LEGAL OPINION ON NATURALIZATION

“Naturalization another absurd situation of losing citizenship”

I. Introduction

This paper is motivated by the recent landmark case of POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC1 and will
briefly revolve around the complexities of acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship of purported
natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship and reacquiring or retaining them and
aliens who wish to acquire and retain Philippine Citizenship.

Under established international and municipal law there are three ways of acquiring citizenship
these are first by way of Jus sanguinis or by blood or relationship, second by Jus soli or by soil or place of
birth, or by naturalization which is defined as the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
privilege of a natural born citizen.

Conversely naturalization is also a way of losing Philippine Citizenship prior to the enactment of
Republic Act 9225 and even after in the case of those who are not natural born citizens of the Philippines.

Philippine law follows the principle of Jus sanguinis thus the only way an alien citizen could acquire
citizenship is through naturalization with the exception however of those according to the 1935
Constitution: (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

Naturalization may either be direct or derivative. We will focus on acquisition of citizenship

through direct naturalization and its lost according to Commonwealth Act 63 as amended by Republic Act
9225.

In the case of POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC the issue or gist of discussion was whether a
foundling was a natural born Filipino citizen which the court ruled in the affirmative. In the same case the
court touched on the issue of naturalization of Filipino citizens, thus under Commonwealth Act 63 prior
to its amendment when a Filipino is naturalized by a foreign country he loses his Philippine Citizenship
this however is no longer entirely true upon enactment of Republic Act 9225.

Therefore the correct view is as stated by the Supreme Court is that:

“While Section 2 [of RA 9225] declares the general policy that Filipinos who
have become citizens of another country shall be deemed "not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by the phrase "under the conditions of this
Act."

Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs.

Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their

1
G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016
 Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.

Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 for those who have lost the
same by naturalization before the effectivity of RA 9225 -- has no retroactive effect.
A former natural-born Filipino citizen re-acquires his Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.

The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both
categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country,
but the terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and "retain"
for the second group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. x x x

In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed
to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63,
under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost.

As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in
the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship, and
also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship.

In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they
shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship
provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.”2

II. Opinion

The law as it now stands is imperfect and presents an unfair situation where a natural-born citizen
can have dual citizenship and a naturalized citizen has to choose between Philippine citizenship and his
foreign citizenship which for all intents and purpose the only ratio for automatic loss of citizenship prior
to R.A. 9225 was the prohibition against dual allegiance and not dual citizenship.

Thus according to the Supreme Court:

“to begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows

2
David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
 the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.”

“With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides:

Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law.”3

Accordingly having determined that it is dual allegiance that is proscribed by the

Constitution what should rule is the legal maxim of cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex
(the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases)

The love of man for his country is not determined by blood but measured by how
much he helped his fellow citizens in improving and protecting his homeland.

III. Conclusion

When the court is faced with a situation to decide whether a naturalized citizen can have dual
citizenship then the court will have no choice because the law is clear that only natural born citizens can
retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship.

The only solution is appropriate legislation as aptly stated by the Supreme Court:

“To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a

policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the
law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were
not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance.

Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed
since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual
allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of
what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual
allegiance and dual citizenship.

Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we said that the courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what

3
Mercado vs Manzano, G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999
 is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether
the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed
with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. The doctrine of
separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the
parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has
clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for
study and legislation by Congress.”4

4
AASJS vs Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869. May 11, 2007