REPUBLIC ACT No.

4200

AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED

VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in
the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the
same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or
in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.

Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be
done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the
provisions of the following section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes
such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six
months or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the
commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation
proceedings.

Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any
peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts
declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason,
espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas,
rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy
to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and
violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against
national security: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he
may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the
crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to be
committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and
inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts
of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any
person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are
no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose
communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or
recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the
telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to
overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words;
(3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the
authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which
shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or
renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.

All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration
of the period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed
package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority
stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the
number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or
copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or
copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope or
package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or
their contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon
motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation
or communications have been recorded.

The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance
within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.

Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained
or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible
in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
accordingly amended.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 19, 1965

G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is
among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties
using a telephone line.

The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed
by the petitioner.

In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal
of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions,
complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon
Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of
Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).

When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for
the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal
of the complaint for direct assault.

(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00.
A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00
no longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client
to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office;

(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical
High School;

(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;

(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco
Technical High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against
Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance
on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;

(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;

(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;

(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).

Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on
where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).

Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office
of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine
Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since
appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both
Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each
sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner
appealed to the appellate court.

On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court,
holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in
nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension
telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between
complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.

In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises
the following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and
accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by
the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had
authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No.
4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the
next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any
other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before
or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same
for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.

We rule for the petitioner.

We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of
evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a
telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and
his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences
simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at
extortion.

There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and
accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one
person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also
undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear
the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a
member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00
consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico
filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We
have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that
a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene,
criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's.

Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the
extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users
often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his
telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if
he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly
overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never
intended for such mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the
phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or
arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years
with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or
deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are
sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations between
a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss
be a proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under
the law?

The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the
enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the
same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964,
when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones
and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly
known communication device.

Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the
floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of
telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph,
detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission
was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of
the Act.

The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term
"device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a
complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable
apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main
telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to
another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication
corning from the other party or end.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in
statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular
clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but
the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
(see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:

Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract
may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are
different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the
same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together,
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and
7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as
to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a
general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the fact in human
experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and
that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are
used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v.
Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised
Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive
to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or
similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main
line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by
the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage
and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the
extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved
from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that
the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he
runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which
shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2
L Ed 2d 137-138):

Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to
ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes
the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear
the conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the
parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not occurred.

In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if
instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and
that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an
extension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is
included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we
explained the rationale behind the rule:

American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the
rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind
would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L
Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531,
69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452).
The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's
Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).

In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a
legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the
law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers
not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement"
but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than
the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly

objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce.

Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the
amendment than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment would only
consist of government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With this
amendment, they would have the right, and the government officials and the person in fact would
have the right to tape record their conversation.

Senator Tañada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.

Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and, therefore,
the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police officers or the
defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace
offices.

(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent outside
listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow
him to record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the chances of
falsifying the evidence is not very much.

Senator Tañada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false
testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false
testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record
and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will be used in
court.

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons
such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in
order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted
advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be
punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of
similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or
arrangements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and

ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a
manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy."1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in
addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript
on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka
napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —

ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00
p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States,
nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi
ka sa akin makakahingi.

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.

ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa
Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on
your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam
ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —

ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha
ka dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito.
"Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi
pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi
ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.
Magsumbong ka.3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize
wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted
herewith:

INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic
Act No. 4200, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not
being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the
said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to
other person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M. CUNETA Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner
that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation
punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication.4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with
this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First
Division) of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring
the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In
thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an
offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant
petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to
the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a
private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.8 In relation to
this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the
Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally,
petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private
respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms,
and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication
who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not
appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties
but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but
would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties
because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act
may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your
Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as
evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken
without the authorization of all the parties.

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of
one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If
the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties
should know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors
where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair
that the people whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the
observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed
that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we
demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest,
well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations
and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him
knowing that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded,
if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the
speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.

Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person — not between a speaker and a public.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
 xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance
of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the
acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed." 14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word
communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing
or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are
shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent,
in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase
"private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation"
and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to
the bill quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being
overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable
fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to
expose. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable
falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously.
The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our
Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the
nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of
life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals
— free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a
private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19
following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."20
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly
mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders
as among the acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and
leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 121087 August 26, 1999

FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 14, 1994, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena
City, dated July 27, 1992, finding petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide and sentencing him to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months, and (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, but increased the
death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Enrique "Ike" Lingan, from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.

The information against petitioner alleged —

That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province
of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then a member of the Lucena Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police
headquarters, where authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge of their duties, by
boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said victim
fell, by banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said Ike
Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused his death.

The evidence show that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and
Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together
with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing the
nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad
dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres,
Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture.2

At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached
Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a picture.3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam,
because this is my job."4 Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he
would kill him.5 When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the
joint followed by his companions.6

Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the
policeman on duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police
station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to
the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a
motorcycle.7

Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around
fifteen minutes.8 Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall,
said to him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba
kilala?"9 Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face
of Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasin na kita?"10

At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan
pumarito kami para magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate."11 Petitoner Navarro replied: "Walang
press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo."12 He then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make of
record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.13

This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan"14 Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang
ilalagay ko."15 The two then had a heated exchange.16 Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang
abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo."17 Petitioner Navarro replied:
"Ah, ganoon?"18

As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of the pistol above
the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but
petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him.19

Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike
Lingan and naghamon."20 He said to Sgt. Añonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter sa harap ni Alex
Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon."21 He then poked his gun at the right
temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter.22 Jalbuena could not affix his
signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print.23

Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a
policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy,
Casañada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But
Lingan died from his injuries.24

Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between
petitioner and the deceased.25 The following is an excerpt from the tape recording:

Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.

Navarro: Who is that abusing?

Lingan: I'm here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. I'm out of the problem.

xxx xxx xxx

Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . .

Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare, Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with
me. I just came here to ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me. I'm the number one loko
sa media. I'm the best media man. . . .
Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong
sabihing loko ka!

Lingan: I'm brave also.

Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-
tatrabaho lang ako ng ayon sa serbisyo ko.

Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .

Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na may balita
tayong maganda. Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang minomonopoly mo eh.

Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.

Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!

Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?

Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!

Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.

Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!

(Sounds of a scuffle)

Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo.
Alisin ko daw ang baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni
Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis tayo eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan.
Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha. Hinamon
ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital yan.

Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he
(petitioner) was able to duck both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice,
each time hitting his head on the concrete.26

In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:

After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the
defense, this court finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and
sufficient to create that moral certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is criminally
responsible.

The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the circumstance
overturn the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any
motive to make false accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or cause accusation of one
who had neither brought him harm or injury.

Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto
confirms the detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head injuries.

Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of
the defense that the head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latter's falling down on
the concrete pavement head first.

The Court of Appeals affirmed:

We are far from being convinced by appellant's aforesaid disquisition. We have carefully
evaluated the conflicting versions of the incident as presented by both parties, and we find the
trial court's factual conclusions to have better and stronger evidentiary support.

In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of appellant's aggression does
not impair the probative worth of his positive and logical account of the incident in question. In
fact, far from proving his innocence, appellant's unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the
defense has virtually admitted, clearly betrays his violent character or disposition and his
capacity to harm others. Apparently, the same motivation that led him into assailing Jalbuena
must have provoked him into also attacking Lingan who had interceded for Jalbuena and
humiliated him and further challenged to a fist fight.1âwphi1.nêt

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, appellant's explanation as how Lingan was injured is too tenuous and illogical
to be accepted. It is in fact contradicted by the number, nature and location of Lingan's injuries as
shown in the post-mortem report (Exh. D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when
he was outbalanced in the course of boxing the appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated
wounds in his left forehead, left eyebrow, between his left and right eyebrows, and contusion in
the right temporal region of the head (Exh. E.). Certainly, these injuries could not have been
resulted from Lingan's accidental fall.

Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS
CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED ON SPECULATION, SURMISE OR CONJECTURE;
THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON
RECORD; AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.

The appeal is without merit.

First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that
he was a biased witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an
interest in the conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable.27 Trial courts,
which have the opportunity observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a
witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony should be
given credence.28 In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in
according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.

Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording had made. It may be asked
whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The
answer is in the affirmative. The law provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in
the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the
same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or
in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained
or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible
in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.29
Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is
not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the
testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played
in the court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons
such are claimed to belong.30 In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the
voice recording;31 that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded;32 and that the
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.33 A sufficient foundation was thus laid
for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against
him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and
Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.

Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued the
medical certificate,34 dated February 5, 1990, containing the following findings:

Post Mortem Findings:

= Dried blood, forehead & face

= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth

= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right

= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral eyebrow, Left

= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left & right eyebrow

= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left

= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes

CAUSE OF DEATH:

= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK

= BLOW ON THE HEAD

Dr. Yamamato testified:

Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings number one, which is
oozing of blood from the forehead?

A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.

Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1.?

A It is possible, sir.

Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete floor?

A Possible, sir.

FISCAL:
What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your findings No. 2 doctor?

WITNESS:

It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.

Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?

A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun because the butt of a
gun is small, sir.

Q How about this findings No. 4?

A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.

Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?

A Same cause, sir.

Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?

A Same thing sir.

Q How about the last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what could have caused it
doctor?

WITNESS:

It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.

FISCAL:

In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of death it states: Cause of Death:
Cerebral concussion and Shock, will you explain it?

A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang utak" or jarring of the brain, sir.

Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?

A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.

Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?

A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.

Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?

A Yes, sir.

Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the deceased?

A May be, sir.

FISCAL:

Which of these two more likely, to cause death?

WITNESS:

Shock, sir.

Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock?

A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier sir.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL:

Could a bumping or pushing of one's head against a concrete floor have caused shock?

WITNESS:

Possible, sir.

How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?

A Possible, sir.35

The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit Lingan
with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist.

Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part
of the offended party immediately preceding the act should have been appreciated in favor of
petitioner Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the
offended party, capable of exciting, inciting or irritating anyone.36 The provocation must be
sufficient and should immediately precede the act.37 To be sufficient, it must be adequate to
excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity.38 And
it must immediately precede the act so much so that there is no interval between the provocation
by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the accused.39

In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner,
constituted sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso,40 we appreciated this mitigating
circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter had
repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this mitigating circumstance should be
considered in favor of petitioner Navarro.

Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic
exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows
that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be taken into
account in determining the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner Navarro. The allowance
of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal liability shall be incurred
by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended.41 In People v. Castro,42 the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him
guilty of homicide.

However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner
Navarro. The offense in this case was committed right in the police station where policemen
were discharging their public functions.43

The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide, for
which the penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were
two mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in
its minimum period.44 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty
next lower degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its
minimum period.45

The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in

accordance with the current jurisprudence.46

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that
petitioner Felipe Navarro is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison terms of 18 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the

Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for the writs of certiorari and prohibition to set aside "acts, issuances, and
orders" of respondents Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez (respondent Gonzales) and the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), particularly an NTC "press release" dated 11
June 2005, warning radio and television stations against airing taped conversations allegedly
between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano (Garcillano)1 under pain of suspension or revocation of their
airwave licenses.

The Facts

On 24 June 2004, Congress, acting as national board of canvassers, proclaimed President Arroyo
winner in the 2004 presidential elections.2 President Arroyo received a total of 12,905,808 votes,
1,123,576 more than the votes of her nearest rival, Fernando Poe, Jr. Sometime before 6 June
2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the conversation
discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005,
Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a press conference in Malacañang Palace,
where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of
conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as
President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been "spliced" to
make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.

However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman's voice in the compact
discs was not President Arroyo’s after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming
possession of the genuine copy of the Garci Tapes.4 Respondent Gonzalez ordered the National
Bureau of Investigation to investigate media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for
possible violation of Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing
the Garci Tapes is a "cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations" issued to them.5 On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the
broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP), to dispel fears of
censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to press
freedom.6
On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to
nullify the "acts, issuances, and orders" of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on
the following grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III of the
Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and television stations
against airing the Garci Tapes.

In their Comment to the petition, respondents raised threshold objections that (1) petitioner has
no standing to litigate and (2) the petition fails to meet the case or controversy requirement in
constitutional adjudication. On the merits, respondents claim that (1) the NTC's press release of
11 June 2005 is a mere "fair warning," not censorship, cautioning radio and television networks
on the lack of authentication of the Garci Tapes and of the consequences of airing false or
fraudulent material, and (2) the NTC did not act ultra vires in issuing the warning to radio and
television stations.

In his Reply, petitioner belied respondents' claim on his lack of standing to litigate, contending
that his status as a citizen asserting the enforcement of a public right vested him with sufficient
interest to maintain this suit. Petitioner also contests respondents' claim that the NTC press
release of 11 June 2005 is a mere warning as it already prejudged the Garci Tapes as inauthentic
and violative of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, making it a "cleverly disguised x x x gag order."

ISSUE

The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release of
11 June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

I vote to (1) grant the petition, (2) declare the NTC warning, embodied in its press release dated
11 June 2005, an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression, and (3) enjoin the NTC
from enforcing the same.

1. Standing to File Petition

Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in
the present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a
government action in violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the government action
is directed at such citizen. The government action may chill into silence those to whom the
action is directed. Any citizen must be allowed to take up the cudgels for those who have been
cowed into inaction because freedom of expression is a vital public right that must be defended
by everyone and anyone.

Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a free, open and democratic
society, is of transcendental importance that must be defended by every patriotic citizen at the
earliest opportunity. We have held that any concerned citizen has standing to raise an issue of
transcendental importance to the nation,7 and petitioner in this present petition raises such issue.

2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment

Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of
expression is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all other civil and political
rights. No society can remain free, open and democratic without freedom of expression. Freedom
of expression guarantees full, spirited, and even contentious discussion of all social, economic
and political issues. To survive, a free and democratic society must zealously safeguard freedom
of expression.

Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom
of expression allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office. Freedom
of expression crystallizes important public policy issues, and allows citizens to participate in the
discussion and resolution of such issues. Freedom of expression allows the competition of ideas,
the clash of claims and counterclaims, from which the truth will likely emerge. Freedom of
expression allows the airing of social grievances, mitigating sudden eruptions of violence from
marginalized groups who otherwise would not be heard by government. Freedom of expression
provides a civilized way of engagement among political, ideological, religious or ethnic
opponents for if one cannot use his tongue to argue, he might use his fist instead.

Freedom of expression is the freedom to disseminate ideas and beliefs, whether competing,
conforming or otherwise. It is the freedom to express to others what one likes or dislikes, as it is
the freedom of others to express to one and all what they favor or disfavor. It is the free
expression for the ideas we love, as well as the free expression for the ideas we hate.9 Indeed, the
function of freedom of expression is to stir disputes:

[I]t may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.10

Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of
expression:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the
Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however,
courts have carved out narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.

The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to
only four categories of expression, namely: pornography,11 false or misleading advertisement,12
advocacy of imminent lawless action,13 and danger to national security.14 All other expression is
not subject to prior restraint. As stated in Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal
Communication Commission, "[T]he First Amendment (Free Speech Clause), subject only to
narrow and well understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the
content of messages expressed by private individuals."15
Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any
content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A
protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus, there
can be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on the
ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on proposed amendments to the
Constitution.

Prior restraint on expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of
the expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based restraint. If the content-based
prior restraint is directed at protected expression, courts will strike down the restraint as
unconstitutional because there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression.
The analysis thus turns on whether the prior restraint is content-based, and if so, whether such
restraint is directed at protected expression, that is, those not falling under any of the recognized
categories of unprotected expression.

If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral
even if it burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time,
place or manner of the expression in public places16 without any restraint on the content of the
expression. Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.17

An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and route of a rally
passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior restraint on protected expression
which does not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of validity and is
thus enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.18 Courts will uphold time, place or manner
restraints if they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,
and leave open ample alternative channels of expression.19

In content-neutral prior restraint on protected speech, there should be no prior restraint on the
content of the expression itself. Thus, submission of movies or pre-taped television programs to a
government review board is constitutional only if the review is for classification and not for
censoring any part of the content of the submitted materials.20 However, failure to submit such
materials to the review board may be penalized without regard to the content of the materials.21
The review board has no power to reject the airing of the submitted materials. The review
board’s power is only to classify the materials, whether for general patronage, for adults only, or
for some other classification. The power to classify expressions applies only to movies and pre-
taped television programs22 but not to live television programs. Any classification of live
television programs necessarily entails prior restraint on expression.

Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or low-value

expression. By definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression is content-based23 since the
restraint is imposed because of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are currently only four
categories of unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized
false or misleading advertisement as unprotected expression only in October 2007.24

Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior
restraint on unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is
presumed unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the
constitutionality of the prior restraint.25

Courts will subject to strict scrutiny any government action imposing prior restraint on
unprotected expression.26 The government action will be sustained if there is a compelling State
interest, and prior restraint is necessary to protect such State interest. In such a case, the prior
restraint shall be narrowly drawn - only to the extent necessary to protect or attain the
compelling State interest.

Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent punishment.
Although subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are disseminated to the
public. Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be subject to
subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or criminally. Thus, the publication of election surveys
cannot be subject to prior restraint,28 but an aggrieved person can sue for redress of injury if the
survey turns out to be fabricated. Also, while Article 201 (2)(b)(3) of the Revised Penal Code
punishing "shows which offend any race or religion" cannot be used to justify prior restraint on
religious expression, this provision can be invoked to justify subsequent punishment of the
perpetrator of such offensive shows.29

Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not warrant prior restraint, the same expression may
still be subject to subsequent punishment, civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of
unprotected expression. However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of
subsequent punishment, logically it cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior
restraint. Thus, since profane language or "hate speech" against a religious minority is not
subject to subsequent punishment in this jurisdiction,30 such expression cannot be subject to prior
restraint.

If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is subject
to subsequent punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the unprotected expression
before prior restraint on such expression can be justified. The legislature must punish the
unprotected expression because it creates a substantive evil that the State must prevent.
Otherwise, there will be no legal basis for imposing a prior restraint on such expression.

The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action
imposing prior restraint on three categories of unprotected expression – pornography,31 advocacy
of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security - is the clear and present danger
test.32 The expression restrained must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a
substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, and such danger must be grave and
imminent.33

Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms - it may be a law, administrative
regulation, or impermissible pressures like threats of revoking licenses or withholding of
benefits.34 The impermissible pressures need not be embodied in a government agency
regulation, but may emanate from policies, advisories or conduct of officials of government
agencies.

3. Government Action in the Present Case

The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the airing or
broadcasting of the Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a "cause for the
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to radio
and television stations. The NTC warning, embodied in a press release, relies on two grounds.
First, the airing of the Garci Tapes "is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and
the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to radio and TV
stations." Second, the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated, and subsequent investigation
may establish that the tapes contain false information or willful misrepresentation.

Specifically, the NTC press release contains the following categorical warning:

Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and in order not to unnecessarily
aggravate the same, the NTC warns all radio stations and television networks owners/operators
that the conditions of the authorizations and permits issued to them by Government like the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that said companies
shall not use its stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful
misrepresentation. Relative thereto, it has come to the attention of the Commission that certain
personalities are in possession of alleged taped conversation which they claim, (sic) involve the
President of the Philippines and a Commissioner of the COMELEC regarding their supposed
violation of election laws. These personalities have admitted that the taped conversations are
product of illegal wiretapping operations.

Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly authenticated nor could it be said
at this time that the tapes contain an accurate or truthful representation of what was recorded
therein, (sic) it is the position of the Commission that the continuous airing or broadcast of
the said taped conversations by radio and television stations is a continuing violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate
of Authority issued to these radio and television stations. If it has been (sic) subsequently
established that the said tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or
appropriate investigation, the concerned radio and television companies are hereby warned
that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall
be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations issued to the said companies. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what substantive evil
the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC
does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil, of grave and imminent character, that the State has a right and duty to prevent.

The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing of the Garci
Tapes constitutes a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. At the time of issuance of
the NTC press release, and even up to now, the parties to the conversations in the Garci Tapes
have not complained that the wire-tapping was without their consent, an essential element for
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.35 It was even the Office of the President, through the
Press Secretary, that played and released to media the Garci Tapes containing the alleged
"spliced" conversation between President Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano. There is also
the issue of whether a wireless cellular phone conversation is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping
Law.

Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes
constitutes a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were not
even given an opportunity to be heard by the NTC. The NTC did not observe basic due process
as mandated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.36

The NTC claims that the Garci Tapes, "after a prosecution or the appropriate investigation," may
constitute "false information and/or willful misrepresentation." However, the NTC does not
claim that such possible false information or willful misrepresentation constitutes misleading
commercial advertisement. In the United States, false or deceptive commercial speech is
categorized as unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. Recently, this Court
upheld the constitutionality of Section 6 of the Milk Code requiring the submission to a
government screening committee of advertising materials for infant formula milk to prevent false
or deceptive claims to the public.37 There is, however, no claim here by respondents that the
Garci Tapes constitute false or misleading commercial advertisement.

The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as accurate or truthful. The
NTC also concedes that only "after a prosecution or appropriate investigation" can it be
established that the Garci Tapes constitute "false information and/or willful misrepresentation."
Clearly, the NTC admits that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes contain false
information or willful misrepresentation.

4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case

The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint
because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes
might contain "false information and/or willful misrepresentation," and thus should not be
publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based.

5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case

The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any
of the four existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The
airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that a
presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner
right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections.

Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public
discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be
subject to prior restraint. Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the
highest political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever
there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest
rank,38 and among different kinds of political expression, the subject of fair and honest elections
would be at the top. In any event, public discussion on all political issues should always remain
uninhibited, robust and wide open.

The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint
on protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of
course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers
the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may
be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject
matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger
the security of the State.39

The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the
enactment of any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of
expression.40 The only exceptions to this rule are the four recognized categories of unprotected
expression. However, the content of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these categories
of unprotected expression.

The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the
Garci Tapes is a matter of important public concern. The Constitution guarantees the people’s
right to information on matters of public concern.41 The remedy of any person aggrieved by the
public airing of the Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law
after the commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the
remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

The present case involves a prior restraint on protected expression. Prior restraint on protected
expression differs significantly from subsequent punishment of protected expression. While there
can be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be subsequent punishment for
protected expression under libel, tort or other laws. In the present case, the NTC action seeks
prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes, not punishment of personnel of radio and
television stations for actual violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint

The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter of the
NTC does not vest NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio and television
stations.

In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never be
subject to prior restraint. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the airing of the
Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate on
the factual and legal issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and present
danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, so as to
justify the prior restraint.

Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior adjudication by the
courts on whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This is a necessary consequence from the
presumption of invalidity of any prior restraint on unprotected expression. Unless ruled by the
courts as a valid prior restraint, government agencies cannot implement outright such prior
restraint because such restraint is presumed unconstitutional at inception.

As an agency that allocates frequencies or airwaves, the NTC may regulate the bandwidth
position, transmitter wattage, and location of radio and television stations, but not the content of
the broadcasts. Such content-neutral prior restraint may make operating radio and television
stations more costly. However, such content-neutral restraint does not restrict the content of the
broadcast.

7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity

Assuming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression, the NTC action
imposing prior restraint on the airing is presumed unconstitutional. The Government bears a
heavy burden to prove that the NTC action is constitutional. The Government has failed to meet
this burden.

In their Comment, respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior
restraint on the public airing of the Garci Tapes. The respondents claim that they merely "fairly
warned" radio and television stations to observe the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC
circulars on program standards. Respondents have not explained how and why the observance by
radio and television stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars
constitutes a compelling State interest justifying prior restraint on the public airing of the Garci
Tapes.

Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal statute, can always be
subject to criminal prosecution after the violation is committed. Respondents have not explained
why there is a need in the present case to impose prior restraint just to prevent a possible future
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. Respondents have not explained how the violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars, can incite imminent lawless behavior
or endanger the security of the State. To allow such restraint is to allow prior restraint on all
future broadcasts that may possibly violate any of the existing criminal statutes. That would be
the dawn of sweeping and endless censorship on broadcast media.

8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint

The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits of radio and
television stations constitutes impermissible pressure amounting to prior restraint on protected
expression. Whether the threat is made in an order, regulation, advisory or press release, the
chilling effect is the same: the threat freezes radio and television stations into deafening silence.
Radio and television stations that have invested substantial sums in capital equipment and market
development suddenly face suspension or cancellation of their permits. The NTC threat is thus
real and potent.

In Burgos v. Chief of Staff,42 this Court ruled that the closure of the We Forum newspapers under
a general warrant "is in the nature of a previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom
of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law." The NTC warning to radio and television
stations not to air the Garci Tapes or else their permits will be suspended or cancelled has the
same effect – a prior restraint on constitutionally protected expression.

In the recent case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,43 this Court declared unconstitutional

government threats to close down mass media establishments that refused to comply with
government prescribed "standards" on news reporting following the declaration of a State of
National Emergency by President Arroyo on 24 February 2006. The Court described these
threats in this manner:

Thereafter, a wave of warning[s] came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff
Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was "meant to show a 'strong presence,' to
tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this
government." Director General Lomibao further stated that "if they do not follow the standards
— and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do
not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 — we will recommend a
'takeover.'" National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and
radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national
emergency. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any
broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the
national security is threatened.44 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court struck down this "wave of warning[s]" as impermissible restraint on freedom of
expression. The Court ruled that "the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical
seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL."45

The history of press freedom has been a constant struggle against the censor whose weapon is the
suspension or cancellation of licenses to publish or broadcast. The NTC warning resurrects the
weapon of the censor. The NTC warning is a classic form of prior restraint on protected
expression, which in the words of Near v. Minnesota is "the essence of censorship."46 Long
before the American Declaration of Independence in 1776, William Blackstone had already
written in his Commentaries on the Law of England, "The liberty of the press x x x consists in
laying no previous restraints upon publication x x x."47

Although couched in a press release and not in an administrative regulation, the NTC threat to
suspend or cancel permits remains real and effective, for without airwaves or frequencies, radio
and television stations will fall silent and die. The NTC press release does not seek to advance a
legitimate regulatory objective, but to suppress through coercion information on a matter of vital
public concern.
9. Conclusion

In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected
expression. There can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This rule has
no exception.

I therefore vote to (1) grant the petition, (2) declare the NTC warning, embodied in its press
release dated 11 June 2005, an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression, and (3)
enjoin the NTC from enforcing the same.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, vs. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY,

SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for one's
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference demands
respect."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 10,
2007 Decision3 and the September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473.

Factual Antecedents

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as
Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr.
and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue,
Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at
Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an
auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo
filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that
petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would
destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that
case, denied Aldo’s application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its
allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005
illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance
cameras facing petitioners’ property;11 that respondents, through their employees and without the
consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and that the acts
of respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be
ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal
surveillance.14

In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video
surveillance cameras,16 nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners’
construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere
stockholders.18

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a TRO. The
dispositive portion of the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction is granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court sets
at ₱50,000.00, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue against the respondents Alexander
Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the
revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their building overlooking the side of
petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property
can no longer be viewed within a distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo
Servitec, facing the road.

IT IS SO ORDERED.20

Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order22 dated
February 6, 2006.23 Thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction in consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled
that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because
petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA
explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not
violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence.28 The CA
alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed
video surveillance cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical
personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31 The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us

GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and
February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.32
 Issues

Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:

I.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET

ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE RTC DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006
HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT

PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE,
THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS
CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER
SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.

III.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE

THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC.
THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY
UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.

IV.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE

SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND
GAVE X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33

Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to
privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because
respondents’ installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a
revolving camera covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a violation of
petitioners’ right to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins
persons from prying into the private lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the
privacy of another’s residence, petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor
Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for
business, it is still covered by the said provision.37

As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners claim that
respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that respondents only want to hide behind
Aldo’s corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real owners of the
building, where the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business
consenting to the ocular inspection conducted by the court.39

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their
right to privacy since the property involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents maintain
that they had nothing to do with the installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were
installed by Aldo, the registered owner of the building,41 as additional security for its building.42
Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case.43

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is defined as "the right
to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the
right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."46 Simply
put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone."47

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s
abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under
the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.48

The right to privacy under Article 26(1)

of the Civil Code covers business offices

where the public are excluded

therefrom and only certain individuals

are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and
provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals.
It states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

xxxx

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be
denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering
inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter."49 The phrase "prying
into the privacy of another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is
entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." This does not
mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also
"similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded
therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude
the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence,"
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private.
And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right
to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
only to residences.

The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is used to determine whether there is a violation of
the right to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated
that "the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1)
whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and
practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of privacy."53
Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-
case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.54

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover
places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual,
whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry
into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would be no different from
eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining
order. The operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their
building, violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The
camera does not only focus on respondents’ property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo
Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of
petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in
asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going
construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of
Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building
and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back.
Respondents’ camera cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the
respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners
as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure
the rights of a third person."55

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their
property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of
video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion
thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the
issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and
should not be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56
Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that
petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to
the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission which had violated the legal right of
the former.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or

injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to
the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the
former."57

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own
the building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning,
however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building
does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance
cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras
in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case.59 During
the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when
respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but
they did not seem to care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and
eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as
early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family
concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.62 With these factual circumstances in
mind, we believe that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders,
records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not
owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular
inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the
building and answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video
surveillance cameras.64 And when respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated
October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer
damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these
instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using
the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the
foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the
Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6,
200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223
are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST : Chavez Vs Gonzales

G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M.
GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.

Facts : Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the
parties to the conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor President
Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a press
conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two
compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the
woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second
compact disc had been "spliced" to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to
Garcillano. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television
stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a "cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation
of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.5 On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with
officers of the broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP), to dispel
fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to
press freedom

Issue : WON the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an
impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression

Held : When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four
categories of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of
imminent lawless action, and danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to
prior restrain Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value
expression. Any content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without
exception. A protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship
Prior restraint on expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of
the expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based restraint. If the prior restraint
is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it burdens
expression The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior
restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci
Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful misrepresentation," and thus should not be
publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based The public airing of the Garci
Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four existing categories
of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is
essentially a political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly
improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the
last presidential elections. The content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the
ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that
cannot be subject to prior restraint. Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is
one of the highest political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost
protection. If ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would
occupy the highest rank. The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no
content-based prior restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press
release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a
wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape
becomes unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no
claim here by respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security
and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State. The alleged violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on the airing of the
Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the enactment of any law, and that
includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of expression. The only exceptions to this rule
are the four recognized categories of unprotected expression. However, the content of the Garci
Tapes does not fall under any of these categories of unprotected expression.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and
NTC
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the
parties to the conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to favor President
Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in
Malacañang Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc
recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both
recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had
been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s voice in the compact
discs was not President Arroyo’s after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming
possession of the genuine copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to
investigate media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic
Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing
the Garci Tapes is a ” cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations” issued to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the
broadcasters group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press
statement expressing commitment to press freedom
On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to
nullify the “acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on
the following grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III of the
Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and television stations
against airing the Garci Tapes.
ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press
release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.
1. Standing to File Petition
Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in
the present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a
government action in violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the government action
is directed at such citizen. Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a
free, open and democratic society, is of transcendental importance that must be defended by
every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity.

2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment

Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of
expression is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all other civil and political
rights. Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials.
Freedom of expression allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office.
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of
expression:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the
Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however,
courts have carved out narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.

The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to
only four categories of expression, namely:

pornography,
false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.

Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any
content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A
protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus, there
can be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on the
ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on proposed amendments to the
Constitution.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral
even if it burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time,
place or manner of the expression in public places without any restraint on the content of the
expression. Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. An example of
a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and route of a rally passing
through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior restraint on protected expression which does
not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of validity and is thus
enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.

Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or low-value

expression. By definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression is content-based since the
restraint is imposed because of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are currently only four
categories of unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized
false or misleading advertisement as unprotected expression only in October 2007.

Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint
on unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is presumed
unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality
of the prior restraint.
Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent punishment.
Although subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are disseminated to the
public. Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be subject to
subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or criminally. Similarly, if the unprotected expression
does not warrant prior restraint, the same expression may still be subject to subsequent
punishment, civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected expression.
However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of subsequent punishment,
logically it cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior restraint. Thus, since
profane language or “hate speech” against a religious minority is not subject to subsequent
punishment in this jurisdiction, such expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.

If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is subject
to subsequent punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the unprotected expression
before prior restraint on such expression can be justified.
The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action
imposing prior restraint on three categories of unprotected expression – pornography,31
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security – is the clear and present
dangertest.32 The expression restrained must present a clear and present danger of bringing
about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, and such danger must be
grave and imminent.
Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms – it may be a law, administrative
regulation, or impermissible pressures like threats of revoking licenses or withholding
of benefits.34 The impermissible pressures need not be embodied in a government agency
regulation, but may emanate from policies, advisories or conduct of officials of government
agencies.
3. Government Action in the Present Case
The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the airing or
broadcasting of the Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a “cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations” issued to radio and television
stations. The NTC warning, embodied in a press release, relies on two grounds. First, the airing
of the Garci Tapes “is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of
the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to radio and TV stations.”
Second, the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated, and subsequent investigation may establish
that the tapes contain false information or willful misrepresentation.

The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what substantive evil
the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC
does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil, of grave and imminent character, that the State has a right and duty to prevent.
The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing of the Garci
Tapes constitutes a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. There is also the issue of
whether a wireless cellular phone conversation is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes
constitutes a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were not
even given an opportunity to be heard by the NTC. The NTC did not observe basic due process
as mandated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.

The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as accurate or truthful. The
NTC also concedes that only “after a prosecution or appropriate investigation” can it be
established that the Garci Tapes constitute “false information and/or willful misrepresentation.”
Clearly, the NTC admits that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes contain false information
or willful misrepresentation.

4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case

The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint
because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes
might contain “false information and/or willful misrepresentation,” and thus should not be
publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based.

5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case

The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any
of the four existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The
airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that a
presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner
right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections.

Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public
discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be
subject to prior restraint. In any event, public discussion on all political issues should always
remain uninhibited, robust and wide open.

The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on
protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course,
if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the
security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be
subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter
of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the
security of the State.

The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the
Garci Tapes is a matter of important public concern. The Constitution guarantees the people’s
right to information on matters of public concern. The remedy of any person aggrieved by the
public airing of the Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law
after the commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the
remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be subsequent
punishment for protected expression under libel, tort or other laws. In the present case, the NTC
action seeks prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes, not punishment of personnel of radio
and television stations for actual violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint

The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter of the
NTC does not vest NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio and television
stations.

In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never be
subject to prior restraint. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the airing of the
Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate on
the factual and legal issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and present
danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, so as to
justify the prior restraint.

Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior adjudication by the
courts on whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This is a necessary consequence from the
presumption of invalidity of any prior restraint on unprotected expression.

7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity

Respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior restraint on the public
airing of the Garci Tapes. The respondents claim that they merely “fairly warned” radio and
television stations to observe the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars on program
standards. Respondents have not explained how and why the observance by radio and television
stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars constitutes a compelling State
interest justifying prior restraint on the public airing of the Garci Tapes.

Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal statute, can always be
subject to criminal prosecution after the violation is committed. Respondents have not explained
how the violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars, can incite
imminent lawless behavior or endanger the security of the State.

8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint

The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits of radio and
television stations constitutes impermissible pressure amounting to prior restraint on protected
expression. Whether the threat is made in an order, regulation, advisory or press release, the
chilling effect is the same: the threat freezes radio and television stations into deafening silence.
Radio and television stations that have invested substantial sums in capital equipment and market
development suddenly face suspension or cancellation of their permits. The NTC threat is thus
real and potent.

9. Conclusion
In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected
expression. There can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This rule has
no exception.
Case Digest: Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr.
G.R. No. 179736 : June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING,Petitioners, v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR.

and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaintfor Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as
Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr.
and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue,
Cebu;that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at
Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;that respondents constructed an
auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo
filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;that in that case, Aldo claimed that
petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would
destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners property;that the court, in that
case, denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its
allegations;that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005
illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance
cameras facing petitioners property;that respondents, through their employees and without the
consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going construction;and that the acts of
respondents violate petitioners right to privacy.Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be
ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal
surveillance.

In their Answer with Counterclaim,respondents claimed that they did not install the video
surveillance cameras,nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners
construction.They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Ordergranting the application for a TRO.

Respondents moved for a reconsiderationbut the RTC denied the same in its Orderdated
February 6, 2006.

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decisiongranting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled
that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because
petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.The CA explained
that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since
the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence. The CA alsosaid that since
respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance
cameras.They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.Thus,
they are not the proper parties.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy?

2. Whether or not respondents are the proper parties to this suit?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.

POLITICAL LAW: right to privacy

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitutionand in our laws. It is defined as "the right to
be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities."It is the right
of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."Simply
put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone."

The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them against the States
abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under
the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

CIVIL LAW: right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices
where the public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to privacy and
provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals.
It states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be
denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering
inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter."The phrase "prying
into the privacy of anothers residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is
entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of anothers residence." This does not
mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also
"similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded
therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in.

Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude
the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence,"
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private.
And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right
to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
only to residences.

POLITICAL LAW: the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to determine whether

there is a violation of the right to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.In Ople v. Torres,we enunciated that
"the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether,
by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is
one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may,
therefore, limit or extend an individuals "reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence, the
reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis
since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover
places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual,
whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry
into the privacy of anothers residence or business office as it would be no different from
eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining
order. The operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their
building, violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The
camera does not only focus on respondents property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo
Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of
petitioners.
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in
asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going
construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of
Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building
and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back.
Respondents camera cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners lot. To allow the
respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners
as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure
the rights of a third person."

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their
property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of
video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners property or covering a significant portion
thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the
issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and
should not be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the
court.Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in
finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

REMEDEIAL LAW: A real party defendant

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or

injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to
the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission which had violated the legal right of the
former."

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own
the building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras. Such reasoning,
however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building
does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance
cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras
in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case.During the
hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when
respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but
they did not seem to care,and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and
eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC.He also admitted that as early
as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning
the boundaries of their respective properties.With these factual circumstances in mind, we
believe that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders,
records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not
owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular
inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the
building and answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video
surveillance cameras.And when respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated
October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer
damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and transferred.Noticeably, in these
instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely
using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view
of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
No. L-69809, October 16, 1986 [145 SCRA 112]

FACTS:

A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and
his client Manuel Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call to Laconico to give
their terms for withdrawal of their complaint.

Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also a lawyer, to come to his office to advise
him about the proposed settlement. When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to
secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. After enumerating the conditions, several
calls were made to finally confirm if the settlement is agreeable to both parties.

As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the complainant's wife at the
office of the Department of Public Highways. But, he insisted to give the money to the
complainant himself.

After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by the agents of the Philippine
Constabulary, who were alerted earlier before the exchange.

Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal
of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against the complainant.

In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Act as the appellant heard the telephone conversation without complainant's consent.

Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating Sect. 1 of RA No. 4200.
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an interpretation of the Republic Act No. 4200 or
also known as Anti-Wiretapping Act. Petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones
are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do
they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law.

However, respondent argues that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term
"device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a
complete set of a telephone apparatus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act,
such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
HELD:

No.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in
the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the
same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or
in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to that enumerated therein,
should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments
the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violation of Republic Act
No. 4200.
Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]
15AUG
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to
petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”.
Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the
trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by
the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.

RATIO:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication”
to a point of absurdity.
Ramirez v. CA, G.R. No. 93833, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995

“Recording of conversation through a tape recorder”

The language of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law is clear and unambiguous.

The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL
PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder.

• A civil case was filed by petitioner Ramirez alleging that the private respondent, Garcia,
allegedly insulted and humiliated her during a confrontation in the office, in an offensive manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
• To support her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages.
• In response, private respondent filed a criminal case alleging violation of ANTI-WIRE
TAPPING LAW for secretly taping the confrontation.
Whether the act of recording through a tape constitutes an offense? YES.
• The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The provision
clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
• The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the
use of the qualifier "any".
• The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance
of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
• Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes
the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are
shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)."
• These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter's office.
• In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a
private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated, following
the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."
• In this case, the use of tape recorder falls under the devices enumerated in the law
(Dictaphone, Dictagraph, Detectaphone, Walkie-talkie, and Tape recorder).Therefore, the act of
recording through the tape constitutes an offense.
• The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly
mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders
as among the acts punishable.
Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153 (1999)
FACTS:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the police
station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At
the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman
Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim
was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on
tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the
victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified.
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated
discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping.

2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of
the accused.

HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits
wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private

communications(Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted
sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended
party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and
must immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a
person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The
exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed
that he had no intent to kill the latter.