Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v.

Presidential Agrarian Reform

Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011

RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

I. THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the
petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s
Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted
that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative
fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to
choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus
ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said
6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their
choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot,
signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation
(Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November
21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10,
1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May
11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda
Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

III. THE RULING

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et
al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda
Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE.
It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

 [The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since,
contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional
laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the
force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced
acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine
should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC
Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact
doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only
were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as
stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec.
31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution
thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority
clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of
RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that
may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which
only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to
rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the
DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian
reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but
were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too
restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are
considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the
area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the
DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified
FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita
per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation
and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which
shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of
Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by
intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation
(LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be
excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the
unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare
land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.
 [For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989
(the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to
own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject
of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the
SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued
under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the
notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of
the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases
cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely
apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land
valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The
landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just
compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what
is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT
lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land
interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10
years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land
ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the
qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly,
the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands
under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or
convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered
nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to
land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain
as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option
to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the
subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of
the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296%
unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands
of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares
and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will
constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus
one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially
fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

Malaga vs. Penachos (Digest)

Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.

GR No. 86995 03 September 1992

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western
Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The
notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on
December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock
in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built
Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon
of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of
them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC
for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-
qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of
their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be
directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the
bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground
that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the
preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been
awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary
injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure
project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?

RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested
by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the
state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by
P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created
in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the
government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and
offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the
president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such
employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of
P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its
charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the
General Appropriations Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree
as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as
regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).

Case Brief: Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs

Secretary of Education
MAY 6, 2018JEFF REY

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES,

ETC., petitioner,
 vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955
Facts:
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities assailed the constitutionality
of Act No. 2706, known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of
private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction.”

As contended by PACU, the Act is unconstitutional because of the following

reasons: 1) The act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as
teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; 2) it
will also deprive the parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their
children for civic efficiency; and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of
Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards
constitute towards unlawful delegation of legislative powers.

Additionally, the association contended that the Constitution guaranteed every

citizen the right to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous
governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said
right.

On the contrary, the Department of Education maintained that 1) the matters

does not contain justiciable controversy and thus does not need court decision or
intervention; 2) petitioners are inestoppels to challenge the validity of the said
act; and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid.

Section 1 of Act No. 2706 provides that “It shall be the duty of the Secretary of
Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private
schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate
instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction
given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly-authorized
representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools
and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the
same.”

Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 2706 is unconstitutional.

Held:
No, Act No. 2706 is constitutional.
The organic law provides that the state has the power to regulate private schools
for the development of morals, civic efficiency, and scientific aptitude of students.
The court found no justiciable controversy. The power of the courts to declare a
law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of
judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, judicial
power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. Thus, the court
does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question, such as that provided by the
petitioner. On this phase of the litigation, the court conclude that there has been
no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of
circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education.

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An

Act Converting The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.

Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative

district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following
the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the
1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati

is unconstitutional

Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a

special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides
that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA
7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to
hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment
law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government
unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of
a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census,
the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city
with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000,
its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of 250,000.

Macasiano vs NHA
G.R. No. 96541, Aug. 24, 1993
o Requisites for exercise of judicial review: (1) that the question must be raised by the
proper party; (2) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the
constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.
o LEGAL STANDING: a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.
o EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer's Suits
o REQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS: a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only
when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
o WHEN TAXPAYER SUIT MAY PROSPER: A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the
governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the
theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which
may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
o ACTUAL CONTROVERSY: one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a
court of justice.

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a Consignment
Agreement with Christie’s of New York, selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique
silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to
be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prior
to the auction sale, COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was already
opposition to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled and the
proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with
Christie’s of New York for the sale of the artworks

RULING:

On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial review

The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance
with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by
the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the
constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.

Standing of Petitioners

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on
Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons
having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be
joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal
question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must
be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and related party.

EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer’s Suit:

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule
on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the
Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with
the preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal
personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary
to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987
Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846
known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the
preservation and disposition of national and important cultural properties. Petitioners
also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and silverware are public
properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as
great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art
pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due
process of law in violation of the Constitution.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They
themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different
parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-
profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The
foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was
Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs
to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been
given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on
exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the
Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver
wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the Marcos
administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and
silverware were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and
transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the
Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of
these paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with
constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these
properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory
defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the
proper parties — the true owners thereof — whose authority to recover emanates from
their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having
failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces
have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right
whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Requisites for a Mandamus Suit

Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it
does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
this Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only
when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after
the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under the 1987
Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is
constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and
appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as
a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.
When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a
taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A
taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve
disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an
officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the
disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners
admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and
not with public money.

Actual Controversy

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of
controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or
based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the
case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent
public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date — 11
January 1991 — which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot
and academic.

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal
standing when paramount public interest is involved. We find however that there is no
such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.

CASE DIGEST : Legaspi Vs Civil Serv. Comm.

G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987 VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
respondent.

FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in
this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves
as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees
 HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does
not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers,
etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the
availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information
sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted
by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or
not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does
not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the
government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or,
if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To
hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review
1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency
concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ
of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles.
Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective
positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has
failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are,
and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who
pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various
professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if
actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in
this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service
eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law
upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes
imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies

G.R. No. 206794 November 26, 2013

BANKERS ASSOSICATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMELEC

Facts:
This was a petition for the issuance of a status quo to enjoin the implementation of the Money
Ban Resolution issued by COMELEC. The said ban prohibits the withdrawal of cash, encashment
of checks and conversion of any monetary instrument into cash from May 8 to 13, 2013 exceeding
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or its equivalent in any foreign currency, per day in
banks, finance companies, quasi-banks, pawnshops, remittance companies and institutions
performing similar functions. However, all other non-cash transactions are not covered. For this
purpose, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and other financial agencies of the government are
hereby deputized to implement with utmost dispatch and ensure strict compliance with this
resolution without violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 , as amended, and Republic
Act No. 6426.
Issue:
Whether or the COMELEC’s resolution was exercised in excess of its duty.

Held:
The Court held to dismiss the case, as it became moot and academic. The Court has issued a
Status Quo Ante on May 10, 2013, thus the Money Ban Resolution was not in force during the
most critical period of the elections. In addition, nothing in the exceptions of “moot and
academic” principle relates to the case at bar. The Court considers it significant that the BSP and
the Monetary Board continue to possess full and sufficient authority to address the COMELEC’s
concerns and to limit banking transactions to legitimate purposes without need for any formal
COMELEC resolution if and when the need arises. Likewise, the Congress should take note of the
Money Ban Resolution and the evil it sought to prevent in application of its plenary power for
future elections, thus rendering unnecessary further action on the merits of the assailed
Money Ban Resolution at this point.

Francisco Tatad vs Jesus Garcia, Jr.

243 SCRA 436 – Business Organization – Corporation Law – Corporate Nationality – Public
Utility – Nationality Requirement in Nationalized Areas of Activity
In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding was
made but certain corporations were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to qualify was
the EDSA LRT Consortium which was obviously formed for this particular undertaking. An
agreement was then made between the government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium. The agreement
was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law (RA 6957, amended
by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the facilities, i.e.,
railways, and shall supply the train cabs. Every phase that is completed shall be turned over
to the DOTC and the latter shall pay rent for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years,
it was projected that the government shall have fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium. Thereafter,
EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell the facilities to the government for $1.00.
However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmeña, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the
implementation of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign
corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot own a public
utility such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the nationalized areas of
activities. The petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as DOTC Secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition shall prosper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court made a clarification. The SC ruled that EDSA LRT
Consortium, under the agreement, does not and will not become the owner of a public utility
hence, the question of its nationality is misplaced. It is true that a foreign corporation cannot
own a public utility but in this case what EDSA LRT Consortium will be owning are the facilities
that it will be building for the EDSA railway project. There is no prohibition against a foreign
corporation to own facilities used for a public utility. Further, it cannot be said that EDSA LRT
Consortium will be the one operating the public utility for it will be DOTC that will operate the
railway transit. DOTC will be the one exacting fees from the people for the use of the railway
and from the proceeds, it shall be paying the rent due to EDSA LRT Consortium. All that
EDSA LRT Consortium has to do is to build the facilities and receive rent from the use thereof
by the government for 25 years – it will not operate the railway transit. Although EDSA LRT
Consortium is a corporation formed for the purpose of building a public utility it does not
automatically mean that it is operating a public utility. The moment for determining the
requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise, certificate or any other
form of authorization for that purpose.

Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit
of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Kilosbayan vs Morato
Legal Standing

KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

G.R. NO. 118910. July 30, 1993
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C.
CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE
TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN.
FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the
PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts:

1. GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract between Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the provision
in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries through a
collaboration, association, or joint venture.
2. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and
accessories on January 25, 1995. The agreement are as follow:
4. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less than an annual
rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
5. Rent is computed bi-weekly.
6. Term is 8 years.
7. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.
8. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P25M.
3. Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because:
4. It is the same as the old contract of lease.
5. It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.
6. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been approved by the President and
it is not most advantageous to the government.
4. PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
0. ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract.
1. ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No. 301.
2. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of Directors of PCSO.
3. Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment.
4. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
5. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.

Issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.

2. Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an online lottery is valid.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.
1. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues
were actually involved.
2. LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present
case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling
cannot be in any sense be regarded as “the law of this case”. The parties are the same but the
cases are not.
3. RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly
passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future
action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not
apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the
second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable
from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to
make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue.
4. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the
petitioner’s standing.
5. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually
involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are ‘real parties of interest’.
6. Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are
bound either principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract.
7. Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of
public contracts maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
2. Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
1. It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO now bears all losses because the operation
of the system is completely in its hands.
2. Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not
inclined to review.
3. Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt is
discussed in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.)
4. In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitioners state that this
would allow PGMC to control and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court held that the
claim is speculative. In any case, in the construction of statutes, the resumption is that in making
contracts, the government has acted in good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is
not a reason for denying power.
5. It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO does not have the power to enter into any
contract which would involve it in any form of “collaboration, association, or joint venture” for
 the holding of sweepstakes activities. This only mentions that PCSO is prohibited from investing
in any activities that would compete in their own activities.
6. It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does not compete with their own
activities. The Court held that is also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that the
transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited association with
the PGMC.
7. O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies,
materials and equipment and not on the contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases are only for
privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government owned buildings or
spaces for private use.

Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The motion for reconsideration of petitioners
is DENIED with finality.