employed through legislative power to bind subsequent
B. Legislature
1. City of Davao v. RTC (G.R. No. 127383, August 18,
2005)
tax exemption rules governing GSIS and exceptions
the plenary powers of Congress cannot be limited by
passage of un-repealable laws
FACTS: GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of
Public Auction, scheduling public bidding of its properties
for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994,
amounting to the sum total of Php 295, 721.61. The
auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a
deadline extension given by Davao City.
On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and
Notices of Levy on three parcels of land it owned and
another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that
same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City
RTC.
During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec.
234 and 534 of the Local Government Code, which have
withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also
withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from
payment of realty tax.
RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.
ISSUE/S: Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed
as withdrawn by the LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC
HELD: Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC,
as a general rule: the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend
to the levy of “taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
and LGUs.”
However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real
property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons,
including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are
withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC,
then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been
withdrawn.
Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal
on the laws granting exemption, Supreme Court found a
fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory
second paragraph.
Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the
competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on
the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the
plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws.
Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place
restrictions on the amendment or repeal laws. These
conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the
precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.
Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the
amendatory second paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so,
they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means
legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two
conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether
the LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS.
Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC
states that “any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted
by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be
construed strictly against the person claiming it.”
The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992
by the LGC but restored by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39.
The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994
were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions
prevailed and thus may be collected by the City of Davao.
2. GSIS vs The City Treasurer of Manila
Facts: Petitioner GSIS owns or used to own two (2) parcels
of land, one located at Katigbak 25th St., Bonifacio Drive,
Manila (Katigbak property), and the other, at Concepcion
cor. Arroceros Sts., also in Manila (Concepcion-Arroceros
property). Title to the Concepcion-Arroceros property was
transferred to this Court in 2005 pursuant to Proclamation
No. 835[3] dated April 27, 2005. Both the GSIS and the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila occupy the
Concepcion-Arroceros property, while the Katigbak
property was under lease to Manila Hotel Corporation.
The City Treasurer of Manila addressed a letter ated
September 13, 2002 to GSIS informing of the unpaid real
property taxes due on the aforementioned properties for
years 1992 to 2002, broken down as follows: (a) PhP
54,826,599.37 for the Katigbak property; and (b) PhP
48,498,917.01 for the Concepcion-Arroceros property. The
letter warned of the inclusion of the subject properties in
the scheduled October 30, 2002 public auction of all
delinquent properties in Manila should the unpaid taxes
remain unsettled before that date. On September 16, 2002,
the City Treasurer of Manila issued separate Notices of
Realty Tax Delinquency for the subject properties, with the
usual warning of seizure and/or sale. On October 8, 2002,
GSIS, through its legal counsel, wrote back emphasizing the
GSIS’ exemption from all kinds of taxes, including realty
taxes, under Republic Act No. (RA) 8291.
Two days after, GSIS filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition[7] with prayer for a restraining and injunctive
relief before the Manila RTC.
RTC ruled that the assessment of Manila was valid.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not GSIS isexempt from the payment of real
property taxes from 1992 to 2002;
2. Whether GSIS is exempt from the payment of real
property taxes on the property it leased to a taxable entity;
and
3. Whether GSIS’s real properties are exempt from
warrants of levy and from tax sale for non-payment of real
propertytaxes.
Ruling: 1. GSIS Exempt from Real Property Tax
Full tax exemption granted through PD 1146 Revised
Insurance Government Act RA 7160 lifted GSIS Tax
Exemptions Local Governement Code or RA 7160 was
enacted in 1991. Sec 193 vis-avis Sec234. GSIS’ tax-exempt
status withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC was restored in 1997
by RA 8291
Full tax exemption reenacted through RA 8291
Under it, the full tax exemption privilege of GSIS was
restored, the operative provision being Sec. 39 thereof, a
virtual replication of the earlier quoted Sec. 33 of PD 1146.
Sec. 39 of RA 8291 reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the
actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be
preserved and maintained at all times xxx Accordingly,
notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its
assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits
paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall
continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any
assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act
are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws,
ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or
jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this
provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and
rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect.
Real property taxes assessed and due from GSIS
considered paid
Sec. 39 which, for all intents and purposes, considered as
paid “any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of
this Act.” If only to stress the point, we hereby reproduce
the pertinent portion of said Sec. 39:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – x x
x xxx Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the
contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including all
accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from
all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds.
These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and
specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS
as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.
GSIS an instrumentality of the National Government
The Manila International Airport Authority Doctrine,
which provides that, since MIAA does not qualify as a
GOCC, not having been organized either as a stock
corporation, its capital not being divided into shares, or as
a non-stock corporation because it has no members. MIAA
is rather an instrumentality of the National Government
and, hence, outside the purview of local taxation by force
of Sec. 133 of the LGC providing in context that “unless
otherwise provided,” local governments cannot tax
national government instrumentalities.
GSIS is not, in the context of the afore quoted Sec. 193 of
the LGC, a GOCC following the teaching of Manila
International Airport Authority, for, like MIAA, GSIS’
capital is not divided into unit shares. Also, GSIS has no
members to speak of.
And by members, the reference is to those who, under Sec.
87 of the Corporation Code, make up the non-stock
corporation, and not tothe compulsory members of the
system who are government employees. Its management is
entrusted to a Board of Trustees whosemembers are
appointed by the President.
Second, the subject properties under GSIS’s name are
likewise owned by the Republic.
Third, GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance,
retirement, survivorship, and disability benefits of all
government employees and their beneficiaries. This
undertaking, to be sure, constitutes an essential and vital
function which the government, through one of its
agencies or instrumentalities, ought to perform if social
security services to civil service employees are to be
delivered with reasonable dispatch.
2. Beneficial Use Doctrine Applicable
The leased Katigbak property shall be taxable pursuant to
the “beneficial use” principle under Sec. 234(a) of the LGC.
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. – The
following are exempted from payment of the real property
tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines
or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration
or otherwise, to a taxable person.
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of
Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise provided
herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the
levy of the following:
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local
government units. (Emphasis supplied.) GSIS, as a
government instrumentality, is not a taxable juridical
person under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC. GSIS, however, lost in
a sense that status with respect to the Katigbak property
when it contracted its beneficial use to MHC, doubtless a
taxable person.
Thus, the real estate tax assessment of PhP 54,826,599.37
covering 1992 to 2002 over the subject Katigbak property
is valid insofar as said tax delinquency is concerned as
assessed over said property.
Taxable entity having beneficial use of leased property
liable for real property taxes thereon “the unpaid tax
attaches to the property and is chargeable against the
taxable person who had actual or beneficial use and
possession of it regardless of whether or not he is the
owner.” eing in possession and having actual use of the
Katigbak property since November 1991, MHC is liable for
the realty taxes assessed over the Katigbak property from
1992 to 2002.
Moreover, MHC is obligated itself under the GSIS-MHC
Contract of Lease to shoulder such assessment. Stipulation
l8 of the contract pertinently reads:
18. By law, the Lessor, [GSIS], is exempt from taxes,
assessments and levies. Should there be any change in the
law or the interpretation thereof or any other
circumstances which would subject the Leased Property to
any kind of tax, assessment or levy which would constitute
a charge against the Lessor or create a lien against the
Leased Property, the Lessee agrees and obligates itself to
shoulder and pay such tax, assessment or levy as it
becomes due. [28] (Emphasis ours.)
3. GSIS Properties Exempt from Levy
it is without doubt that the subject GSIS properties are
exempt from any attachment, garnishment, execution, levy,
or other legal processes.
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – x x
x.
xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well
as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the
benefitsunder this Act shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by
the courts, quasijudicial agencies or administrative bodies
xxx
Summary
In sum, the Court finds that GSIS enjoys under its charter
full tax exemption. Moreover, as an instrumentality of the
national government, it is itself not liable to pay real estate
taxes assessed by the City of Manila against its Katigbak
and ConcepcionArroceros properties. Following the
“beneficial use” rule, however, accrued real property taxes
are due from the Katigbak property, leased as it is to a
taxable entity. But the corresponding liability for the
payment thereof devolves on the taxable beneficial user.
The Katigbak property cannot in any event be subject of a
public auction sale, notwithstanding its realty tax
delinquency. This means that the City ofManila has to
satisfy its tax claim by serving the accrued realty tax
assessment on MHC, as the taxable beneficial user of the
Katigbak property and, in case of nonpayment, through
means other than the sale at public auction of the leased
property.
3. Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board
570 SCRA 410 – Political Law – Qualifications of a Senator
or a Congress Representative
NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous
Drugs Board (G.R. No. 158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC
(G.R. No. 161658)
FACTS: In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was
implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection
with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate
for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks
(1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a
maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a
candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate.
He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by
requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a
senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that
all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug
free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution
6486 are constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec.
36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or
an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws
must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions,
the three departments of government have no choice but
to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test” is not tenable as it
enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise
of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36,
validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress
cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such
additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.
4. RIZALITO Y. DAVID v. SENATE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE POELLMANZARES
G.R. No. 221538. September 20, 2016, EN BANC (Leonen,
J.)
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a
foundling whose biological parents are unknown. She was
abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo while still an
infant. It was a certain Edgardo Militar who found her
outside the church who later turned her over to Mr. and
Mrs. Emiliano Militar. Emiliano Militar reported to the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found
on September 6, 1968. She was given the name Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar.
Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly
known as Susan Roces) filed a Petition for Adoption of
Senator Poe. On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San
Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the
adoption. Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the
2013 Elections. Rizalito David, a losing candidate in the
2013 Senatorial Elections, filed a Petition for Quo
Warranto before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
assailing the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply
with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated
by the 1987 Constitution." The SET ruled that Senator Poe
is a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold
office as Senator.
ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution exclude foundlings from
entering public service?
2. Was the SET correct in dismissing the petition for Quo
Warranto, finding that Grace Poe is a naturalborn Filipino
citizen, thus, qualified to hold a seat as Senator?
RULING:
1. NO. Article IV, Section 2 and Article IV, Section 1(2),
constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken
in isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional
mandate to defend the well-being of children, to guarantee
equal protection of the law and equal access to
opportunities for public service, and to respect human
rights. They must also be read in conjunction with the
Constitution's reasons for requiring natural-born status
for select public offices. Further, this presumption is
validated by contemporaneous construction that considers
related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international instruments.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives
an enumeration. Section 2 categorically defines "natural-
born citizens." This constitutional definition is further
clarified in jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born
citizenship from naturalized citizenship. Consistent with
Article 8 of the Civil Code, this jurisprudential clarification
is deemed written into the interpreted text, thus
establishing its contemporaneous intent.
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a
human thoroughbred.
Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2)
stipulates that to be a citizen, either one's father or one's
mother must be a Filipino citizen.
That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features,
genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity are not determinative of
citizenship.
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-
born Filipino citizens. It does not even require them to
conform to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously
or ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore,
be ethnically foreign.
Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant
degree: parentage. The citizenship of everyone else in
one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as David
insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.
Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion
of Filipino citizenship may be sustained by evidence
adduced in a proper proceeding, which substantially
proves that either or both of one's parents is a Filipino
citizen.
Consistent with a reading that harmonizes Article IV,
Section 2's definition of natural-born citizens and Section
1(2)'s reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a
presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines
are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino
mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is
substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV,
Section 1(2), any such countervailing proof must show that
both—not just one—of a foundling's biological parents are
not Filipino citizens. Senator Poe was found as a newborn
infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on
September 3, 1968. In 1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not
all—Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino
population. Senator Poe is described as having "brown
almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair
and an oval-shaped face." She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches
tall. Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in
Jaro, Iloilo.
These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an
inference that her biological parents were Filipino. Her
abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less
consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a
predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would
have behaved. The absence of an international airport in
Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother,
along with a foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously
coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave
her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is
unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it.
Out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in
1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners. This
translates to roughly 99.8% probability that Senator Poe
was born a Filipino citizen. Given the sheer difficulty, if not
outright impossibility, of identifying her parents after half
a century, a range of substantive proof is available to
sustain a reasonable conclusion as to Senator Poe’s
parentage.
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v.
Commission on Elections, the Solicitor General
underscored how it is statistically more probable that
Senator Poe was born a Filipino citizen rather than as a
foreigner.
2. NO. The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the
bounds of its constitutional competence when it ruled that
Senator Poe is a natural-born citizen qualified to sit as
Senator of the Republic. There is basis for concluding that 1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative districts
the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess of in this wise:
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
District Municipalities/Cities Population
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by David,
1st Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304
the Senate Electoral Tribunal was confronted with a novel
District Ragay Minalabac
legal question: the citizenship status of children whose Lupi Pamplona
biological parents are unknown, considering that the Sipocot Pasacao
Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes Cabusao San
reference to one's father or mother. It was compelled to Fernando
exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a 2nd Gainza Canaman 474,899
constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without District Milaor Camaligan
judicial precedent. Naga Magarao
Pili Bombon
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was Ocampo Calabanga
only asked to make a reasonable interpretation of the law
3rd Caramoan Sangay 372,548
while needfully considering the established personal
District Garchitorena San Jose
circumstances of Senator Poe. It could not have asked the Goa Tigaon
impossible of Senator Poe, sending her on a proverbial Lagonoy Tinamba
fool's errand to establish her parentage, when the Presentacion Siruma
controversy before it arose because Senator Poe’s
4th Iriga Buhi 429,070
parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout District Baao Bula
her life. Balatan Nabua
Bato
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human
capacity. It did not insist on burdening Senator Poe’s with Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716,
conclusively proving, within the course of the few short the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
months, the one thing that she has never been in a position reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative
to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it district for the province. Hence, the first district
conscientiously appreciated the implications of all other municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
facts known about her finding. Therefore, it arrived at Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form
conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of
a new second legislative district. The following
proof required in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic
not absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt Act No. 9716:
or preponderance of evidence, but "substantial evidence,
or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable District Municipalities/Cities Population
mind might accept as adequate tojustify a conclusion."
1st Del Gallego 176,383
In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for District Ragay
Lupi
all children with the misfortune of having been abandoned
Sipocot
by their biological parents. Far from reducing them to Cabusao
inferior, second-classcitizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
did justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and 2nd Libmanan San 276,777
District Minalabac Fernando
defendingthe well-being of children, advancing human
Pamplona Gainza
rights, and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws Pasacao Milaor
andequal access to opportunities for public service.
3rd Naga Camaligan 439,043
5. Aquino III v COMELEC District Pili Magarao
(formerly Ocampo Bombon
Facts: Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III 2nd Canaman Calabanga
and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and District)
citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of 4th Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the District Garchitorena San Jose
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative (formerly Goa Tigaon
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby 3rd Lagonoy Tinamba
District) Presentacion Siruma
Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment.” In substance, the said law created an 5th Iriga Buhi 429,070
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines District Baao Bula
Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second (formerly Balatan Nabua
4th Bato
legislative districts of the province.
District)
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of
Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of Petitioners contend that the reapportionment
introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for
the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim
that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will
end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard. The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory.Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Issue:
whether or not Republic Act 9716 is
unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first
district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population
requirement for the creation of the legislative district as
explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1)
and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended thereto; and whether or not Republic Act 9716
violates the principle of proportional representation as
provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and
(4) of the Constitution
Held:
No. There is no specific provision in the
Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the
second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the
intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative
district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of
the Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.”
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction
between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand,
and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.
For while a province is entitled to at least a representative,
with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first
meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to
separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each
province” point to no other conclusion than that the
250,000 minimum population is only required for a city,
but not for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution
requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to
be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support.
And the formulation of the Ordinance in the
implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance
itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000
is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an
additional legislative district in a province, whose
population growth has increased beyond the 1986
numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated
population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─based on the
formula and constant number of 250,000 used by
the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces
and cities ─entitled to two (2) districts in addition
to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986
apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino
concedes this point. In other words, Section 5 of
Article VI as clearly written allows and does not
prohibit an additional district for the Province of
Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on
the Ordinance on the protests and complaints
against strict conformity with the population
standard, and more importantly based on the final
districting in the Ordinance on
considerations other than population, the
reapportionment or the recomposition of the first
and second legislative districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a
new legislative district is valid even if the
population of the new district is 176,383 and not
250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on
House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the
regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of
the discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting
from the redistricting of Districts One and Two.
Each of such factors and in relation to the others
considered together, with the increased population of the
erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence
of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of
discretion, that would warrant the invalidation of Republic
Act No. 9716.
6. Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25,
2010
Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to
declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan.
Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a
city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts.
Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162
(later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986,
Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as
requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of
Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the
population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the
year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional
for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of
250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is
unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of
Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.
Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A.
9591 isunconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the
grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city
must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with
this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification
which is based on the demographic projections, was
declared without legal effect because the Regional Director
has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification
based on the following statements supported by Section 6
of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which
provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued
only if such are declared official by the Nat’l Statistics
Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether
the document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in which
case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is
unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the
year, which in this case, the Certification issued by Director
Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the
growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population
of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333
as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this
Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to
equalize the population and voting power among districts.
7. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO et al. versusEXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
G.R. No. 180050
February 10, 2010
FACTS: Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought
this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to nullify
Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional.
Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the
population of the Province of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A
special census was afterwards conducted by the Provincial
Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded a
population count of 371,576 inhabitants with average
annual income for calendar year 2002-2003 of
P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12 square
kilometers as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance.
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local
Government Code, a province may be created if it has an
average annual income of not less than P20 million based
on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of
Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000
inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous
territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not
contribute to the income of the province.
Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands was enacted into law and a plebiscite was held
subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and
63,502 negative. With the approval of the people from
both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the
Province of Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was created
into a separate and distinct province.
Respondents argued that exemption from the land area
requirement is germane to the purpose of the Local
Government Code to develop self-reliant political and
territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules and regulations
have the force and effect of law as long as they are
germane to the objects and purposes of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2,
Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid.
RULING: No. The rules and regulations cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. The
Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a
province, including any exemption from such criteria, must
all be written in the Local Government Code. The IRR
went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the
Local Government Code when it added the italicized
portion “The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands. “
The extraneous provision cannot be considered as
germane to the purpose of the law as it already conflicts
with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a
territorial subdivision. Thus, there is no dispute that in
case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules
and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law
prevails.
8. Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) vs COMELEC
586 SCRA 210 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Legislative Department – Party List System; Proportional
Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction – Rule in Interpreting the
Constitution – Intent of the Framers vs Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs
COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation
of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in
May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats,
the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for
legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come
from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List
System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the
total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled
to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2
seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats –
this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs
COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats
even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the
party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned
the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of
RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to
qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of
the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by
the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or
is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%
qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be
impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in
the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation
(which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this
digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list
candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section
11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not
major political parties are allowed to participate in the
party-list elections or is the said elections limited to
sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats
in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat
valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is
valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for
every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be
one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally,
the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not
more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-
20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50
would be from party-list representatives. However, the
Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate.
As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220
district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or
the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list
representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the
formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷
0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number
of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is
no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and
those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified.
Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical
impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The
Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats.
Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a
guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50
parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list
seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to
100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties
get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is
present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list
garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat,
and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering
less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following
rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to
the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all
the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats
shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional
seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the
allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists
which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the
two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total
number of seats given to these two-percenters are then
deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In
this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There
are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55
minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text
of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be
used in the second round, particularly, in determining,
first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and
second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not
garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process
filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and
multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but
the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest
total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes
cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered)
x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so
2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it
has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a
total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20%
of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat
limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their
guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the
remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the
voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to
disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO,
LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that
there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or
from RA 7941 against major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections as the word “party”
was not qualified and that even the framers of the
Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed
major political parties to participate in the party-list
elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing
which represents the marginalized (indirect participation),
Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other
justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the
will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it
is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and
the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections
of the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to
ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list
system.
9. ATONG PAGLAUM, et al. v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS G.R. No. 203766, 02 April 2013, EN BANC
(Carpio, J.)
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualified
Atong Paglaum and other aspiring party-list groups in the
2013 Elections because Paglaum, et. al. are not sectoral
groups and they failed to represent the marginalized and
the underrepresented sectors of the society. However,
Atong Paglaum, et al. contends that the party-list election
was never intended to be exclusively for sectoral groups.
ISSUE:
Is the party-list election intended to be exclusively for
sectoral groups?
RULING:
No. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-
clear that there shall be "a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
The commas after the words "national[,]" and "regional[,]"
separate national and regional parties from sectoral
parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended
national and regional parties to be at the same time
sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional
sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was
never their intention to make the party-list system
exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote
in Section5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list
system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or
organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations,
and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three
groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any
doubt that national and regional parties are separate from
sectoral parties. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines
and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 or the Party-List
System Act defines a "party" as "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political
party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A.
No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to
an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No.
7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized
group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector." R.A. No.7941 provides different definitions for a
political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate
and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional
parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and
regional parties under the partylist system to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and
exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties from the party-list system. To exclude them from
the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the
armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list
system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
The Court overturned the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayan v.
COMELEC and BANAT v.COMELEC, and laid down new
rules regarding the party-list system and elections:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (a) national parties ororganizations, (b) regional
parties or organizations, and (c) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need toorganize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented"sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates
in legislative district elections can participate in partylist
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing isby
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
"marginalized and underrepresented" orlacking in "well-
defined political constituencies." It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to thespecial interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized
and underrepresented"include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans,and overseas workers. The sectors
that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include
professionals,the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the"marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectorthey represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack "welldefinedpolitical
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoralparties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or
that represent thosewho lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective
sectors, or musthave a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regionalparties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
10. ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner is a national organization which
represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders.
It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral
grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress
their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic
passages in their decision. It also stated that since their
ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are
considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even
punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed
this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar
as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights
to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal
protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the
Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner
does not have a concrete and genuine national political
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when
it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of
the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application
on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration
of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what
our non-establishment clause calls for is “government
neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC
to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of
Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have
a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are
sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful
as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported
violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies
for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code
or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction.
It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of
violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution
of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is
not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion
of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.
The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further
any substantial public interest.
11. Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines Inc. [Senior Citizens Party-List] vs.
Commission on Elections
Key take away: The twin requirements of due notice and
hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may
properly order the cancellation of the registration and
accreditation of a party-list organization.
The Partylist group named Senior Citizens signed an
agreement pertaining to the term sharing of their
nominees to the House of Representatives, dividing the
fixed 6 year term of an HOR rep depending on how many
seats will they be entitled to. Due to the Term Sharing
agreement which is contrary to Section 7, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution (which imposes that there is a fixed
term to hold public elective office) the registration and
accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS under Party-List System
of Representation was cancelled. Two factions (Datol and
Arquiza group) of the Senior Citizen filed separate petition
contending that their right to due process was violated.
The court ruled that the party was deprived of due
process. Due process violation was committed when they
were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing
agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR
CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material considerationin the
evaluation of the organizations qualifications as a party-
list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both
factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this
issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the
opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the
term-sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence,
accordingly, in support of their position.
FACTS
• The present petitions were filed by the two rival
factions within the same party-list organization, the
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc.
(SENIOR CITIZENS). One group is headed by the
organization’s incumbent HOR rep, Rep.Arquiza (Arquiza
group) and the other, the organization’s third nominee,
Francisco Datol (Datol group).
• SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14,
2007 elections. However, the organization failed to get the
required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast.
In accordance with the procedure set forth in BANAT for
the allocation of additional seats under the party-list
system, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in
Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organization’s first
nominee, served as a member of the House of
Representatives.
• Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to
participate in the May 10, 2010 elections
• The nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an
agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, which contains
the list of their candidates and terms on sharing of their
powers (they broke down the term to accommodate those
who are not entitled to hold the office)
• After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections,
SENIOR CITIZENS ranked 2nd among all the party-list
candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of
Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first
nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its
second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
• According to Datol’s group, the members of
SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention in order to
address “the unfulfilled commitment of [Rep. Arquiza] to
his constituents.” Further,a new set of officers and
members of the Board of Trustees of the organization were
allegedly elected during the said convention. SENIOR
CITIZENS’ third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was
supposedly elected as the organization’s Chairman. In an
opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR
CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were allied with
Rep. Arquiza.
• Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. in a letter that the 2nd
nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his
resignation. By virtue of such resignation and as provided
under their agreement, Rep. Arquiza stated that its fourth
nominee shall assume position since their third nominee,
Datol, has been previously expelled in their party.
However, the board of the party list, headed by Rep.
Arquiza, recalled the previous acceptance of the
resignation of Rep. Kho.
• The COMELEC en Banc issued a resolution that the
list submitted to them is deemed to be permanent as the
law deprives the party the right to change their nominees.
Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-
list were true, the list and order of nominees of the Senior
Citizens party-list remains the same in so far as the
COMELEC and the law are concerned as it does not fall
under one of the three grounds mentioned in law for the
changing of nominees. And that the resignation of Kho,
pursuant to the party nominees term-sharing agreement,
cannot be recognized and be given effect so as to create a
vacancy in the list and change the order of the nominees.
• Republic Act No. 7941 clearly deprived the
party-list organization of the right to change its nominees
or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted
to the COMELEC, except for three (3) enumerated
instances such as when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the
nominee becomes incapacitated.
• Due to the Term Sharing agreement which is
contrary toSection 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
(which imposes fixed term to hold public elective office)
the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS
under Party-List System of Representation was cancelled
• The two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS (Datol and
Arquiza Group) filed separate petitions
The Arquiza Group argues that no notice and
hearing were given to SENIOR CITIZENS for the
cancellation of its registration on account of the
term-sharing agreement of its nominees.
Datol Group faults the COMELEC for cancelling the
registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS
without giving the latter the opportunity toshow that it
complied with the parameters laid down in AtongPaglaum
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process of Senior
Citizens was violated
HELD:YES
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the
COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal,
are those outlined in the seminal case of AngTibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations:
• The first of these rights is the right to a hearing,
which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. This right pertain to the substantive rights of a
party at hearing stage of the proceedings.The essence of
this aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is
simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in
the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure
defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as
the standards in the determination of the presence or
denial of due process.
• The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of
the AngTibay requirements are reinforcements of the right
to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the
deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the
evidence presented during the hearing. These standards
set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the
case and are the material and substantial components of
decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the
totality of the evidence presented which must all be found
in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or
submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the
decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be
based on substantial evidence.
• Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form
and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body,
further complements the hearing and decision-making due
process rights and is similar in substance to the
constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must
state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is
based. As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies
due process, this is the "duty to give reason" to enable the
affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has
been administered in his case, to expose the reason to
public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the
decision will be thought through by the decision-maker.
In the instant case, the review of the registration of
SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary
hearing carried out on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157
(PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the
Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed given the
opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing
compliance with the requirements for party-list
accreditation.
Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed
when they were not apprised of the fact that the term-
sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of
SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material
consideration in the evaluation of the organizations
qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013
elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS
were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other
words, they were deprived of the opportunity to
adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing
agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in
support of their position.
It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival
groups of SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence of
the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of
COMELEC, however, said hearing was conducted for
purposes of discussing the petition of the Arquiza Group
asking for the confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho,
who had tendered his resignation effective on December
31, 2011.
More specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that
the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the Arquiza
group and its subsequent manifestation, praying that the
group be allowed to withdraw its petition. Also, during the
hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the
rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts and
warned them about the complications brought about by
their term-sharing agreement.
However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding
the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group
and the issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may
be a ground for disqualification was neither raised nor
resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantess remonstration
was not sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the
term-sharing agreement would be considered as a ground
for the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS registration and
accreditation.
12. Lico v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205505, September 29,
2015
A party-list organization owes its existence to the State
and the latter's approval must be obtained through its
agent, the COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v.
COMELEC, We declared that it is the State, acting through
the COMELEC, that breathes life to a party-list
organization. The implication, therefore, is that the State,
through the COMELEC, is a party to the principal contracts
entered into by the party-list organization and its
members - the Constitution and By-laws - such that any
amendment to these contracts would constitute a novation
requiring the consent of all the parties involved. An
amendment to the by-laws of a party-list organization
should become effective only upon approval by the
COMELEC.
Such a prerequisite is analogous to the requirement of
filing of the amended by-laws and subsequent conformity
thereto of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
under corporation law. Under the Corporation Code, an
amendment to a by-law provision must be filed with the
SEC. The amendment shall be effective only upon the
issuance by the SEC of a certification that it is not
inconsistent with the Corporation Code.
Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay claim to
legitimacy, the equipoise doctrine comes into play. This
rule provides that when the evidence in an issue of fact is
in equipoise, that is, when the respective sets of evidence
of both parties are evenly balanced, the party having the
burden of proof fails in that issue. Since neither party
succeeds in making out a case, neither side prevails. The
courts are left with no other option but to leave them as
they are. The consequence, therefore, is the dismissal of
the complaint/petition.
In Seneres v. COMELEC, the validity of the Certificate of
Nomination filed by Buhay Party-List through its
President, Roger Robles, was questioned on the ground
that his term had expired at the time it was filed. The Court
applied by analogy the default rule in corporation law to
the effect that officers and directors of a corporation hold
over after the expiration of their terms until such time as
their successors are elected or appointed. Señeres ruled
that the hold-over principle applies in the absence of a
provision in the constitution or by-laws of the party-list
organization prohibiting its application.
In the present case, We have gone through the Constitution
and By-laws of Ating Koop and We do not see any
provision forbidding, either expressly or impliedly, the
application of the hold-over rule. Thus, in accordance with
corporation law, the existing Interim Central Committee is
still a legitimate entity with full authority to bind the
corporation and to carry out powers despite the lapse of
the term of its members on 14 November 2011, since no
successors had been validly elected at the time, or since.
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of
the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect.
Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is
circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of
electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is
exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the
cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of
the proclaimed winner.
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's
expulsion from the House of Representatives is anchored
on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily
affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list
nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide
member of the party or organization for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election.[38] Needless
to say, bona fide membership in the party-list group is a
continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications
for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing
requirements. They must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but
during the officer's entire tenure.[39]
This is not the first time that this Court has passed upon
the issue of HRET jurisdiction over the requirements for
bona fide membership in a party-list organization. In
Abayon v. HRET,[40] it was argued that the petitioners did
not belong to the marginalized and under-represented
sectors that they should represent; as such, they could not
be properly considered bona fide members of their
respective party-list organizations. The Court held that it
was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the
requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list
organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI
of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all
contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of
the House of Representatives.
13. Lokin vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22,
2010
FACTS: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a
duly registered party-list organization, manifested their
intent to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections. They submitted a list of five
nominees from which its representatives would be chosen
should CIBAC obtain the number of qualifying votes.
However, prior to the elections, the list of nominees was
amended: the nominations of the petitioner Lokin, Sherwin
Tugna and Emil Galang were withdrawn; Armi Jane Borje
was substituted; and Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and
Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were retained.
Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a
second seat and that Lokin, as second nominee on the
original list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by
Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the
amendment of the list of nominees and the withdrawal of
the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It approved
the amendment of the list of nominees with the new order
as follows:
1. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva
2. Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane Borje
The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the
official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her
oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.
Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee
of CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for certiorari
assailing Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it
expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC to
change its nominees.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the
controversy;
2. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
3. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is
unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act;
and
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and
allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC
without any basis in fact or law and after the close of polls.
RULING: The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the
case. Lokin’s case is not an election protest nor an action
for quo warranto. Election protest is a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the
grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine
who obtained the higher number of votes entitling them to
hold the office. On the other hand, a special civil action for
quo warranto questions the ineligibility of the winning
candidate. This is a special civil action for certiorari against
the COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of the
COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping because the
filing of the action for certiorari and the action for
mandamus are based on different causes of action and the
reliefs they sought were different. Forum shopping
consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously
or successively to obtain a favorable judgment.
The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was
invalid. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 as an
implementing rules and regulations in accordance with the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and the Party-List
System Act. As an administrative agency, it cannot amend
an act of Congress nor issue IRRs that may enlarge, alter or
restrict the provisions of the law it administers and
enforces. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 provides that: Each
registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to
the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the
election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which
party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains
the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only
persons who have given their consent in writing may be
named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of
any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an
elective office in the immediately preceding election. No
change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shal be allowed after the same shall have been submitted
to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies,
or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
representatives in the House of Representatives who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.
The above provision is clear and unambiguous and
expresses a single and definite meaning, there is no room
for interpretation or construction but only for application.
Section 8 clearly prohibits the change of nominees and
alteration of the order in the list of nominees’ names after
submission of the list to the COMELEC. It enumerates only
three instances in which an organization can substitute
another person in place of the nominee whose name has
been submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the nominee
fies; (2) when the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; and (3) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception
to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are
strictly but reasonably construed.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the
exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 when it
provided four instances by adding “nomination is
withdrawn by the party” as statutory ground for
substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no authority to
expand, extend, or add anything to law it seeks to
implement. An IRR should remain consistent with the law
it intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it.
An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law but in case
of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law prevails.
The petitions for certiorari and mandamus were granted.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was declared invalid
and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee
once it has submitted the nomination to the COMELEC.
14. Dr. Hans Christian Señeres vs Commission on
Elections
585 SCRA 557 – Political Law – Leadership Disputes
Within a Party List – Electioneering
Mercantile Law – Corporation Law – Hold-Over Principle
FACTS: In 1999, Melquiades Robles was elected president
and chairperson of BUHAY, a party-list group duly
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
The constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-year term
for all its party officers, without re-election. BUHAY
participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles
as its president. All the required Manifestations of Desire
to Participate in the said electoral exercises, including the
Certificates of Nomination of representatives, carried the
signature of Robles as president of BUHAY. On January 26,
2007, in connection with the May 2007 elections, BUHAY
again filed a Manifestation of its Desire to Participate in the
Party-List System of Representation. As in the past two
elections, the manifestation to participate bore the
signature of Robles as BUHAY president.
Dr. Hans Christian Señeres, on the other hand, filed with
the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to Certificates.
In it, Señeres alleged that he was the acting president and
secretary-general of BUHAY, having assumed that position
since August 17, 2004 when Robles vacated the position.
Señeres also claim that the nominations made by Robles
(nominations pertaining as to who should represent
BUHAY in Congress) were, for lack of authority, void owing
to the expiration of the latter’s term as party president.
Furthermore, Señeres asserted that Robles was, under the
Constitution, disqualified from being an officer of any
political party, the latter being the Acting Administrator of
the Light Railway Transport Authority (LRTA), a
government-controlled corporation. Robles, so Señeres
would charge, was into a partisan political activity which
civil service members, like the former, were enjoined from
engaging in.
On July 9 and July 18, 2007, respectively, the COMELEC
issued two resolutions proclaiming BUHAY as a winning
party-list organization for the May 2007 elections entitled
to three (3) House seats and it also declared Robles as the
duly authorized representative of BUHAY.
ISSUE: Whether or not Robles should be disqualified as
president of BUHAY.
HELD: No, Robles is not disqualified as the president of
BUHAY. His being the chairman of LRTA and the president
of BUHAY, a party-list group, is not compatible. There is no
law prohibiting that the LRTA chair cannot be a president
of a party-list group. Further, Robles is not guilty of
electioneering. Robles’ act of nominating BUHAY
representatives to Congress is not electioneering. The
crime electioneering is clearly defined under Section 79
(b) of the Omnibus Election Code but Robles did not
commit any act defined thereunder.
Anent the issue that Robles’ term as president of BUHAY
already expired when he made the nominations hence the
nominations are void, the Supreme Court ruled that the
nominations are valid. This is because of the “Hold-Over”
doctrine under corporation law. As a general rule, officers
and directors of a corporation hold over after the
expiration of their terms until such time as their
successors are elected or appointed. The holdover doctrine
has, to be sure, a purpose which is at once legal as it is
practical. It accords validity to what would otherwise be
deemed as dubious corporate acts and gives continuity to a
corporate enterprise in its relation to outsiders.
15. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS,
Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)
ET AL., Respondents.
SERENO,J.:
FACTS: Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral
party registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941,
otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in
its constitution and bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to
fight graft and corruption and to promote ethical conduct
in the countrys public service. Under the leadership of the
National Council, its highest policymaking and governing
body, the party participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007
elections. On 20 November 2009, two different entities,
both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the
COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the
Party-List System of Representation in the May 10, 2010
Elections.
The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B.
Derla, who claimed to be the partys acting secretary-
general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another
Manifestation6 was submitted by herein respondents
Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the partys
vice-president and secretary-general, respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
87447 giving due course to CIBACs Manifestation,
WITHOUT PREJUDICE the determination which of the two
factions of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral
organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of intent
to participate is the official representative of said party-
list/coalitions/sectoral organizations.
On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and
Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the
Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law
Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva
and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla
submitted a second Certificate of Nomination, which
included petitioners Luis Lokin and Teresita Planas as
party-list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her
signature as acting secretary-general of CIBAC.
Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and
Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed with the
COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From The Records
And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to nullify the
Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that
Derla had misrepresented herself as acting secretary-
general, when she was not even a member of CIBAC; that
the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she
submitted were unauthorized by the party and therefore
invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly
authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its
behalf.
In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First
Division granted the Petition, ordered the Certificate filed
by Derla to be expunged from the records, and declared
respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon
Motion for Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse
parties, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the Divisions
findings.
Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in
accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose
to file the partys Certificate of Nomination is an intra-
corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special
commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction; and
2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for
Disqualification and recognizing respondents as the
properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.
HELD: As earlier stated, this Court denies the petition for
being filed outside the requisite period. The review by this
Court of judgments and final orders of the COMELEC is
governed specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,
which states:
REMEDIAL LAW: review of judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the COA
Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or
resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved
party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65,
except as hereinafter provided.
The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers
precisely to the immediately succeeding provision, Section
3 thereof, which provides for the allowable period within
which to file petitions for certiorari from judgments of
both the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Thus,
while Rule 64 refers to the same remedy of certiorari as
the general rule in Rule 65, they cannot be equated, as they
provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65
provides for a period of 60 days from notice of judgment
sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while Section 3
expressly provides for only 30 days, viz:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment
or final order or resolution, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall
interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied,
the aggrieved party may file the petition within the
remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5)
days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution
on 12 July 2010. Upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the COMELEC en banc
issued the second assailed Resolution on 31 August 2010.
This per curiam Resolution was received by petitioners on
1 September 2010.16 Thus, pursuant to Section 3 above,
deducting the three days it took petitioners to file the
Motion for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period
of 27 days or until 28 September 2010 within which to file
the Petition for Certiorari with this Court.
However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1
October 2010, clearly outside the required period.
POLITICAL LAW: COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party
disputes
In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it
was expressly settled that the COMELEC possessed the
authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary
tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce
election laws and register political parties. The Court
therein cited Kalaw v. Commission on Elections and
Palmares v. Commission on Elections, which uniformly
upheld the COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party
disputes:
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership
disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court
ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the
COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the
identity of the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another
case that the COMELECs power to register political parties
necessarily involved the determination of the persons who
must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an
intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought
before it, as an incident of its power to register political
parties.
ELECTION LAW: party-list system law
Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of party-
list representatives, as well as their individual
qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System Law.
Sections 8 and 9 thereof state:
Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each
registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to
the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the
election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which
party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains
the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only
persons who have given their consent in writing may be
named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate
for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for
an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No
change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted
to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies,
or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
representatives in the House of Representatives who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person
shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election,
able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law
vesting the COMELEC with jurisdiction over the
nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing
the qualifications of each nominee, the COMELEC
promulgated its Rules on Disqualification Cases Against
Nominees of Party-List Groups/ Organizations
Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and
Local Elections. Adopting the same qualifications of party-
list nominees listed above, Section 6 of these Rules also
required that:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit
documentary evidence in consonance with the
Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that
the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party,
organization, political party or coalition they seek to
represent, which may include but not limited to the
following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization
showing active participation of the nominee/s in the
undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the
advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented
sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or
coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the
advocacies of the party-list group/organizations (prior
declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other
positive actions on the part of the nominee/sshowing
his/her adherence to the advocacies of the party-list
group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide
member of the party-list group/ organization for at least
ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented
sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate
of the party-list/organization but is/are also a bona fide
member/s of said marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group and
nominees to submit the foregoing documentary evidence if
not complied with prior to the effectivity of this resolution
not later than three (3) days from the last day of filing of
the list of nominees.
Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the COMELEC First Division
and the COMELEC en banc.
The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged
authority as acting secretary-general was an
unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting
evidence. Petitioners did not submit any documentary
evidence that Derla was a member of CIBAC, let alone the
representative authorized by the party to submit its
Certificate of Nomination.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions,
the instant Petition is DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS the
judgment of the COMELEC expunging from its records the
Certificate of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010 by Pia B.
Derla.
16. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN G.R. No.
207264, 25 JUNE 2013, EN BANC (Perez, J.)
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc
Resolution of June 25, 2013 which foundno grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections and
affirmed the March 27,2013 Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division.
Reyes raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or
not Respondent COMELEC iswithout jurisdiction over
Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who has
already taken her oathof office for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
districtof Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed
winner and having taken her oath of office as member
ofthe House of Representatives, all questions regarding
her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of
theCOMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the
correctness of petitioner submission.Thecrucial question is
whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on May 18,
2013. Differently stated,was there basis for the
proclamation of petitioner on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18,
2013, the COMELEC En Banc hadalready finally disposed
of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency via itsresolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling
petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation
whichpetitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any
basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme
Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and
the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless
proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of
promulgation alone becomevalid and legal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process.
RULING:
Yes. Reyes alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it took cognizance of"newly-discovered
evidence" without the same having been testified on and
offered and admitted inevidence. She assails the admission
of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy ofthe Certification from the Bureau of
Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a
violation of herright to due process of law because she was
not given the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to
strictly adhere to the technical rulesof procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the
COMELEC Rules ofProcedure "shall be liberally construed
in order to achieve just, expeditious and
inexpensivedetermination and disposition of every action
and proceeding brought before the Commission." In viewof
the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due
course or to cancel certificate of candidacy aresummary in
nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly
admitted by respondentCOMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the
case at bar as petitioner was given everyopportunity to
argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October
2012 when Tan's petition wasfiled up to 27 March 2013
when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner
had a period of five
(5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not
avail herself of the opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process
only requires that the party be given theopportunity or
right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:
The petitioners should bereminded that due process does
not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity orright to be heard. One may be heard, not
solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
timesmore creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative
proceedingsmoreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative
processcannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due
processcannot be successfully invoked where a party was
given the chance to be heard on his motion
forreconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of Reyes’ COC, respondent
submitted records of the Bureau ofImmigration showing
that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her
status is that of a"balikbayan." At this point, the burden of
proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty
toprove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has
not lost the same, or that she has re-acquiredsuch status in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside
from the bare allegation that sheis a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such
contention. Neither didshe submit any proof as to the
inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
17. LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO v. HON. SPEAKER
FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,SECRETARY GENERAL
MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP and REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016, EN BANC (Leonardo-De
Castro, J.)
FACTS:
The COC of Regina Reyes was cancelled in a petition filed
for the purpose. Pending theresolution of Reyes' motion
for reconsideration, elections were held. A day after the
election, theCOMELEC en banc affirmed the said
resolution. Despite such decision, Reyes was still
proclaimed asthe representative of the lone district of
Marinduque. In the meantime, the COMELEC's
resolutionbecame final and executory. Velasco filed a
petition for certiorari assailing that the proceedings of
thePBOC and the proclamation of Reyes were null and
void. The COMELEC denied the aforementionedpetition.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the denial of Velasco's
petition and declared null and voidthe proclamation of
Reyes. However, Velasco alleged that despite all the letters
and requests to Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to
recognize him as the duly elected Representativeof the
Lone District of Marinduque. Hence, the instant Petition for
Mandamus with prayer for issuanceof a temporary
restraining order and/or injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap can
be compelled to administer oath andto delete the name of
Reyes in the Roll of the members of the House of
Representatives respectively.
RULING:
YES. The present Petition for Mandamus seeks to compel
respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr.and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory
Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC
by administering the oath of office to Velasco andentering
the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives. In other words, theCourt is called upon to
determine whether or not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the
administration of theoath of office to Velasco; and (if) the
inclusion of his name in the Roll of Members, are
ministerial incharacter vis-a-vis the factual and legal
milieu of this case. As the Court has previously stated,
theadministration of oath and the registration of Velasco in
the Roll of Members of the House ofRepresentatives for the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no longer
a matter of discretionor judgment on the part of Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They are legally
duty-bound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected
Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone
Districtof Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by
the Court and the COMELEC'S compliance with thesaid
ruling, now both final and executory.
18. TANADA v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 217012, March 1, 2016, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)
FACTS: Wigberto Tanada filed twin petitions before the
COMELEC to cancel the COC of Alvin John Tanada for false
representations and to declare him as a nuisance
candidate. They were both candidates for the position of
Congress Representative. A COMELEC division denied both
his petitions, but on reconsideration, the COMELEC en
banc on April 13, 2013 granted to cancel the COC of Alvin
John for false representations. The petition to declare him
as nuisance candidate however was denied. Wigberto
again sought reconsideration of the denial of his petition
on the basis of a newly discovered evidence. Comes
election day and the name of Alvin John remained in the
ballots, whichafter Angelica Tan was the winning
candidate, and Wigberto only second.
Wigberto filed before the PBOC a petition to correct
manifest mistakes concerning the cancelled candidacy of
Alvin John and a motion to consolidate Alvin John’s votes
with the votes he garnered. The PBOC denied the motion
to consolidate the votes because Alvin John was not a
nuisance candidate. PBOC then proclaimed Angelica as the
winner.
On May 21, 2013, Wigberto filed a supplemental petition
before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of Tan,
which was granted and affirmed by the COMELEC en banc.
However, Angelica had by then taken her oath and
assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, thereby
rendering the adverse resolution on her proclamation
moot.
On May 27, 2013, before the SC, Wigberto filed a certiorari
assailing the April 25, 2013 COMELEC en banc’s ruling
declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate and an
election protest claiming that fraud has been perpetrated.
The SC, noting that the proclaimed candidate has already
assumed office, dismissed the election protest and directed
Wigberto to file the protest before the proper tribunal
which is the HRET. The certiorari was also dismissed for
being filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period.Before
the HRET, the election protest was dismissed for being
insufficient in form and substance and for lack of
jurisdiction over John Alvin who was not a member of the
House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Are the votes for Alvin John should be credited in favor
of Wigberto as a result of the cancellation of Alvin John’s
candidacy
2. the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC en banc’s ruling is proper
3. Does SC has jurisdiction to resolve issues on the conduct
of canvassing after the proclamation of a winning
candidate
RULING:
1. No, the votes cast for Alvin John whose COC was
cancelled are stray votes only. A COC cancelled on ground
of false representations under Sec 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, unlikein being a nuisance candidate in Sec
69, does not have the effect of crediting the votes in favorof
another candidate.
2. No, the motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading. Rule 13 Sec 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure specifically prohibits the filing of a motion for
reconsiderationof an en banc ruling, resolution, order or
decision except in election offensecases. Consequently,
when a COMELEC en banc ruling become final and
executory, itprecludes a party from raising again in any
other forum the nuisance candidacy as an issue.
3. No. The SC no longer has jurisdiction over questions
involving the elections, returns andqualifications of
candidates who have already assumed their office as
members of House of Representatives. Issues concerning
the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation
ofcandidates are matters which fall under the scope of the
terms “election” and “returns” andhence, properly fall
under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.
19. MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND
PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY
GR. No. 219603, January 26, 2016, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)
FACTS:
In 2008, Philip Pichay was convicted of four counts of libel.
In 2016, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur for the 2013
elections. A petition for his disqualification was filed by
Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado under Sec. 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code on the ground that he was convicted of libel,
a crime involving moral turpitude. When Pichay paid the
fine in lieu of imprisonment, on February 17, 2011, the
five-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to
lapse. When Pichay was proclaimed as the winner, she
filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET
reiterating that Pichay's ineligibility.
However, the HRET concluded that the circumstances
surrounding Pichay's conviction for libel showed that the
crime did not involve moral turpitude.
ISSUE:
Whether Pichay is disqualified to become a member of the
House of Representatives.
RULING:
YES. A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving
moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. Libel is listed as
one of the crimes involving moral turpitude. In the present
case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel.
In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines (587 Phil. 64, 2008),
the Court found Pichay liable for publishing the four
defamatory articles, which are libelous per se, with
reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification
under Section 12, which became final on June 1, 2009,
Pichay made a false material representation as to his
eligibility when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
2013 elections. Pichay's disqualification under Sec. 12 is a
material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under
Secs. 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The HRET
committedgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify
Pichayfor his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral
turpitude.
20. HARLIN C. ABAYON, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET)
AND RAUL A. DAZA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 223032
HARLIN C. ABAYON, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET)
AND RAUL A. DAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These consolidated petitions for certiorari filed under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court seek to reverse and set aside the
December 14, 20151 and January 21, 20162 Resolutions of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in
HRET Case No. 13-023, dismissing the counter-protest of
petitioner Harlin C. Abayon (Abayon); and the February 3,
2016 Decision3 and the March 7, 2016 Resolution4 of the
HRET in the same case, which found private respondent
Raul A. Daza (Daza) as the duly elected Representative of
the First Legislative District of Northern Samar in the May
13, 2013 Elections.
The Antecedents
Abayon and Daza were contenders for the position of
Representative in the First Legislative District of Northern
Samar during the May 13, 2013 Elections. Out of the votes
cast in the 332 clustered precincts in the First District of
Northern Samar, Abayon emerged as the winner after
obtaining the majority vote of 72,857. Daza placed second
with a total of 72,805 votes. The difference was 52 votes.
On May 17, 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Northern Samar proclaimed Abayon as the duly elected
member of the House of Representatives for the said
legislative district.5
On May 31, 2013, Daza filed his Election Protest6
challenging the elections results in 25 clustered precincts
in the Municipalities of Biri, Capul, Catarman, Lavezares,
San Isidro, and Victoria. In his protest, he bewailed that
there was massive fraud, vote-buying, intimidation,
employment of illegal and fraudulent devices and schemes
before, during and after the elections benefitting Abayon
and that terrorism was committed by the latter and his
unidentified cohorts, agents and supporters.7
On August 1, 2013, Abayon filed his Verified Answer
raising special and affirmative defenses as well as his
Counter-Protest.8 He challenged the results in all 332
precincts alleging that the 72,805 votes obtained by Daza
were questionable in view of the frauds and anomalies
committed by the latter and his supporters during the
elections.9
In its Resolution No. 14-055,10 dated February 27, 2014,
the HRET found both Daza's protest and Abayon's counter-
protest to be sufficient in form and substance. From
October 14, 2014, until October 15, 2014, revision
proceedings were conducted on the 25 clustered precincts
protested by Daza.11 After the revision of ballots in the
said precincts, the votes for Abayon increased by 28 and
the votes for Daza increased by 14.12
In his Urgent Manifestation and Omnibus Motion,13 dated
September 3, 2015, Daza moved for the withdrawal of his
cause of action for the recount, revision and re-
appreciation of the ballots in the clustered precincts in the
municipalities of Biri, Capul and San Isidro. He likewise
prayed that the validity and legitimacy of his separate and
distinct cause of action for the annulment of election
results in certain identified precincts on the ground of
terrorism be upheld.14 In its Resolution No. 15-052, dated
September 24, 2015, the HRET granted Daza's motion and
directed the Hearing Commissioner to continue with the
reception of Abayon's defense on the issue of terrorism
and to hold in abeyance the proceedings relative to his
counter-protest.15
G.R. No. 222236
Thereafter, Daza filed an Urgent Manifestation and
Motion,16 dated November 4, 2015, praying that Abayon's
counter-protest be dismissed as a consequence of the
withdrawal of his (Daza's) cause of action for the recount,
revision and re-appreciation in the concerned clustered
precincts.
In its Resolution No. 15-058, dated December 14, 2015, the
HRET granted Daza's motion and dismissed Abayon's
counter-protest. Abayon moved for reconsideration but his
motion was denied by the HRET in its January 21, 2016
Resolution. Aggrieved, Abayon filed a Petition for
Certiorari17 with prayer for the urgent issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a status quo
ante order and/or Preliminary injunction before the Court,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 222236.
Meanwhile, the HRET proceeded with the reception of
evidence with regard to the issue of terrorism on the
remaining clustered precincts in the municipalities of
Lavezares and Victoria. After the parties had submitted
their memoranda, the HRET decided the election protest in
Daza's favor and declared him as the winning candidate.
G.R. No. 223032
In its February 3, 2016 Decision, the HRET annulled the
election results in five (5) clustered precincts in the
municipalities of Lavezares and Victoria because of the
commission of massive terrorism. As a result of nullifying
the election results in the said clustered precincts, the
HRET deducted the votes received by the parties in the
concerned clustered precincts and concluded that Daza
obtained 72,436 votes and Abayon had 72,002 votes.
The HRET highlighted that Daza presented testimonial and
documentary evidence showing that: (1) prior to the May
13, 2013 elections, the National Democratic Front-Eastern
Visayas (NDF-EV) had already shown its animosity and
hostility towards him and his then incumbent governor
son through the posting on the NDF-EV website and in
conspicuous places statements declaring them as enemies
of the people of Northern Samar; (2) comic magazines
vilifying them were distributed; (3) "pulong-pulongs" were
held in the concerned barangays where the NDF-EV
exhorted the resident-attendees to vote against him and in
favor of Abayon, threatening to comeback if the result
were otherwise; (4) his supporters and/or fellow Liberal
Party candidates were prohibited from campaigning for
him, and also from mounting tarpaulins/posters and
distributing sample ballots; (5) Abayon had meetings with
NDF-EV officials, during which times, he gave them money
and guns; and (6) NDF-EV armed partisans were deployed
around the school premises in the concerned precincts on
election day.
The HRET found that Daza had adduced convincing
evidence to establish that fear was instilled in the minds of
hundreds of resident-voters in the protested clustered
precincts from the time they had attended the "pulong-
pulongs" up until the election day itself when armed
partisans were deployed to the schools to ensure that the
voters would not vote for him but for Abayon.
The HRET disregarded the certifications issued by the
Provincial Election Supervisor Atty. Antonio G. Gulay Jr.
that there was no failure of election in Northern Samar and
by P/SSupt. Mario Abraham Gonzalez Lenaming, Officer-
in-Charge of the Northern Samar Police Provincial Office,
that the conduct of the elections was generally peaceful
despite the occurrence of two election-related incidents in
the First District of Northern Samar. The HRET noted that
the said government officials were not presented to testify
and, even if the said certifications were admissible, it had
no probative value in disputing the terroristic acts
committed upon the voters in the assailed precincts.
The HRET ratiocinated that there was clear and convincing
evidence to warrant the annulment of the elections in the
concerned precincts because the terrorism affected more
than 50% of the votes cast in the said precincts and it was
impossible to distinguish the good votes from the bad.
Abayon moved for reconsideration, but his motion was
denied by the HRET in its March 7, 2016 Resolution.
On March 9, 2016, Abayon filed before the Court this
petition for certiorari18 and prohibition with prayer for
the urgent issuance of TRO and/or a status quo ante order
and/or preliminary injunction before the Court, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 223032.
These present consolidated petitions raise the following:
ISSUES
1] Whether the HRET had jurisdiction to annul the
elections in the contested precincts in the municipalities of
Lavezares and Victoria;
2] Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
in annulling the elections on the ground of terrorism; and
2] Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the counter-protest filed by Abayon.
G.R. No. 222236
Petitioner Abayon insists that the HRET erred when it
dismissed his counter-protest as it was in violation of his
right to due process. He states that the resolutions issued
by the HRET dismissing his counter-protest did not state
clearly and distinctly the facts and legal bases thereof.
Abayon even asserts that the HRET admitted in its
resolution that it merely adopted the facts and the law
invoked by Daza in his urgent manifestation and motion.
He argues that the counter-protest could not be simply
dismissed on the basis of Daza's withdrawal of his cause of
action for the recount, revision and re-appreciation of the
ballots in the clustered precincts in Biri, Capul and San
Isidro; that a counter-protest is an independent, distinct,
separate and alternative legal remedy which is exclusively
available to a protestee in an election protest case; and
that his counter-protest may be summarily dismissed only
if the grounds under Rule 2119 of the 2011 HRET Rules of
Procedure are present.
G.R. No. 223032
Abayon asserts that the nullification of the election results
in the concerned clustered precincts was not within the
jurisdiction of the HRET. He explains that the annulment of
election results on the ground of terrorism is akin to a
declaration of failure of elections, which is under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7166.20
Further, Abayon argues that even if the HRET had
jurisdiction to annul election results, it still committed
grave abuse of discretion in this particular case for lack of
legal and factual bases. He avers that there was no clear
and convincing evidence to establish that terrorism
affected more than 50% of the votes cast and that it was
impossible to distinguish the good votes from the bad.
Abayon heavily relies on the respective certifications
issued by the COMELEC and the Philippine National Police
(PNP) that the elections in Northern Samar were orderly
and peaceful.
Also, Abayon laments that his right to due process was
violated because the HRET did not exhibit the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge in handling the present
election protest. He points out that the HRET granted
Daza's motion to present additional witnesses without him
being granted the opportunity to be heard. Abayon also
reiterates that his counter-protest was unceremoniously
dismissed.
Position of Respondent Daza
In his Consolidated Comment,21 dated March 28, 2016,
Daza countered that the petition (G.R. No. 222236) should
be dismissed because it contained fatal violations of the
Rules of Court. He cited the following infractions: (1)
forum shopping; (2) the resolution dismissing Abayon's
protest had become final and executory for his failure to
file a motion for reconsideration thereof; and (3) the
petition did not indicate in its caption the original case
number before the HRET. Moreover, Daza contended that
the petition was without merit because the HRET could
continue or discontinue the revision proceedings motu
propio. In addition, he stated that the case had been
mooted by the promulgation of the HRET decision
declaring him as the winner in the last electoral process.
Further, Daza posited that the HRET had jurisdiction to
annul the election results on the ground of terrorism. He
questioned the present petition (G.R. No. 223032) as it
raised factual issues, which was outside the province of a
Rule 65 petition. He stressed that the Court could only
exercise its certiorari jurisdiction in cases of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the HRET. Daza further stated
that even if the Court were to review the factual findings of
the HRET, it would still find clear and convincing evidence
to justify the annulment of election results in the contested
precincts. He asserted that the testimonies of the voters
and residents of the concerned precincts were
corroborated by P/SSupt. Isaias B. Tonog (P/SSupt.
Tonog), then Provincial Director of Northern Samar; and
Col. Roberto S. Capulong (Col. Capulong), Operations
Officer of the 8th Division, Philippine Army in Catbalogan,
Samar. Daza explained that the totality of his evidence
clearly and convincingly showed that the NDF-EV, through
violence, intimidation and threats conducted before and
during elections, harassed voters in the contested
precincts to vote for Abayon and threatened them should
they not do so.
In its Consolidated Comment,22 dated March 28, 2016, the
HRET, through the Office of the Solicitor General, averred
that it had jurisdiction to annul election results. It
highlighted Rule 16 of the 2011 HRET Rules stating that
the election or returns of a proclaimed House
Representative may be assailed in an election protest if the
election or returns were attended by specific acts or
omission constituting electoral frauds, anomalies or
irregularities, which necessarily included acts of terrorism
to dissuade voters from casting their vote or to alter the
results of the election.
The HRET faulted Abayon in claiming that the case was
similar to a declaration of failure of elections which was
under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc, pursuant
to R.A. No. 7166. It reasoned that mere allegation of
terrorism would not immediately convert the case to a
nullification case because terrorism was an act resulting in
either failure of elections or electoral fraud, anomaly, or
irregularity, which can only be protested through an
election protest. Moreover, the HRET claimed that it did
not commit grave abuse of discretion as its decision in
favor of Daza was supported by clear and convincing
evidence. As such, it concluded that its decision should be
sustained.
The HRET further stated that it did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing Abayon's counter-protest
because it had the prerogative to discontinue the revision
proceedings. It likewise elucidated that Abayon was not
deprived of due process when his counter-protest was
dismissed because he was given his day in court.
The HRET underscored that Abayon did not move for
reconsideration when his counter-protest was denied,
hence, the resolution became final and executory.
Finally, the HRET posited that it did not violate Article VIII,
Section 14 of the Constitution23 because the assailed
resolutions were merely interlocutory orders and, even if
they were considered decisions or final orders, they
sufficiently stated the facts and law upon which they were
based as there was no proscription against the court's
adoption of the narration of facts made in the briefs or
memoranda of the parties.
The Court's Ruling
The petitions are impressed with merit.
The HRET Jurisdiction
Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution clearly spells out
HRET's jurisdiction, to wit:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman,
Abayon argues that the annulment of the election results
in the contested precincts was beyond the jurisdiction of
the HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives. He claims that under Section 4
of R.A. No. 7166,24 only the COMELEC En Banc has
jurisdiction to annul elections or declare a failure of
elections. Daza, on the other hand, counters that the power
of the HRET to annul election results, where terrorism,
fraud or other irregularities are existent, differs from the
power of the COMELEC to declare failure of elections or
annul elections pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No.
7166.
Both Abayon and Daza do not contest the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET to decide election protests filed
against members of the House of Representatives. They,
however, diverge as to the extent of its jurisdiction.
An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning
candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the
grounds of electoral frauds or irregularities.25 It aims to
determine who between them has actually obtained the
majority of the legal votes cast and, therefore, entitled to
hold the office.26
The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul
elections differ from the power granted to the COMELEC to
declare failure of elections. The Constitution no less, grants
the HRET with exclusive jurisdiction to decide all election
contests involving the members of the House of
Representatives, which necessarily includes those which
raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or other irregularities
committed before, during or after the elections. To deprive
the HRET the prerogative to annul elections would
undermine its constitutional fiat to decide election
contests. The phrase "election, returns and qualifications"
should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title.27
Consequently, the annulment of election results is but a
power concomitant to the HRET's constitutional mandate
to determine the validity of the contestee's title.
The power granted to the HRET by the Constitution is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature.28 Thus, the HRET,
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, may annul election results if in its
determination, fraud, terrorism or other electoral
irregularities existed to warrant the annulment. Because in
doing so, it is merely exercising its constitutional duty to
ascertain who among the candidates received the majority
of the valid votes cast.
To the Court's mind, the HRET had jurisdiction to
determine whether there was terrorism in the contested
precincts. In the event that the HRET would conclude that
terrorism indeed existed in the said precincts, then it could
annul the election results in the said precincts to the extent
of deducting the votes received by Daza and Abayon in
order to remain faithful to its constitutional mandate to
determine who among the candidates received the
majority of the valid votes cast.
Moreover, the passage of R.A. No. 7166 cannot deprive the
HRET of its incidental power to annul elections in the
exercise of its sole and exclusive authority conferred by no
less than the Constitution. It must be remembered that the
COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative and
administrative functions. In Bedol v. COMELEC,29 the
Court expounded, to wit:
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred
upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election
Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-
legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of
the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising from the enforcement of election
laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power
refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to
implement the election laws and to exercise such
legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by
Congress. Its administrative function refers to the
enforcement and administration of election laws. In the
exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article
IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c])
authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to
implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code.
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is
the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself
in enforcing and administering the same law.30
Thus, the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial function
when it decides election contests not otherwise reserved
to other electoral tribunals by the Constitution. The
COMELEC, however, does not exercise its quasi-judicial
functions when it declares a failure of elections pursuant
to R.A. No. 7166. Rather, the COMELEC performs its
administrative function when it exercises such power.
R.A. No. 7166 was enacted to empower the COMELEC to be
most effective in the performance of its sacred duty of
ensuring the conduct of honest and free elections.31
Further, a closer perusal of Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code readily reveals that it is more in line with the
COMELEC's administrative function of ensuring that
elections are free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible,
and not its quasi-judicial function to adjudicate election
contests. The said provision reads:
Sec. 6. Failure of elections - If, on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law
for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the
failure or suspension of election would affect the result of
the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a
verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure
to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of
the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
In Sambarani v. COMELEC,32 the Court clarified the nature
of the COMELEC's power to declare failure of elections, to
wit:
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the
COMELEC the broad power to "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." Indisputably,
the text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give
COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve its primordial objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are
essentially executive and administrative in nature. It is
elementary in administrative law that "courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies." The authority
given to COMELEC to declare a failure of elections and to
call for special elections falls under its administrative
function.33
Consequently, the difference between the annulment of
elections by electoral tribunals and the declaration of
failure of elections by the COMELEC cannot be gainsaid.
First, the former is an incident of the judicial function of
electoral tribunals while the latter is in the exercise of the
COMELEC's administrative function. Second, electoral
tribunals only annul the election results connected with
the election contest before it whereas the declaration of
failure of elections by the COMELEC relates to the entire
election in the concerned precinct or political unit. As such,
in annulling elections, the HRET does so only to determine
who among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal
votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other hand, declares a
failure of elections with the objective of holding or
continuing the elections, which were not held or were
suspended, or if there was one, resulted in a failure to
elect. When COMELEC declares a failure of elections,
special elections will have to be conducted.34
Hence, there is no overlap of jurisdiction because when the
COMELEC declares a failure of elections on the ground of
violence, intimidation, terrorism or other irregularities, it
does so in its administrative capacity. In contrast, when
electoral tribunals annul elections under the same
grounds, they do so in the performance of their quasi-
judicial functions.
Annulment of elections only warranted in exceptional
circumstances
Abayon asserts that even if the HRET had jurisdiction to
annul the elections in the concerned precincts, the latter
nonetheless acted with grave abuse of discretion because
the circumstances did not warrant the nullification of the
results in the contested precincts. He explains that Daza
failed to sufficiently establish that terrorism was so
prevalent in the said clustered precincts that it had
adversely affected the right of the majority of residents to
vote and that made it impossible to differentiate the valid
votes from the invalid ones.
It must be remembered that "[t]he power to declare a
failure of elections should be exercised with utmost care
and only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond
doubt that the disregard of the law had been so
fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is
impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what
are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever,
or that the great body of the voters have been prevented
by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their
franchise."35 Consequently, a protestant alleging
terrorism in an election protest must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that the will of the majority has
been muted by violence, intimidation or threats.
The Court agrees with the observation of HRET Member
and esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta (Justice Peralta), that the circumstances in the case
at bench did not warrant the nullification of the election in
the concerned clustered precincts. The Court quotes the
pertinent portions of his dissent in the HRET decision, to
wit:
Protestant's evidence is utterly weak, unclear and
unconvincing. The Tribunal, in Balindong v. Macarambon,
Jr., declared that "[t]here should be clear and convincing
evidence to nullify an election. It is the duty of the courts to
sustain an election authorized by law if it has so conducted
as to give substantially a free and fair expression of the
popular will, and actual result thereof is clearly
ascertained. When a person elected obtained a
considerable plurality of votes over his adversary, and the
evidence offered to rebut such a result is neither solid nor
decisive, it would be imprudent to quash the election, as
that would be to oppose without reason the popular will
solemnly expressed in suffrage." xxx
There are two (2) indispensable requisites that must
concur in order to justify the drastic action of nullifying the
election:
(1) The illegality of the ballots must affect more than fifty
percent (50%) of the votes cast on the specific precinct or
precincts sought to be annulled, or in case of the entire
municipality, more than fifty percent (50%) of its total
precincts and the votes cast therein; and
(2) It is impossible to distinguish with reasonable certainty
between the lawful and unlawful ballots. xxx
While protestant's witnesses, Messrs. Crisanto G.
Camposano, Alex B. Rimbao and Melquiades T. Bornillo,
contended that they are residents and voters of Barangay
Salvacion, Barangay Toog and Barangay Datag,
respectively, and merely voted for protestee out of fear of
the said armed partisans, not a single ballot or vote cast by
said witnesses and/or other voters allegedly subjected to
terroristic acts had been identified and the effect thereof,
proven extensive or massive. Failing in this regard, the
Tribunal cannot order the annulment of votes for
protestee, as prayed for by protestant. The validity of the
results of the elections in the protested clustered precincts
must be upheld.
It is worthy to note that no evidence was presented which
will directly point to protestee as the one responsible for
the incidents which allegedly happened before and during
the elections. Absent anything that would concretely and
directly establish protestee as the one who had induced or
actually perpetrated the commission of terroristic acts and
demonstrate that those incidents were part of a scheme to
frustrate the free expression of the will of the electorate,
the alluded handing of material considerations, including
guns, to the NDF-EV officials, and the garnering of votes
higher than those of the protestant in the protested
clustered precincts, do not per se make him responsible
for the charges of terrorism.
Moreover, at the time of the alleged submission to the
offices of the Provincial and Regional Directors, Philippine
National Police (PNP), of intelligence reports regarding the
commission of massive terroristic acts, Comelec
Resolution No. 9583 xxx was already effective. Upon
validation of intelligence reports, the logical step that
should have been undertaken by the PNP, which is in
accord with human experience, was to report also such
terroristic acts to the Comelec in order to place under its
immediate and direct control and supervision the political
divisions, subdivision, unit or area affected by "serious
armed threats" to ensure the holding of free, peaceful,
honest, orderly and credible elections. However, no
evidence on reporting to the Comelec for said purpose was
made to concretize protestant's postulation of massive
terrorism. The protestant himself did not even bother to
report to the COMELEC the alleged terroristic acts in order
to control or prevent such serious armed threats and to
ensure the holding of free, peaceful, honest, orderly and
credible elections. Protestant also did not report the
matter to the police so that the alleged persons committing
such terroristic acts would be arrested and the proper
cases filed against them in court. It is thus highly doubtful
that such terroristic acts, as protestant claimed, existed.
Such actuation by protestant is simply not in accord with
human experience.
Since public officers like those in the PNP are presumed to
have regularly performed their official duties, given the
foregoing intelligence reports, and the effectivity as well
during the election period xxx of Comelec Resolution No.
9561-A xxx it is expected that they would have assigned
their forces therein to protect not only the life and limb of
the voters, but also their right to vote. In fact, in his post-
election memorandum addressed to the Regional Director
dated May 27, 2013, P/SSupt. Tonog, then Provincial
Director, mentioned about the strict implementation of
"PRO8 LOI 20/2012 "SAFE 2013 WARAY" through the
Provincial Special Operations Task Group, Secure and Fair
Elections 2013 (PSOTG-SAFE 2013)." Hence, it is
incredible that there were as many as five (5) NPA armed
partisan at the school premises for the purpose of
over�seeing that the voters in involved barangays would
not be supporting protestant on the day of the elections.
Such circumstance was not even reflected in the
memorandum of P/SSupt. Tonog.36
It is on record that Daza presented several residents of the
concerned precincts to illustrate how NDF-EV members
terrorized the residents of the said precincts before and
during the elections to ensure Daza's defeat to Abayon.
The Court, nevertheless, observes that only three (3)
witnesses testified that they voted for Abayon out of fear
from the NDF-EV. The other witnesses merely described
the alleged violence committed by the NFD-EV but did not
expound whether the same had ultimately made other
voters vote for Abayon.
Neither did the testimonies of P/SSupt. Tonog and Col.
Capulong corroborate the fact that the alleged terrorism by
the NDF-EV caused voters to vote for Abayon. These
testimonies do not prove that voters in the concerned
precincts indeed voted for Abayon out of fear of the NDF-
EV. For one, Col. Capulong simply stated that the NDF-EV
would want to see that politicians and candidates whom
they call "enemies of the people" be defeated in the
elections. Further, as noted by Justice Peralta, P/SSupt.
Tonog's Post-Election Memorandum did not state that
NDF-EV armed partisans were present in the course of the
elections.
Daza presented three (3) voters as witnesses to establish
that they were coerced by NDF-EV armed partisan to vote
for Abayon during the 2013 Elections. Their collective
testimonies, however, fail to impress. First, their
testimonies made no reference to Abayon's alleged
participation in the purported terroristic acts committed
by the NDF-EV. Second, Daza's witnesses alone are
insufficient to prove that indeed terrorism occurred in the
contested precincts and the same affected at least 50% of
the votes cast therein. The testimonies of three (3) voters
can hardly represent the majority that indeed their right to
vote was stifled by violence. With the allegation of
widespread terrorism, it would have been more prudent
for Daza to present more voters who were coerced to vote
for Abayon as a result of the NDF-EV s purported violence
and intimidation.
Indubitably, the numbers mattered considering that both
the COMELEC and the PNP issued certifications stating that
no failure of elections occurred in Northern Samar and
that the elections was generally peaceful and orderly. The
unsubstantiated testimonies of Daza's witnesses falter
when faced with official pronouncements of government
agencies, which are presumed to be issued in the regular
performance of their duties.
In Tan v. COMELEC,37 the Court found wanting the
testimony of a sole witness to substantiate the claim of
terrorism which disenfranchised a majority of voters and
gave more credence to official statements of government
agencies, to wit:
We agree with the finding of the COMELEC en banc that
the evidence relied upon by petitioners to support their
charges of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of
elections in the questioned municipalities consisted of
affidavits prepared and executed by their own
representatives; and that the other pieces of evidence
submitted by petitioners were not credible and inadequate
to substantiate petitioners' charges of fraud and
irregularities in the conduct of elections. Mere affidavits
are insufficient, more so, when they were executed by
petitioners' poll watchers. The conclusion of respondent
COMELEC is correct that although petitioners specifically
alleged violence, terrorism, fraud, and other irregularities
in the conduct of elections, they failed to substantiate or
prove said allegations. Had there been massive
disenfranchisement, petitioners should have presented the
affidavits of these disenfranchised voters, instead of only a
single affidavit of one allegedly disenfranchised voter.
We go along with the COMELEC en banc giving more
weight to the affidavits and certifications executed by the
members of the Board of Election Inspectors and the PNP
and military authorities that the elections held were
peaceful and orderly, under the presumption that their
official duties had been regularly performed.38
The testimonies of a minute portion of the registered
voters in the said precincts should not be used as a tool to
silence the voice of the majority expressed through their
votes during elections. To do so would disenfranchise the
will of the majority and reward a candidate not chosen by
the people to be their representative. With such dire
consequences, it is but expected that annulment of
elections be judiciously exercised with utmost caution and
resorted only in exceptional circumstances.
It is true that in Vilando v. HRET,39 the Court recognized
that the power granted to the HRET by the Constitution is
full, clear and complete, which excludes the exercise of any
authority by the Court that may restrict or curtail, or affect
the same.40 The Court, nevertheless, clarified in Tagolino
v. HRET41 that the HRET's independence is not without
limits as the Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over it if
only to check whether it had gravely abused its
discretion.42 As such, the Court will not hesitate to set
aside the HRET's decision favoring Daza if it was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion on its part.
In Leus v. St. Scholastica's College Westgrove,43 the Court
has ruled that a decision unsupported by sufficient
evidence amount to grave abuse of discretion, to wit:
Nevertheless, while a certiorari proceeding does not
strictly include an inquiry as to the correctness of the
evaluation of evidence (that was the basis of the labor
tribunals in determining their conclusion), the
incorrectness of its evidentiary evaluation should not
result in negating the requirement of substantial evidence.
Indeed, when there is a showing that the findings or
conclusions, drawn from the same pieces of evidence, were
arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on
record, they may be reviewed by the courts. In particular,
the CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that
the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, made a
factual finding not supported by substantial evidence. A
decision that is not supported by substantial evidence is
definitely a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
As discussed above, the decision of the HRET was clearly
unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, the
HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling the
elections in the contested precincts and disregarding the
respective number of votes received by Abayon and Daza
from the precincts, which led to its conclusion that Daza
was the one elected by the majority of voters in the First
Legislative District of Northern Samar to be their
Representative in Congress. Hence, Abayon should be
reinstated as the duly elected Representative of the said
legislative district.
Moreover, Daza cannot claim that the issue had been
mooted by his assumption to office because the same is
premised on the fact that the HRET had correctly ruled
Daza to be the duly elected representative. A moot and
academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.44 In the present case, there is still a justiciable
controversy � who between Daza and Abayon was truly
chosen by the majority of voters of the First Legislative
District of Northern Samar to be their representative.
Propriety of the dismissal of Abayon 's counter-protest is
now moot
With the Court's ruling that Abayon is the duly elected
Representative of the First Legislative District of Northern
Samar, the issue of dismissal of his counter-protest in G.R.
No. 222236 is now moot and academic. A declaration on
the propriety of the dismissal of Abayon's counter-protest
has no practical value because to continue with his
counter-protest would be a redundancy considering that
the Court has upheld his election as the duly elected
Representative of his constituents.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the February 3, 2016 Decision and the
March 7, 2016 Resolution of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Harlin C. Abayon is DECLARED to be the
lawfully elected Representative of the First Legislative
District of Northern Samar in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
21. POBRE vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
(A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009)
FACTS:
PETITIONER
Petitioner Antero Pobre made aware to the court the
contents of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech
delivered on the senate floor. The following excerpts are
the ones in question:
x xx I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I
am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to
be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was
to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x xx.
According to Pobre, the words of the lady senator were
disrespectful and requested that the latter be disbarred or
be subjected to disciplinary action.
RESPONDENT
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the
statements she made were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a
speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as
member of Congress or its committee. She claims to have
made those comments to expose anomalies with regard to
the selection process of the Judicial Bar Council for the
next Chief Justice.
The argument of the respondent is based on Article VI
Section 11 which states that:
"A Senator or Member of the House of Representative
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof."
ISSUE
WON Miriam Defensor-Santiago can be charged for her
comments on the Judiciary
SUPREME COURT: NO.
The court ruled in favor of Defensor-Santiago in this case.
The plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the
complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well
taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules
of Court.
Despite this, the court feels that the lady senator has gone
beyond the limits of decency and good conduct for the
statements made which were intemperate and highly
improper in substance. The court is not hesitant to impose
some form of disciplinary sanctions on her, but the factual
and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the
Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse
from her.
Petition is DISMISSED
22. TRILLANES VS CASTILLO-MARIGONEM (PDF FILE
SEPARATE NEW CASE 2018)
23. DANTE V. LIBAN, et al. v. RICHARD GORDON
G.R. No. 175352, 18 January 2011, EN BANC (Leonardo-
De Castro, J.)
FACTS: Liban, et al. filed with the Supreme Court a Petition
to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat
in the Senate for having been elected Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors
during his incumbency as Senator in violation of Sec. 3,
Article VI of the Constitution. It was advanced by Liban, et
al. that the PNRC is a GOCC. Formerly, the Court held that
the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government
office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition
in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore,
Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat. The Court,
however, held further that the PNRC Charter (R.A 95) is
void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation
which the Congress cannot create. Hence, it directed the
PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
ISSUE:
What is the nature of PNRC?
RULING:
The PNRC’s structure is sui generis. Although the PNRC is
neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the
government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a
“private corporation” within the contemplation of the
provision of theConstitution that must be organized under
the Corporation Code. In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special
status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government
in the humanitarian field in accordance withits
commitments under international law. This Court cannot
all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially
since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter
was never raised by the parties.
24. Senate of the Philippines vs Executive Secretary
Ermita
FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous
transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the
Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct
a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The
investigating Senate committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials to speak
before the committee as resource persons. Ermita
submitted that he and some of the department heads
cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters
that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga
likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president,
excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly
and arrangements were already made and scheduled.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior
officials of executive departments who in the judgment of
the department heads are covered by the executive
privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive
privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with
rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are
covered by the executive privilege; Senior national
security officials who in the judgment of the National
Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege;
and Such other officers as may be determined by the
President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by
Congress without first securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were
invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to
except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing
proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For
defying President Arroyo’s order barring military
personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
were relieved from their military posts and were made to
face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality
was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights
and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part.
To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the
SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art
6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry
is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information – which is not
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do
possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question
Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or
a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of
the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not
only in the application of check and balance but also, in
effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which
anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he
refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A
distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21
and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the
power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is
to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the
lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle
of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information. When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They
are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from
this power — the President on whom executive power is
vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her
being the highest official of the executive branch, and the
due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government
which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The
requirement then to secure presidential consent under
Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22,
Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on
their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to
respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by
the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it
has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers,
states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires
their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21,
the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.
25. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount
of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos).
The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of
China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN
deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III
testified that several high executive officials and power
brokers were using their influence to push the approval of
the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before
the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing
wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which
he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him
with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita
sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and
that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be
applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent
committees and an order for his arrest and detention until
such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3)
questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and
employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing
laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case
of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because
this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under
our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of
presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and
received” by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must
be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought “likely
contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his
claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall
under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials” necessary in “her executive
and policy decision-making process” and, that “the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on
matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed,
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are “received” by a close
advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of
petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.50 We might
have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself
available to them during the September 26 hearing, where
he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more
questions from the Senators, with the exception only of
those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is
subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
26. Reghis Romero II et al vs. Jinggoy Estrada et al
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with application
for temporary restraining order(TRO) and preliminary
injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of
the invitations and compulsory processes issued by the
Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human
Resources Development in connection with its
investigation on the investment of Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration(OWWA) funds in the Smokey
Mountain project.
Pursuant to Resolution No. 537 and 543, PetitionerReghis
Romero II as owner of R-II Builders Inc. was invited by the
Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development to attend a public hearing at the Senate on
August 23,2006 regarding the investment of OWWA
(Overseas Workers Welfare Administration) funds in the
Smokey Mountain project. The investigation is intended to
aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to
the pertinent provisions of RA 8042, The Migrant Workers
Act.
Petitioner Romero in his letter-reply requested to be
excused from appearing and testifying before the
Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter
and purpose of Philippine Senate Resolution Nos. 537 and
543. The Committee denied his request. On the same date,
invitations were sent to the other six petitioners, then
members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc.
requesting them to attend the September 4,2006
Committee hearing. The next day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada
as Chairman of the Committee issued subpoena ad
testificandum to petitioner Romero II directing him to
appear and testify before the Committee relative to the
aforesaid Senate resolutions. The Committee later issued
subpoenas to the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject matter of the Senate inquiry is
sub judice
Ruling:
NO. The Supreme court held that the sub judice issue has
been rendered moot and academic by the supervening
issuance of the en banc resolution of July 1, 2008 in GR No.
164527. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that
a determination of the issue would be without practical
use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial
relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Thus,
there is no more obstacle-on the ground of sub judice,
assuming it is invocable to the continuation of the
Committee’s investigation challenged in this proceeding.
As stated in Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of inquiry
with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true- recourse must be had to
others who possess it.
The court further held that when the Committee issued
invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before
it in connection with its investigation of its
aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its
authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is
clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec.21 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. The court has no authority to prohibit a
Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and
testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure.
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearign in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected. (Art. VI, Section 21 of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution)
27. PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, et al. v.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, etal. G.R. No. 180308, 19
June 2012, EN BANC (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any
committee of Congress must carry with it all powers
necessary and proper for its effective discharge.
Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin (Locsin) and Manuel D. Andal
(Andal) are nominees of the government to the board of
directors of Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) and Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). Both Locsin and
Andal are also directors and corporate officers of
Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC). By virtue of its
interest in both PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the government
has also substantial interest in PHC.
The government, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), received cash dividends from
POTC. However, POTC suffered losses because of its huge
operating expenses. In view of the losses and to protect the
government’s interest in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Proposed
Senate Resolution No. 455 directing the conduct of an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the losses incurred by
POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement
committed by their respective board of directors. PSR No.
455 was referred to Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises (Senate Committee),
which conducted hearings. Locsin and Andal were invited
to attend these hearings as resource persons. The Senate
Committee found an overwhelming mismanagement by
the PCGG over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that
PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve
the government’s interest in the said corporations.
Committee Report No. 312 recommended the privatization
and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the
government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization
Management Office(PMO) under the Department of
Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government
nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT. Locsin
and Andal filed a petition before the Supreme Court
questioning the hasty approval of the Senate of the
Committee Report No. 312.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
approving Committee Resolution No. 312
RULING:
The Senate Committees’ power of inquiry relative to PSR
No. 455 has been passed upon andupheld in the
consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabiowhich cited Article VI,
Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conductinquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights ofpersons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.”
The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative
power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this
case, the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with
it all powers necessaryand proper for its effective
discharge. On this score, the Senate Committee cannot be
said to have actedwith grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it
submittedCommittee Resolution No. 312, given its
constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries.
Nor canthe Senate Committee be faulted for doing so on
the very same day that the assailed resolution
wassubmitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with
respect to these legislative inquiries has long beensettled,
otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered
pointless.
28. Sanchez vs. COA
Facts: In 1991, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7180
(R.A. 7180) otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1992. This law provided an
appropriation for the DILG under Title XIII and set aside
the amount of P75,000,000.00 for the DILG's Capability
Building Program. On 11 November 1991, Atty. Hiram C.
Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Project Director of the Ad Hoc
Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement
Local Autonomy, informed then Deputy Executive
Secretary Dionisio de la Serna of the proposal to constitute
and implement a "shamrock" type task force to implement
local autonomy institutionalized under the Local
Government Code of 1991. The proposal was accepted by
the Deputy Executive Secretary and attested by then DILG
Secretary Cesar N. Sarino, one of the petitioners herein,
who consequently issued a memorandum for the transfer
and remittance to the Office of the President of the sum of
P300,000.00 for the operational expenses of the task force.
An additional cash advance of P300,000.00 was requested.
Upon post-audit conducted by Department auditor
Iluminada M.V. Fabroa, however, the amounts were
disallowed.
Issue: What are two essential requisites in order that a
transfer of appropriation may be allowed? Are those
present in this case?
Ruling: Contrary to another submission in this case, the
President, Chief Justice, Senate President, and
the heads of constitutional commissions need not first
prove and declare the existence of savings before
transferring funds, the Court in Philconsa v. Enriquez,
supra, categorically declared that the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, shall approve the realignment (of savings).
However, "[B]efore giving their stamp of approval, these
two officials will have to see to it that: (1) The funds to be
realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of
expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and (2)
The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of
augmenting the items of expenditure to which said
transfer or realignment is to be made.”
The absence of any item to be augmented starkly projects
the illegality of the diversion of the funds and the
profligate spending thereof.
With the foregoing considerations, it is clear that no valid
transfer of the Fund to the Office of the President could
have occurred in this case as there was neither allegation
nor proof that the amount transferred was savings or that
the transfer was for the purpose of augmenting the item to
which the transfer was made.
Further, we find that the use of the transferred funds was
not in accordance with the purposes laid down by the
Special Provisions of R.A. 7180.
29. GRECO ANTONIOUS BELGICA, ET AL. v. HON.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 208566/G.R. No. 208493/G.R. No. 209251, 19
November 2013,
EN BANC (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No.
209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the
Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly
known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the
members of the Congress. It underwent several legal
designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest
“Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The
allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual
General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the
following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house;
broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects”
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.),
and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants,
medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development,
etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to –
P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of
funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for
the realignment of funds into their department provided
that the request for realignment is approved or concurred
by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not
included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel
comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from
the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since
1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived
from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since
about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by
allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers,
headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade,
the corruption in the pork barrel system had been
facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about
20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which
would make it appear that government funds are being
used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to
“ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred
with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several
others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is
constitutional.
2. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is
constitutional.
RULING:
1. No, the congressional pork barrel system is
unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates
the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive,
on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the
GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may
implement the law but under the pork barrel system,
what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was
enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which
projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear
act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of
the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older
case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork
barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide
Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds
go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the
PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of
the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in
Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people
legislative power but only insofar as the processes of
referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it
cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by
the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units
but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual
legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money
should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of
legislative power.
The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in
Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and
not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in
the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate
the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the
power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he
may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already
being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is
approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system,
how can the president veto the appropriation made by the
legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of
the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-
given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage
their local affairs. Through their Local Development
Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs
and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF,
particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman
can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and
later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the
national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government –
and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the
Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is
happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the
PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of
legislators.
2. Yes.The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the
presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides: No money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential
pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular
legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910,
which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as
amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter,
provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among
others, collected from certain energy related ventures shall
form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which
shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President
may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that
a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General
Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of
Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a
particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
30. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA) v. THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)
G.R. No. 204869, 11 March, 2014
FACTS: Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) discovered that for the years 2004-
2007, it paid Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses
(EME) twice each year from two sources:
(1) the General Fund for locally-funded projects, and (2)
the Technical Education and Skills
Development Project (TESDP) Fund for the foreign-
assisted projects. The payment of EME was authorized
under the General Provisions of the General
Appropriations Acts of 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 (2004-
2007 GAAs).
The audit team issued Notice of Disallowance disallowing
the payment of EME for being in excess of the amount
allowed in the 2004-2007 GAAs. In addition, the
Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), contrary to the provisions of the
2004-2007 GAAs, disbursed the EME to TESDA officials
whose positions were not of equivalent ranks as
authorized. Notice of Disallowance indicated the persons
liable for the excessive payment of EME: the approving
officers, payees and the accountants. TESDA filed an appeal
arguing that the 2004-2007 GAAs and the Government
Accounting and
Auditing Manual allowed the grant of EME from both the
General Fund and the TESDP Fund provided the legal
ceiling was not exceeded for each fund. It alleged that the
General Fund and the TESDP Fund are distinct from each
other, and TESDA officials who were designated as project
officers concurrently with their regular functions were
entitled to separate EME from both funds.
The Commission on Audit (COA) denied the appeal and
stated that the GAA provision on EME is very clear to the
effect that payment of EME may be taken from any
authorized appropriation but shall not exceed the ceiling
stated therein.
ISSUE: Did COA gravely erred in disallowing the payments
made by TESDA to its officials of their EME from both
General Fund and TESDA Fund?
HELD:
NO. The Constitution vests COA, as guardian of public
funds, with enough latitude to determine, prevent and
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. The
COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the
exercise of
its constitutional duty and the Court generally sustains its
decisions in recognition of its expertise in the laws it is
entrusted to enforce.
Only when COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, may the Court grant a petition assailing
COA’s actions.
There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when
the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence
but on caprice, whim and despotism.
The Court did not find any grave abuse of discretion when
COA disallowed the disbursement of EME to TESDA
officials for being excessive and unauthorized by law,
specifically the 2004-2007 GAAs, to wit:
x x x Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses.–
Appropriations authorized herein may be used for
extraordinary expenses of the following officials and those
of equivalent rank as may beauthorized by the DBM, not
exceeding:
(a)P180,000 for each Department Secretary;
(b)P65,000 for each Department Undersecretary;
(c)P35,000 for each Department Assistant Secretary;
(d)P30,000 for each head of bureau or organization of
equal rank to a bureau and for each
Department Regional Director;
(e)P18,000 for each Bureau Regional Director; and
(f)P13,000 for each Municipal Trial Court Judge, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge, and Shari’a Circuit Court Judge.
In addition, miscellaneous expenses not exceeding Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000) for each of the offices under the
above named officials are authorized.
The GAA provisions are clear that the EME shall not exceed
the amounts fixed in the GAA.
The GAA provisions are also clear that only the officials
named in the GAA, the officers of equivalent rank as may
be authorized by the DBM, and the offices under them are
entitled to claim EME not exceeding the amount provided
in the GAA.
The COA faithfully implemented the GAA provisions. COA
Circular No. 2012-001 states that the amount fixed under
the GAA for the National Government offices and officials
shall be the ceiling in the disbursement of EME. COA
Circular No. 89-300, prescribing the guidelines in the
disbursement of EME, likewise states that the amount
fixed by the GAA shall be the basis for the control in the
disbursement of these funds.
The COA merely complied with its mandate when it
disallowed the EME that were reimbursed to officers who
were not entitled to the EME, or who received EME in
excess of the allowable amount.
When the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, there
should be no room for interpretation but only its
application.
31. Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers
– Fund Realignment – Constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse – Executive Impoundment
FACTS: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his
administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
“Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of
government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign
funds from slow moving projects to priority projects
instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what
happens under the DAP was that if a certain government
project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive
agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by
the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared
as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be
reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did
work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to
the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds
from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by
Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada
made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for
voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money
was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the
request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that
the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive.
It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also
funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro
National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon
Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among
their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain
laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution
(power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of
Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered
as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are
constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to
the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is
applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive
and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program
for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not
violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which
were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely
being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to
refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in
the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were
unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the
heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be
made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-
border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But
under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also
contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in
the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were
within the Executive, these projects are non-existent
insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these
projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent
under the GAA because they were not provided for by the
GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional
and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what
was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition
of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other
instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued,
or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings”
as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus,
since the statutory definition of savings was not complied
with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the
transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the
end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the
year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive
particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used
as money source for the DAP because under the law, such
funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case,
no such certification was secured before unprogrammed
funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes
the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The
DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to
reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more
harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone.
The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on the
validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative
Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers,
and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative)
that they have not acted in good faith.
32. ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Purisima
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A.
9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months
of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this
petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a
system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best
only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of
rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines
the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
integrity, loyalty and efficiency. foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system
of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should
not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly
delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President
as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While
Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law
does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved.
Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to
the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore
be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and
unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC
personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional
oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of
the law.
To determine the validity of delegation of legislative
power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness test
and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which
it is to be implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on
Elections, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks
and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of
powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in
the executive branch.

Issues:

Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and

incentives limitation to officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.

Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power

to fix revenue targets to the President.

Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has

been violated in the creation of a congressional oversight
committee.

Discussions:

The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde

Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution

allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with
one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid
because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification
is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality.