April 6, 2016

G.R. No. 206766

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO YEPES, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before us for review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CEB CR HC No. 01007 dated 21 September 2012,
which dismissed the appeal of accused-appellant Eduardo Yepes and affirmed with modification the Judgment2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28 of Catbalogan City in Criminal Case Nos. 6125-6126 finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit:

That on or about the 29th day of July 2004, at about 6:20 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at vicinity of Purok 6,
Barangay Guindapunan, Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to gain and without being authorized by law, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and hand over One (1) Heat sealed transparent plastic bag containing
white crystalline substance called methylamphetamine Hydrocholoride locally known as "shabu", a dangerous drug,
having the following marking and net weight, to wit: "A-1-("JFI-1")-0.03 gram", as per Chemistry Report No. D-276-2004,
to PO1 Ervin A. Ariño who acted as poseur-buyer in a "buy-bust" operation conducted by the Samar Provincial Police
Office (PPO) of Catbalogan, Samar, as evidenced by the Two (2) pieces of One Hundred Pesos Bills (Pl00.00) marked
money with Serial Numbers RN535127 and QJ837907, respectively. 3

At his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Officer 2 Ervin Ariño (PO2 Ariño ), Police Senior Inspector Benjamin
Aguirre Cruto (P/S Insp. Cruto) PO2 Roy Lapura (PO2 Lapura), Senior Police Officer 4 Romy dela Cruz (SPO4 dela Cruz),
PO3 Nelson Lapeciros (PO3 Lapeciros) and PO3 Jay Ilagan (PO3 Ilagan).

PO2 Arifio testified that on 29 July 2004, at around 6:20 in the evening, he was with PO2 Lapura and PO2 Arthur Perdiso
(PO2 Perdiso) at Purok 6, Barangay Guindapunan, Catbalogan City to conduct a buy-bust operation on a person yet to be
identified and accompanied by their police asset. The operation had been authorized by Police Inspector Carlos G. Vencio
in the afternoon of the same day. The police asset whose name PO2 Ariño failed to remember on the witness stand, arrived
in a motorcycle with accused-appellant as passenger. P02 Ariño, as poseur buyer, then asked accused-appellant if he had
"some stuff' and the latter nodded. PO2 Ariño gave him two (2) One Hundred Peso (Pl00.00) bills in exchange for a small
sachet of what PO2 Ariño believed to be shabubased on its appearance. PO2 Ariño removed his cap to signal the
consummation of the operation to his companions who had been hiding behind a concrete wall about 5-6 meters away.
When his companions arrived and arrested accused-appellant, PO2 Ariño headed for the police station to report the
outcome of the operation. Thereat, he surrendered the plastic sachet to PO3 Ilagan.4

PO2 Lapura confirmed that they had not been informed about the identity of the suspect before the buy-bust operation
and that the police asset was to identify him for them. During the buy-bust operation, PO2 Lapura together with PO2
Perdiso and SPO4 dela Cruz been stationed more or less ten (10) meters from the location of the alleged buy-bust
operation. PO2 Lapura saw accused-appellant and PO2 Ariño hand one another something and when the latter executed
the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Lapura and PO2 Perdiso approached them. PO2 Lapura informed the accused-appellant of
his constitutional rights and conducted a body search on the latter which yielded two (2) small plastic sachets and two (2)
pieces of One Hundred Peso (Pl00.00) bills. PO2 Lapura subsequently handed the sachets to SPO4 dela Cruz who had
remained at their original location and the bills to PO3 Ilagan at the police station. On cross-examination, P02 Lapura
stated that from his vantage point, he could not see the plastic sachet but merely saw accused-appellant hand PO2 Ariño
something. He also stated that he cannot ascertain whether it was shabu due to the distance.5

SPO4 dela Cruz narrated that he had been waiting at the barangay hall when the buy-bust team together with accused-
appellant passed by en route to the police station. PO2 Ariño handed him three (3) sachets. SPO4 dela Cruz proceeded to
examine the contents of one of the sachets. His conclusion that the same was shabu is embodied in a Certification of Drug
Field Test dated 29 July 2004.6

PO3 Ilagan, as evidence custodian, testified that three (3) sachets of shabu had been surrendered to him at the police
station by officers PO2 Ariño and Lapura. He marked the evidence as "JFI" and submitted them to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for examination.7

PO3 Lapeciros stated that he had photocopied five (5) pieces of One Hundred Peso (Pl00.00) bills and had them
subscribed by the Office of the Clerk of Court for use in buy-bust operations.8

P/S Insp. Cruto testified that he had conducted a physical examination of the substance alleged to be shabu. 9 His positive
findings are encapsulated in Chemistry Report No. D-276-2004. 10
Accused-appellant testified on his behalf and vehemently denied the indictment. He narrated that on the date of the
alleged buy-bust operation, he had just come from the public cemetery and was walking to the town proper when a person
named Lagrimas, known to be a police asset, came around driving a motorcycle. Lagrimas requested accused-appellant to
ride with him in his motorcycle and he acceded. Near the grandstand in Barangay, Guindapunan, Lagrimas parked the
motorcycle with several police officers, more than ten (10) of them, within distance. The police officers approached them
and handcuffed accused-appellant. Lagrimas pulled out shabu from his shirt, gave it to one of the police officers who
attempted to put it inside accused-appellant's pocket which the latter was able to resist. The police officers brought
accused-appellant to the police station and there was shown the sachet of shabu but he denied any charges. The police
officers told him "here, so that you can go free, because according to you, you have not committed any crime, here is Two
Hundred (P200.00) Pesos marked money, go to Guinsorongan, buy this 'shabu', to whoever you will give the money, that
is the one we will apprehend." When accused-appellant refused the request, he was placed inside the detention cell. 11

On 19 December 2008, the RTC rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of illegal sale of a dangerous drug.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby sentences the accused EDUARDO YEPES Y CINCO,beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 and, thus, punishes him to suffer a penalty of life
imprisonment to death and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). But however, acquits the
accused of illegal possession of shabu under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.

Mr. Victor Templonuevo, OIC, Provincial Warden, is hereby directed to deliver the living body of accused Yepes to Abuyog
Penal Colony immediately upon receipt of this judgment, unless otherwise, detained for some other causes. With cost de
oficio. 12

Accused-appellant moved for a reconsideration and re-opening of the case, tendering a joint affidavit executed by four (4)
affiants stating that no buy-bust operation took place on 29 July 2004, and that about the time of the alleged operation,
accused-appellant was working at another place and that the latter is of good moral character and enjoys good standing in
their community. 13 This the RTC denied. 14

Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 18 February 2009. 15 On 21 September 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered
the assailed judgment affirming with modification the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals found accused-appellant
guilty of the crime charged, or violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.

Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before this Court. In a Resolution 16 dated 08 July 2013, accused-appellant and
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) were asked to file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. Both
parties manifested that they will no longer file supplemental briefs as their arguments in their respective briefs are already
sufficient.17

Accused-appellant asserts that the shabu was planted by the police officers and that there was no sufficient proof that the
prosecution witnesses had indeed seen him sell shabu. In addition, the police officers failed to observe the proper
procedure in the handling, custody and disposition of the seized drug.

The Court finds merit in the appeal.

The RTC anchored accused-appellant's conviction fundamentally on the testimonial evidence of the prosecution. The RTC
brushed aside accused-appellant's defense of denial ruling that his evidence failed to overturn the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of the police officers. Similarly, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment of the RTC, also lending greater credence to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution. According to the
Court of Appeals, said evidence was found to have sufficiently established the elements of the crime charged, as well as the
fact of preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug specimens seized. The appellate court also upheld the
presumption of regularity in favor of the police officers.

The Court reviewed the records of the instant case and saw a different story. The police officers had indeed committed
serious lapses in procedure in the conduct of the buy-bust operation on 29 July 2004. The Court also finds that the
evidence for the prosecution falls short of the exacting degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt required under our
criminal laws.

Generally, the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great weight
and will not be disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and
substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misapplied as in the case at bar.18

To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be present: (a) the identities of the buyer and
the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing.
It is material to establish that the transaction or sale actually took place, and to bring to the court the corpus delicti as
evidence. 19 Proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions for the sale of illegal drugs demands that unwavering
exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti, the body of crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. 20

The reason for this the Court elucidated in People v. Tan, 21 to wit:

[B]y the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as
informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heron can be planted in pockets or hands of unsuspecting
provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great." Thus, the courts
have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses. Needless to state, the lower court should have exercised the utmost diligence and prudence in
deliberating upon accused-appellants guilt. It should have given more serious consideration to the pros and cons of the
evidence offered by both the defense and the State and many loose ends should have been settled by the trial court in
determining the merits of the present case.

The Court carefully examined the pieces of evidence on record, read the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
and the defense, and noted the following material points:

1. Only the police asset/informant and PO2 Ariño had personal knowledge of the buy-bust operation, if at all one
was done. Interestingly, the prosecution never presented the police asset. Neither had any statement been taken
from him which was material considering that he was the lone source of information regarding accused-
appellant's supposed illegal activities. It is noteworthy that the identity of the accused-appellant had not been
known to any of the participants of the buy-bust team and that he could only be identified through the police
asset. It is also remarkable that PO2 Ariño could not remember the police asset's name on the witness stand. No
surveillance was conducted to identify the alleged drug-pusher who would be the subject of the entrapment. There
was even no evidence regarding the dependability or reliability of the police asset.

2. PO2 Ariño testified that immediately after his companions apprehended accused-appellant, he went back to the
police station to report the incident and hand over one (1) plastic sachet to PO3 Ilagan. His actuations were not
according to procedure. PO2 Ariño left the scene shortly. There was no mention that he marked the sachet, nor
that he took photographs and made an inventory of the same. PO2 Ariño stated that he had the sachet marked but
could not recall its marking. Most importantly, PO2 Ariño stated that he surrendered only one (1) sachet and that
he surrendered the same to PO3 Ilagan.

3. PO2 Lapura was positioned with SPO4 dela Cruz and PO2 Perdiso some ten (10) meters away from the location
of the buy-bust operation. He admitted that he merely observed the gestures of the PO2 Ariño and accused-
appellant and that he could not ascertain from his vantage point whether the plastic sachet indeed
contained shabu. PO2 Lapura also testified that his body search on accused-appellant yielded two (2) small plastic
sachets and two (2) pieces of One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills. PO2 Lapurahanded the sachets to SPO4 dela
Cruz who had remained at their original post and the bills to PO3 Ilagan at the police station.

4. SPO4 dela Cruz did not witness the buy-bust operation as he had waited at the barangay hall. There, PO2
Ariño allegedly handed him three (3) sachets. He opened one (1) sachet, tasted it and concluded that the
same and the other two (2) sachets all contained shabu.

5. P03 Ilagan testified that, as evidence custodian, three (3) sachets of shabu had been surrendered to him at
the police station by officers PO2 Ariño and Lapura. He marked the evidence as "JFI" and submitted them to
PDEA for examination. There was no mention whether the marking had been made in the presence of accused-
appellant.

6. P03 Lapeciros and P/S Insp. Cruto only performed limited tasks and had no personal knowledge of the buy-
bust operation.

Evidently, there are material inconsistencies between and among the testimonies of the police officers raising doubts
whether an entrapment operation had indeed been made; and serious questions regarding the integrity of the corpus
delicti if truly there had been a buy-bust operation. Considering that the police asset was not presented, the evidence
against accused-appellant consists solely of PO2 Ariño's declaration that there was a buy-bust operation conducted on a
drug-pusher who turned out to be accused-appellant. It is PO2 Ariño's positive declaration versus accused-appellant's
denial. While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties, this presumption cannot
prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.22 And although the defense of denial may be weak, courts should not at once look at them with
disfavor as there are situations where an accused may really have no other defenses which, if established to be truth, may
tilt the scales of justice in his favor, especially when the prosecution evidence itself is weak. 23

Even assuming that an entrapment operation in truth had been made, the presumption that police officers enjoy is also
overcome by evidence of their procedural lapses in the handling of the seized drug. In illegal drugs cases, the identity and
integrity of the drugs seized must be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to arrive at a
finding of guilt.24

The procedure set forth in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is intended precisely to ensure the identity and integrity of
dangerous drugs seized. This provision requires that upon seizure of illegal drug items, the apprehending team having
initial custody of the drugs shall (a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and (b) take photographs thereof (c) in the
presence of the person from whom these items were seized or confiscated and (d) a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice and any elected public official (e) who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given copies
thereof.

Section 21 was laid down by Congress as a safety precaution against potential abuses by law enforcement agents who
might fail to appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of
illegal drugs. Under the principle that penal laws are strictly construed against the government, stringent compliance
therewith is fully justified.25
In the present case, the procedure was not observed at all. Such noncompliance raises questions whether the illegal drug
items were the same ones allegedly seized from accused-appellant.

Although justifiable grounds may excuse noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved, the police officers in the present case presented no justifiable
reason for the non-observance of the procedure. Lamentably, both RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to even note at all
that there were deficiencies in the handling of the seized evidence much less inquire into the reasons for the non-
observance of procedure.

Most important, the Court finds as established fact that the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized were
not shown to have been preserved.1âwphi1 Contrarily, the records of the case bear out the glaring fact that the chain of
custody of the seized illegal drugs was broken even at the very first link thereof.

To recall, the testimonial evidence of the prosecution could not even be sure about the number of sachets seized from
accused-appellant and to whom it was first handed to by PO2 Ariño. PO2 Ariño testified that he handed it to PO3 Ilagan at
the police station who in turn testified that he received three (3) sachets from both PO2 Ariño and PO2 Lapura. PO2
Lapura said that he gave two (2) sachets to SPO4 dela Cruz who had been remained at his original post. SPO4 dela Cruz
however stated that at the barangay hall where he had been staying the whole time, PO2 Ariño handed him three (3)
sachets. These are confusing testimonies of witnesses who are themselves confused.

Corpus delicti is the "actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged."26 In illegal drug cases, it refers to
the illegal drug item itself.27 When there are reservations about the identity of the illegal drug item allegedly seized from
the accused, the actual commission of the crime charged is put into serious question and courts have no alternative but to
acquit on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Even if accused-appellant failed to present evidence with respect to his defense of denial or the ill motive that impelled the
police officers to falsely impute upon him the crime charged, the same is of no moment. The evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. 28 If the
prosecution cannot establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt, the defense is not even required to
adduce evidence. The presumption of innocence on the part of accused-appellant in this case thus must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated 21 September 2012 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. CEB CR HC No. 01007. Accused-appellant Eduardo Yepes is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is confined for
another lawful cause.

Let a copy of the decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court the action taken thereon
within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

April 4, 2016

G.R. No. 192320

BENJAMIN L. VERGARA, JONA M. SARVIDA and JOSEPHINE P. SABALLA, Petitioners,

vs.
ATTY. EUSEBIO I. OTADOY, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioners to challenge the June 30, 2009 decision 1and May
11, 2010 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 100262. The CA decision reversed the Regional Trial
Court's (RTC) orders3 which denied the respondent's motion to postpone the pre-trial conference and which adopted the
evidence that the petitioners had previously presented.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case stemmed from a petition for habeas corpus decided by this Court in G.R. 154037.4 In that case, the petitioners
were arrested for indirect contempt because they refused to comply with the probate court’s order to pay rentals to
Anselma Allers’ estate. This Court ruled that their imprisonment was unwarranted as it violated the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for nonpayment of debt.

Armed with this ruling, on January 12, 2004, the petitioners Benjamin L. Vergara, Jona M. Sarvida, and Josephine P.
Saballa filed a civil action for damages against respondent Atty. Eusebio I. Otadoy, Jr. and three other persons
(defendants). Atty. Otadoy served as the administratrix’s counsel in G.R. No. 154037. The petitioners alleged that they
were unjustly detained as a result of Atty. Otadoy’s fraudulent practices.

On March 4, 2004, the petitioners filed a motion to admit an amended complaint which the RTC granted.

When the defendants failed to file their answers, the petitioners moved to declare the defendants in default and to allow
the petitioners to present evidence ex parte. These were granted in the RTC’s order dated September 17, 2004.

Atty. Otadoy, representing himself, filed several motions for reconsideration of the RTC’s order. He alleged that he did not
receive the amended complaint.

Meanwhile, the petitioners presented their evidence ex parte on September 27, 2004 and October 11, 2004.

On February 8, 2005, the RTC granted Atty. Otadoy’s motion to set aside the default order. It also directed the petitioners
to serve a copy of the amended complaint on Atty. Otadoy.

The court scheduled the pre-trial conference on March 12, 2007, at 1:30 in the afternoon.

Atty. Otadoy filed a motion to postpone the pre-trial conference to April 20, 2007. He claimed that on March 4, 2007, he
was invited to deliver a lecture at the National Annual Lectureship of the Church of Christ on March 11-14, 2007. As a
minister and evangelist of that church, he chose to accept the invitation rather than attend the pre-trial
conference. Without waiting for a ruling on his motion, Atty. Otadoy proceeded to attend the lecture in Zamboanga.

At the pre-trial conference, the petitioners’ counsel opposed the motion to postpone the pre-trial conference arguing that
Atty. Otadoy failed to file a pre-trial brief and that his motion was filed late. The petitioners’ counsel moved that he be
allowed to present his evidence ex parte as stated in Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. He also moved that the court
adopt the evidence that he had previously presented.

The RTC granted his motions and considered the case submitted for resolution.

Atty. Otadoy filed his pre-trial brief only on April 11, 2007. He also filed a motion for reconsideration on April 20, 2007,
which the RTC denied.

Atty. Otadoy responded by filing a petition for certiorari with the CA.

THE CA RULING

The CA granted Atty. Otadoy’s petition. It noted that Atty. Otadoy should be blamed for not appearing at the pre-trial and
for presuming that his motion would be granted ipso facto. Nevertheless, Atty. Otadoy only asked once for the
postponement of the pre-trial proceedings during the entire duration of the case. The RTC should have placed greater
premium on safeguarding a litigant’s fullest opportunity to establish his case than on technicalities. Thus, the CA opined
that the RTC should have granted Atty. Otadoy’s motion to postpone.

The CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

In their present petition, the petitioners argue that the CA incorrectly ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying Atty. Otadoy’s urgent motion to postpone dated March 6, 2007.

First, a mere error of judgment does not constitute grave abuse of discretion unless attended by personal biases, whims,
and caprices, which were not proven here. Moreover, the CA did not refer to any law or rule that the RTC violated in
granting the petitioners’ motions.

Second, Atty. Otadoy did not submit any proof that he indeed attended the conference. Despite this lack of evidence, the
CA reversed the RTC’s order denying his motion for postponement.

In his comment, the respondent argues that the CA’s decision is supported by facts and jurisprudence. He argues that his
motion to postpone was timely filed by registered mail on March 7, 2007, or six (6) days before the scheduled pre-trial
conference. He claims that by denying his motion, the RTC deprived him of his day in court.

OUR RULING
We GRANT the petition.

The issue to be resolved here is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Atty. Otadoy’s motion to
postpone the pretrial conference.

A ruling that precludes a party from presenting evidence, such as an order of default, must have basis in law; otherwise, it
is issued with grave abuse of discretion.5

In the present case, the RTC had legal basis to deny the motion for postponement as explained more fully below. Thus, we
rule that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Atty. Otadoy’s motion.

Motion to Postpone is a
privilege, not a right.

Pre-trial answers the call for the speedy disposition of cases.6 Under Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the counsels and the
parties are mandated to appear at pre-trial.7 Their non-appearance may be excused only if there is a valid cause or if a
representative appears on their behalf.8 If the defendant fails to appear, the RTC may allow the plaintiff to present
evidence ex parte and may render judgment based on it.9

This Court has ruled that a motion for postponement is a privilege and not a right. 10 The movant should not assume that
his motion would be granted.11

In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to postpone the pretrial, the court must take into account two factors: (a)
the reason given, and (b) the merits of the movant’s case.12

In Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al. v. Song,13 the defendants’ counsel moved to postpone the pre-trial due to
his illness. The trial court denied the motion because the movant did not attach any supporting medical certificate. In the
motion for reconsideration, the defendants’ counsel attached a duly notarized medical certificate and an affidavit of merit
that he signed. The trial court, however, also denied the motion for reconsideration.

When the case reached this Court, we ruled that the trial court should have granted the motion for reconsideration after
the notarized medical certificate was submitted, following the rationale we discussed below.

On the basis of this precedent, the question now for us is whether Atty. Otadoy presented a valid cause to postpone the
pre-trial conference.

We note that Atty. Otadoy’s failure to attach proof that he attended the alleged lectureship weighs heavily against him. He
had many opportunities to submit proof of his attendance. He could have attached this proof in his motion for
reconsideration, in his petition before the CA, or in this petition. Yet, he failed to do so. Thus, we find that he did not
sufficiently establish a valid cause to postpone the pre-trial conference, giving the RTC a firm legal basis to deny his
motion and to declare him in default.

Strict application of
procedural rules

The CA acknowledged Atty. Otadoy’s fault. However, it added that the courts should not be overly strict in applying
procedural rules. It cited Africa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.14 and RN Development Corporation v. A.I.I.
System, Inc.15

In those cases, the judges declared the parties in default only because their lawyers were late: for ten minutes
in Africa and for four minutes in RN Development.

In the present case, Atty. Otadoy not only failed to appear during pretrial; he also failed to file the mandatory pre-trial
brief within the prescribed time.1âwphi1

To be sure, judicial action must be guided by the principle that a party-litigant must be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his case.16 Rules of procedure, however have their own reasons for their existence; they are with us
to ensure prompt, speedy, and orderly dispensation of justice. This competing reason must be weighed and balanced
against the admittedly weightier need to give litigants their day in court. When procedural rules are at the point of being
abused, such as when the litigant fails to establish a valid cause to postpone the proceedings, procedural rules cannot and
must not be brushed aside.

In Philippine Transmarine Carriers, the Court considered that the motion was the first postponement that the defendants
requested only after finding that there was a valid cause to postpone.

In this petition, although Atty. Otadoy requested for postponement only once, he failed to show a valid cause to justify his
request; thus, the RTC did not legally err in denying his motion to postpone.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The June 30, 2009 decision and May 11, 2010 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 100262 are REVERSED. The Regional Trial Court's order dated March 12, 2007, is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 192075, February 10, 2016

ROBERTO PALO Y DE GULA,1 Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside
the September 22, 2009 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31677. The assailed decision affirmed
the July 27, 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 171, in Criminal Case No. 586-V-
02, finding Roberto Palo y De Gula (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and his co-accused Jesus Daguman y Ramos (Daguman) were charged with violation of Section 11 (illegal
possession of dangerous drugs), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in an Information,5which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"That on or about July 24, 2002 in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, without any authority of law, did then and there
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 0.03 gram of Metharnphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), knowing the same to be a regulated drug.

Contrary to Law."
The two accused were apprehended by the authorities. After posting their bail bonds, both were ordered released. At the
scheduled arraignment on September 23, 2002, only Daguman appeared and pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.6 The petitioner's sister, Carolina Geronimo, explained that petitioner's failure to appear in said arraignment was
because he was suffering from some kind of mental disorder.7 For this reason, the trial court ordered the family of the
petitioner that he be brought to the National Center for Mental Health for psychiatric evaluation. The trial court also
directed the attending physician to submit a report on the petitioner's mental condition. After receipt of notice that the
petitioner was fit for trial, the trial court set his arraignment on March 10, 2003 during which he entered a plea of not
guilty.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Version of the Prosecution

To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Officer 3 Miguel Capangyarihan (PO3 Capangyarihan). During trial,
the testimonies of all other prosecution witnesses namely: Police Officer 1 Ernesto Santos (PO1 Santos), Senior Police
Officer 1 Reynaldo Tapar (SPO1 Tapar), Police Officer 2 Miguel Isla (PO2 Isla), and Police Inspector Juanita Sioson
(P/Insp. Sioson) were dispensed with upon stipulation by the parties.

PO3 Capangyarihan, a member of the Valenzuela City Police, testified that at around 6:30 in the evening of July 24, 2002,
he was walking along a dark alley at Mercado Street, Gen. T. De Leon in Valenzuela City. With him at that time was a boy
who was a victim of a stabbing incident and right behind them, was PO1 Santos. While they were walking toward the
petitioner's direction, at a distance of about five to seven meters, PO3 Capangyarihan saw the petitioner and Daguman
talking to each other. PO3 Capangyarihan also noticed the petitioner holding a plastic sachet in his hand who was then
showing it to Daguman. Believing that the plastic sachet contained shabu, from the manner by which the petitioner was
holding the sachet, PO3 Capangyarihan immediately approached the petitioner, held and recovered from his hand the said
plastic sachet. Right there and then, the petitioner was arrested by PO3 Capangyarihan. Daguman was also arrested by
PO1 Santos.
PO3 Capangyarihan further testified that the petitioner and Daguman were informed of their constitutional rights and
that the two accused, together with the item seized, were brought to the police station where the confiscated item was
marked by PO3 Capangyarihan with petitioner's initials "RPD." During his cross-examination, PO3 Capangyarihan
disclosed that there is a rampant selling of shabu at the place where the two accused were apprehended and that his
suspicion was aroused by the petitioner's delicate way of handling the plastic sachet.

PO3 Capangyarihan turned over the petitioner, Daguman and the confiscated item to SPO1 Tapar, the investigator of the
case. The parties stipulated that SPO1 Tapar received one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with "RPD" marking
from PO3 Capangyarihan, which item was marked in evidence as Exhibit "B". SPO1 Tapar prepared the letter-request for
the examination of the substance found inside the plastic sachet. Also stipulated was the fact that after SPO1 Tapar's
investigation, the seized item (Exhibit "B") and the said letter-request were transmitted by him to PO2 Isla for delivery to
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory-Northern Police District Crime Laboratory Office (PNPCL-NPDCLO).

The testimony of PO2 Isla was dispensed with as the prosecution and defense agreed that: (1) he received from SPO1
Tapar the seized item marked as Exhibit "B" as well as the corresponding letter-request for laboratory examination; (2) he
delivered these two to the PNPCL-NPDCLO; and (3) both the seized item and the letter-request were accepted by P/Insp.
Sioson.

Likewise dispensed with was the testimony of P/Insp. Sioson, a forensic chemical officer of the PNPCL-Camp Crame,
Quezon City, after the defense acknowledged that her office received one (1) heat-sealed small transparent plastic sachet
bearing the marking "RPD" (Exhibit "B") together with the letter-request for laboratory examination. In addition, the
defense admitted that the contents of the sachet tested positive for methyl amphetamine hydrochloride, more commonly
known as shabu. P/Insp. Sioson's examination of the submitted specimen was reduced into writing as embodied in her
Chemistry Report No. D-706-02 containing the following entries:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

A-One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings "RPD" containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline
substance. xxx

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug. xxx

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx

CONCLUSION:

Specimen A contains Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx" 9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Lastly, the parties stipulated on the fact that PO1 Santos, also of the Valenzuela City Police Station, arrested Daguman but
found no shabu in his possession at the time of his arrest.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Version of the Defense

The defense, on the other hand, presented the petitioner and Daguman as witnesses.

According to the petitioner, he can no longer recall the date and time of his arrest. All the same, the petitioner testified
that he and Daguman were just sitting along the road, in front of a house that was raided by PO3 Capangyarihan and PO1
Santos. One or two persons were arrested from the raid. The petitioner averred that when the police officers passed by him
and Daguman, they were arrested and frisked but nothing was found in their persons. Nevertheless, the two accused were
made to board the police vehicle, brought to the police station and detained thereat. The petitioner insisted that he had
never been involved in any drug-related incident prior to his arrest. On cross-examination, he stated that he only
complained to his sister of the illegality of his arrest.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Testifying in his behalf, Daguman denied the accusation against him. He claimed that on the day of the incident, he went
to the petitioner's place to play cara y cruz. Instead of gambling, Daguman was invited by the petitioner to go somewhere
to get shabu. Daguman narrated that they rode a jeep and alighted at Mercado Street, Valenzuela City to look for the
person from whom the petitioner would buy shabu. After the two accused met a certain Joseph, a shabu seller, the
transaction between the petitioner and the latter started. While the petitioner and Joseph were busily selecting which
plastic sachet had more contents, they caught the attention of the police officers. The police officers approached them and
when they were about to be arrested, the petitioner went berserk, challenged the arresting officers to a fistfight and told
them that they were only brave as they were armed. Nonetheless, the three were arrested. Daguman confirmed that
several plastic sachets were confiscated from Joseph while one (1) small plastic sachet of shabu and a P100.00 bill were
recovered from the petitioner at the time of their apprehension. On direct and cross-examination, Daguman categorically
stated that no shabu was taken from him.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The RTC's Ruling

After trial, judgment was rendered by the RTC convicting the petitioner of the offense charged. The trial court ruled that
the prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and as the petitioner had
been caught in flagrante delicto, his warantless arrest was justified pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.13 The RTC applied the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers' duties since no ill motive
on their part was shown by the defense. However, the trial court acquitted Daguman for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ROBERT[O] PALO y DE GULA is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Consequently, said accused is hereby ordered to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight years (8) and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months as maximum. In addition thereto, the said accused is further ordered to pay a FINE of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 300,000.00).

Anent, accused JESUS DAGUMAN y RAMOS, for insufficiency of evidence, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense
charged. Accordingly, the bailbond posted by the said accused for his provisional liberty is hereby
ordered RELEASED from liability.

The Branch Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to turn over to PDEAthe drugs used as evidence in this case for proper
disposition.

SO ORDERED.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The CA's Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the prior ruling of the RTC. The CA held that the chain of custody over the seized item was
unbroken from the time it was confiscated from the petitioner at the crime scene until the same was brought to the crime
laboratory for examination. It added that failure of the police officer to comply strictly with the directives embodied in
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case if justifiable grounds exist and for as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item has been properly preserved. The appellate court also found
the testimony of PO3 Capangyarihan credible and accorded the police officer the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duty. On the other hand, it completely disregarded the self-serving and uncorroborated denial
by the petitioner.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration15 of the CA Decision. Finding no merit in the motion, it was
denied by the CA through its Resolution16 dated April 14, 2010.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Issues

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari raising two issues, namely: (1) whether the Honorable Court of Appeals
gravely erred in finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite the dearth of evidence
supporting the prosecution's contention; and (2) whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court notwithstanding the arresting officers' patent non-compliance with the proper chain of custody
of the seized dangerous drugs.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Illegal possession of dangerous drugs is penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:

xxxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:

xxxx

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300.000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are
less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin
oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or
"ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three
hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
To secure a conviction for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, the concurrence of the following elements must be
established by the prosecution: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited
or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court finds that these elements were proven by the prosecution in the present case. PO3 Capangyarihan testified in a
clear and straightforward manner that when he chanced upon petitioner, the latter was caught red-handed in the illegal
possession of shabu and was arrested in flagrante delicto. On direct examination, the police officer positively identified
the petitioner as the person holding, scrutinizing and from whom the plastic sachet was confiscated. After conducting a
chemical analysis, the forensic chemical officer certified that the plastic sachet recovered from the petitioner was found to
contain 0.03 gram of shabu. Nowhere in the records was it shown that the petitioner is lawfully authorized to possess the
dangerous drug. Furthermore, Daguman admitted that the petitioner intentionally sought and succeeded in getting hold
of shabu. Clearly, the petitioner knowingly possessed the dangerous drug, without any legal authority to do so, in violation
of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

The Court concurs with the trial court in attributing full faith and credence to the testimony of PO3 Capangyarihan. His
detailed narration in court remained consistent with the documentary and object evidence submitted by the prosecution.
As there is nothing in the record to indicate that PO3 Capangyarihan was impelled by improper motive when he testified
against the petitioner, the Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the apprehending officer's performance of
official duty.

In addition to the above-metioned elements, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti18 which in drug-related cases
refers to the dangerous drug itself,19 in this case, shabu. As repeatedly ruled by this Court, the identity, integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti are properly preserved for as long as the chain of custody of the same are duly
established.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The essence of the chain of custody rule is to make sure that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the
accused is the same dangerous drug recovered from his or her possession. 21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs, Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No.
916522prescribes:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.

xxxx
The aforequoted provision is expounded in Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
R.A. No. 9165, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search wan-ant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In seeking acquittal, the petitioner insists that the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the directives outlined in
Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 particularly on the requirements of markings, physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items translates to their failure to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
item.

The Court disagrees with the argument of the petitioner.

The fact that the apprehending officer marked the plastic sachet at the police station, and not at the place of seizure, did
not compromise the integrity of the seized item. Jurisprudence has declared that "marking upon immediate confiscation"
contemplates even marking done at the nearest police station or office, of the apprehending team. 24 Neither does the
absence of a physical inventory nor the lack of photograph of the confiscated item renders the same inadmissible. What is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items as these would be used
in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.25cralawred

The Court is convinced that the integrity and evidentiary value of shabu seized from the petitioner had been preserved
under the chain of custody rule even though the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as
implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, was not strictly complied with.

Here, evidence shows that immediately after both the petitioner and the plastic sachet were brought to the police station
by PO3 Capangyarihan, the latter marked the plastic sachet with petitioner's initials "RPD" and turned them over to
investigator SPO1 Tapar. SPO1 Tapar forwarded the plastic sachet bearing "RPD" initials as well as the letter-request for
laboratory examination to PO2 Isla. PO2 Isla delivered the same marked sachet and the letter-request to forensic chemical
officer P/Insp. Sioson, of the PNPCL-NPDCLO, for examination of the contents of said sachet. As earlier mentioned, the
contents of the marked sachet tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

It should be emphasized that the parties have already stipulated on the names of the above-stated persons who handled
and essentially covered every movement of the seized item. The parties are bound by the stipulations they made in the trial
court.
In effect, the prosecution was able to account for every link in the chain of custody starting from the time the shabu was
confiscated by the arresting officer from the petitioner until the same was received by the forensic chemical officer for
examination. Moreover, when the prosecution presented as evidence in court the plastic sachet with "RPD" initials, PO3
Capangyarihan positively identified that the shabu submitted for laboratory examination is the same one taken from the
petitioner.

Further, the Court sees no compelling reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the
appellate court. Fundamental is the rule that factual findings of the trial courts involving the credibility of witnesses are
accorded great weight and respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts or speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The lower courts correctly rejected petitioner's defense of denial for being self-serving and uncorroborated. Denial is
inherently a weak defense which cannot outweigh positive testimony of a prosecution witness. 27 "A defense of denial which
is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no
weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on
affirmative matters."28 In the instant case, the defense of denial fails even more when the petitioner's co-accused,
Daguman, confirmed that the petitioner had every intent to possess and was caught in actual possession of shabu.

Thus, the Court affirms the conviction of the petitioner for illegal possession of 0.03 gram of shabu.

As previously cited, the penalty for illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of shabu is imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence, the minimum period of which shall not be less than the minimum term fixed by law while the
maximum period shall not exceed the maximum term prescribed under the same law.

The RTC and C A sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of eight years (8) and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum. The lower courts also ordered the petitioner to pay a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

The penalty meted out by the RTC and CA should be modified as it is not in accord with the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, is proper under the premises.

With respect to the imposed fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), this amount is sustained as it is in
accordance with that prescribed under Section 11(3), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

WHEREFORE, the September 22, 2009 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 31677 is

hereby AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION. Petitioner Roberto Palo y De Gula is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and
to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 197056, March 02, 2016

FE P. ZALDIVAR, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND ELIEZER ZALDIVAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES AND MAMERTO B. DUMASIS., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Petitioner Fe P. Zaldivar (Zaldivar) filed the present petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
questioning the Decision2 dated May 31, 2010 and Resolution3 dated December 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 02085, which set aside the Orders4 dated November 18, 2005 and June 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. 03-57161.

Facts

Zaldivar and Jeanette Artajo (Artajo) were charged with Estafa pursuant to a complaint filed by respondent Mamerto
Dumasis (Dumasis) before the RTC, which was initially raffled to Branch 33. Pre-trial conference was held by the trial
court and a Pre-Trial Order was issued on the same date, February 15, 2005. Zaldivar and her co-accused Artajo were then
arraigned and both pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.5

During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented Alma Dumasis and Delia Surmieda as witnesses, and both
identified their respective affidavits, which constituted their direct testimonies. Zaldivar's counsel, Atty. Salvador
Cabaluna, opted not to cross-examine the witnesses, while Artajo's counsel was deemed to have waived his right to cross-
examine in view of his absence despite notice.6

Dumasis, by himself and without the consent or acquiescence of the public prosecutor subsequently filed a Motion for
Inhibition against Judge Virgilio Patag, which was granted by the latter. Hence, the case was re-raffled to Branch 23,
presided by Judge Edgardo Catilo (Judge Catilo).7

On November 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order, denying the admission of the prosecution's exhibits. The trial court also
nullified and set aside the previous proceedings conducted and set the case anew for pre-trial conference. The dispositive
portion of the order reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court orders the following:

a) The proceedings in this case wherein prosecution witnesses were presented but whose affidavits were only considered
as their direct testimonies, are hereby nullified and set aside for want of procedural due process:

b) The prosecution's formal offer of exhibits is also set aside for being premature, in view of the declaration of nullity of
the proceeding for the presentation of prosecution witnesses; and

c) In the greater interest of justice, this case is set for pre-trial conference anew to consider matters not covered by the pre-
trial conference last February 15, 2005.

The pre-trial conference in this case is set on January 19, 2006 at 8:30 in the morning.

Notify the Public Prosecutor, the complaining witness, both accused, their surety, and their counsel.

SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Zaldivar then filed on January 16, 2006 a Motion to Declare Prosecution's Case Terminated, which was denied by the RTC
in its Order dated March 10, 2006. Zaldivar filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was also denied in the Order dated
June 20, 2006.9

Aggrieved, Zaldivar filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA, where the issues
submitted for resolution are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) whether, by presenting only the affidavits of its witnesses, the prosecution failed to prove the
commission of the crime charged, and which should have resulted in the dismissal of the criminal
case; and

(2) whether there was grave abuse of discretion committed by Judge Catilo in nullifying the
proceedings and setting the case anew for pre-trial.10
In the assailed Decision dated May 31, 2010, the CA found strong and compelling reasons to review the findings of the trial
court presided by Judge Catilo, and set aside the Orders dated November 18, 2005 and June 20, 2006. 11 The dispositive
portion of the CA decision provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed twin Orders rendered by the [RTC], Branch 23, Iloilo City in
Criminal Case No. 03-57161 dated November 18, 2005 and June 20, 2006 respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE and the
trial court is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of the case.

SO ORDERED.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA dismissed Zaldivar's theory that the prosecution failed to prove by competent and admissible evidence the crime
as charged in view of the prosecution's act of merely presenting the affidavits of its witnesses in lieu of giving their
testimonies in open court. The CA ruled that such conclusion is best left to the sound judgment of the trial court and that
the prosecution presented its evidence in a manner that it deems fit over which neither Zaldivar nor the trial judge has no
control.13

The CA also ruled that Judge Catilo grossly abused the exercise of his discretion and judgment when he nullified the pre-
trial proceedings taken before Branch 33 and ordered the conduct of a new pre-trial. According to the CA, the trial court's
order is tantamount to ordering a new trial or re-opening of the case to the prejudice of the rights of the accused.14 The CA
agreed with the Office of the Solicitor General's (OSG) contention that Judge Catilo is without authority to nullify and set
aside the proceedings already conducted and to set the case for a second pre-trial conference to consider matters, which
were not covered in the first pre-trial conference held on February 15, 2005.15Moreover, the CA stated that instead of
calling for a new pre-trial, Judge Catilo could recall witnesses as provided for in Section 9, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 16

Zaldivar filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 15, 2010.
Unsatisfied, she instituted this petition grounded on the same issues raised in the CA.

Zaldivar points out that the denial of the admission of exhibits of the prosecution upon timely and sustained objections of
the accused has the effect of terminating the case of the prosecution for failure to adduce competent and admissible
evidence during the trial proper.17 Moreover, she argues that the prosecution has lamentably failed to establish by
competent and admissible evidence the crime as charged and to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
and, therefore, the case should be dismissed instead of being tried anew or re-opened for further proceedings.18 Finally,
she contends that the RTC's Order dated November 18, 2005 directing the conduct of another pre-trial or re-opening of
the case violates her right not to be prosecuted and tried twice on the same information against her. 19
Ruling of the Court

The assailed CA decision and resolution are affirmed for the following reasons:

The CA was correct in ruling that Zaldivar's contention that the prosecution failed to establish by competent and
admissible evidence of the crime charged is best left to the sound judgment of the trial court. 20 Zaldivar should be
reminded of the rule that "the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits."21 Unless Zaldivar files a demurrer to the evidence
presented by the prosecution,22 she cannot enjoin the trial court to terminate the case on the ground of the prosecution's
alleged failure to establish and prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 23 The validity and merits of the prosecution's
accusations, or Zaldivar's defense for that matter, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence,24 are better
ventilated during trial proper.

The CA, likewise, correctly found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it nullified the proceedings
previously conducted and ordered anew a pre-trial of the case. Note that one of the main reasons presented by Judge
Catilo in nullifying the pre-trial proceedings was that the proceedings conducted after the pre-trial conference did not
comply with the prescribed procedure in the presentation of witnesses.25 But as propounded by the CA, and even the OSG
who appeared for Judge Catilo, what the trial court should have done to correct any "perceived" procedural lapses
committed during the presentation of the prosecution's evidence was to recall the prosecution's witnesses and have them
identify the exhibits mentioned in their respective affidavits.26 This is explicitly allowed by the rules, specifically Section 9,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 9. Recalling witnesses - After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness cannot be
recalled without leave of court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion as the interest of justice may require.
The trial court may even grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in
question, for strict observance of the order of trial or trial procedure under the rules depends upon the circumstance
obtaining in each case at the discretion of the trial judge.27cralawred

Another reason adduced by the trial court in nullifying the pre-trial proceedings was that "[t]he pre-trial order of February
15, 2005 did not contain x x x matters ought to be the subject matter of a pre-trial conference under Sec. 1, Rule 118 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure."28

The pertinent provision governing pre-trial in criminal cases states:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, [RTC],
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the
court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.29
In this case, there is nothing on record that will show any disregard of the rule. Pieces of evidence were marked, objections
thereto were raised, issues were identified, no admissions on factual matters were arrived at, and trial dates were set.30 As
found by the CA, "[a] close scrutiny of the Pre-Trial Conference Order dated February 15, 2005, would show that there was
due compliance with the Rules relative to the conduct of pre-trial, x x x Verily, there is nothing in the pre-trial order which
calls for its nullification as the same clearly complies with the Rules." 31 And while the Court recognizes the trial court's zeal
in ensuring compliance with the rules, it cannot, however, simply set aside the proceedings that have been previously duly
conducted, without treading on the rights of both the prosecution and the defense who did not raise any objection to the
pre-trial proceedings. Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between the parties and
to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. Its chief objective is to simplify, abbreviate and
expedite or dispense with the trial.32 In this case, this purpose was clearly subverted when the trial court hastily set aside
the pre-trial proceedmgs and its results. Absent any palpable explanation as to why and how said proceedings were
conducted in violation of the rules and thus should be set aside, the Court sustains the CA's finding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in nullifying the previous proceedings and setting the case anew for pre-
trial.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May 31, 2010 and Resolution
dated December 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02085 are hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23, is ORDERED to proceed with Criminal Case No. 03-57161 with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

 G.R. No. 213910, February 03, 2016

VINSON* D. YOUNG A.K.A. BENZON ONG AND BENNY YOUNG A.K.A. BENNY
ONG, Petitioners, v.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 10, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated
July 31, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 07147, which reversed and set aside the Order4 dated July
24, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 22 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. CBU-96106, finding probable
cause to indict petitioners Vinson D. Young a.k.a. Benzon Ong (Vinson) and Benny Young a.k.a. Benny Ong (Benny;
collectively, petitioners) for violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e)5 in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c)6 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9208,7 otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003."

The Facts

On separate dates,8 members of the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force (RAHTTF) of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), namely, PO2 Lyman N. Arsiia (PO2 Arsua) and PO2 Napoleon A. Talingting, Jr. (PO2 Talingting, Jr.),
among others, conducted surveillance operations at Jaguar KTV Bar (Jaguar) in Cebu City, and observed that its
customers paid P6,000.00 in exchange for sexual intercourse with guest relations officers (GROs), or P10,000.00 as "bar
fine" if they were taken out of the establishment. In the course of their surveillance, they learned that: (a) petitioners were
the owners of Jaguar; (b) a certain "Tico" acted as overall manager; and (c) a certain "Ann" welcomed customers and
offered them GROs.9

On April 9, 2011, in the course of an entrapment operation, PO2 Arsua, PO2 Talingting, Jr., and PO1 Jef Nemenzo (PO1
Nemenzo), acting as poseur customers, handed P15,000.00 worth of marked money to the "mamasang"/manager of
Jaguar in exchange for sexual service. At the prearranged signal, the rest of the RAHTTF members raided Jaguar resulting
to multiple arrests, seizure of sexual paraphernalia, recovery of the marked money from one Jocelyn Balili (Balili), 10 and
the rescue of 146 women and minor children.11 Later, six (6) of these women - who all worked at Jaguar as GROs, namely,
AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, EEE, and FFF12 (AAA Group) - executed affidavits13 identifying petitioners, Tico, and Ann as
Jaguar's owners. Accordingly, a criminal complaint for violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and
(c) of RA 9208 was filed against them, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cebu City (OCP), docketed as NPS Docket
No. VII-09-INV-IID00605.14

In defense, Vinson denied ownership of Jaguar and asserted that he had sold his rights and interests therein to one
Charles Theodore Rivera pursuant to a Deed of Assignment 15 dated December 14, 2009 (December 14, 2009 Deed of
Assignent). Not being the manager nor owner of Jaguar, therefore, he had no control and supervision over the AAA Group,
with whom he denied acquaintance. Similarly, Benny claimed that he was neither the owner nor manager of Jaguar and
was not even present during the raid. He raised "mistake in identity" as defense, stressing that he was not the same person
identified by the AAA Group in their respective affidavits.16

During the pendency of the preliminary investigation, or on May 31, 2011, the AAA Group submitted affidavits 17 stating
that their previous affidavits were vitiated and not of their own free will and voluntary deed,18 effectively recanting the
same.

The OCP Ruling

In a Resolution19 dated October 27, 2011, the OCP found probable cause and ordered the indictment of petitioners, Tico,
and Ann for violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208.

It found that the receipt and subsequent recovery of the marked money from Balili constituted prima facie evidence that
there was a transaction to engage in sexual service for a fee.20 It also held that the documentary evidence pertaining to
Jaguar's business operations, as well as the positive identification made by the AAA Group, sufficiently established
petitioners as its owners. Besides, it noted that Vinson's defense - i.e., that he had divested his interests in Jaguar - was
evidentiary in nature and hence, must be threshed out in a full-blown trial. Moreover, while the AAA Group had since
retracted their initial statements, their retractions were found to hold no probative value. Finally, while the OCP ruled that
the crime of human trafficking was qualified for being committed by a syndicate, or in large scale - carried out by three (3)
or more persons - it, however, did not appreciate the minority of EEE and FFF as a qualifying circumstance, not having
been substantiated by sufficient and competent evidence.21

Separately, both parties moved for reconsideration.22 In a Resolution23 dated April 23, 2012, the OCP modified its
previous ruling and considered the minority of EEE and FFF based on the certified true copies of their certificates of live
birth24 as additional qualifying circumstance. On May 29, 2012, the corresponding information 25 was filed before the RTC,
docketed as Crim. Case No. CBU-96106.

On June 18, 2012, petitioners filed an omnibus motion26 for a judicial determination of probable cause, praying that the
issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest be held in abeyance pending resolution thereof, and for the case against
them to be dismissed for lack of probable cause.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The RTC Ruling

In an Order28 dated July 24, 2012, the RTC granted the omnibus motion and dismissed the case for lack of probable
cause.29 It ruled that the affidavits of the RAHTTF members and the AAA Group failed to show that petitioners had
knowledge or participated in the recruitment of the 146 women and minors who were rescued at Jaguar as sex workers. It
also found that the recantations of the AAA Group were fatal to the prosecution's case, since it effectively cleared
petitioners of any knowledge in Jaguar's operations. It further reasoned that the December 14, 2009 Deed of Assignment -
the authenticity, due execution, and validity of which were not impugned by the prosecution - showed that Vinson had
already ceded his rights and interests in Jaguar.30

Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for certiorari31 before the CA, docketed as CA G.R. SP. No. 07147, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. In their
Comment,32 petitioners maintained that the RTC properly dismissed the case. Procedurally, they also pointed out that the
correct remedy on the part of the OSG was to file an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Even assuming that
a certioraripetition was the proper mode of review, the OSG's failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration was a fatal
infirmity warranting the petition's outright dismissal.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The CA Ruling

In a Decision34 dated September 10, 2013, the CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the case for lack of probable cause. Consequently, it ordered the reinstatement of the information and remanded the case
to the RTC for further proceedings.35 The CA primarily reasoned out that the court a quo failed to consider the other
evidence proffered by the prosecution to support its finding of probable cause, and that it delved on evidentiary issues in
evaluating the affidavits submitted by the prosecution which are matters better ventilated during the trial proper than at
the preliminary investigation level.36

The CA, however, did not touch on the issue of the propriety of the certiorari petition filed by the OSG.

Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration37 which was, however, denied in a Resolution38dated July 31, 2014;
hence, the instant petition.

The Issues Before the Court

The essential issues for the Court's resolution are: (a) whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC in dismissing the criminal case against petitioners for lack of probable cause; and (b) whether or not a
motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to filing a certiorari petition.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Determination of probable cause is either executive or judicial in nature.

The first pertains to the duty of the public prosecutor during preliminary investigation for the purpose of filing an
information in court. At this juncture, the investigating prosecutor evaluates if the facts are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.39

On the other hand, judicial determination of probable cause refers to the prerogative of the judge to ascertain if a warrant
of arrest should be issued against the accused. At this stage, the judge makes a preliminary examination of the evidence
submitted, and on the strength thereof, and independent from the findings of the public prosecutor, determines the
necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody in order liot to frustrate the ends of justice. 40

In People v. Inting,41 the stark distinctions between executive and judicial determination of probable cause were aptly
explained, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for
trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no
confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the
Judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor.42 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Pertinently, the Court declared in Santos-Dio v. CA43 (Santos-Dio) that while a judge's determination of probable cause is
generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, he is nonetheless authorized under Section 5
(a),44 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor's authority, it must be stressed that the judge's
dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to
establish probable cause - that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established
facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if
the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the
parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the
presentation of additional evidence.45 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Accordingly, a judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record
plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts
which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.46

Applying the standard set forth in Santos-Dio, the evidence on record herein does not reveal the unmistakable and clear-
cut absence of probable cause against petitioners. Instead, a punctilious examination thereof shows that the prosecution
was able to establish a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6
(a) and (c) of RA 9208. As it appears from the records, petitioners recruited and hired the AAA Group and, consequently,
maintained them under their employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. In view of this, probable cause
exists to issue warrants for their arrest.

Moreover, the Court notes that the defenses raised by petitioners, particularly their disclaimer that they are no longer the
owners of the establishment where the sex workers were rescued, are evidentiary in nature - matters which are best
threshed out in a full-blown trial. Thus, the proper course of action on the part of the RTC was not to dismiss the case but
to proceed to trial. Unfortunately, and as the CA aptly observed, the RTC arrogated upon itself the task of dwelling on
factual and evidentiary matters upon which it eventually anchored the dismissal of the case. Consequently, grave abuse of
discretion was correctly imputed by the CA against the RTC for its action.

Anent the question of whether a motion for reconsideration- is a prerequisite to the filing of a certiorari petition, the
Court finds the OSG's argument well-taken. In this regard, jurisprudence has carved out specific exceptions allowing
direct resort to a certiorari petition, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings
were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law
or where public interest is involved.47

In this case, the assailed RTC Order was a patent nullity for being rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction.48 Significantly, the present case involves public interest as it imputes violations of RA
9208, or the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003," a crime so abhorrent and reprehensible that is characterized by
sexual violence and slavery.49Accordingly, direct resort to a certiorari petition sans a motion for reconsideration is clearly
sanctioned in this case.cralaw-red

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 10, 2013 and the Resolution dated July 31, 2014
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 07147 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Leonardo-De Castro, and Bersamin, JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., no part prior OSG action.

G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JERRY PEPINO Y RUERAS AND PRECIOSA GOMEZ Y
CAMPOS, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is an appeal filed by Jerry Pepino (Pepino) and Preciosa Gomez (Gomez) assailing the June 16, 2006 decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02026.

ANTECEDENTS

The prosecution evidence showed that at 1:00 p.m., on June 28, 1997, two men and a woman entered the office of Edward
Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat, Paranaque City, and pretended to be customers. When Edward was about to
receive them, one of the men, eventually identified as Pepino, pulled out a gun. Thinking that it was a holdup, Edward told
Pepino that the money was inside the cashier's box. Pepino and the other man looted the cashier's box, handcuffed
Edward, and forced him to go with them.2 From the hallway, Jocelyn Tan (mentioned as "Joselyn" in some parts of the
record), Edward's wife, saw Pepino take her husband. She went to the adjoining room upon Edward's
instructions.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota Corolla where three other men were waiting inside. The woman (later
identified as Gomez) sat on the front passenger seat.4 The abductors then placed surgical tape over Edward's eyes and
made him wear sunglasses. After travelling for two and a half hours, they arrived at an apartment in Quezon City. The
abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes, placed him in a room, and then chained his legs. Pepino approached
Edward and asked for the phone number of his father so that he could ask for ransom for his (Edward's) liberty. Edward
told Pepino to negotiate with his wife, but the latter insisted on talking to his father. 5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

At around 5:00 p.m. of the same day, the kidnappers called Edward's father and demanded a P40 million ransom for his
release. Edward's father told the kidnappers that he did not have that amount. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn who
eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom. The kidnappers told Jocelyn to pack the money into two packages and to
drop these at a convenience store in front of McDonald's at Mindanao Avenue. They further demanded that Edward's
vehicle be used to bring the money.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After four days, or on July 1, 1997, Antonio Gepiga (the family driver) brought the agreed amount to the 7-Eleven
convenience store at Mindanao Avenue as instructed.7 That evening, three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made
him board a car, and drove around for 30 minutes. Upon stopping, they told Edward that he could remove his blindfold
after five minutes. When Edward removed his blindfold, he found himself inside his own car parked at the UP Diliman
Campus. He drove home and reported his kidnapping to Teresita Ang See, a known anti-crime
crusader.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After five months, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) informed Edward that they had apprehended some
suspects, and invited him to identify them from a lineup consisting of seven persons: five males and two females. Edward
positively identified Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo.9 Jocelyn likewise identified
Pepino.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead presented Zeny Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, NBI
Special Investigator Marcelo Jadloc and P/Sr. Insp. Narciso Quano (mentioned as "Qano" in some parts of the record).

Zeny testified that she and her husband, Jerry Pepino, were inside their house in Cebu City on December 7, 1997, when
about 20 heavily armed men entered their house looking for Jerry. When Jerry asked them if they had a warrant of arrest,
one of the men pointed a gun at him and handcuffed him; the armed men then hit him with the butt of an armalite and
punched him. The men also took Pepino's wristwatch and wallet, as well as Zeny's bag and watch. Some of the armed men
searched the second floor of the house, and found a .45 caliber gun. The armed men brought Zeny and Pepino outside
their house where Zeny saw Renato Pepino and Larex Pepino already handcuffed. The armed men brought them to the
Cebu City Police Headquarters before bringing them to the NBI Headquarters in Manila. The following day, Jerry, Renato,
and Larex were brought to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Zeny, on the other hand, was released after being detained at
the NBI for three (3) days.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Reynaldo's testimony was summarized by the CA as follows:

x x x On December 6, 1997, he accompanied accused-appellant Gomez to his brother's sister-in-law who happens to work
in a recruitment agency. While they were inside the latter's house at Lot 2, Block 15, Marikina Heights, Marikina City, they
heard a noise at the gate. When he peeped through the window, he saw two (2) motorcycles and two (2) Vannette vans.
Shortly thereafter, someone kicked the back door and several armed men emerged therefrom and announced their arrest.
When he asked them if they had any warrant, they replied: "Walang warrant, warrant. Walang search, search." They
were then hogtied and made to lie face down. Five (5) of them then went upstairs and seized his personal belongings
together with his briefcase which contained P45,000.00, documents of accused-appellant Gomez, and his .45 caliber pistol
as well as his license and permit to carry the same. No receipts were issued for their personal effects which were
confiscated. They were subsequently brought to Camp Crame and subjected to torture. The following day, they were
brought to the Department of Justice and a case for kidnapping was filed against him. Upon reinvestigation, however, he
was discharged from the Information and the court dismissed the case against him.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SI Jadloc and Police Senior Inspector Quano, Jr. were presented as hostile witnesses.

Jadloc declared on the witness stand that NBI Assistant Director Edmundo Arugay dispatched a team to Cebu City to
investigate a kidnap-for-ransom case. The team immediately conducted surveillance operations when they arrived at Calle
Rojo, Lahug, Cebu City. One of the team members saw Renato and Larex Pepino with guns tucked in their waists. When
the team approached them, the two men ran inside their house. The team went after them and on entering the house, they
saw Jerry in possession of a .45 caliber gun. The team arrested Jerry, Renato and Larex, and then brought them to the NBI
Headquarters in Manila.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Quano testified that he was designated as the leader of a team tasked to arrest members of a kidnap-for-ransom group at
their safe house in Lot 2, Block 50, Marikina Heights, Marikina City. When they arrived there, they introduced themselves
as police officers. The police forcibly opened the door after the occupants of the house refused to open the ground floor
door. During their search at the second floor, the operatives found an armalite and a .45 caliber gun. The members of the
team handcuffed Gomez and Reynaldo, and then brought them to Camp Crame.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The prosecution charged Preciosa Gomez, Jerry Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, Jessie Pepino, George Curvera, Boy Lanyujan,
Luisito "Tata" Adulfo, Henriso Batijon (a.k.a. Dodoy Batijon), Nerio Alameda, and an alias Wilan Tan with kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention before the Regional Trial Court {RTC), Branch 259, Paranaque City. 15 Reynaldo was
subsequently discharged after reinvestigation. Only Pepino, Gomez, and Batijon were arraigned; their other co-accused
remained at large.

In its May 15, 2000 decision, the RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. The RTC also ordered
them to pay Edward P700,000.00 representing the amount extorted from him; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
P50,000 as exemplary damages. The trial court acquitted Batijon for insufficiency of evidence.
The RTC held that Edward positively identified Pepino and Gomez as two of the persons who forcibly abducted him at
gunpoint inside Kilton Motors, and who consequently detained him somewhere in Quezon City for four (4) days until he
was released inside the UP Diliman Campus after the payment of ransom. The RTC added that Jocelyn corroborated
Edward's testimony on material points. It also pointed out that Edward identified both Pepino and Gomez at the lineup
conducted inside the NBI compound, although Jocelyn only recognized Gomez.

The RTC further ruled that the accused were already estopped from questioning the validity of their arrest after they
entered their respective pleas.

The case was automatically elevated to this Court in view of the death penalty that the RTC imposed. We referred the case
to the CA for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In its decision dated June 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that the
amounts of moral and exemplary damages were increased from P300,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively.

The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed to have waived any objection to the illegality of their arrests when they
did not move to quash the information before entering their plea, and when they participated at the trial.

The CA further ruled that Pepino and Gomez conspired with each other to attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap
Edward in exchange for ransom.

While the case was under review by the Supreme Court, Pepino filed an urgent motion to withdraw his appeal, which the
Court granted.17] Only Gomez's appeal is now pending before us.

In her brief18 and supplemental brief,19 Gomez maintained that it was impossible for Edward to have seen her in the front
seat of the getaway car because he (Edward) was blindfolded. She also alleged that the prosecution failed to prove that she
had conspired with the other accused.

Gomez further claimed that Edward's identification of her during trial "may have been preconditioned x x x by suggestive
identification"20 made at the police lineup. She further argued that the death penalty imposed on her is no longer proper
due to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346.

THE COURT'S RULING

We affirm Gomez's conviction, but we modify the penalty imposed and the awarded indemnities.

Illegality of the Arrest

We point out at the outset that Gomez did not question before arraignment the legality of her warrantless arrest or the
acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction over her person. Thus, Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her warrantless
arrest.

It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.21 As we held in People v. Samson:22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing
of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in
the trial.23chanrobleslaw

At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State
of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to
complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial
had commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against
her.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence

a. Elements of kidnapping proved

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1)
the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If
the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if
the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is also of
no moment and the crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present.25cralawred
All these elements have been established by the prosecution. Edward positively identified Gomez and Pepino - both
private individuals - as among the three persons who entered his office and pretended to be Kilton Motors' customers. He
further declared that Pepino pointed a gun at him, and forcibly took him against his will. To directly quote from the
records:

ATTY. WILLIAM CHUA:

Q: Can you tell us if anything unusual happened to you on June 28, 1997?

EDWARD TAN:

A: I was kidnapped.

xxxx

Q: Can you tell this Court how the kidnapping was initiated?

A: At around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, there were three persons who entered the office of Kilton Motors and
pretended to be customers.

Q: What was the gender of these three persons that you are referring to?

A: Two men and a woman.

Q: After they pretended to be customers, tell us what happened?

A: They told me they were going to pay but instead of pulling out money, they pulled out a gun.

Q: How many people pulled out guns as you said?

A: Only one, sir.

Q: Will you look around this courtroom now and tell us if the person who pulled out a gun is in court?

A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A PERSON AT THE RIGHT SECTION, SECOND ROW WHO, WHEN
ASKED HIS NAME, ANSWERED JERRY PEPINO)

Q: Now, you said that there were two men and a woman who went up the Kilton Motors Office and you pointed
to one of the men as Jerry Pepino, can you look around the courtroom and tell us if any of the two others are
in court?

A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A WOMAN INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO, WHEN ASKED HER
NAME, ANSWERED AS PRECIOSA GOMEZ)

xxxx

Q: You said Mr. Pepino pulled out his gun, what happened after he pulled out his gun?

A: He told me just to be quiet and go with him.

Q: What was your reaction when he pointed a gun to you and he stated those words?

A: I thought it was only a holdup and so I told him there was money with the cashier and told him to get it.

Q: What happened after you told him the money was in the cashier's box?

A: His companion took the money and told me to still go with them.

Q: When they told you to go with them, what happened next?

A: I told them why should I still go with them and then, I was handcuffed and was forced to go down.

xxxx

Q: As they were bringing you down, what happened next, Mr. Witness?

A: When we went down nearing his car, I was boarded on [in] his car.

xxxx

Q: When they boarded you inside that car, what did they do to you, Mr. Witness?

A: They put surgical tape on my eyes and also sunglasses.

xxxx
Q: Who was at the passenger's front seat of the car?

A: It was Preciosa Gomez.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxxx
Edward further declared on the witness stand that Pepino, Gomez, and their other co-accused brought him to a safe house
in Quezon City; detained him there for four (4) days; and demanded ransom from his (Edward's) family.

It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also in
detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is
restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of
the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. 27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Notably, Jocelyn corroborated Edward's testimony on the following points: Pepino poked a handgun at Edward while they
were on the second floor of Kilton; Pepino and his companion brought him downstairs and out of the building, and made
him board a car; and the kidnappers demanded ransom in exchange for Edward's release.

Both the RTC and the CA found the respective testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn credible and convincing. We affirm the
credibility accorded by the trial court (and affirmed by the CA) to these prosecution witnesses, in the absence of any
showing that this factual finding had been arbitrarily arrived at. There is nothing in the records that would put the
testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn under suspicion. We recall that Edward had close contacts with Pepino at Kilton
Motors and at the safe house. He also saw Gomez (a) seated at the front seat of the getaway Toyota Corolla vehicle; (b) at
the safe house in Quezon City; and (c) inside the car before the kidnappers released him.

Jocelyn, for her part, stated that she was very near Pepino while he was taking away her husband.

In People v. Pavillare,28 the Court found the testimonies of the private complainant Sukhjinder Singh and his cousin,
Lakhvir Singh, to be credible and convincing, and reasoned out as follows:

Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to remember their faces. The complainant had close
contact with the kidnappers when he was abducted and beaten up, and later when the kidnappers haggled on the amount
of the ransom money. His cousin met Pavillare face to face and actually dealt with him when he paid the ransom money.
The two-hour period that the complainant was in close contact with his abductors was sufficient for him to have a
recollection of their physical appearance. Complainant admitted in court that he would recognize his abductors if he sees
them again and upon seeing Pavillare he immediately recognized him as one of the malefactors as he remembers him as
the one who blocked his way, beat him up, haggled with the complainant's cousin and received the ransom money, x x x It
bears repeating that the finding of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses is given utmost respect and as a rule will
not be disturbed on appeal because it had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of the witness in
court.29chanrobleslaw

b. Admissibility of Identification

We find no merit in Gomez's claim that Edward's identification of her during trial might have been preconditioned by the
"suggestive identification" made during the police lineup.

In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,30 the Court explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine
the admissibility of such identifications in this manner:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone
is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons
lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy
of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.31chanrobleslaw

Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Edward's out-of-court identification to be reliable and thus admissible.
To recall, when the three individuals entered Edward's office, they initially pretended -to be customers,32 and even asked
about the products that were for sale.33 The three had told Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino "pulled out a
gun" instead.34 After Pepino's companion had taken the money from the cashier's box, the malefactors handcuffed Edward
and forced him to go down to the parked car. From this sequence of events, there was thus ample opportunity for Edward
- before and after the gun had been pointed at him -to view the faces of the three persons who entered his office. In
addition, Edward stated that Pepino had talked to him "[a]t least once a day" 35 during the four days that he was detained.

Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the getaway metallic green Toyota Corolla vehicle. In addition, the
abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes when they arrived at the apartment, and among those whom he saw there
was Gomez. According to Edward, he was able to take a good look at the occupants of the car when he was about to be
released.

On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of Pepino as the person who pointed a gun at her
husband while going down the stairs, and who brought him outside the premises of Kilton Motors. She maintained that
she was very near when Pepino was taking away her husband; and that she could not forget Pepino's face. For accuracy, we
quote from the records:

ATTY. CORONEL:

Q: You stated that you were able to see one of the persons who kidnapped your husband, if you see this person
again, would you be able to identify him?

JOCELYN SY TAN:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you look around the courtroom and see if the person you are referring to is here today?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you point to him?

A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A MALE PERSON INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO WHEN ASKED HIS NAME
ANSWERED AS JERRY PEPINO).

Q: Ms. Witness, what role did this person whom you identified and gave his name as Jerry Pepino, what role did
he play in the kidnapping of your husband?

A: Siya po bale 'yong nakayakap sa husband ko tapos nakatutok ng baril.

xxxx

ATTY. ESTRUCO:

Q: When Jerry Pepino was at Kilton Motors, he embraced your husband?

JOCELYN SY TAN:

A: Yes, sir. And pointed a gun at my husband.

Q: And he was not blindfolded at that time?

A: No, he was not blindfolded, he was only wearing a cap.

Q: You are very sure that he is Jerry Pepino?

A: Yes, I am very, very sure. I could not forget his face.

Q: You are very sure?

A: Yes, sir. Kahit sa nightmare ko, kasama siya.

x x x x36

We add that no competing event took place to draw Edward's and Jocelyn's attention from the incident. Nothing in the
records shows the presence of any distraction that could have disrupted the witnesses' attention at the time of the
incident.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their
assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. As the Court held in People v.
Esoy:38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrator
and to observe the manner in which the offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements
thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness's memory. Experience dictates that
precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a
high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any given time.39chanrobleslaw

While this pronouncement should be applied with great caution, there is no compelling circumstance in this case that
would warrant its non-application.

Contrary to what Gomez claimed, the police lineup conducted at the NBI was not suggestive. We note that there were
seven people in the lineup; Edward was not compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. While it
might have been ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup instead of only two, or if there had been a
separate lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone that there were five males and two females in the lineup did not
render the procedure irregular. There was no evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to Edward that the
appellants were the suspected perpetrators.
The following exchanges at the trial 'during Edward's cross-examination prove this point:

ATTY. ESTURCO:

Q: When they were lined up at the NBI, where were they placed, in a certain room?

EDWARD TAN:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: With a glass window? One way?

A: No, sir.

Q: You mean to say you were face to face with the alleged kidnappers?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the persons who allegedly kidnapped you, you conferred with the NBI
agents?

A: The NBI agents told me not to be afraid.

Q: No, my question is, you conferred with the NBI agents?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What is the name of the NBI agent?

A: I cannot remember, sir.

Q: And how many were lined up?

A: Seven, sir.

Q: And the NBI agent gave the names of each of the seven?

A: No, sir.<SUP STYLE="COLOR: RGB(255, 0, 0);">[40]</SUP>

We also note that Jocelyn's and Edward's out-of-court identifications were made on the same day. While Jocelyn only
identified Pepino, the circumstances surrounding this out-of-court identification showed that the whole identification
process at the NBI was not suggestive. To directly quote from the records:

ATTY. ESTURCO:

Q: How about the alleged kidnappers, where were they placed during that time?

JOCELYN TAN:

A: They were in front of us.

Q: Without any cover?

A: None, sir.

Q: Without any glass cover?

A: See-through glass window.

Q: One-way mirror?

A: Not one way, see-through.

Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the alleged kidnappers, you were already instructed by the NBI what
to do and was told who are the persons to be lined up?

A: No, sir.

xxxx

Q: And between the alleged length of time, you were still very positive that it was Gerry (sic) Pepino inside the
NBI cell?
A: At first, I did not know that he was Jerry Pepino but we know his face.

Q: At first, you did not know that it was Jerry Pepino?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: It was the NBI officer who told you that the person is Jerry Pepino, am I correct?

A: They identified that the person we identified was Jerry Pepino. We first pinpointed na heto ang mukha at
saka sinabi na 'yan si Jerry Pepino.

x x x x 41

These exchanges show that the lineup had not been attended by any suggestiveness on the part of the police or the NBI
agents; there was no evidence that they had supplied or even suggested to either Edward or Jocelyn that the appellants
were the kidnappers.

We are not unaware that the Court, in several instances, has acquitted an accused when the out-of-court identification is
fatally flawed. In these cases, however, it had been clearly shown that the identification procedure was suggestive.

In People v. Pineda,42 the Court acquitted Rolando Pineda because the police suggested the identity of the accused by
showing only the photographs of Pineda and his co-accused Celso Sison to witnesses Canilo Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos.
According to the Court, "there was impermissible suggestion because the photographs were only of appellant and Sison,
focusing attention on the two accused."43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Similarly, the Court in People v. Rodrigo44 acquitted appellant Lee Rodrigo since only a lone photograph was shown to the
witness at the police station. We thus held that the appellant's in-court identification proceeded from, and was influenced
by, impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic identification.

The lack of a prior description of the kidnappers in the present case should not lead to a conclusion that witnesses'
identification was erroneous. The lack of a prior description of the kidnappers was due to the fact that Jocelyn (together
with other members of Edward's family), for reasons not made known in the records, opted to negotiate with the
kidnappers, instead of immediately seeking police assistance. If members of Edward's family had refused to cooperate
with the police, their refusal could have been due to their desire not to compromise Edward's safety. 45 In the same
manner, Edward, after he was freed, chose to report the matter to Teresita Ang See, and not to the police.

Given these circumstances, the lack of prior description of the malefactors in this case should not in any way taint the
identification that Edward and Jocelyn made.

c. The Right to Counsel

The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion that would lead the accused
to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
accused.46chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission
of the crime under investigation.47 As a rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches
only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police lineup.

Our ruling on this point in People v. Lara48 is instructive:

x x x The guarantees of Sec. 12(1), Art. Ill of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only
by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the
police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-
up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stage.49chanrobleslaw

Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were among those already presented to the
media as kidnapping suspects by the DOJ a day before the police lineup was made. In this sense, the appellants were
already the focus of the police and were thus deemed to be already under custodial investigation when the out-of-court
identification was conducted.

Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court identification for having been tainted by an
irregular out-of-court identification in a police lineup. They focused, instead, on the legality of the appellants'
arrests.

Whether Edward and Jocelyn could have seen Pepino and Gomez in various media fora that reported the presentation of
the kidnapping suspects to the media is not for the Court to speculate on. The records merely show that when defense
counsel, Atty. Caesar Esturco, asked Jocelyn during cross-examination whether she was aware that there were several
kidnap-for-ransom incidents in Metro Manila, the latter answered that she "can read in the newspapers." 50 At no time did
Jocelyn or Edward ever mention that they saw the appellants from the news reports in print or on television.

At any rate, the appellants' respective convictions in this case were based on an independent in-court identification
made by Edward and Jocelyn, and not on the out-of-court identification during the police lineup. We
reiterate that the RTC and the CA found the court testimonies of these witnesses to be positive and credible, and that there
was no showing that their factual findings had been arrived at arbitrarily. The in-court identification thus cured whatever
irregularity might have attended the police lineup.

As the Court ruled in People v. Algarme:51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Even assuming arguendo the appellants' out-of-court identification was defective, their subsequent identification in court
cured any flaw that may have initially attended it. We emphasize that the "inadmissibility of a police lineup identification x
x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification." We also stress that all the
accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses during the trial.

It is also significant to note that despite the overwhelming evidence adduced by the prosecution, Pepino and Gomez did
not even testify for their respective defenses.

d. The Presence of Conspiracy

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to
commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged
conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose.

Proof of the agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the agreement may be inferred from the conduct of the
parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is
not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details
of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. 52chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the present case, the records establish the following facts: Pepino, Gomez, and another man entered Edward's office,
and initially pretended to be customers; the three told Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino pulled out a gun.
After Pepino's companion took the money from the cashier's box, the malefactors handcuffed him and forced him to go
down to the parked car; Gomez sat at the front passenger seat of the car which brought Edward to a safe house in Quezon
City; the abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes, placed him in a room, and then chained his legs upon arrival at
the safe house; the abductors negotiated with Edward's family who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom to be
delivered by the family driver using Edward's own car; and after four days, three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward,
made him board a car, drove around for 30 minutes, and left him inside his own car at the UP Diliman campus.

The collective, concerted, and synchronized acts of the accused before, during, and after the kidnapping constitute
undoubted proof that Gomez and her co-accused conspired with each other to attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap
Edward and detain him illegally in order to demand ransom for his release.

The Proper Penalty:

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the imposition of the death penalty when the kidnapping or
detention is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Ransom, as employed in
the law, is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases one from
captivity.53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the present case, the malefactors not only demanded but received ransom for Edward's release. The CA thus correctly
affirmed the RTC's imposition of the death penalty on Pepino and Gomez.

With the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines" (signed into law on June 24, 2006), the death penalty may no longer be imposed. We thus sentence Gomez to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-
SC.54chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is more favorable to him.

The Awarded Indemnities:

In the case of People v. Gambao55 (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Court set the minimum indemnity and damages
where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and
thus needs no proof; and (3) PI00,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. These amounts
shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until
fully paid.

We thus reduce the moral damages imposed by the CA from P300,000.00 to P100,000.00 to conform to prevailing
jurisprudence on kidnapping cases. This reduced penalty shall apply to Pepino for being more favorable to him. However,
the additional monetary award (i.e., P100,000.00 civil indemnity) imposed on Gomez shall not be applied to
Pepino.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We affirm the P700,000.00 imposed by the courts below as restitution of the amount of ransom demanded and received
by the kidnappers. We also affirm the CA's award of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages based on Gambao.

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, we AFFIRM the challenged June 16, 2006 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02026 with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) the penalty imposed on Gomez and Pepino shall be reduced from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole;

(2) they are jointly and severally ordered to pay the reduced amount of PI 00,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) Gomez is further ordered to pay the victim PI 00,000.00 as civil indemnity; and

(4) the awarded amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the
Court's Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza Reyes, and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., no part.
Leonen, J., see dissenting opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part, prior OSG action

G.R. No. 205472, January 25, 2016

AMADO I. SARAUM,1Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse the Decision2 dated
September 8, 2011 and Resolution3 dated December 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 01199,
which affirmed the judgment of conviction against petitioner Amado I. Saraum (Saraum) rendered by the Regional Trial
Court (ATC), Branch 57, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737.

Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article II (Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about the 17th day of August, 2006, at about 12:45 A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and without being authorized by law, did
then and there have in his possession the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1 = One (1) lighter

2 = One (1) rolled tissue paper
3 = One (1) aluminum tin foil

which are instruments and/or equipments (sic) fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting, or
introducing, any dangerous drug into the body.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In his arraignment, Saraum, with the assistance of a counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 5 Trial ensued.
Meantime, Saraum was released on bail.6

PO3 Jeffrey Larrobis and PO1 Romeo Jumalon testified for the prosecution while the defense presented no witness other
than Saraum.

According to the prosecution, on August 17, 2006, a telephone call was received by PO3 Larrobis regarding the illegal drug
activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. A buy-bust team was then formed composed of PO3 Larrobis, PO1
Jumalon, PO2 Nathaniel Sta. Ana, PO1 Roy Cabahug, and PO1 Julius Aniñon against a certain "Pata." PO2 Sta. Ana was
designated as the poseur-buyer accompanied by the informant, PO1 Jumalon as the back-up of PO2 Sta. Ana, and the rest
of the team as the perimeter security. PO1 Aniñon coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
regarding the operation. After preparing all the necessary documents, such as the pre-operation report and submitting the
same to the PDEA, the team proceeded to the subject area.

During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the house, which was divided with
a curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and Peter Espcranza, who were holding drug paraphernalia
apparently in preparation to have a "shabu" pot session. They recovered from Saraum's possession a lighter, rolled tissue
paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter). PO3 Larrobis confiscated the items, placed them in the plastic pack of misua
wrapper, and made initial markings ("A" for Saraum and "P" for Esperanza). At the police station, PO3 Larrobis marked as
"AIS-08-17-2006" the paraphernalia recovered from Saraum. After the case was filed, the subject items were turned over
to the property custodian of the Office of City Prosecutor.

By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He testified that on the date and time in
question, he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the house of his parents-in-law when he was held by men with
firearms. They were already with "Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were his neighbors. Believing that he had not
committed anything illegal, he resisted the arrest. He learned of the criminal charge only when he was brought to the
court.

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 12, Article
II of R.A. 9165 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and to
pay a fine of Php20,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The drug paraphernalias (sic) are ordered forfeited in favor of the government.

SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the CA sustained the judgment of conviction; hence, this petition.

We deny.

Considering that Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the
trial and appellate courts, such findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding. 9 Besides, a review of
the records reveals that the CA did not err in affirming his conviction.

The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs
under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or
other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law. 10 In this case, the prosecution has
convincingly established that Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue
paper, and lighter, all of which were offered and admitted in evidence.

Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require a warrant in accordance with
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.11 In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is
apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the
presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 12

Here, the Court is unconvinced with Saraum's statement that he was not committing a crime at the time of his arrest. PO3
Larrobis described in detail how they were able to apprehend him, who was then holding a disposable lighter in his right
hand and a tin foil and a rolled tissue paper in his left hand,13 while they were in the course of arresting somebody. The
case is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pate," who, in eluding arrest, entered the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza were
incidentally caught in possession of the illegal items. Saraum did not proffer any satisfactory explanation with regard to
his presence at the vicinity of the buy-bust operation and his possession of the seized items that he claims to have
"countless, lawful uses." On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses have adequately explained the respective uses of the
items to prove that they were indeed drug paraphernalia.14 There is, thus, no necessity to make a laboratory examination
and finding as to the presence or absence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or any illegal substances on said items since
possession itself is the punishable act.

The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating to the crime and seize the
drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug
paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them. Considering that
Saraum's arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence for having
proceeded from a valid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delictiof the crime
charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction.

Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have waived any objection thereto when he did not raise
the issue before entering his plea. "The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing the legality of
his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. Any objection
involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed waived."15 In this case, counsel for Saraum manifested
its objection to the admission of the seized drug paraphernalia, invoking illegal arrest and search, only during the formal
offer of evidence by the prosecution.16

In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia presented in court as the ones actually seized
from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No.
9165 has been complied with or falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165;17and (b) there was an unbroken link (not perfect link) in the chain of
custody with respect to the confiscated items.18

Although Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending team must immediately conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and photograph them, non-compliance therewith is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable
ground and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team.19 While nowhere in the prosecution evidence show the "justifiable ground" which may excuse the
police operatives involved in the buy-bust operation from making the physical inventory and taking a photograph of the
drug paraphernalia confiscated and/or seized, such omission shall not render Saraum's arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him as inadmissible in evidence. Said "justifiable ground" will remain unknown in the light of the
apparent failure of Saraum to specifically challenge the custody and safekeeping or the issue of disposition and
preservation of the subject drug paraphernalia before the trial court. He cannot be allowed too late in the day to question
the police officers' alleged non-compliance with Section 21 for the first time on appeal.20

The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the confiscated items for the purpose of
duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized
from the accused until the time they arc presented in court.21 Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1,
Series of 2002, implementing R.A. No. 9165, defines chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date
and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.
In Mallillin v. People,22 the Court discussed how the chain of custody of seized items should be established, thus:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken lo ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
While the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain.24 Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not
necessarily render an accused person's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. 25
x x x Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its
reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will be
accorded it by the courts. x x x

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the
confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if
there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value to be
given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each
case.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.27 In this case, the
prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not
been compromised because it established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items from the time they
were first discovered until they were brought to the court for examination. Even though the prosecution failed to submit in
evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the drug paraphernalia, this will not render Saraum's arrest illegal or
the items seized from him inadmissible. There is substantial compliance by the police as to the required procedure on the
custody and control of the confiscated items. The succession of events established by evidence and the overall handling of
the seized items by specified individuals all show that the evidence seized were the same evidence subsequently identified
and testified to in open court.

Certainly, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation arc generally accorded full faith and
credit in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and especially so in the absence of ill-
motive that could be attributed to them.28 The defense failed to show any odious intent on the part of the police officers to
impute such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of an innocent person. 29 Saraum's mere denial
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical identification and declarations of the police officers. The defense of denial,
frame-up or extortion, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and
is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.30 As evidence that is
both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
who testily clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed.31 To merit
consideration, it has to be substantiated by strong, clear and convincing evidence, which Saraum failed to do for
presenting no corroborative evidence.32

Settled is the rule that, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted, the findings and conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed because it has the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing
their deportment and manner of testifying.33 The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are
sustained by the CA as in this case.34 In this case, the quantum of evidence necessary to prove Saraum's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt had been sufficiently met since the prosecution stood on its own strength and did not rely on the
weakness of the defense. The prosecution was able to overcome the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 8, 2011 and Resolution
dated December 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 01 199, which sustained the judgment of
conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Del Castillo,*Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

April 20, 2016

G.R. No. 200302

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA, Appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 31May2011 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated 23 March 2010 of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-05-136584. The RTC found appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC
also ordered appellant to pay damages to the heirs of Rolando Cueno (Cueno).4

The Facts

Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating
with two (2) other persons whose true names, identities and definite whereabouts have not as

yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery,
and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one RONALDO CUENO Y BONIFACIO, by then and there
stabbing him repeatedly with bladed weapons, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of Ronaldo Cueno y Bonifacio.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial conference was
terminated on 26 October 2005, and trial on the merits ensued.

The CA summarized the parties’ evidence as follows:

The Prosecution[’s] Evidence

Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno, testified that on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m.,
she was in her house located in [sic] Lot 34, Block 4, Sipna Compound, Bagong Silangan, Quezon City. She was about to
leave the house to go to the market when she saw appellant, his brother Larry Lipata and a certain [Rudy] attacking the
victim by repeatedly stabbing him. She was at a distance of more or less ten (10) meters from the incident. Shocked at
what she had just witnessed, she shouted for help and pleaded the assailants to stop, but they did not stop stabbing the
victim. In her account, she recalled that the assailants, including appellant, used a tres

cantos, an ice pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse [bottle]. At one point, the victim managed to take the knife
away from appellant and brandished the same at his attackers. Thereafter, the victim fell on the ground. Upon seeing the
victim fall, appellant and the other assailants left the scene. Through the help of some neighbors, Mercelinda rushed the
victim to a hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Criz Reymiluz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she saw appellant together with Larry Lipata and Rudy Lipata
[stab] her father to death in front of their house. She recounted that upon arriving at home from work on September 1,
2005 at around 6:00 p.m., her father immediately went to the house of her aunt Mercelinda Valzado, which was located
only a block away from their house, to ask for malunggay leaves.
Upon coming home from her aunt’s house, the victim was attacked by the Lipatas which prompted the victim to run away.
Thinking that his assailants were no longer around, the victim proceeded to their [sic] house but then the Lipatas stabbed
him to death. She was at a distance of six (6) to eight (8) meters away from the scene. She further testified that she had no
knowledge of any reason why the Lipatas would kill her father, but her father’s death brought her pain and sadness and
anger against the perpetrators of her father’s killing.

The Defense[’s] Evidence

The defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant himself. According to appellant, he was resting in his
house in Sipna Compound, Brgy. Bagong Silangan, Quezon City on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m. when two
children, namely John Paul Isip and a certain Rommel, called him and told him to help his brother, Larry Lipata. He
immediately rushed to his brother and upon arrival he saw Larry being stabbed by the victim. He instantaneously assisted
his brother but the victim continued stabbing Larry, causing Larry to fall to the ground. Thereafter, appellant managed to
grab the knife from the victim and stab the victim. Then he fled from the scene [of the crime] because he was wounded.
Appellant’s sister-in-law, a certain Lenlen, brought him to the Amang Medical Center for treatment of his stab wound
where he was apprehended by police officers.6

The RTC’s Ruling

The RTC noted that since appellant raised the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, he hypothetically admitted
the commission of the crime. Hence, the burden of proving his innocence shifted to appellant. The RTC found that the
defense failed to adequately establish the element of unlawful aggression on the part of Cueno. There was no actual or
imminent danger to the life of appellant or of his brother Larry. On the contrary, the three Lipata brothers (appellant,
Larry, and Rudy)7 employed treachery and took advantage of their superior strength when they attacked Cueno after
Cueno left the house of his sister-in-law. Cueno suffered 17 stab wounds on his trunk from the Lipata brothers. The
existence of multiple stab wounds on the trunk of the unarmed Cueno is inconsistent with appellant’s theory of defense of
a relative. The RTC, however, ruled that the prosecution failed to show conclusive proof of evident premeditation.

The dispositive portion of the RTC’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court here[b]y renders judgment finding the accused
GERRY LIPATA Y ORTIZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.

The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando Cueno the following amounts:

(a) Php 50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the accused;

(b) Php 120,550.00 representing the actual damages incurred by the heirs of Rolando Cueno, incident to his death
plus 12% interest per annum computed from 6 September 2005 until fully paid;

(c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and emotional anguish suffered by the heirs arising from the
death of Rolando Cueno; and

(d) Php 25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.

The accused shall be credited with the full period of his preventive imprisonment, subject to the conditions imposed under
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.8

Appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal 9 on 6 April 2010. The RTC granted
appellant’s notice in an Order10 dated 19 April 2010.

The CA’s Ruling

The CA dismissed appellant’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA agreed with the RTC’s ruling that
appellant’s claim of defense of a relative must fail. There was no actual or imminent threat on the life of appellant or of his
brother Larry. There was also no reason for appellant to stab Cueno. Cueno was outnumbered by the Lipata brothers,
three to one. The requirement of lack of provocation on the part of appellant is negated by the multiple stab wounds that
Cueno sustained.

The CA disagreed with appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to establish treachery. The CA pointed out that
Cueno was not forewarned of any impending threat to his life. Cueno was unarmed, and went to his sister-in-law’s house
to gather malunggay leaves. The Lipata brothers, on the other hand, were readily armed with tres cantos, an icepick, and
a broken piece of glass from a Red Horse bottle. The execution of the Lipata brothers’ attack made it impossible for Cueno
to retaliate.

The CA also disagreed with appellant’s contention that there was no abuse of superior strength. The three Lipata brothers
were all armed with bladed weapons when they attacked the unarmed Cueno. The Lipata brothers refused to stop stabbing
Cueno until they saw him unconscious.
The dispositive portion of the CA’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be bereft of merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. The appealed decision of the trial
court convicting appellant of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.11

The PAO filed a notice of appeal12 on behalf of appellant on 10 June 2011. The CA ordered the immediate elevation of the
records to this Court in its 30 June 2011 Resolution.13

Appellant’s Death Prior to Final Judgment

This Court, in a Resolution dated 13 June 2012,14 noted the records forwarded by the CA and required the Bureau of
Corrections (BuCor) to confirm the confinement of appellant. The BuCor, in a letter dated 26 July 2012, informed this
Court that there is no record of confinement of appellant as of date. In a Resolution dated 10 September 2012, 15 this Court
required the Quezon City Jail Warden to transfer appellant to the New Bilibid Prison and to report compliance within ten
days from notice. The Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012, 16 informed this Court that appellant
passed away on 13 February 2011. The former Quezon City Jail Warden wrote to the RTC about appellant’s demise in a
letter dated 23 February 2011. Attached to the 22 October 2012 letter were photocopies of appellant’s death certificate and
medical certificate, as well as the former Quezon City Jail Warden’s letter.17 In a Resolution dated 7 January 2013,18 this
Court noted the 22 October 2012 letter from the Quezon City Jail Warden, and required the parties to submit their
supplemental briefs on the civil aspect of the case if they so desire.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation dated 18 March 2013, 19 which stated that it had already
exhaustively argued the relevant issues in its appellee’s brief. The PAO, on the other hand, filed a supplemental brief on 26
March 2013.20

In view of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA’s decision, this Court issued a Resolution dated 25
September 2013 which ordered the PAO "(1) to SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased
appellant as party; and (2) to COMMENT on the civil liability of appellant within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Resolution."21

The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant on 29 November
2013.22 According to the Public Attorney’s Office-Special and Appealed Cases Service, the relatives of the deceased
appellant have not communicated with it since the case was assigned to its office on 29 September 2010. The PAO sent a
letter on 4 November 2013 to Lilia Lipata, who was appellant’s next of kin per official records. Despite receipt of the letter,
the relatives of appellant still failed to communicate with the PAO.

In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:

xxxx

9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from and is based solely on the act complained of, i.e.
murder, the same does not survive the death of the deceased appellant. Thus, in line with the abovecited ruling [People v.
Jaime Ayochok, G.R. No. 175784, 25 August 2010, 629 SCRA 324, citing People v. Rogelio Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2
September 1994, 236 SCRA 239], the death of the latter pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.

10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to substitute the legal representatives of the estate of the
deceased as party does not arise.23

On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared that "the [PAO] shall continue as the legal representative of
the estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case." 24

The Court’s Ruling

At the outset, we declare that because of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA’s decision, there is no
further need to determine appellant’s criminal liability. Appellant’s death has the effect of extinguishing his criminal
liability. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxxx

What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellant’s death with regard to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court,
in People v. Bayotas,25 reconciled the differing doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded that "[u]pon death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso factoextinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal."26

We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages
from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged
but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines
against whom the same shall be enforced."27

We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of action. If the act or omission complained of
arises from quasidelict or, by provision of law, results in an injury to person or real or personal property, the separate civil
action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court.28 On the other hand, if the act or omission complained of arises from contract, the separate civil action must be
filed against the estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. 29

We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by
prescription.30 (Emphases supplied)

The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect of the death of the accused
after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action to reflect our ruling in Bayotas:

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted
under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation
may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate,
as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.1âwphi1

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party
may file against the estate of the deceased.

Contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant, 31 Cueno died because
of appellant’s fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through deliberate acts. 32 Appellant’s civil liability ex quasi
delicto may now be pursued because appellant’s death on 13 February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment,
extinguished both his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.

Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
as well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent
designation of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing
the estate in the civil aspect of this case,"33 the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in

Bayotas,34 require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their
claims against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as
claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed
separately by the offended party even without reservation.35 The separate civil action proceeds independently of the
criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence.36 The civil action which may thereafter be instituted
against the estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 337 in
relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87. 38

Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the
criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-
delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution
for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict leads us to the conclusion
that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.

However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court for study and
recommendation to the Court En Banc appropriate amendments to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive resolution of
such similar cases with the objective of indemnifying the private offended party or his heirs in cases where an accused dies
after conviction by the trial court but pending appeal.

In Lumantas v. Calapiz,39 this Court declared that our law recognizes that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the accused does not exempt the accused from civil liability ex delicto which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence. This Court’s pronouncement in Lumantas is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.

We also turn to the Code Commission’s justification of its recognition of the possibility of miscarriage of justice in these
cases:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most
serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is
that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails
to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of
the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other,
private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered
by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish)
Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purpose of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion
or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person
any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious
defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice – a cause for disillusionment on the part of
innumerable persons injured or wronged.40

In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases to be recommended by the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules of Court shall aim to provide the aggrieved parties relief, as well as recognition of their right to indemnity. This
reform is of course subject to the policy against double recovery.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 31 May 2011 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 04461. The criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are
declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment.
Let a copy, of this Decision be forwarded to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION

January 11, 2016

G.R. No. 192914

NAPOLEON D. SENIT, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2dated
November 20, 2009 and the. Resolution3 dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN
which affirmed with modification the Dedision4 dated April 26, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay
City, Bukidnon, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 10717-00 convicting Napoleon D. Senit (petitioner) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property.

The Antecedents

The facts as narrated are culled from the Comments5 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and from the assailed
decision of the CA:

In the morning of September 2, 2000, private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was driving north along Aglayan from the
direction of Valencia on board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their three-year-old son Mohinder Toor,
Jr., and househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He turned left and was coming to the center of Aglayan when a speeding Super
5 bus driven by petitioner and coming from Malaybalay headed south towards Valencia, suddenly overtook a big truck
from the right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the accident by swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the road and
applying the brakes, but he was moving too fast and could not avoid a collision with the pick-up. The bus crashed into the
right side of private complainant’s pick-up at a right angle.

All passengers of the pick-up were injured and immediately brought to Bethel Baptist Hospital, Sumpong, Malaybalay
City. However, because of lack of medical facilities, they were transferred to the Bukidnon Doctor’s Hospital in Valencia
City, Bukidnon. Rosalinda Toor sustained an open fracture of the humerus of the right arm and displaced, closed fracture
of the proximal and distal femur of the right lower extremity which required two surgical operations. She was paralyzed as
a result of the accident and was unable to return to her job as the Regional Manager of COSPACHEM Product
Laboratories. Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about P580,000.00 for her treatment and P3,000.00 for Mezelle Jean Silayan,
who suffered frontal area swelling as a result of the accident. Mohinder Toor, Sr. suffered a complete fracture of the
scapular bone of his right shoulder while his son Mohinder Toor, Jr. sustained abdominal injury and a wound on the area
of his right eye which required suturing. The damage sustained by the pick-up reached P106,155.00.

Thus, on May 30, 2001, Carlo B. Mejia, City Prosecutor of Malaybalay City, charged petitioner with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property in an Amended Information which was filed with
Branch 10 of the [RTC] in Malaybalay City. The information reads:

"That on or about September 2, 2000 in the morning at [sic] Barangay Aglayan, Malaybalay City, Province of Bukidnon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally in violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, in negligent, careless, imprudent
manner and without precaution to prevent accident [to] life and property, drive a Super Five Nissan Bus, color white/red
bearing plate No. MVD-776 owned by PAUL PADAYHAG of Rosario Heights, Iligan City, as a result hit and bumped the
[sic] motor vehicle, Toyota Pick-up color blue with plate No. NEF-266 driven and owned by MOHINDER S. TOO[R,] SR.,
and with his wife Rosalinda Toor, son Mohinder Toor, Jr., 3 years old and househelp Mezelle Jane Silayan, 17 years old,
riding with him. The Toyota pick-up was damaged in the amount of [P]105,300.00 and spouses Mohinder Toor[,] Sr. and
Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor[,] Jr[.] and Mezelle Jane Silayan sustained the following injuries to wit:

MOHINDER TOOR[,] SR.

= complete fracture of superior scapular bone right shoulder

MOHINDER TOOR[,] JR.

= MPI secondary to MVA r/o Blunt abdominal injury

= Saturing [sic] right eye area

ROSALINDA TOOR

= Fracture, open type 11, supracondylar, humerus right

= Fracture, closed, Complete, displaced, subtrochanter

= and supracondylar femur right

MEZELLE JANE SILAYAN

= Frontal area swelling 20 vehicular accident

to the damage and prejudice of the complainant victim in such amount that they are entitled to under the law.

CONTRARY TO and in Violation of Article 365 in relation to 263 of the Revised Penal Code. IN RELATION TO THE
FAMILY CODE."6 (Citations omitted)

Upon being arraigned on June 21, 2001, the petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
Information in this case.7

Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation of evidence for the petitioner, he resigned from his employment and
transferred residence. His whereabouts allegedly became unknown so he was not presented as a witness by his new
counsel.8

On April 26, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in absentia convicting the petitioner of the crime charged. The fallo of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused NAPOLEON SENIT y Duhaylungsod guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, he is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of an indeterminate penalty of Four
[4] months and One [1] day of Arresto Mayor maximum as minimum and to Four [4] years and Two [2] months Prision
Correc[c]ional medium as maximum. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the amount of
Fifty Thousand [P50,000.00] Pesos as moral damages, the amount of Four Hundred Eighty Thousand [P480,000.00]
[Pesos] for the expenses incurred in the treatment and hospitalization of Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor, Jr[.] and
Mezelle Jean Silayan and the amount of Eighty Thousand [P80,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses incurred in the repair of
the damaged Toyota pick-up vehicle.

SO ORDERED.9

The RTC issued a Promulgation10 dated August 4, 2006, which included an order for the arrest of the petitioner.

The petitioner then filed a motion for new trial via registered mail on the ground that errors of law or irregularities have
been committed during trial that are allegedly prejudicial to his substantial rights. He claimed that he was not able to
present evidence during trial because he was not notified of the schedule. Likewise, he mistakenly believed that the case
against him has been dismissed as private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. (Toor, Sr.) purportedly left the country. 11

On September 22, 2006, the public prosecutor opposed the motion for new trial filed by the petitioner. 12

On October 26, 2006, the motion for new trial was denied by the lower court pronouncing that notices have been duly
served the parties and that the reason given by the petitioner was self-serving.13

Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, the petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal dated November 6, 2006 by registered mail to
the CA, on both questions of facts and laws.14

Ruling of the CA

On November 20, 2009, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty imposed, the
dispositive portion thereof reads:

ACCORDINGLY, with MODIFICATION that [the petitioner] should suffer the penalty of three (3) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, the Court AFFIRMS in all other respects the appealed 26 April 2006 Decision of the [RTC] of
Malaybalay City, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 10717-00.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15

In affirming with modification the decision of the RTC, the CA ratiocinated as follows: first, the evidence presented by
OSG overwhelmingly points to the petitioner as the culprit. A scrutiny of the records further reveals that the pictures taken
after the accident and the Traffic Investigation Report all coincide with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
which are in whole consistent and believable thus, debunking the claim of the petitioner that he was convicted on the mere
basis of allegedly biased and hearsay testimonies which do not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In addition,
there was no existing evidence to show that there was an improper motive on the part of the eyewitnesses.16

Second, it found the arguments of the petitioner to move for a new trial as baseless.17

Lastly, it rendered that the proper imposable penalty is the maximum period of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods that is – imprisonment for three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor since the petitioner has, by
reckless imprudence, committed an act which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony, based
on the first paragraph of Article 365 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).18

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA, in its Resolution 19 dated June 17, 2010.

As a final recourse, the petitioner filed the petition for review before this Court, praying that the applicable law on the
matter be reviewed, and the gross misappreciation of facts committed by the court a quo and by the CA be given a second
look.

The Issues

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND THE CA ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO RE-OPEN
THE SAME IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON HIS BEHALF; AND

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE APPARENT FAILURE
ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.20

Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

The RTC and CA did not err in denying the petitioner’s motion for new trial or to re-open the same.

The Court finds that no errors of law or irregularities, prejudicial to the substantial rights of the petitioner, have been
committed during trial.

The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule 121, Section 2(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
wit:

Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. – The Court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the
judgment. (Emphasis ours)

To sum up the claims of the petitioner, he theorizes that there was an error of law or irregularities committed when the
RTC promulgated a decision in absentia and deemed that he had waived his right to present evidence resulting to denial
of due process, a one-sided decision by the RTC, and a strict and rigid application of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure against him.

First, it must be noted that the petitioner had already been arraigned and therefore, the court a quo had already acquired
jurisdiction over him. In fact, there was already an initial presentation of evidence for the defense when his whereabouts
became unknown.

The petitioner’s claims that he had not testified because he did not know the schedule of the hearings, and mistakenly
believed that the case had already been terminated with the departure of Toor, Sr., do not merit our consideration. 21

The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.22 It is established that notices have been served to the counsel of the petitioner
and his failure to inform his counsel of his whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear on the scheduled date. Thus,
the arguments of the petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of judgment in absentia for being
in violation of the constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. 23
In Estrada v. People,24 the Court ruled that:

Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of
the controversy.

In the present case, petitioner was afforded such opportunity. The trial court set a hearing on May 14, 1997 for reception of
defense evidence, notice of which was duly sent to the addresses on record of petitioner and her counsel, respectively.
When they failed to appear at the May 14, 1997 hearing, they later alleged that they were not notified of said setting.
Petitioner’s counsel never notified the court of any change in her address, while petitioner gave a wrong address from the
very beginning, eventually jumped bail and evaded court processes. Clearly, therefore, petitioner and her counsel were
given all the opportunities to be heard. They cannot now complain of alleged violation of petitioner’s right to due process
when it was by their own fault that they lost the opportunity to present evidence. 25 (Citation omitted)

Similarly in the present case, the petitioner clearly had previous notice of the criminal case filed against him and was given
the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The petitioner was not in any way deprived of his substantive and
constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense, but he forfeited this right, through his own negligence, by not appearing in court at the scheduled
hearings.26

The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the case was already terminated resulting to his failure to attend the
hearings, is inexcusable. The Court has ruled in many cases that:

It is petitioner’s duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. It is
mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect that
all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. It is also its responsibility, together with its counsel, to
devise a system for the receipt of mail intended for them.27 (Citations omitted)

The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the petitioner, towards the criminal case against him in which his liberty
is at risk, is not borne of ignorance of the law as claimed by his counsel rather, lack of concern towards the incident, and
the people who suffered from it. While there was no showing in the case at bar that the counsel of the petitioner was
grossly negligent in failing to inform him of the notices served, the Court cannot find anyone to blame but the petitioner
himself in not exercising diligence in informing his counsel of his whereabouts.

The Court also agrees with the Comment of the OSG that there is neither rule nor law which specifically requires the trial
court to ascertain whether notices received by counsel are sufficiently communicated with his client. 28

In GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Judge Principe,29 the Court held that:

[W]hen petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless, there is no reason to overturn well-settled jurisprudence or to
interpret the rules liberally in its favor. Where petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence, its plea that it was not
accorded the right to due process cannot elicit this Court’s approval or even sympathy. It is petitioner’s duty, as a client, to
be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. x x x.30 (Citations omitted)

Even if the Court assumed that the petitioner anchors his claim on Section 2(b) of Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the argument still has no merit.

"A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a)
that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is
essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but
nonetheless failed to secure it."31 The Court agrees with the CA in its decision which held that "a new trial may not be had
on the basis of evidence which was available during trial but was not presented due to its negligence. Likewise, the
purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial against [the petitioner’s] substantive rights do not
exist."32

In Lustaña v. Jimena-Lazo,33 the Court ruled that:

Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice,
such that strict adherence thereto is required. Their application may be relaxed only when rigidity would result in a defeat
of equity and substantial justice, which is not present here. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot just be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal construction.34 (Citations omitted and italics in the original)

In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to waive the procedural rules in order to grant the motion for new trial of the
petitioner. There is just no legal basis for the grant of the motion for new trial. The Court believes that the petitioner was
given the opportunity to be heard but he chose to put this opportunity into waste by not being diligent enough to ask about
the status of the criminal case against him and inform his counsel of his whereabouts.

The RTC did not err in convicting the petitioner.

The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 365 of the RPC, which provides that:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. – x x x.

xxxx

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

xxxx

The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to
do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place. 35

All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have been established in the present case.

The petitioner questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and claims that their testimonies are biased. He also
claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit when he turned left without looking for an incoming vehicle, thus violating traffic
rules resulting to the mishap.

The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the evidence and testimonies presented in the instant case.

The Court agrees with the OSG that not only were the witnesses’ narrations of the accident credible and worthy of belief,
their accounts were also consistent and tallied on all significant and substantial points. 36 These witnesses’ testimonies are
as follows:

PO3 Jesus Delfin testified that he investigated the accident at Aglayan. He made the following findings in his accident
report: the pick-up owned and driven by Toor, Sr., together with his family and a househelper as his passengers, was
turning left along Aglayan when it was hit at a right angle position by a Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner. He noted skid
marks made by the bus and explained that the petitioner was overtaking but was not able to do so because of the pick-up.
The petitioner could not swerve to the left to avoid the pick-up because there was a ten-wheeler truck. He swerved to the
right instead and applied breaks to avoid the accident. The investigator clearly testified that, on the basis of data gathered,
the collision was due to the error of the bus driver who was driving too fast, as evinced by the distance from the skid marks
towards the axle.37

Albert Alon testified that he saw Toor, Sr.’s pick-up turn left along Aglayan. He also saw a big truck and a Super 5 bus both
coming from Malaybalay. The truck was running slowly while the Super 5 bus was running fast and overtaking the big
truck from the right side. The bus crashed into the pick-up and pushed the smaller vehicle due to the force of the impact.
He went nearer the area of collision and saw that the four passengers of the pick-up were unconscious.38

Mezelle Jane Silayan testified that while moving towards the center of Aglayan on board her employer’s pick-up, she saw a
Super 5 bus overtaking a big truck from the right side. Their vehicle was hit by the bus. She was thrown out of the pick-up
and hit her head on the ground.39

Toor, Sr. testified that while he was driving his pick-up at the corner of the center of Aglayan, a Super 5 bus, moving fast,
overtook a big truck from the right side. The bus then hit the pick up, injuring him and all his passengers. 40

Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses conclusively suggest that: (1) the Super 5 bus was moving fast; (2) the
bus overtook a big truck which was moving slowly from the right side; and (3) when the petitioner saw the pick-up truck
turning left, he applied the brakes but because he was moving fast, the collision became inevitable.

"Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight and
is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance
and influence. This rule is based on the fact that the trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and the
conduct of the witnesses."41 The Court finds in the instant case that there is no reason for this Court to deviate from the
rule.

The Court finds the testimonies of the witnesses not biased. There was no evidence of ill motive of the witnesses against
the petitioner.

Lastly, the petitioner claims that Toor, Sr. committed a traffic violation and thus, he should be the one blamed for the
incident. The Court finds this without merit.1âwphi1

The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner recklessly drove on the right shoulder of
the road and overtook another south-bound ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the intersection, obviously to give way to
another vehicle about to enter the intersection. It was impossible for him not to notice that the ten-wheeler truck in front
and traveling in the same direction had already slowed down to allow passage of the pick-up, which was then negotiating a
left turn to Aglayan public market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow down, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to
reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in order to allow the pick-up to safely make a left turn. Instead, he drove
at a speed too fast for safety, then chose to swerve to the right shoulder of the road and overtake the truck, entering the
intersection and directly smashing into the pick-up. In flagrantly failing to observe the necessary precautions to avoid
inflicting injury or damage to other persons and things, the petitioner was recklessly imprudent in operating the Super 5
bus.42

In Dumayag v. People,43 the Court held:

Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road
or highway. When overtaking another, it should be made only if the highway is clearly visible and is free from oncoming
vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a curve in the highway, where the driver's view is obstructed, is not allowed.
Corollarily, drivers of automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high degree of
care and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it that vehicles coming from
the opposite direction are not taken unaware by his presence on the side of the road upon which they
have the right to pass.44 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Thus, the petitioner cannot blame Toor, Sr. for not noticing a fast-approaching bus, as the cited law provides that the one
overtaking on the road has the obligation to let other cars in the opposite direction know his presence and not the other
way around as the petitioner suggests.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated November 20, 2009 and the Resolution dated
June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 196962, June 08, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOAN SONJACO Y STA. ANA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before us for review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03211 dated 27 October 2010, which
dismissed the appeal of appellant Joan Sonjaco y Sta. Ana and affirmed the Judgment 2 dated 10 July 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65 of the City of Makati in Criminal Case Nos. 05-1506 and 05-1507, finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05-1506

That on or about the 6th day of August 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell, distribute, and transport zero point zero one (0.01) gram of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride which
is a dangerous drug in consideration of two hundred (Php200.00) pesos.3

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05-1507

That on or about the 6th day of August 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession zero
point one five (0.15) gram of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride which is a dangerous drug.4

At her arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. Joint trial ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Officer 1 Flonorio Marmonejo, Jr. (POl Marmonejo) who acted as
the poseur-buyer and POl Percieval Mendoza (POl Mendoza), a member of the buy-bust team. The prosecution and the
defense agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemical Officer Sharon Lontoc Fabros of the Philippine
National Police Laboratory who examined the seized drugs.

The prosecution established that based on information received on 6 August 2005, that appellant and a
certain alias Kenkoy were engaged in illegal drug trade in Pateros Street, Barangay Olympia, Makati City, Police
Superintendent Marieto Valerio (P/Supt. Valerio) formed a buy-bust team composed of POl Marmonejo, POl Mendoza,
POl Randy Santos and SPO3 Luisito Puno and two (2) other anti-drug agents Eduardo Monteza and Llerminia Facundo.
After a surveillance of the area and coordination with the Phihppine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) were made,
P/Supt. Valerio briefed the team. PO1 Marmonejo was designated as poseur-buyer and two (2) pieces of One Hundred
Peso (P100) bills marked with the initials "MMV" were provided for the operation. At five o'clock in the afternoon of that
day, PO1 Marmonejo and the police asset, on board a tricycle driven by PO1 Mendoza, proceeded to the target area. The
other members of the buy-bust team positioned themselves nearby. The police asset called appellant and told her that PO1
Marmonejo wanted to buy shabu. Appellant asked PO1 Marmonejo how much, to which he replied, "katorse lang" or
P200.00 worth of shabu. Appellant then took out from her pocket two (2) transparent plastic sachets containing a white
crystalline substance, one of which she handed to POl Marmonejo in exchange for two (2) One Hundred Peso (P100) bills.
Appellant pocketed the other plastic sachet.5

Upon consummation of the transaction, PO1 Marmonejo revealed that he was a police officer and immediately
apprehended appellant, apprised her of her constitutional rights and asked her to empty her pockets. POl Marmonejo
recovered money in the amount of Five Hundred Forty Pesos (P540.00), a mobile phone, and three (3) other plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO1 Marmonejo marked the sachet sold to him as "BONG" while the three
(3) other sachets as "JOAN," "JOAN 1," and JOAN 2." Appellant was brought to the police station for investigation and
POl Marmonejo submitted the seized sachets to the Southern Police District Crime Laboratory. 6 The Forensic Laboratory
Report7 confirmed that the sachets contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The sachets
of shabu purchased and recovered from appellant,8 the inventory of the seized items,9 the marked buy-bust mone10 and
the Final Police Investigation Report11 were likewise presented in court.

Appellant testified on her behalf and vehemently denied the indictment. She claimed innocence and asserted that she had
been at her mother-in-law's house when three (3) police officers entered the house and forcibly brought her to the police
station and there attempted to extort money from her in exchange for her liberty. 12

On 10 July 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 05-1506, the [c]ourt finds accused JOAN SONJACO GUILTY of the charge for violation of Sec. 5,
Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentences her lo suffer LIFE imprisonment and to pay a fine of FIVE Hundred Thousand
(P500.000.00) pesos;

2. In Criminal Case No. 05-1507, the [c]ourt finds accused JOAN SONJACO y STA. ANA GUILTY of the charge for
violation of Sec. 11, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentences her to suffer the indeterminate sentence of Twelve (12) years and
one (1) day as minimum to Fourteen (14) Years and one (1) day as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE Hundred
Thousand (P300,000.00) pesos.

The period of detention of the accused should be given full credit.

Let the dangerous drug subject matter of this case be disposed of in the manner provided for by
law.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Appellant moved for a reconsideration of the case which the RTC denied. 14 The RTC reiterated that the testimony of the
poseur-buyer sufficiently established all the elements of the crimes charged. The other witness could not be expected to
corroborate the poseur-buyer's testimony on all the material points as the former only served as support officer. More
importantly, the inconsistencies are too minor to cause a dent on the credibility of both prosecution witnesses. The RTC
further said that the inventory sheet of the seized items from appellant, witnessed by two disinterested persons, belies any
claim of irregularity. Lastly, the certification faxed by PDEA two (2) hours after the buy-bust operation evidenced an
actual coordination earlier made.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 January 2008.15 On 27 October 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
judgment affirming the RTC's decision. The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty of the crimes charged, or violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Appellant appealed his conviction before this Court. In a Resolution 16 dated 14 September 2011, appellant and the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) were asked to file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. Both parties
dispensed with the filing of supplemental briefs.17

The Court finds no merit in the appeal.

The prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty the following elements required for all prosecutions for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.18Appellant was apprehended, indicted and convicted by way of a buy-bust operation,
a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers
in the execution of their criminal plan.19 The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
like shabu, merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction which happens the moment the buyer receives the
drug from the seller. The crime is already consummated once the police officer has gone through the operation as a buyer
whose offer was accepted by the accused, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former.20

Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto delivering two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance to PO1
Marmonejo, the poseur buyer, in exchange for P200.00. PO1 Marmonejo positively identified appellant in open court to
be the same person who sold to him the items which upon examination was confirmed to be methylamphetamine
hydrochlloride or shabu. Upon presentation of the same in open court, another member of the buy-bust team, PO1
Mendoza, duly identified the items to be the same objects sold to the poseur buyer by appellant. 21

On the other hand, to sustain a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug. 22 Obtained through a
valid search the police officers conducted pursuant to Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,23 the sachets recovered
from appellant's person all tested positive for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Mere possession of a
prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendisufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of any satisfactory explanation of such possession.24The burden of evidence to explain the absence of animus
possidendi rests upon the accused, and this, in the case at bar, the appellant failed to do. 25cralawred

Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police
officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. In this case,
no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting appellant.
We accord great respect to the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses in the absence of any
palpable error or arbitrariness in its findings.26 Against the positive testimonies of both prosecution witnesses, appellant's
plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence simply fails. The defenses of
denial and frame-up have been viewed with disfavor due to the ease of their concoction and the fact that they have become
common and standard defense ploys in prosecutions for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. 27 The
inconsistencies, if any, in their testimonies, as alleged by appellant, the Court agrees with both the RTC and the appellate
court, are but minor and cannot overturn a conviction established by competent and credible evidence. It has been settled
that the witnesses' testimonies need only to corroborate one another on material details surrounding the actual
commission of the crime.28

Anent the supposed failure to comply with the procedures prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. 9165, jurisprudence has it that
non-compliance with these procedures does not render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust
operation.29 What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
because the same will be utilized in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused.30 The chain of custody requirement
ensures the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items in order to remove unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence.31 In addition to the inventory made of the seized items, the prosecution was able
to prove an unbroken chain of custody of the illegal drugs from their seizure and marking to their submission to the
Southern Police District Crime Laboratory for analysis, to the identification of the same during the trial of the case.32 As
long as the chain of custody is unbroken, even though the procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not
faithfully observed, the guilt of the appellant will not be affected.33

Notably, appellant raised the buy-bust team's alleged non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 only on
appeal. Failure to raise this issue during trial is fatal to the cause of appellant. 34 It has been ruled that when a party desires
the court to reject the offered evidence, he must so state in objection form. Without such objection, he cannot raise the
question for the first time on appeal.35

R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 prescribes life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 as penalties for violations of Section 5, Article II thereof. The passage of
Republic Act No. 9346 proscribes the imposition of the death penalty, 36 thus the appellate court correctly affirmed the
penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P500,000.00 prescribed by the RTC. Under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of shabu is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum period of the imposable penalty shall not fall below the minimum period set by law and the maximum
period shall not exceed the maximum period allowed under the law.37 The Court of Appeals likewise correctly affirmed the
penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum term to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day as
maximum term, together with the fine of P300,000.00 imposed by the RTC.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 27 October 2010
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03211 affirming the conviction of Joan Sonjaco y Sta. Ana by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 65, of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-1506 and 05-1507 for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, sentencing her to suffer respectively, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
P500,000.00, and the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum term to fourteen (14) years
and one (1) day as maximum term and a fine of P300,000.00, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson),, and , Reyes JJ.

Peralta, J., on official leave.
Jardeleza, J., on wellness Leave.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. No. 211672, June 14, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN HAPPY DOMINGO Y CARAG, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

We resolve the appeal of John Happy Domingo y Carag (accused-appellant) assailing the 21 November 2012 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03575. The CA Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 5, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan finding the accused guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Case

On 27 August 2008, the RTC promulgated a Decision2 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00). The RTC ruled that the evidence presented by the prosecution successfully established the elements of
illegal sale of a dangerous drug as accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a valid buy-bust operation. It noted
that the defense of denial and frame-up offered by the defense cannot overturn the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties accorded to the apprehending officers.

On intermediate appellate review, the CA upheld the RTC ruling. It found no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC as it
is in accordance with law and jurisprudence and was based on the evidence presented and proven during trial. The
appellate court likewise rejected the claim of accused-appellant that he was framed-up by the apprehending officers
because his brother failed to repair the cell phone of the police asset. It agreed with the RTC that it is highly unbelievable
that the buy-bust team would concoct such a serious charge against accused-appellant especially considering that it is the
police asset, who is not even a member of the buy-bust team, that allegedly has an issue against the brother of accused-
appellant. The CA also held that the apprehending officers complied with the proper procedure in the custody and
disposition of the seized drug and that the identity of the confiscated drug has been duly preserved and its chain of custody
has been properly established by the prosecution.3

Issue

Whether the lower courts gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165.4

Our Ruling

We affirm the accused-appellant's conviction.

The elements of illegal sale

of dangerous drugs

In the prosecution of a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the prosecution is able to establish the
following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-
buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.5

In this case, all of these elements were clearly established. The prosecution's evidence positively identified Police Officer 1
Marcial Eclipse (PO1 Eclipse) as the buyer and accused-appellant as the seller of the shabu. The prosecution established
through testimony and evidence the object of the sale, which is a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing shabu and the two (2) marked Php 100.00 bills, as the consideration thereof. Finally, the delivery of
the shabu sold and its payment were clearly testified to by prosecution witness PO1 Eclipse.

Accused-appellant denied the accusation that he sold shabu to PO1 Eclipse and maintained that it was only in the police
station that he first saw the sachet containing the white crystalline substance and the marked money allegedly taken from
him. He claimed that the reason for his frame-up was the failure of his brother to repair the cell phone of the police
civilian asset Boyet Relos.

Accused-appellant's defense which is anchored mainly on denial and frame-up cannot be given credence. It does not have
more evidentiary weight than the positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses. His defense is unavailing considering
that he was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate buy-bust operation. This Court has ruled that the defense of denial
or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 6 Moreover, we agree
with the lower courts that the ill-motive imputed on the apprehending officers is unworthy of belief. Accused-appellant's
defense that he was framed-up because his brother found it difficult to repair the cell phone of the police asset deserves
scant consideration. When the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to testify against the
accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption that they performed their duties regularly. 7 In fact, for as long as the
identity of the accused and his participation in the commission of the crime has been duly established, motive is
immaterial for conviction. As correctly noted by the appellate court, the person who allegedly had a grudge against the
brother of the accused-appellant was not even a member of the buy-bust team. He was only a police informant. Moreover,
accused-appellant was clearly identified by PO1 Eclipse as the person who sold to him for two hundred pesos a substance
contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which later on tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.

Chain of Custody Rule

Accused-appellant also submits that the lower courts failed to consider the procedural flaws committed by the arresting
officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, R.A. No. 9165.8 Accused-
appellant alleged that the trial court failed to consider the admission of PO1 Eclipse that the alleged item taken from him
was not photographed in the latter's presence and no inventory was made immediately after the alleged operation.
We are not persuaded. The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of the seized dangerous drugs is outlined
in Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which states:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.](Emphasis supplied)

The last part of the aforequoted provision stated the exception to the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165. Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling of evidence,
"substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item" is sufficient. 9 This Court has
consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. 10What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.11In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the
prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time
these were seized from the accused by the arresting officers; turned-over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the
laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the
chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 were not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected. 12

Contrary to the contention of accused-appellant, this Court finds no broken links in the chain of custody over the seized
drug. Records reveal that after the arrest of the accused-appellant; the seizure of the suspected shabu and recovery of the
marked money in the latter's possession, PO1 Eclipse, with the assistance of the other members of the buy-bust team,
brought accused-appellant to the police station.13

Upon their arrival at the police station, PO1 Eclipse handed the marked money and the confiscated plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance to their investigator,14 PO3 Wilfredo Taguinod (PO3 Taguinod).15 PO3 Taguinod
marked the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance with words "WAT," representing the initials of his name
"Wilfredo A. Taguinod."16 Thereafter, PO3 Taguinod turned over the confiscated plastic sachet and the marked money to
the desk officer so that the incident and the confiscated items will be recorded in their blotter. 17

PO3 Taguinod also prepared a letter-request18 addressed to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Tuguegarao City to have the
contents of the plastic sachet examined for presence of illegal drugs. 19 PO3 Taguinod then handed the said letter-request,
together with the confiscated plastic sachet, to PO3 Rolando Domingo who brought the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory
in Tuguegarao City. Said letter-request and the plastic sachet were received by PO1 Myrna B. Janson of the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Tuguegarao City.20

PSI Alfredo M. Quintero, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Tuguegarao City, performed qualitative
examination of the contents of the plastic sachet with the markings "WAT." 21Said examination proved that the confiscated
plastic sachet contained 0.07 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu as evidenced by Chemistry Report No.
D-073-2005.22

It is clear from the foregoing that the substance marked, tested and offered in evidence was the same item seized from
accused-appellant. We have previously ruled that as long as the state can show by record or testimony that the integrity of
the evidence has not been compromised by accounting for the continuous whereabouts of the object evidence at least
between the time it came into the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory, then the
prosecution can maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 23

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof
that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bear the burden of showing that the evidence was tampered
or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the
presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties.24 Here, accused-appellant failed to convince the Court
that there was ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimony of PO1 Eclipse deserves full faith and
credit. Accused-appellant did not even question the credibility of the apprehending officers. He simply insisted that the
civilian informant had an ax to grind against his brother for the latter's failure to repair the cell phone. It is unbelievable
that the apprehending officers would go to the extent of fabricating a story just to have a reason to arrest accused-
appellant and get back at the latter's brother.

Imposable penalty

Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 provides the penalty for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, viz.:

Sect. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
We sustain the penalty imposed on accused-appellant as it is in conformity with the above-quoted provision of the
law.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03575 affirming the Regional Trial Court
Decision finding the accused John Happy Domingo y Carag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Leonen,* JJ.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

THIRD DIVISION

January 27, 2016

G.R. No.190798

RONALD IBAÑEZ, EMILIO IBAÑEZ, and DANIEL "BOBOT" IBAÑEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal is the September 25, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31285 which affirmed
with modifications the July 17, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 255 of Las Piñas City, convicting
Ronald Ibañez (Ronald), Emilio Ibañez (Emilio) and Daniel "Bobot" Ibañez (Bobot) (collectively, petitioners) of the crime
of frustrated homicide.

The Facts

For allegedly stoning, hitting and stabbing Rodolfo M. Lebria (Rodolfo), the petitioners together with their co-accused,
Boyet Ibañez (Boyet) and David Ibañez (David), who have remained at large, were charged with the crime of frustrated
homicide in an Information3 dated October 11, 2001. The accusatory portion thereof reads:

"That on or about 15th day of July, 2001, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping
and aiding one another, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stone, hit with an spade and stab with bladed weapons one RODOLFO M. LEBRIA, thereby
inflicting upon him physical injuries, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said RODOLFO M. LEBRIA, which prevented his
death.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

After posting their bail bond at P24,000.00 each, Ronald, Bobot and Emilio were released on bail. 4 Arraignment of
Ronald and Bobot was held on May 9, 2002. Emilio was, in turn, arraigned on December 10, 2002. All the petitioners
entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.5 After termination of pre-trial on April 23, 2003,6 trial on the merits
immediately followed. In the course of trial, two versions of what transpired on the early morning of July 15, 2001
surfaced. These conflicting versions of the incident, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Version of the Prosecution

In his narration, Rodolfo claimed that Ronald and his sons Emilio, Bobot, Boyet and David were his neighbors in CAA, Las
Piñas City. Rodolfo recalled that he had visitors on the day of the incident. When his guests left at around 1:00 a.m. of July
15, 2001, Rodolfo accompanied them outside his house. After about thirty minutes and as he was about to go inside,
Rodolfo noticed some garbage in front of his house. Addressing nobody in particular, Rodolfo uttered in the
vernacular "bakit dito tinambak ang basura sa harap ng aking bahay na malawak naman ang pagtataponan ng
basura?"7 Emilio and Boyet, who was then present and angered by what they heard, threw stones at the private
complainant hitting him twice on the forehead. With blood oozing from his forehead, Rodolfo went inside his house to
cleanse his face obscured by blood and emerged again, this time, carrying a 2" x 2" (dos por dos) piece of wood. Rodolfo
was caught off guard when he was hit on the head with a shovel by another accused, David.8 Then, Ronald held Rodolfo,
rendering him helpless, as Boyet and Bobot simultaneously stabbed him in the abdomen. 9 At this point, Rodolfo fell to the
ground, lying flat and eventually lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness, Rodolfo found himself at the Las
Piñas District Hospital (LPDH) but was later on transferred to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for the much-
needed surgical procedure. At the PGH, Rodolfo was operated on, confined for nine days and incurred hospital expenses
amounting to P30,000.00.10

PO2 Sulit testified that he was the investigating police officer who took the statements of Rodolfo’s daughter Ruth Ann
Lebria (Ruth) and Rodolfo’s wife, Salvacion Lebria (Salvacion) when they went to the police station to complain about the
incident. PO2 Sulit disclosed that when he asked Ruth and Salvacion why Rodolfo was not with them, he was informed
that Rodolfo was still undergoing medication and treatment for the injuries suffered from the petitioners. PO2 Sulit also
testified that he endorsed the complaint against the petitioners to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas for proper
disposition.11

To corroborate Rodolfo’s testimony, the prosecution presented Ruth and Salvacion as witnesses.

Ruth testified that she actually witnessed the entire incident which she admitted was preceded by the utterance made by
his father.12 Her testimony on how Ronald, Emilio, Bobot, Boyet and David ganged up on her father and who among them
stoned, hit, held and stabbed Rodolfo perfectly matched the latter’s sworn declarations.13

Salvacion, who was also home on that fateful morning, confirmed the beating and stabbing her husband endured in the
hands of the petitioners and their co-accused. Salvacion also submitted receipts in the total amount of P2,174.80,
representing the medical expenses incurred for the treatment of Rodolfo’s injuries resulting from the incident. 14

The prosecution presented the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the Records Division of the PGH showing that Rodolfo
suffered multiple stab wounds in the abdomen and underwent an exploratory laparotomy,15 the standard surgery in
abdominal trauma cases involving life-threatening injuries.16

Version of the Defense

To refute the accusations against them, the petitioners offered an entirely different scenario.

Not only did he deny the allegations against him but Ronald even claimed that he was the one who was stabbed by
Rodolfo. Ronald averred that the incident happened within the vicinity of his home, which was about four meters away
from the house of Rodolfo.17 When Ronald heard Rodolfo shouting at around 2:00 a.m., he tried pacifying Rodolfo by
telling him that they would just talk later in the day. Unappeased, Rodolfo allegedly destroyed the bicycle belonging to
Ronald’s son-in-law. Rodolfo then attacked Ronald by stabbing him on his right arm. It was during this time that Ronald’s
son, Bobot, came to his rescue but was prevented from doing so as Bobot was also struck with a knife by Rodolfo. Ronald
and his son instituted a criminal complaint against Rodolfo for attempted homicide but nothing came out of it. In support
of his testimony, Ronald presented a picture taken the day after the incident showing a slipper purportedly belonging to
Rodolfo and a balisong. Ronald further insisted that all the other accused were not around as they were residing elsewhere
at that crucial time.

Bobot testified that he immediately rushed outside his house, which is located beside his father’s, upon hearing Ronald
shout, "Tulungan mo ako, ako'y sinaksak."18 However, he was not able to save his father as he himself was stabbed twice
with a knife by Rodolfo. A struggle for the possession of the knife between Bobot and Rodolfo ensued and in the process,
the latter accidentally sustained a stab wound in the abdomen. Still, Bobot asserted that it was Rodolfo who ran away from
the scene of the crime. Meanwhile, Ronald had already left for the nearby police detachment to seek help.

Accused Emilio, for his part, interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. He emphatically denied that he threw a stone at
Rodolfo. On the date and time of the incident, Emilio claimed that he was working overtime as a laborer in Moonwalk, Las
Piñas City, which is one kilometer away from the crime scene. He argued that he was just unfortunately dragged into this
case which had nothing to do with him at all.19

The defense likewise proffered two medical certificates to support the petitioners’ claims. The July 15, 2001 medical
certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Cecilia Leyson (Dr. Leyson), of the Ospital ng Maynila, declared that Ronald’s body bore
lacerations and hematoma at the time she attended to him. Nevertheless, Dr. Leyson acknowledged that she had no idea
how the injuries were sustained by Ronald. The other medical certificate dated March 20, 2006 was issued by Dr. Renato
Borja (Dr. Borja), a physician affiliated with the Parañaque Community Hospital where Bobot was taken after getting
injured. Based on the hospital records, Dr. Borja testified that Bobot had sustained wounds on the head and chest,
possibly caused by a sharp instrument.20

Petitioners’ Representation in the Trial Court Proceedings

In view of the petitioners’ allegation that they were denied of right to counsel, a narration of petitioners’ representation in
the trial court proceedings is imperative.

During the arraignment on May 9, 2002, Ronald and Bobot were assisted by Atty. Bibiano Colasito, who was selected as
their counsel de oficio only for that occasion. At his arraignment on December 10, 2002, Emilio appeared with the
assistance of Atty. Antonio Manzano (Atty. Manzano), who was then appointed by the trial court as counsel de oficio for all
the accused. In the pre-trial conference that followed, Atty. Manzano appeared for the petitioners. Atty. Manzano was
informed that the trial for the presentation of prosecution evidence was set on June 18, 2003.
Both Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit completed their respective testimonies during the June 18, 2003 hearing. However, Atty.
Manzano failed to appear at the said hearing despite prior notice. Likewise, Ronald, one of the petitioners, absented
himself from the same hearing. As a result, the RTC issued the June 18, 2003 Order,21 the pertinent portion of which
reads:

Due to the failure of Atty. Manzano to appear in today’s proceeding despite due notice and so as not to delay the
proceedings herein, his right to cross-examine the said two (2) witnesses is deemed waived. At the same time, Atty.
Manzano is hereby fined the amount of P2,000.00 for his absence in today’s proceedings despite the fact that the same
has been previously set and known to him, without even filing any motion or pleading regarding his inability to appear
herein which clearly indicates a show of disrespect to the authority of this Court.

Let a warrant of arrest be issued against accused Ronald Ibañez for failing to appear in today’s hearing despite notice and
the bond posted by him for his provisional liberty confiscated in favor of the government. As such, the bondsman BF
General Insurance Company, Inc., is hereby directed to produce the body of the said accused within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Order and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against the bond.

The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director of the Criminal Investigation Service Command,
PNP, Camp Crame, are hereby directed to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Order why the warrants of arrest
issued against Boyet Ibañez and David Ibañez remain unimplemented and/or no return submitted to this Court.

Thereafter, Atty. Manzano withdrew as petitioners’ counsel de oficio. In its Order22 dated September 3, 2003, the trial
court appointed Atty. Gregorio Cañeda, Jr. (Atty. Cañeda) as the new counsel de oficio of the petitioners. On the same
date, Atty. Cañeda conducted the cross-examination of Ruth and even expressed his desire to continue with the cross-
examination of said witness on the next scheduled hearing. In the hearing of September 17, 2003, Atty. Cañeda appeared
for the petitioners but Bobot and Emilio did not show up. This prompted the trial court to issue the corresponding
warrants for their arrest and the bonds posted by them for their provisional liberty were ordered confiscated in favor of
the government. Despite the continued absence of his clients, Atty. Cañeda religiously attended the succeeding hearings.
On November 5, 2003, upon his request, the trial court relieved Atty. Cañeda of his designation as counsel de oficio for the
petitioners.

Per the trial court’s Order23 dated February 10, 2004, Atty. Ma. Teresita C. Pantua (Atty. Pantua), of the Public Attorney’s
Office, was designated as the petitioners’ counsel de oficio. However, Atty. Pantua’s designation was recalled upon her
manifestation that she had previously assisted Rodolfo in initiating the present case. In her stead, the trial court appointed
the petitioners’ current counsel de oficio, Atty. Juan Sindingan (Atty. Sindingan).

Since then, Atty. Sindingan has been representing the petitioners. With his help, all three petitioners finally appeared
before the trial court on May 5, 2005. Atty. Sindingan handled the cross-examination of another prosecution witness,
Salvacion, as well as the presentation of evidence for the defense.

After both parties had rested their case, they were required to submit their respective memoranda in thirty (30) days. Atty.
Sindingan submitted the Memorandum for the petitioners while no memorandum was ever filed by the prosecution.
Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

The RTC’s Ruling

The RTC accorded more weight to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses over the declarations of the
defense, thus, the dispositive portion of its judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court finds accused Ronald Ibañez, Emilio Ibañez and Daniel "Bobot"
Ibañez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide and hereby sentences them to each suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, up to EIGHT (8) YEARS
of prision mayor, as maximum, as well as to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law.

Also, accused Ronald Ibañez, Emilio Ibañez and Daniel "Bobot" Ibañez are ordered to pay to private complainant or victim
Rodolfo Lebria the sum of P2,174.80 representing his actual medical expenses.

With costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.24

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision but this was denied in an Order 25 dated October 11,
2007. Undaunted, the petitioners elevated their case to the CA. They faulted the trial court for totally disregarding their
claim that Rodolfo was the aggressor and for not recognizing that Bobot was merely acting in self-defense when Rodolfo
was stabbed. The petitioners also asserted that they were deprived of their constitutional right to counsel.

The CA’s Ruling

The CA agreed with the trial court’s judgment of conviction but modified the penalty imposed. The appellate court
sentenced the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The CA also found it proper to award P15,000.00 as temperate
damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages to Rodolfo. The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the CA’s decision.
Still, their motion was denied in the Resolution26 of December 28, 2009.
 The Issue

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising the lone issue of whether the petitioners were deprived of their
constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the conviction of the petitioners with modification.

No Deprivation of Right to Counsel

The right invoked by the petitioners is premised upon Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution which states that:

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, x x x.

Guided by the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused to counsel and pursuant to its rule-making authority, the
Court, in promulgating the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted the following provisions:

Rule 115, SEC. 1. Rights of accused at the trial. – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following
rights:

xxxx

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of the judgment. x x x

xxxx

Rule 116 of the same Rules makes it mandatory for the trial court to designate a counsel de oficio for the accused in the
absence of private representation. It provides:

SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. – Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused
of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or
has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de officio to defend him.

SEC. 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. – The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the
questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de officio such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of
their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are not
available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend
the accused.

The right to be assisted by counsel is an indispensable component of due process in criminal prosecution.27 As such, right
to counsel is one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused. 28 A deprivation of the right to counsel strips the
accused of an equality in arms resulting in the denial of a level playing field. 29 Simply put, an accused without counsel is
essentially deprived of a fair hearing which is tantamount to a grave denial of due process. 30

On the basis of this ratiocination and as a last ditch effort to be exculpated, the petitioners insisted that they were denied
of their right to counsel when their counsel de oficio failed to appear on the June 18, 2003 trial court hearing during which
Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit gave their testimonies. As a consequence, the petitioners argued that they were divested of the
opportunity to cross-examine the said two prosecution witnesses.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, disputed the petitioners’ claim that they were deprived of their
constitutional right to counsel. In their May 5, 2010 Comment 31 on the instant petition, the OSG pointed out that since the
beginning of the proceedings in the trial court until the filing of the present petition before this Court, three (3) counsel de
oficio were appointed and represented the petitioners32 and to which designation the latter did not raise any protest.33 The
OSG opined that the trial court judge made sure that the petitioners were adequately assisted by a counsel de oficio when
they failed to engage the services of a lawyer of their own choice. Thus, the OSG recommended the dismissal of the
petition.

The Court agrees with the position taken by the OSG.

There was no denial of right to counsel as evinced by the fact that the petitioners were not only assisted by a counsel de
oficio during arraignment and pre-trial but more so, their counsel de oficio actively participated in the proceedings before
the trial court including the direct and cross-examination of the witnesses.34 As aptly found by the CA, the petitioners were
duly represented by a counsel de oficio all throughout the proceedings except for one hearing when their court appointed
lawyer was absent and Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit presented their testimonies. 35As previously stated, it was during said
hearing when the trial court declared that the cross-examination of the said two prosecution witnesses was deemed
waived.
Mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine.36 The case of Savory
Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al. thoroughly explained the meaning and substance of right to
cross-examine as an integral component of due process with a colatilla that the same right may be expressly or impliedly
waived, to quote:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in
nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part
of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to
a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness
but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.37

Such is the scenario in the present case where the reason why Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit were not subjected to cross-
examination was not because the petitioners were not given opportunity to do so. Noticeably, the petitioners’ counsel de
oficio omitted to mention that in the June 18, 2003 hearing, Ronald, one of the accused, did not show up despite prior
notice. Thus, the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty was ordered confiscated in favor of the government.
Ironically, Ronald comes to this Court asserting the very right he seemingly waived and abandoned for not attending the
scheduled hearing without justifiable cause. Moreover, neither did the petitioners interpose any objection to the
presentation of testimony of the prosecution witnesses during the June 18, 2003 hearing nor did their counsel de
oficio subsequently seek a reconsideration of the June 18, 2003 Order.

Further, the trial court judge, when he issued the June 18, 2003 Order, was merely exercising a judicial prerogative. No
proof was presented by the defense showing that the exercise of such discretion was either despotic or arbitrary.

Going by the records, there is no indication that any of the counsel de oficio had been negligent in protecting the
petitioners’ interests. As a matter of fact, the counsel de oficio kept on attending the trial court hearings in representation
of the petitioners despite the latter’s unjustified absences.

In sum, the Court is not persuaded that the absence of the counsel de oficio in one of the hearings of this case amounts to a
denial of right to counsel. Nor does such absence warrant the nullification of the entire trial court proceedings and the
eventual invalidation of its ruling. In People v. Manalo, the Court held that the fact that a particular counsel de oficio did
not or could not consistently appear in all the hearings of the case, is effectively a denial of the right to counsel,
especially so where, as in the instant case, there is no showing that the several appointed counsel de oficio in any way
neglected to perform their duties to the appellant and to the trial court and that the defense had suffered in any
substantial sense therefrom.38

Guilt Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt

At any rate, the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA, which are backed up by substantial evidence on record,
led this Court to no other conclusion than that the petitioners are guilty of frustrated homicide.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is present.39 There being no prior determination by both the trial and appellate courts of any qualifying
circumstance that would elevate the homicide to murder, the Court will simply limit its discussion to the first two
elements.

In ascertaining whether intent to kill exists, the Court considers the presence of the following factors: (1) the means used
by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime
was committed and the motives of the accused.40

Here, intent to kill Rodolfo was evident in the manner in which he was attacked, by the concerted actions of the accused,
the weapon used and the nature of wounds sustained by Rodolfo.

Both the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose and unity
of action towards the realization of an unlawful objective among the accused. 41 Its existence can be inferred from the
individual acts of the accused, which if taken as a whole are in fact related, and indicative of a concurrence of
sentiment.42 In this case, conspiracy was manifested in the spontaneous and coordinated acts of the accused, where two of
them delivered the initial attack on Rodolfo by stoning, while another struck him with a shovel and the third held him so
that the other two can simultaneously stab Rodolfo. It was only when Rodolfo laid helpless on the ground and had lost
consciousness that the accused hurriedly left the scene. This chain of events leading to the commission of the crime
adequately established a conspiracy among them.

Plainly, the kind of weapon used for the attack, in this case, a knife and the vital parts of Rodolfo’s body at which he was
undeniably stabbed demonstrated petitioners’ intent to kill. The medico-legal certificate revealed that Rodolfo sustained
multiple stab wounds in the epigastrium, left upper quadrant of the abdomen resulting to internal injuries in the
transverse colon (serosal), mesentery and left kidney.43 Given these injuries, Rodolfo would have succumbed to death if
not for the emergency surgical intervention.

With respect to the petitioners’ defenses of denial and alibi, the Court concurs with the lower courts’ rejection of these
defenses. An assessment of the defenses of denial and alibi necessitates looking into the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that in determining who between the prosecution and defense witnesses are to be
believed, the evaluation of the trial court is accorded much respect for the simple reason that the trial court is in a better
position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they deliver their testimonies. 44 As such, the findings of the trial
court is accorded finality unless it has overlooked substantial facts which if properly considered, could alter the result of
the case.45

In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from this rule considering the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.

The trial and appellate courts were right in not giving probative value to petitioners’ denial. Denial is an intrinsically weak
defense that further crumbles when it comes face-to-face with the positive identification and straightforward narration of
the prosecution witnesses.46 Between an affirmative assertion which has a ring of truth to it and a general denial, the
former generally prevails.47 The prosecution witnesses recounted the details of the crime in a clear, detailed and consistent
manner, without any hint of hesitation or sign of untruthfulness, which they could not have done unless they genuinely
witnessed the incident. Besides, the prosecution witnesses could not have mistakenly identified the petitioners as
Rodolfo’s perpetrators considering there is so much familiarity among them. The records are also bereft of any indication
that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by ill motives when they testified against the petitioners. Thus, their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.

In contrast, the petitioners’ testimonies are self-serving and contrary to human reason and experience.

The Court notes that the defense presented no witnesses, other than themselves, who had actually seen the incident and
could validate their story. Additionally, aside from the medical certificates of Ronald and that of Bobot which was issued
almost five (5) years since the incident occurred, the defense have not submitted any credible proof that could efficiently
rebut the prosecution’s evidence.

Further, the Court finds it contrary to human reason and experience that Ronald, would just leave his son Bobot, while the
latter was being stabbed and struggling for the possession of the knife with Rodolfo, to go to a police station for assistance.
Logic dictates that a father would not abandon a son in the presence of actual harm.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was at
another place at the time of the commission of the offense but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime.48 Emilio himself admitted that he was just one kilometer away from the crime scene when the incident
happened during the unholy hour of 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001. As such, Emilio failed to prove physical impossibility of his
being at the crime scene on the date and time in question. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot
prevail over the positive identification by the witnesses of the petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime. 49 In the present
case, Emilio was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the assailants. Moreover, alibi becomes less
credible if offered by the accused himself and his immediate relatives as they are expected to make declarations in his
favor,50 as in this case, where Emilio, his father and brother insisted that the former was somewhere else when the
incident occurred. For these reasons, Emilio’s defense of alibi will not hold.

Anent Bobot's claim of self-defense, it is undeserving of any serious consideration or credence. Basic is the rule that the
person asserting self-defense must admit that he inflicted an injury on another person in order to defend himself.51 Here,
there is nothing on record that will show that Bobot categorically admitted that he wounded Rodolfo.

Based on the foregoing, the Court upholds the trial and appellate courts' conviction of the petitioners for frustrated
homicide.1âwphi1

Penalty and Civil Liability

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Article 50
of the same Code states that the imposable penalty upon principals of a frustrated crime shall be the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Hence, frustrated homicide is punishable by prision
mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present in this
case, the minimum penalty to be meted on the petitioners should be anywhere within the range of six (6) months and one
(1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional and the maximum penalty should be taken from the medium period
of prision mayor ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, the imposition by the CA of
imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, is proper.

As regards the civil liability of the petitioners, the Court sustains the award of moral and temperate damages with
modification as to the latter's amount.

Pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but the amount of which cannot be proven with certainty. In People v. Villanueva52 and Serrano v. People,53 the
Court ruled that in case the amount of actual damages, as proven by receipts during trial is less than P25,000.00, the
victim shall be entitled to P25,000.00 temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. In the instant
case, only the amount of P2,174.80 was supported by receipts. Following the prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds it
necessary to increase the temperate damages from P15,000.00 to P25,000.00.

The award of moral damages is justified under Article 2219 of the Civil Code as Rodolfo sustained physical injuries which
were the proximate effect of the petitioners' criminal offense. As the amount is left to the discretion of the court, moral
damages should be reasonably proportional and approximate to the degree of the injury caused and the gravity of the
wrong done.54 In light of the attendant circumstances in the case, the Court affirms that P30,000.00 is a fair and
reasonable grant of moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31285
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners RONALD IBAÑEZ, EMILIO IBAÑEZ and DANIEL "BOBOT"
IBAÑEZ are found guilty of frustrated homicide and sentenced to a prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. They are also ordered to pay RODOLFO
LEBRIA Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

April 4, 2016

G.R. No. 205414

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO DELA CRUZ y GUMABAT@"EDDIE", Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For the Court's consideration is the Decision1 dated March 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
04587 affirming the Decision2 dated August 2, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal
Case No. 09-271907, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In an information filed on November 5, 2009, appellant Eduardo dela Cruz y Gumabat was charged with illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5 of Article II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about October 23, 2009, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not having been authorized by law
to sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly
sell or offer for sale to poseur-buyer, one (1) Blister pack with label "Valium" containing Ten (10) round blue tablets
weighing ONE POINT SEVEN TWO ZERO (1.720) grams which after a qualitative examination, gave positive result to the
test of diazepam, a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law.3

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.4

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the witnesses of the prosecution, namely, PO1 Jaycee John Galotera, who acted as
the poseurbuyer; PO1 Roderick Magpale, who was the investigator-on-duty at the Special Operation and Task Unit; and
PO3 Ryan Sulayao, who acted as the perimeter back-up, are as follows:

At around 7:30 p.m. on October 22, 2009, a confidential informant arrived at the Jose Abad Santos Police Station, Manila
Police District and informed PO1 Ronnie Tan, PO3 Ryan Sulayao and PO3 Eric Guzman about the illegal drug activities
being conducted by appellant along Solis Street, Tondo, Manila. Said informant claimed to have gained access to
appellant. Consequently, the police officers immediately informed their station commander, P/Supt. Remigio Sedanto,
who tasked the unit to conduct a buy-bust operation, to be led by P/Inspector Jeffrey Dallo, with PO1 Galotera acting as
poseur-buyer, and the rest of the team to serve as back-up. P/Inspector Dallo gave PO1 Galotera three (3) pieces of One
Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills to be utilized as buy-bust money, which PO1 Galotera marked with his initials "JJG." The
team also agreed that PO1 Galotera’s removal of his ball cap constitutes the signal indicating that the transaction has been
consummated and that the appellant may be arrested. After a thorough briefing and coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the team left the station and proceeded to the target area at around 12:20 a.m.5

PO1 Galotera and the confidential informant went straight to the destination aboard a motorcycle, while PO1 Tan, PO3
Sulayao, and PO3 Guzman, aboard a separate motorcycle, positioned themselves about ten (10) meters away from PO1
Galotera and the informant. PO1 Galotera and the informant then walked along an alley on Solis Street towards Villanueva
Street and saw two (2) men standing at a dark portion thereof. As they approached said men, the confidential informant
whispered to PO1 Galotera that the person on the right was appellant. Thereafter, appellant asked the informant what he
needed.6 In reply, the informant told appellant that he and his companion, PO1 Galotera, needed "Valium," which contains
Diazepam, a dangerous drug. Appellant then asked how much Valium they need, to which PO1 Galotera answered, "Isang
banig lang." PO1 Galotera then handed the marked money in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) to appellant,
who placed the same in his front left pocket. Thereafter, appellant pulled out one blister pack containing ten (10) pieces of
round, blue tablets from his right pocket and handed the same to PO1 Galotera. Believing that what he received was
Valium based on its appearance, PO1 Galotera executed the pre-arranged signal. Upon seeing the signal, PO3 Guzman
proceeded to assist PO1 Galotera, who immediately grabbed appellant. Appellant’s companion, who tried to escape, was
also subdued by PO3 Guzman. PO1 Galotera then apprised appellant of the nature of his arrest and read him his
constitutional rights. He also marked the seized tablets with the initials "EDG" corresponding to appellant’s name.

Afterwards, he turned over the appellant and the seized evidence to PO1 Roderick Magpale, an investigator of the Anti-
Illegal Special Operation Task Unit at the Police Station. PO1 Magpale then took pictures of appellant and the seized
evidence, prepared the Booking and Information Sheet, and forwarded the seized tablets to the forensic laboratory for
examination. Accordingly, Forensic Chemist Erickson L. Calabocal, conducted a chemistry examination and in his
Chemistry Report No. D-787-09, found that the ten (10) round, blue tablets seized from appellant tested positive for
Diazepam, a dangerous drug.7 During trial, however, Calabocal’s testimony was dispensed with after the parties stipulated
on the existence and due execution of Chemistry Report No. D-787-09.8

Against the foregoing charges, appellant testified on his own version of facts, and further presented the testimonies of his
mother, Leonora dela Cruz, and one Roberto Balatbat.9

Appellant testified that he was a jeepney driver by profession and a resident at Solis Street, Tondo, Manila. At around 3:00
p.m. on October 23, 2009, he went to see his friend, Nicanor Guevarra, to convince him to place a bet on the "karera." He
found him at the tricycle terminal at Solis Street corner Callejon Villanueva, playing cara y cruz and joined him. Suddenly,
the policemen arrived. They tried to run but were eventually arrested. Appellant requested that he be brought to
the barangay hall, but the policemen brought him directly to the police station. He thought that he was only being
accused of illegal gambling for playing cara y cruz. It turned out, however, that he was being charged with illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.10

After appellant, the defense presented appellant’s mother who denied that her son was into selling dangerous drugs.
According to her, at around 3:00 p.m. on October 23, 2009, appellant asked her permission to leave the house to place a
bet. However, she later learned from her granddaughter that her son had been arrested.

Next was Roberto Balatbat, a tricycle driver residing at Solis Street, Tondo, Manila, who testified that on that day, he was
at the tricycle terminal on Solis Street playing cara y cruz. When the four (4) police officers arrived, he quickly ran away
leaving behind appellant and Guevarra, who were arrested. He denied that any sale of dangerous drugs transpired at the
time and place of appellant’s arrest.11

In its Decision dated August 2, 2010, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers as they were given in a
clear and convincing manner showing that the officers were at the place of the incident to accomplish exactly what they
had set out to do, which was to conduct a legitimate buy-bust operation on appellant.12 It found that unless the members
of the buy-bust team were inspired by any ill motive to testify falsely against appellant, their testimonies deserve full faith
and credit, particularly in light of the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. Indeed, the positive
identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses prevails over appellant’s denial, which is inherently a weak
defense.13 The trial court, therefore, disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused, Eduardo dela Cruz y Gumabat @
Eddie, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The specimen is forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court, accompanied by the Branch Sheriff, is
directed to turn over with dispatch and upon receipt the said specimen to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) for proper disposal in accordance with the law and rules.

SO ORDERED.14

Appellant appealed his conviction arguing that his warrantless arrest was unlawful for he was not, in fact, caught selling
dangerous drugs but was merely committing the offense of illegal gambling. Thus, the ten (10) tablets of Valium allegedly
seized from him is inadmissible as evidence.15 Appellant also argued that there was no showing that he was informed of
the reason for his arrest, of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of his
choice.16 Appellant further faulted the prosecution for not only failing to present the buy-bust money as evidence in
court17 but also failing to show proof that the confiscated Valium was subjected to a qualitative examination. 18 He noted
that the chemist who supposedly conducted the laboratory examination on the drug did not know the source from which it
came.19

On March 19, 2012, the CA sustained appellant’s conviction. At the outset, it noted that it was only in appellant’s appeal
that appellant raised for the first time the issue of the irregularity of his arrest. At no time before or during his
arraignment did he object to the same. As such, jurisprudence dictates that he should be estopped from assailing said
irregularity, for issues not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal without offending the
basic rules of fair play.20 Even assuming that the police officers failed to inform appellant of his rights under custodial
investigation, the appellate court held that such would not necessarily result in appellant’s acquittal because his conviction
was based not on any extrajudicial confession but on the testimony of PO1 Galotera who clearly and convincingly narrated
the material details of the buy-bust operation that led to appellant’s arrest.21
On appellant’s main contention that the police officers should have obtained a judicial warrant to validly effect his arrest,
the appellate court held that the instant case falls within one of the settled exceptions: an arrest made after an entrapment
operation. This is because such warrantless arrest is considered valid under Section 5(a),22 Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure. The CA explained that buy-bust operations, such as the one conducted herein, is a form of
entrapment where means are resorted to for the purpose of capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their own, criminal
plan. In upholding the validity of the operation, the "objective test" demands that the details of the purported transaction
be clearly shown, beginning from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the
promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of
the sale.23 Here, the appellate court found that said requirements were adequately met for as observed by the trial court,
the testimonies presented by the prosecution were given in a clear, straightforward and convincing manner.

As for the failure by the prosecution to offer as evidence the marked money, the CA cited jurisprudence holding that the
absence of the marked money does not create a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence, as long as the sale of the dangerous
drug is adequately proved.24 Furthermore, the appellate court rejected appellant’s contention that there was no proof that
the Valium that was subjected to qualitative examination was the same Valium seized from him during the buy-bust
operation. According to the appellate court, the unbroken chain of custody of the ten (10) Valium tablets was established
by the prosecution through the testimonies of PO1 Galotera and PO1 Magpale. Thus, in the absence of any bad faith or
proof that the evidence has been tampered with, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved. 25

Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal26 on April 4, 2012. Thereafter, in compliance with the Resolution of the
Court, dated March 13, 2013, notifying the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire,
within thirty (30) days from notice, appellant filed his Supplemental Brief on June 14, 2013 raising the following errors:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE NONCOMPLIANCE BY THE ARRESTING OFFICERS OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER
CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER R.A. NO. 9165.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE IDENTITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI.27

Appellant maintains that the instant case does not fall under the exceptions to the requirement of obtaining a judicial
warrant prior to making an arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. According to
appellant, for in flagrante warrantless arrests to be lawful, the following elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. But here,
appellant asserts that he was not exhibiting any strange actuation at the time of his arrest, merely playing cara y cruz with
a friend. Thus, absent any physical act on the part of the accused, positively indicating that he had just committed a crime
or was committing or attempting to commit one, no reasonable suspicion would be sufficient enough to justify his arrest
and subsequent search without a warrant.28

Next, appellant asseverates that the prosecution failed to establish, with moral certainty, that the item seized from him
was the very same item presented and proved in court because of its non-compliance with the requirements under Section
21 of RA No. 9165 mandating the arresting team to conduct a physical inventory of the items seized and photograph the
same in the presence of: (1) the accused; (2) a representative from the media; (3) a representative from the Department of
Justice (DOJ); and (4) any elected public official who shall further be required to sign the copies of the said inventory.
According to appellant, no physical inventory nor photograph was ever taken in this case. 29

Furthermore, while appellant recognizes the jurisprudential teaching that non-compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165
is not fatal so long as: (1) there is justifiable ground therefor; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were properly preserved by the apprehending team, he stressed that said conditions were not established in this case. Not
only did the prosecution fail to adequately explain its failure to comply with said requirements, it likewise failed to show
the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Appellant asserts that this is due to a gaping
hole in the chain of custody of the seized items arising from the prosecution’s failure to show how the seized drugs were
transported from the place of arrest to the police station, or from the time they were delivered to the laboratory until their
eventual presentation in court.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements under Section 5,
Article II of RA No. 9165 should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti.30

The Court finds that the prosecution sufficiently proved the preceding requisites warranting appellant’s conviction. As
appropriately found by the lower courts, the prosecution presented clear and convincing testimonies of the police officers
categorically recounting, in detail, how they conducted the buy-bust operation, beginning from the receipt of the tip from
the confidential informant, then to the marking of the buy-bust money with the initials of PO1 Galotera, and then to the
meeting of the appellant as seller and PO1 Galotera as buyer, and next to the actual exchange of the blister pack containing
the Valium tablets with the marked money, and then finally to the appellant’s eventual arrest and turn over to the police
station where his arrest was duly recorded. Moreover, the prosecution further presented before the trial court Chemistry
Report No. D-787-09 on the seized tablets revealing positive results for Diazepam, a dangerous drug under RA No. 9165.
It is clear, therefore, that the prosecution’s evidence adequately established beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the
buyer and seller, the ten (10) tablets of Valium as the object of the sale, the marked money as the consideration, as well as
the exchange of the Valium and the marked money signifying the consummation of the sale.

In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to appellant’s insistence on the illegality of his warrantless arrest due to an
alleged absence of any overt act on his part positively indicating that he was committing a crime. He asserts that he was
merely playing cara y cruz and denies any participation in the crime charged. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the circumstances by which a warrantless arrest are considered reasonable:

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.31

Contrary to appellant’s claims, there is overwhelming evidence that he was actually committing a crime in the presence of
the police officers who arrested him without a warrant. To repeat, straightforward and unwavering testimonies were
presented by the prosecution narrating, in detail, how the police officers personally witnessed the sale by appellant of the
dangerous drug, being actual participants of the buy-bust operation. Indeed, a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment,
in which the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only
authorized, but duty-bound, to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used
in the commission of the crime.32 Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s plain denial of
the offense charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.33

As for appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to establish that the items seized from him were the very same
items presented and proved in court due to its non-compliance with the requirements under Section 21 of RA No. 9165
mandating the arresting officers to take photographs and conduct a physical inventory of the items seized, the Court is not
convinced. Section 21, Paragraph 1, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

Notwithstanding the foregoing, and as admitted by appellant, the failure to conduct a physical inventory of the seized
items, as well as to take photographs of the same in the presence of the persons required above, will not automatically
render an arrest illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence,34 pursuant to the following Section 21 (a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.]35

In view of the preceding, the Court has, time and again, ruled that non-compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 shall
not necessarily render the arrest of an accused as illegal or the items seized as inadmissible if the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved in compliance with the chain of custody rule.36 The Court explained the
rule on the chain of custody to be as follows:

The rule on chain of custody expressly demands the identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the
purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they
are seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court. Moreover, as a method of authenticating evidence,
the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such manner that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 37

It is evident from the records of this case that the prosecution sufficiently complied with the chain of custody rule.
Contrary to the claims of appellant, the unbroken chain of custody of the tablets seized from him was categorically
established by the testimonies presented by the prosecution’s witnesses. PO1 Galotera gave a clear and detailed account of
the events that transpired from the moment he handed the marked money to appellant, to the time appellant pulled out
the blister pack containing ten (10) pieces of round, blue tablets from his right pocket, all the way up to his execution of
the pre-arranged signal and subsequent arrest of appellant. He testified that he informed appellant of his constitutional
rights, apprised him of the nature of his arrest, and marked the seized tablets with appellant’s initials. He also attested to
the process by which he turned appellant and the seized items over to PO1 Magpale, who in turn, clearly narrated how he
took photographs thereof, prepared the Booking and Information Sheet, and eventually turned over appellant and the
seized items to Forensic Chemist Calabocal.1âwphi1

In an attempt to further assign breaks in the chain of custody, appellant claimed that the prosecution did not present any
testimony of the persons who took charge of the safekeeping and custody of the illicit drugs from the time they were
delivered to the laboratory. It bears stressing, however, that such point had already been addressed by the appellate court
in the following wise:

The testimony of Forensic Chemist PS I. Erickson L. Calabocal was dispensed with after the parties had
stipulated on the existence and due execution of Chemistry Report No. D-787-09 (Exhibit "C").

xxxx

x x x Quoting from their testimonies, the Solicitor General aptly traced the unbroken chain of custody of the valium tablets
seized from appellant, thus:

xxxx

Worthy of note, as well is the fact that the parties stipulated during pre-trial that the forensic chemist
who conducted the qualitative examination of the seized item received a letter request dated October 23,
2009 from PO1 Magpale. Attached to said letter was the specimen with markings EDG. 38

In like manner, the trial court similarly noted appellant’s admission, during pre-trial, of the parties’ stipulation as to the
qualification of PS I. Erickson L. Calabocal as a Forensic Chemist, as well as the genuineness and due execution of the
documents he brought together with the specimen, part of which were his Final Chemistry Report and his Findings and
Conclusions resulting from the laboratory examination he conducted on the seized tablets, which yielded positive results
for dangerous drugs.39 Due to these stipulations, the testimony of Forensic Chemist Calabocal was not presented at trial
not because the prosecution failed to do so, but because the same was dispensed with as expressly agreed to by the parties.

Unfazed, appellant further faults the police officers not only for failing to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of
RA No. 9165 but also for failing to provide any explanation constituting justifiable ground therefor. It bears stressing,
however, that said objection was never raised in the trial court, and not even on appeal before the appellate court.
Appellant cannot belatedly raise its questions as to the evidence presented at trial, too late in the day and, at the same
time, expect the prosecution to have provided justifiable grounds for its non-compliance with RA No. 9165. People of the
Philippines v. Jimmy Gabuya y Adlawan40 explains:

It is well to note that the records of the case are bereft of evidence that appellant, during trial, interposed any objection to
the non-marking of the seized items in his presence and the lack of information on the whereabouts of the shabu after it
was examined by P/Insp. Calabocal. While he questioned the chain of custody before the CA, the alleged defects appellant
is now alluding to were not among those he raised on appeal. The defects he raised before the CA were limited to the
alleged lack of physical inventory, non-taking of photographs of the seized items, and the supposed failure of the police
officers to mark the sachets of shabu at the crime scene. But even then, it was already too late in the day for appellant to
have raised the same at that point since he should have done so early on before the RTC. It bears stressing that the
Court has already brushed aside an accused’s belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from
his person is inadmissible for failure of the arresting officers to comply with Section 21 of R.A. 9165.20
This is considering that "[w]hatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from literally
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because [appellant] did not question during trial the
safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an
objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. x x x"

Be that as it may, the Court has always reiterated that "what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused."41 Here, the Court opines that said requirement was sufficiently complied with. It is evidently clear, therefore,
that there exists no gap in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug seized from appellant for all the links thereof
beginning from the moment the item was obtained from appellant up to the time the same was presented in court were
sufficiently accounted for. Thus, it is because the apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items that the Court excuses their failure to strictly comply with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 for on said
failure, alone, appellant cannot automatically be exonerated.

All things considered, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the courts below for the prosecution
adequately established, with moral certainty, all the elements of the crime charged herein. It is hornbook doctrine that the
factual findings of the appellate court affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court unless there is a clear
showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.42 Thus, there exists no reason
to overturn the conviction of appellant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 19, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04587, affirming the Decision dated August 2, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 09-271907, finding appellant Eduardo Dela Cruz y Gumabat guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 216920, January 13, 2016

GIRLIE M. QUISAY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October 10, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated
January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968, which affirmed the denial of petitioner Girlie M.
Quisay's (petitioner) Motion to Quash before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144
(RTC).chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Facts

On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati) issued a Pasiya4or Resolution
finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, 5 otherwise known as
the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid
Sakdal6 or Information was filed before the RTC on January 11, 2013 charging petitioner of such crime.

On April 12, 2013, petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of authority of the
person who filed the same before the RTC. In support of her motion, petitioner pointed out that the Pasiya issued by the
OCP-Makati was penned by Assistant City Prosecutor Estefano H. De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz) and approved by Senior
Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang (SACP Hirang), while the Pabatid Sakdal was penned by ACP De La Cruz,
without any approval from any higher authority, albeit with a Certification claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written
authority or approval from the City Prosecutor in filing the said Information. In this regard, petitioner claimed that
nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that ACP De La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had prior
written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the Information against her. As such,
the Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be
cured.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In its Comment and Opposition,8 the OCP-Makati countered that the review prosecutor, SACP Hirang, was authorized to
approve the Pasiya pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32.9 Further, it maintained that the Pabatid Sakdal was
filed with the prior approval of the City Prosecutor as shown in the Certification in the Information
itself.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The RTC Ruling

In an Order11 dated May 8, 2013, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit. It found the Certification
attached to the Pabatid Sakdal to have sufficiently complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires
the prior written authority or approval by, among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of
Informations.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,13 which was, however, denied in an Order14 dated July 10, 2013. Aggrieved,
petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The CA Ruling

In a Decision16 dated October 10, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that pursuant to Section 9 of RA
10071,17 otherwise known as the "Prosecution Service Act of 2010," as well as OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, the City
Prosecutor of Makati authorized SACP Hirang to approve the issuance of, inter alia, resolutions finding probable cause
and the filing of Informations before the courts. As such, SACP Hirang may, on behalf of the City Prosecutor, approve
the Pasiya which found probable cause to indict petitioner of violation of Section 10 of RA
7610.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Further, it held that the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz in the Pabatid Sakdal clearly indicated that the same was
filed after the requisite preliminary investigation and with the prior written authority or approval of the City Prosecutor.
In this regard, the CA opined that such Certification enjoys the presumption of regularity accorded to a public officer's
performance of official functions, in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary. 19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration, 20 but was denied in a Resolution21 dated January 30, 2015; hence, this
petition.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held that the RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in dismissing petitioner's motion to quash.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information
requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed
before the courts, viz.:

SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold
the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information
that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that
there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that
the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an
opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutoror chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or approval
of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d),
Rule 117 of the same Rules, to wit:

SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this relation, People v. Garfin22 firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite
authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or
even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the case at bar, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to quash on the grounds that: (a) the City Prosecutor
of Makati may delegate its authority to approve the filing of the Pabatid Sakdalpursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071, as well
as OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32; and (b) the Pabatid Sakdal contained a Certification stating that its filing before the
RTC was with the prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor.

The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071, which gave the City Prosecutor the power to
"[investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and
ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or
made and filed against the persons accused,"24 he may indeed delegate his power to his subordinates as he may deem
necessary in the interest of the prosecution service. The CA also correctly stressed that it is under the auspice of this
provision that the City Prosecutor of Makati issued OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which gave division chiefs or review
prosecutors "authority to approve or act on any resolution, order, issuance, other action, and any information
recommended by any prosecutor for approval,"25 without necessarily diminishing the City Prosecutor's authority to act
directly in appropriate cases.26 By virtue of the foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly designated SACP Hirang,
Deputy City Prosecutor Emmanuel D. Medina, and Senior Assistant City Prosecutor William Celestino T. Uy as review
prosecutors for the OCP-Makati.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime charged, was validly made as
it bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his
signature therein.

Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before the RTC, as there was no
showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP-Makati's division chiefs or review
prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz which stated, among others, that "DAGDAG KO
PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na angpaghahain ng sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay
ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig"28 - which translates to "and that the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and
approval of the City Prosecutor."

In the cases of People v. Garfin,29Turingan v. Garfin,30 and Tolentino v. Paqueo31 the Court had already rejected
similarly-worded certifications, uniformly holding that despite such certifications, the Informations were defective as it
was shown that the officers filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained
prior written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file
the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor
of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior written authority or by designating him as a
division chief or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz
sought the approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32
in filing thePabatid Sakdal. Quite frankly, it is simply baffling how ACP De La Cruz was able to have the Pasiyaapproved
by designated review prosecutor SACP Hirang but failed to have the Pabatid Sakdalapproved by the same person or any
other authorized officer in the OCP-Makati.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions solely on the basis of the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz considering the absence
of any evidence on record clearly showing that ACP De La Cruz: (a) had any authority to file the same on his own; or (b)
did seek the prior written approval from those authorized to do so before filing the Information before the RTC.

In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as the Pabatid Sakdal or
Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to
do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.

As a final note, it must be stressed that "[t]he Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts of
the Philippines. For the orderly administration of justice, the provisions contained therein should be followed by all
litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the Government." 32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10, 2014 and the Resolution dated January 30,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Information against petitioner Girlie M. Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal case against her is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur.

February 17, 2016

G.R. No. 192233

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,

vs.
SPOl CATALINO GONZALES, JR., Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H. C. No. 02638, affirming with modification the
Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Trece Martirez City, Branch 23, convicting accused-appellant SPOl Catalino
Gonzales, Jr. for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.

On 30 January 2006, appellant was charged with Kidnapping for Ransom in the following Information:

That on December 28, 2005, at about 10:30 o'clock in the morning in the Municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually
helping one another, with threats and/or intimidation and through the use of force, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously take, carry away, and deprive PETER TAN and his son MICHAEL TAN, a minor of two (2)
years of age, of their respective liberties against their will for the purpose of extorting money as in fact a demand for
money in the amount of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, was demanded as a condition for
their safe release to their damage and prejudice.

With the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of authority against SPO1 CATALINO GONZALES, PS1
NATHANIEL CAPITENEA and PO2 ARDEN G. LANAZA, being active members of the Philippine National Police.3

On arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.

The victim Peter Tan (Tan) and his wife Huang Haitao (Haitao) lived in Retirees’ Village in Tanza, Cavite. They operated a
stall in a market also in Tanza.

Haitao narrated in her Sworn Statement4 that in the morning of 28 December 2005, Haitao left the house ahead of Tan
and their two-year old son to go to the market. When Haitao arrived at their stall, she tried calling Tan in his phone but
the latter did not answer. Finally, the call was answered by someone who introduced himself as a National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) agent and who told Haitao that her husband was arrested for illegal possession of shabu. Haitao
immediately asked for her husband’s whereabouts but the alleged NBI agent hung up. Haitao then called Tan’s phone
again. Before she could talk to her husband, someone snatched the phone away from Tan and told her that someone would
get in touch with her. At around 10:30 a.m., an unknown Chinese man called up Haitao and informed her that her
husband and son were detained for possession of drugs, and that she should pay off the captors. That evening, a man
called Haitao and demanded P5,000,000.00 for the release of her husband and son. The demand was lowered to
P3,000,000.00. Haitao was ordered by the captor to prepare the money and go to Luneta Park on the following day.

Haitao reported the incident to the Philippine Anti-Crime Emergency Response Unit (PACER) of the Philippine National
Police. The Luneta Park meeting did not push through. Haitao still received various instructions from the captors to fetch
her son until the PACER received information that Haitao’s son was in White Cross Children’s Home. Haitao was
eventually reunited with her son.

On 15 January 2006, Haitao received a text message from an unidentified man who claimed that he knew about Tan’s
kidnapping and demanded P30,000.00 from Haitao. They met at McDonald’s restaurant in Tanza, Cavite. When the man,
later identified as Edwin Torrente (Torrente) approached Haitao, he was arrested by PACER agents.

It turned out that Torrente was part of the group which forcibly took Tan and his son. In exchange for the needed
information, Torrente was placed under the Witness Protection Program and was utilized as a state witness.

In his Sworn Statement,5 Torrente narrated that on 27 December 2005, he was approached by appellant and told about a
plan to arrest Tan, an alleged drug pusher in Tanza, Cavite. At around 7:00 a.m. on 28 December 2005, Torrente received
a text message from appellant asking him to proceed to the Shell Gas Station along Coastal Road in Imus, Cavite. Thereat,
Torrente met appellant, his son, Joy Gonzales, Lt. Capitanea, and nine other people. The group then proceeded to the
Retirees’ Village in Tanza, Cavite to conduct a surveillance of the house of appellant. At around 11:00 a.m., the group left
the village and went to a nearby Mc Donald’s restaurant to have some snacks. After eating, the group went back to the
village and chanced upon Tan who was inside his Ford vehicle. They immediately blocked Tan’s car, forced him and his
son to alight from the vehicle, and boarded them into another vehicle. Torrente then went back to the gas station to get his
motorcycle and proceeded to his house. On 31 December 2005, Torrente received a call from appellant informing him that
Tan would soon be released as negotiations were ongoing. Torrente admitted that he called Haitao and asked for a
meeting. When Torrente sensed the presence of policemen, he immediately surrendered and voluntarily gave his
statement.

Appellant denied the charges against him and proffered the defense of alibi. Appellant claimed that on 28 December 2005,
at 10:08 a.m., he was at the Land Bank of the Philippines branch in Dasmariñas, Cavite to encash his check. After
encashing his check, appellant went home and stayed there until 8:00 p.m. to attend a party. On 31 December 2005,
Torrente went to his house and together, they conducted a surveillance against drug suspects. On 17 January 2006, he
planned to meet up with Torrente at the Shell Station along Anabu Road in Imus, Cavite. When appellant arrived at the
gas station, two armed men alighted from their vehicles and poked their guns on him. Appellant was then forcibly dragged
into the vehicle. Appellant claimed that he was subjected to physical and mental torture before he was brought to the
PACER office. 6

The branch manager of Land Bank, Mr. Edgar Deligero, corroborated appellant’s alibi. He acknowledged that a check
under appellant’s name was encashed on 28 December 2005 at 10:08 a.m. He noted that based on the bank’s verification
procedure, the signature of appellant is valid and an identification document was presented by the appellant. Hence, the
bank manager confirmed that it was indeed appellant who personally encashed the check. 7

Appellant’s daughter corroborated appellant’s statement that he was tortured. Jocelyn Gonzales witnessed his father’s
condition while the latter was detained in the PACER’s office. She also saw a first medical certificate and heard the DOJ
prosecutor order a second medical examination. Dr. Edilberto Antonio confirmed the issuance of two medical certificates
certifying the injuries suffered by appellant.

On 12 July 2006, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay P200,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

Appellant challenged the trial court’s decision affirming his conviction on the ground of alleged discrepancies in the
testimonies and statements of prosecution witnesses. Appellant specifically pointed out the discrepancy in the time of the
commission of the crime. Appellant asserted that based on the statement of Haitao, the kidnapping incident took place at
around 10:30 a.m. while state witness Torrente, claimed that the kidnapping occurred after 11:00 a.m. Furthermore,
appellant insisted that Torrente’s claim that he and appellant were together from 7:30 a.m. up to after 11:00 a.m. on 28
December 2005 is inconsistent with the fact that appellant, as confirmed by the branch manager, was at the Land Bank
branch in Dasmariñas, Cavite at 10:08 a.m. to encash a check. Based on these inconsistencies, appellant maintained that
he should be acquitted. Appellant also argued that the absence of the victim puts in serious doubt the presence of
the corpus delicti.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, recommended that appellant be held guilty of kidnapping for
ransom. The OSG contended that there is no material discrepancy as to time that would tend to create reasonable doubt as
to appellant’s guilt. The OSG stressed that the corpus delicti in this case is the actual confinement, detention and restraint
on the victims. The OSG asserted that the prosecution has proven that the detention of the victims was perpetrated by
appellant, among others.

In a Decision8 dated 12 November 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

The appellate court rejected appellants’ defense of alibi and held that it cannot prevail over the positive identification by
the state witness. The appellate court also dismissed the alleged disparities on the sworn statements and testimonies of
prosecution witnesses as trivial and minor details that do not detract in any way from the main thrust of what the
prosecution witnesses related in court.

On 7 July 2010, this Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective Supplemental Briefs.9 While the OSG
manifested that it is adopting its brief earlier filed before the Court of Appeals, 10 appellant filed his Supplemental
Brief11 reiterating that the inconsistent statements of the prosecution witnesses with respect to the time of the commission
of the crime are so crucial to merit his acquittal. Appellant maintains that he was at the bank at 10:08 a.m. Using this as a
reckoning point, both of the prosecution witnesses’ claim of the time of kidnapping are erroneous. The disparity in the
statements of the prosecution witnesses creates a doubt in the guilt of the accused which, according to appellant, should
work for his acquittal.

The bone of contention in this case is whether the inconsistent statements of prosecution witnesses with regard to the time
of the commission of the crime will exonerate appellant.

In People v. Delfin,12 a case involving simple rape, the Court held that where the inconsistency is not an essential element
of the crime, such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified to. In a case for
illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs,13 the Court ruled that inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony
referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not diminish the witnesses’ credibility. An
inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction. In fact
in People v. Macapanas,14 we added that these inconsistencies bolster the credibility of the witness’s testimony as it erases
the suspicion of the witness having been coached or rehearsed.

The alleged inconsistencies related to the time the kidnapping was committed. The elements of kidnapping for ransom
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to
deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is
extorting ransom for the release of the victim.15 Time is not a material ingredient in the crime of kidnapping. As long as all
these elements were sufficiently established by the prosecution, a conviction for kidnapping is in order.

At any rate, Torrente declared during the cross-examination that he tried to rectify the error with regard to the time, thus:

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS

CONDUCTED BY ATTY. MAPILE:

ATTY. MAPILE:

Q Mr. Witness, you said you talked to the Prosecutor before taking to the witness stand, is it not?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir. He explained to me that if I am telling the truth, sir.

Q And he also explained to you the need of correcting paragraph 5 in your sworn statement, is it not because of a
typographical error?

A Yes, sir.

Q And except for that error, you confirmed everything to be true and accurate on figures and dates especially the time, am
I right?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. MAPILE:
Q And you have nothing, you have no desire subsequent to correct, to make any further correction?

WITNESS:

A I have, sir. With respect to time only.

Q What time are you talking about Mr. Witness?

A When Peter Tan was taken, it could be more or less 10:00 in the morning, sir.

Q Instead of what? What appears in your statement when he was abducted or taken?

A No more, sir. He was abducted more or less 10:00 o’clock in the morning.

Q You had occasion to read how many times your sworn statement before signing it?

A For about five (5) times, sir.

Q Why did you notice for the first time that Number 5, question number 5 and answer number 5 should be corrected?

A For the third time, sir.

ATTY. MAPILE:

Q And when was the time when you also discovered that the abduction was 10:00 o’clock instead of beyond 10:00 o’clock
of December 28, 2005?

WITNESS:

A For the second time, sir.

Q You mean for the second time, the second time that you read your statement?

A Yes, sir.

Q When was that Mr. Witness?

A Before I signed it, sir.

Q Before you signed it, it was stated you did not forget the one who prepared your statement?

A I called the attention of the one who prepared, sir.

Q But what he say?

A According to the Investigator, they changed it already, sir.

Q So you did not sign that purported sworn statement, that sworn statement was already changed?

COURT:

Let us make this clear counsel. As per statement given on January 17 and one January 24.

ATTY. MAPILE:

I’m merely referring to the 17, Your Honor.

COURT:

17.

WITNESS:

A I did not, sir.

ATTY. MAPILE:

Q You did not because you pointed out the mistake?

A Yes, sir.

Q When you refused to sign because you disclosed to get the error, did the Investigator changed your statement?

A Yes, sir.

PROSE. PARICO:

Your Honor, the witness answered earlier "Binago Na Po", that was his statement, Your Honor.

WITNESS:

A The sworn statement is the same, sir.

ATTY. MAPILE:

Q In short, they did not correct the error that you pointed out?

A No, sir. I did not change it.

Q And despite pointing out the error, they did not change it anymore?

A I do not know the reason, sir. 16

Appellant now seeks to assail the testimony of Torrente as a "last-minute adjustment" which weakens the testimony.

It has been consistently held that discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness’ affidavit and testimony do not
necessarily impair his credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence
of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. What is important is, in the over-all analysis of the case, the trial court’s
findings and conclusions are duly supported by the evidence on record. 17

In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave credit to Torrente’s statement. It is a well-settled rule that factual
findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect especially if affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. The Court shall not supplant its own interpretation of the testimonies for that of the trial judge
since he is in the best position to determine the issue of credibility of witnesses.18

A concomitant issue is whether the corpus delicti was proven despite the non-presentation of the kidnap victims during
trial. Appellant stresses that the corpus delicti was not proven because Tan19 could not be found.

Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime which may be proved by the testimony of the witnesses who saw
it.20 The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an individual has been in any manner
deprived of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. 21

To prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the prosecution to be able to show that (1) a certain fact has been proven —
say, a person has died or a building has been burned; and (2) a particular person is criminally responsible for the act. 22

The fact of kidnapping has been duly proved by Haitao who categorically testified that a kidnapping transpired, to wit:

PROSE. PARICO:

May I manifest, Your Honor, that while the witness is reading intensely the affidavit No. 8, she is continues crying, Your
Honor.

COURT:

Okay, noted the manifestation of the counsel is granted that while witness is reading paragraph No. 8 question and answer
the witness is crying. Noted. Can you interpret in Chinese?

WITNESS:

A And when she went to the Palengke, they were not in the same car. She went ahead and then Peter and the son followed
in another car with Plate No. PTY-955. She called her husband five times and nobody was answering, sir. The husband was
not answering the cellphone, her cellphone and somebody answered a voice, the voice of a male, Filipino voice. The man
said that they arrested Peter, they are from NBI and they arrested him because he has in possession one (1) kilo of shabu,
sir. She said that she cannot believe it. They are just telling lies. She could not believe that Peter Tan is in possession of
shabu and if Peter will be arrested why will be include my son. She said that she has a business in the market doing
glassware and houseware in Tanza, sir.

xxxx
A I called again the cellphone of Peter, sir. She got to talk on Peter at the cellphone and Peter clearly told her in Chinese to
ask them where is the child, a boy and quickly, they cut the cellphone. So when she got to talk to the person on the other
line, they answered if he is Chinese or Filipino and she said she is Chinese and there somebody who speak to her in
Chinese, sir. The Chines[e] told her that his friend gave this Chinese her cellphone number. The Chinese said that they
arrested him because her husband has shabu and had a case, sir. And the Chinese said that they are kidnapping the
husband and they wanted for ransom and the Chinese said that he is not going to help anymore he wants to go home. He
doesn’t want to get involve. He doesn’t want to get anymore and he wants to go home. She asked again, what is really the
case and please don’t get the child, don’t involve the child in this case, in the case of her husband. She said she was asking
the other line where did they bring my husband and what office they brought him to and if she knows the office, she is
going to get a lawyer. Then she asked them to return the child, her son back to her. The Chinese said that Yah, why did you
involve the child and after that switch off the cellphone, sir.23

Torrente, on the other hand, identified appellant as one of the captors.

Article 267 of the RPC provides that the penalty of death shall be imposed if the kidnapping was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom, thus:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any
other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to
kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a
public officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

Pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the penalty is correctly reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

We observe that the lower courts failed to award civil indemnity and moral damages in this case. Civil indemnity is
awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty. 24 On the other hand,
moral damages is warranted. Under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury. There is no doubt that Haitao suffered
physical, mental and emotional trauma over the kidnapping of Tan and her two-year old son.

In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence,25 the following amount of damages should be imposed:

1) Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2) Pl00,000.00 as moral damages; and

3) Pl 00,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded, to earn from
the date of the finality of the Court's Decision until fully paid. 26

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that
appellant SPOl Catalino Gonzales, Jr. is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole, and to pay the family of the kidnap victim Peter Tan the following amounts: (1) Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2)
Pl00,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice