G.R. No. L-5272 The United States vs.

Ah Chong March 19, 1910

 FACTS:

Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room.
He sat up in bed and called out twice if who it was but he heard no answer and was convinced by the
noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone who is forcing his way into the room.

The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out
that if he enter the room, he will kill him. At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge
of the chair which had been placed against the door.

Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, Ah Chong, struck out wildly at
the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual who is a house boy or muchacho,
was playing a trick on him. There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one
of which took place in a house where he was employed as cook so he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

The Trial court held it as homicide.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not Ah Chong can be held criminally responsible for committing a felony (homicide).

 HELD:

Ah Chong was not criminally liable and absolved. He was acquitted for a mistake of fact which in
order for it to be held as a valid defense, there has to be several requisites. First, that the act done would
have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be. Second, that the intention of the
accused in performing the act should be lawful, and that the mistake must be without fault or carelessness
on the part of the accused.

In the instant case, had the intruder been a robber as the defendant believed him to be, then Ah
Chong acted in good faith, without malice or criminal intent, and would have been wholly exempt from
criminal liability and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness.
 G.R. No. 108763 Republic vs. CA and Molina February 13, 1997

 FACTS:

The Spouses, Reynaldo and Roridel Molina got married in 1985, however, after a year of being
together, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father
preferring to spend more time with friends whom he wasted his money, depends on his parents for aid and
assistance and was never honest with his wife as to their finances.

In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few
weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

Roridel filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage in the Regional Trial Court
of La Trinidad.

The Regional Trial Court granted the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of Reynaldo and Roridel Molina is void on the ground of
psychological incapacity (Art. 36, Family Code of the Philippines).

 HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilities and duties due to some psychological illness.

Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would
comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.

The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with
each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but
only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

a) burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff;

b) root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined;
c) such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage;
d) such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage;
e) Such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code;
f) decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected;
and
g) Court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.
 G.R. No. L – 20089 Wassmer vs. Velez 12 SCRA 648 December 26, 1964

 FACTS:

In 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez arranged their marriage to be held on September 4
of the same year. The bride-to-be has been devoted with all the preparations for their wedding. However,
two days before their marriage, ‘Paking’ left a note that they must postpone the marriage for his mother
was against it. A day before their wedding, Paking wrote again that the wedding shall push through.
Worse, Paking did not show up on their wedding day causing Wassmer to be publicly humiliated.

The breach of promise to marry made by Velez prompted Wassmer to file a civil suit against the
former. Velez never filed an answer, thus, awarding moral and exemplary damages to Wassmer.

Velez appealed on the court and stated that he failed to attend the wedding day because of
fortuitous events. He also insisted that he cannot be civilly liable for there is no law that acts upon the
breach of promise to marry. He also contested the award of moral and exemplary damages.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not moral or exemplary damages may be awarded in a breach of promise to marry
suit.

 HELD:

A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. However, Wassmer has already
made preparations for the wedding. Velez’s failure to appear on the wedding day is contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy which is embodied on Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Under the law, the injured party is entitled to moral damages as well as to exemplary damages
because Velez’s acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner (Article 2232) in breaching his promise
to marry Wassmer.