its acting appointments while Congress is in resolution. The question of the session impairs no power of Congress. constitutionality of the President’s Among the petitioners, only the following are appointment of department secretaries in an members of the Commission on acting capacity while Congress is in session Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator will arise in every such appointment. Enrile as Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, confirmation or rejection, whereas and Senator Angara, Senator Ejercito- appointments in an acting capacity may be Estrada, and Senator Osmeña as members. extended any time there is a vacancy and are Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives not submitted to the Commission on of members of the Commission on Appointments.—In distinguishing ad interim Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, appointments from appointments in an acting Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmeña have capacity, a noted textbook writer on standing in the present petition. This is in constitutional law has observed: Ad interim contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, appointments must be distinguished from and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in appointments in an acting capacity. Both of protecting their perceived prerogatives as them are effective upon acceptance. But ad members of Congress, possess no standing interim appointments are extended only in the present petition. during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time Same; Same; Same; Congress, through a there is a vacancy. Moreover ad interim law, cannot impose on the President the appointments are submitted to the obligation to appoint automatically the Commission on Appointments for undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.— confirmation or rejection; acting The essence of an appointment in an acting appointments are not submitted to the capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop- Commission on Appointments. Acting gap measure intended to fill an office for a appointments are a way of temporarily filling limited time until the appointment of a important offices but, if abused, they can also permanent occupant to the office. In case of be a way of circumventing the need for vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego confirmation by the Commission on of the President, such as the office of a Appointments. department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice 7. PIMENTEL VS ERMITA as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Courts; Judicial Review; An employee’s Congress, through a law, cannot impose on personal and substantial injury, if a particular the President the obligation to appoint appointee is not the lawful COMELEC automatically the undersecretary as her Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether standi to raise the constitutional issue temporary or permanent, holds a position of regarding the ad interim appointment of said great trust and confidence. Congress, in the COMELEC Chairman.—Benipayo guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, reassigned petitioner from the EID, where cannot impose on the President who her alter she was Acting Director, to the Law ego should be. Department, where she was placed on detail service. Respondents claim that the Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Section 17, reassignment was “pursuant to x x x Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states Benipayo’s authority as Chairman of the that “[t]he President may temporarily Commission on Elections, and as the designate an officer already in the Commission’s Chief Executive Officer.” government service or any other competent Evidently, respondents anchor the legality of person to perform the functions of an office in petitioner’s reassignment on Benipayo’s the executive branch.”—The law expressly authority as Chairman of the COMELEC. The allows the President to make such acting real issue then turns on whether or not appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of the Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President COMELEC. Even if petitioner is only an may temporarily designate an officer already Acting Director of the EID, her reassignment in the government service or any other is without legal basis if Benipayo is not the competent person to perform the functions of lawful COMELEC Chairman, an office an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the created by the Constitution. On the other President may even appoint in an acting hand, if Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC capacity a person not yet in the government Chairman because he assumed office in service, as long as the President deems that accordance with the Constitution, then person competent. petitioner’s reassignment is legal and she has no cause to complain provided the Same; Same; Same; Ad interim reassignment is in accordance with the Civil appointments are extended only during Service Law. Clearly, petitioner has a recess of Congress and are submitted to the personal and material stake in the resolution Commission on Appointments for of the constitutionality of Benipayo’s assumption of office. Petitioner’s personal interest requires the resolution of the and substantial injury, if Benipayo is not the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. lawful COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi to raise the Administrative Law; Public Officers; constitutional issue in this petition. Appointments; Words and Phrases; An ad interim appointment is a permanent Same; Same; The earliest opportunity to appointment because it takes effect raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the immediately and can no longer be withdrawn pleadings before a competent court that can by the President once the appointee has resolve the same.—Respondents harp on qualified into office—the fact that it is subject petitioner’s belated act of questioning the to confirmation by the Commission on constitutionality of the ad interim Appointments does not alter its permanent appointments of Benipayo, Borra and character.—An ad interim appointment is a Tuason. Petitioner filed the instant petition permanent appointment because it takes only on August 3, 2001, when the first ad effect immediately and can no longer be interim appointments were issued as early as withdrawn by the President once the March 22, 2001. However, it is not the date of appointee has qualified into office. The fact filing of the petition that determines whether that it is subject to confirmation by the the constitutional issue was raised at the Commission on Appointments does not alter earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity its permanent character. The Constitution to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in itself makes an ad interim appointment the pleadings before a competent court that permanent in character by making it effective can resolve the same, such that, “if it is not until disapproved by the Commission on raised in the pleadings, it cannot be Appointments or until the next adjournment of considered at the trial, and, if not considered Congress. The second paragraph of Section at the trial, it cannot be considered on 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as appeal.” Petitioner questioned the follows: “The President shall have the power constitutionality of the ad interim to make appointments during the recess of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason the Congress, whether voluntary or when she filed her petition before this Court, compulsory, but such appointments shall be which is the earliest opportunity for pleading effective only until disapproval by the the constitutional issue before a competent Commission on Appointments or until the body. Furthermore, this Court may next adjournment of the Congress.” determine, in the exercise of sound (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the ad interim discretion, the time when a constitutional appointment remains effective until such issue may be passed upon. There is no doubt disapproval or next adjournment, signifying petitioner raised the constitutional issue on that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked time. by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for Same; Same; In keeping with the Supreme any reason an ad interim appointment is Court’s duty to determine whether other utterly without basis. agencies of government have remained within the limits of the Constitution and have Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution not abused the discretion given them, the imposes no condition on the effectivity of an Supreme Court may even brush aside ad interim appointment, and thus an ad technicalities of procedure and resolve any interim appointment takes effect immediately; constitutional issue raised.—In any event, the In case of an appointment made by the issue raised by petitioner is of paramount President when Congress is in session, the importance to the public. The legality of the President nominates, and only upon the directives and decisions made by the consent of the Commission on Appointments COMELEC in the conduct of the May 14, may the person thus named assume office, 2001 national elections may be put in doubt if while with reference to an ad interim the constitutional issue raised by petitioner is appointment, it takes effect at once, and the left unresolved. In keeping with this Court’s individual chosen may thus qualify and duty to determine whether other agencies of perform his function without loss of time.— government have remained within the limits The Constitution imposes no condition on the of the Constitution and have not abused the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and discretion given them, this Court may even thus an ad interim appointment takes effect brush aside technicalities of procedure and immediately. The appointee can at once resolve any constitutional issue raised. Here assume office and exercise, as a de jure the petitioner has complied with all the officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. requisite technicalities. Moreover, public In Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, this Court elaborated on the Same; Same; Same; Same; An ad interim nature of an ad interim appointment as appointment becomes complete and follows: “A distinction is thus made between irrevocable once the appointee has qualified the exercise of such presidential prerogative into office, and the withdrawal or revocation requiring confirmation by the Commission on of an ad interim appointment is possible only Appointments when Congress is in session if it is communicated to the appointee before and when it is in recess. In the former, the the moment he qualifies, as any withdrawal President nominates, and only upon the or revocation thereafter is tantamount to consent of the Commission on Appointments removal from office.—An ad interim may the person thus named assume office. It appointee who has qualified and assumed is not so with reference to ad interim office becomes at that moment a government appointments. It takes effect at once. The employee and therefore part of the civil individual chosen may thus qualify and service. He enjoys the constitutional perform his function without loss of time. His protection that “[n]o officer or employee in the title to such office is complete. In the civil service shall be removed or suspended language of the Constitution, the appointment except for cause provided by law.” Thus, an is effective ‘until disapproval by the ad interim appointment becomes complete Commission on Appointments or until the and irrevocable once the appointee has next adjournment of the Congress.’ ” qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is Same; Same; Same; Same; The term “ad possible only if it is communicated to the interim appointment,” as used in letters of appointee before the moment he qualifies, appointment signed by the President, means and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is a permanent appointment made by the tantamount to removal from office. Once an President in the meantime that Congress is in appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal recess.—The term “ad interim appointment”, right to the office which is protected not only as used in letters of appointment signed by by statute but also by the Constitution. He can the President, means a permanent only be removed for cause, after notice and appointment made by the President in the hearing, consistent with the requirements of meantime that Congress is in recess. It does due process. not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The Same; Same; Same; An ad interim term, although not found in the text of the appointment can be terminated for two Constitution, has acquired a definite legal causes specified in the Constitution—first, by meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The the disapproval of his ad interim appointment Court had again occasion to explain the by the Commission on Appointments, and, nature of an ad interim appointment in the second, by the adjournment of Congress more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court without the Commission on Appointments of Appeals, where the Court stated: “We have acting on his appointment.—An ad interim already mentioned that an ad interim appointment can be terminated for two appointment is not descriptive of the nature of causes specified in the Constitution. The first the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of cause is the disapproval of his ad interim whether the appointment is temporary or in appointment by the Commission on an acting capacity, rather it denotes the Appointments. The second cause is the manner in which the appointment was made. adjournment of Congress without the In the instant case, the appointment extended Commission on Appointments acting on his to private respondent by then MSU President appointment. These two causes are resolu Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor tory conditions expressly imposed by the limitation as to tenure. The permanent status Constitution on all ad interim appointments. of private respondent’s appointment as These resolutory conditions constitute, in Executive Assistant II was recognized and effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads attested to by the Civil Service Commission of ad interim appointees. No one, however, Regional Office No. 12. Petitioner’s can complain because it is the Constitution submission that private respondent’s ad itself that places the Sword of Damocles over interim appointment is synonymous with a the heads of the ad interim appointees. temporary appointment which could be validly terminated at any time is clearly Same; Same; Same; Security of Tenure; An untenable. Ad interim appointments are appointment or designation in a temporary or permanent but their terms are only until the acting capacity is the kind of appointment that Board disapproves them.” (Emphasis the Constitution prohibits the President from supplied) making to the three independent constitutional commissions.—While an ad interim appointment is permanent and renew the appointment not because of the irrevocable except as provided by law, an constitutional prohibition on reappointment, appointment or designation in a temporary or but because of a final decision by the acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked Commission on Appointments to withhold its at the pleasure of the appointing power. A consent to the appointment. temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A by- This is the kind of appointment that the passed appointment is one that has not been Constitution prohibits the President from finally acted upon on the merits by the making to the three independent Commission on Appointments at the close of constitutional commissions, including the the session of Congress.—An ad interim COMELEC. appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Appointments to organize is another matter. Commissions; Commission on Elections; A by-passed appointment is one that has not Statutory Construction; To hold that the been finally acted upon on the merits by the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments at the close of Commission on Appointments to first confirm the session of Congress. There is no final ad interim appointees before the appointees decision by the Commission on can assume office will negate the President’s Appointments to give or withhold its consent power to make ad interim appointments.— to the appointment as required by the While the Constitution mandates that the Constitution. Absent such decision, the COMELEC “shall be independent,” this President is free to renew the ad interim provision should be harmonized with the appointment of a by-passed appointee. This President’s power to extend ad interim is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the appointments. To hold that the independence Commission on Appointments, which of the COMELEC requires the Commission provides as follows: “Section 17. Unacted on Appointments to first confirm ad interim Nominations or Appointments Returned to appointees before the appointees can the President. Nominations or appointments assume office will negate the President’s submitted by the President of the Philippines power to make ad interim appointments. This which are not finally acted upon at the close is contrary to the rule on statutory of the session of Congress shall be returned construction to give meaning and effect to to the President and, unless new nominations every provision of the law. It will also run or appointments are made, shall not again be counter to the clear intent of the framers of considered by the Commission.” (Emphasis the Constitution. supplied) Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed Same; Same; Same; Commission on appointment can be considered again if the Appointments; Principle of Check and President renews the appointment. Balance; An ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Appointments can no longer be extended a Construction; The jurisprudence under the new appointment—the disapproval is a final 1935 Constitution governing ad interim decision of the Commission on Appointments appointments by the President is doubtless in the exercise of its checking power on the applicable to the present Constitution.— appointing authority of the President.—There Guevara was decided under the 1935 is no dispute that an ad interim appointee Constitution from where the second disapproved by the Commission on paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Appointments can no longer be extended a present Constitution on ad interim new appointment. The disapproval is a final appointments was lifted verbatim. The decision of the Commission on Appointments jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution in the exercise of its checking power on the governing ad interim appointments by the appointing authority of the President. The President is doubtless applicable to the disapproval is a decision on the merits, being present Constitution. The established a refusal by the Commission on practice under the present Constitution is that Appointments to give its consent after the President can renew the appointments of deliberating on the qualifications of the by-passed ad interim appointees. This is a appointee. Since the Constitution does not continuation of the well-recognized practice provide for any appeal from such decision, under the 1935 Constitution, interrupted only the disapproval is final and binding on the by the 1973 Constitution which did not appointee as well as on the appointing power. provide for a Commission on Appointments In this instance, the President can no longer but vested sole appointing power in the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An ad President. interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The does not constitute a term of office—the prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), period from the time the ad interim Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither appointment is made to the time it lapses is to disapprove nor by-passed ad interim neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term.— appointments.—The prohibition on However, an ad interim appointment that has reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of lapsed by inaction of the Commission on the Constitution applies neither to Appointments does not constitute a term of disapproved nor by-passed ad interim office. The period from the time the ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is appointment cannot be revived by another ad neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To interim appointment because the disapproval hold otherwise would mean that the President is final under Section 16, Article VII of the by his unilateral action could start and Constitution, and not because a complete the running of a term of office in the reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 COMELEC without the consent of the (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by- Commission on Appointments. This passed ad interim appointment can be interpretation renders inutile the confirming revived by a new ad interim appointment power of the Commission on Appointments. because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words such new appointment will not result in the and Phrases; The phrase “without appointee serving beyond the fixed term of reappointment” applies only to one who has seven years. been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Appointments, whether or not such person framers of the Constitution made it quite clear completes his term of office.—The phrase that any person who has served any term of “without reappointment” applies only to one office as COMELEC member—whether for a who has been appointed by the President full term of seven years, a truncated term of and confirmed by the Commission on five or three years, or even for an unexpired Appointments, whether or not such person term of any length of time—can no longer be completes his term of office. There must be a reappointed to the COMELEC.—The framers confirmation by the Commission on of the Constitution made it quite clear that any Appointments of the previous appointment person who has served any term of office as before the prohibition on reappointment can COMELEC member—whether for a full term apply. To hold otherwise will lead to of seven years, a truncated term of five or absurdities and negate the President’s power three years, or even for an unexpired term of to make ad interim appointments. any length of time—can no longer be reappointed to the COMELEC. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commissioner Foz succinctly explained this Supreme Court will not subscribe to a intent in this manner: “MR. FOZ. But there is proposition that will wreak havoc on vital the argument made in the concurring opinion government services.—In the great majority of Justice Angelo Bautista in the case of of cases, the Commission on Appointments Visarra vs. Miraflor, to the effect that the usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad prohibition on reappointment applies only interim appointments first issued to when the term or tenure is for seven years. appointees. If such ad interim appointments But in cases where the appointee serves only can no longer be renewed, the President will for less than seven years, he would be certainly hesitate to make ad interim entitled to reappointment. Unless we put the appointments because most of her qualifying words “without reappointment” in appointees will effectively be disapproved by the case of those appointed, then it is mere inaction of the Commission on possible that an interpretation could be made Appointments. This will nullify the later on their case, they can still be constitutional power of the President to make reappointed to serve for a total of seven ad interim appointments, a power intended to years. Precisely, we are foreclosing that avoid disruptions in vital government possibility by making it clear that even in the services. This Court cannot subscribe to a case of those first appointed under the proposition that will wreak havoc on vital Constitution, no reappointment can be government services. made.” (Emphasis supplied) Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; framers of the present Constitution prohibited Transfers; Security of Tenure; Career reappointments for two reasons—first, to Executive Service; One who is not a Career prevent a second appointment for those who Executive Service (CES) officer, nor a holder have been previously appointed and of a Career Executive Service Eligibility, confirmed even if they served for less than which are necessary qualifications for holding seven years, and, second, to insure that the the position of Director IV as prescribed in the members of the three constitutional Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) commissions do not serve beyond the fixed issued by the Civil Service Commission, does term of seven years.—The prohibition on not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV.— reappointment is common to the three Petitioner’s appointment papers dated constitutional commissions. The framers of February 2, 1999, February 15, 2000 and the present Constitution prohibited February 15, 2001, attached as Annexes “X”, reappointments for two reasons. The first is “Y” and “Z” to her Petition, indisputably show to prevent a second appointment for those that she held her Director IV position in the who have been previously appointed and EID only in an acting or temporary capacity. confirmed even if they served for less than Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service seven years. The second is to insure that the (CES) officer, and neither does she hold members of the three constitutional Career Executive Service Eligibility, which commissions do not serve beyond the fixed are necessary qualifications for holding the term of seven years. position of Director IV as prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; One who issued by the Civil Service Commission. has been given an ad interim appointment as Obviously, petitioner does not enjoy security COMELEC Chairman is a de jure officer, and of tenure as Director IV. In Secretary of consequently, he has full authority to exercise Justice Serafin Cuevas vs. Atty. Josefina G. all the powers of that office for so long as his Bacal, this Court held that: “As respondent ad interim appointment remains effective; does not have the rank appropriate for the The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the position of Chief Public Attorney, her COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his appointment to that position cannot be own authority, without having to secure the considered permanent, and she can claim no approval of the COMELEC en banc, to security of tenure in respect of that position. transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with Civil Service Law.— Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner’s posturing will hold water if The COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer Benipayo does not possess any color of title specifically vested with the power to transfer to the office of Chairman of the COMELEC. or reassign COMELEC personnel, the We have ruled, however, that Benipayo is the COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto de jure COMELEC Chairman, and itself this power because that will mean consequently he has full authority to exercise amending the Revised Administrative Code, all the powers of that office for so long as his an act the COMELEC en banc cannot legally ad interim appointment remains effective. do.—The proviso in COMELEC Resolution Under Section 7 (4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C, No. 3300, requiring due notice and hearing Book V of the Revised Administrative Code, before any transfer or reassignment can be the Chairman of the COMELEC is vested with made within thirty days prior to election day, the following power: “Section 7. Chairman as refers only to COMELEC field personnel and Executive Officer; Powers and Duties. The not to head office personnel like the Chairman, who shall be the Chief Executive petitioner. Under the Revised Administrative Officer of the Commission, shall: x x x (4) Code, the COMELEC Chairman is the sole Make temporary assignments, rotate and officer specifically vested with the power to transfer personnel in accordance with the transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. provisions of the Civil Service Law.” The COMELEC Chairman will logically (Emphasis supplied) The Chairman, as the exercise the authority to transfer or reassign Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is COMELEC personnel pursuant to COMELEC expressly empowered on his own authority to Resolution No. 3300. The COMELEC en transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in banc cannot arrogate unto itself this power accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the because that will mean amending the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not Revised Administrative Code, an act the required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc cannot legally do. COMELEC en banc. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Election Period; COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel, should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body.—COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to require such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will have to approve every personnel transfer or reassignment, making the resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second approval from the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer or reassignment.