PEOPLE v.
JAURIGUE wound about 41/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal *upon his death,
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was
acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide
That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased
Amado Capiña. Amado was courting Avelina to no avail about one month before
that fatal night, Amado Capiña snatched a handkerchief belonging to her,
bearing her nickname "Aveling,: while it was being washed by her cousin, Josefa
Tapay.
Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached her and spoke
to her of his love, which she refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and
kissed her and touched her breast, on account of which Avelina, a resolute and
quick- tempered girl, slapped Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him. She
kept the matter to herself, until the following morning when she informed her
mother about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife, whenever
she went out, evidently for self-protection.
One night Amado climbed up the house of the defendant and appellant and
entered the room of Avelina and he felt her forehead, w/ the intention of
abusing her. She screamed for help and awakened her parents and Amado came
out of hiding and apologized. The following morning, Nicolas Jaurigue sent for
barrio lieutenant Lozada and for Amado’s parents who apologized
SAME DAY
Avelina received information that Amado had been falsely boasting in the
neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person and that she had even
asked him to elope with her and that if he should not marry her, she would take
poison; and that Avelina again received information of Amado's bragging at
about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day.
CHURCH EPISODE SAME DAY
Nicolas Jurigue went to the chapel of the seventh day Adventist of the same day.
Lt. Casimiro Lozada was also there. The chapel was bright. In the chapel, upon
seeing Avelina in the church, Amado went to the bench of Avelina and placed
his hand on the upper part of her right thigh
On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capiña,
Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with
her right hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B, which she had in a pocket of her
dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized
Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and
stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a
Her father asked her why she did that and she said "Father, I could not endure
anymore."
A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a
virtuous woman represents the only true nobility. And they are the future wives
and mothers of the land Such are the reasons why, in the defense of their honor,
when brutally attacked, women are permitted to make use of all reasonable
means available within their reach, under the circumstances. Criminologists and
courts of justice have entertained and upheld this view.
In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the
legitimate defense of our own person, we have the right to property acquired by
us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of our patrimony.
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing
her aggressor, in the defense of her honor.
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial
court in this case, when the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant
on the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on
the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was
lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of
them, inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and
other dignitaries of the organization; and under the circumstances, there was
and there could be no possibility of her being raped. And when she gave Amado
Capiña a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a
mortal wound 41/2 inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the
means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive;
and under the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally
declared completely exempt from criminal liability
But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and
unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting
having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to
her house shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said
barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities (United States vs. Fortaleza, 12
Phil., 472); and the further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication
of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon such
provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason
and self-control, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favour
Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the
deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand with her knife, as
shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single wound. And this is
another mitigating circumstance which should be considered in her favour the
further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense
committed against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to
produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control,
should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favour

She commited the crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance

whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified
character to be considered in her favor; and, in accordance with the provisions
of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction by one or
two degrees in the penalty to be imposed upon her. And considering the
circumstances of the instant case, the defendant and appellant should be
accorded the most liberal consideration possible under the law

The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide;
and if it should be reduced by two degrees, the penalty to be imposed in the
instant ase is that of prision correccional; and pursuant to the provisions of
section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein defendant and appellant should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its
medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium degree. Consequently,
with the modi􀀾cation of the judgment appealed from, defendant and appellant
Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four
months, and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amado
Capiña, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given the bene􀀾t of
1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked Exhibit B ordered
confiscated. So ordered.
PEOPLE v. NARVAEZ (def. of property, no unlawful agression against person)
At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of
his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on.
If the fencing would go on, appellant would be prevented from getting into his
house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the group, saying -'Pare, if
possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over - what
is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The
deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.'
Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer,
hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing
there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him. It
appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal
battle between the Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased Fleischer was the
secretarytreasurer and deceased Rubia the assistant manager, on the one hand,
and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was appellant.
Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went
to Mindanao in 1937 and settled He established his residence therein, built his
house, cultivated the area, and was among those who petitioned then President
Manuel L. Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and
nearby Kalaong Plantation totalling about 2,000 hectares, for distribution
among the settlers Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an
American landowner in Negros Oriental, filed sales application No. 21983 on
June 3, 1937 over the same area formerly leased and later abandoned by
Celebes Plantation Company, covering 1,017.2234 hectares.
Their area was up for sale. There was an amicable settlement that was
repudiated by the settlers but it was still sold to the company. There was an
ouster of settlers.
Appellant signed a contract w/ the company. According to him, he
signed the contract although the ownership of the land was still uncertain, in
order to avoid trouble, until the question of ownership could be decided. He
never paid the agreed rental, although he alleges that the milling job they did for
Rubia was considered payment the deceased gave him a letter informing him
that he had not paid six mos rental to feischers and co. and he was to be
terminated. He is given 6 mos to remove his house, ricemill, bodega and water
pitcher pumps from the land of Fleischer. August 21, fence were put around the
said property.
He claims self defense re: two deceased
According to appellant, Fleischer's remarks caused this reaction in him: "As if, I
lost my senses and unknowingly I took the gun on the bed and unknowingly
also I shot Mr. Fleischer, without realizing it, I shot Mr. Fleischer" (p. 132,
supra). As for the shooting of Rubia, appellant testified:
"When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon hearing the
shot, Mr. Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer and when Mr. Fleischer fell down, Mr.
Rubia ran toward s the jeep and knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep
and thinking that if he will take that firearm he will kill me, I shot at him
PROSECUTION: the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of
ownership over the land in question. Whey they fenced that sealed off
appellant’s access to the highway
When appellant woke up to the sound of chiselling, his first reaction was to look
out of the window and saw the damage beign done to his house, compounded
by the fact that his house and rice mill will be shut off from the highway by the
fence. He appealed to Rubia to stop what they were doing and talk things over
but Fleischer was angry and told his men to proceed there was aggression on
the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia was actually
participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of
appellant, but on his property rights.
The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a
right to fence off the contested property, to destroy appellant's house and to
shut off his ingress and egress to his residence and the highway?
"It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we better rent the
place because even though we do not know who really owns this portion to
avoid trouble. To avoid trouble we better pay while waiting for the case because
at that time, it was not known who is the right owner of the place. So we decided
until things will clear up and determine who is really the owner, we decided to
pay rentals" (p. 169, t.s.n., Vol. 6).
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh. 10, p. 2,
Defense Exhibits) within which to vacate the land. He should have allowed
appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of
chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant's entrance and exit to the
highway.
"Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who
believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a
thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to
deliver the thing."
"Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and
should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said
possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court"
(Articles 536 and 539, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy
or cause damage to appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility to the
highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him.
The assault on appellant's property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression
as contemplated by law. ART 429
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of
Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his
window, killing the 2 victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e.,
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his
property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part, since
he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the
victims and their laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and
talk things over with him was no provocation at all.
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since
not all the elements for justification are present. He should therefore be held
responsible for the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the
special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6,
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the
crime. The appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and its
accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. Not
only was his house being unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger of
closing down for lack of access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so
near to the time when his first house was dismantled, thus forcing him to
transfer to his only remaining house, must have so aggravated his obfuscation
that he lost momentarily all reason causing him to reach for his shotgun and fire
at the victims in defense of his rights
Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not
being attended by any qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but extenuated
by the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense - in view of the
presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims and lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the appellant - and by two generic mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide as
reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 69, supra, the penalty lower by one or
two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of
the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same. Considering that
the majority of the requirements for defense of property are present, the
penalty may be lowered by two degrees, i.e., to prision correccional. And under
paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same may further be reduced by one degree, i.e.,
arresto mayor, because of the presence of two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance.
WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES, MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY TWO (2)
GENERIC MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND
OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS
HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4) MONTHS
OF ARRESTO MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF HEIRS OF DAVIS
FLEISCHER AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND
(P4,000.00) PESOS, WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT
ANY AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. CONSIDERING
THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON AUGUST 22, 1968,
HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. NO COSTS.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
While I agree with the order to release the appellant, I am constrained to
dissent in part. It is true that Art. 429, Civil Code of the Philippines, provides
that the owner or legal possessor of a thing may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property. It seems to me, however, that an
attack on the person defending his property is an indispensable element where
an accused pleads self-defense but what is basically defended is only property.
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of
property can only be invoked when it is coupled with some form of attack on
the person of one entrusted with said property. The defense of property,
whether complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions for murder or
homicide must be coupled with an attack by the one getting the property on the
person defending it. In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence
that an attack was Attempted, much less made upon the person of appellant.
The mere utterance "No, gademit, proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful
aggression which entitles appellant to the pela of selfdefense. I agree with the
majority opinion that the crime is homicide but without any privileged
mitigating circumstance. Therefore, since the appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) homicides, mitigated by the two generic mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and obfuscation, without any aggravating
circumstance, the maximum sentence the appellant should have served was
prision mayor plus the indemnification to each group of heirs of Davis Fleischer
and of Flamiano Rubia of the sum of P4,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment, but without any award for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Considering that appellant has been under detention for almost 14 years now
since August 22, 1968, he has served the penalty and should be released.
PEOPLE v. ULEP (excessive means; 1 req of performance of duty lacking)
Two o'clock in the morning of 22 December 1995 Buenaventura Wapili was
having a high fever and was heard talking insensibly to himself in his room. He
said that he could not understand himself to his brother in law, Dario Leydan.
Because Dario heard disturbance in the room, he called Pastor Bonid to pacify
him of the Alliance Church of Kidapawan to help him "pray over" Wapili, but
they could not enter the latter's room as he became wild and violent he went
out of the room, chased Leydan, naked. Leydan and 2 neighbors tried to tie
Wapili but to no avail. He went crazy. Leydan went to house of policewoman
Plando, she called Ulep and other members of PNP assigned in the nearby
premises.
4am: the police officers were armed with rifles, they saw the naked Wapili
approaching them. The kind of weapon Wapili was armed with is disputed. The
police claimed that he was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili's
relatives and neighbors said he had no bolo, but only a rattan stool.
SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his
weapons or they would shoot him. But Wapili retorted "pusila!" ("fire!") and
continued advancing towards the police officers. When Wapili was only about
two (2) to three (3) meters away from them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his
M-16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the victim slumped to the
ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his head and
literally blew his brains out.
POST MORTEM: (5) gunshot wounds: one (1) on the right portion of the head,
one (1) on the right cheek, one (1) on the abdomen and two (2) on the right
thigh: SHEENT — gunshot wound on the right parietal area with fractures of the
right temporoparietal bones with evisceration of brain tissues, right zygomatic
bone and right mandible, lateral aspect; CHEST AND BACK — with powder
burns on the right posterior chest; ABDOMEN — gunshot wound on the right
upper quadrant measuring 0.5 cm. in diameter (point of entry) with multiple
powder burns around the wound and on the right lumbar area (point of exit).
Gunshot wound on the suprapubic area (point of entry); EXTREMITIES — with
gunshot wounds on the right thigh, upper third, anterior aspect measuring 0.5
cm. in diameter with powder burns (point of entry) and right buttocks
measuring 0.5 cm. in diameter (point of exit); gunshot wound on the right thigh,
upper third, posterolateral aspect;
CAUSE OF DEATH — multiple gunshot wounds.
Office of the Ombudsman for the Military filed an Information for murder
against SPO1 Ulep. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge on
arraignment, and insisted during the trial that he acted in self-defense. RTC
convicted him of murder and sentenced him to death penalty:
The means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the alleged aggression
is not reasonable because the victim, Buenaventura Wapili, was already on the
ground, therefore, there was no necessity for the accused to pump another shot
on the back portion of the victim's head. Clearly the gravity of the wounds
sustained by the victim belies the pretension of the accused that he acted in
selfdefense. It indicates his determined effort to kill the victim. It is established
that accused was already in the ground that would no longer imperil the
accused's life. The most logical option open to the accused was to inflict on the
victim such injury that would prevent the victim from further harming him. The
court is not persuaded by the accused's version because if it is true that the
victim attacked him and his life was endangered — yet his two (2) companions
SPO1 Espadera and SPO2 Pillo did not do anything to help him but just witness
the incident — which is unbelievable and unnatural behavior of police officers
Prays for acquittal because killing of victim was due to performance of duty and
self defense
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY
Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5,
of The Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the accused must prove
the presence of two (2) requisites, namely, that he acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and that the injury caused or
the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The second requisite is lacking
in the instant case.
Sound discretion and restraint dictated that accused-appellant, a veteran
policeman, should have ceased firing at the victim the moment he saw the latter
fall to the ground. The victim at that point no longer posed a threat and was
already incapable of mounting an aggression against the police officers.
Shooting him in the head was obviously unnecessary. It cannot therefore be said
that the fatal wound in the head of the victim was a necessary consequence of
accused-appellant's due performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a
right or office
SELF DEFENSE
In the present case, the records show that the victim was lying in a prone
position on the ground — bleeding from the bullet wounds he sustained, and
possibly unconscious — when accused-appellant shot him in the head. The
aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when accused-
appellant attacked him. From that moment, there was no longer any danger to
his life
PROPER PENALTY WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant SPO1
We find in favor of accused-appellant the incomplete justifying circumstance of ERNESTO ULEP is found guilty of HOMICIDE, instead of Murder, and is
fulfillmentof a duty or lawful exercise of a right. Under Art. 69 of The Revised sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months
Penal Code, "a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law and ten (10) days of prision correccional medium as minimum, to six (6) years,
shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the same or to four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum.
exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Arts. 11 and 12, He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Buenaventura
provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall Wapili in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the
number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking." of some
of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal
liability in the several cases mentioned in Arts. 11 and 12, provided that the
majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in
the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of
the conditions of exemption present or lacking.”

Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance,

which, not only cannot be offset by aggravating circumstances but also reduces
the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. Undoubtedly,
the instant case would have fallen under Art. 11, par. 5 of The Revised Penal
Code had the two (2) conditions therefor concurred which, to reiterate: first,
that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a
right or office; and second, that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. But here, only the first condition was fulfilled.
Hence, Art. 69 is applicable, although its "that the majority of such conditions be
present," is immaterial since there are only two (2) conditions that may be
taken into account under Art. 11, par. 5. Article 69 is obviously in favor of the
accused as it provides for a penalty lower than that prescribed by law when the
crime committed is not wholly justifiable mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender

Article 249 of The Revised Penal Code prescribes for the crime of homicide the
penalty of reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years. There being an incomplete justifying circumstance
of fulfillment of a duty, the penalty should be one (1) degree lower, i.e., from
reclusion temporal to prision mayor, pursuant to Art. 69, in relation to Art. 61,
par. 2, and Art. 71, of the Code, to be imposed in its minimum period since
accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered to the authorities and there was no
aggravating circumstance to offset this mitigating circumstance. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty shall be taken from
the minimum period of prision mayor, the range of which is six (6) years and
one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree which is prision correccional, in any of its periods,
the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
GUILLERMO v PEOPLE
Vicente Alon averred that at 5:40 in the afternoon of July 21, 1996 Winnie Alon,
Wilfredo Cabison, Eddie Roque, and him [sic] were at the public market of
Cuartero, at [sic] the restaurant of Melecio Heyres to eat. Noel Guillermo, Arnel
Socias, and Joemar Palma were at the restaurant drinking beer. Noel Guillermo
and Arnel Socias are known to him since childhood since they come from the
same barangay. Joemar Palma is known to him only recently in that incident.
While sitting at the table inside the restaurant, an altercation between Arnel
Socias and Winnie Alon regarding the cutting of wood by a chain saw [sic]
transpired. Noel Guillermo suddenly took hold of Winnie Alon and stabbed the
latter at the neck three (3) times. Joemar Palma went to the kitchen and got a
knife. Arnel Socias hit him with a bottle of beer by [sic] the head. He fell down
and lost consciousness. Significantly, Vicente admitted on cross-examination
that he and Winnie were already drunk even before they went to the restaurant
where the stabbing took place
POST MORTEM:
1. Stab wound 1.5 x 3 cm with 6-8 cm depth [L]eft anterior chest at level of 5th
rib mid clavicular area.
2. Stab wound 2 x 3 cm with 5 cm depth anterior neck just above the sternum.
3. Stab wound 2 x 3 cm with 3-5 cm depth at epigastric area.
The most probable cause of death was massive [H]emorrhage secondary
to multiple stab wounds
DEFENSE VERSION:
Winnie Alon challenged Arnel Socias to a contest on clean or straight cutting of
wood. Arnel declined the challenge claiming that he is only an assistant to his
brother-in-law. Winnie Alon got angry and told him that he has long been in
[the] chain saw [sic] business but "you're stupid" ("gago ka!") . Arnel responded:
"If the wood is crooked and you would deviate from line, you're stupid. Winnie
Alon suddenly stood up and said to Arnel: "Don't ever call me
stupid", pointing his finger to Arnel. He told them to settle the matter peacefully
as they are friend [sic], but Winnie Alon was so furious and grabbed Arnel
Socias by the collar. Arnel tried to release the hold of Winnie from his collar.
While he was pacifying the two telling them to settle the matter peacefully,
Winnie Alon turned to him and said: "you also", then struck him with a beer
bottle. He was hit at the right top of his head thrice. He stood up and boxed
Winnie who again picked up a bottle break [sic] it against the wall, and struck
him with the broken bottle. He stepped back, pulled his knife, and stabbed him
three (3) times but cannot remember what part of his body was hit by his
successive stabs.
RTC: Guillermo as principal in the crime of homicide for stabbing three (3)
times
Winnie Alon which caused the latter's death, attended by a special or privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete justification, and without any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances attendant, he is imposed an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, with the corresponding accessory
penalties, and to pay death indemnity of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Winnie Alon,
in the service of his sentence he shall be credited the period that he undergone
[sic] preventive imprisonment, conformably with Art. 29 of the Code
Arnaldo Socias and Joemar Palma are acquitted of the crime charged.
COURT
Petitioner asserts that it was because of self defense
1) THERE IS UNLAWFUL AGRESSION BY THE VICTIM
-Established by victim when he struck petitioner on the head when the latter
intervened to pacify the quarrel between Winnie and Arnaldo
-Petitioner suffered injuries: contusion hematoma at the parital area above left
ear, linear abrasion left hand medial side, linear abrasion left head ulnar side
-weapons used where beer bottle and fingernails as victim grappled each other
2) THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
-We consider it also established that the petitioner did not provoke the fight
that ensued; he was a third party to the quarrel between the original
protagonists — Winnie and Arnaldo — and did not at all initiate any
provocation to ignite the quarrel
3) REASONABLE MEANS
-Generally, reasonableness is a function of the nature or severity of the attack or
aggression confronting the accused, the means employed to repel this attack,
the surrounding circumstances of the attack such as its place and occasion, the
weapons used, and the physical condition of the parties — which, when viewed
as material considerations, must show rational equivalence between the attack
and the defense.
-means employed by a person invoking self-defense must be reasonably
commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted
-we considered the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim as
important indicia material to a plea for selfdefense.
The petitioner claims self-defense on the position that Winnie, after hitting him
on the head three times with an empty bottle, grabbed another bottle, broke it
against the wall, and thrust it towards him. It was at this point that the
petitioner used his knife to inflict Winnie's fatal wounds. Clearly, the petitioner
wants to impress upon us that his response to Winnie's attack was reasonable;
he used a knife to repel an attacker armed with a broken beer bottle.
MILITATIONS TO ACCEPT PETITIONER’S INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS RTC on petitioner. We affirm this to be the legally correct and proper penalty to
-physical evidence show that petitioner only suffered only one hematoma/one be imposed upon petitioner.
blow
-Vicente and Eddie were alreay drunk, broken beer bottle might not be potent
weapon in hands of a drunk wielder
-the knife wounds were all aimed at vital parts of the body, thus pointing against
a conclusion that the petitioner was simply warding off broken beer bottle
thrusts and used his knife as a means commensurate to the thrusts he avoided.
To be precise, the petitioner inflicted on the victim: one stab wound at the chest,
6-8 cms. deep, at the 5th rib clavicular area, or in plainer terms, in the area of
the victim's heart; another was at the neck, 5 cms. deep, just above the
breastbone; and a last one was in the abdominal area, 3-5 cms. deep. The depth
of these wounds shows the force exerted in the petitioner's thrusts while the
locations are indicative that the thrusts were all meant to kill, not merely to
disable the victim and thereby avoid his drunken thrusts.
-if petitioner did have a complete self-defense: they would have gone to th
police and request a dispact of policemen to the locus crimins and confirm
presence of broken pieces of beer bottle, they however, escaped via backdoor
on a motocycle; neither arnaldo, joemar or babylou corroborated the claim that
appellant was hit w/ a bottle,

In sum, we rule that there was no rational equivalence between the means of
the attack and the means of defense sufficient to characterize the latter as
reasonable

PROPER PENALTY: ART 69

ART 249 for homicide is reclusion temporal in full range but applying art 69
reduces the penalty to one degree
-entitled privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
-reclusion temporal minus one degree to prison mayor
-maximum of th indeterminate penalty is determined by taking into account the
attendant modifying cicumstances, applying art 64 RPC, no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances intervened the maximum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be prision mayor in its medium period whose range is from 8 years and 1
day to 10 years.

To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision mayor has to

be reduced by one degree without taking into account the attendant modifying
circumstances. The penalty lower by one degree is prision correccional whose
range is from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The trial court is given the widest
discretion to fix the minimum of the indeterminate penalty provided that such
penalty is within the range of prision correccional.

The CA affirmed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years prision correccional,
as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, as imposed by the
PEOPLE V URAL
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating,
The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, a circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed
twenty-six year old former detention prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for
murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
Alberto saw policment Ural boxing a detention prisoner, Felix Napola. Napola
collapsed, Ural, stepped on his body. He went out of the cell, got a bottle, poured
its contents on the Napola’s body, ignited it w/ a match, left while Napola was
screaming in agony, shouting for help but nobody came to him.

Ural cautioned Alberto to keep quiet of what he has done.

Doctor Bakil testified that the 30 year old victim who she treated twice
sustained second degree burns on arms, neck, face, ½ of the body including the
back. His dermis and epidermis were burned. If they were not treated, they
would death would come because toxaemia and tetanus. Napola died, burn as
the cause of death.

Appellant version:
He heard screams of help from Napola and found his shirt in flames. w/
assistance from ogoc and siton, ural removed napola’s shirt and did not
summon a doctor because burns were not serious and besides he was aloen in
the municipal bldg.

The court did not find any justification for disbelieving Alberto.

This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that
"criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". The
presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act"

The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio)
(Par. 3, Art. 248, Revised Penal Code The trial court correctly held that the
accused took advantage of his public position (Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal
Code). He could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard
duty

But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" (Par.
3, Art. 13, Revised Penal code). It is manifest from the proven facts that
appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him
may be because in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself
inside the detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his
felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical treatment at the municipal
dispensary.
PEOPLE V GONZALES
BOTH PARTY OF THE SAME STORY VERSION
The families of the parties were on their way to the exit of Loyola Memorial
Park. The appellant was driving w/ his grandson and 3 housemaids and private
complainant was w/ his pregnant wife Feliber Andres and 2 year old Kenneth,
nephew Kevin and sister in law Francar Valdez
-their vehicles ALMOST collided at the intersection when Gonzalez’s car was
turning left to the exit and complainant was heading straight
-appellant continued driving while Andres followed and cut him off and Andres
got out of the car and knocked on the appellant’s car window
PROSECUTION VERSION
Noel andres told the appellant to drive carefully and informed him that he is w/
his family where appellant replied "Accidents are accidents, what's your
problem." And noting that appellant turned red in anger. Complainant went
back to his vehicle and he was blocked by appellant’s son who said, "Anong
problema mo sa erpat ko." Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he
immediately boarded his vehicle. He left his window partially open enough to
talk w/ appellant’s son, Dino. Then he turned to his wife, son and nephew were
all wounded.
DEFENSE VERSION:
Complainant cut appellant’s path and he said to the latter, his vehicle, stood
beside the appellant's car window, and repeatedly cursed the appellant, "Putang
ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong magmaneho. Ang
bobobobo mo." The appellant stayed inside his car and allegedly replied,
"Pasensiya ka na hindi kita nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang." Appellant went
back to his car but complainant kept on cursing.
-Dino enters the scene.
- When Andres suddenly reached for something inside his vehicle, Dino froze on
the spot where he stood. This prompted the appellant to get his gun. From the
glove compartment and feeling that his son was threatened he got out of his car
ready to shoot
- appellant's daughter Trisha who was riding in Dino's car arrived at the scene
and pushed the appellant away. She hugged her father and in the process held
his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand and with Trisha's
substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost his balance and
the gun accidentally fired
INFORMATION:
Appellant employ personal violence by means of treachery and abuse of
superior strength upon the person of Noel Andres y Tomas, by then and there
shooting him with a Glock cal. 9mm pistol but instead hitting one Feliber Andres
y Ordoño, on the left back portion of her head, thereby inflicting upon her
serious and mortal wound which directly caused her death, as well as hitting
John Kenneth Andres y Ordoño and Kevin Valdez y Ordoño physical injuries
which ordinarily would have caused their death **they were brought to hospital
Feliber died the following day, she was able to give birth. Kenneth and Kevin
were treated for extraction of metallic fragments on their faces. They were
discharged from the hospital six days later or on November 6, 1998.
The trial court rendered judgment finding that the shooting was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and held the appellant guilty of the
complex crime of murder for the death of Feliber Andres and for two counts of
frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by Kenneth Andres and Kevin
Valdez and sentenced the appellant to the maximum of the imposable penalty
which is death.
The trial court held:
"He owns the black Gluck 9 mm. automatic pistol; that the said gun will never
fire even if he drops it; that only one bullet was fired from his gun; and that the
victim Feliber Andres is already dead. With this exegesis and the declarations in
open court of the eyewitness of both the prosecution and some of the defense,
there is no real dispute on the antecedent facts showing that the accused fired
on Noel Andres but instead hit and caused the fatal injuries to the victims John
Kenneth Andres, Kevin Valdez and Feliber Andres resulting to the ultimate
death of the latter.
The court likewise take judicial notice on the feature of the automatic pistol
used in this case which is capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Practically, the stages
before an automatic firearm would be capable of firing are as follows: 1) the
loading of a bullet into the chamber of the gun; 2) the cocking of the hammer, if
uncocked; 3) the releasing of the safety pin; 4) the pressing of the trigger to
unleash the hammer so that the firing pin will hit the cartridge to propel the
bullet out to hit the target. Realistically, it demonstrates that a gun will not fire
even if the bullet is loaded in its chamber if the hammer is uncocked; or even if
cocked if the safety pin is engaged; or even if the safety pin is disengaged if the
trigger will not be pressed. However, even if the gun is fired if it is not aimed
and leveled to the target, the purpose of firing it shall not be achieved.
Contrarily, once a gun is drawn against a person, the means methods and forms
employed for its execution is already conceived. And once it is tended directly
and specifically to insure its execution, it consequently produces the conscious
and deliberate intention. Finally if all the acts of execution had been effectively
done without risk on the part of the offender arising from any defense coming
from the offended party, treachery results. In brief, there is treachery when the
offender commits any crime against persons, employing means, methods and
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended
party might make (People vs. Mesa, 276 SCRA 407; People vs. Carlos Patrolla, Jr.,
G. R. No. 112445, March 7, 1996). To appreciate treachery two (2) conditions
must be present, to wit: 1) the employment of means of execution that give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and 2) the means
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. (People vs. Azugue, 268
SCRA 711; People vs. Peña, G. R. No. 116022, July 1, 1998, p. 1)
In the case at bar and guided with the above-quoted doctrinal cases, logically,
the accused is positive of the crime charged against him. When he alighted with
a drawn gun to protect his son and released all the safety measures of his gun as
he fired and missed at Noel who was then unarmed, but instead hit Kevin
Valdez, John Kenneth Andres and Feliber Andres which resulted to the death of
the latter, demonstrate that the accused has executed the two (2) conditions to
generate treachery enough to qualify the crime committed to murder."
xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused Inocencio Gonzalez,
Jr., y Esquivel is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder
penalized under Art. 248, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the maximum
penalty of Death by lethal injection.
COURT
Appellant prays for: judgment be rendered exempting him from criminal and
civil liabilities. Appellant declared he had no intention to shoot. He lost his
balance when his daughter approached and pushed him backwards to stop him
from joining Dino. It is also argued that had the appellant intended to shoot Noel
Andres he could have simply done so by shooting at him directly.
The defense asserts that the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish the
attendance of treachery and without the attendance of the said qualifying
circumstance the crime committed is homicide, not murder.
-shooting also happened immediate after argument, hence, it was not attended
by treachery. As regards the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, it is
argued that considering that there was no intent to kill and that they stayed in
the hospital only for six days, the crime committed is physical injuries.
Appellant assigns as error the trial court's rejection of the mitigating
circumstances pleaded by the defense which allegedly attended the commission
of the crime, i.e., lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, passion and
obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and voluntary surrender.
First, he was angered by Andres' abusive language and later he got out of his car
with a loaded gun to protect his son from a perceived danger. The appellant
claims that his willingness to help the injured and his voluntary surrender to
the police should likewise be considered as mitigating circumstances in the
imposition of penalties
OSG: Homicide and not murder, Shooting came after argument, Shooting was
done impusively
Th appellee disagrees with the contention that the appellant is liable only for
slight physical injuries. The injuries sustained by both children are head injuries
and could have caused their death if not for the immediate medical attention
given them. The number of days spent in the hospital is not determinative of the
severity of the wounds. Their nature and location should instead be considered.
The appellant cannot escape liability for frustrated homicide for the injuries of
the two children on the ground that he fired a single shot at the vehicle of Noel
Andres. He is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act even if the crime
committed is different from that intended.
As regards the pleaded mitigating circumstances, appellee asserts that none can
be considered in favor of the appellant. There is evidence on record that the
appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police and it appears from the
testimonies of witnesses that he entertained the possibility of flight but his car
was stuck in traffic along the exit of the memorial park. His pretense of
incomplete defense of a relative is belied by his own admission that when he
saw that Noel Andres did not have a gun he lowered his hand holding the gun.
There was allegedly no threat on the life of his son at the time of the shooting,
no uncontrollable fear nor irresistible force that would mitigate the commission
of the offense.
In sum, the appellee asserts that considering that the appellant fired a single
shot and in the process committed four offenses the appellant should be held
liable for the complex crime of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres, double
frustrated homicide against Kevin and Kenneth and attempted homicide against
Noel Andres. Under the rules on complex crimes the penalty for the gravest
offense, i.e., reclusion temporal for homicide, should be imposed in its maximum
period.
The suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from behind the
victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was made or
the fact that the victim was unarmed do not by themselves render the attack as
treacherous. NO TREACHERY
From the story, it was complainant who provoked the altercation. After the
almost collusion, he followed and cut off appellant. Andres did told appellant
"Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na gago ka pa". it was from his hostile
behaviour that appellant turned red in anger.
The pictures indicate that Gonzalez fired at the FX at an angle away from Noel
Andres and that Gonzalez was not aiming at anybody in particular. He could
have easily aimed and shot at Gonzalez.
Gonzalez categorically stated in court that he did not point his gun nor
threatened Andres during their short spat. Gonzalez, although he had his gun in
his car, did not react to Andres' cursing until the latter was having an altercation
with the appellant's son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his son
was in imminent danger. Whether he overreacted or he shot at Andres' vehicle
out of rage over Andres' aggressive behavior, one thing appears clear to us, that
the shooting was not done in cold blood. It is undisputed that the windows of
the FX are heavily or darkly tinted so that a person outside would not see if
anybody was inside. The pictures of the FX 39 on record confirm the
testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses that the other
passengers of the FX were not visible from the outside. Gonzalez admitted in
court that Noel Andres mentioned that he has passengers with him while he
was shouting and cursing at Gonzalez but there is no indication that Gonzalez
had any opportunity to see the passengers when he fired the shot.
The totality of the evidence on record fails to support a conclusion that Gonzalez
deliberately employed the mode of attack to gain undue advantage over the
intended nor the actual victim. Without any decisive evidence to the contrary,
treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime committed is homicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime
committed are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill
determines whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and
such intent is made manifest by the acts of the accused which are undoubtedly
intended to kill the victim. In a case wherein the accused did not know that a
person was hiding behind a table who was hit by a stray bullet causing
superficial injuries requiring treatment for three days, the crime committed is
slight physical injuries. In case of doubt as to the homicidal intent of the
accused, he should be convicted of the lesser offense of physical injuries.
Defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by
the defense, were not convincingly proved and none can be considered in the
imposition of penalties. The testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the
appellant's pretense of voluntary surrender. Witness Ramos testified that the
appellant drove away towards the gate of the memorial park while he was
questioning him after the shooting and had not Noel Andres and onlookers
blocked his path the appellant could have fled the scene of the crime.
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining.
For this mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that (1) an
unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by
the intended victim; (2) that the crime was committed within a reasonable
length of time from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the
obfuscation in the accused's mind; and that (3) "the passion and obfuscation
arouse from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge."
52 Noel Andres' act of shouting at the appellant's son, who was then a nurse and
of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation as it is claimed
by the accused. Besides, the appellant's son, Dino was shouting back at Noel
Andres. It was not a case wherein the appellant's son appeared helpless and
oppressed that the appellant lost his reason and shot at the FX of Noel Andres.
The same holds true for the appellant's claim of provocation on the part of Noel
Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong
committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime
committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the
circumstances of the case. 53 The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards
the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not
sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainant's vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and
shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression
against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise
devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a
notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a
wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the
time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the
mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim of a gun,
although not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have
reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his
act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any mitigating
circumstance, the appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of
8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum to 14
years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed against
Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days
of arresto menor in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED. The appellant
is hereby found guilty of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres and is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in
its medium period, as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight
physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the
appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor.
PEOPLE v PAGAL suffer each the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed. With costs against the appellants.
The accused, Pedro Pagal y Marcelino and Jose Torcelino y Torazo, were
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide with intent to gain, and by
means of violence, take away from the person of one Gau Guan, cash amounting
to P1,281.00, Philippine currency and they use personal violence upon the said
Gau Guan, by then and there stabbing him with an icepick and clubbing him
with an iron pipe on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.

The appellant Pedro Pagal contends that the trial court erred in convicting him
of the crime of robbery with homicide instead of declaring him liable only for
his individual acts, claiming that the record is bereft of any proof or evidence
that he and his co-appellant Jose Torcelino conspired to commit the crime of
robbery with homicide.

He pleaded guilty after commission of the crime, the trial court did not commit
any error in convicting the appellant Pedro Pagal of the crime of robbery with
homicide.

Appellants contend that the event had a mitigating circumstance of sufficient

provocation, passion or obfuscation.

Firstly, since the alleged provocation which caused the obfuscation of the
appellants arose from the same incident, that is, the alleged maltreatment
and/or ill treatment of the appellants by the deceased, these two mitigating
circumstances cannot be considered as two distinct and separate circumstances
but should be treated as one.

Secondly, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a

crime which — as in the case at bar — is planned and calmly meditated before
its execution

Thirdly, the maltreatment that appellants claim the victim to have committed
against them occurred much earlier than the date of the commission of the
crime. Provocation in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient
and immediately preceding the act

Robbery with homicide is punished by reclusion perpetua to death. 20 Since the

aggravating circumstance of nighttime is offset by the mitigating circumstance
of plea of guilty, the lesser penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should be
imposed upon the appellants.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is modified, and the appellants
Pedro Pagal y Marcelino and Jose Torcelino y Torazo are hereby sentenced to
URBANO v PEOPLE
The accussed attacked Bridgido Tomelden inflicting mortal injuries:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
A. Softened portion of the scalp over (R) occipito-temporal area about 5 inches
above and posterior to the (R) ear.
B. Clotted blood over the (R) occipito-temporal area.
C. No lacerations noted.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
A. On opening the skull there is oozing of dark colored blood from the brain
substances.
B. More darked blood vessels at the (L) side of the brain.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant
cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident.
Victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner arrived at Lingayen from a picnic from
a nearby town, Bugallon, Pangasinan. They had an altercation w/c Tomelden
said insulting remarks at petitioner. Petitioner asked why Tomelden, when
drunk, has the penchant of insulting petitioner.
A fight ensued. The fight stopped but again ensued. Petitioner gave a lucky
punch w/c made Tomelden topple down, Tomelden was at the verge of hitting
his head on the ground had not their companions prevented the fall. The blow
made Tomelden’s nose bleed and rendered him unconscious.
(sept 29, 1993) The following day he told his wife that he had a fight, he
complained of a pain in his nape, head and ear w/c he went to the hospital to be
examined and treated his lacerated left index finger, contusions and hematoma
at the right cerebrum.
(oct 2 and 7, 1993) Tomelden went back to hospital because of dizziness,
headache and other pains. He was in a state of drowsiness and frequent
vomiting.
Oct 8, he was diagnosed w/ brain injury, secondary to mauling to consider
cerebral haemorrhage.
Oct 10, he died of cardio respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion w/
resultant cerebral haemorrhage due to mauling incident
DEFENSE DENIED INTENTION TO KILL
RTC AND CA: convicted of Homicide
COURT:
His lucky punch was enough to topple him to the ground, had his nose bleed and
render him unconscious. From then on, Tomelden was in and out of the
hospital. Dr. arellano testified in conducting autopsy that "softened portion of
the scalp over (R) occipitotemporal area about 5 inches above and posterior to
the (R) ear" of the victim could have been caused by a fist blow. She also opined
that the fist blow which landed on Tomelden's head could have shaken his brain
which caused the cerebral concussion; and that the cause of the victim's death
was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant
cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident".
Lucky punch as proximate cause
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
No intention to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation on the part
of the victim
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an
essential element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper
conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone;
it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the
provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and
should immediately precede the act. This third requisite of self-defense is
present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when,
even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the
provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or
(4) when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it
was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.
Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner was sufficient provocation.
Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.
Upon reaching the LIWAD compound, Tomelden allegedly slapped and hurled
insults at him, calling him "sipsip " just to maintain his employment as
Navarro's tricycle driver. Tomelden allegedly then delivered several fist and
kick blows at petitioner, a couple of which hit him despite his evasive actions.
Petitioner maintained that he only boxed the victim in retaliation, landing that
lucky punch in the course of parrying the latter's blows.
Q And when you were already in the compound of LIWAD Office, Brigido
Tomelden was challenging the accused for a fist fight?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the accused refused to accept the challenge?
A Yes because Mr. Brigido Tomelden is very much bigger than Mr. Rodel
Urbano. He is stouter than the accused.
Q But finally the fist fight took place?
A Yes, sir
mayos as maximum. He has a prison term of 8 years and 1 day as max and
period of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as minimum period is
reasonable.
From reclusion temporal to prision maryos w/ application of indeterminate
sentence law, he is to be incarcerated from prision correccional as minimum
and prision mayor as maximum.

PROS. CHIONG
Q When the victim and this accused had this fight, fist fight, they exchanged
blows, but there was this lucky punch that hit the victim because the victim fall
down, is that correct?
A When I stop pacifying them . . ., I saw Biring the late Brigido Tomelden, he
was much aggressive than the accused, sir.
Q You mean that although it was the victim who was more aggressive than the
accused here, he also [threw] punches but sometime some of his punches most
of which did not hit the victim?
A He tried to parry the blows of the late Brigido Tomelden, sir.
Q Because he tried to parry the blow of the Brigido Tomelden, when the accused
throw punches, the punch was directed to the victim but most of them did not
hit the victim, is that what you saw?
A Yes, sir.

PROVOCATION WAS FROM TOMELDEN

Petitioner also had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
should also be appreciated in his favour as he even tried to evade the fight. He
had no intention to make a grave so wrong

Withal, with no aggravating circumstance and two mitigating circumstances

appreciable in favor of petitioner, we apply par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC, which
pertinently provides:
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. —
In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods,
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties,
each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles
76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the
following rules, according to whether there are or are no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances:
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the
number and nature of such circumstances.

From reclusion temporal to prision mayor. Applying indeterminate sentence

law, he is to be incarcerated from prision correccional as minimum and prision
PEOPLE v. BENITO
Victim Pedro Moncayo, Jr., Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction and Acting
Chief of the Administrative Division of the Civil Service Commission, while
driving his car was followed by the accused and when the car was about to turn
at the intersection of P. Paredes and Lepanto st., the accused shot him 8 times
using .22 caliber which resulted to his death.
I ka na nga diyan baka may mangyari pa sa iyo at baka ipayari kita dito"
The accused has in his favour the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender given that after the event, he called up the manila police department.
Althought initially he did not reveal his identity and told the police that he can
help w/ the case because he knew the suspect and the motive. While he was
brought to the police station as a possible witness, he confided to the
investigators that he was "voluntarily surrendering" and "also surrendering the
fatal gun used in the shooting of the victim"
II
Contention of the accused that the criminal act of murder was committed in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense done by the victim against the accused
victim was an alleged remark made in the presence of the accused at about
11:00 a.m. of December 12, 1969, that the Civil Service Commission is a hangout
of thieves. The accused felt alluded to because he was facing then criminal and
administrative charges on several counts involving his honesty and integrity
-this remark whether it was uttered, cannot be considered a grave offense
against the latter. The remark itself was general in nature and not specifically
directed to the accused. If he felt alluded to by a remark which he personally
considered insulting to him, that was his own individual reaction thereto. Other
people in the vicinity who might have heard the remark could not possibly
know that the victim was insulting the accused unless they were aware of the
background of the criminal and administrative charges involving moral
turpitude pending against the accused. At most, said remark might be
considered a mere provocation and not a grave offense which might have
impelled the accused to commit a crime in immediate retaliation. As the
provocation was not sufficient and did not immediately precede the act, it may
not be considered as a mitigating circumstance
The provocation was uttered at 11 am December 12, 1969 while the crime was
commited at 530 pm of the same day giving him several hours to reflect and
hold his temper. The act of killing was not immediately or proximately following
the sufficient provocative remark. The failure of the accused to immediately
react to the supposed provocative insulting remark might even be taken as his
ignoring it altogether, or considering it unimportant at the moment he heard the
remark. In other words, the remark was inadequate to stir or drive the accused
to violence at the time it was uttered and he had more than sufficient time to
suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it. The trial Court
did not commit any error when it rejected the aforementioned incident as a
basis for crediting a mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused.
III
Accused also claims a sufficient provocation/threat from the deceased
immediately preceded tha act because of the alleged statement of th deceased
uttered around 7pm on dec 11, 1969 (night preceding t day of the crim) "Umalis
-it was uttered almost 24 hours before the crime
-there was no overt act against the accused, it could not have been sufficiently
provoked/threatened as to immediately react in his defense/retaliate by
committing a crime
-provocation did not precede the shooting
-accused almost had a day to mull over the alleged threat/provocation before
he reacted by shooting
The inevitable conclusion is that the accused did not feel sufficiently threatened
or provoked by the alleged utterance of the victim at the time it was uttered, or
within a reasonable time thereafter, and when he shot the victim the next day, it
was a deliberate act of vengeance and not the natural reaction of a human being
to ward off a serious threat or to immediately retaliate when provoked
PROVOCATION MUST BE SUFFICIENT
For all the foregoing, the guilt of the appellant has been established beyond
reasonable doubt, with two mitigating circumstances in his favor, that of plea of
guilty and voluntary surrender. However these are offset by the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and disregard of respect due to the
deceased. The crime of murder being punishable with reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code), the penalty, pursuant
to Article 248 in relation to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, should be, as it
is hereby, imposed in its medium period, or reclusion perpetua
The penalty of death imposed by the trial court is hereby modified and reduced,
as above indicated, to reclusion perpetua with accessories of the law.
BACABA v. PEOPLE
Evening dec 23, 1990: at the dance hall @ Iloilo city were Hernani Quidato (the
victim), Eduardo Selibio (Eduardo) and Melchor Selibio (Melchor), Jonathan
Bacabac (Jonathan) and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel)
Jesus Rosadio noticed a commotion: Melchor was "hugging" Edzel, and later
"tying" Jonathan "with his hands". Still later, he saw the victim hit Edzel with a
"stick." He thus told the victim and his companions that Edzel is the son of
Councilor Jose Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), whereupon Eduardo told him (Jesus) to
go away for they might shoot him. Jesus thus left and proceeded to Edzel's
residence to report to his father what he had witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel
and Jonathan managed to flee.
They all went home. Ricardo Bacabac (herein petitioner), together with Edzel
and Jonathan who are his nephews, and Edzel's father, Jose, his mother, and two
sisters at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and Sto. Domingo Streets. Petitioner and
Jose were carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were carrying a
piece of wood and a revolver, respectively.
Jesus pointed that the victim and his companions were the ones who
manhandled Jonathan and Edzel. Victim and company apologized and said that
they mistook the offended party as other person.
Petitioner and Jose fired their armalites. Victim and Eduardo were hit. Eduardo
fell and the victim who was in a kneeling position. They raised their hands to
surrender and Jose shot him again. Melchor escaped. Victim and Eduardo died.
POST MORTEM: two bullet wounds in the thoraco-abdominal regions and one
bullet wound in the extremities, and that he died due to "maceration of the
internal organs due to bullet wounds." Eduardo sustained two bullet wounds in
the thoraco-abdominal region, and died of "hemorrhage due to gunshot
wounds."
RTC: found presence of conspiracy among petitioner and co accused
ON CONSPIRACY:
The Appellant did not lift a finger when Jose fired at and shot Hernani and
Eduardo. He stood by as Jose shot Hernani anew when the latter on bended
knees, raised his two (2) hands, in surrender. The Appellant and the other
Accused then fled from the scene, with their respective firearms and weapons.
The overt act of the Accused and the Appellant in conjunto, constitute proof of
conspiracy.
The Appellant and Jose were armed with high-powered guns. Jesus was armed
with a revolver. The nature of the weapons of the Accused evinced a common
desire to do away with the culprits, not merely to scare them
ON TREACHERY: "the attack was executed in such a manner as to make
it impossible for the victim to retaliate." In the case at bar, petitioner, a
policeman, and his co-accused were armed with two M-16 armalites and a
revolver. The victim and his companions were not armed. The attack was
sudden and unexpected, and the victim was already kneeling in surrender when
he was shot the second time. Clearly, the victim and his companion Eduardo had
no chance to defend themselves or retaliate.
As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance of "immediate
vindication of a grave offense", it fails. For such mitigating circumstance to be
credited, the act should be, following Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the
one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within
the same degree." The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a
stick (according to Jesus), a bamboo pole (according to Edzel). By Edzel's own
clarification, "[he] was hit at [his] ear, not on [his] head." That act would
certainly not be classified as "grave offense". And Edzel is petitioner's nephew,
hence, not a relative by affinity "within the same degree" contemplated
in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
They are charged of: All the accused, namely; Jose Talanquines, Jr., Edzel
Talanquines, Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio
are hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder and there being no aggravating
circumstance with one mitigating circumstance, accused Jose Talanquines, Jr.,
Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby sentenced each to suffer
imprisonment for a period of 10 years and 1 day as minimum, to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day, as maximum; while accused Edzel Talanquines and Jonathan
Bacabac who are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave
offense, are hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of 4 years, 2
months and 1 day, as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as maximum. All the
accused are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased
Eduardo Selibio, the amount of P50,000.00 for his wrongful death; P20,000.00
for moral damages; P10,000.00 for attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit.
US v HICKS
Augustus Hicks + Austinal Sola = illicit relationship
After a trouble between them, she left and went to live w/ her brother, Lues
Corrales. After a few days, she had a new relationship w/ Wallace Current.
Augustus and current talked. Hicks said "Did I not tell you to leave this
woman alone?," to which Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she
did not want to live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and
you can live with her." The accused then replied: "God damn, I have made up my
mind;" then hicks drew his revolver. Current hid and hicks fired at Agustina at
the left breast. She died.
Hicks surrendered himself to the chief of police.
Convicted of murder: qualifying circumstance of treachery. All the foregoing
circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due
reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and
in order to accomplish his perverse intention with safety loss of reason and self-
control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only
causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are
such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious,
unworthy, and immoral passions
The death penalty shall be executed according to the law in force, and that in the
event of a pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties
of article 53 of the Penal Code unless the same be expressly remitted in the
pardon. So ordered.
US v DELA CRUZ
The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the
deceased, who had theretofore been his querida (concubine or lover) upon
discovering her in fragrante in carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance.
U. S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep., 217), we held that the "causes which mitigate the
criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from
legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral
passions," and declined to give the benefit of the provisions of this article to the
convict in that case on the ground that the alleged causes for his loss of
selfcontrol did not "originate from legitimate feelings."
In the former case the cause of the alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the
aggressor was the convict's vexation, disappointment and deliberate anger
engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations
with him, which she had a perfect right to do; his reason for killing her being
merely that he had elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and
live with another man. In the present case however, the impulse upon which
defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" was
not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden
revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in
the arms of another. As said by the supreme court of Spain in the above cited
decision, this was a "suf􀀾cient impulse" in the ordinary and natural course of
things to produce the passion and obfuscation which the law declares to be one
of the extenuating circumstances to be taken into consideration by the court
reduction of the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal.
PEOPLE v GELAVER
Eduardo Gelaver charged w/ parricide w/ intent to kill stabbed Victoria Gelaver
y Pacinabao, his wife.
Randy Mammon testified that he saw the spouses in a heated argument. Then
held neck of victim, dragged her and stabbed her 3 times on the breast
the obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might have recovered his
equanimity. (I Revised Penal Code, Aquino, 1987 ed., p. 267) The crime was
committed almost a year after the victim had abandoned the conjugal dwelling
parricide affirmed

Eduardo: did it because caught her having carnal act w/ her paramour
-they have 4 children. She abandoned her family to live /w her paramour
-he was informed by his daughter that his wife and her paramour were living at
a house in front of Sto. Niño church. He went there and saw his wife and
paramour having sex (he admitted that he did not know paramour’s name nor
the owner of the house)
-his version is that he pushed aside the paramour. The paramour took a knife to
stab him but he hid behind the wife so the wife was stabbed

COURT
Before Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code can be operative, the following
requisites must be compresent:
"1. That a legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or his
daughter, the latter under 18 years of age and living with him, in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person.
"2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of
them any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter.
"3. That he has not promoted or facilitated that prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse."

-must be established by defense

Appellant’s testimony has inconsistencies

1) he should have reported first to the police that he killed his wife
2) if paramour and wife had sex, there should be a nude man running in the
streets
3) Sheryl (daughter) denied knowing where her mom was. She further testified
that she had not seen her mother in any other house except that of her
grandfather's

Entitled of mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to authorities

However, the trial court erred in finding the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation "as a result of his (appellant's) wife
leaving their home and their children." (Rollo, p. 28) Before this circumstance
may be taken into consideration, it is necessary to establish the existence of an
unlawful act sufficient to produce such a condition of mind. The act producing
PEOPLE v BELLO
The accused alleged four (4) aggravating circumstances, namely: treachery,
evident premeditation, night-time, and superior strength
Sentence: death by electrocution and indemnify heirs of Alicia Cervantes of 3k
Guillermo Bello, a widower took Alicia Cervantes as his common law wife.
Accused who has no substantial livelihood except making kaingin and in
financial straits induced Alicia to seek employment as an entertainer at a bar
(marin’s place)
- she entered as a public hostess
- Accused used to watch her everyday
- Alicia entered into gumaca w/ a man w/c caressed her, as found by husband
- he took her out of the movie house and warned her to be more discreet in
personal conduct
- she continued to serve there as a public hostess
- May 20, 1958, accused went to maring’s to ask Alicia for money
- Maring and Alicia refused to give money. Maring told Guillermo to forget
Alicia because he is already old and an invalid and stop bothering her
- on his way home he met the brothers Justo Marasigan and Luis Marasigan
who greeted the accused, Luis saying to his brother Justo the following: 'So this
is the man whose wife is being used by Maring for white slave trade'; that these
remarks of Luis Marasigan naturally brought grief to the accused, to drown
which he sought Paty's place in Gumaca where he drank 5 glasses of tuba
- he went to realistic studio in front to maring’s to watch Alicia
- 9:00 o'clock that night, he entered Maring's Place and without much ado held
Alicia from behind with his left hand in the manner of a boa strangulating its
prey and with his right hand stabbed Alicia several times with a balisong; that
seeing Alicia fallen on the ground and believing her to be mortally wounded, he
fled and went to the municipal building and there surrendered himself to the
police of Gumaca.
Not murder but homicide
Alicia was stabbed at the back, the wound was but a part and continuation of the
aggression. The four (4) stab wounds (the 3 others were in the breast,
hypogastric region, and in the left wrist were inflicted indiscriminately, without
regard as to which portion of her body was the subject of attack. The trial court
itself found that the stab in the back was inflicted as Alicia was running away.
For this reason, treachery cannot be imputed.
There is also no premeditation because he carried balisong w/ him for a long
time and w/o intent to use it against common law wife
No superior strength used because he is invalid/baldado and old. It was not
shown that there was deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength.
The crime was committed at night time but the place was well lighted, hence did
not aggravate the crime
Accused was entitled for voluntary surrender.
Passion and obfuscation: The defense submits that accused is so entitled,
because the deceased's flat rejection of petitioner's entreaties for her to quit her
calling as a hostess and return to their former relation, aggravated by her
sneering statement that the accused was penniless and invalid (baldado),
provoked the appellant, as he testified, into losing his head and stabbing the
deceased. The state disputes the claim primarily on the strength of the rule that
passion and obfuscation can not be considered when "arising from vicious,
unworthy and immoral passions"
We are inclined to agree with the defense, having due regard to the
circumstances disclosed by the record. It will be recalled that the lower court
found that the accused had previously reproved the deceased for allowing
herself to be caressed by a stranger. Her loose conduct was forcibly driven
home to the accused by Marasigan's remark on the very day of the crime that
the accused was the husband "whose wife was being used by Maring for
purposes of prostitution", a remark that so deeply wounded the appellant's
feelings that he was driven to consume a large amount of wine (tuba) before
visiting Alicia (the deceased) to plead with her to leave her work. Alicia's
insulting refusal to renew her liaison with the accused, therefore, was not
motivated by any desire to lead a chaste life henceforth, but showed her
determination to pursue a lucrative profession that permitted her to distribute
her favors indiscriminately. We can not see how the accused's insistence that
she live with him again, and his rage at her rejection of the proposal, can be
properly qualified as arising from immoral and unworthy passions. Even
without benefit of wedlock, a monogamous liaison appears morally of a higher
level than gainful promiscuity.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision should be, and hereby is, modified. This
Court finds the accused-appellant, Guillermo Bello, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide, attended by two (2) mitigating circumstances:
(a) passion and obfuscation, and (b) voluntary surrender; and, therefore,
imposes upon him an indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to a maximum of ten (10) years of
prisión mayor; orders him also to personally indemnify the heirs of Alicia
Cervantes in the amount of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs. So ordered.
PEOPLE v AMAGUIN
Willie, Gildo and Celso Amaguin, charged w/ murder of Oro brothers Pacifico
and Disdado. Celso remains a fugitive while the 2 went through w/ trial.
Hernando (sib of the deceased): he, his brothers, brother in law Rafael
candelaria, 1st cousin Sergio Argonzola were invited by eldest brother Pacifico
to the latter’s house to celebrate town fiesta. Then they went to the plaza to get
a ride.
Accused Celso said ‘pare, come here’ but Pacifico said ‘pare, not yet because I
have to conduct my guests first.’ Celso w/ a butcher knife rushed towards
Pacifico. Gildo w/ a knife followed by a slingshot. Gildo aimed at Danilo w/c hit
the latter on the chest. Celso hacked Pacifico then stabbed Diosdado. Willie
appeared w/ handgun and shot bros Pacifico, Diosdado and fleeing Danilo.
Diosdado plead for his life, Willie fired at Pacifico. Gildo and Celso repeatedly
stabbed Pacifico.
Danilo: Danilo was hit in the chest by a slingshot from Gildo, he ran away but
was hit on the hips by a bullet. He was pushed by Hernando to seek cover.
Rafael: one stabbed him, hit him on the left arm, he immediately took a cab to go
to the hospital.
DEFENSE: Oro bros started the fight
Gildo: Pacifico and 5 others approached brother Celso. Pacifco and company
approached Celso and said ‘this is the bravest man in divinagarcia st, the
Amaguin.’ Pacifico gave Celso a flying kick. Gildo said ‘don’t fight’ but attackers
had knives and slingshots. Celso pulled his knife. One attacked him so he went
out to throw stones Danny hit Danilo w/ slingshot. Danny was stabbed from
behind by Pacifico’s companion, Ernie Ortigas, Celso’s guest had a revolver.
Ernie fired 3 warning shots w/c after he shot Pacifico and a person tried to stab
the former. The following day, he was brought by his uncle to the PC authorities
in Fort San Pedro for "safe-keeping" and turned over to the local police after
week.
Willie, seeing his cousin Danny, with a stab wound, LL being taken by two
policemen, and his wounded brother Gildo running towards the plaza. As a
consequence, he was told by his mother to look for his two brothers who were
wounded in the fight and to take them to the hospital. He turned himself in after
five days, upon learning that law enforcers were looking for him
MEDICO LEGAL: out of the 15 stab wounds and one gunshot wound Pacifico
sustained, five of the stab wounds were fatal. With regard to Diosdado, four (4)
stab wounds, out of ten (10), and the lone bullet wound he had sustained were
considered fatal
PROSECUTION IS FOUND MORE CREDIBE. Amaguin are convicted of mrder,
sentence of reclusion perpetua +accessory penalties. Willie is accomplice
COURT:
There was conspiracy between Gildo and Celso, who remains at large, the
evidence shows how Celso and Gildo simultaneously assaulted the Oro brothers.
While Celso lunged at Pacifico, Gildo aimed his slingshot at Danilo who was hit
by its dart, and immediately attacked Pacifico with a knife. Under the
circumstances, it is evident that Gildo and Celso acted in unison and cooperated
with each other toward the accomplishment of a common felonious objective.
Certainly, there was conspiracy between the brothers Gildo and Celso,
No treachery: While we have already ruled that even a frontal attack can be
treacherous, as when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed, 24
here, it appears that the aggressors did not employ means tending directly and
specially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising
from the defense which the offended parties might take.
It must be noted that the assailants attacked a group of six (6) individuals who
could have been armed.
No conspiracy tied to Willie. Liable for his own actions.
Voluntary surrender should be appreciated in their favor. While it may have
taken both Willie and Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the fact is, they
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities before arrest could be effected.
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the
following elements must be present: (a) the offender has not been actually
arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c)
the surrender must be voluntary. 28 All these requisites appear to have
attended their surrender.
In Crim. Cases Nos. 8041 and 8042, Gildo Amaguin is guilty of two (2) separate
crimes of homicide for the death of Diosdado and Pacifico, respectively. The
penalty prescribed by law for homicide is reclusion temporal. 29 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender with no aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty to
be imposed on accused Gildo Amaguin for each of the homicide he has
committed, which he must serve successively, should be taken from the
minimum of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion temporal the range of the
minimum period of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months, while the minimum should be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor the full range of which is
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
In Crim. case No. 8041, Willie Amaguin is guilty of homicide aggravated by
abuse of superior strength but offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, and in Crim. Case No. 8042, he is guilty of frustrated
homicide likewise aggravated by abuse of superior strength but offset by
voluntary surrender. For the homicide, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
which, as earlier mentioned, offsets the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, the maximum penalty should be taken from the medium of
the imposable penalty, which is reclusion temporal the range of the medium
period of which is fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum should be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree which is rision mayor in any of its
periods.
For the frustrated homicide, the imposable penalty is one degree lower than the
penalty prescribed by law for the consummated offense, and one degree lower
than reclusion temporal is prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and the attending circumstances which offset each other, the maximum
penalty to be imposed should be taken from the medium of the imposable
penalty, which is prision mayor the range of the medium period of which is
eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, while the minimum should be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional the
full range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, in any of its
periods.
PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ
Francisco de la Cruz and others, conspired, giving assault and use personal
violence upon one Yu Wan, by then and there giving him blows with his fist on
the face and other parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him physical
injuries which have required and will require medical attendance for a period of
more than one but less than nine days and have prevented and will prevent the
said Yu Wan from engaging in his customary labor for the same period of time;
and afterwards took, stole and carried away with him without the consent of the
owner thereof the following personal property of 26 pesos.
Francisco is a habitual delinquent
The appellant's plea of guilty does not constitute a mitigating circumstance
under article 13, subsection 7, of the Revised Penal Code, which requires that
this plea be spontaneous and that it be made prior to the presentation of
evidence by the prosecution. The confession of guilt, although subsequent to the
consummation of the crime and entirely alien to its development, constitutes a
cause for the mitigation of the penalty, not because it is a circumstance
modifying criminal responsibility already incurred and in the evolution of which
it has not intervened absolutely, but because, as an act of repentance and
respect for the law, it indicates a moral disposition in the accused favorable to
his reform. It is clear that these benefits are not deserved by the accused who
submits to the law only after the presentation of some evidence for the
prosecution, believing that in the end the trial will result in his conviction by
virtue thereof.
Eliminating the additional penalty by reason of habitual delinquency,
considering the presence of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of
the crime without any mitigating circumstance, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the appellant is sentenced to the penalty of from six months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to six years, ten months and one day of prision
mayor, as maximum, affirming the appealed sentence in all other respects, with
the costs.
Canta v People
Exuperancio Canta guilty of violation of P.D. No. 533, otherwise known as the
Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, and sentencing him to ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and
eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay the
costs
- steal and carry away one (1) black female cow belonging to Narciso
Gabriel valued at Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) without the
knowledge and consent of the aforesaid owner, to his damage and
prejudice
Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow, it was
passed down to ownder, lastly gardenia agapay. Agapay took the cow at (5pm,
march 13) to graze in the mountain, when he came back for it at past 9 o'clock
in the morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay found the cow gone. He found hoof
prints which led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos. He was told that petitioner
Exuperancio Canta had taken the animal.
Upon order of wonder, gardenia and maria tura went to Petitioner’s wife to
retrieve it but they were informed that the cow was delivered to his father.
Petitioner said that if narciso wa ste owner, he should claim it himself.
Petitioner accompanied the two to his father’s whose were maria recognized
the cow. Petitioner’s father was nt in the house and he said he would call them
the next day. Petitioner never called. Narcisco reported the matter to the police.
Petitioner admitted taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that he lost it
on dec 3, 1985. He presented 2 cert of owndershp to support claim.
Petitioner claimed he acquired the animal under an agreement which he had
with Pat. Diosdado Villanueva, that petitioner take care of a female cow of Pat.
Villanueva in consideration for which petitioner would get a calf if the cow
produced two offsprings. Petitioner claimed that the cow in question was his
share and that it was born on December 5, 1984. This cow, however, was lost on
December 2, 1985. Petitioner said he reported the loss to the police of
Macrohon, Padre Burgos, and Malitbog, on December 3, 1985 (Exh. A and Exh.
1).
They went to see if the cow would suckle the mother cow w/c it did. Florentino
refused to give cow and opt to call narciso to setlle matter. Narcisco did not
come. Petitioner tok cow to municipal hall and florentino and exuperancio were
called for investigation.
Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the municipal
treasurer, who stated that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had no Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle in the municipality of Padre Burgos (Exhs. E, E-1 and
2). 17 On the other hand, Telen testified that he issued the Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle to petitioner on March 24, 1986 but, at the instance
of petitioner, he (Telen) antedated it to February 27, 1985. On January 24, 1997,
the trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense
charged. In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution
COURT:
1) Petitioner claims good faith and honest belief in taking the cow
The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large cattle is
taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of
the owner; (4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme; (5) the
taking is with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with
or without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things. These
requisites are present in this case.
2) mistake of fact: he had a certificate of owndership that is fraudulent that
belies his good faitha dn honest mistake.
First, accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. The circumstance of voluntary
surrender has the following elements:
(1) the offender has not actually been arrested;
(2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and
(3) the surrender is voluntary.
In the present case, petitioner Exuperancio Canta had not actually been
arrested. In fact, no complaint had yet been filed against him when he
surrendered the cow to the authorities. It has been repeatedly held that for
surrender to be voluntary, there must be an intent to submit oneself
unconditionally to the authorities, showing an intention to save the authorities
the trouble and expense that his search and capture would require.
In petitioner's case, he voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall of Padre
Burgos to place it unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus
saved them the trouble of having to recover the cow from him. This
circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender and should
be considered in favor of petitioner.
Second, the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of §2(c) of P.
D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. However,
it erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. The trial court apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a special law
and applied §1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that "if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same." However, as held in People v.
Macatanda, 28 P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is in
terms of the classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the Revised
Penal Code, thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the
Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact,
§10 of the law provides:

The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules
and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the

modification that petitioner Exuperancio Canta is hereby SENTENCED to suffer
a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum, as maximum.