PROPERTY: USUFRUCT Case Digests
2. That anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the
Article 562
1) Mercedes Moralidad vs. Pernes
G.R. No. 152809, August 3, 2006
Art. 562
FACTS:
At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land located
in Davao City and registered in the name of petitioner Mercedes
Moralidad under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
123125 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City.
In her younger days, petitioner taught
in Davao City, Quezon City and Manila. While teaching in Manila,
she had the good fortune of furthering her studies at
the University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. While schooling, she was
offered to teach at the Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese, which she
did for seven (7) years. Thereafter, she worked at the Mental Health
Department of said University for the next seventeen (17) years.
During those years, she would come home to
the Philippines to spend her two-month summer vacation in her
hometown in Davao City. Being single, she would usually stay in
Mandug, Davao City, in the house of her niece, respondent Arlene
Pernes, a daughter of her younger sister, Rosario.
Back in the U.S.A. sometime in 1986, she received news
from Arlene that Mandug at the outskirts of Davao City was infested
by NPA rebels and many women and children were victims of
crossfire between government troops and the insurgents. Shocked
and saddened about this development, she immediately sent money
to Araceli, Arlenes older sister, with instructions to look for a lot
in Davao City where Arlene and her family could transfer and settle
down. This was why she bought the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. T-123125.
Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the purpose
of letting Arlene move from Mandug to Davao City proper but later
she wanted the property to be also available to any of her kins
wishing to live and settle in Davao City. Petitioner made known this
intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986 which reads:
I, MERCEDES VIA MORALIDAD, of legal age, single,
having been born on the 29th day of January, 1923, now
actually residing at 8021 Lindbergh Boulevard,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., wishes to convey my
honest intention regarding my properties situated at Palm
Village Subdivision, Bajada, Davao City, 9501, and hereby
declare:
1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M.
Pernes may build their house therein and stay as long as
they like;
aforementioned real property should maintain an
atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid
bickering with one another;
3. That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay
therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however,
that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof;
4. That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the
wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to
look for his own;
5. That any proceeds or income derived from the
aforementioned properties shall be allotted to my nearest
kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser
percentage to those who are better of in standing.
Mercedes retired in 1993 and went back to Davao City and
lived with the Pernes on the property denominated as Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-123125. In the course of time,
their relations turned sour because members of the Pernes family
were impervious to her suggestions and attempts to change certain
practices concerning matters of health and sanitation within their
compound.
Then, on August 3, 1998, petitioner filed with the MTCC of
Davao City an unlawful detainer suit against the respondent
spouses. Petitioner alleged that she is the registered owner of the
land on which the respondents built their house; that through her
counsel, she sent the respondent spouses a letter demanding them
to vacate the premises and to pay rentals therefor, which the
respondents refused to heed.
In their defense, the respondents alleged having entered
the property in question, building their house thereon and maintaining
the same as their residence with petitioners full knowledge and
express consent. To prove their point, they invited attention to her
written declaration of July 21, 1986, supra, wherein she expressly
signified her desire for the spouses to build their house on her
property and stay thereat for as long as they like.
Ruling of the MTCC
The MTCC, resolving the ejectment suit in petitioners favor,
declared that the respondent spouses, although builders in good
faith vis--vis the house they built on her property, cannot invoke
their bona fides as a valid excuse for not complying with the demand
to vacate. To the MTCC, respondents continued possession of the
premises turned unlawful upon their receipt of the demand to vacate,
such possession being merely at petitioners tolerance, and sans any
rental.
Ruling of the RTC
 The RTC reversed that of the MTCC, holding that
respondents possession of the property in question was not, as ruled
by the latter court, by mere tolerance of the petitioner but rather by
her express consent.
Ruling of the CA
The CA further ruled that what governs the rights of the
parties is the law on usufruct but petitioner failed to establish that
respondents right to possess had already ceased. On this premise,
the CA concluded that the ejectment suit instituted by the
petitioner was premature. The appellate court thus affirmed the
appealed RTC decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not article 562 is applicable under the facts of
the case.
RULING:
1. YES, article 562 is applicable under the facts of the case.
Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in
the following wise:
ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to
enjoy the property of another with the obligation
of preserving its form and substance, unless the
title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy
anothers property.[9] It is also defined as the right to enjoy the
property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and
the jus fruendi,[10] with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the
power to alienate the same.
IN THE CASE AT BAR, It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document
dated July 21, 1986, supra, made known her intention to give
respondents and her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the
fruits of her property. There can also be no quibbling about the
respondents being given the right to build their own house on the
property and to stay thereat as long as they like. Paragraph #5 of the
same document earmarks proceeds or income derived from the
aforementioned properties for the petitioners nearest kins who have
less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who
are better of (sic) in standing. The established facts undoubtedly
gave respondents not only the right to use the property but also
granted them, among the petitioners other kins, the right to enjoy
the fruits thereof. We have no quarrel, therefore, with the CAs ruling
that usufruct was constituted between petitioner and respondents. It
is thus pointless to discuss why there was no lease contract between
the parties.
THEREFORE, article 562 is applicable under the facts of the
case.
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
__
Article 565
1) NHA v CA
G.R. No. 148830. April 13, 2005]
Art. 565
FACTS:
On 24 October 1968, Proclamation No. 481 issued by then
President Ferdinand Marcos set aside a 120-hectare portion of land
in Quezon City owned by the NHA[4] as reserved property for the site
of the National Government Center (NGC). On 19 September 1977,
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1670, which removed a
seven-hectare portion from the coverage of the NGC. Proclamation
No. 1670 gave Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. (MSBF)
usufructuary rights over this segregated portion, as follows:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me by the Constitution and the
laws of the Philippines, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of
Proclamation No. 481, dated October 24, 1968, which established
the National Government Center Site, certain parcels of land
embraced therein and reserving the same for the Manila Seedling
Bank Foundation, Inc., for use in its operation and
projects, subject to private rights if any there be, and to future
survey, under the administration of the Foundation.
This parcel of land, which shall embrace 7 hectares, shall be
determined by the future survey based on the technical
descriptions found in Proclamation No. 481, and most
particularly on the original survey of the area, dated July 1910 to
June 1911, and on the subdivision survey dated April 19-25,
1968.
MSBF occupied the area granted by Proclamation No. 1670.
Over the years, MSBFs occupancy exceeded the seven-hectare area
subject to its usufructuary rights. By 1987, MSBF occupied
approximately 16 hectares. By then the land occupied by MSBF was
bounded by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to the west,
Agham Road to the east, Quezon Avenue to the south and a creek to
the north.
On 18 August 1987, MSBF leased a portion of the area it
occupied to BGC and other stallholders. BGC leased the portion
facing EDSA, which occupies 4,590 square meters of the 16-hectare
area.
On 11 November 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued
Memorandum Order No. 127 (MO 127) which revoked the reserved
status of the 50 hectares, more or less, remaining out of the 120
hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of the National
Government Center. MO 127 also authorized the NHA to
commercialize the area and to sell it to the public.
On 15 August 1988, acting on the power granted under MO
127, the NHA gave BGC ten days to vacate its occupied area. Any
structure left behind after the expiration of the ten-day period will be
demolished by NHA.
BGC then filed a complaint for injunction on 21 April 1988 before
the trial court. On 26 May 1988, BGC amended its complaint to
include MSBF as its co-plaintiff.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court agreed with BGC and MSBF that Proclamation
No. 1670 gave MSBF the right to conduct the survey, which would
establish the seven-hectare area covered by MSBFs usufructuary
rights. However, the trial court held that MSBF failed to act
seasonably on this right to conduct the survey. The trial court ruled
that the previous surveys conducted by MSBF covered 16 hectares,
and were thus inappropriate to determine the seven-hectare area.
The trial court concluded that to allow MSBF to determine the seven-
hectare area now would be grossly unfair to the grantor of the
usufruct.
The Appellate Courts Ruling
Initially, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that
Proclamation No. 1670 granted MSBF the right to determine the
location of the seven-hectare area covered by its usufructuary rights.
However, the appellate court ruled that MSBF did in fact assert this
right by conducting two surveys and erecting its main structures in
the area of its choice.On 30 March 2001, the appellate court
reversed the trial courts ruling.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Article 565 is applicable under the facts of
the case;
2. Whether or not a usufructuary may lease his usufructuary
rights to another;
3. What are the other rights of the usufructuary under the law
on usufructs in relation to article 565?
RULING:
1. YES, Article 565 is applicable under the facts of the case.
Article 565 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 565. The rights and obligations of the usufructuary
shall be those provided in the title constituting the usufruct;
in default of such title, or in case it is deficient, the
provisions contained in the two following Chapters shall be
observed.
In the present case, Proclamation No. 1670 is the title
constituting the usufruct. Proclamation No. 1670 categorically
states that the seven-hectare area shall be determined by future
survey under the administration of the Foundation subject to private
rights if there be any. The appellate court and the trial court agree
that MSBF has the latitude to determine the location of its seven-
hectare usufruct portion within the 16-hectare area. The appellate
court and the trial court disagree, however, whether MSBF
seasonably exercised this right.
It is clear that MSBF conducted at least two surveys.
Although both surveys covered a total of 16 hectares, the second
survey specifically indicated a seven-hectare area shaded in
yellow. MSBF made the first survey in 1984 and the second in
1986, way before the present controversy started. MSBF
conducted the two surveys before the lease to BGC. The trial court
ruled that MSBF did not act seasonably in exercising its right to
conduct the survey. Confronted with evidence that MSBF did in fact
conduct two surveys, the trial court dismissed the two surveys as
self-serving. This is clearly an error on the part of the trial court.
Proclamation No. 1670 authorized MSBF to determine the location
of the seven-hectare area. This authority, coupled with the fact that
Proclamation No. 1670 did not state the location of the seven-
hectare area, leaves no room for doubt that Proclamation No. 1670
left it to MSBF to choose the location of the seven-hectare area
under its usufruct.
More evidence supports MSBFs stand on the location of
the seven-hectare area. The main structures of MSBF are found in
the area indicated by MSBFs survey. These structures are the
main office, the three green houses, the warehouse and the
composting area. On the other hand, the NHAs delineation of the
seven-hectare area would cover only the four hardening bays and
the display area. It is easy to distinguish between these two groups
of structures. The first group covers buildings and facilities that
MSBF needs for its operations. MSBF built these structures before
the present controversy started. The second group covers facilities
less essential to MSBFs existence. This distinction is decisive as to
which survey should prevail. It is clear that the MSBF intended to
use the yellow-shaded area primarily because it erected its main
structures there.
THEREFORE, Article 565 is applicable under the facts of
the case.
2. YES, a usufructuary may lease his usufructuary rights to
another.
A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and
under such conditions as the parties may deem convenient subject to
the legal provisions on usufruct.[9] A usufructuary may lease the
object held in usufruct.[10] Thus, the NHA may not evict BGC if the
4,590 square meter portion MSBF leased to BGC is within the seven-
hectare area held in usufruct by MSBF. The owner of the property
must respect the lease entered into by the usufructuary so long as
the usufruct exists.[11] However, the NHA has the right to evict BGC if
BGC occupied a portion outside of the seven-hectare area covered
by MSBFs usufructuary rights.
3. Art. 601, 605.
A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owners interests.
One such duty is found in Article 601 of the Civil Code
which states:
ART. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the
owner of any act of a third person, of which he may have
knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of
ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do so, for
damages, as if they had been caused through his own
fault.
A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another
with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the
title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.[22] This controversy
would not have arisen had MSBF respected the limit of the beneficial
use given to it. MSBFs encroachment of its benefactors property
gave birth to the confusion that attended this case. To put this matter
entirely to rest, it is not enough to remind the NHA to respect MSBFs
choice of the location of its seven-hectare area. MSBF, for its part,
must vacate the area that is not part of its usufruct. MSBFs rights
begin and end within the seven-hectare portion of its usufruct. This
Court agrees with the trial court that MSBF has abused the privilege
given it under Proclamation No. 1670. The direct corollary of
enforcing MSBFs rights within the seven-hectare area is the negation
of any of MSBFs acts beyond it.
The seven-hectare portion of MSBF is no longer easily
determinable considering the varied structures erected within and
surrounding the area. Both parties advance different reasons why
their own surveys should be preferred. At this point, the
determination of the seven-hectare portion cannot be made to rely on
a choice between the NHAs and MSBFs survey. There is a need for
a new survey, one conducted jointly by the NHA and MSBF, to
remove all doubts on the exact location of the seven-hectare area
and thus avoid future controversies. This new survey should consider
existing structures of MSBF. It should as much as possible include all
of the facilities of MSBF within the seven-hectare portion without
sacrificing contiguity.
A final point. Article 605 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town,
corporation, or association for more than fifty years. If it has
been constituted, and before the expiration of such period the town is
abandoned, or the corporation or association is dissolved, the
usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof. (Emphasis added)
The law clearly limits any usufruct constituted in favor of a
corporation or association to 50 years. A usufruct is meant only as a
lifetime grant. Unlike a natural person, a corporation or associations
lifetime may be extended indefinitely. The usufruct would then be
perpetual. This is especially invidious (difficult) in cases where the
usufruct given to a corporation or association covers public land.
Proclamation No. 1670 was issued 19 September 1977, or 28 years
ago. Hence, under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has 22
years left.
MO 127 released approximately 50 hectares of the NHA
property as reserved site for the National Government Center.
However, MO 127 does not affect MSBFs seven-hectare area since
under Proclamation No. 1670, MSBFs seven-hectare area was
already exclude[d] from the operation of Proclamation No. 481, dated
October 24, 1968, which established the National Government
Center Site.
THEREFORE, Art. 601, 605 are the other rights of the
usufructuary under the law on usufructs in relation to article 565.
2) MERIDA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 158182, June 12, 2008
Art. 565
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of
Romblon, Romblon, (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended, for cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]
a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang,
Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M.
Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.[6]
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December
1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the
Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo
(Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. Royo summoned petitioner to a
meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about
the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed
that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who,
according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco
in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to
Royo Calixs written authorization signed by Calixs wife.[8]
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting
to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon.
When Hernandez confronted petitioner about the felled tree,
petitioner reiterated his earlier claim to Royo that he cut the tree with
Calixs permission. Hernandez ordered petitioner not to convert the
felled tree trunk into lumber.
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that
petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with
other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod
Property and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller
pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the lumber,[9] deposited
them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt
to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod
Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an investigation on the
matter.[10]
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial Prosecutor) charging
petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. During
the preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit
reiterating his claim that he cut the narra tree with Calixs permission.
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses
including Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez who testified on the
events leading to the discovery of and investigation on the tree-
cutting. Petitioner testified as the lone defense witness and claimed,
for the first time, that he had no part in the tree-cutting.
The Ruling of the RTC:
The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. The trial court
dismissed petitioners defense of denial in view of his repeated
extrajudicial admissions that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod
Property with Calixs permission. With this finding and petitioners lack
of DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court held petitioner liable for
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling but
ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the governments
favor.[13] The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding that
petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra
tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Article 565 is applicable to the facts of this
case.
RULING:
1. YES, Article is applicable to the facts of this case.
Article 565 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 565. The rights and obligations of the usufructuary
shall be those provided in the title constituting the usufruct;
in default of such title, or in case it is deficient, the
provisions contained in the two following Chapters shall be
observed.
IN THE CASE AT BAR, petitioner admitted to the punong
barangay Royo that he cut the narra tree upon the permission of
Vicar Calix, who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property
from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale.
Petitioner showed to Royo Calix’s written authorization signed by
Calixs wife. When Hernandez (DENR Official) confronted petitioner
about the felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier claim to Royo
that he cut the tree with Calixs permission. When required to submit
a counter-affidavit to the Prosecutor, petitioner submitted a counter-
affidavit reiterating his claim that he cut the narra tree with
Calixs permission. The CA even ruled that petitioner is bound by his
extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod
Property without any DENR permit. This ruling by the CA was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. All told, it is the pacto de retro sale
that constitutes the title of the usufructuary rights of petitioner from
Vicar Calix, who bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in
October 1987.
THEREFORE, Article is applicable to the facts of this case.
3) SEPULVEDA SR v PELAEZ
G.R. No. 152195. January 31, 2005
Art. 565
FACTS:
On December 6, 1972, private respondent Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed
a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, for the:
a. recovery of possession and ownership of his one-half (1/2)
undivided share of several parcels of land covered by Tax
Declaration (T.D.) Nos. 28199, 18197, 18193 and 28316;
b. his undivided one-third (1/3) share in several other lots
covered by nine T.D. Nos. 28304, 35090, 18228, 28310,
26308, 28714, 28311, 28312 and 28299 (all located in
Danao, Cebu);
c. and for the partition thereof among the co-owners.
The eleven (11) lots were among the twenty-five (25) parcels of
land which Atty. Pelaez’s mother, Dulce Sepulveda, inherited from
her grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda under the Project of
Partition[2] dated April 16, 1937 submitted by Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as
the administrator of the formers estate, duly approved by the then
CFI of Cebu in Special Proceeding No. 778-0.
Under the said deed, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. appeared to be
the owner of an undivided portion of Lot No. 28199, while his brother
and Dulce’s uncle Santiago Sepulveda, was the undivided owner of
one-half (1/2) of the parcels of land covered by T.D. Nos. 18197,
18193 and 28316. Dulce and her uncles, Pedro and Santiago, were
likewise indicated therein as the co-owners of the eleven other
parcels of land, each with an undivided one-third (1/3) share thereof.
 In his complaint, the Atty Pelaez alleged that his mother
Dulce died intestate on March 2, 1944, and aside from himself, was
survived by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez and her mother Carlota
Sepulveda. Dulce’s grandfather Vicente Sepulveda died intestate on
October 25, 1920, and Dulce was then only about four years old.
According to the Atty Pelaez, his grandmother Carlota
repeatedly demanded the delivery of her mother’s share in the
eleven (11) parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. who by then
was the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, refused to do so. Dulce, likewise,
later demanded the delivery of her share in the eleven parcels of
land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. still refused, claiming that he needed
to continue to possess the property to reap the produce therefrom
which he used for the payment of the realty taxes on the subject
properties. The Atty Pelaez alleged that he himself demanded the
delivery of his mothers share in the subject properties on so many
occasions, the last of which was in 1972, to no avail.
Atty Pelaez further narrated that his granduncle Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr executed an affidavit on November 28, 1961, stating
that he was the sole heir of Dionisia when she died intestate on June
5, 1921, when, in fact, the latter was survived by her three sons,
Santiago, Pedro and Vicente. Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. also executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale on July 24, 1968 over the property covered by
T.D. No. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090) in favor of the City of Danao
for P7,492.00. According to Atty Pelaez, his granduncle received this
amount without his Atty Pelaez’s knowledge.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Article 565 is applicable under the facts of
the case and whether or not there are any other laws which
relates to Article 565.
RULING:
1. YES, Article 565 is applicable under the facts of the case
and Article 996 of the New Civil Code, Article 807 and 834
of the Old Civil Code, and the following jurisprudence are
the other applicable laws which relates to Article 565.
Article 565 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 565. The rights and obligations of the usufructuary
shall be those provided in the title constituting the usufruct;
in default of such title, or in case it is deficient, the
provisions contained in the two following Chapters shall be
observed.
ART. 996. If a widow and widower and legitimate children
or descendants areleft, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the children.
IN THE CASE OF Gamis v. Court of Appeals, 105 Phil. 768
(1959), the Supreme Court held that:
“Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code
the surviving spouse is a forced heir and entitled to a share
in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse equal to
that which by way of legitime corresponds or belongs to
each of the legitimate children or descendants who have
not been bettered or have not received any share in the
one-third share destined for betterment. The right of the
surviving spouse to have a share in usufruct in the estate
of the deceased spouse is provided by law of which such
spouse cannot be deprived and which cannot be ignored.
Of course, the spouse may waive it but the waiver must be
express.”
IN THE CASE AT BAR, it appears that when the private
respondent filed the complaint, his father, Rodolfo Pelaez, was still
alive. Thus, when his mother Dulce Pelaez died intestate on March 2,
1944, she was survived by her husband Rodolfo and their son, the
private respondent. Under Article 996 of the New Civil
Code,[17] Rodolfo Pelaez, as surviving spouse, is entitled to a portion
in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of
the legitimate children who has not received any betterment. The
rights of the usufructuary are provided in Articles 471 to 490 of the
old Civil Code.
THEREFORE, Article 565 is applicable under the facts of
the case and Article 996 of the New Civil Code, Article 807 and 834
of the Old Civil Code, and the following jurisprudence are the other
applicable laws which relates to Article 565.
4) OPOSA v FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
Article 565
FACTS:
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was
filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region.
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all
minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges
that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."
The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn."
CAUSE OF ACTION
Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16)
million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more
than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of
the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of
virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land
mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have
granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations
to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.
12. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their
successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this
rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the
benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a Timber License Agreement is a form of
“title constituting the usufruct” contemplated by Article 565
in relation to Article 562
RULING:
1. YES, a Timber License Agreement is a form of “title
constituting the usufruct” contemplated by Article 565 in
relation to Article 562.
Article 562 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of
another with the obligation of preserving of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the
law otherwise provides.
Article 565 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 565. The rights and obligations of the usufructuary
shall be those provided in the title constituting the usufruct;
in default of such title, or in case it is deficient, the
provisions contained in the two following Chapters shall be
observed.
Furthermore, IN THE CASE OF “Republic v Tuvera G.R.
No. 148246”, the Supreme Court held A timber license agreement
authorizes a person to utilize forest resources within any forest land
with the right of possession and exclusion of others.
In the same case, the Supreme Court further held that the
rationale underlying the very elaborate procedure that entails prior to
the grant of a timber license agreement is to avert the haphazard
exploitation of the State's forest resources as it provides that only the
most qualified applicants will be allowed to engage in timber activities
within the strict limitations of the grant and that cleared forest areas
will have to be renewed through reforestation. Since timber is not a
readily renewable natural resource, it is essential and appropriate
that the State serve and act as a jealous and zealous guardian of our
forest lands, with the layers of bureaucracy that encumber the grant
of timber license agreements effectively serving as a defensive wall
against the thoughtless ravage of our forest resources.
IN THE CASE AT BAR, Timber License Agreements
clearly grants title to the holders of thereof the right to enjoy and use
the forests within the forest lands, a state property, by means of
cutting the same and dispose it to the market for profit. The TLA also
obligates its holders to renew the “cleared forests” by means of
reforestation. Renewal, in this case, is equivalent to restoration of
“cleared forests”, it can be inferred therefore that renewal and
restoration is equal to preservation as contemplated by Article 562 in
relation to Article 565.
THEREFORE, a Timber License Agreement is a form of
“title constituting the usufruct” contemplated by Article 565 in relation
to Article 562.
5) REPUBLIC v TUVERA
G.R. No. 148246, February 16, 2007
Article 565
FACTS:
Twin Peaks Development Corporation (Twin Peaks) was
organized on 5 March 1984 as a corporation with a principal purpose
of engaging in the real estate business. There were five incorporating
stockholders, including respondent Victor Tuvera (Victor)[1] who
owned 48% of the shares of the fledgling corporation. Victor was the
son of respondent Juan Tuvera, who was then Presidential Executive
Assistant of President Marcos.
Acting on a letter dated 31 May 1984 of Twin Peaks Vice-
President and Treasurer Evelyn Fontanilla in behalf of the
corporation, President Marcos granted the award of a Timber
License Agreement (TLA), more specifically TLA No. 356, in favor of
Twin Peaks to operate on 26,000 hectares of forest land with an
annual allowable cut of 60,000 cubic meters of timber and to export
10,000 cubic meters of mahogany of the narra species.[2] As a
result, Twin Peaks was able to engage in logging operations.
The TLA issued to Twin Peaks was established as illegal
because it did not follow the normal public bidding processes and
other procedures required by the Forestry Reform Code. In the same
vein, at the time the TLA was issued, laws prohibiting the exportation
of mahogany of the narra species were already in place.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not an illegally obtained Timber License
Agreements operates as a valid “title constituting the
usufruct” as contemplated in Article 565 thereby creating a
valid rights and obligations of the usufructuary under the
same article.
RULING:
1. NO, an illegally obtained Timber License Agreements
cannot operate as a valid “title constituting the usufruct” as
contemplated by Article 565 thereby creating a valid rights
and obligations of the usufructuary under the same article.
Section 24 of Forestry Administration Order No. 11 does
admit that a timber license agreement may be granted
through negotiation, as well as through public bidding.
26. When license may be issued.A license under this
Regulations may be issued or granted only after an
application and an award either through bidding or by
negotiation has been made and the Director of Forestry is
satisfied that the issuance of such license shall not be
inconsistent with existing laws and regulations or
prejudicial to public interest, and that the necessary license
fee, bond deposit and other requirements of the Bureau of
Forestry have been paid and complied with.
IN THE CASE AT BAR, Fortunato S. Arcangel, Regional
Technical Director III of the DENR testified that he is a Technical
Director under the Forest Management Services of the DENR. ] He
identified Forestry Administration Order (FAO) No. 11 dated 1
September 1970. He said he was aware of TLA No. 356 of Twin
Peaks[] because at the time it was issued, he was the chief of the
Forestry Second Division and his duties included the evaluation and
processing of applications for licenses and permits for the disposition
and distribution of timber and other forest
products.[36] Consequently,he was aware of the process by which
TLA No. 356 was issued to Twin Peaks.[37] According to him, they
processed the application insofar as they evaluated the location of
the area concerned and its present vegetative state, examined the
records, and determined the annual allowable land. After the
examination, the license agreement was prepared and submitted for
approval.[38] He continued that under FAO No. 11, a public bidding is
required before any license agreement or permit for the utilization of
timber within the forestry land is issued[39] but no public bidding was
conducted for TLA No. 356.[40] He explained that no such bidding was
conducted because of a Presidential Instruction not to accept any
application for timber licensing as a consequence of which bidding
procedures were stopped.
THEREFORE, an illegally obtained Timber License
Agreements cannot operate as a valid “title constituting the usufruct”
as contemplated by Article 565 thereby creating a valid rights and
obligations of the usufructuary under the same article.
Article 566
OROZCO v ARANTE
G.R. No. L-3691, November 21, 1951
Article 566
FACTS:
Eugenio del Saz Orozco died on February 7, 1922, leaving a will
which he had executed on March 5, 1921, and was afterwards duly
admitted to probate. The pertinent clause of that will provided that
certain properties should be given in life usufruct to his son Jacinto
del Saz Orozco y Mortera, with the obligation on his part to preserve
said properties in favor of the other heirs who were declared the
naked owners thereof. Among these properties were 5,714 shares of
stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, according to the
project of partition executed pursuant to said will and duly approved
by the court.
On September 11, 1934, the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company
declared and distributed stock dividends out of its surplus profits, the
plaintiff receiving his proportionate portion of 11,428 shares. On
November 17, 1939, said Mining Company again declared stock
dividends out of its surplus profits, of which the plaintiff received
17,142 shares, making a total of 28,570 shares.
The question at this issue is whether the stock dividend is part of the
capital which should be preserved in favor of the owners or an
income of fruits of the capital which should be given to and enjoyed
by the life usufructuary, the plaintiff herein, as his own exclusive
property.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Jacinto Del Saz Orozco, as
usufructuary of the 28,570 shares of stocks entrusted to
 him by his late father Eugenio del Saz Orozco, is entitled to
the dividends of the 28,570 shares of stocks.
RULING:
1. YES, Jacinto Del Saz Orozco, as usufructuary of the 5,714
shares of stocks entrusted to him by his late father Eugenio
del Saz Orozco, is entitled to the dividends of 28,570
shares of stocks derived from the 5,714 original shares of
stocks.
IN THE CASE OF “In the Matter of the Testate Estate of
Emil Maurice Bachrach”, * G.R. No. L-2659, the Supreme
Court held that:
“that a dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is
income and, consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking into
consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can be
declared only out of profits of the corporation, for it were declared out
of the capital it would be a serious violation of the law.”
IN THE CASE AT BAR, the Supreme Court declared that
the stock dividends amounting to 28,570 shares, above mentioned,
belongs to the plaintiff-appellant Jacinto del Saz Orozco y Mortera
exclusively and in absolute ownership.
THEREFORE, Jacinto Del Saz Orozco, as usufructuary of
the 5,714 shares of stocks entrusted to him by his late father Eugenio
del Saz Orozco, is entitled to the dividends of 28,570 shares of
stocks derived from the 5,714 original shares of stocks.
HERMEDES v CA
G.R. No. 107132. October 8, 1999
Article 581
FACTS:
The instant controversy involves a question of ownership
over an unregistered parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6, with an
area of 21,773 square meters, situated in Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. It
was originally owned by the late Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima
Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes. On March 22, 1947 Jose
Hemedes executed a document entitled Donation Inter Vivos With
Resolutory Conditions[3] whereby he conveyed ownership over the
subject land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third
wife, Justa .
On September 27, 1960, for and in consideration of love and
affection of Justa Kausapin to Maxima Hemedes, Justa executed a
Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by
Reversion[4] conveying ownership of the said property to Maxima
except the possession and enjoyment of the said property which
shall remain vested in me during my lifetime, or widowhood and
which upon my death or remarriage shall also automatically revert to,
and be transferred to my designee, Maxima Hemedes.
Maxima Hemedes, through her counsel, filed an application for
registration and confirmation of title over the subject unregistered
land. Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (0-941) 0-
198[5] was issued in the name of Maxima Hemedes married to Raul
Rodriguez by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna on June 8, 1962, with
the annotation that Justa Kausapin shall have the usufructuary
rights over the parcel of land herein described during her lifetime or
widowhood.
On June 2, 1964, Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul
Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage in favour to R & B
Insurance over the subject property in its favor to serve as security
for a loan which they obtained in the amount of P6,000.00. On
February 22, 1968, R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the loan even after it
became due on August 2, 1964.
Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of
Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin executed a Kasunduan on May
27, 1971 whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson
Enrique D. Hemedes.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the real estate mortgage executed by
Maxima in favour to R&B Insurance and its consequent
extra-judicial foreclosure have prejudiced the usufructuary
rights of Justa as contemplated by Article 581 of the New
Civil Code thereby.
RULING:
1. YES, the real estate mortgage executed by Maxima in
favour to R&B Insurance and its consequent extra-judicial
foreclosure have prejudiced the usufructuary rights Justa
as contemplated by Article 581 of the New Civil Code
thereby.
Article 581 of the New Civil Code provides that:
Art. 581 – the owner of property the usufruct of which is
held by another, may alienate it, but he cannot alter its form
or substance or do anything thereon which may be
prejudicial to the usufructuary.
IN THE CASE AT BAR, the act of Maxima in executing the
real estate mortgage in favour to R&B Insurance as security of
payment in obtaining the loan amount of P6,000.00 is clearly within
the ambit of Article 581 which provides that “xxx...the owner of the
property the usufruct of which is held by another, may alienate
it...xxx”. However, when R&B Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed
the said property by reason of Maxima’s non-payment have already
caused prejudice to the rights of the usufructuary, Justa, because
Justa may no longer possess and enjoy the said property during her
lifetime or widowhood as a condition precedent prior to her execution
of the Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by
Reversion. For it is normal for the creditor that when he extra-
judicially foreclosed the collateral, he would certainly sell the same in
a public auction to satisfy his money claims. The buyers thereof shall
become the new owners. As a new owner, he would naturally
exercise his exclusive rights to his newly acquired property but
because Justa is a possessor in good faith, the new owner would
naturally evict Justa’s possession thereof through court intervention
thus causing Justa to be stripped of whatever legal rights she may
have on the subject property.
THEREFORE, the real estate mortgage executed by
Maxima in favour to R&B Insurance and its consequent extra-judicial
foreclosure has prejudiced the usufructuary rights Justa as
contemplated by Article 581 of the New Civil Code thereby.
LOCSIN v VALENZUELA
G.R. No. L-51333 May 18, 1989
Article 581
FACTS:
Petitioners Ramona R. Locsin, et al (5 others) were co-
owners of a 3,033,048) square meters, more or less, tract of
agricultural land known as "Hacienda Villa Regalado" located in
Barrio Panubigan, Canlaon City, Negros Occidental. The tract of land
was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-494.
A portion of this land, known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 and
consisting of an area of 60.07464 hectares, was subject to the
lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. The bulk of
this lot was cultivated by 17 lessees-tenants who customarily
delivered the rental to Helen Schon.
On 22 October 1972, after the onset of the martial law
administration of former President Marcos, Presidential Decree No.
27 was promulgated, decreeing the "Emancipation of Tenants." The
tract of land owned in common by the petitioners, including the
portion thereof subject to Helen Schon's usufructuary rights, fell
within the scope of "Operation Land Transfer."
In consequence, staff members of the Department of
Agrarian Relations Identified the tenant-tillers of said land, and the
necessary parcellary map sketch was made and submitted to the
Bureau of Lands Office in Dumaguete City. 3
Petitioners through counsel sought the opinion of the DAR
as to who (petitioners or respondent Helen Schon) should be entitled
to receive the rental payments which continued to be made by the
respondent tenants to Helen Schon. The DAR District Officer
rendered an opinion on 30 May 1977 that the rental payments as of
22 October 1972 were properly considered as amortization payments
for the land and as such should pertain to the land- owners and not
to the usufructuary.
On 22 May 1978, petitioners filed against the spouses
Joseph and Helen Schon in the then Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, for collection of rentals plus damages. There
petitioners claimed that since the land subject to Helen Schon's
usufructuary rights was among the parcels of land which collectively
had been declared by the DAR as a land reform area, the rental
payments which the respondent spouses had been collecting from
the tenants really pertained and should be delivered to petitioners,
beginning from 21 October 1972, as constituting or forming part of
the amortization payments for the land to be made by the tenants.
In their answer, spouses Schlon contended that the CFI
has no jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it should be referred to the
Court of Agrarian Reform.
Ruling of the Court of Agrarian Reform
The Agrarian Court ruled that it has no jurisdiction of the
case because the case actually is a dispute between two landowners
— one, the naked owners (Ramona R. Locsin, et al), the other, the
beneficial owner (Helen Schlon) — whose controversy revolves on
who of them should receive the rentals being paid by the tenants or
lessees on the land in question. Consequently, there is as between
the two contending parties, no agrarian dispute which this Court may
take cognizance of.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the case involves a pure question of law
and certified the case to the Supreme Court for the latter's
disposition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the facts of the instant case is cognizable
under Article 581.
RULING:
1. NO, the facts of the instant not case is cognizable under
Article 581.
Article 581 of the New Civil Code provides that:
Art. 581 – the owner of property the usufruct of which is
held by another, may alienate it, but he cannot alter its form
or substance or do anything thereon which may be
prejudicial to the usufructuary.
IN THE CASE AT BAR, the alienation of the 60.07464
hectares was not of the petitioners doing but because of the
Presidential Decree No. 27 issued by then President Ferdinand
Marcos decreeing the "Emancipation of Tenants." The tract of land
owned in common by the petitioners, including the portion thereof
subject to Helen Schon's usufructuary rights, fell within the scope of
"Operation Land Transfer." The 17 lessee-tenants thereof will
become legitimate owners pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer
thus stripping them of their former status as lessee-tenant. As a
natural consequence, they are no longer obligated to customarily
deliver to Helen Schlon the said rentals of the land.
THEREFORE, the facts of the instant not case is
cognizable under Article 581.
ART 581
1) G.R. No. 107132 October 8, 1999
MAXIMA HEMEDES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, DOMINIUM REALTY AND CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, ENRIQUE D. HEMEDES and R & B INSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 108472 October 8, 1999
R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINIUM REALTY AND
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, ENRIQUE D. HEMEDES and
MAXIMA HEMEDES, respondents.
FACTS: The instant controversy involves a question of ownership
over an unregistered parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6 situated in
Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was originally owned by the late Jose
Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes.
Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled "Donation Inter
VivosWithResolutory Conditions" whereby he conveyed ownership
over the subject land, together with all its improvements, in favor of
his third wife, JustaKauapin, subject to the following resolutory
conditions:
(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the
property donated shall revert to any of the children, or their heirs, of
the DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE in a public
document conveying the property to the latter; or
(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE
before her death or remarriage contained in a public instrument as
above provided, the title to the property shall automatically revert to
the legal heirs of the DONOR in common.
Pursuant to the first condition above mentioned, JustaKausapin
executed a "Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by
Reversion" conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property.
Maxima Hemedes, through her counsel, filed an application for
registration and confirmation of title over the subject unregistered
land. An OCT was issued in the name of Maxima Hemedes married
to Raul Rodriguez by the Registry of Deeds with the annotation that
"JustaKausapin shall have the usufructuary rights over the parcel of
land herein described during her lifetime or widowhood."
R & B Insurance claimed that Maxima Hemedes and her husband
Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the subject
property in its favor to serve as security for a loan in the amount of
P6,000.00. R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage
for failure to pay the loan, and the land was sold at a public auction
with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder and a certificate of sale
was issued by the sheriff in its favor. Since Maxima Hemedes failed
to redeem the property within the redemption period, R & B
Insurance executed an Affidavit of Consolidation and a TCT was
issued its name. The annotation of usufruct in favor of JustaKausapin
was maintained in the new title.
Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima
Hemedes, JustaKausapin executed a "Kasunduan" whereby she
transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes,
pursuant to the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed
in her favor by her late husband Jose Hemedes. Subsequently,
Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and
Construction Corporation (Dominium).
Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery,
Inc. who, even before the signing of the contract of lease,
constructed two warehouses made of steel and asbestos costing
about P10,000,000.00 each. Upon learning of Asia Brewery's
constructions upon the subject property, R & B Insurance sent a
letter informing the former of its ownership of the property and of its
right to appropriate the constructions since Asia Brewery is a builder
in bad faith.
On May 8, 1981, Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to
Asia Brewery wherein she asserted that she is the rightful owner of
the subject property and that she has the right to appropriate Asia
Brewery's constructions, to demand its demolition, or to compel Asia
Brewery to purchase the land. In another letter addressed to R & B
Insurance, Maxima Hemedes denied the execution of any real estate
mortgage in favor of the latter.
Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a
complaint with the CFI for the annulment of the TCT issued in favor
of R & B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to Dominium of the
subject property. The complaint alleged that Dominium was the
absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the deed of sale
executed by Enrique D. Hemedes, who in turn obtained ownership of
the land from JustaKausapin, as evidenced by the "Kasunduan".
RTC: In favor of Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes.
CA: Affirmed the decision in toto.
ISSUE: 1. WON the conveyance by JustaKausapinin favor of
Maxima Hemedes transferred ownership over the subject land? –
YES
2. Whether or not the annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of
JustaKausapin upon Maxima Hemedes' OCT imposes upon R & B
Insurance the obligation to investigate the validity of its mortgagor's
title. - No
RULING: 1. Public respondent's finding that the "Deed of
Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property By Reversion" executed
by JustaKausapin in favor of Maxima Hemedes is spurious is not
supported by the factual findings in this case. It is grounded upon the
mere denial of the same by JustaKausapin. A party to a contract
cannot just evade compliance with his contractual obligations by the
simple expedient of denying the execution of such contract.
Moreover, public respondent's reliance upon JustaKausapin's
repudiation of the deed of conveyance is misplaced for there are
strong indications that she is a biased witness. JustaKausapin was
dependent upon Enrique D. Hemedes for financial assistance and
was already 80 years old, suffering from worsening physical
infirmities and completely dependent upon her stepson Enrique D.
Hemedes for support. He could easily have influenced his aging
stepmother to donate the subject property to him.
The CA also erred when it declared the “Deed of Conveyance by
Reversion” in favor of Maxima void for failure to comply with Article
1332 of the Civil Code, which states: When one of the parties is
unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by
him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the
contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained
to the former. In this case, Justa denies knowledge of the deed of
conveyance. Hence, Art. 1332 is inapplicable as it was useless to
determine whether or not Justa was induced to execute the
document by means of fraud when she denies knowledge of
existence in the first place.
Moreover, private respondents have failed to produce clear, strong,
and convincing evidence to overcome the positive value of the "Deed
Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion" — a
notarized document. The mere denial of its execution by the donor
will not suffice for the purpose.
The declarations of real property by Enrique D. Hemedes, his
payment of realty taxes, and his being designated as owner of the
subject property cannot defeat a certificate of title, which is an
absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. With regard to tax
declarations and tax receipts, this Court has held on several
occasions that the same do not by themselves conclusively prove
title to land.
2. R & B Insurance should be considered a mortgagee in good faith
and an innocent purchaser of the land in question. It is a well-
established principle that every person dealing with registered land
may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued and
the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to
determine the condition of the property. An innocent purchaser for
value is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in such property and
pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or
before he has notice of the claim of another person.
The annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of JustaKausapin
upon Maxima Hemedes' OCT dose not impose upon R & B
Insurance the obligation to investigate the validity of its
mortgagor's title. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of
another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance. The usufructuary is entitled to all the natural,
industrial and civil fruits of the property and may personally
enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate his
right of usufruct, even by a gratuitous title, but all the contracts
he may enter into as such usufructuary shall terminate upon the
expiration of the usufruct.
Clearly, only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property is
transferred to the usufructuary. The owner of the property maintains
the jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform,
and even destroy the same. This right is embodied in the Civil Code,
which provides that the owner of property the usufruct of which is
held by another may alienate it, although he cannot alter the
property's form or substance, or do anything which may be prejudicial
to the usufructuary.
There is no doubt that the owner may validly mortgage the property
in favor of a third person and the law provides that, in such a case,
the usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the debt of the
mortgagor, and should the immovable be attached or sold judicially
for the payment of the debt, the owner shall be liable to the
usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof.
Based on the foregoing, the annotation of usufructuary rights in
favor of JustaKausapin is not sufficient cause to require R & B
Insurance to investigate Maxima Hemedes' title, contrary to
public respondent's ruling, for the reason that Maxima
Hemedes' ownership over the property remained unimpaired
despite such encumbrance. R & B Insurance had a right to rely
on the certificate of title and was not in bad faith in accepting
the property as a security for the loan it extended to Maxima
Hemedes.
2) LOCSIN VS VALENZUELA
FACTS: Petitioners Ramona R. Locsin, Teresita R. Guanzon, Celina
R. Sibug, Ma. Lusia R. Perez, Editha R. Ylanan and Ana Marie R.
Benedicto were co-owners of Hacienda Villa Regalado located in
Negros Occidental.
A portion of this land, known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 was subject to the
lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. The bulk of
this lot was cultivated lessees-tenants who customarily delivered the
rental to Helen Schon.
After the onset of the martial law administration, PD 27 was
promulgated decreeing the "Emancipation of Tenants." The tract of
land owned in common by the petitioners, including the portion
thereof subject to Helen Schon'susufructuary rights, fell within the
scope of "Operation Land Transfer." Petitioners through counsel
sought the opinion of the DAR as to who (petitioners or respondent
Helen Schon) should be entitled to receive the rental payments which
continued to be made by the respondent tenants to Helen Schon.
The DAR District Officer rendered an opinion that the rental
payments as of 22 October 1972 (when PD 27 was created) were
properly considered as amortization payments for the land and as
such should pertain to the land- owners and not to the usufructuary.
Civil Case No. 13828, Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
Petitioners filed against the spouses Joseph and Helen Schon for
collection of rentals plus damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction. There petitioners claimed that since the land subject to
Helen Schon'susufructuary rights was among the parcels of land
declared by the DAR as a land reform area pursuant to PD 27, the
rental payments which the respondent spouses had been collecting
should be delivered to petitioners.
Respondents Schon alleged that the CFI was bereft of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case.
CAR Case No. 76, Court of Agrarian Relations
Approximately 5 months after filing their complaint before the Negros
Occidental CFI, petitioners filed a second complaint with the Court of
Agrarian Relations. Petitioners impleaded as co-respondents of the
spouses Schon the tenants who were cultivating the land burdened
with the usufruct of Helen Schon. Petitioners prayed that the
respondent tenants be required to pay to petitioners (rather than to
the spouses Schon) all future rentals beginning with the crop year of
1978 and every year thereafter, until full payment of the amortization
payments computed by the DAR.
Respondents Schon once again asserted lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case, this time on the part of the CAR. The
dispute between petitioners and respondents Schon related to the
continued existence or termination of the usufructuary rights of Helen
Schon, which issue did not constitute an agrarian dispute and
therefore had to be litigated elsewhere, i.e., before the regular courts
of first instance.
The respondent tenants agreed with the Schons that there was no
tenancy relationship existing in respect of the land cultivated by
them, since such land had already been brought within the ambit of
"Operation Land Transfer".
Dismissal of Civil Case No. 13823 and CAR Case No. 76
The Agrarian Court rendered a decision dismissing petitioners'
complaint in CAR. It held that it had no jurisdiction to decide the case
because it is a dispute between two landowners, thus, no agrarian
dispute which it may take cognizance of.
On appeal, the CA ruled that since the only issue presented in the
appeal was whether or not the CAR had jurisdiction to try and decide
CAR Case, the appeal raised "a pure question of law" and certified
the case to the Supreme Court for the latter's disposition.
In Civil Case 13823, the CFI held that it was the Court of Agrarian
Relations that had jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUES: 1. As between the naked owners and the usufructuary, who
should be entitled to the amounts paid by the tenants beginning 21
October 1972? – The naked owners
2. Whether or not the legal character of the payments made by the
tenants beginning 21 October 1972 are amortization payments on
the cost of the land- Yes
HELD: Under PD No. 27, the tenant-farmer became owner of a
family-size farm of five (5) hectares or, if the land was irrigated, three
(3) hectares, and that the tenant-owner had to pay for the cost of the
land within fifteen (15) years by paying fifteen (15) equal annual
amortization payments. Thus, it appears clear that ownership over
lands (like Lot No. 2-C-A-3) subjected to Operation Land Transfer
moved from the registered owner (the old landowner) to the tenants
(the new landowners). The fifteen (15) annual amortizations to be
paid by the tenants-owners were intended to replace the
landholdings which the old landowners gave up in favor of the new
landowners, the tenants-owners.
It follows that in respect of land subjected to Operation Land
Transfer, the tenants-farmers became owners of the land they tilled
as of the effective date of Presidential Decree No. 27, i.e., 21
October 1972.
We believe and so hold that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been
declared part of the land reform area and subjected to Operation
Land Transfer, the payments made on and after 21 October 1972
by the private respondent tenants-farmers constituted
amortization payments on the cost of the land that they were
required to pay under Presidential Decree No. 27. These
payments, therefore, legally pertain to petitioners, the former
landowners as part of the compensation for the dominion over
land of which they were deprived by operation of Presidential
Decree No. 27.
Those payments cannot be characterized as rentals like those which
had been paid to Helen Schon as usufructuary prior to the
promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 and prior to the effectivity
of Operation Land Transfer.
We turn to the question of what rights, if any, were retained by Helen
Schon as a usufructuary, after the effectivity of Presidential Decree
No. 27.
We believe that the usufruct which had therefore existed as a jus in
re aliena in favor of Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by
Presidential Decree No. 27.
To hold, as private respondent Helen Schon apparently urges, that
her usufruct was not extinguished but rather remained impressed
upon the land passing on to the new owners, would obviously defeat
the very purpose of the land reform statute. Presidential Decree No.
27 was enacted to "emancipate" the tenants from the "bondage of
the soil" by giving to tenants-farmers ownership of the land which
they were cultivating upon the assumption that they would work
harder to improve their lot in life if they became landowners rather
than mere tillers of somebody else's land.
This is not to say that respondent Helen Schon lost any and all rights
upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27. In a legal,
technical sense, it may be difficult to hold that Presidential Decree
No. 27 resulted in the lands brought within the scope of Operation
Land Transfer being "expropriated for public use", as this term is
used in Article 609 of the Civil Code, which reads thus:
Art. 609. Should the thing in usufruct be expropriated for public use,
the owner shall be obliged either to replace it with another thing of
the same value and of similar conditions, or to pay the usufructuary
the legal interest on the amount of the indemnity for the whole period
of the usufruct. If the owner chooses the latter alternative, he shall
give security for the payment of the interest.
For it was not the Government or any of its agencies which took over
ownership of the land nor was such land devoted subsequently to
"public use", since ownership was transferred directly from former
landowner to the tenant-tiller as new landowner, for the use and
benefit exclusively of the new landowner. While, however, Article 609
of the Civil Code may not be strictly applicable, we believe that the
situation contemplated in Article 609 is sufficiently close to that which
resulted from application of Presidential Decree No. 27 to the land
here involved. Bearing in mind that refusal to decide an otherwise
unavoidable issue upon the ground of non liquet ("it is not clear") is
not a permissible response by a court where there is no provision of
law clearly and specifically applicable to the facts at hand,4 we
believe that Article 609 should be applied to the present set of facts
by analogy.
It follows that respondent Helen Schon, so long as her rights as
usufructuary persist under the instrument which gave birth to such
rights, would be entitled to a replacement reasonably equivalent to
the land previously burdened with her usufructuary right, or to legal
interest on the amount of the indemnity or cost of the land paid by
private respondent tenants-farmers and the Land Bank. While the
option or choice belongs to petitioners, considering that Helen Schon
had already received part of the purchase price of the land previously
owned by petitioners from private respondent tenants-farmers, and in
the interest of expeditious justice, we consider it the second
alternative that should be given effect. Thus, from the monies that
she actually received from private respondent tenants-farmers on
and after 21 October 1972, respondent Helen Schon is entitled to
retain an amount equivalent to the legal interest on said amounts for
every year that the usufruct would by its own terms have continued to
exist had it not been extinguished by operation of Presidential
Decree No. 27; the balance of such amounts received by her shall be
turned over to petitioners. She is also entitled to the same right in
respect of the balance of the price of the land petitioners presumably
received from the Land Bank.
_______________________________________________________
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ART 597
1) BISLIG BAY LUMBER COMPANY. INC., Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
SURIGAO, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS: Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. is a timber concessionaire of a
portion of public forest located in the provinces of Agusan and
Surigao. With a view to developing and exploiting its concession, the
company constructed at its expense a road from the barrio
Mangagoy into the area of the concession in Surigao, a portion of
which is on a private property of the company. The expenses
incurred by the company in the construction of said road amounted to
P113,370, upon which the provincial assessor of Surigao assessed a
tax in the amount of P669.33. Of this amount, the sum of P595.92
corresponds to the road constructed within the area of the
concession. This was paid under protest. Later, the company filed an
action for its refund in the Court of First Instance of Manila alleging
that the road is not subject to tax.
It is the theory of Appellant (Government of Surigao) that, inasmuch
as the road was constructed by Appellee (Bislig) for its own use and
benefit it is subject to real tax even if it was constructed on a public
land.
On the other hand, Appellee contended that said road is exempt from
real tax because (1) the road belongs to the national government by
right of accession, (2) the road cannot be removed or separated from
the land on which it is constructed and so it is part and parcel of the
public land, and (3) the road was built not only for the use and benefit
of Appellee but also of the public in general.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bislig Bay Lumber Co. is exempt from
real tax. – Yes because it a usufructuary of the road in question
RULING: We are inclined to uphold the theory of Appellee.
In the first place, it cannot be disputed that the ownership of the road
that was constructed by Appellee belongs to the government by right
accession not only because it is inherently incorporated or attached
to the timber land leased to Appellee, but also because upon the
expiration of the concession, said road would ultimately pass to the
national government.
In the second place, while the road was constructed by Appellee
primarily for its use and benefit, the privilege is not exclusive, for,
under the lease contract entered into by the Appellee and the
government and by public in by the general. Thus, under said lease
contract, Appellee cannot prevent the use of portions, of the
concession for homesteading purposes. It is also in duty bound to
allow the free use of forest products within the concession for the
personal use of individuals residing in or within the vicinity of the
land. The government has reserved the right to set aside communal
forest for the use of the inhabitants of the region, and to set forest
reserves for public uses. It can also grant licenses covering any
portion of the territory for the cutting and extraction of timber to be
used in public works, for mining purposes, or for the construction of
railway lines. And, if it so desires, it can provide for logging railroad,
cable ways timber chute os slide, telephone lines, pumping stations
log landings, and other rights of way for the use of forest licensees,
concessionaires, permittees, or other lessees.
In other words, the government has practically reserved the
rights to use the road to promote its varied activities. Since, as
above shown, the road in question cannot be considered as an
improvement which belongs to Appellee, although in part is for
its benefit, it is clear that the same cannot be the subject of
assessment within the meaning of section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 470.
We are not oblivious of the fact that the present assessment was
made by Appellant on the strength of an opinion rendered by the
Secretary of Justice, but we find that the same is predicated on
authorities which are not in point, for they refer to improvements that
belong to the lessee although constructed on lands belonging to the
government. It is well settled that a real tax, being a burden upon
the capital, should be paid by the owner of the land and not by a
usufructuary. Appellee is but a partial usufructuary of the road in
question.
Article 600-same sa 1st case sa Article 581
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Article 609
1) Locsin v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-51333
Petitioners were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural land known
as “Hacienda Villa Regalado.” A portion of this land, Lot No. 2-C-A-3,
was subject to a lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen
Schon. The bulk of this lot was cultivated by the lessees who
customarily delivered the rentals to respondent.
In 1972, PD 27 was enacted, decreasing the “Emancipation of
Tenants.” The tract of land owned in common by the petitioners,
including the portion thereof subject to petitioner’s usufructuary
rights, fell within the scope of the “Operation Land Transfer.”
Petitioners sought the opinion of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) as to who should be entitled to receive the rental payments
which continued to be made by the tenants to respondent. The DAR
District Officer rendered the opinion that the rental payments were
properly considered as amortization payments for the land and as
such should pertain to the landowners and not the usufructuary.
ISSUE: Whether the usufructuary was extinguished by PD 27 and
who, between the naked owner and the usufructuary, should be
entitled to the amounts paid by the tenants beginning 1972.
HELD:
Yes. The usufruct which had therefore existed as a jus in re aliena(A
right in the property of another – encumbrance) in favor of Helen
Schon was effectively extinguished by PD 27.
To hold, as private respondent apparently urges would obviously
defeat the purpose of the land reform statute. PD 27 was enacted to
emancipate the tenants from “bondage of the soil” by giving to the
tenant-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating.
Ownership over the lands subjected to the Operation Land Transfer
moved from the registered owner to the tenants.
The Court holds that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of
the land reform area and subjected to the Operation Land Transfer,
the payments made in 1972 by the tenant-farmers constituted
amortization payments on the cost of the land that they were required
to pay under PD 27. These payments, therefore, legally pertain to the
petitioners as part of the compensation for the dominion over the
land of which they were deprived of by operation of PD 27.
2) BALURAN V. NAVARRO - Usufruct
The manner of terminating the right of usufruct may be stipulated by
the parties such as in this case, the happening of a resolutory
condition.
FACTS:
Baluran and Paraiso (ancestor of Obedencio) entered into a contract
which they called barter, but in fact stipulated that they would only
transfer the material possession of their respective properties to each
other. Thus, Baluran will be allowed to construct a residential house
on the land of Paraiso while Paraiso is entitled to reap the fruits of
the riceland of Baluran. The contract prohibited them from alienating
the properties of the other and contained a stipulation that should the
heirs of Paraiso desire to re-possess the residential lot, Baluran is
obliged to return the lot. Indeed, years after, Obedencio (grandchild
of Paraiso) acquired the ownership of the residential lot from his
mother and demanded that Baluran, who was in possession, vacate.
Baluran now counters that the barter already transferred ownership.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract was a barter or usufruct
RULING:
IT IS USUFRUCT. First, the contract is what the law defines it to be
and not what the parties call it. It is very clear that what the parties
exchanged was not ownership, but merely material possession or the
right to enjoy the thing.
Now, because it is usufruct, the law allows the parties to stipulate the
conditions including the manner of its extinguishment. In this case, it
was subject to a resolutory condition which is in case the heir of
Paraiso (a third party) desires to repossess the property. Upon the
happening of the condition, the contract is extinguished.
Therefore, Baluran must return the land to Obedencia. But since Art.
579 allows the usufructuary to remove improvements he made,
Baluran may remove the house he constructed.
One last point. At the time of this case, the Obedencias were also in
possession of the riceland of Baluran. Although it was not proper to
decide the issue of possession in this case, the Court nevertheless
decided on the matter and order the Obedencias to vacate the
property inasmuch as there was an extinguishment of a reciprocal
obligations and rights.
Article 611
ARTICLE 611 A usufruct constituted in favor of several
persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be
extinguished until death of the last survivor. (521)
1) GIL P. POLICARPIO vs. JOSE V. SALAMAT
In the last will and testament of Damasa Crisostomo, she gave the
naked ownership of a fishpond owned by her to her sister Teodorica
de la Cruz while its usufruct to the 14 children of her cousins Antonio
Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo. Later, Teodorica de la
Cruz, the naked owner, bequeathed in her will all her rights to the
fishpond to Jose V. Salamat.
The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to one Gil P.
Policarpio who used to give them proportionately the usufruct
corresponding to them. However, three of the usufructuaries died,
both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries claimed the
shares corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries in the amount
of P10,714.26. Because of these conflicting claims, the lessee
withheld said amount.
Subsequently, on May 31, 1962, the surviving usufructuaries leased
the fishpond to one Batas Riego de Dios who, and because of the
conflicting claims the said lessee was also constrained to withhold
the corresponding part of the usufruct of the property. So on
November 15, 1962, the two lessees commenced the present
against both the naked owner and surviving usufructuaries.
Defendant Jose V. Salamat avers as special defense that he is the
successor-in-interest of Teodorica de la Cruz and as such he is
entitled to the shares corresponding to the three deceased
usufructuaries inasmuch as the usufruct in their favor was
automatically extinguished by death and became merged with the
naked owner.
The surviving usufructuaries, on the other hand, adhere to the theory
that since the usufructuaries were instituted simultaneously by the
late Damasa Crisostomo, the death of the three usufructuaries did
not extinguish the usufruct, hence, the surviving usufructuaries are
entitled to receive the shares corresponding to the deceased
usufructuaries, the usufruct to continue until the death of the last
usufructuary.
The court declared the defendants entitled to the fruits.
ISSUE: Whether the eleven surviving usufructuaries of the fishpond
in question are the ones entitled to the fruits that would have
corresponded to the three deceased usufructuaries or the naked
owner Jose V. Salamat.
Appellants argue that it is the surviving usufructuaries who are
entitled to receive the shares of the deceased by virtue of Article 611
of the Civil Code which provides "A usufruct constituted in favor of
several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be
extinguished until the death of the last survivor
The well-known Spanish commentators on the counterpart of Article
611 we have copied above which implicitly provides that the share of
a usufructuary who dies in the meantime inures to the benefit of the
surviving usufructuaries.
therefore, appears that the Spanish commentators on the subject are
unanimous that there is accretion among usufructuaries who are
constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of
the usufruct. The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a
last will and testament and the testator makes a contrary provision.
Here there is none. On the contrary, the testatrix constituted the
usufruct in favor of the children of her three cousins with the
particular injunction that they are the only ones to enjoy the same as
long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of
them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones.
These provisions of the will are clear. They do not admit of any other
interpretation.
,
ARTICLE 612 Upon the termination of the usufruct, the thing
in usufruct shall be delivered to the owner, without prejudice to
the right of retention pertaining to the usufructuary or his heirs
for taxes and extraordinary expenses which should be
reimbursed. After the delivery has been made, the security or
mortgage shall be cancelled. (522a)
1) JUANA PICHAYvs. EULALIO QUEROL, ET AL.,
Facts:
The plaintiff, Juan Pichay, in April, 1905, conveyed to
the defendants an undivided one-third interest in twenty- five parcels
of land situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, as payment of a debt of
P1,500 which she owed them. The defendants and appellants claim
that their agreement gaveplaintiff no right of usufruct in the land,
saying that it appears that she only asked for this right and it does
not appear that the defendants gave it to her. On the 10th of August,
1905, the owners of the twenty- five parcels of land made a partition
thereof among themselves, in which the plaintiff took no part, and in
this partition certain specific tracts of land were assigned to the
defendants as the third to which they were entitled by reason of the
conveyance from the plaintiff to them. They have been in possession
of the tracts so assigned to them in partition since the date thereof,
and are now in such possession, and have refused to recognized in
the plaintiff any right of usufruct therein.
Issue:
Whether or not the usufructuary is bound by the partition made by
the owners of the undivided property although he took no part
therein.
Held:
The usufructuary shall be bound by the partition made by the owners
of the undivided property although he took no part in the partition but
the naked owner to whom the part held in usufruct has been alloted
must respect the usufruct. The right of the usufructuary is not
affected by the divisionbut is limited to the fruits of said part alloted to
the co-owner.
2) ANULINA L. VDA. DEBOGACKI vs. HON. SANCHO Y.
INSERTO
FACTS: Maria Emma Luz Bogacki, is the owner of four parcels of
land situated in Iloilo City, over which her mother, herein petitioner
Anulina Ledesma Vda. de Bogacki has a usufruct, covering one-sixth
(1/6) of the share pertaining to the deceased Cesar Bogacki, Jr. Due
to a misundersatnding, Maria Emma Bogacki, left the home for her
mother and the latter took possession of all these properties
exclusively for herself, without sharing with Maria Emma Luz the
rentals she obtained from the said properties. As a consequence,
Maria Emma Luz filed an action for partition with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo against her mother.
The Court ordered the defendant to limit her right of usufruct to one-
sixth (1/6) each of all these portions of the Land.
Since no tangible assets or properties were available to satisfy the
money judgment, the plaintiff therein asked the Court that a levy be
made on the usufructuary rights of the defendant. The defendant
opposed the motion upon the ground that her usufructuary right is
one created by law as a surviving spouse and hence, exempt from
execution for family reasons. The motion was denied on March 25,
1971, 5 and thereafter, the respondent Sheriff set the sale of the
usufruct at public auctionHence, the instant recourse for the
annulment of the order of August 5, 1974, as well as the levy on
execution and the sale at public auction of the petitioner's
usufructuary rights, and to restrain the respondents from
dispossessing her of the said usufruct.
ISSUE: whether or not there was abuse of discretion in the levy and
sale on execution of the petitioner's usufructuary rights and the
issuance of the writ of possession.
HELD: This Court had ruled that the usufruct of a widow may be
transferred, assigned or otherwise disposed of by her as she may
please, like any other hereditary property, and hence, an interest in
real property which can be sold upon execution.
Tthe grounds relied upon by the petitioner in resisting the levy and
sale on execution of her usufructuary rights are devoid of merit.
Thus. the petitioner claimed that her usufruct cannot be alienated for
family reasons pursuant to Article 321 of the Civil Code. This article
of the Civil Code, however, cannot be invoked by the petitioner
because the usufructuary rights mentioned in this article are those
enjoyed by parents over the property of their unemancipated children
under their custody, and not those enjoyed by the petitioner which
are those of a widow, constituted on the property of her late husband
as her share in the estate of the latter
The usufruct herein granted cannot be alienated or transferred to
third persons because it arises from parental authority and is
necessary to enable the parents to carry out their obligations to the
incompetents under their authority. But, upon emancipation of the
child or loss of parental authority, as in the case of the private
respondent who has already attained the age of majority, is married,
and living independently of the petitioner, the usufruct is
extinguished.
3) IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED REV. FATHER TEODORO ARANAS,
RAMONA B. VDA. DE ARANAS, ADELIA B. ARANAS-
FERNANDEZ, HEIRS OF THE LATE RODULFO B.
ARANAS, ETC., ET AL.
vs.
VICENTE B. ARANAS AND HON. LUIS B. MANTA,
FACTS:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic
Church, died. He had executed his Last Will and Testament which
was admitted to probate. In said Last Will and Testament, Fr.
Teodoro Aranas stipulated the following:
A. The return to Aniceto Aranas or his heirs of
all properties acquired by Fr. Aranas from his
brother Aniceto Aranas and ten (10) parcels of
 land described in the Will inherited by the testator may be succeeded by any of the brothers of the administrator as
from his parents. selected by their father, Carmelo Aranas, if still alive or one selected
by his sons if, he, Carmelo, is dead
B. The return to Carmelo Aranas or his heirs of
all properties acquired by Fr. Aranas from his HELD:
brother Carmelo Aranas and ten (10) parcels of
land described in the Will inherited by the testator Yes. It was the sincere intention and desire of the testator
from his parents. to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish
services by allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the
C. The special administration of the remainder testator’s third group of properties until Vicente’s death and/or refusal
of the estate of the testator by Vicente Aranas, a to act as administrator in which case, the administration shall pass to
faithful and serviceable nephew and designating anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons and upon
him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said Carmelo’s death, his sons will have the power to select one among
properties after deducting the expenses for the themselves. Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right
administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result
be given to the Catholic Church for the eternal from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another’s property,
repose of the testator’s soul. Said pertinent with the obligation to return, at the designated time, either the same
provision reads as follows: thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy
the fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual
Fourth. It is my will that the lands I as there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal. Likewise his
had bought from other persons should designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his
be converged and placed under a refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art. 870
“special administrator.” The special of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted that
administrator of these lands, for his Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other
office, should receive one half of all the benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the naked owners (the
produce from which shall be deducted other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of which has been given to
the expenses for the administration, Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership
and the other half of the produce without prejudice of course to Vicente’s continuing usufruct.
should be received by the Roman
Catholic Church and should be spent
for my soul, Vicente B. Aranas
(Tingting), because he is a faithful and
serviceable nephew, should be the first Note: Article 603 case: Chingen vs Arguelles NOT FOUND. 
special administrator of said properties,
without bond, until his death or until he
should not want to hold the said office
anymore. Anyone of the sons of my
brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the
said office of special administrator, and
none other than they. Their father, my
brother Carmelo Aranas shall be the
one to decide who among them shall
hold the said office, but upon the death
of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his
said sons will have power to select the
one among them ourselves. The
special administration is perpetual.

ISSUE:

whether or not the properties under Group C of the testate

estate of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas are subject to remunerative
legacies by way of usufruct of the net proceeds of 1/2 of the estate
after deducting expenses for administration in favor of Vicente
Aranas, during his lifetime and shall continue an administrator of the
estate, and, who, upon his death or refusal to continue such usufruct,