 Mario is not a common carrier.

Under the new civil code, common carriers are

persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, air, or water, for
compensation, offering their services to the public. In the present case, the
element of compensation is absent because the P1,000.00 per month which
Mario receives is only for accommodation, not for compensation.

 No. The new civil code provides that in a contract of carriage of passengers, a
stipulation limiting the responsibility of a common carrier from utmost
diligence of very cautious person to extraordinary diligence is void.

 Atty. Cruz should immediately make a claim to the carrier if the damage is
apparent or if not, he has 3 days from receipt within which to make a claim,
as provided under COGSA.

 Atty. Cruz has 1 year to bring an action, counted from the date when the goods
are delivered by the carrier to the arrastre operator, or when the goods were
lost, within 1 year from the time the carrier had the last opportunity to advise
the consignee of the arrival of the goods.

 The sending of a demand letter will not stop the action from prescribing. The
1 year prescriptive period is provided by COGSA and not by the new civil code.

 Atty. Cruz should file a complaint in court for the lost/damaged articles,
pursuant to the COGSA, otherwise, he will be barred from recovering if the 1-
year prescriptive period has already set in. [What is the remedy of the
consignee in case of rejection? The claim should be filed in court within 1 year
from the delivery of the goods by the common carrier to the arrastre operator]

 The complaint will not prosper. Under the provisions of code of commerce, in
case of damage to the goods carried by a common carrier by land, claim must
be filed immediately if damage is apparent, or, within 24 hours from receipt of
goods if not apparent. Since the claim to carrier was made only on the 3rd day
after he received them, such claim is invalid. Also, the law requires that before
one can file an action in court, it is essential that he already made a claim
with the carrier. In the present case, since no claim with carrier was validly
made, Pedro’s action will not prosper.

 PAL is obliged to indemnify Gerry of P2,000.00 only. Under the law, the
stipulation limiting the liability of the common carrier with respect to goods is
valid, provided the parties agree to such stipulation and unless the shipper
declares the value of the goods and pays a corresponding fare for such
declaration and payment, he can receive only P2,000.00 for the 2 boxes. [must
be in writing; signed by both parties; supported by a consideration other than
to transport; stipulated standard of care must not be less than that of a good
father of a family; other stipulations must be fair and reasonable.]

 By express provision of the civil code, the liability of the common carrier shall
be governed by the law of the country where the goods are transported. In the
 case at bar, since the goods are transported in Japan, Japanese law shall
apply.

 The common carrier cannot be held liable for damages. The liability of common
carrier with respect to acts of strangers and other passengers are limited only
to those which could not be foreseen or if foreseen, cannot be avoided. The
facts that the bus zigzagged on the hilly part of Quezon Province is only a
necessary consequence of travelling in hilly roads. Moreover, even if due
diligence on the part of the driver is exercised, the puking incident is still
unavoidable. The common carrier cannot control the fact that one of the
passengers would be dizzy and would eventually puke on Tanya.

 Both owners of thee 2 vessel shall bear their own loss. In case of collision of 2
vehicles by reason of fortuitous events, the colliding vessels shall bear their
own loss.

 If the cargoes of the vessels are also damaged, since the damage are by reason
of fortuitous event and in the absence of any negligence on the part of the
shipowners, the owners of the cargoes shall bear their own losses and
damages. The owners of the colliding vessel cannot be held liable for damages
because they can invoke the defense of fortuitous event. It is clear from the
facts that the typhoon is the proximate and only cause of the loss. Therefore,
the common carrier cannot be held liable.

 Rex cannot qualify to render public service because he does not have the
necessary financial capacity to render service to the public at large. One of the
requisites to be a public service is that one must have financial capacity. From
the facts of the case, he cannot be deemed to have the requisite financial
capacity. [Pedicab drivers, while they are common carriers, they are not
allowed to engage in public service because of lack of financial capacity.]

 Mac may invoke the provisions of the code of commerce and the civil code
because the flight is merely domestic in character, meaning, it is only within
the Philippines.

 The warsaw convention cannot be invoked because it only applies to

international flights where the place of destination and the place of origin are
in different countries, or when the place of destination and origin are in the
same country but there is a transshipment in another country belonging in
the itinerary. [port of origin is in one country and the port of destination is in
the same country but the agreed stopping place is in another country (the
stopover must be in the itinerary and not an emergency stopover)]

 It does not qualify as a vessel because in order to qualify as such, it must not
be a mere accessory to another watercraft; it must be registered with maritime
industry authority; it must be used to transport goods, passengers, or both;
and it is seagoing. The shallow waters of Laguna de Bay is not a sea and
therefore, it cannot be a vessel.
 NA Insurance is correct. COGSA does not apply to the arrastre operator.
Hence, the arrastre operator cannot invoke the 1 year prescriptive period.
COGSA contemplates a situation where the goods are still in the custody of
the carrier. Once the goods have already been transferred to the arrastre
operator, regardless whether the goods are shipped from a foreign port to a
Philippine port, COGSA will not anymore apply. The 1-year prescriptive period
only applies to the shipowner and the ship agent.

 Lando must sue Ruben, the customs broker. He cannot sue the common
carrier in this case because the tally sheets are clean and therefore, there is
no evidence against the common carrier to prove that the damages or loss of
the goods are made by reason of the carrier’s negligence.

 The basis of the action shall be breach of contract of carriage. Ruben, being a
customs broker, is considered a common carrier. Therefore, the liability shall
be based on breach of contract of carriage.

 Pedro can qualify as a common carrier because the law does not distinguish
as to the manner of transportation made. The test to determine whether or
not one is a common carrier is that he must hold himself out to anyone who
wishes to avail for his services for a fee as a public employment and not merely
for casual employment.

 If the charter is a bareboat charter, it is valid. However, if it is a voyage of time

charter, it is not valid. Assuming that the charter agreement is a bareboat or
demise charter wherein the charterer becomes the owner of the vessel pro hac
vice, the stipulation exempting the company from liability for the negligent
acts of its employees is valid. Therefore, if it is proved that the employee of the
company is negligent, then the company may not be held liable. Bareboat or
demise charter, in effect, makes the carrier a mere private carrier. Therefore,
it may stipulate exemption from liability against negligent employees.

o However, the same would be different if the charter is in the nature of

a voyage or time charter. If the charter is a voyage or time charter, the
stipulation is invalid because the carrier is considered as a common
carrier and therefore, any stipulation limiting the common carrier’s
liability on account of negligent acts of employees is void for being
contrary to public policy. Hence, the common carrier would be held
liable.

 No. This is because the flight is international in character and therefore, the
warsaw convention will apply. The complaint must be filed in Bangkok where
ABC Airways has a principal place of business, or where the ABC Airways is
operating and where the contract was established. Article 28 (1) of the warsaw
convention is jurisdictional in nature and therefore, filing of the complaint
other than those enumerated by law will not confer a court jurisdiction over
the case.
 The stipulation is valid because the contract of carriage in the case at bar is
gratuitious in character and therefore, a stipulation limiting the carrier’s
liability is valid except for wilfull and gross negligence is valid.

 The doctrine of inscrutable fault states that if there is a collision of 2 vessels

and it cannot be determined who is at fault, each bears his own loss. However,
both shipowners are solidarily liable for damage to all cargoes.

 The contention of R Corporation is wrong. In cases of breach of contract, the

defense of exercise of due diligence in the selection and engagement of
employees cannot lie. This is because the carrier is bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence in transporting the passengers. The fact that the
accident was a force majeure as invoked by the company cannot lie because
it was attended by the negligence of the driver. In order for force majeure to
lie, it must be the proximate and only cause of the loss.

 Yes, the insurer may seek indemnity from the carrier under the right of
subrogation. An insurer who indemnifies an insured steps into his shoes and
may therefore seek reimbursement from the carrier.

 The complaint should be filed within 1 year from the delivery of the goods to
the arrastre operator. The 1 year prescriptive period under COGSA also
applies to an insurer claiming indemnity from the carrier. To hold otherwise
would allow the shipper from indirectly circumventing what the law intends
to prohibit. Therefore, the insurer must file the claim on or before December
15, 2015.

 Pedro can hold the carrier liable for damages because when a carrier has
notice of any defet in the packaging of the goods and accepts them despite
such fact, he may be held liable and he cannot invoke as a defense that he is
exempt from liability by reason of the defect in the container or packaging of
the goods.

 The contentions are wrong. Having overloaded the vessel, the ship is not
anymore seaworthy and therefore, it may be said that the doctrine of limited
liability cannot apply in the case at bar because the shipowner was negligent
and failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods. When
death of passenger results from the concurrent negligence of the shipowner
and the captain, the doctrine of limited liability does not apply. The application
of the doctrine presupposes that the carrier has already overcame the
presumption of negligence. Moreover, the contention that the liability only
extends to the cargo is untenable. The carrier may be held liable for damages
on account of death of the passengers by reason of its negligence for failure to
exercise extraordinary diligence.

 For one to be able to procure property insurance, one must have insurable
interest over the property insured which may be an existing right, expectancy
founded on an existing interest, or inchoate right founded on an existing right.
Mario does not have any insurable interest over the house prior to the
 perfection of the sale as he has no existing right or interest over it. Thus, he
cannot insure the house.

 Sonia is not qualified. The Insurance Doe provides that an insured who
insures his own life may designate any person as his beneficiary subject to
Art. 739 in relation to Art. 2012 of the civil code. It prohibits donations
between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
between persons convicted of the same offense, in consideration thereof; and
in favor of public officers, his spouse, ascendants, or descendants in
consideration of his office. Notwithstanding Sonia’s separation from her
husband, she is still married and thus guilty of adultery and is further
prohibited from making each other beneficiaries of their insurance policies.

 A person may designate any person as the beneficiary if he takes an insurance

upon his own life, subject only to Art. 739 in relation to Art. 2012 of the civil
code which prohibits donations between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage, among others. Here, they are not guilty of adultery as Luz is not
married and also not guilty of concubinage as the indecent proposal is not
sufficient nor tantamount to the crime of concubinage. Thus, Fred may
designate Luz as the beneficiary.

 Yes. The insurance code allows a person to take an insurance upon the life of
a person in whom he depends in whole or in part for support or education,
among others. Thus, as Tony is dependent on Nardo for support, he may take
an insurance upon the life of the latter.

 As the beneficiary of an insurance policy, Beca has a vested right over the
policy and is allowed by law to pay the premiums therefor. As her payments
caused the policy to subsist at the time of the loss or death of the insured, she
may claim the indemnity as the beneficiary thereof.

Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.

Article 1744. A stipulation between the common carrier and the shipper or owner limiting the
liability of the former for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods to a degree less than
extraordinary diligence shall be valid, provided it be:

(1) In writing, signed by the shipper or owner;

(2) Supported by a valuable consideration other than the service rendered by the
common carrier; and

(3) Reasonable, just and not contrary to public policy.

Article 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust
and contrary to public policy:

(1) That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or shipper;

(2) That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss, destruction, or deterioration of
the goods;

(3) That the common carrier need not observe any diligence in the custody of the goods;

(4) That the common carrier shall exercise a degree of diligence less than that of a good
father of a family, or of a man of ordinary prudence in the vigilance over the movables
transported;

(5) That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omission of his or its
employees;

(6) That the common carrier's liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do
not act with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished;

(7) That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of
goods on account of the defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other
equipment used in the contract of carriage.

Article 1758. When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common
carrier's liability for negligence is valid, but not for wilful acts or gross negligence.

The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the common carrier's liability.

Article 739. The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time
of the donation;

(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof;

(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of
his office.

Article 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the
insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained
of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer
or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does
not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from
the person causing the loss or injury.
Article 333. Who are guilty of adultery.—Adultery is committed by any married woman who shall
have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge
of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.

Art. 334. Concubinage. — Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or
shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife,
or shall cohabit with her in any other place