VALENZUELA vs PEOPLE, June 21, 2007

 This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal law jurisprudence. Petitioner
effectively concedes having performed the felonious acts imputed against him, but instead
insists that as a result, he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in
its consummated stage of which he was convicted. The proposition rests on a common theory
expounded in two well-known decisions1 rendered decades ago by the Court of Appeals,
upholding the existence of frustrated theft of which the accused in both cases were found
guilty. However, the rationale behind the rulings has never been affirmed by this Court.

 The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The case stems from an Information6
charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner) and Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the
crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted
outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North
EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the open
parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card
with the mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of
detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking
space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and
after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded
these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.7
 Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed
it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of
Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago,
who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked
petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot,
but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner
and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered.8 The
filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra
25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of
P12,090.00.9
 Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before they were
transferred on the same day to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police, Quezon
City, for investigation. It appears from the police investigation records that apart from
petitioner and Calderon, four (4) other persons were apprehended by the security guards at
the scene and delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in connection with the
incident. However, after the matter was referred to the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor,
only petitioner and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor, in
Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the day after the incident.10
 After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon both claimed
having been innocent bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club on the afternoon
of 19 May 1994 when they were haled by Lago and his fellow security guards after a
commotion and brought to the Baler PNP Station. Calderon alleged that on the afternoon of
the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied
by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada.11 As the queue for the ATM was long, Calderon and
Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the supermarket. It was while they were eating that
they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, leading them to head out of the building to check what
was
 transpiring. As they were outside, they were suddenly "grabbed" by a security guard, thus
commencing their detention.12 Meanwhile, petitioner testified during trial that he and his
cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela,13 had been at the parking lot, walking beside the nearby
BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they saw the security
guard Lago fire a shot. The gunshot caused him and the other people at the scene to start
running, at which point he was apprehended by Lago and brought to the security office.
Petitioner claimed he was detained at the security office until around 9:00 p.m., at which
time he and the others were brought to the Baler Police Station. At the station, petitioner
denied having stolen the cartons of detergent, but he was detained overnight, and eventually
brought to the prosecutor’s office where he was charged with theft.14 During petitioner’s
cross-examination, he admitted that he had been employed as a "bundler" of GMS Marketing,
"assigned at the supermarket" though not at SM.15
 In a Decision16 promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 90, convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft.
They were sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years of prision correccional
as minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum.17 The RTC found credible the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and established the convictions on the positive
identification of the accused as perpetrators of the crime.
 Both accused filed their respective Notices of Appeal,18 but only petitioner filed a brief19 with
the Court of Appeals, causing the appellate court to deem Calderon’s appeal as abandoned
and consequently dismissed. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should
only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never
placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.
 Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, petitioner effectively conceded both his
felonious intent and his actual participation in the theft of several cases of detergent with a
total value of P12,090.00 of which he was charged.

 Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with
intent to gain, of personal property of another without the latter’s consent. While the
Diño/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the offender, the statutory definition of
theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender, compounded
by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim.
 For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated
stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but
certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal
property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is
immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts
of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This
conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that "[i]n
theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the
thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was
frustrated."91
 It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen
delves into the concept of "taking" itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor
obtains such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect
would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would
mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking not having been
accomplished." Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for future discussion, but our
concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such consideration
proves ultimately immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts
of this particular case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the
petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of
the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these
off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.
 Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete
from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same.92 And long ago, we asserted in People v. Avila:93
 x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of the thing to be
appropriated into the physical power of the thief, which idea is qualified by other conditions,
such as that the taking must be effected animo lucrandi and without the consent of the
owner; and it will be here noted that the definition does not require that the taking should be
effected against the will of the owner but merely that it should be without his consent, a
distinction of no slight importance.94
 Insofar as we consider the present question, "unlawful taking" is most material in this
respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element
which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful
taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.
 With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
 Neither Diño nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both fail to consider that once the
offenders therein obtained possession over the stolen items, the effect of the felony has been
produced as there has been deprivation of property. The presumed inability of the offenders
to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have already
been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking.
 Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the rule —that the inability of the
offender to freely dispose of the stolen property frustrates the theft — would introduce a
convenient defense for the accused which does not reflect any legislated intent,95 since the
Court would have carved a viable means for offenders to seek a mitigated penalty under
applied circumstances that do not admit of easy classification. It is difficult to formulate
definite standards as to when a stolen item is susceptible to free disposal by the thief. Would
this depend on the psychological belief of the offender at the time of the commission of the
crime, as implied in Diño?
 Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances such as the size
and weight of the property, the location of the property, the number and identity of people
present at the scene of the crime, the number and identity of people whom the offender is
expected to encounter upon fleeing with the stolen property, the manner in which the stolen
item had been housed or stored; and quite frankly, a whole lot more. Even the fungibility or
edibility of the stolen item would come into account, relevant as that would be on whether
such property is capable of free disposal at any stage, even after the taking has been
consummated.
 All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the colorful detail,
the owner was indeed deprived of property by one who intended to produce such deprivation
for reasons of gain. For such will remain the presumed fact if frustrated theft were
recognized, for therein, all of the acts of execution, including the taking, have been
completed. If the facts establish the non-completion of the taking due to these peculiar
circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade the crime to the attempted stage, as not all
of the acts of execution have been performed. But once all these acts have been executed, the
taking has been completed, causing the unlawful deprivation of property, and ultimately the
consummation of the theft.
 Maybe the Diño/Flores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in common sense. Yet they do
not align with the legislated framework of the crime of theft. The Revised Penal Code
provisions on theft have not been designed in such fashion as to accommodate said rulings.
Again, there is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the "free
disposition of the items stolen" is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has
been produced. Diño itself did not rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its
conclusion, and the later Flores was ultimately content in relying on Diño alone for legal
support. These cases do not enjoy the weight of stare decisis, and even if they did, their
erroneous appreciation of our law on theft leave them susceptible to reversal. The same holds
true of Empilis, a regrettably stray decision which has not since found favor from this Court.
 We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As
petitioner has latched the success of his appeal on our acceptance of the Diño and Flores
rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction.
That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft
under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. It will
take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may
be recognized. Our deference to Viada yields to the higher reverence for legislative intent.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

Lessons Applicable: frustrated or consummated theft

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
• May 19, 1994 4:30 pm: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the
Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by
Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of
the supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was wearing an ID with the mark “Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU)” who hauled a push cart with cases of detergent of “Tide” brand and
unloaded them in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. He then returned
inside the supermarket and emerged 5 minutes after with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic
and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. Thereafter, he
left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the
parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic
inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. As Lago watched, he proceeded to stop the taxi as it
was leaving the open parking area and asked Valenzuela for a receipt of the merchandise but
Valenzuela and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot. Lago fired a warning shot to alert his
fellow security guards. Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended at the scene and the
stolen merchandise recovered worth P12,090.
• Valenzuela, Calderon and 4 other persons were first brought to the SM security office
before they were transferred to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police but only
Valenzuela and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor.
• They pleaded not guilty.
• Calderon’s Alibi: On the afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to
withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. As the
queue for the ATM was long, he and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the supermarket.
While they were eating, they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, so they went out to check
what was transpiring and when they did, they were suddenly grabbed by a security guard
• Valenzuela’s Alibi: He is employed as a “bundler” of GMS Marketing and assigned at the
supermarket. He and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, had been at the parking lot, walking
beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they
saw the security guard Lago fire a shot causing evryon to start running. Then they were
apprehended by Lago.
• RTC: guilty of consummated theft
• CA: Confirmed RTC and rejected his contention that it should only be frustrated theft
since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of
the articles stolen.

ISSUE: W/N Valenzuela should be guilty of consummated theft.

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED

• Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted
felonies.
o A felony is consummated “when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.”
o It is frustrated “when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.”
o It is attempted “when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.”
• Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a:
o subjective phase - portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act
which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which,
with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime
if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely
attempted
o objective phase - After that point of subjective phase has been breached
subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes
• the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial
concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender
• The determination of whether the felony was “produced” after all the acts of execution had
been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony.
• “actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea” - ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an
unlawful act for there to be a crime or there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting
• In crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as “a guilty mind, a guilty or
wrongful purpose or criminal intent” and “essential for criminal liability.”
• Statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of
the crime is and overt acts that constitute the crime
• Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (Elements of Theft):
1. that there be taking of personal property - only one operative act of execution by the
actor involved in theft
2. property belongs to another
3. taking be done with intent to gain - descriptive circumstances
4. taking be done without the consent of the owner - descriptive circumstances
5. taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things - descriptive circumstances
• Abandoned cases:
o U.S. v. Adiao: failed to get the merchandise out of the Custom House - consummated
theft
o Diño: Military Police inspected the truck at the check point and found 3 boxes of army
rifles - frustrated theft
o Flores: guards discovered that the “empty” sea van had actually contained other
merchandise as well - consummated theft
 o Empelis v. IAC: Fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had seized - frustrated
qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the felony as a consequence
cannot attribute weight because definition is attempted
• The ability of the actor “to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only
momentary.”
o We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed
in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of
detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the
parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.
• Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only
be attempted (no unlawful taking) or consummated (there is unlawful taking).

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ONG, June 18, 2012

 Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the government’s favor and against the
applicant.1 The applicant carries the burden of proving his full compliance with the
requirements of law.2

 Before the Court is the Republic’s appeal of the appellate court’s Decision3 dated May 13,
2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74794, which affirmed the trial court’s grant of citizenship to
respondent Kerry Lao Ong (Ong). The Court of Appeals (CA) held:
 With all the foregoing, We find no cogent reason to reverse the decision of the court a quo.
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region,
Branch 9 in its Decision dated November 23, 2001, is AFFIRMED in toto and the instant
appeal is DISMISSED.
 On November 26, 1996, respondent Ong, then 38 years old,5 filed a Petition for
Naturalization.6 The case was docketed as Nat. Case No. 930 and assigned to Branch 9 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. As decreed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by
Republic Act No. 530, known as the Revised Naturalization Law,7 the petition was published
in the Official Gazette8 and a newspaper of general circulation,9 and posted in a public place
for three consecutive weeks,10 six months before the initial hearing.11 The Office of the
Solicitor General entered its appearance and authorized12 the city prosecutor to appear on its
behalf.13 Accordingly, Fiscals Ester Veloso and Perla Centino participated in the proceedings
below.
 Respondent Ong was born at the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to Chinese citizens Siao
Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958.14 He is registered as a resident alien and
possesses an alien certificate of registration15 and a native-born certificate of residence16 from
the Bureau of Immigration. He has been continuously and permanently residing17 in the
Philippines from birth up to the present.18 Ong can speak19 and write in Tagalog, English,
Cebuano, and Amoy.20 He took his elementary21 and high school22 studies at the Sacred
Heart School for Boys in Cebu City, where social studies, Pilipino, religion, and the Philippine
Constitution are taught. He then obtained a degree in Bachelor of Science in Management
from the Ateneo De Manila University on March 18, 1978.23
 On February 1, 1981, he married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen.24 They have four
children,25 namely, Kerri Gail (born on April 15, 1983),26 Kimberley Grace (born on May 15,
1984),27 Kyle Gervin (born on November 4, 1986),28 and Kevin Griffith (born on August 21,
1993),29 who were all born and
 raised in the Philippines. The children of school age were enrolled30 at the Sacred Heart
School for Boys31 and Sacred Heart School for Girls.32 At the time of the filing of the petition,
Ong, his wife, and children were living at No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Niño Village, Banilad,
Cebu City.
 Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a "businessman/business manager" since 1989,
earning an average annual income of P150,000.00.3
 Respondent Ong presented a health certificate to prove46 that he is of sound physical and
mental health.47 As shown by the clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation,48 the
Philippine National Police,49 the trial courts,50 and the barangay,51 he has no criminal record
or pending criminal charges.
 Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised
Naturalization Law.
 Petitioner assigns as error the appellate court’s ruling that "there is an appreciable margin of
(respondent’s) income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support."71
The Republic contends that the CA’s conclusion is not supported by the evidence on record
and by the prevailing law.72
 The only pieces of evidence presented by Ong to prove that he qualifies under Section 2,
fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law, are his tax returns for the years 1994 to
1997, which show that Ong earns from P60,000.00 to P128,000.00 annually.
 Respondent’s Arguments
 Respondent asks for the denial of the petition as it seeks a review of factual findings, which
review is improper in a Rule 45 petition.77 He further submits that his tax returns support
the conclusion that he is engaged in lucrative trade.78
 Our Ruling
 The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the
highest public interest.79 Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.80 The burden of proof rests
upon the applicant to show full and
 complete compliance with the requirements of law.81
 In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around respondent Ong’s compliance with the
qualification found in Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law, which
provides:
 SECTION 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the
following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
 xxxx
 Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation;
 x x x x82
 Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for
his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income
such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to
provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work
and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge."83 His income should
permit "him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance
with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity,
at this stage of our civilization."84
 Ong’s gross income might have been sufficient to meet his family’s basic needs, but there is
simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to create an appreciable margin of income over
expenses. Without an appreciable margin of his income over his family’s expenses, his
income cannot be expected to provide him and his family "with adequate support in the event
of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work."96
 Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a
known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
 the Revised Naturalization Law.97
 The Court finds no merit in respondent’s submission that a Rule 45 petition precludes a
review of the factual findings of the courts below.98 In the first place, the trial court and
appellate court’s decisions contain conclusions that are bereft of evidentiary support or
factual basis, which is a known exception99 to the general rule that only questions of law may
be entertained in a Rule 45 petition.
 Moreover, a review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that the Court
is not precluded from reviewing the factual existence of the applicant’s
qualifications.1âwphi1 In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the
naturalization case are open for consideration in an appeal to this Court.100 Indeed, "[a]
naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been differently
categorized and given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial contest, the
granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case and
giving the government another opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order
granting citizenship will not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a
subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization already granted, on the
ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if
not raised in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to the
attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the lower
court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be
considered adequate for the purpose of determining the correctness or incorrectness of said
decision, in the light of the law and extant jurisprudence."101 In the case at bar, there is even
no need to present new evidence. A careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that
respondent Ong has not proven his possession of a "known lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation" to qualify for naturalization.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is
GRANTED. The Decision dated May 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
 74794 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao Ong is
DENIED for failure to comply with Section 2, fourth paragraph, of Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended.

GO vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, July 2, 2014

 Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the January 18, 2012 Decision1 and the July 23, 2012 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95120, which reversed and set aside the
November 18, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila (RTCJ, by
dismissing, without prejudice, the petition for naturalization filed by Dennis L. Go (petitioner)
 On October 13, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under Commonwealth Act
(C.A.)No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,3 with the RTC, where it was docketed as
Naturalization Case No. 03-107591.
 Petitioner made the following allegations in his petition: 1] that he was born on May 7, 1982
in Manila to spouses Felix and Emma Go, both Chinese nationals; 2] that he was of legal age,
Chinese national, single, with residence address at No. 1308-1310 Oroquieta Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila, where he had been residing since birth; 3] that he spoke English and Tagalog
and has spent his elementary, secondary and tertiary education in Philippine schools where
subjects on Philippine history, government and civics were taught as part of the school
curriculum; 4] that he believed in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, was
of good moral character and had conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relations with the
constituted government as well as with the community; 5] that he is not opposed to
organized government or is affiliated with any association or group of persons that uphold
and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; 6] that he did not defend or teach
the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of men’s ideas; 7] that he was neither a polygamist nor a believer in polygamy;
8] that he had never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude and was not
suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; 9] that he was not a
citizen or subject of a nation at war with the Philippines;
 Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial
and formal compliance with C.A. No. 473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the
jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2) character
witnesses to support his allegations.20 In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines,21 the Court
listed the requirements for character witnesses, namely:
 1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;
 2. That they are "credible persons";
 3. That they personally know the petitioner;
 4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by law;
 5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute;
 6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable;
 7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines; and
 8. That he "is not in any way disqualified under the provisions" of the Naturalization Law.
 In vouching for the good moral character of the applicant for citizenship, a witness, for
purposes of naturalization, must be a "credible" person as he becomes an insurer of the
character of the candidate.22 The Court, in Ong, explained:
 a "credible" person is, to our mind, not only an individual who has not been previously
convicted ofa crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not
perjured in the past; or whose "affidavit" or testimony is not incredible. What must be
"credible" is not the declaration made, but the person making it. This implies that such
person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and
upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on
its face value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner.
 In consonance with the above dictum, in Lim Ching Tian v. Republic,23 the Court explained
that the "law requires that a vouching witness should have actually known an applicant for
whom he testified for the requisite period prescribed therein to give him the necessary
competence to act as such. The reason behind this requirement is that a vouching witness is
in a way an insurer of the character of petitioner because on his testimony the court is of
necessity compelled to rely in deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore, imperative
that he be competent and reliable. And he is only competent to testify on his conduct,
character and moral fitness if he has had the opportunity to observe him personally, if not
intimately, during the period he has allegedly known him." The law, in effect, requires that
 the character witnesses be not mere ordinary acquaintances of the applicant, but possessed
of such intimate knowledge of the latter as to be competent to testify of their personal
knowledge; and that they have each one of the requisite qualifications and none of the
statutory disqualifications.
 In this case, the OSG mainly harps on the petitioner’s failure to prove that his witnesses are
credible.
 The Court agrees.
 The records of the case show that the joint affidavits executed by petitioner’s witnesses did
not establish their own qualification to stand as such in a naturalization proceeding. In turn,
petitioner did not present evidence proving that the persons he presented were credible. In
the words of the CA, "he did not prove that his witnesses had good standing in the
community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and
that their word may be taken at face value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of
petitioner."24
 While there is no showing that petitioner’s witnesses were of doubtful moral inclinations,
there was likewise no indication that they were persons whose qualifications were at par with
the requirements of the law on naturalization. Simply put, no evidence was ever proffered to
prove the witnesses’ good standing in the community, honesty, moral uprightness, and most
importantly, reliability. As a consequence, their statements about the petitioner do not
possess the measure of "credibility" demanded of in naturalization cases. This lack of
"credibility" on the part of the witnesses, unfortunately, weakens or renders futile petitioner’s
claim of worthiness. An applicant for Philippine citizenship would carefully testify as to his
qualifications, placing emphasis on his good traits and character. This is expected of a
person who longs to gain benefits and advantages that Philippine citizenship bestows.
Therefore, a serious assessment of an applicant’s witnesses, both as to the credibility of their
person and their very testimony, is an essential facet of naturalization proceedings that may
not be brushed aside.
 Further, petitioner’s witnesses only averred general statements without specifying acts or
events that would exhibit petitioner’s traits worthy of the grant of Philippine citizenship. For
instance, a statement in their affidavits as to petitioner’s adherence to the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution is not evidence, per se, of petitioner’s agreement and
zeal to Philippine ideals. These appear to be empty declarations if not coming from credible
witnesses.
 It bears stressing that the CA was correct in finding that the testimonies of petitioner’s
witnesses only proved that he mingled socially with Filipinos. While almost all of the
witnesses testified that they knew petitioner since birth and that they had interacted with
petitioner’s family in times of celebration, this did not satisfy the other requirements set by
law, that is, a genuine desire to learn and embrace the Filipino ideals and traditions. Besides,
both the NBI and BOI reports cast doubt on petitioner’s alleged social interaction with
Filipinos. The background checks done on petitioner yielded negative results due to the
uncooperative behavior of the members of his household. In fact, petitioner himself
disobliged when asked for an interview by BOI agents.
 To the Court, this is a display of insincerity to embrace Filipino customs, traditions and
ideals.1âwphi1 This leads to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner failed to prove that he
has all the qualifications entitling him to the grant of Philippine citizenship. Filipino
citizenship is predicated upon oneness with the Filipino people. It is indispensable that an
applicant for naturalization shows his identification with the Philippines as a country
deserving of his wholehearted allegiance. Until there is a positive and unequivocal showing
that this is so in the case of petitioner, the Court must selfishly decline to confer Philippine
citizenship on one who remains an alien in principles and sentiment.
 Finally, it is noteworthy that the OSG was correct in arguing that petitioner's failure to state
his former residence in the petition was fatal to his application for naturalization. Indeed,
this omission had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Differently stated, the inclusion of present and former places of residence in the petition is a
jurisdictional requirement, without which the petition suffers from a fatal and congenital
defect which cannot be cured by evidence on the omitted matter at the trial.25
 Here, a character witness had unwittingly revealed that he and petitioner were neighbors in
Sto. Cristo Street before the latter's family transferred to their declared residential address in
Oroquieta Street. This proves that petitioner's former residence was excluded in his
allegations contained in the published petition. In effect, there was an unpardonable lapse
committed in the course of petitioner's compliance to the jurisdictional requirements set be
law, rendering the trial court's decision, not only as erroneous, but void.
 WHEREFORE, the pet1t1on is DENIED. The January 18, 2012 Decision and the July 23,
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 95120 are AFFIRMED. As stated
in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the dismissal is without prejudice.
 SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BATUGAS, October 7, 2013

 Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the May 23, 2008 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) G.R. CV No. 00523, which affirmed the January 31, 2005 Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for Naturalization5 of
respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
 On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur. The case was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 03-001 and raffled to
Branch 29 of said court.
 Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; that she has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
the period of her stay in the Philippines, as well as in her relations with the constituted
Government and with the community in which she is living; that she has mingled socially
with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace their customs,
traditions, and ideals; that she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none
of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA473);6 that
she is not opposed to organized government nor is affiliated with any association or group of
persons that uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; that she is not
defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of men’s ideas; that she is neither a
polygamist nor believes in polygamy; that the nation of which she is a subject is not at war
with the Philippines; that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and
to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.
 Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and
tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools,i.e., Margosatubig Central Elementary
School in 1955,14 Margosatubig Academy in1959,15 and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in 1963,16
graduating with a degree in Bachelor of Science in Education. She then practiced her
teaching profession at the Pax High School for five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for
two years, and in Talisayan High School in Misamis Oriental for another two years.17
 In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas18 (Santiago),a natural-born
Filipino citizen.19 They have five children, namely Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen, Dennis
Emmanuel, and Edsel James.
 To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted clearances issued by the
Philippine National Police of Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Office and by the National Bureau
of Investigation.27 She also presented her Health Examination Record28 declaring her as
physically and mentally fit.
 The Petition lacks merit.
 Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139
(the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative
naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found
under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
 "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
 Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed
ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess
other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to
submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States
which has since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473,
which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative
naturalization.37
 Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration:38
 Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying
a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an
alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that
she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.39
 As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the conferment of
Filipino citizenship is as follows:
 Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in
order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration
is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate
of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that
 she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband’s citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to
the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited
section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of Immigration conducts
an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition.40
 Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission
on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) No. 03070541 by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID
granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it
found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen42 as only their
marriage certificate was presented to establish his citizenship.
 Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for
judicial naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have been unnecessary if the
process at the CID was granted in her favor, there is nothing that prevents her from seeking
acquisition of Philippine citizenship through regular naturalization proceedings available to
all qualified foreign nationals. The choice of what option to take in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship rests with the applicant. In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for
judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her application for derivative
naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her from seeking
judicial naturalization under the same law. It is to be remembered that her application at the
CID was denied not because she was found to be disqualified, but because her husband’s
citizenship was not proven. Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a
judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in fact
grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization
proceedings.
 As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino citizenship has been adequately
proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate indicating therein
that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and
business registrations/licenses, all of which are public records. He has always comported
himself as a Filipino citizen, an operative fact that should have enabled Azucena to avail of
Section 15 of CA473. On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers
from any of the disqualifications under Section 4 of the same Act.
 However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization and is not based on
Section 15 of CA 473 which was denied by the then Ministry of Justice. The lower court
which heard the petition and received evidence of her qualifications and absence of
disqualifications to acquire Philippine citizenship, has granted the Petition, which was
affirmed by the CA. We will not disturb the findings of the lower court which had the
opportunity to hear and scrutinize the evidence presented during the hearings on the
Petition, as well as determine, based on Azucena’s testimony and deportment during the
hearings, that she indeed possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
 The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that Azucena does not have the
qualification required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not have any lucrative
income, and that the proceeding in the lower court was not in the nature of a public hearing.
The OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during the initial
hearing scheduled on May 18, 2004.However, the OSG or the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing, prompting the lower court to order ex parte
presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004. The OSG was also
notified of the ex parte proceeding, but despite notice, again failed to appear. The OSG had
raised this same issue at the CA and was denied for the reasons stated in its Decision. We
find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA on this issue. Neither should this issue
further delay the grant of Philippine citizenship to a woman who was born and lived all her
life, in the Philippines, and devoted all her life to the care of her Filipino family. She has more
than demonstrated, under judicial scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine citizen. On the
second issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that since the government who has an
interest in, and the only one who can contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified
through the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor’s office, the proceedings have complied with
the public hearing requirement under CA 473.
 No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine citizen:
 4. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.
 Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession before she had
to quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take on her role as joint provider,
together with her husband, in order to support her family. Together, husband and wife were
able to raise all their five children, provided them with education, and have all become
 professionals and responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both
husband and wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can resume
teaching at anytime. Her profession never leaves her, and this is more than sufficient
guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only country she has known since birth.
 Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship
privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus:
 It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a
husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one
should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests in
property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the
conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own
efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances
should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in
respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers from
the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.43
 We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no proceeding authorized by
the law or by the Rules of Court, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual.44 "Such judicial declaration of citizenship cannot even be decreed pursuant to an
alternative prayer therefor in a naturalization proceeding."45
 This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship but rather
a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a
Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In
the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire
the privilege of be coming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA
473.Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the
grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly
Filipino family.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 00523 which affirmed the January 31,2005 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for Naturalization, is hereby
 AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the period and the requirements under Republic Act
No. 530which supplements the Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization
be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be
cancelled.
 SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CHUNG, March 20, 2013

 This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), challenges the June 30, 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appea1s (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 93374, which affirmed the June 3, 2009 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
49, Manila (RTC), granting the petition for naturalization of respondent Li Ching Chung
(respondent).
 On August 22, 2007, respondent, otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng,
a Chinese national, filed his Declaration of Intention to Become a Citizen of the Philippines
before the OSG.4
 On March 12, 2008 or almost seven months after filing his declaration of intention,
respondent filed his Petition for Naturalization before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 08-
118905.5 On April 5, 2008, respondent filed his Amended Petition for Naturalization,6
wherein he alleged that he was born on November 29, 1963 in Fujian Province, People’s
Republic of China, which granted the same privilege of naturalization to Filipinos; that he
came to the Philippines on March 15, 1988 via Philippine Airlines Flight PR 311 landing at
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport; that on November 19, 1989, he married Cindy Sze
Mei Ngar, a British national, with whom he had four (4) children, all born in Manila; that he
had been continuously and permanently residing in the country since his arrival and is
currently a resident of Manila with prior residence in Malabon; that he could speak and write
in English and Tagalog; that he was entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act
(CA) No. 473 reducing to five (5) years the requirement under Section 2 of ten years of
continuous residence, because he knew English and Filipino having obtained his education
from St. Stephen’s High School of Manila;
 In support of his application, he attached his barangay certificate,9 police clearance,10 alien
certification of registration,11 immigration certificate of residence,12 marriage contract,13
authenticated birth certificates of his children,14 affidavits of his character witnesse
 On June 3, 2009, the RTC granted respondent’s application for naturalization as a Filipino
citizen.36
 The decretal portion reads:
 WHEREFORE, petitioner LI CHING CHUNG a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI a.k.a STEPHEN LEE
KENG is hereby declared a Filipino citizen by naturalization and admitted as such.
 However, pursuant to Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530, this Decision shall not become
executory until after two (2) years from its promulgation and after the Court, on proper
hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so
finds, that during the intervening time the applicant has: (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has
dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of
any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; (4) or committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
 As soon as this decision shall have become executory, as provided under Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 530, the Clerk of Court of this Branch is hereby directed to issue to the
Petitioner a Naturalization Certificate, after the Petitioner shall have subscribed to an Oath,
in accordance with Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 472, as amended.
 The Local Civil Registrar of the City of Manila is, likewise directed to register the
Naturalization Certificate in the proper Civil Registry.
 SO ORDERED.37
 To bolster its claim for the reversal of the assailed ruling, the OSG advances this pivotal issue
of
 x x x whether the respondent should be admitted as a Filipino citizen despite his undisputed
failure to comply with the requirements provided for in CA No. 473, as amended – which are
mandatory and jurisdictional in character – particularly: (i) the filing of his petition for
naturalization within the one (1) year proscribed period from the date he filed his declaration
of intention to become a Filipino citizen; (ii) the failure to attach to the petition his certificate
of arrival; and (iii) the failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements
prescribed by CA No. 473.44
 The OSG argues that "the petition for naturalization should not be granted in view of its
patent jurisdictional infirmities, particularly because: 1) it was filed within the one (1) year
proscribed period from the filing of declaration of intention; 2) no certificate of arrival, which
is indispensable to the validity of the Declaration of Intention, was attached to the petition;
and 3) respondent’s failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements set
under CA 473."45 In particular, the OSG points out that the publication and posting
requirements were not strictly followed, specifically citing that: "(a) the hearing of the petition
on 15 December 2008 was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing on 3 April 2009; (b) the
order moving the date of hearing (Order dated 31 July 2008) was not published; and, (c) the
petition was heard within six (6) months (15 December 2008) from the last publication (on 14
July 2008)."46
 The petition is meritorious.
 Section 5 of CA No. 473,47 as amended,48 expressly states:
 Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission
to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of
Justice (now Office of the Solicitor General) a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth name, age,
occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the
date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he came to the Philippines,
and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration. No
declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent residence has been established
and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued. The
declarant must also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines,
where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the
school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of
him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant
must furnish two photographs of himself. (Emphasis supplied)
 As held in Tan v. Republic,49 "the period of one year required therein is the time fixed for the
State to make inquiries as to the qualifications of the applicant. If this period of time is not
given to it, the State will have no sufficient opportunity to investigate the qualifications of the
applicants and gather evidence thereon. An applicant may then impose upon the courts, as
the State would have no opportunity to gather evidence that it may present to contradict
whatever evidence that the applicant may adduce on behalf of his petition." The period is
designed to give the government ample time to screen and examine the qualifications of an
applicant and to measure the latter’s good intention and sincerity of purpose.50 Stated
otherwise, the waiting period will unmask the true intentions of those who seek Philippine
citizenship for selfish reasons alone, such as, but not limited to, those who are merely
 interested in protecting their wealth, as distinguished from those who have truly come to love
the Philippines and its culture and who wish to become genuine partners in nation building.
 The law is explicit that the declaration of intention must be filed one year prior to the filing of
the petition for naturalization. Republic v. Go Bon Lee51 likewise decreed that substantial
compliance with the requirement is inadequate. In that case, Go filed his declaration of
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines on May 23, 1940. After eleven months, he
filed his petition for naturalization on April 18, 1941. In denying his petition, the Court
wrote:
 The language of the law on the matter being express and explicit, it is beyond the province of
the courts to take into account questions of expediency, good faith and other similar reasons
in the construction of its provisions (De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 289; 48 Off. Gaz.,
1787). Were we to accept the view of the lower court on this matter, there would be no good
reason why a petition for naturalization cannot be filed one week after or simultaneously with
the filing of the required declaration of intention as long as the hearing is delayed to a date
after the expiration of the period of one year. The ruling of the lower court amounts, in our
opinion, to a substantial change in the law, something which courts can not do, their duty
being to apply the law and not tamper with it.52
 The only exception to the mandatory filing of a declaration of intention is specifically stated in
Section 6 of CA No. 473, to wit:
 Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons
born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public
schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality,
and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or
more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration
of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements
shall be added that which establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary
education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools recognized by the
Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood
applicable with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized.
(Emphases supplied)
 Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the category of such exempt individuals that
would excuse him from filing a declaration of intention one year prior to the filing of a
petition for naturalization. Contrary to the CA finding, respondent’s premature filing of his
petition for naturalization before the expiration of the one-year period is fatal.53
 Consequently, the citation of the CA of the ruling in Tam Tan v. Republic54 is misplaced. In
that case, the Court did not excuse the non-compliance with the one-year period, but
reiterated that the waiting period of one (1) year is mandatory. In reversing the grant of
naturalization to Tam Tan, the Court wrote:
 The appeal is predicated on the fact that the petition for naturalization was filed (26 October
1950) before the lapse of one year from and after the filing of a verified declaration of his
bona fide intention to become a citizen (4 April 1950), in violation of Section 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.1âwphi1
 The position of the Government is well taken, because no petition for naturalization may be
filed and heard and hence no decree may be issued granting it under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, before the expiration of one year from and after the
date of the filing of a verified declaration of his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines. This is mandatory.55 Failure to raise in the lower court the question of non-
compliance therewith does not preclude the Government from raising it on appeal.56
 Nevertheless, after the one-year period, the applicant may renew his petition for
naturalization and the evidence already taken or heard may be offered anew without the
necessity of bringing to court the witnesses who had testified. And the Government may
introduce evidence in support of its position.57
 The decree granting the petition for naturalization is set aside, without costs.
 In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of the law.58 The opportunity of a foreigner to
become a citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to
him by the State; the applicant does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or vested
right to be admitted to Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner has, to be given
the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers upon him; and to
acquire such right, he must strictly comply with all the statutory conditions and
requirements.59 The absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this
necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization process.
 Hence, all other issues need not be discussed further as respondent failed to strictly follow
the requirement mandated by the statute.
 It should be emphasized that "a naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest
that it has been differently categorized and given special treatment. x x x Unlike in ordinary
 judicial contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude the reopening
of that case and giving the government another opportunity to present new evidence. A
decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute res judicata to any matter or
reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization
already granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the
same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As
the matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in the
disputed decision of the lower court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the
present proceeding may be considered adequate for the purpose of determining the
correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and extant
jurisprudence."60
 Ultimately, respondent failed to prove full and complete compliance with the requirements of
the Naturalization Law. As such, his petition for naturalization must be denied without
prejudice to his right to re-file his application.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 93374 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for naturalization of
respondent Li Ching Chung, otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng,
docketed as Civil Case No. 08-118905 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila, is
DISMISSED, without prejudice.
 SO ORDERED.

MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG vs THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, May

11, 2007

 This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
 Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon
Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays
that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No.
9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended,
and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it
violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
 Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003, reads:
 SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003."
 SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
 SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship
 In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225
unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual
allegiance?
 We shall discuss these issues jointly.
 Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual
citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or
naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing
their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-
born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath
of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is
categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest.
 Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist - -
the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this
case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed
out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter
asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign
citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the
Constitution…
 Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional
injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law
aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means.
 Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in
that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin
 and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he
explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the
last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual
allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country.4
(Emphasis supplied.)
 From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature
in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635
which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-
born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to
the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not
made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
 Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any
law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why
this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that while it is true that there is
no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,6
already had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual
citizenship.7
 For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance
is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues
regarding dual allegiance.8
 To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not
a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship
per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a
law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this
is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on
issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
 Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the
case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner
misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance
but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
 Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws
with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing
the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in
tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution
and forbearance.12 The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate
the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution
itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for
study and legislation by Congress.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

LOPEZ vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, July 23, 2008

 A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at
the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.
 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution1 and (2) Omnibus Order2 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as Barangay
Chairman.
 Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.
 On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition3 before the Provincial
Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on
the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public
office.
  WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Disqualification is GRANTED and
respondent Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez is DISQUALIFIED from running as Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo.
 SO ORDERED.7
 In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to regain his Filipino
citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify as
a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship. This, petitioner failed to do.
 His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the present petition,
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from
running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.
 We dismiss the petition.
 More importantly, the Court’s 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the enactment of
R.A. No. 922510 in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those
who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5
of the said law states:
 Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to
all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
 xxxx
 (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
(Emphasis added)
 Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly
provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath."
 Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC
observation on this point:
 While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship
Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
General’s Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a
public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual
citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented
that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such
proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.
 For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an
officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and
unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the
instant case, respondent Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by
the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that
he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that
he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him disqualified
from running for an elective position in the Philippines.11 (Emphasis added)
 While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the
functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his candidacy.
Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate
because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is
not a matter of popularity.12
 In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as
candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

JACOT vs DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, November 27, 2008

 Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution1 dated 28 September 2007 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution
dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division2 disqualifying him from running for
the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local
Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States
(US) citizenship.
 Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of
the US on 13 December 1989. 3
 Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for
the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the
Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California.
 Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 7
 On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification8 before the
COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to
renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which
reads as follows:
 Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.–Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
 xxxx
 (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
 Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant Petition for Certiorari, an
"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign
Citizenship,"25 which he supposedly executed on 7 February 2007, even before he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. With the said Affidavit, petitioner puts forward in
the Petition at bar a new theory of his case–that he complied with the requirement of making
a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship before filing his Certificate of
Candidacy. This new theory constitutes a radical change from the earlier position he took
before the COMELEC–that he complied with the requirement of renunciation by his oaths of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and in his
Certificate of Candidacy, and that there was no more need for a separate act of renunciation.
 As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the
proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention
of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule.26 Courts have neither the time nor
the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly.27
 Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence.28 Petitioner
should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the
COMELEC.
 Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the absence of
any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the
Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect." Section 34
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not
formally presented:
 SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
 Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no
opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due
process. 29 Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly
justice.30
 The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the COMELEC an
identical document, "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and
Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" executed on 27 June 2007, subsequent to
his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. Petitioner attached the said Oath
of 27 June 2007 to his Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. The
COMELEC en banc eventually refused to reconsider said document for being belatedly
executed. What was extremely perplexing, not to mention suspect, was that petitioner did not
submit the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 or mention it at all in the proceedings before the
COMELEC, considering that it could have easily won his case if it was actually executed on
and in existence before the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, in compliance with law.
 The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him against presenting
this crucial piece of evidence, is lame and unconvincing. If the Affidavit of 7 February 2007
was in existence all along, petitioner’s counsel, and even petitioner himself, could have easily
adduced it to be a crucial piece of evidence to prove compliance with the requirements of
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. There was no apparent danger for petitioner to submit
 as much evidence as possible in support of his case, than the risk of presenting too little for
which he could lose.
 And even if it were true, petitioner’s excuse for the late presentation of the Affidavit of 7
February 2007 will not change the outcome of petitioner’s case.
 It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence, and
mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result
might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently.31 The only exceptions to the
general rule -- that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court finds
acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of one’s
property through a technicality.32 These exceptions are not attendant in this case.
 The Court cannot sustain petitioner’s averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in
deciding against the presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings
before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the
sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden of
proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case -- unless
they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly presenting his case -- do not
constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer be bound by
the acts of their counsel.33
 Also belying petitioner’s claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the fact that
petitioner continuously used his former counsel’s theory of the case. Even when the
COMELEC already rendered an adverse decision, he persistently argues even to this Court
that his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and
in his Certificate of Candidacy amount to the renunciation of foreign citizenship which the
law requires. Having asserted the same defense in the instant Petition, petitioner only
demonstrates his continued reliance on and complete belief in the position taken by his
former counsel, despite the former’s incongruous allegations that the latter has been grossly
negligent.
 Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was inept,
petitioner should have promptly taken action, such as discharging his counsel earlier and/or
insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC, instead of
waiting until a decision was rendered disqualifying him and a resolution issued dismissing
his motion for reconsideration; and, thereupon, he could have heaped the blame on his
former counsel. Petitioner could not be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of his
former counsel’s acts, because, otherwise, it would render court proceedings indefinite,
tentative, and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.
34

 Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,35 where therein petitioner De Guzman was

unable to present a piece of evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to
evidence, despite the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful
insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of
any chance to present documentary evidence in his defense. This was certainly not the case
in the Petition at bar.
 Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended his
suit by attending the hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting evidence on petitioner’s
behalf. Moreover, petitioner’s cause was not defeated by a mere technicality, but because of a
mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case lost due to an
untenable legal position does not justify a deviation from the rule that clients are bound by
the acts and mistakes of their counsel.36
 Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a
candidate, who must comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and
failed to do so, received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense
with, or amount to a waiver of, such requirement.37 The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed
that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must
be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.38 The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is
not a matter of popularity.39
 WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28 September 2007
of the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of
the COMELEC Second Division, is AFFIRMED. Petitioner is DISQUALIFIED to run for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007 National and Local
Elections, and if proclaimed, cannot assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by
virtue of such disqualification. Costs against petitioner.