UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain Assessment

Assessment of the UNICEF
Somalia
Supply Chain System
PREPARED BY THE GLOBAL EMERGENCY GROUP ASSESSMENT TEAM AND UNICEF COUNTERPARTS
SOMALIA
1
Prepared by
Langdon Greenhalgh (Project Manager)
& the Global Emergency Group Assessment Team

Thierry Schweitzer (Supply Chain Expert)
Angi Yoder-Maina (Somalia Programme Expert)
Kelly Johnson (Administrator)
with
Lars Jensen (Project Coordinator)

Amna Elmamoun (UNICEF Counterpart)
Cormac O’Sullivan (UNICEF Counterpart)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Global Emergency Group team would like to express our sincere
appreciation to all of those who made this work possible. First and foremost,
our colleagues at UNICEF, particularly Sikander Khanfor, Foroogh Foyouzat,
Deen Kaphle, Lars Jensen, Peter Hailey, Mette Nordstrand, Wessam Elbeih,
Haydar Nasser, and Marianne Clark-Hattingh providing GEG with the
opportunity to conduct this important piece of work and all the support to
make sure it could be done well. The UNICEF staff who we met in Nairobi,
Mogadishu, Baidoa, Bossaso, and Hargesia, were all extremely helpful;
we left each facility with an admiration for all they do despite extremely
challenging circumstances. The number of other stakeholders and great
people who made our work possible is too long to name, but each and every
contribution was essential in the creation of this substantive study.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6
Objectives 6
Methodology 6
Recommendations & Solutions 8
1.1 Assessment Objectives 10
1.2 UNICEF Supply Chain Context 10
INTRODUCTION 10
1.3 Assessment Methodology 11
1.4 Organization of the Project 16
1.5 Limitations 18
FINDINGS 19
2.1 Positive Elements of the Supply Chain to Build Upon 19
2.2 The Five Main Supply Chain Findings 20
2.3 Detailed Supply Chain Findings 24
2.4 Additional Related Findings 30
2.5 Mapping the UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain 31
RECOMMENDATIONS 36
3.1 Introduction to Recommendations 36
3.2 Strategic Recommendations 36
3.3 Tactical Recommendations 43
IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING 48
4.1 Proposed Implementation 48
4.2 UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain Optimization 49
Implementation Plan 49
ANNEXES 55
ACRONYMS
3PL 3rd Party Logistics
AFAP As Fast As Possible
ATA Actual Time of Arrival
ATD Actual Time of Departure
CBM Cubic Meter
CSS Consolidated Supply Sections (Copenhagen)
CSZ Central South Zone in Somalia
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DOS US Department of State
ES Emergency Shelter
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid
Office
EPZ Export Processing Zones in Kenya
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival
ETD Estimated Time of Departure
FEFO First Expiry First Out
FIFO First In First Out
FFP Food for Peace (USAID)
GEG Global Emergency Group
IP Implementing Partner
IDP Internally Displaced Person
KPI Key Performance Indicator
S&L Supply & Logistics Unit
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MOUs Memoranda of Understanding
MT Metric Ton
NEZ North East Zone in Somalia (Puntland)
NFI Non-Food Items
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NWZ North West Zone in Somalia (Somaliland)
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development
PO Purchase Order
PRQ Payment Request
QAM Quality Assurance Management
RO Request Order
RCSO Resident Coordinator’s Support Office
RFID Radio-Frequency Identification
RUTF Therapeutic food for malnourished children
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
T&T Trace and Track
TAD Transit Accompanying Document
TOR Terms of Reference
UK United Kingdom
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNJLC United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
US United States
USSC UNICEF Somalia Support Centre
VISION UNICEF SAP System
WFP World Food Programme
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Objectives
GEG conducted a comprehensive supply chain assessment from 24 August – 25 November 2013,
which includes key findings and recommendations (both strategic and tactical) to inform the eventual
optimization of UNICEF Somalia’s supply chain and logistics. The assessment is to assist UNICEF Somalia in
ensuring a more effective distribution of essential supplies to vulnerable children and women in Somalia,
under immensely complex logistical challenges. Specifically, the two main objectives of this assessment are:
01 By end of the study, the key issues and challenges in the supply chain used for delivery of commodities, particularly
pharmaceuticals, via Kenya and within Somalia will have been identified as well as opportunities for improvements.
02 By the end of the study, tactical and strategic actions to alleviate the issues and challenges will have been designed,
along with a method to implement these actions and promote sustainable change in the supply chain for the immediate
and mid-term future.
Methodology
The assessment was divided into four phases over a three-month period (August to November 2013).
Phase I consisted of the secondary data research of existing materials related to UNICEF Somalia supply
chain and the set-up of this work (including the creation of an inception report). Phase II involved field
research including an in-depth assessment, primary data collection and interviews with key stakeholders
in Nairobi, Mombasa, Mogadishu, Baidoa, Bosaso, Hargesia and Berbera. The interviews built upon the
secondary data research. Phase III included the analysis of the secondary and primary data and served
as the basis for the key findings and recommendations for the assessment. Phase IV consisted of the
preparation of the final report, including an implementation plan created specifically for UNICEF Somalia
that incorporates the recommendations and analysis from this assessment. The implementation plan maps
the steps for implementing the proposed recommendations aimed at strengthening and building trust in
the supply chain. Throughout all phases of the study, key stakeholders in Somalia as well as at the UNICEF
Somalia Support Centre (USSC) in Nairobi were engaged in order to provide critical insight and guidance.
It is intended that many of these same stakeholders will also take responsibility for the realization of the
implementation plan.
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Findings
The findings of this assessment are based on seven location visits in Somalia (of a total of eight UNICEF office
sites) and interviews with 158 key informants conducted by the assessment team. The assessment team
visited 10 UNICEF warehouses and 5 cold chains storage areas in both Kenya and Somalia. There are broad-
level findings and more detailed supply chain specific findings included in the study. While this study is
rightfully focused on areas in the UNICEF Somalia’s supply chain needing improvement, the field assessment
discovered many positive elements that can be used as a basis for enhancement, some of which include:
•UNICEF’s Ability to Mobilize Critical Supplies During Emergencies. There is a significant evidence to suggest that UNICEF is
able to overcome obstacles in the supply chain during emergency situations.
•Committed Programme and Supply Chain Staff Delivering in Highly Challenging Circumstances. In both the Nairobi USSC
and in all the field offices the dedication and professionalism of the staff was cited as the number one positive effective aspect
of the supply chain.
•Initiatives Already in Progress to Strengthen the Supply Chain. UNICEF staff from the USSC in Nairobi are currently in the
process of internally identifying the challenges and possible solutions related to the Somalia supply chain. New tools are
under development that may appropriately address some of the challenges identified in this assessment.
•International Procurement Effectively Supports the UNICEF Supply Chain. The international procurement of key
commodities (particularly RUTF and pharmaceuticals) is essential to the supply chain given that these items cannot
be procured in Somalia and there are scale efficiencies to be found through international procurement. International
procurement processes and sourcing are generally thought to be well handled and supported from UNICEF Supply Division
(Copenhagen).
•The Somalia Call-In Centre. The ‘call-in centre’ system in Somalia, implemented within the last two years, greatly improved
UNICEF’s communication with both suppliers and partners within the nutrition programmes.
•Nutrition Programme. There were noticeable improvements within the last two years with the supply of commodities from
the nutrition programme.
The main findings of this assessment that identify current challenges related to the supply chain are
as follows.
01 There is limited forward demand planning that involves all key stakeholders which is exacerbated by minimal levels of
commodity tracking visibility and the poor security environment.
02 The supply chain is primarily a push system vulnerable to variable funding and without a viable pull supply chain driver
from field operations and implementing partners.
03 Due to long lead times and planning issues, key commodities are often not available when needed and when the
supplies finally do arrive they have short shelf lives.

04 There is a lack of trust, responsive communication and staff empowerment between Somalia field offices and Nairobi.
05 Two parallel and duplicative logistics teams are in place creating tensions and duplication of effort. The situation is
exacerbated by insufficient communication and conflict between Supply & Logistics and Programme.
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Recommendations & Solutions
The following strategic and tactical recommendations for UNICEF operational management directly involved
in the supply chain are aimed at directly addressing the challenges identified in this assessment.
Strategic Recommendations
01 Clear the Air, Start Anew & Rebuild Logistics & Supply Chain Systems Everyone Can Trust
UNICEF leadership must enforce a collaborative working culture holding all staff accountable for improved relationships.
Supply & Logistics credibility, particularly as perceived by Programme, needs to be rebuilt by first strengthening Supply
& Logistics systems and teams to meet programme requirements (particularly regarding visibility and tracking of the
supply chain).
02 Shift to a Hybrid Pull-Push Supply Chain System

Because of the duration of procurement and delivery within the supply chain, limited capacity and access issues in
Somalia, it is likely not possible to setup a fully functional pull system. Instead a combined pull-push supply chain system
would be optimal which allows Programme and Supply & Logistics to procure based on a comprehensive supply chain
planning process. Then by monitoring with Programme the pull side of the supply chain against planned activities,
Supply & Logistics can support Programme to adjust the combined pull-push system with an increase or decrease of
supplies required in the field.
03 Establish a Transparent, Systematic & Inclusive Supply Chain Planning Process

Establishment of an inclusive 18-month1 forward demand planning process that links planning and forecasting to
assessments and actual need. This process would involve significant input from UNICEF (Programme, Supply & Logistics
and Supply Division), Implementing Partners and the responsible government counterparts.
04 Transition Supply Chain Leadership from Nairobi to Somalia Strengthening the Somalia Systems, Infrastructure &
Staffing
As a part of the wider UNICEF transition from Nairobi to Somalia, UNICEF Somalia supply chain management and
leadership should move to Somalia from Kenya. The supply chain strengthening process could be embedded as a
component of the UNICEF transition from Kenya to Somalia. Supply & Logistics and Programme can develop a specific
plan of action that allows for increased operations in Somalia which could include reductions of stock in Kenya within
a specific timeframe while shifting stock to Somalia though increased direct shipping. Simultaneously, UNICEF could
increase investments in and empower Somali national staff operating in Somalia.
05 To the Greatest Extent Possible, Increase the Proportion of Supplies Shipped Direct and Stored in Somalia
(Bypassing Mombasa) and Incorporate Regional and National Procurement
Over time UNICEF should substantially increase the number of shipments directly to Somalia (Mogadishu and Berbera)
bypassing Mombasa as a transit point to the greatest extent possible. While the majority of UNICEF procurement will
continue to flow through international procurement avenues and the options for local procurement in Somalia remain
limited, transitioning to increased regional and national procurement should be a key component of future initiatives
aimed at optimizing the UNICEF supply chain in Somalia.
1 An 18-month forward demand planning process would be the ideal end goal for the future. It may be necessary to phase in this approach over time until the
process is institutionalized. For example, UNICEF could first introduce a 6-month plan by January 2014, 12-month plan by April 2014 and an 18-month plan by
September 2014.
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Tactical Recommendations
01 Change the Culture and Tools to Enable Enhanced UNICEF Communication & Collaboration.
Fundamentally UNICEF needs an immediate shift in the culture of communication and collaboration related to the
supply chain. Steps can be taken immediately, led by UNICEF senior management, to change the culture and identify
better ways of communicating and collaborating so that the supply chain can function more effectively. A range of best
practices, approaches and tools exist (e.g. listening, meeting management, email communications, protocols) around
which UNICEF should explore further in order to identify the most appropriate tools to match the UNICEF supply chain
operating context. Specific steps related to meetings that could be taken so as to institutionalize regular coordination
events (weekly meetings, quarterly workshops and an annual retreat) with the participation of both Supply & Logistics
and Programme.
02 Strengthen UNICEF Warehousing, Pharmaceutical Supply Chain and Cold Chain Capacity
UNICEF would first conduct a rapid detailed assessment of the specific gaps in the UNICEF’s warehousing, pharmaceutical
supply chain, and cold chain facilities, equipment and capacity specific to each particular zone and office location. This
assessment would set the basis for an upgrade of UNICEF warehousing, pharmaceutical and cold chain infrastructure
needed for a well-functioning supply chain.
03 Ensure that ‘Last-Mile’ Logistics Funds and Support are Available for Implementing Partners.
UNICEF could ensure that logistics funds are available to assist Implementing Partners in meeting their logistics and
distribution needs so that the ‘last mile’ of the supply chain is paid for. These funds would cover logistics costs that
sometimes are not currently being met by IPs such as transport, distribution or temporary warehousing. These funds
could be included within the PCAs on a discretionary basis or a pool of funds could be established that IPs would apply
directly to UNICEF staff in Somalia for access to these funds.
04 Optimize Category Management and Ordering Processes

The UNICEF supply chain would benefit from a detailed category management review aimed at streamlining to the
greatest extent possible the number of commodities that exist in the supply chain. With more than 300 commodities, this
category management review would assist UNICEF in identifying those critical commodities that need to be prioritized
within the system and those which can either be removed or re-prioritized. Further, rapid optimization of the picking
orders and release order process would include ensuring that any cancellation of picking orders is communicated to
the 3PL supplier and simultaneously cancelled in VISION while ensuring that release orders are issued in advance of the
delivery date. If possible, a single release order should have the option of including several waybills so that large release
orders do not fit all on one.2
05 Create a Dashboard & Access Map to Assist with Up-to-Date Situational Awareness
The creation of a Somalia Dashboard and Access Map would better inform all key operational actors involved as to key
situational changes affecting the operation or supply chain and the status of principal access routes (ports, airports,
crossing points and main roads) and frequently used secondary routes. In conjunction with implementing partners and
field staff (and possibly other UN agencies such as World Food Programme and OCHA), UNICEF Supply & Logistics could
develop, update and circulate on a regular basis a situational awareness dashboard and access map for all three zones.
This will assist UNICEF staff in more effectively adjusting to changing circumstances and the selection of the possible
routes when developing distribution plans.
2 UNICEF. “Logistics Process Mapping: Process review - RO and WB.”

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INTRODUCTION
1.1 Assessment Objectives support to Somali women and children affected

by conflict, displacement and food insecurity,
GEG conducted a comprehensive supply chain particularly in southern and central Somalia which
assessment which also includes recommendations experiences greater insecurity and conflict than
and (strategic and tactical) to inform the eventual other regions of Somalia. In 2012, curative nutrition
optimization UNICEF Somalia’s supply chain programs managed 400,000 acutely malnourished
and logistics. This will assist in ensuring the children under five, while blanket supplementary
more effective distribution of essential supplies feeding reached over 266,312 families (equivalent to
to vulnerable children and women in Somalia, 1,597,872 individuals). Child Health Days immunized
under immensely complex logistical challenges. one million children, protecting them from diseases
Specifically, the two main objectives of this such as measles and polio. 421,598 people, including
assessment are: school children and users of health facilities, gained
sustainable access to safe drinking water through
01 By end of the study, the key issues and challenges temporary measures. UNICEF support also allowed
in the supply chain used for delivery of commodities, 429,974 children to finish the 2011/2012 school year.
particularly pharmaceuticals, via Kenya and within In 2012, the UNICEF combined supply plan was
Somalia will have been identified as well as
opportunities for improvements. at the level of USD 30 million, with programming
divided approximately as Nutrition 46%, Health
02 By the end of the study, tactical and strategic actions 29%, WASH 15% and Education 7%. The majority
to alleviate the issues and challenges will have been of UNICEF supplies for Somalia are procured
designed, along with a method to implement these internationally. Logistical challenges remain difficult
actions and promote sustainable change in the
supply chain for the immediate and mid-term future. with poor transport infrastructure (though the
number of direct and indirect commercial container
shipping lines to main Somalia ports is slowly
1.2 UNICEF Supply Chain increasing), high inland transportation costs, port
Context congestion and customs transit formalities through
third country, as well as, limited access of road
As described in the Terms of Reference, Somalia corridors through Kenya due to the volatile security
represents one of the most critical, complex and situation in Somalia and difficult road access during
prolonged humanitarian emergencies in the rainy seasons. The complex logistical challenges
world today. The majority of Somali people have are also reflected through the number of storage
not experienced effective rule of law for more locations managed by UNICEF, which currently
than twenty years, and during that time, most of includes: Mogadishu, Baidoa, Galkayo, Bossaso,
the country has experienced protracted conflict. Berbera and Hargeisa inside Somalia with main
Unfortunately, the Somali context affects children, transit storage facilities in Nairobi and Mombasa.
who constitute almost half of the estimated 10 The 2012 end-of-year supply inventory of all Somalia
million people, more than it does adults. The Somalia controlled warehouses was valued at approximately
context presents a range of strategic challenges USD 25 million and in-country logistics costs at USD
to humanitarian response organisations including 20 million.
UNICEF. UNICEF delivers essential, life-saving
10
The UNICEF programme support in Somalia is during the field assessment and conducted an initial
currently coordinated from Nairobi’s Somalia review of reports, policies and procedures related to
Support Centre (USSC) with over 120 staff and the UNICEF Somalia supply chain. Following the kick-
implemented through more than 160 staff based off meeting, UNICEF and GEG identified stakeholder
inside Somalia, including offices in Mogadishu, groups and individuals including key UNICEF staff
Galkayo, Baidoa, Hargeisa, Bossaso and Garowe. (logistics, supply and programming), partners
(operational NGOs), staff, donors, and suppliers
Further it is important to recognize that the UNICEF (local, international and transport).
Somalia country office provides support through
both large-scale emergency humanitarian programs Phase 2: Field Data Collection
and an increasingly significant development This phase began concurrent with Phase 1 and
programming. Thus, the UNICEF supply chain must included development of a detailed project
be able to support both the existing emergency plan and confirmation of needed logistical and
humanitarian programming as well as the expanded administrative support with UNICEF offices. The
development programming. To that end, this GEG assessment team started work in Nairobi on
assessment is key first step in a 4-stage long-term August 30th deployed to Somalia to begin the field
optimization process that should eventually move assessment on September 8th. The effectiveness of
key areas of supply and logistics from Internal the supply chain was assessed iteratively through all
Optimization through Training and Capacity stages of the project using a combination of ‘supply
Development of Partners and Transition to Key chain theory driven’ assessment approaches and
Partners (e.g. the Somalia Ministry of Health through ‘values driven’ evaluation approaches which assess
public-private partnerships) and eventually finishes performance relative to key stakeholder (particularly
in a Monitoring phase. UNICEF recognizes that it UNICEF and partner) needs.
has an organizational responsibility to optimize its
own supply chain practices while simultaneously The GEG assessment team began by identifying
embedding strong practices within its partners the criteria of merit against which the supply chain
(particularly Ministry partners) to ensure that an would be measured in collaboration with UNICEF
optimal long-term supply network is created, and partners while drawing from pre-established
especially for key commodities in health and performance standards, indicators and plans.
nutrition. This assessment and report is focused on Based on stakeholder input, a weighting of relative
the 1st stage of this process: Internal Optimization. importance was assigned to each criteria of merit
Subsequent phases of this work will need to be for analysis following the secondary data review and
advanced in the future within the scope of UNICEF field work. Logic modelling, ‘supply chain theory
Somalia long-term programming. modelling’ and coding of primary and secondary
data collected was employed to inform the analysis.
1.3 Assessment Methodology A combination of qualitative and quantitative
techniques were used to determine whether the
This supply chain assessment has been separated current supply chain is achieving the intended
into four phases including: Planning & Secondary results, both those explicitly contained in plans
Data Collection; Field Data Collection; Analysis; and and established performance metrics and those
Final Report. implicitly valued as identified through interviews
and research.
Phases
To understand the performance and effectiveness
Phase 1: Planning & Secondary Data Collection of the supply chain in Somalia, a two person GEG
During this initial phase, GEG designed tools for use assessment team (composed of the Supply Chain
Expert and the Somalia Programme Expert) travelled
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(in chronological order) from Nairobi to Mombasa, reviewed exploring administrative and management
Mogadishu, Baidoa, Bosaso, Berbera and Hargeisa. functions. After an organisational chart review,
These locations were among those originally interviews with key UNICEF staff were used to
proposed (though Baidoa was added during the confirm information flow, responsibilities and roles.
kick-off meeting) and were confirmed as appropriate The roles of staff and members were assessed for
field assessment destinations by UNICEF. responsibility, access, need and duplicity. Further,
the current funding mechanisms were analysed
The GEG assessment team mapped the UNICEF for their flexibility, responsiveness and intricacy of
supply chain in process steps from demand planning procedures.
to the end of chain distribution. The process was
reviewed for tracking and accountability. A sample Phase 3: Analysis
of transactions at the central, regional, and local Once the stakeholder and informant interviews were
logistics points will was examined in terms of complete, data from the interviews was combined
Supply Chain Key Performance Indicators (KPI). with field observations, the survey and secondary
While there is not one indicator or tool that can data collection to identify trends informing key
adequately address and summarise Somalia’s many findings. A substantive analysis and coding process
logistical challenges, the GEG assessment team collated this data so that it could be subsequently
used a diversified risk reduction approach that took translated into findings and recommendations. A
into account contextual variations and provided matrix was created to identify gaps and strengths,
realistic measures at the field level. This approach and develop recommendations. Preliminary
incorporated the following: findings and recommendations were presented on
November 6th at the conclusion of Phase 3 to test
Comparative Analysis – The Somalia case was their validity and to allow for real-time input from
compared to other relevant humanitarian response UNICEF staff. The GEG assessment team returned
environments also facing conflict/security to Kenya to facilitate a UNICEF Somalia supply
as well as geographical/seasonal constraints chain presentation and workshop on November 6th
where response agencies use varying degrees of that included a presentation of the draft findings,
‘remote management’ such as Yemen, Sudan and recommendations and implementation plans
Afghanistan. included in the Final Report.
Pre-Emptive Risk Analysis – GEG performed a Phase 4: Final Report

risk analysis to determine supply chain strengths All components of the analytical approach were
and weaknesses and their overall impact on the crafted with the aim of creating the final deliverables
KPIs. Looking at past experience and developing for the assessment, namely a set of clear, relevant
possible scenarios, the team was able to make and implementable recommendations including a
recommendations to improve system-wide road map for implementation. The implementation
performance and strategic decision-making. plan includes a suggested action hierarchy which is
linked to a rigorous project management framework,
Survey – A stakeholder survey was designed and resource requirements, expected benefits and
distributed across levels in UNICEF and select an implementation timeline. Throughout the
stakeholder organisations. The survey measured the assessment, GEG encouraged and solicited feedback
satisfaction of members with the services provided and comments from stakeholders to both inform the
by UNICEF in regards to timeliness, appropriateness, study, and also to build consensus for the eventual
quality, and responsiveness of the supply chain. findings and recommendations.
Management Structure & Funding Review – The For each recommendation, action steps are
management structure of the supply chain was suggested as part of an implementation plan.
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The report includes all of the findings from the outcomes and supply plan
assessment with recommendations. The assessment • Country and Regional Office Reports
• Logistics guidelines, procedures and recent logistics
team provided a draft of the Final Report on reports
November 6th for UNICEF consideration. Comments • Organisational charts and job descriptions for key supply
were solicited and feedback incorporated into the chain staff
final version of the report, which was delivered • Essential commodities listing
November 25th, 2013. • Statistics with supply chain data (lead times, metric
tonnage etc.)
• Logistics assets (fleet, equipment etc.)
Data Collection Strategy • Procurement information (number of orders, minimum/
The GEG assessment utilized a mixed methods maximum/average values, suppliers listing, supplier
approach incorporating data collected from one- agreements)
on-one semi-structured interviews, a survey, focus • Funding source information
• Any related evaluations or assessments
groups and direct observation. More than 158 • Relevant Meeting Minutes
individual stakeholders and informants from UNICEF • M&E Reports
and partner organizations participated in interviews • Procurement Plans
or focus groups. An additional thirteen people • Standing Purchase Orders
participated in the survey3. The GEG assessment • Transport Contracts
team used its own set of tested tools, templates,
and matrices to gather, vet, clean, and transform The secondary data review provided a basis on
data from its rough form into a useful information which other data collection, such as the individual
product for analysis. In addition, direct observation and group interviews, the focus group discussions,
during field visits, establishment of historical trends/ and the survey could be based.
timelines, and institutional linkage diagrams among
other standardized evaluation tools were employed Field Assessment Visits – A period of three weeks
throughout the project. Quantitative data was was designated for the field assessment period.
analysed and qualitative data coded using methods The length of time at each field site was adjusted
that promote transparency and replication ensuring from the original proposal to optimize the time
validity and confidence in the results. Coding was available in the field, based on staff availability, and
linked to the data rehearsal and expected data logistical considerations. Field work began with the
displays, though the team remained flexible to kick-off meeting after arrival in Nairobi on August
ensure unexpected findings were appropriately 30th. From there, the assessment team visited the
captured and analysed. These tools also included logistics hub in Mombasa. The two-person GEG
rigorous project management functions that guided assessment team (composed of the Supply Chain
all phases of the methodology development and Expert and the Somalia Programme Expert) then
assessment rollout. travelled into Somalia (specifically Mogadishu,
Baidoa, Bossaso, Hargeisa and Berbera). At each field
The following specific data collection methods and site location, the assessment team went through
tools were used during the assessment: identical steps for gathering data, performing
analysis and review as detailed in the project plan,
Secondary Data Collection – A detailed document thus ensuring maximum coverage for each objective
review was undertaken as a framework for the and milestone. The assessment team departed from
analysis. Reviewed documents included: Somalia on September 24th concluding with several
days in Nairobi working with the UNICEF USSC
• Guidelines team. After returning to their home base locations,
• Programme plans of action and strategies with outputs, the GEG assessment team triangulated all data
3 Recognizing that some of those interviewed (through direct one-on-one from the field data collection to identify findings
interviews or focus groups) may have also participated in the survey, GEG and recommendations. This served as the basis
accounts for these two separate data collection tools to minimize double
counting of the number of respondents participating in the assessment. for completing the analysis and the subsequent
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final report with findings, recommendations, access and high fulfilment rates.
and implementation plans. The GEG assessment
team returned to Kenya for the final presentation/ Supply Chain Mapping – The current supply
workshop with UNICEF key stakeholders. chain process was written down in process steps
encompassing distribution planning, supply
Direct Observation – During the field visit, direct requisitioning, procurement, in-country delivery and
observation was used to gather data on process and receiving, warehousing and loading-transportation,
structures to assist in the final analysis. final distribution, and implementing partners.
The current availability and procurement for the
Interviews – Collection of data during field visits supply chain performance was established in terms
was based primarily on individual and group of demand, throughput and availability for the
interviews of key UNICEF supply chain management essential commodity items. Specific bottlenecks
staff. Additional interviews were conducted to hindering the supply chain performance were also
gather input from stakeholders identified as a identified. The data from the mapping was compiled
data source but not included in the country visits and then treated as follows:
(i.e. UNICEF Supply Headquarters Copenhagen
staff, implementing partners, donor government • Calculated the current end-to-end supply chain
experts, commercial operators and external subject performance.
• Considered relative to Somalia and parallel/private
matter experts). GEG worked closely with UNICEF supply chains.
to develop and refine the list of interviewees to • Identified possible changes that could be made to the
ensure a nuanced understanding of the subject existing supply chain.
matter. Interviews were conducted face-to-face and • Analysed identified changes and their estimated costs;
via telephone and video conference, and primarily only those that are possible and likely to succeed were
recommended.
focused on qualitative data collection.
Quality Assurance
Focus Group Discussions – Group discussions were
At the kick-off meeting, UNICEF and the GEG
facilitated to solicit feedback on the UNICEF supply
assessment team agreed that the following comprise
chain. This was particularly important during field
the Critical Success Factors for the supply chain
visits where the interactions took place under time
assessment:
pressure. Information from each focus group was
recorded to include observations about context,
01 Impact at the beneficiary level
group dynamics, intonation and participation to aid 02 Clear understanding by all key stakeholders of project
in analysing qualitative responses. As needed, focus scope and deliverables
groups were followed up by one-on-one interviews 03 Availability of secondary data
to further explore sensitive or detailed issues raised 04 Access to key informants
in the group setting. 05 Security, access and support during field data
collection
06 Understanding of UNICEF working realities
Survey Mechanism – Data collection by survey 07 High-quality deliverables from the project team
provides an insurance mechanism of sorts for 08 UNICEF satisfaction and approval of all project phases
the data collection methodology. A survey was
designed and implemented to gather information In order that final project outcomes weigh
and impressions across a range of stakeholders favourably against these Critical Success Factors,
(particularly UNICEF field based staff and partner GEG utilized a tested and proven project
staff ). The survey captured quantitative and management approach – Quality Assurance
qualitative data using a mixture of open-ended Management (QAM). Application of QAM, together
questions and relative ranking techniques. The with the Contingency Escalation Process presented
survey was administered online to ensure broad in Figure 1, ensured that results of the assessment
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were delivered at the quality level required by the client and GEG.
Given the complexity of the work required for this assessment, it was essential that the GEG assessment
team collaborated with our client counterpart(s) for a regular review of objectives and deliverables as
compared to operational realities and agreed-upon timelines. GEG’s QAM-trained and experienced
assessment team has worked with the client from the outset and will continue to do so through the course
of the engagement to deliver its high quality work products on time and according to budget. Each project
phase was approved by the client before advancing towards completion of the next phase. Bi-weekly
reports were provided to UNICEF to enhance communications and ensure that any issues were addressed
as rapidly as possible. Any critical adjustments to the project were agreed to by both UNICEF and GEG. The
following graphic depicts the process used to immediately address any challenging issues or obstacles that
could have arisen during the course of the assessment:
Figure 1 - Contingency Escalation Process
Type of Contingency Contingency Criteria Level 1 Level 2

Slippage by 7 or more days
Slippage in milestone Slippage by 1- 7 days
Timelines GEG Project Manager and
achievement GEG Project Manager
UNICEF Counterpart(s)
Significant decrease
Decrease in agreed quality Minor decrease
Quality GEG Project Manager and
of services and output GEG Project Manager
Reduction in access
in Somalia or key Major Reduction
Minor Reduction
Infrastructure infrastructure (IT, transport, GEG Project Manager and
GEG Project Manager
housing, etc.) due to UNICEF Counterpart(s)
insecurity
Drastic decrease in
Less responsiveness to SLight decrease in
responsiveness
Responsiveness UNICEF requests from GEG responsiveness
GEG Project Manager and
project team GEG Project Manager
15
1.4 Organization of the 02 UNICEF – As the study sponsor, UNICEF played the critical
role in ensuring that the results are applicable to the delivery
Project of an improved supply chain. UNICEF also provided significant
resourcing (technical expertise, funding and time) to advance
The project was organized around three principal this project. UNICEF was represented in the following project
team positions: Heads of Section from Nutrition, WASH,
groups, instrumental for both the study and action Health, Education, PM&E, Malaria & HIV (formalized as the
planning components of the work: UNICEF Sponsor Committee), Lars Jensen (UNICEF Project
Coordinator), Amna Elmamoun and Cormac O’Sullivan
01 The Stakeholders – The stakeholders were integrated (UNICEF Counterparts).
into the project from inception through the planning stage.
Stakeholders were chosen UNICEF staff (both program and 03 Global Emergency Group (GEG) – GEG was contracted
supply and logistics), from the government (particularly by UNICEF to provide project management support and
Health, Education and Water Ministries), the private sector technical guidance to the study. The GEG project team is
(vendors), United Nations agencies, and both UNICEF’s local represented by Langdon Greenhalgh (Study Manager), Thierry
and international partner non-governmental organisations. Schweitzer (Logistics Technical Specialist), and Angi Yoder-
Stakeholders provided valuable input throughout, primarily Maina (Somalia Programme Specialist).
via interviews, written and verbal feedback, offering guidance
and input as how best to create sustainable and realistic All three of these groups met at critical junctures
solutions. Those interviewed for the study are represented in
in the project, which began August 24th, 2013
the stakeholders group.
and concluded on November 25th, 2013. Figure 2
below shows the overall assessment project team
organisation.
Figure 2 – Assessment Project Team Organization

JOINT PROJECT TEAM ORGANIZATION
UNICEF Sponsor Committee

Heads of Section: Nutrition, WASH, Health, Education, PM&E, Malaria & HIV
UNICEF Project Coordinator

Lars Jensen
UNICEF Counterparts
Amna Elmamoun & Cormac O’Sullivan Key
Stakeholders
Project Manager
Langdon Greenhalgh
Administrator
Kelly Johnson
Supply Chain Expert Somalia Programme Expert

Thierry Schweitzer Angi Yoder-Maina
16
Figure 3 – Detailed Project Plan
% Task Complete
26-Aug-2013
16-Sep-2013
23-Sep-2013
30-Sep-2013
18-Nov-2013
25-Nov-2013
11-Nov-2013
14-Oct-2013
21-Oct-2013
28-Oct-2013
2-Sep-2013
9-Sep-2013
4-Nov-2013
2-Dec-2013
7-Oct-2013
Tasks Owner Start Date End Date
Overview 299%
Start-Up 100%
0.1 Contract Finalized UNICEF 15-Apr-13 21-Aug-13 100%

0.2 GEG Team Mobilized to Begin Work GEG 22-Aug-13 24-Aug-13 100%
Phase I: Planning & Secondary Data Review 99%
1.1 Kick-Off Meeting UNICEF/GEG 30-Aug-13 30-Aug-13 100%

1.2 Conduct Secondary Data Review GEG 30-Aug-13 2-Sep-13 95%
1.3 Confirm List of Key Informant/Stakeholder Interviews & Field Visits UNICEF/GEG 30-Aug-13 2-Sep-13 100%
1.4 Finalize Conceptual Methodology, Timetable and Implementation Work Plan GEG 30-Aug-13 2-Sep-13 100%
1.5 Drafting of Inception Report GEG 30-Aug-13 3-Sep-13 100%
1.6 Finalize Administrative and Logistical Arrangements GEG 31-Aug-13 4-Sep-13 100%
1.7 M1: Presentation of Inception Report UNICEF/GEG 4-Sep-13 4-Sep-13 100%
Phase II: Field Visits & Data Collection 100%
2.1 Travel to Nairobi GEG 28-Aug-13 29-Aug-13 100%

2.2 Briefing and Introductory Meetings with UNICEF Somalia Staff - Kenya GEG 30-Aug-13 30-Aug-13 100%
2.3 Conduct Key Informant & Stakeholder Interviews (Regional & International) GEG 30-Aug-13 7-Sep-13 100%
2.4 Travel to Mombasa, Kenya GEG 6-Sep-13 6-Sep-13 100%
2.5 Data Collection (Mombasa Individual Stakeholders) GEG 6-Sep-13 6-Sep-13 100%
2.6 Data Collection (Field Visit to Transit Storage Facility) GEG 6-Sep-13 6-Sep-13 100%
2.7 Travel to Mogadishu GEG 8-Sep-13 8-Sep-13 100%
2.8 Briefing and Introductory Meetings with UNICEF Somalia Staff GEG 9-Sep-13 9-Sep-13 100%
2.9 Data Collection (Mogadishu Individual Stakeholders) GEG 10-Sep-13 11-Sep-13 100%
2.10 Data Collection (Field Visit to & Warehousing) GEG 12-Sep-13 12-Sep-13 100%
2.11 Travel to Galgaiyo GEG 13-Sep-13 13-Sep-13 100%
2.12 Data Collection ( Individual Stakeholders) GEG 13-Sep-13 13-Sep-13 100%
2.13 Data Collection (Field Visit to Galgaiyo Warehousing) GEG 14-Sep-13 14-Sep-13 100%
2.14 Travel to Bossaso GEG 15-Sep-13 15-Sep-13 100%
2.15 Data Collection (Bossaso Individual Stakeholders) GEG 16-Sep-13 16-Sep-13 100%
2.16 Data Collection (Field Visit to Port of Bossaso & Warehousing) GEG 17-Sep-13 18-Sep-13 100%
2.17 Travel to Berbera GEG 19-Sep-13 19-Sep-13 100%
2.18 Data Collection (Berbera Individual Stakeholders) GEG 19-Sep-13 19-Sep-13 100%
2.19 Data Collection (Field Visit to Port of Bebera & Warehousing) GEG 20-Sep-13 20-Sep-13 100%
2.20 Travel to Hargeisa GEG 20-Sep-13 20-Sep-13 100%
2.21 Data Collection (Individual Stakeholders) GEG 21-Sep-13 22-Sep-13 100%
2.22 Data Collection (Warehouse) GEG 22-Sep-13 23-Sep-13 100%
2.23 Departure Travel to Nairobi GEG 23-Sep-13 23-Sep-13 100%
2.24 Interviews and Debriefing in Nairobi GEG 24-Sep-13 26-Sep-13 100%
2.25 M2: Field Data Collection and Debriefing Complete GEG 27-Sep-13 27-Sep-13 100%
Phases III & IV: Analysis & Report Writing 90%
3.1 Synthesis of Interview Data, Field Data & Secondary Desk Review GEG 27-Sep-13 18-Oct-13 100%
3.2 Drafting of Final Report & Presentation GEG 18-Oct-13 3-Nov-13 100%
3.3 Travel to Nairobi GEG 4-Nov-13 5-Nov-13 100%
3.4 M3: Presentation of Draft Final Report, Findings & Recommendations GEG 6-Nov-13 6-Nov-13 100%
4.1 Return Travel GEG 7-Nov-13 7-Nov-13 100%

4.2 UNICEF Review of Draft Report UNICEF 7-Nov-13 18-Nov-13 100%
4.3 Incorporate Feedback from UNICEF GEG 19-Nov-13 21-Nov-13 100%
4.4 Final Check & Approval UNICEF 22-Nov-13 25-Nov-13 100%
4.5 Final Report Design, Formatting and Translation (as needed) GEG 19-Nov-13 25-Nov-13 100%
4.6 Circulation of Final Report UNICEF 25-Nov-13 25-Nov-13 0%
4.7 M4: Final Report UNICEF/GEG 25-Nov-13 25-Nov-13 100%
17
1.5 Limitations
The assessment was mainly limited by the following key factors:
• The security environment in the field that limited access to particular field site locations and generally restricted
assessment team movement in Somalia.
• Limited time in Somalia to conduct the field work given security concerns.
• The provision of secondary data needed but that the current supply chain system is unable to produce.
1.6 Structure of the Report

Section 1 introduces the objectives and deliverables while outlining the assessment approach including
organization and methodology.
Section 2 presents and discusses findings based on the field assessment.
Section 3 proposes recommendations aimed at solving the issues identified.
Section 4 focuses upon implementation plans, how to implement change and the impact of the solutions.
Section 5 provides the conclusion.
Annexes A-C include terms of reference, interview guides, details on methodology for data collection, key
analysis and impact data, list of interviewees.
18
FINDINGS
2.1 Positive Elements of the Supply Chain to Build Upon
While this study is rightfully focused on areas in the UNICEF Somalia’s supply chain that need improvement,
the field assessment discovered many positive elements that can be used as a basis for enhancement, some
of which include:
Ability to Mobilize Critical Supplies During Emergencies. There is significant evidence to suggest that UNICEF is able to
overcome obstacles in the supply chain during emergencies. This likely comes at a higher cost but the prioritization of urgent
beneficiary needs is of paramount importance. This ability to rapidly and effectively mobilize emergency support to those in
need was particularly evident during the Horn of Africa drought emergency in 20114.
Committed Programme and Supply Chain Staff Delivering in Highly Challenging Circumstances. In both the Nairobi USSC
and in all the field offices the dedication and professionalism of the staff was cited as the number one positive effective aspect
of the supply chain5.
Initiatives Already in Progress to Strengthen the Supply Chain. UNICEF staff from the USSC in Nairobi are currently in the
process of internally identifying the challenges and possible solutions related to the Somalia supply chain. New tools are
under development that may appropriately address some of the issues identified in this assessment. UNICEF’s ability to
rapidly address the issues identified by staff and in this assessment report is critical. Doing so recognizes that there are always
challenges to a supply chain particularly in a difficult environment such as Somalia. However, the ability of the supply chain to
adapt to the changing circumstances despite current and future challenges often can define the success or failure of the supply
chain6.
International Procurement Dominates the UNICEF Sourcing. The international procurement of key commodities (particularly
RUTF and pharmaceuticals) is essential to the supply chain given that these items cannot be procured in Somalia and there
are scale efficiencies to be found through international procurement. International procurement processes and sourcing are
generally thought to be well handled and supported from UNICEF Supply Division (Copenhagen)7. However, as a result there is
also a limited amount of attention paid to national or regional supply chain providers who may be able to increasingly provide
some of the supplies needed by UNICEF in Somalia8.
Call-In Centre. The ‘call-in centre’ system in Somalia, implemented within the last two years, greatly improved UNICEF’s
communication with both suppliers and partners within the nutrition programmes. A number of partners talked about how
having a focal point to call made a huge difference in being able to follow-up with UNICEF on key issues, particularly to report
supplies that were not delivered or to report that supplies were being used faster than expected. Somali partners emphasised
having someone that spoke Somali on the phone was also incredibly helpful9.
Nutrition Program. There were noticeable improvements within the last two years with the supply of commodities from the
nutrition programme. Many NGOs, the donors and the field staff stated that the leadership within the nutrition department
had made significant efforts to improve their service delivery. They noted that some of the best practices including the ‘call-in
centre’, program tracking and having logistics staff solely responsible for tracking the nutrition program’s supplies should be
replicated by other programs wishing to make similar improvements in the supply of particular commodities.
4 UNICEF. Somalia Country Office Annual Report 2011.

5 Interviews and focus groups (39 references) in Baidoa (19), Bossaso (4), and Hargesia (1), Mogadishu (7), and Nairobi (12). (August 31, 2013 –
September 27 2013).
6 Based on direct observations by the field assessment team in Nairobi. (31 August 2013 – 6 September 2013, 16 September 2013, and 25-27
September 2013).
7 Interviews and focus groups (18 references) in Baidoa (3), Mogadishu (3), and Nairobi (12). (31 August 2013 – 6 September 2013, 16 September
2013, and 25-27 September 2013).
8 Secondary data from Supply & Logistics USSC reports and interviews (18 references) in Baidoa (6), Bossaso (5), Hargesia (2), Mogadishu (2) and
Nairobi (3). (31 August 2013 – 27 September 2013).
9 Interviews and focus groups (18 references) in Baidoa (3), Mogadishu (3), and Nairobi (12). (31 August 2013 – 6 September 2013, 16 September
2013, and 25-27 September 2013).
19
2.2 The Five Main Supply Chain Findings
There are five main findings based on the analysis of assessment data collected through field visits,
interviews, focus groups, secondary data and the survey:
01 There is limited forward demand planning that involves all key stakeholders that is exacerbated
by minimal levels of commodity tracking visibility and the poor security environment.
a) The security environment, particularly in southern and central Somalia, remains highly unpredictable significantly
impacting access, transportation and distribution of commodities within the SCZ10. Road access within SCZ remains
limited for UN convoys although private sector suppliers are using all main supply routes (including the roads from
Mogadishu to Baidoa as well as to Dusamareb and Galkayo) 11.
b) There is no regular (annual, quarterly or more frequent) planning process with Programme, Partners and Supply &
Logistics working together to determine how best to meet forecasted needs12. Planning tends to start late each year (with
December and January leave schedules affecting the planning process each year) with the supply plan being provided to
the Supply Division by the programmes in March/April of the calendar year13.
c) Supply & Logistics is not adequately incorporated into Programme annual planning processes while there is no integrated
supply planning process that Programme can be a part of14.
d) When distributions plans are completed, they are usually short-term in nature, inconsistent in terms of how they are
constructed and not always widely shared throughout the UNICEF supply chain. This can lead to the late delivery of
goods, lack of medium-term visibility and increases in transportation costs (particularly when rapid shipments via air
transport are required to fill urgent supply chain gaps15).
e) There is a limited ability to effectively track commodities. Supply chain visibility and tracking is a critical aspect of the
supply chain functionality from the Programme perspective in particular. Without this key element which has repeatedly
been insufficient to meet needs, distrust of the entire supply chain has pervaded throughout Programme and led to the
creation by Programme of duplicate and parallel systems in order to address this issue16.
f) Supply & Logistics use the VISION system to a minimum level of its potential capacity based on their collectively limited
understanding of what the system is capable of. The rollout of the VISION system came at an inopportune time for the
Somalia offices17. While some staff were trained in the use of VISION, there remains a lack of knowledge as to how best
to use the system. Further, the VISION system is not yet linked with the Kuehne and Nagel physical stock system often
resulting in difficulty in reconciling Kuehne & Nagel inventory with the VISION system records. As a result of this, there are
inconsistencies in stock reports, which leads to a further lack of confidence in the system18.
10 Interviews and focus groups (43 references) in Baidoa (19), Bossaso (4), Hargesia (1) Mogadishu (7) and Nairobi (12), (31 August 2013 – 15
September 2013).
11 Interviews and focus groups in Baidoa (2 references). (September 12-15 September, 2013)
12 Interviews and focus groups (29 references) in Baidoa (11), Mogadishu (9) and Nairobi (9), (31 August 2013 – 15 September 2013).
13 Interviews and focus group (3 references) in Baidoa (2), and Hargesia (1). (12-25 September 2013). As well as, from secondary data: UNICEF
USSC. “Supply Plan Report 2013”.
14 Interviews and focus groups (14 references) in Baidoa (4), Mogadishu (4), and Nairobi (6). (31 August 2013 – 15 September 2013). As well as, from
secondary data: UNICEF. “Supply Manuel.” E-handbook. Chapter 3. Section 2. “Supply Planning Processes” (12/19/2011).
15 Interviews and focus group (13 references) in Bossaso (2), Hargesia (4) Mogadishu (1) and Nairobi (6), (31 August 2013 – 27 September 2013).
16 GEG notes that the ‘tipping point’ related to the lack of trust between Programme and Supply & Logistics likely occurred around the same time point
in time (2011-2012) when UNICEF needed to significantly scale up its supply chain in response to the 2011 famine in Somalia (resulting in significant
increases in stock values that more than tripled from an annual average of $15 million up to more than $45 million in 2011) while at the same time
prematurely attempting to shift from the previous supply chain management system (UNI-TRACK) to a new system (VISION). This led to very specific
challenges particularly as related to data integrity, inventory management and the visibility of supplies within the system.
17 Interviews and focus group (8 references) in Baidoa (2), Mogadishu (2), and Nairobi (4). (31 August 2013 – 27 September 2013).
18 Interviews and focus group (6) in Baidoa (1) and Nairobi (5). (31 August 2013 – 15 September 2013). As well as, secondary data: UNICEF.
“Warehousing - VISION and Actual Stock Alignment Q4 2013”; UNICEF. “July 2013 Count Report For Nairobi And Mombasa”; and UNICEF. “Physical
Stock Take Programme Supplies: Step by Step Guide.— Somalia Country Office.
20
02 The supply chain is primarily a push system vulnerable to variable funding and without a viable
pull supply chain driver from field operations and partners.
a) Partners are not required or currently capable of being pull drivers within the supply chain. The logistical capacity and
technical ability of the partners is rarely assessed or considered as a part of supply chain planning19. Many partners lack
a minimum level of logistics knowledge. There are often no stock reports being provided by partners and partners do
not always make timely requests. Distribution plans are often created based on a clustering of partners thus when one
partner delays a submission it affects all the other partners as well20.
b) Funding commitments are inconsistent and the availability of funds from donors can occur months after the program
is proposed to start. Donors often require that all stock be moved through the system in one fiscal year. Thus, the
programme is shortened with restrictions that make it more difficult to implement21.
c) Some programs are underfunded or significantly underfunded (particularly education programs). Supplies are often
ordered with the expectation that requested funds will come in, however when the funds do not arrive, the supplies are
left sitting in the warehouses as there are no additional funds for transporting the supplies to the field (i.e. textbooks and
school kits)22.
03 Due to long lead times and planning issues, key commodities are often not available when
needed and when the supplies finally do arrive they have short shelf lives.
a) Partners noted that they often have limited supplies for months, causing them to either close facilities or to slow down
work23, and when the needed items arrive they are have a very short shelf life leading them to have to use the items
quickly. Partners, field and Programme staff are frustrated when commodities are delivered with a short life span24. As a
result, partners must use the items quickly and sometimes are forced to dispose of the commodities, within a few months
of having received the needed commodities. Pharmaceutical supplies for health programming is generally considered
to be a more significant problem for those key commodities within the supply chain with significant implications for the
clinics and other health facilities that rely upon UNICEF supplies. Al-Shabaab often uses information such as the delivery
of medicine with short expiration dates as a part of their local propaganda against the Federal Government of Somalia
(FGS) and UNICEF programs25.
b) Due to long lead times and current supply chain inefficiencies, UNICEF is often forced to use more expensive emergency
flights for supply shipments that could be sent in a less expensive manner26.
c) Lead times are inaccurately reflecting the actual amount of time that it takes commodities to move through the supply
chain27.
d) Programme is viewed as making unreasonable or impossible requests for delivery resulting in the perception that
Programme staff do not fully understand lead times and the actual functioning of the supply chain28.
e) Programmes are sometimes shut down (particularly local clinics and feeding centres) as a result of a lack of supplies.
As a result, some implementing partners (primarily international partners) have taken to procuring their own supplies,
augmenting their supplies with UNICEF supplies, due to delays in the UNICEF supply chain29. UNICEF programmes are
19 Interviews and focus group (9 references) in Baidoa (1), Hargesia (1), and Mogadishu (7). (8 – 25 September 2013).
20 Interviews and focus group (4 references) in Mogadishu (3), and Baidoa (1). (8-15 September 2013).
21 Interviews and focus groups (2 references) in Baidoa (1) and Bossoso (1). (12-19 September 2013).
22 Interviews and focus groups (3 references) in Baidoa (2), and Hargesia. (1). (12-24 September, 2013).
23 Interviews and focus groups (2 references) in Baidoa (1) and Hargesia (1). (12-24 September, 2013).
24 Interviews and focus groups (25 references) in Baidoa (15), Hargesia (3), Mogadishu (4), Mombasa (1), and Nairobi (2). (31 August 2013 – 27
September 2013).
25 Interviews and focus groups (6) in Baidoa (6). (31 August 2013 – 27 September 2013).
26 Interviews and focus groups (9) in Baidoa (1), Bossoso (3) Mogadishu (3) and Nairobi (2). (31 August 2013 – 19 September 2013).
27 Interviews and focus groups (14 references) in Baidoa (2), Bossaso (4), Mogadishu (4), and Nairobi (4), (31 August 2013 – 27 September 2013).
28 Interviews and focus groups (14 references) in Baidoa (2), Bossaso (4), Mogadishu (4), and Nairobi (4), (31 August 2013 – 27 September 2013).
29 Interviews and focus groups (2 references) in Nairobi (1), and Bossaso (1), (31 August 2013 – 27 September 2013).
21
high profile in Somalia and important to the communities. If supplies are not delivered on time through the UNICEF
supply chain it can reflect badly on both the implementing partner organization and UNICEF. Al-Shabaab often uses
information such as clinic closings as a part of their local propaganda against the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)
and the international community30.
Current estimate lead times are presented in the following graphic (Figure 4)31.
Figure 4 – Current UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain Estimated Lead Times
LEAD TIMES
INTERNATIONAL KENYA SOMALIA SCZ, NEZ, NWZ
Direct Shipping:
64 – 66 Days*1 91– 93 Days
Bosasso
3PL WH 10
27*1
3PL WH
-‐17 60 Days*1 Via Mombasa:
143– 166 Days 19 1 Days Direct Shipping: 116 – 119 Days
-‐21 Via Mombasa: 168 – 193 Days
Direct Shipping: Via Bosasso

40 -‐ 46 Days
5?
67– 73 Days Garowe
Implemen0ng Partner
Supply Division Warehouse
Berbera Via Berbera

Kenya 10
27*2
3PL WH 3 Days Direct Shipping: 94 – 100 Days
35 – 40 Days 45 Days Via Mombasa:

11-‐2 Via Mombasa: 155 – 178 Days
-‐17 19
2 128– 151 Days 94 – 100 Days
Direct Shipping:
3 Days
Via Mombasa: 155 – 178 Days
Direct Shipping: 5? Via Berbera

60– 74 Days
40 – 54 Days
Mogadishu Galkayo
20 8 Days Via Mogadishu
10 3PL WH Direct Shipping: 79 – 97 Days
2 Days Via Mombasa: 6-‐10 Via Mombasa: 97 – 124 Days
-‐17
78 – 101 Days 2 Days Direct Shipping: 73 – 91 Days
Via Mombasa: 91 – 118 Days
5? Via Mogadishu
10
5 Days 8-‐17
Mandera
1 Days Baidoa
Mombasa -‐17 Entry point Via Mandera
Via Mombasa: Via Mombasa: 75 – 107 Days
69 – 101 Days
Gov.
Partner
Keys External Services Implemen0ng Partner Berbera Bosasso Mogadishu Mandera xx

Receiving – sending
process in days *1 Must be SOC for value item or bulk shipping
*2 Blanket custom clearance can greatly reduce 0me (10 days)
30 Interviews and focus groups (6 references) in Baidoa (1), Bossaso (1), and Nairobi (4), (31 August 2013 – 15 September 2013).
31 Estimate calculations sourced from the following secondary data: UNICEF Somalia. “Working document: Lead Time Systems.” (2013); UNICEF.
“Transportation Matrix” (07/02/2013); as well as primary data from actual shipping lines schedules.
22
04 There is a lack of trust, responsive communication and staff empowerment between Somalia field
offices and Nairobi.
a) The lack of clarity and direction regarding the Nairobi-Somalia office transition is creating angst and uncertainty. Staff in
Somalia do not believe, particularly after so many years of inaction, that the transition will actually happen while there
remains no outward signs (e.g. a transition team) or communications regarding the planned transition32.
b) UNICEF is missing a culture of problem identification, problem-solving, issue tracking, learning and innovation. As a
result, issues and problems often linger because they are not proactively addressed in an effective manner.
c) The UNICEF Nairobi and Somalia staff are working on two different work schedules. The USSC in Nairobi works from
Monday to Friday while the Somalia offices work from Sunday to Thursday. As a result, important communication and
information can be missed. For example, supplies are sent to the airport in Somalia with only an e-mail notification on
Friday, leaving the office in Somalia to scramble to receive goods on Sunday morning.
d) There is limited sharing of resources and knowledge between and amongst UNICEF Somalia field offices.
e) UNICEF Nairobi staff often describe the lack of capacity in the UNICEF Somalia offices33. However, there is indeed staff
capacity at both the Somalia field level as well as in Nairobi. A key issue remains how best to continually strengthen both
offices which are separated by very real and challenging geographic and location differences.
f ) When UNICEF Somalia offices describe the relationship with the USSC in Nairobi they talk about how they are left on
their own, with limited authority and decision-making abilities yet facing the daily pressure to provide needed supplies,
services and payments to meet the expectations of the government, implementing partners, beneficiaries, and local
suppliers. Field staff emphasize that planning for supplies happens in a “bubble” in Nairobi and not based on field
realities34.
g) There is no culture or expectation of field assessments to determine supply needs. Field assessments with implementing
partners should be the key drivers to determine demand and feed into the demand planning process. For example,
according to the field staff the health kits for Somalia were changed in the last year by Nairobi without consulting the
field offices and performing a needs assessment35.
05 Two parallel and duplicative logistics teams are in place creating tensions and duplication of
effort. The situation is exacerbated by insufficient communication and conflict between
Supply & Logistics and Programme.
a) Given the lack of trust in and credibility of Supply & Logistics, Programmes at the USSC created an imbedded supply chain
function to fill the key functions that Supply & Logistics were not adequately supporting36 (particularly related to supply
chain visibility and commodity tracking). However, while UNICEF services may have improved through this additional
dedicated resourcing and expertise, doing so also created a parallel logistics and supply chain function outside of the
Supply & Logistics department37.
b) There is an open distrust between Supply & Logistics and Programme38. This has led in the past to direct confrontation
32 Interviews and focus groups (10) in Baidoa (2), Bossoso (2), Mogadishu (3), and Nairobi (3). (31 August 2013 – 27 September 2013).
33 Interviews and focus groups (39 references) Baidoa (7), Bossaso (7), Hargesia (4), Mogadishu (16) and Nairobi (5). (31 August 2013 –27 September
2013).
34 Interviews and focus groups (39 references) Baidoa (7), Bossaso (7), Hargesia (4), Mogadishu (16) in Nairobi (5). (31 August 2013 –27 September
2013).
35 Interviews and focus groups (7 references) in Hargesia (6), and Nairobi (1). (22-23 September 2013).
36 Interviews and focus groups (17 references), Baidoa (3), Mogadishu (3), Nairobi (11). (31 August 2013 – 15 September 2013).
37 Interviews and focus groups (17 references) in Baidoa (3), Mogadishu (3), Nairobi (11). (31 August 2013 – 15 September 2013).
38 Interviews and focus groups (22 references) in Baidoa (9), Hargesia (2), Mogadishu (5), and Nairobi (6). (31 August 2013 – 27 September 2013).
23
between staff. While some tension between Supply & Logistics and Programme is common in many organizations this
situation appears to be of significant concern. Interaction between these two critical UNICEF departments is sub-optimal
with poor communication between the two entities and confusion about roles and responsibilities resulting in ineffective
programming. Implementing partners understand that this internal UNICEF tension exists and have even found it
necessary to mediate in certain circumstances.
c) Supply & Logistics are often perceived to be an administrative function instead of an integral component of effective
programming, including being a part of the planning process (i.e. development of the PCAs and development of the
distribution plans)39.
d) A number of Programme staff noted that they felt that a service mind-set is missing within Supply & Logistics40.
2.3 Detailed Supply Chain Findings
In addition to the main findings above there are several more detailed supply chain findings that are
particularly relevant to this assessment. These findings include:
2.3.1 The Use of Mombasa for Transiting of Goods. The use of Mombasa as a transiting point into Somalia
is often resulting in longer lead times41, cost increases and supply chain inefficiencies. When comparing
shipping directly to three key in-country supply points (Berbera, Mogadishu and Bossaso), GEG calculates
that UNICEF’s use of Mombasa as a transiting point is increasing lead times by at least an estimated 70
days for shipments to Berbera, 30 days for Mogadishu and 70 days for shipments to Bossaso. The following
analysis and estimate in Figures 5, 6 & 7 demonstrates the increased lead times associated with the use of
Mombasa when considering shipping, receiving, loading, warehousing and onward shipping42.
40 Interviews and focus groups (5 references) in Mogadishu (1) and Nairobi (4). (31 August 2013 – 12 September 2013).
41 Interviews and focus groups (11 references) in Baidoa (1), Mogadishu (1), and Nairobi (9) (31 August 2013 – 27 September 2013).
42 Estimate calculations sources from the following secondary data: UNICEF. “Working document: Lead time systems.”; UNICEF. “Road lead times”.
(October 2013); and primary data from actual shipping lines schedules.
24
Figure 5 - Direct to Mogadishu
Comparison of Direct Shipping to Mogadishu As Compared to Transiting Thru Mombasa
Min Max Min Max

Direct to Mogadishu 40 54 Direct to Mombasa 35 40
Shipping Copenhagen to
40 54 Shipping Copenhagen to Berbera 35 40
Mogadishu
Receiving at Mombasa 11 22
Vaissel waiting time 2 7
Offloading container at port 5 9
Custom clearance 2 3
Physical receiving/Counting at the
1 1
warehouse
VISION data entry 1 2
Loading at Mombasa 10 17
Picking and waybill creation 1 2
Physical picking at K&N / warehouse 2 7
Customs documentation 1 2
Loading the truck, transport to air or
3 3
sea port
Loading the plane / boat (if air/sea
3 3
shipment)
Mombasa to Mogadishu 2 2
Sailing time 2 2
Receiving at Mogadishu 20 20 Receiving at Mogadishu 20 20

Vessel waiting time 5 5 Vessel waiting time 5 5
Offloading container at port 7 7 Offloading container at port 7 7
Custom clearance 2 2 Custom clearance 2 2
Physical receiving/Counting at the Physical receiving/Counting at the
4 4 4 4
warehouse warehouse
VISION data entry 2 2 VISION data entry 2 2
Total 60 74 Total 78 101
Direct shipping to Mogadishu

Passing by Mombasa represent % of
represent % of passing by 76.9% 73.3% 130.0% 136.5%
direct shipping to Mogadishu
Mombasa
This estimation is based on a physical immediat release of the commodities (0 warehousing time) once entered in Mombasa Warehouse.
25
Figure 6 - Direct to Berbera
Comparison of Direct Shipping to Berbera As Compared to Transiting Thru Mombasa
Min Max Min Max

Direct to Berbera 40 46 Direct to Mombasa 35 40
Shipping Copenhagen to Berbera 40 46 Shipping Copenhagen to Berbera 35 40
1 1
warehouse
3 3
sea port
3 3
shipment)
Mombasa to Berbera 45 45
Shipping Mombasa to Berbera 45 45
Receiving at Berbera 27 27 Receiving at Berbera 27 27

4 4 4 4
warehouse warehouse
Direct shipping to Berbera

direct shipping to Berbera
Mombasa
This estimate does not include the right on time arrival of comodities against the schedule of departure to Berbera.
26
Figure 7 - Direct to Bosaso
Comparison of Direct Shipping to Bosaso As Compared to Transiting Thru Mombasa
Min Max Min Max

Direct to Bosaso Mini 64 66 Direct to Mombasa 35 40
Shipping Copenhagen to Bosaso 64 66 Shipping Copenhagen to Berbera 35 40
1 1
warehouse
3 3
sea port
3 3
shipment)
Mombasa to Bosaso 60 60
Sailing time 60 60
Receiving at Bosaso 27 27 Receiving at Mogadishu 27 27

4 4 4 4
warehouse warehouse
Direct shipping to Bosaso

Passing by Bosaso represent % of
Mombasa
Please note the Dhows, used from Sharjah to Bossaso, are not so reliable when it comes to scheduling.
Please note fragile cargo, high value cargo, pharmaceutical equipment and actual pharmaceuticals will only be accepted in SOC.
27
2.3.2 Warehousing. There is a lack of common warehouse supplies and equipment (forklifts, quality pallets,
truck pallets, shrink wrap film, new cartons for packaging etc.) where necessary at the field warehouse level
(such as in Mogadishu and Berbera)43. The third party logistics services contracted in Somalia to manage
the warehouses are often lacking basic skills and working procedures44. In Somalia, many of the warehouses
do not meet the majority of minimum warehousing standards45. As a result the field warehouses are not
well sorted, goods are not effectively grouped for easy management and lack fully completed bin cards
(when a bin card exists) in order to recognise what stock is in place and how much remaining space is
present. There is space in all the warehouses visited but that space is not always ready for future deliveries
due to stock sometimes being scattered in an unorganised manner over the available surface. There are
also instances when warehousing standards and processes are not well applied. For example, Programme
staff must submit ‘Annex E: Logistics Warehouse Assessment Checklist’ for all partners46. Rather than being
a useful exercise that uses the Supply & Logistics expertise at the field level to aid in evaluating the logistics
and warehousing capacity of the partners, it is simply an exercise of filling out the checklist47. As one
Programme staff noted, “warehousing capacity could be a red flag that stops the PCA, so we just answer yes
for everything so there are no red flags.”
2.3.3 Kits/Sets. Kits and sets of bundled items may be programmatically useful but from a supply chain
perspective they are quite complex. This is especially the case if a kit must be opened while being within the
inventory system. Managing a kit in a warehouse is not difficult if it is unopened. However, if a kit is opened
VISION cannot log an automatic kit opening in the system. Further, the management of expired items within
a kit is difficult48. When an item (that is still in the inventory system) in a kit expires there is no possibility of
entering the items from the kit into the stock given that it is no longer a full kit. A set physically appears to
be a kit in the warehouse, but its items are individually listed in the inventory system. Thus it is difficult to
reconcile the warehouse inventory with the system inventory since items being counted are different49.
For example, a large order of medicine is present in several locations (i.e. Mombasa, Baidoa, Berbera and
Mogadishu). It was delivered and coded in VISION as a set. Of the set of two cartons, one carton contains
only ORS while the other carton is filled with a variety of drugs each with different expiry dates/batches.
The ORS cartons are marked with three markings: the sales order, the purchase order and the batch number
(from the supplier). While the carton containing the drugs is marked only with the packing number. This
can lead to human error by logistics staff. It should be noted that cartons with the drugs also hold the same
drugs but each with different batch numbers and more importantly expiration dates. For example, the zinc
had expiration dates ranging from September 2013 to September 2015. As no expiration date is marked on
the carton, logistics have to open each carton in order to check the expiration dates and remove any expired
drugs. This is a labour intensive process that requires a great deal of time and effort50.
Lastly, the education kits in particular were noted as not being adapted to the Somali culture and context.
Health partners across the zones noted that in the last nine months the types of drugs in the health kits have
also changed and the kit is no longer as relevant as the previous kit.
43 Direct observation by supply chain and logistics expert during field assessment as well as interviews and focus groups (9 references) in Baidoa (1),
Bossoso (1), Berbera (1) and Mogadishu (6). (8-24 September 2013).
44 UNICEF. “Supply Manual.” E-handbook. Warehousing and Inventory Management. (12/19/2011).
45 It is important to note that effective warehousing management is a significant challenge for most other humanitarian organizations and commercial
providers throughout Somalia. Security and looting of warehouses is of significant concern as is having the technical capacity for effective warehouse
management.
46 Interviews and focus groups (9 references) in Baidoa (1), Hargesia (1), and Mogadishu (7). (8 – 25 September 2013).
47 UNICEF. PCA: Annex E i-v Checklist Programme, Finance, Unit Costs, Warehouse and Supply.
48 Generally, there are two ways to dispose of expired inventory. The first and most commonly applied way is to open the box while in stock (within the
inventory system) and dispose of the bad batch then enter the remaining items as a unit or create a new kit with the remaining components. The second
way is to deliver the boxes and ask the partner to either dispose or return the items for disposal (though this second method is not really standard or
accepted by organisations).
50 Direct observation by Supply Chain and Logistics expert during field assessment visits.
28
2.3.5 Category Management. There are as many as 30051 commodities flowing through the UNICEF Somalia
supply chain. Most of these commodities exceed the sourcing, production and/or storage capacity of local
suppliers and thus are procured internationally. There is little evidence to suggest that effective category
management practices are utilized within the existing supply chain. Further, it is a challenge for the
supply chain managers to identify, particularly with the pharmaceutical commodities, or prioritize those
commodities deemed as essential within the supply chain. Given the number of commodities involved and
the complexity of managing pharmaceutical supplies, strengthened category management could be a key
component of an optimized UNICEF Somalia supply chain.
2.3.6 Picking Orders. Cancelled requested Picking Orders are not always communicated down to the 3PL
supplier. In other cases cancelled Picking Orders are communicated to the 3PL but are not cancelled in
VISION. This can lead to discrepancies between Keuhne & Nagel and VISION thereby increasing costs and
confusion in the inventory as inventory reports will not match52.
2.3.7 Release Orders. Release orders are not always issued in advance of the delivery date so that they can
be combined for bulk or chain transport53. Further, one release order cannot have several waybills54 (though
several release orders can be on one waybill). As a result there are situations when all of the items on a
large release order will not fit on one vehicle. Thus, partners can receive several trucks but it is challenging
to verify which items should be in each truck. This likely causes confusion in cases when commodities are
missing and the partner cannot track which truck had which items/quantity55.
2.3.8 Invoicing and Payments. Some UNICEF payments to suppliers and partners are significantly delayed56.
This can be a security issue while also harming the UNICEF reputation (particularly within the private sector)
and increasing prices as suppliers will factor the waiting time into their prices57.
2.3.9 Waybills. The current system dictates that the original waybill must be returned to the warehouse of
origin in order to close the file and initiate payment58, despite programme staff in the field or staff at the call
centre often having confirmation from the partner that the items had already arrived. As a result, there is an
undesirably large quantity of commodities under transport in VISION because the original waybill has not
yet been returned59.
2.3.10 National or Local Suppliers. There is currently limited communication and utilization of the national
or local supplier market in Somalia. When there are opportunities for national or local suppliers, they are
sometimes unaware of tenders. Further, when suppliers are not selected they rarely are given feedback so
that they can understand the rationale for that decision in order to improve their future bids60.
2.3.11 Cold Chain. The UNICEF cold chain is not consistent throughout the supply chain61. Consistency in
the cold chain is one of the pillars of a well functioning health supply chain system. In Somalia almost all
the locations the assessment team visited showed problems related to cold chain management. There were
observations of inadequate infrastructure, a lack of cleanliness, holes in roofs, ventilation issues and poorly
51 Count based on the 2013 supply plan.
52 Interviews in Mombasa (2 references). (5 September 2013).
53 Interviews and focus groups (4 references) in Mogadishu (3) and Nairobi (1). (31 August 2013 – 12 September 2013).
54 Interviews and focus groups (3 references) in Hargesia (1), and Nairobi (2). (31 August 2013 – 25 September 2013).
55 UNICEF. Process Review – RO and WB.
56 Interviews and focus groups (12 references) in Baidoa (1), Hargesia (2), Mogadishu (5), and Nairobi (4). (31 August – 27 September 2013).
57 Some suppliers will have to take a loan and pay interest on the loan.
58 UNICEF. “Supply Manuel.” E-handbook. Warehousing and Inventory Management. (12/19/2011).
59 Interviews and focus groups (7) in Hargesia (5) and Nairobi (2). (31 August – 27 September 2013).
60 Interviews and focus groups (29) in Bossaso (8), Hargesia (9), and Mogadishu (11). (8 – 24 September 2013).
61 Direct observation by Supply Chain and Logistics expert during field assessment visits. (September 2013).
29
functioning back-up power supply. Buildings and/or the rooms holding the fridges and freezers are often
sub-standard. During warehouse visits it was observed that some fridges/freezers maintained either too
high or too low (below zero) a temperature for the items in the fridges/freezers62. A lot of the freezers are
not equipped with thermometers while temperature tracking sheets, often, cannot be tracked back to the
corresponding freezer/fridge.
Batch numbers are often not used, thus when there is an issue with a vaccine, the batch cannot be used to
track which partners received it. Knowing which batch is in which fridge/freezer and when it was placed
there is critical to providing quality of care to beneficiaries. Additionally, backup energy systems are not
efficient or present in the partners’ cold chains that were visited. A number of partners noted that UNICEF
has many problems supporting them to maintain back-up energy systems (through maintenance and/or
supply of kerosene).
2.3.12 Logistics and Supply Capacity Building for Partners. Both government and local implementing
partners do not have minimal logistics knowledge related to warehousing and transportation of supplies63.
Record keeping is inconsistent in most partner warehouse facilities including: little use of stock-cards;
stock-cards not being kept up-to-date; a lack of consumption records; and minimal systematic filing or
compilation of orders sent, delivery notes, issue notes and requisitions. Governments in all three zones
have an interest in maintaining the components of the UNICEF supply chain, particularly for education and
health64. However, lack of capacity (i.e. infrastructure, and staff training) and resources (budget allocations)
make this impossible at this time. Yet, the will and desire is there for the government and local partners to
have an increased role based on a corresponding ability to take on more responsibility.
2.4 Additional Related Findings
There are several issues that, while beyond the focused scope of this assessment, if addressed would have a
significant impact on improving the UNICEF Somalia supply chain. These issues include:
Professional Development. Staff training is often provided as a performance reward instead of being
needs based65. Staff in Somalia feel that they lack professional development opportunities and request that
training be prioritized for them.
Role of National Staff. National Officers play a key role in UNICEF programming particularly given the
limited security access in many of the field locations in southern and central Somalia. These General Service
(GS) staff have a significant role to play in the day-to-day running of the program yet they maintain little
decision making authority with decisions consistently required of other staff (some of whom are based
in Nairobi)66. They see their professional development opportunities as being quite minimal with limited
opportunity for mentoring, coaching and shadowing of other expert staff. Further, national staff are
frustrated by the short amount of leave periods they can take due to the priority given to international staff’s
travel and leave schedule (R&Rs and annual leave).
PCAs. PCAs can take a great deal of time and effort to develop and approve67. This leaves remote health and
62 UNICEF. “Supply Manuel.” E-handbook. Chapter 7, Section 5 Coordinating, Receiving and Inspecting Vaccine Supplies. (12/19/2011).
63 Interviews and focus groups (25 references) in Baidoa (7), Bossoco (6), Hargesia (6), Mogadishu (5), and Nairobi (1). (31 August 2013 – 27
September 2013).
64 Interviews and focus groups (13) in Bossoco (3), Hargesia (5), Mogadishu (4), and Nairobi (1). (31 August 2013 – 27 September 2013).
65 Interviews and focus groups (4) in Mogadishu (4). (8-12. September 2013).
66 Interviews and focus groups (4 references) in Mogadishu (1) and Nairobi (3). (31 August, 2013 – 12 September, 2013).
67 Interviews and focus groups (5 references) in Baidoa (1), Bossoco (2), Mogadishu (1), and Nairobi (1). (31-August 2013 – 19 September 2013).
30
nutrition clinics run by local NGOs vulnerable to either being closed or limited in being able to provided
life-saving services. Late and inconstant supply delivery makes compliance with PCAs very difficult. For
example, a number of education partners in SCZ suggested that while they signed PCAs with UNICEF, no
supplies were ever delivered and that they had to turn to diaspora support to continue to support local
schools that they had made commitments to based on the PCAs from UNICEF. Currently Supply & Logistics
is not involved in any way with the creation of PCAs68. Further, logistics capacity assessments and partner
trainings are not part of the PCA agenda. Very few partners have had a minimum standard of logistics
training or skills development69.
Target Beneficiary Estimates. Targeted beneficiaries are sometimes underestimated due to false population
assumptions (e.g. on the basis of 2005 UNDP population figures and not on annual admission records).
UNICEF finds that it is often necessary to proceed with limited needs assessment data to determine what is
needed, when and in what quantities70.
2.5 Mapping the UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain

GEG mapped the UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain to consider its alignment with Programme needs, agility
to handle disruption and adaptability to move with changing programme and management objectives.
Current overall supply chain components are as presented in the following supply chain map graphic (Figure
8).
Figure 8 - Current Supply Chain
ACTUAL PUSH DELIVERY MECHANISM
Reported items not Little Logistics

needed, short expiry, knowledge from
wrong specs or no partners
deliveries
PCA Supplies Assements, Partners

Release Order meeting missing
Agreement & New
\ Activity
(Partner) Needs
Management Report
Some time items not
needed, short expiry,
wrong specs
No Stock
Report
Receiving at Last
UNICEF PCA Supplies
Warehouse Compilation (Partial &
Depending on Programs)
PUSH
Incomplete, based
on passed
consumption mostly,
little information
from partners
Based program
needs or decision,
WH space needs Funding
expiry dates Receiving Release Order Programs
Estimates
(Transit) (Transit)
Push of Supplies Planning
Stock Incomplete When
Existing
Transport
Road Sea Air
Supply
Division
Little involvement
for L&S
Delivery to Main Bridging Sales Actual
Mechanism Funding
Hub Mombasa & Orders
Berbera / Mogadishu
Inventory report is
hectic
Pipeline information Funding late, sales
weak in VISION order late
68 Interviews and focus groups (14 references) in Baidoa (4), Mogadishu (4), and Nairobi (6). (31 August 2013 – 15 September 2013).
69 Interviews and focus groups (25 references) in Baidoa (7), Bossoco (6), Hargesia (6) Mogadishu (5), Nairobi (1). (31 August 2013 – 15 September
2013).
70 Interviews and focus groups (3 references) in Baidoa (1), and Nairobi (2). (31 August, 2013 – 15 September, 2013).
31
This supply chain relies predominantly on international suppliers who have the capacity to meet the
specifications of particular supplies that are needed. There are as many as 30071 commodities flowing
through the supply chain. Most of these commodities exceed the sourcing, production and/or storage
capacity of local suppliers.
The supply chain has consistently struggled to provide the visibility and tracking of commodities within the
supply chain as the reports in VISION are not directly accessible to Trace and Track (T&T) all commodities
moving (internationally and in country) at one point in time72. The main point of entry for an international
Sales Order (SO) into Somalia for 2012 was Mombasa, Kenya. In 2013 UNICEF Somalia started a shift to direct
shipping to Mogadishu and Berbera in Somalia. From Mombasa, Release Orders (RO) are manually signed
and provided by Programme to Supply & Logistics in order to transfer commodities from the point of entries
into Somalia73. Picking Order (PiO) and Loading Plan (LP) are created to facilitate the move of commodities.
Shipping from Mombasa was reported to be a lengthy process and commodities can be damaged during
the transfer given that they are allowed to be shipped in bulk as some feeder ships are not container ships
(or required to ship as Shipper Owned Container (SOC)74.
Once the goods arrive in point of entry warehouse (Berbera and Mogadishu) commodities will be received,
unloaded on pallets and stored either in a transit area or in a storage area for local distribution. The VISION
system will be updated accordingly. A new RO will be created to move to the next transit warehouse if
the commodities are in transit. Picking Order (PiO) and Loading Plan (LP) are created again and after some
time the commodities will move to the next warehouse and will be received again in another UNICEF
warehouse close to the last mile of distribution. A final RO will be issued in order to deliver commodities to
implementing partners. The file will be closed once the waybill for delivery will be returned and signed by
the Implementing Partner. Locally procured supplies can also be received at the warehouse, entered into
inventory and released for transport / distribution in the same cycle as international commodities.
As a traditional push-orientated supply chain75, the UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain focuses on getting
items into Somalia based on supply availability and projected needs (as opposed to actual needs). There
is currently little to no “pull”76 capacity in Somalia and nor is a demand-driven “pull” approach required by
UNICEF. The current “push” based supply chain system is depicted in Figure 9 adjacent.
71 Count based on the 2013 supply plan.

72 Interviews and focus groups (7 references) in Bossoco (3), Hargesia (1), Mogadishu (1), and Nairobi (2). (31 August 2013 – 27 September 2013).
73 UNICEF. Process Review – RO and WB.
74 Shipper Owned Container (SOC). The container used for cargo shipment is owned by the shipper.
75 A situation in which an organisation makes inventory deployment decisions at the central distribution centre and ships to its individual warehouses
accordingly.
76 A situation in which an organisation warehouse controls its own shipping requirements by placing individual orders for inventory with a central
distribution centre.
32
Figure 9 – Current UNICEF Push Supply Chain System
CURRENT KEY Program Logs & Supply External Services Implementing External Services Supply Flow Info Documents Way Release
CYCLE
Distribution
Partners
Bill Order Plan
INTERNATIONAL KENYA SOMALIA SCZ, NEX, NWZ
Supplies (Mandera)
Receiving Receiving Receiving
Supplies
Inventory Mngt Inventory Mngt Inventory Mngt
Dispatch Dispatch Dispatch
WB WB
WB WB
Transport
Supplies
Transport
Transport
3PL WH
Transport
Supplies 3PL WH Supplies 3PL WH Supplies
Export Import Kenya Export Import Entry points Somalia
export & import
Nairobi WB WB Transit if changing zones Distribution
Mombasa Mogadishu
Supplies
Supplies Implement-
- Bosasso -
Supply Local Export Import Logs and WB
ing Partner
Berbera
Division Suppliers WB
WB Supply
(UAE-Dubai as
Transport
local
Picking UNICEF Inventory 3PL WH
Order Entry points
Supplier) USSC Supplies
Distribution WB
RO
LTA
Logs and Picking Supplies
Order
PO Supply Local
Suppliers RO Inventory
Sales Orders Logs and
LTA Supply
Supply Information
PO
Shipping Information Inventory Selection, Agreement
Reports
Monthly activity Reports
Sales Order Emergency Needs
UNICEF Program Supply Request
USSC Needs 12-18 months Gov.
RO passed
Program Emergencies
DP consumption Disaster Partner
Data consolidation PCA’s Supply List

PCA’s Supply List
33
Supply Chain System Description. The supply chain cycle starts at the field level with the PCA when
supplies listings are presented though they do not always mention the quantities required over time. The
needs regarding specifications and quantities are driven by past consumption (last 12-18 months) and a
population survey estimated at the USSC Nairobi level77. The current process does not currently include
needs assessments (often due to security restrictions)78, an analysis with IPs as to the appropriateness of the
supplies or actual physical inventory management with partners. The PCA, despite improvements in 2013,
is still a relatively weak supply compilation tool and it is mostly very difficult to know based on the existing
process what is needed when and where. Currently, Supply & Logistics have a minimal level of input into the
plans that are created based on this process.
During a normal program cycle Implementing Partners request supplies from the UNICEF program officers.
Release Orders are approved at USSC Nairobi level and not at the field UNICEF office Level. It was noted that
the lead-time between an Implementing Partner’s request and the actual Release Order is not monitored
nor it is a KPI in the supply chain. Information is then sent from the field to USSC program managers. Supply
plans are designed and send to Supply & Logistics and Supply Division in the form of Excel table listing with
some time frames included but without an actual breakdown per month and quarter as to the supply needs.
At this stage Supply & Logistics have little involvement in the planning with Programme and important
budget line items such as transport costs (international and local) may be under estimated, over estimated
or simply missing79.
Depending on funding availability and the capacity to use the bridging funds mechanism80 the Sales Orders
(SO) will be placed with the Supply Division for international orders and with the Supply Unit for local orders.
Supply Division then source the orders. Large orders are placed due to funding gaps but as well due to a
lack of trust in Supply Division suppliers to perform and ship in a timely manner newly produced supplies.
Tracking and Tracing (T&T) provides some visibility on lead-time to point of discharge but is not yet a full
information tool.
Inventory management is a challenge with the UNICEF Somalia supply chain. It is important to note
that significant changes in the inventory management system inconveniently took place during a major
humanitarian crisis in 2011. Supply & Logistics staff had limited ability to effectively assimilate and take
on the new VISION system81. As a result, the data in VISION has not been as accurate and trustworthy as
needed82. After commodities are entered as inventory in the VISION system, the supplies are then pushed
forward from inventory based on several factors:
• Requests from the field

• Space requirements (when warehouses are full and supplies need to be moved as a result, this
issue is often linked to limited network capacity forecasting)
• Soon to expire items (an issue linked to expiry forecasting)
• Donors’ requirement for commodities to be distributed within a set period of time
Moving inventory through several warehouses is impaired by the VISION system as each leg of the transport
has to be received and a Release Order processed every time it passes through a warehouse. It sometimes
can take days, if not months, to receive and release stocks making the movement of stock a lengthy process.
77 Interviews and focus groups (3) in Baidoa (1), and Nairobi (2). (31 August 2013 – 15 September 2013).
78 Interviews and focus groups (8) in Baidoa (1), Hargesia (6), and Nairobi (1). (31 August 2013 – 24 September 2013).
79 Interviews and focus groups (14 references) in Baidoa (4), Mogadishu (4), and Nairobi (6). (31 August 2013 – 15 September 2013).
80 The Bridge Fund provides UNICEF's Supply Division with a flexible mechanism to reduce or eliminate gaps between the moment a critical need for
supplies is identified and when funding becomes available.
81 Interviews and focus groups (7 references) in Baidoa (4), Hargesia (1), and Mogadishu (2). (8– 24 September 2013).
82 Interviews and focus groups (3) in Baidoa (1) and Nairobi (2). (31 August 2013 – 15 September 2013).
34
When the commodities do eventually arrive at the final warehouse IPs sometimes find that the items may
longer be needed, may have the wrong specification, or have a short life span and thus may not useable83.
Finally, the Implementing Partners will receive in stock the commodities, but the storage condition and
management at the partners location is not controlled or adequately reported.
83 Interviews and focus groups (25 references) in Baidoa (15), Hargesia (3), Mogadishu (4), Mombasa (1) and Nairobi (2). (31 August 2013 – 27
September 2013).
35
RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1 Introduction to Recommendations
GEG proposes two different types of supply chain recommendations for UNICEF consideration and use:
Strategic and Tactical. The tactical recommendations are meant to address many of the improvements to
the supply chain that would require minimal levels of resourcing and capacity while still offering significant
improvements on UNICEF supply chain performance. These tactical recommendations can also be termed
as ‘quick wins’ given that they could be carried out in a relatively short period of time (1-6 months) while
also demonstrating supply chain optimization. However, the most critical recommendations related to
supply chain optimisation and performance enhancement are the five strategic recommendations. These
five strategic recommendations likely will take more time (12-18 months), resourcing and commitment to
implement. However, in order to fundamentally improve the functioning of the supply chain they also need
to be implemented as expeditiously as possible. While there are many recommendations that could be
made to improve the UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain, to encourage utilisation these recommendations have
been prioritized and focused on five tactical recommendations and five strategic recommendations. Given
their relative levels of importance, the strategic recommendations are presented first (section 3.2) and the
tactical recommendations are presented second (section 3.3).
3.2 Strategic Recommendations
01 Clear the Air, Start Anew & Rebuild Logistics & Supply
Chain Systems Everyone Can Trust
UNICEF leadership must compel a collaborative working culture holding all staff accountable for
improved relationships. Supply & Logistics credibility, particularly as perceived by Programme,
needs to be rebuilt by first strengthening Supply & Logistics systems and teams to meet programme
requirements (particularly regarding visibility and tracking of the supply chain). It should inject
innovative and dynamic supply chain management into Supply & Logistics along with a service
mind-set (incorporating Service Mind-Set and Logistics for Managers training and coaching).
Leadership should prioritize an adaptive culture and systems that can more effectively adjust to the
reality of working in a highly complex and constantly evolving situation in Somalia. A project-based
entity is needed to support Supply & Logistics in making enhancements as well as any related USSC
transition from Kenya into Somalia. Once Supply & Logistics can regain the trust of Programme, the
direct reporting line of duplicative logistics staff should be transferred from Programme to Supply
& Logistics while keeping those same staff imbedded in Programme with dotted line reporting
to Programme. Further, this same type of arrangement (with Supply & Logistics staff physically
and operationally imbedded in Programme) should be considered for expansion into other major
Programme divisions (e.g. WASH, and education). Supply & Logistics can build Programme trust
by establishing systems that meet Programme needs (visibility, tracking, monitoring, timeliness,
etc.). Programme can build the trust of Supply & Logistics by incorporating Supply & Logistics into
forward-looking and collaborative demand-driven planning processes. The VISION system should be
more utilized to a greater extent of its capabilities. Logistics Officers should be proficient in the use
36
of VISION and have a designated VISION expert in Nairobi and in each of the three zonal offices that
staff can contact when there is the need for expert instruction and guidance. Lastly, UNICEF should
consider (through a feasibility study) the use of technology to create enhanced visibility and tracking
capabilities in Somalia. Taking into consideration many factors, particularly security repercussions,
the use of technology (e.g. GPS tracking, digital photography, RFID84) should be further explored.
This technology should link into the VISION system and a simplified dashboard to provide enhanced
visibility and tracking of commodities en route to their end destinations.
Benefits:
01 A productive operating environment marked by a spirit of teamwork, innovation and
adaptability that is squarely focused on beneficiary needs.
02 Clarification of supply chain related roles and responsibilities between Programme

and Supply & Logistics.
03 Integrated Programme and Supply & Logistics operations that are critical to a
well-functioning operation and supply chain
04 Visibility and transparency within the UNICEF supply chain filling this critical gap that
currently exists.
05 The ability of UNICEF to work collaboratively and adapt to the constant stream of
challenges that the organisation faces when working in Somalia.
Costs:
01 Leadership, management and staff time and effort.
02 Training (e.g. VISION, Service Mindset), coaching and mentoring programming expenses.
03 Establishment of a project-based entity to advance the optimization process for a minimum

of a 6-month period. Funding of Project Manager position (or of a position to back-stop
responsibilities of position shifted to temporary fulfil Project Manager role). Additional
technical expertise as needed to support the optimization improvement project.
02 Shift to a Combined Pull-Push Supply Chain System
Because of the duration of procurement and delivery within the supply chain, limited capacity and
access issues in Somalia, it is likely not possible to set up a fully functional pull system. Instead a
combined pull-push supply chain system would be optimal which allows Programme and Supply &
Logistics to procure based on an annual plan. Then by monitoring with Programme the pull side of
the supply chain against planned activities, Supply & Logistics can support Programme to adjust the
combined pull-push system with an increase or decrease of the supplies required on the ground. In
a pull-push combined system, UNICEF would use information from the PCAs as a forecasting tool in
order to estimate the specific supply needs, linking the creation of the supply list to where and when
supplies should be delivered. Adjustments to the supply chain and review of the planning would be
done after receiving information from partners on the ground when they report usage of supplies
against expected stocks. The timely exchange of information required for a combined pull-push
84 Radio-Frequency Identification
37
supply chain is an essential component of this proposed optimised system. UNICEF will need to hold
implementing partners accountable for the provision of this information and UNICEF will need to
maintain strong information management practices in order for the system to be successful.
In order to link demand planning and forecasting to the planning process UNICEF will need to
anticipate change and unexpected events as constant components of the supply chain planning
process. Safety stock for particular commodities may need to be established and adjusted on
a regular basis to account for constantly changing circumstances in Somalia. Improvements in
category management should assist with prioritization of commodities within the supply chain.
Adjustment of the supply chain will need to be based on both the planned as well as emerging
needs. Programme and Supply & Logistics will need to work together to jointly develop a master
supply chain plan for the year noting when commodities have to be ordered according to estimated
time of delivery at entry point in country and actual supply chain capacity. Such plans will need to
be cross-referenced with the overall funding forecast versus actual funding to adjust to the most
optimal solution, every month, or when funds become available.
Benefits:
01 Engages Programme and Implementing Partners as key actors in the design and
management of a pull-push supply chain system.
02 Provides a forward vision of the supply chain enabling active management of constantly
emerging challenges.
03 Gives the supply chain the flexibility to re-route incoming supplies if an emergency or other
need arises.
Costs:
01 Capacity building of implementing partners so that they can have a more active role in the
pull side of the supply chain.
02 Time and effort required of all actors involved in the supply chain towards the creation of an
annual master supply chain.
03 In line with Strategic Recommendation #1, and as a component of the optimization process
initiative, the establishment of a project-based entity to advance the optimization process
for a minimum of a 6-month period. Funding of Project Manager position (or of a position to
back-stop responsibilities of position shifted to temporary fulfil Project Manager role).
Additional technical expertise as needed to support the optimization improvement project.
The combined Pull-Push system described above is illustrated in Figure 10 adjacent.
38
Figure 10 - Proposed combined Push-Pull Supply Chain System
PROPOSED COMBINED PUSH AND PULL DELIVERY MECHANISM

Supply Needs Information Network Program
New Capacity Units
Activity
Needs Report Review of Target
PCA Supplies PCA Supplies

Funding
Supplies Estimates
L&S Unit
Supplies
Agreement & Mgmt Compilation Planning
Stock Report
Forecasting
Supply
Division &
Suppliers
Bridging Actual
PULL PUSH
Mechanism Funding
Receiving
(Transit) Release Order
(Transit)
Release Order Inventory Mgmt
Delivery to
Supplies Delivery Hubs & Sales Orders
Main Hubs
Field Warehouse
Warehouse Transport
Demand Capacity Road, Sea, Air
Network Pipeline
Access &
Capacity Actual Supplies Availability Information
Lead Time Stock Information
Incoming
Stock
03 Establish a Transparent, Systematic & Inclusive Supply Chain Planning Process
Establishment of an inclusive 18-month85 forward demand planning process that links planning and
forecasting to assessments and actual need. The key steps related to this recommendation include:
01 Invite Implementing Partners to an annual meeting with UNICEF to review the activities
of the past year and to jointly prepare for the next year.
02 Collect and combine in a systematic manner PCA supply agreements. As a part of this process,
estimate when a PCA will be completed and/or renewed given that the current method of
using an excel table to manage the PCAs and their supplies is not optimal. Convene annual
partner planning meetings in each Zone so as to incorporate assessment data and lessons
learned into the planning for the coming year.
03 Based on this demand planning, Supply & Logistics would then produce (in a consolidated
format) the supply needs per month and quarterly to know what supplies need to be where
and when.
04 Support Implementing Partners (IPs) with minimum standards in logistics and stock
report system training and coaching so that IPs can provide regular information to
UNICEF regarding stock levels at partner’s location. IPs should be better able to estimate
the minimum stock level before reordering supplies.
85 An 18-month forward demand planning process would be the ideal end goal for the future. It may be necessary to phase in this approach over time
until the process is institutionalized. For example, UNICEF could first introduce a 6-month plan by January 2014, 12-month plan by April 2014 and an
18-month plan by September 2014.
39
05 Ensure that Implementing Partners send their supply requests to UNICEF on a regular
planned basis. UNICEF would actively follow up on any late submissions.
06 On a monthly basis, Programme would then compile partners requests comparing them
with a master supply plan created based on the PCAs anticipated annual approved supply.
Tracking of supply levels and follow-up with the IPs should improve the overall monitoring of
the supplies given to Implementing Partners through the PCAs.
Benefits:
01 Provides more accurate information to the supply chain planning process.
02 Provides an overview of the annual needs enabling Supply & Logistics and Supply Division
Copenhagen to more accurately forecast supply needs for the year.
03 Reduces warehouse space requirements through more effective receiving and

dispatching of stocks.
Costs:
01 Meeting and travel costs associated with bringing key stakeholders together as a part of the
planning process.
02 Logistics training and on-going coaching of IPs.

03 Staff time and effort related to the compilation, management and monitoring of PCAs along
with reports related to demand planning.
04 Transition Supply Chain Leadership from Nairobi to Somalia Strengthening the

Somalia Systems, Infrastructure & Staffing
UNICEF Somalia should reposition, as a part of the wider UNICEF transition from Nairobi to Somalia,
supply chain management and leadership to Somalia from Kenya. The supply chain strengthening
process could be imbedded as a component of the UNICEF transition from Kenya to Somalia. Supply
& Logistics and Programme can develop a specific plan of action that allows for increased operations
in Somalia that could include reductions of stock in Kenya within a specific timeframe while
shifting stock to Somalia though increased direct shipping. Simultaneously, UNICEF could continue
investing in and empowering Somali institutional partners (including the Government of Somalia,
national NGOs and private sector partners relevant to the supply chain) and UNICEF Somali national
staff operating in Somalia. By building up the capacity of national institutions, over time UNICEF
can transfer responsibility for the management of the supply chain to those national institution
minimizing risk and supply chain costs. To this end, UNICEF should conduct a study (preferably in
early 2014) to determine the feasibility and requirements related to the long-term transitioning of
supply chain responsibility to Somali national partners. That transition is a significant long-term
shift and needs to have a solid basis through which planning and resources can be focused. This
study would serve to guide this transition process and determine how the supply chain should be
adjusted to match this desired long-term direction. The supply chain capacity building of Somali
national institutions could be done best by partnering with other national and international actors
(including the World Bank and other UN agencies such as WFP and OCHA) so that a wide array of
resources are leveraged towards this goal. Several capacity building models could be utilised to
40
support Somali institutions and those models should be adapted to match the approach most
relevant and effective to the Somalia context. Empowerment of UNICEF Somali national staff would
include mentoring, coaching and training of staff by management while also gradually transferring
increased responsibility and ownership of the supply chain to national staff (possibly through the
creation of National Officer positions in all Zone offices). This would include decentralizing to the
greatest extent possible decision-making to the NOs who would then have the ability to take on an
increased role and responsibilities at the field level.
Benefits:
01 Quicker field based decision-making processes that are more responsive to the needs of
partners in Somalia.
02 Strengthening of UNICEF’s image in Somalia as a program for Somalis.
03 Clarification of the process, steps and leadership involved in the eventual transition of
management from Kenya to Somalia.
Costs:
01 Investments related to capacity building on UNICEF Somalia national staff, national IPs and
the Government of Somalia (as a part of long-term collaborative initiative). This would
includes training, mentoring and coaching programs.
02 Funding of a study to determine the feasibility and requirements related to the long-term
transitioning of supply chain responsibility to Somali national partners.
05 To the Greatest Extent Possible, Increase the Proportion of Supplies Shipped

Direct and Stored in Somalia (Bypassing Mombasa) and Incorporate Regional
and National Procurement
Over time UNICEF should substantially increase the proportion of supplies shipped directly to
Somalia bypassing Mombasa as a transit point to the greatest extent possible. Shipping points in
Somalia would include Mogadishu and Berbera. While UNICEF has recently made efforts in this
regard, there is the need for an increased proportion of supplies to be shipped directly to Somalia
while also ensuring that primarily only those stocks that can enter particular points in Somalia
through Mombasa use Mombasa as a transit point.
The options for local procurement in Somalia remain limited but an increasing number of
companies are now present in some regions and local procurement options for particular supplies
should be vigorously explored. For example, particular WASH and education products (e.g. pipes,
hand pumps, parts for hand pumps, chalk and printing) could be identified for increased local
procurement. UNICEF could begin with a baseline assessment of local procurement possibilities
while building upon the regional procurement assessments already planned. While the majority
of UNICEF procurement will continue to flow through international procurement avenues and
there are currently challenges related to regional procurement, it is possible that over time some
of these regional obstacles could be overcome. Transitioning to increased regional and national
procurement should be a key component of future initiatives aimed at optimizing the UNICEF
supply chain in Somalia.
41
Benefits:
01 Estimated reduction in costs of $1,900 per TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit) for the entry
point of Berbera and an estimated reduction of $4,600 in costs per TEU for the entry point of
Mogadishu (compared to transiting through Mombasa).
02 Estimated reduction of lead times of between 18 to 27 days for Mogadishu, between 61 to

78 Days for Berbera and between 52 to 73 Days for Bosaso.86
03 Reduce damage and losses on commodities by reducing handling and shipping to entry
points in containers instead of as bulk cargo.
Costs:
01 Baseline assessment of local commodities available or possibly available for Somalia national
procurement.
02 Staff time and effort associated with identifying which commodities and destinations could
be acceptably shifted through direct shipping into Somalia bypassing Mombasa. Additional
time and effort required to justify and manage this shift.
Figure 10 - Comparison of Direct Versus Indirect Shipping to Somalia Main Point of Entry
Comparison of Direct Shipping to Mogadishu As Compared to Transiting Thru Mombasa

Direct shipping Min Max Via Mombasa Min Max
Direct shipping to Mogadishu

Mombasa
Comparison of Direct Shipping to Berbera As Compared to Transiting Thru Mombasa

Direct shipping to Berbera

direct shipping to Berbera
Mombasa
Comparison of Direct Shipping to Bosaso As Compared to Transiting Thru Mombasa

Direct shipping to Bosaso

Passing by Bosaso represent % of
Mombasa
86 Estimations based on shipping line schedule (Kuehne and Nagel) for the next 6-8 weeks, UNICEF SOP and 3PL KPI’s.
42
3.3 Tactical Recommendations
01 Change the Culture and Tools to Enable Enhanced UNICEF Communication &
Collaboration
Fundamentally UNICEF needs an immediate shift in the culture of communication and collaboration
related to the supply chain. Steps can be taken immediately, led by UNICEF senior management, to
change the culture and identify better ways of communicating and collaborating so that the supply
chain can function more effectively. A range of best practices, approaches and tools exist (e.g.
listening, meeting management, email communications, protocols) which UNICEF should explore
further in order to identify the most appropriate tools to match the UNICEF supply chain operating
context. Some additional, more specific steps related to meetings that could be taken would
include:
01 Institutionalize regular (weekly, quarterly and annual) coordination events with both
Supply & Logistics and Programme. UNICEF would first establish a weekly Supply &
Logistics and Programme meeting at the USSC and in each field office to review planned
activities as compared to actual workload, the distribution planning for the coming
month(s). The weekly meeting would prioritize urgent issues and determine how
adjustments will be made to meet emerging needs.
02 Concurrently, UNICEF would establish a quarterly Supply & Logistics and Programme half-day
workshop at the USSC and in each of the three zones. This quarterly workshop would include
a review of the last quarter, common objectives, achievements, gaps, pipeline, inventories
and set new objectives for the coming quarter. This quarterly workshop would review both
the demand and supply planning/forecasting and be based on the distribution plans produced
by Programme for the next quarter87.
03 Prior to the conclusion of each year, there should be an annual UNICEF Supply & Logistics and
Programme Retreat that would include as many staff as possible from both the USSC and
Somalia field offices. This Retreat could take place in one of the field locations (i.e. Hargesia
or Garowe) and each office would come prepared with a presentation of their office’s
challenges and solutions for discussion. For 2014 planning, Supply & Logistics should be
included in the programme design process so that they can be in a stronger position to
support Programme and provide logistical support for the next year. Supply & Logistics staff
could work with Programme regarding topics such as supply routes to be used, whether
to order a kit or a set of items, procurement and pricing specifications, and calculation of the
transportation costs estimates for the distributing implementing partners.
For all of the above coordination events, UNICEF would need to ensure that there is an established
process of tracking issues. Tracked issues are documented and addressed with the clear
identification of person(s) responsible for actions and the timeframe for accomplishing each task.
Management would review on a regular basis key documentation that tracks issues to ensure
that key areas of work are being addressed. A potential format for this type of issue tracking
document would include elements such as date, issue, solution, assigned officer, percentage of
task accomplished and due date for completion.
87 UNICEF. “Supply Manual.” E-handbook. Chapter 3. Section 2. “Supply Planning Processes.” (12/19/2011).
43
Benefits:
01 Institutionalizes the communication operational flow between Supply & Logistics and
Programme.
02 Enables UNICEF Supply & Logistics and Programme to prioritize areas of work in a
transparent manner.
03 Reduces miscommunication between parties.
04 Highlights issues in the supply chain and while having a platform from which to find joint
solutions to common problems.
05 Increases forecasting engagement with Programme staff.
06 Brings Supply & Logistics and Programme together to review the past three months and
identify common objectives for the next three months.
07 Makes UNICEF staff accountable for tracking and solving issues.
08 Ensures a common understanding on what is arriving when and where and will be compared
to the distribution plan and that any gaps will be addressed.
09 Increased the communication between the different UNICEF offices, improving the chances
that Somalia offices will reach out to each other when needing help to resolve an issue.
10 Provides face-to-face interaction between the field offices and the USSC.
11 Provides a forum to speak about problems and solutions where the UNICEF team can
collectively brainstorm around cross-cutting supply chain issues such as warehouse
management, demand planning and transport.
12 Issues will be assigned to a particular staff member, bringing responsibility and ownership in
dealing with issues until resolution.
13 Over time the number of issues should decrease (due to an increase in performance and
follow-up) while also building trust between UNICEF team members.
14 Supports the development of demand-driven supply planning over time (instead of the
development of a supply list88).
15 Clarifies expectations at the planning stage regarding expected lead times as compared to
likely lead times.
Costs:
01 Leadership, management and staff time and effort involved in ensuring there is a cultural
change that takes place.
02 Expenses related to the identification and utilization of any new communication tools
selected to facilitate improved communications.
03 Expenses and staff time related to any annual, quarterly or monthly coordination events.
88 UNICEF. “Supply Manuel.” E-handbook. Chapter 3. Section 1. “Supply Planning” (12/19/2011).
44
02 Strengthen UNICEF Warehousing, Pharmacutical Supply Chain and
Cold Chain Capacity
UNICEF would first conduct a rapid detailed assessment of the specific gaps in the UNICEF
warehousing, pharmaceutical supply chain, and cold chain facilities, equipment and capacity
specific to each particular zone and office location. This assessment would set the basis for an
upgrade of UNICEF warehousing, pharmaceutical and cold chain infrastructure needed for a well-
functioning supply chain. In a pharmaceutical supply chain medicine and medical equipment
are managed independently of each other (but can be integrated into standard health kits).
Medicine and medical items are ordered in bulk and managed as unique items from proposed
pharmaceutical hubs.
Additional equipment, training, coaching and other remedies would be identified as a part of this
process. A possible solution to the pharmaceutical supply chain could be for UNICEF to identify
a strong international partner to implement the system. This could be implemented in several
phases handing over the health and health components of other programs gradually to the
international partner.
An additional feasibility study may be necessary to prepare an implementation plan for the cold
chain capacity to strengthen from the point of entry in country to last mile delivery. The feasibility
study can look at but not be limited to the following: assessment of the cold chain infrastructure
and equipment; practice against standard procedures; and staffing and work capacities – in terms
of needs and cost to develop an action plan.
Benefits
01 Ensures that supplies are maintained and provided in a condition that is safe for
beneficiary consumption.
02 Optimizes stock rotation, warehouse utilisation and potentially reduces related costs.
03 Decreases likelihood that goods will expire in UNICEF warehouses and that supplies
will be maintained in a good condition while stored in UNICEF facilities.
04 Exemplifies the level of professionalism and type of well-functioning supply chain that
UNICEF endeavours to create.
05 Pharmaceuticals can be managed in VISION as one line item for one item.
06 Pharmaceuticals can be managed in the warehouse as one item for one line item.
07 Pharmaceuticals will then move more easily through the supply chain as one carton until
arriving in a pharmaceutical hub.
08 This is adapted to a pull system and will allow more flexibility in responding to field needs.
09 Can be integrated with other pharmaceutical supply chains (such as World Health
Organization (WHO) with an easier hand-over to the Ministries of Health in the Zones.
10 This allows UNICEF to disengage from being hands on with logistics to a more standard
UNICEF role.
45
Costs:
01 Detailed cold chain assessment to determine the specific cold chain equipment and
improvements required.
02 Expenses related to the identification, procurement, shipping and placement of new cold
chain essential equipment.
03 Expenses related to upgrading of facilities.
04 Expenses related to the identification and contracting of an international partner who could
take over responsibility for warehousing and cold chain responsibilities.
05 Training, coaching and mentoring of staff responsible for these key components of the
supply chain.
03 Ensure Create a Pool of that Emergency ‘Last-Mile’ Logistics Funds & Support are
Available for for Implementing Partners
UNICEF could ensure that logistics funds are available to assist Implementing Partners in meeting
their logistics and distribution needs so that the “last mile” of the supply chain is paid for. These
funds would cover logistics costs that sometimes are not currently being met by IPs such as
transport, distribution or temporary warehousing. These funds could be included within the PCAs
on a discretionary basis or a pool of funds could be established that IPs would apply directly to
UNICEF staff in Somalia for access to these funds. The funds available and utilised for ‘last mile’
logistics could be reviewed on a quarterly basis with USSC Nairobi. These emergency funds
would be available until such time that UNICEF can better plan with Implementing Partners the
incorporation of logistics expenses that, while smaller in relative numbers are critical in covering the
last-mile of the supply chain, can have a significant impact on beneficiary impact.
In areas where the capacity of partners exists or is developing (e.g with infrastructure, access, staff,
communication capacity, willingness) enough to be upgraded, the implementation of partners’
logistics “hubs” (as proven beneficial with WASH hubs) could be a solution. The involvement of
S&L in the assessment, selection, training, coaching and monitoring of such partners is key to the
success in the long term of this type of solution.
Benefits:
01 Needed supplies cover the last-mile for distribution to beneficiaries.
02 UNICEF supports IPs in a small but very tangible way to meet immediate logistics needs
that may not have been covered in the previous years’ supply chain planning.
03 Partners’ logistics “hubs” will support UNICEF Somalia on fulfilling its mandate by delegating
tasks and management activities.
Costs:
01 Increase in discretionary funding available for logistics ‘last mile’ costs.
02 Staff time and effort required for the identification and management of additional ‘last-mile’
logistics costs for IPs.
46
04 Optimize Category Management and Ordering Processes89
The UNICEF supply chain would benefit from a detailed category management review aimed at
streamlining to the greatest extent possible the number of commodities that exist in the supply
chain. With more than 300 commodities, this category management review would assist UNICEF
in identifying those critical commodities that need to be prioritized within the system and those
which can either be removed or re-prioritized. Further, rapid optimization of the picking orders
and release order process would include ensuring that any cancellation of picking orders is
communicated to the 3PL supplier and simultaneously cancelled in VISION while ensuring that
release orders are issued in advance of the delivery date. If possible, a single release order should
have the option of including several waybills so that large release orders that do not fit all on one.
Benefits:
01 Clarity in VISION and with the Keuhne & Nagel system when picking orders are cancelled
that should result in improved inventory management.
02 Improved stock management and tracking of transported supplies.
Costs:
01 Staff time and effort required to conduct an internal detailed category management review
and optimize the picking and release order components of the system.
05 Create a Dashboard & Access Map to Assist with Up-to-Date Situational Awareness
Develop and Maintain a Somalia Access Map
The creation of a Somalia Dashboard and Somalia Access Map to better inform all key operational
actors involved as to key situational changes affecting the operation or supply chain and the status
of principal access routes (ports, airports, crossing points and main roads) and frequently used
secondary routes. In conjunction with implementing partners and field staff (and possibly other
UN agencies such as World Food Programme and OCHA), UNICEF Supply & Logistics could develop,
update and circulate on a regular basis a situational awareness dashboard and n access map for all
three zones. This will assist UNICEF staff in more effectively adjusting to changing circumstances
and the selection of the possible routes when developing the distribution plans.
Benefits:
01 Increased ability to adjust programming that is more responsive to implementing partner
and beneficiary needs.
02 Selection of the best routes available to UNICEF for transport at any given time.
03 Reduced delivery time and costs by not selecting dead end routes due to logistic or
security access constraints.
Costs:
01 Staff time and effort required to create the dashboard and access map along with any
expenses related to technical expertise needed in the creation process.
02 Staff time and effort to maintain and consistently update the dashboard and access map so
that they are current and useful.
89 UNICEF. “Process review – RO and WB.
47
IMPLEMENTATION
PLANNING
4.1 Proposed Implementation
Based on the previous findings and recommendations in this assessment and per the ToR, an
implementation plan has been created as the basis for a supply chain optimization process. Stakeholder
feedback, particularly on the proposed recommendations, advised this implementation plan that aims
to address the inefficiencies in the current supply chain. This implementation plan has specifically been
designed to be high impact and usable for all levels of UNICEF supply chain leadership.
The UNICEF supply chain optimization implementation plan consists of 6 key elements:
01 A clear, measurable goal that is the main success indicator for this initiative.
02 A set of specific objectives and activities to support the achievement of the overall goal of the
initiative.
03 The projected resources needed (along with associated costs) so as to guide resource allocation.
04 The key benefits and expected results from implementation and that can serve as future key
performance indicators.
05 Designated and agreed upon roles as set by the stakeholders to ensure implementation
accountability.
06 A set timeline for the implementation of the plan.
Note that the objectives described in the implementation plan are listed in order of priority, but are
also linked to one another. Therefore if funding was not sufficient to implement all objectives, funding
could be allocated according to the objective prioritization. Only doing one or two of the proposed
recommendations or objectives will not have the intended impact of optimizing the UNICEF Somalia
Supply Chain. By combining all of the objectives within the implementation plan a fundamental and lasting
improvement to the current supply chain can be achieved.
This implementation plan may also serve as the basis for securing the funding and other resources required
to make this UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain optimization process a success.
48
4.2 UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain Optimization
Implementation Plan
Goal: a highly responsive, transparent and integrated UNICEF supply chain that is optimized so that
UNICEF programs more effectively deliver assistance to children and their families in Somalia.
Objective:
01 Internal UNICEF Optimization
02 Development of Combined Pull-Push Supply Chain
03 Create an Integrated Planning Approach to Guide the UNICEF Supply Chain
04 Make Key Tactical Adjustments to the Supply Chain
Draft Project Plan with Objectives, Activities, Roles & Timing

The following objectives, activities and timing were agreed upon in draft format during the workshop held on
November 6, 2013 as a part of this assessment process.
Tasks Owner Phase Start Date End Date
Overview
Project Set-Up
0.1 Design Project Team (USSC & Zonal) & Project Manager Jensen 1 6-Nov-13 11-Nov-13
0.2 Creation of Optimization Process ToR with Roles & Responsibilities Hailey 1 6-Nov-13 11-Nov-13
Integrate Recommendations into annex (2-3 pages) of Mid Term Review +
0.3 Jensen 1 6-Nov-13 11-Nov-13
Discussion
0.4 Management Response to Supply Chain Assessment Hailey 1 27-Nov-13 11-Dec-13
Link MTR and 'New Deal' to Parallel S&L Long-Term Strategy (Including Long-Term
0.5 Hailey 1 12-Dec-13 10-Feb-14
Capacity Building)
0.6 Identify Resourcing & Donors to Support Process Hailey 1 15-Nov-13 15-Dec-13
0.7 Identification, Recruiment & Hiring of Project Manager and Project Team Jensen 1 16-Nov-13 31-Dec-13
0.8 M1: Supply Chain Optimization Implementation Project Team Functioning 1 10-Feb-14 10-Feb-14
49
Objective 1: Internal UNICEF Supply Chain Optimization
Identify the optimal internal S&L structure (includes S&L focal points in each
of the programmes). Create a culture of integrated responsibility, whereby
1.1 PM 1 15-Nov-13 30-Jan-14
all S&L staff and partners assume shared responsibility tfor ensuring the
effectiveness of the supply chain.
Align different components of the supply chain by creating a collaborative

1.2 culture with all components foced on common goals (as described in annual PM 1,2,3 15-Dec-13 1-Oct-15
strategy) and that is learning based and adaptive.
Develop a single end user definition and ensure all activities are focused on
1.3 PM 1 15-Dec-13 15-Mar-14
on-time delivery to Implementing Partners.
Establish a partner-focused, centralized call-in centre system to service all 3
1.4 PM 1,2 13-Feb-14 10-Dec-14
Zones and Sections.
Establish an extended and expanded supply tracking monitoring system,
1.5 which will be updated daily for every zone and every section; and pro- PM 1,2 15-Dec-13 1-May-15
actively managed/monitored to reduce bottlenecks.
Ensure, through a dashboard tool, total visibility over, and tracking of, all
1.6 PM 1,2 15-Dec-13 1-May-15
commodities in the supply chain.
Identification of standard KPIs to measure partner satisfaction such as

percentage of on-time adherence to delivery and percentage of on-time
1.7 PM 1,2 15-Dec-13 13-Jun-14
adherence to supply chain timelines (combined transit lead-times and
processing times).
Put in place collaborative coordination events (meetings, quarterly
1.8 workshops and annual retreat) to enable more productive internal PM 1,2 15-Jan-14 1-Mar-14
management and interaction.
1.9 Establishment of annual S&L meeting in January 2014. PM 1 15-Jan-14 30-Jan-14
Identify, train and coach S&L staff to be VISION experts who can be
1.10 available to support Programme staff with more effective utilization of PM 1,2,3 15-Jan-14 1-Oct-15
VISION.
Develop a comprehensive training package for key supply chain principles

1.11 and technical areas (warehousing, inventory management, transport PM 1,2,3 15-Jan-14 1-Oct-15
management, contract management, etc)
Involve Copenhagen for better relationships, improved customer service,
1.12 PM 1,2,3 15-Jan-14 1-Oct-15
needed trans-shipments and more involvement in systems.
Involve and use T4D (including electronic management of waybills, RFID) to
1.13 PM 1,2 13-Feb-14 8-Jun-15
optimize the supply chain.
1.14 M2: Optimal UNICEF Internal Systems Fully Functional PM 3 1-Oct-15 1-Oct-15
50
Objective 2: Development of Combined Pull-Push Supply Chain
Build buy-in to capacity building process of UNICEF and IPs in Somalia so that
2.1 they can have a more significant role in assisting with the ‘pull’ component of the PM 1,2,3 15-Dec-13 1-Oct-15
supply chain.
Establish mechanism(s) for capacity building and monitoring of IPs and

2.2 PM 1,2 14-Jan-14 10-Nov-14
Government of Somalia
Review (considering values of PCAs, risk areas, known capacities) and select pilot
2.3 PM 1 15-Dec-13 15-Mar-14
IPs to work with in medium-term capacity building.
Support Implementing Partners (IPs) with minimum standards in logistics, stock
2.4 report system training and coaching so that they can correctly report on stock PM 1,2,3 14-Jan-14 1-Oct-15
levels.
Formally transfer pull responsibilities to selected IPs as a part of piloting process

2.5 PM 1,2 14-Jan-14 10-Nov-14
(with on-going coaching by UNICEF)
Monitor and evaluate to ensure that all parties are following through on their
2.6 PM 1,2,3 14-Jan-14 1-Oct-15
agreed upon commitments as a part of the supply chain.
Adjust pull responsibility based on piloting experience and roll-out to additional
2.7 PM 2,3 10-Dec-14 1-Oct-15
IPs.
Close the supply chain cycle at distribution level (waybill and distribution of
2.8 PM 1,2 14-Jan-14 10-Nov-14
supplies)
Design of Long-Term Capacity Building Strategy (UNICEF, other UN agencies,
2.9 PM 1,2 14-Jan-14 10-Nov-14
other partners) with Roles & Responsibilities
2.10 Optimize push component of the supply chain (smooth out push elements) PM 1,2,3 14-Jan-14 1-Oct-15
Identify key next steps and components (e.g. release orders, monitoring of
2.11 PCAs) to be included in the decentralization of authority and decision-making. PM 1 15-Dec-13 15-Mar-14
Differentiate by Zones and Sections.
2.12 Ensure that UNICEF Somalia staff have the capacity to take on that role. PM 2 15-Mar-14 10-Nov-14
Transition authority and decision-making related to the components identified

2.13 PM 2,3 14-May-14 1-Oct-15
for transfer to UNICEF staff in Somalia.
M2: UNICEF Somalia Pull-Push Supply Chain Functioning with UNICEF Somalia
2.14 PM 3 1-Oct-15 1-Oct-15
Staff Empowered
Objective 3: Integrated Supply Chain Planning Approach
3.1 Establish Comprehensive & Transparent Supply Chain Planning Framework PM 1 15-Jan-14 25-Apr-14
Create Programme Forecasting Process (including time period - 18 months) with
3.2 PM 1,2 15-Jan-14 22-Sep-14
IPs and PCAs
3.3 Cross-Reference Forecasting with Resource Availability PM 1,2 15-Jan-14 22-Sep-14
3.4 Create UNICEF 'Master Plan' and Update Regularly PM 1,2 15-Jan-14 25-Apr-14
Integrate Annual Retreat, Quarterly Workshop and Monthly Meetings for Supply
3.5 PM 1,2 15-Jan-14 25-Apr-14
Chain Adjustments & Update Plan(s) Accordingly - Build Upon Existing Meetings
Smooth out release orders across the planning process according to zones and
3.6 PM 1,2 15-Jan-14 22-Sep-14
sections
Include emergency buffer stock (and stock rotation) as a part of the planning
3.7 PM 1,2 15-Jan-14 25-Apr-14
process
M3: Integrated Planning Approach Functional as the Key Driver of the Supply
3.8 PM 2 25-Apr-14 25-Apr-14
Chain
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Objective 4: Supply Chain Tactical Adjustments
Determine the extent to which UNICEF can shift shipping through Mombasa
4.1 PM 1 15-Jan-14 22-Sep-14
to shipping directly into Somalia. Set targets for percentage shifts.
Assess on a location-by-location basis the warehousing and cold chain

4.2 gaps throughout Somalia. Insert additional equipment, technical expertise PM 1,2 15-Jan-14 22-Sep-14
and training to improve warehousing and cold chain performance.
Identify the best possible mechanism to support IPs with filling financial gaps
4.3 PM 1,2 15-Jan-14 22-Sep-14
related to 'last mile' logistics.
Work with VISION experts and 3PL providers to ensure that the UNICEF systems
4.4 PM 1,2 15-Jan-14 22-Sep-14
are incorporating picking order cancellations.
4.5 M4: Supply Chain Tactical Adjustments Complete PM 1 22-Sep-14 22-Sep-14
Key Benefits & Expected Results:
• Cost savings estimated at 1,500 USD90 per TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit) with direct delivery to
entry points in Somalia compared to passing by Mombasa.
• Decreased lead times with an estimated reduction from 27 to 18 days for Mogadishu, 78 to 61 days for
Berbera and 73 to 52 days for Bosaso with direct delivery to entry points in Somalia.
• A reduction in passing cargo by Mombasa by 85% in 2014 (as compared to January to June 2013) could
result in a minimum of 850,000 USD in savings and reduced wastage (through the use of containerised
shipping as compared to bulk cargo shipping).
• Collaborative planning and decision-making increase common understanding and decrease tension
within staff and units making all staff related to the supply chain more productive and likely increasing
staff retention rates.
• Prioritisation of Release Orders will take into account the global impact on programs.
• Responsive and adaptive service provision will focus on solving forecasted challenges and issues before
impacting the program, as well as decreasing the time consuming “fire fighting.”
• Increase in partner/beneficiary satisfaction due to an increase in availability of adequate supplies on

time.
• Routing of commodities is planned according to information updated weekly with direct impact on
how much time the commodities will stay in transit warehouse.
• Cold chain gaps are studied and acted upon, directly impacting the wastage rate of the vaccines and
increasing the quality of the vaccination.
• A warehousing “upgrade” to minimum standards will support inventory management and KPI’s link
to inventory, decrease lead time by increasing unloading and loading rate, and reduce wastage with
standard warehousing and the capacity to properly repack.
90 Value estimated by experience and in agreement with USSC S&L staff.

52
Potential Key Performance Indicators:
PCA Supply Planning with Monthly/Quarterly Needs
01 Measure the percentage of PCAs modified to include a delivery timeframe.
02 Measure the percentage of IPs assessed, trained and supported by S&L.
For Shipping to Somalia

01 Measure the percentage of TEU passing by Mombasa, with a proposed target of 15% for road
transport and delivery in South of South Zone.
02 Percentage of commodities spread, phased and delivered over time and according to needs.
For Inventory
01 Good Stock Percentage: Stock with more than 12 months expiration and in UNICEF Somalia logistics
network for less than 12 months, including contingency stock up to 18 months. Target could be
proposed at 85% in 2014.
02 Wastage: This KPI measures wastage as a proportion of procured and stored value in each calendar
year. The target is proposed at no more than 0.5%.
For Delivery
01 Quantity Delivered to Partners: This KPI should check that the agreed amount of PCA delivered to
Partners is actually met.
02 Timely Delivery to Partner: This KPI measures whether dates agreed for delivery are met (this KPI is
directly impacted by the lack of planning in PCA agreement and can only be measured if the PCA
includes a timetable for deliveries).
Risk Assessment
UNICEF understands that there will be additional risk management required in order to implement these
planned actions. Specific risk elements related to the optimization process include, but are not limited to,
the following areas:
• Increasing UNICEF stock levels and supply chain responsibilities in Somalia could make the supply
chain more vulnerable to graft, manipulation, leakages and theft.
• Shipping an increased proportion of supplies directly into Somalia, if not staged and managed
appropriately, could place UNICEF systems in Somalia under a burden that they cannot adequately
handle.
• Heighten exposure of UNICEF supply chain management staff to the Somalia security environment.
• Reliance on Somali national providers who may not necessarily have all of the desired qualifications
and capacity to take on additional responsibility within the supply chain.
• With increased transparency and accountability in the supply chain could come the identification of
specific problems with leakages. Parties who benefit from those leakages may resist changes and
could pose as a threat to UNICEF operations.
• Inability, through ineffective and long-term capacity building, of Somali based entities to take on
additional responsibilities overwhelming their existing capacity.
Additional risks associated with the optimization process should be identified as a component of the
implementation. However, not taking the actions specified in this implementation plan as a part of
the optimization process likely carries a higher level of risk than the proposed actions. With good risk
management and mitigation practices these risks can likely be reduced to acceptable levels.
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Roles
Dedicated Project Team – ‘UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain Optimization Initiative Project Team’. Percentages
of specific staff time would be dedicated to participating on the project team. Both Programme and
Supply & Logistics staff (from Nairobi and Somalia) would participate on the project team. One individual
would be identified as the project manager for this initiative. The project team would identify and secure
additional resources and expertise required to fulfil project requirements. Backstopping of positions
involved with this initiative would likely be required so that regular duties would also be fulfilled.
Internal and External Expertise – Additional expertise and support from within and outside of UNICEF
would be needed to support UNICEF staff throughout the optimisation process. This could include subject
matter experts in areas such as change management, supply chain management, VISION, training etc.
Resource Requirements:
Funding – The funding for the personnel and staff time required to optimize the Somalia supply chain are
significant but not prohibitive. Most of the changes needed are process or systems based without major
investments in new infrastructure or equipment.
Equipment & Facilities – Additional equipment and facilities are required particularly related to the
warehousing and cold chain in Somalia. Facilities need upgrades with additional standard equipment added
or replaced.
Training & Coaching – The creation of specialized trainings relevant to the Somalia context and specific to
filling the current supply chain gaps. Match trainings with coaching of more junior staff or partners by more
experienced staff.
Timeframe:
This supply chain optimisation initiative would be rolled out in three phases:
Phase I (6 months from inception) would entail the convening of a project team to conduct any additional
research, agree upon the desired design for the optimisation initiative, agree upon progress measurements,
finalize the implementation plan and commit the required resourcing for this initiative.
Phase II (7-18 months from inception) would be focused on the actual implementation of the initiative.
This would include actions such as planning workshops, system redesign and enhancements, training and
capacity building of UNICEF staff and all other key initiatives identified by UNICEF.
Phase III (19-24 months from inception) would include measuring the results of the initiative, incorporation
of lessons learned and making regular adjustments to further optimize the system. During Phase III it would
be expected that this work would transition from a project-based approach to the incorporation of project
approaches into regular staff and departmental functions. During Phase III it would be expected that this
work would transition from project-based approach to having project approaches incorporated into regular
staff and departmental functions.
54
ANNEXES
Annex A: Terms of Reference
TERMS OF REFERENCE: ASSESSMENT OF UNICEF SOMALIA SUPPLY CHAIN
Objectives:
UNICEF Somalia is seeking to hire a consultancy firm or institution to conduct an assessment of the supply chain management
systems and provide practical recommendations to ensure that UNICEF supply chain strategy, planning, technology, facilities, and
processes in Somalia are cost effective and efficient.
Background
Somalia represents one of the most critical, complex and prolonged humanitarian emergencies in the world today. The majority
of Somali people have not experienced effective rule of law for more than twenty years, and during that time, most of the country
has experienced protracted conflict. More than 30% of Somali populations currently require immediate humanitarian assistance.
Tragically, the Somali conflict affects children - who constitute almost half of the estimated 10 million people - more than adults
yet recognition of this or concern for the best interests of children is rarely articulated.
The UNICEF Programme support in Somalia is currently coordinated from Nairobi but implemented through more than 160 staffs
based inside Somalia, including offices in Mogadishu, Galkayo, Baidoa, Hargeisa, Bossaso and Garowe.
UNICEF delivers essential, life-saving support to Somali women and children affected by conflict, displacement and food
insecurity. In 2012 curative nutrition programs managed 400,000 acutely malnourished children under five, while blanket
supplementary feeding reached over 266,312 families (equivalent to 1,597,872 individuals). Child Health Days immunized one
million children, protecting them from diseases such as measles and polio. 421,598 people, including school children and users
of health facilities, gained sustainable access to safe drinking water as compared to 892,000 in 2011. A further 956,675 people,
including IDPs and vulnerable households, gained access to safe water through temporary measures. UNICEF support also
allowed 429,974 children to finish the 2011/12 school year.
In 2012 the supply combined plan was at the level of USD 30 million, hereunder Nutrition with approx. 46%, Health 29% and
WASH 15%. Education accounted for approx. 7% of the activities. The options for local procurement in Somalia remain limited and
thus majority of Program sector supplies have to be procured from off-shore.
Logistical challenges remain immense with poor transport infrastructure, lack of direct commercial container shipping lines to
most Somalia ports (include air transport), high inland transportation costs, port congestion and customs transit formalities
through third country as well as limited access of road corridors through Kenya due to the volatile security situation and
impassability during rainy seasons.
The complex logistical challenges are also reflected through the number of storage locations managed by UNICEF which currently
includes; Mogadishu, Baidoa, Galkayo, Bossaso, Berbera, and Hargeisa inside Somalia with main transit storage facilities in Nairobi
and Mombasa. Combined 2012 end-year supply inventory of all Somalia controlled warehouses were approx. USD 25 million and
in-country logistics costs at the level of US$ 20 Million.
Scope of work:
01 Analyse programme plan of actions and strategies, Review the scope of current supply assistance for each programme
component in Somalia and provide recommendations to ensure alignment and full implementation of the Core Commitment for
Children in Humanitarian action (CCC’s), which is UNICEF’s core humanitarian policy.
02 Analyse and map the Supply Chain work processes from supply-requisitioning, distribution planning through procurement
to in-country delivery, warehousing and final distribution to partners with focus on the distribution planning, in-country logistics
systems and in-country warehousing and hand-over to partners.
03 Conduct strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis for key components of the Supply & Logistics chain,
with particular emphasis on pharmaceuticals and drugs. Assess partner’s technical (logistics) capacity, storage and distribution
capability from the time supplies are handed over by UNICEF through to delivery to the end user.
56
04 Identify supply & logistics chain solutions (from sourcing to distribution to beneficiary), conduct cost benefit analysis and risk
analysis for feasible solutions and make recommendations in terms of immediate, medium term and strategic solutions .
05 Develop an implementation plan and identify resources required for effective implementation.
Methods:
The methodology for the assessment will be developed by the selected consultancy as a part of the proposal. However, it’s
envisaged the following will be included but not limited to;
• Desk review of relevant documents to understand background and context of the assignment
• Conduct field visits to offices/ports in Mogadishu, Berbera/Hargeisa, Bossaso in Somalia and Mombasa in Kenya
• Conduct field work/data collection
• Analyze data
• Meetings with stake-holders: UNICEF Programme sections, UNICEF Supply & Logistics section; other UN agencies;
logistics service providers and selected number of key implementing partners
• Industry bench-marks and standards
Deliverables:
01 Inception report and presentation, which shall include methodology, summary of preliminary desk review, proposed field
visits, list of key informant interviews, implementation work-plan and timetable.
02 Draft report
03 Presentation of key findings and recommendations
04 Final report, which shall include all points specified in scope of work above.
Duration:
03 months with mandatory field visit for at least 1 week in each Zone Office to ensure a proper information and data collection of
information and understanding of the local complexity
Expected Background and Experience
This work is to be undertaken by a competent and experienced institution or company with a track record of at least 10 years of
experience within Supply Chain Management, with particular emphasis on pharmaceuticals and drugs in the humanitarian sector
and / or developing countries. The consultancy should be familiar with UN and Government Supply & Logistics Management
systems. Previous work experience in Somalia or similar complex logistics areas is an asset.
57
Annex B: Interview Guide
UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain Assessment Interview Record
Respondent’s Name:
Respondent’s Title & Function:
Interviewer’s Name(s):
Date:
Location:

Thank you for talking with me OR us today. I OR We am part of a team conducting an assessment of the
UNICEF Somalia supply chain. We greatly value the chance to talk with you about your work relevant to this
assessment. We will keep all of your remarks anonymous. In doing our work, the team will not use your name or
any of your comments in such a way that it is clear that these views have come from you or your organization.
In an assessment of this type, we find that this promotes the most open sharing of information. We have a
series of questions to ask to about your work and UNICEF Somalia’s supply chain.
Question Notes
Background
1. What is your function/position/job? (Get full name and formal position)
2. What is the role of your organization or entity in the supply chain?
3. What are the main impediments to the effective supply of UNICEF

commodities in Somalia? Prompt as needed perspective related to:
Demand planning, Forecasting, Availability, Communication, Ordering,
Tracking, Receiving, Storage, Inventory Management, Transport,
Distribution, Organizational Structure, Staffing, Leakages, Donor
Policies, Timing etc.
4. What aspects of the UNICEF supply chain have you found to be the most
effective? Why? Prompt as needed perspective related to: Demand
planning, Availability, Forecasting, Ordering, Tracking, Receiving,
Storage, Inventory Management, Transport, Distribution, Organizational
Structure, Staffing, Timing etc.
Demand planning
Availability of commodities
Ordering
5. How would you rate on a scale of 1 to 10 (1 = low performance; 10 = Tracking
Inventory Management
highest possible performance) the performance of the UNICEF supply
Timing
chain? How do you justify this rating? Organizational Structure
Staffing
Comments:
6. How do UNICEF Somalia’s implementing partners enable or hinder the
UNICEF supply chain?
How could the performance of the partners be improved?
7. How does the UNICEF Somalia supply chain function as compared to
other similar supply chains?
58
8. What possible solutions can you offer towards optimizing the
UNICEF Somalia supply chain? Prompt as needed perspective on: ‘Push’
and ‘Pull’ Systems, Capital Investments, Communications, Systems of
Order Coordination, Enhancing Worker Skills, Organization of Resources,
Monitoring Systems, Inventory Control, Measurement etc. Also, offer
solutions provided as others to get respondents opinion on other proposed
solutions.
9. How do you think the functioning of the UNICEF supply chain is

perceived by colleagues?
10. Do you have any examples as to how the UNICEF Somalia supply
chain is appreciated?
11. What are the current or future threats to a well-functioning UNICEF

Somalia supply chain?
12. What do you think UNICEF’s supply chain managers should do

(differently or the same) in your country over the next 2 years? Related, how
do you think the UNICEF supply chain should adjust to the planned Somalia
transition?
13. Who else should we talk to about the UNICEF Somalia supply chain?
Do you have any written material of relevance to share on this work?
14. Is there any other information related to this work that you would
like to provide?
Thank you again for your openness and candor in talking with us OR me today, and for all your work. Here is
my contact information if you would like to provide any additional information relevant to this interview.
59
Suppliers Questionnaire
Have you already work / supply /answer to a tender for UNICEF Somalia YES NO
If yes (please make a X in the box)
Are you / have you Contract Reply to tender
Currently
Less than 3 months ago
Between 3 – 6 months ago
6 to 12 months ago
Over 12 months ago
Do you know where to look for UNICEF call for tender YES NO
If yes please explain: ___________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
Have you already responded once or more to a UNICEF call for tender ? YES NO
It was easy to respond to the tender? YES NO
If NO it was difficult because (you can have several answers)
1 - Language (English only) 2 - Too Technical don’t have the knowledge
4 - Too complex / Could not understand the
3 - Not enough time given
document
5 - Item specification not adapted to locally available 6 - Did not get answers from UNICEF to my
goods / service questions
7 - Did not have the cash flow to supply big quantities
Do you have a branch or are you a branch of an international company, if yes main country(ies) of supplies _____________
____________________________________________________________
If contracted would you have the capacity to:
YES / NO
Provide UNICEF with supplier’s own stock
Supplier stock is in UNICEF warehouse and paid only when it is send out
Accept a Long Term Agreement (LTA)
Fixed price and quality over an agreed period of time (generally 6 months or more)
Ensure minimum / maximum stock level to UNICEF at supplier warehouse/cost

UNICEF have the right to do count check and give penalty to supplier if the minimum quantity is not there
Offer delivery in Mogadishu/Berbera to UNICEF partners warehouse / distribution point

Depending on security situation at the time of delivery
Would you have the capacity to make a kit?

UNICEF may require that several items a unpacked and put into one carton box (for example a hygiene
kit or an education kit)
You company is mainly dealing with:

Service transport warehousing construction Clearance
Goods
Water Construction material Plastic item Blanket plastic mats
Hygienic products (soap) Printed material School supplies School furniture’s
Others _______________________________________________________________________________________
60
Annex C: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
Contact and Interview List - Nairobi
Organisation/Company Interviewee Position
UNICEF Lars Jensen Chief of Supply/Logistics
UNICEF Amna Elmamoun Procurement Specialist
UNICEF Cormac O'Sullivan Logistics Specialist
UNICEF Meseret Wassihune Supply & Logistics Assistant
UNICEF Fridah Karimi Supply Assistant
UNICEF Carol Masheti Supply Assistant
UNICEF Carol Kunga Supply Assistant
UNICEF Esther Supply Assistant
UNICEF Peter Hailey Senior Nutrition Manager
UNICEF Imran Mirza Maternal & Child Health Specialist
UNICEF Amanuel Ghebray Education Specialist
UNICEF Sikander Khan Special Representative
UNICEF Chiara Pierotti HIV/AIDS Specialist
UNICEF Muna Shalita Malaria Specialist
UNICEF Gideon Chelule PSM Specialist
UNICEF Cecilia Udoto Programme Budget Officer
UNICEF Sarah Elamin Ng'inja Donor Relations Specialist
UNICEF Virginia Kimemia Registry Assistant
UNICEF Hameed Bhullar Logistics Officer
UNICEF Rage Habarwa Logistics Assistant
UNICEF Dennis Murage Njogu Supply & Logistics Officer
UNHCR Jasna Kaleb
Somkan Trading Co. Ltd Abdikhadar S. Farah Supplier - CEO
USAID OFDA Sureka Khandagle Donor OFDA Program Officer EA
USAID FFP Pete Mohan Donor FFP Program Officer Somalia
OXFAM Fatuma Abdirahman Implementing Partner - INGO
OXFAM Mercy ? Implementing Partner - INGO
Save the Children Onesmus Kilungu Implementing Partner - INGO
ACF Sadik Mohammed Implementing Partner - INGO
COSVI Susan Implementing Partner - INGO
COSVI Fatuma Implementing Partner - INGO
HARD Abdiwelli Hassan Implementing Partner -- LNGO
Zamzam Hassan Abdikarim Implementing Partner -- LNGO
CAFDARO Mohamed Haibe Hidig Implementing Partner -- LNGO
URDO Yonis Yussuf Implementing Partner -- LNGO
Kuehne & Nagel Clifford N. Karanja Supplier – Warehouse management
Kuehne & Nagel Tariq Arain Supplier – Warehouse management
61
Contact and Interview List - Mombasa
Kuehne & Nagel Frederick Murolli Supplier – Warehouse management
Kuehne & Nagel Joseph Muluvu Supplier – Warehouse management
Kuehne & Nagel Ishmael Ithongo Supplier – Warehouse management
Kuehne & Nagel Job Nyangaresi Supplier – Warehouse management
Kuehne & Nagel Festus Langat Supplier – Warehouse management
Kuehne & Nagel Irene Achieng Supplier – Warehouse management
Contact and Interview List - Mogadishu (SCZ)

UNICEF Abdullahi Mayow Mahad Supply & Logistics Assistant
UNICEF Nur Abdullahi Hassan Logistics Assistant
UNICEF Abdulkadir Ahmed Muse Logistics Assistant
UNICEF Mohamed Hassan Ibrahim WASH-Programme Officer WASH
UNICEF Mohamed Hussein Omar HEALTH-EPI Health Officer
UNICEF Mohamud M.Hashi Education-Programme Officer
UNICEF Abdi Aden Mohamed Warehouse Assistant
UNICEF Kassim Alodi Warehouse Assistant
Supplier Ismail Abdullahi Siyad Furqan Trading & Transportation Co.
Supplier Abdirizak Hassan Global Link Trading & Logistics Co.
Supplier Abdulkadir Ali Mogadishu Star
Supplier Mohamed Nur Adar Sabriye Electronics Company
Supplier Mohamed Nur Mohamed Abu Star Electronics Company
Supplier Abdirahman Mohamoud Liban General Store
Supplier Abdullahi Haji Ali Hillaac Pertoleum Company
Sophpa Abdullahi Jama Hassan Partner - LNGO
Muslim Aid UK Idhow Noor Abdi Partner - INGO
SAREDO Hassan Ali Abdirahman Partner -- LNGO
IAS Nur Sheikh Mohamed Partner -- LNGO
SCC Mohamed Ibrahim Mohamed Partner -- LNGO
BPHCC Asha Hussein Moallim Partner -- LNGO
ACF Abdirahmin Ali Mohamed Partner -- LNGO
ACF Nur Sheikh Ibrahim Partner -- LNGO
WOCCA Adam Abdullahi Mahdi Partner -- LNGO
WOCCA Abdullahi Ahmed Idow Partner -- LNGO
WOCCA Abukar Abdullahi Tifow Partner -- LNGO
Cosvi Dr. Abdullahi Mohamed Nur Partner -- INGO
Swisso-Xalmo Hassan Ahmed Shariff Partner -- LNGO
Somali Aid Suleman Kahiye Bulle Partner -- LNGO
Mercy USA Mohamed Abdille Ali Partner -- INGO
MoF Ahmed Abdi Mohamed Government Partner
MoF Mahad M. Hassan Government Partner
MoHD Mohamuud M. Mohamud Government Partner
MoHD Salad Hussein Abddulle Government Partner
MOHD Abdulkadir Abukar Mohamed Government Partner
OPM, SSU Maluka Abdulkadir Government Partner
62
Contact and Interview List - Baidoa (SCZ)
UNICEF Phyllis Oyugi Nutrition Specialist
UNICEF Nisar Syed WASH Specialist
UNICEF Amilu Chilingulo Education Specialist
GRRN Adam N. Ali Partner
GREDO Bashir M. Hassan Partner
GREDO Abdulahi Mohamed Abdi Partner
BTSC Xaber Ibrahim Ali Partner
URRO Xaran Maxed Partner
DURO Abdirahim Maalim Partner
SOS children's village Mustafa Haji Hassan Partner
WHC Abdishakur Eleck Ahmed Partner
BREC Ibrahim Hassan Partner
GREDO Mohamed Sk. Abdule Partner
SRCS Aydrus Maxed Partner
EPHCO Muhyrd Adam Partner
SAMA Mukthar Mohamed Hasan Partner
BMO Mohamed Ibrahim Haider Partner
CCC Hassan Madin Korin Partner
UNICEF Abdi Farah Osman Cold Chain Technician
UNICEF Mohamed Abdullahi Wash Officer
UNICEF Madina Ali Abdirahman Nutrition Program Assistant
UNICEF Abdulkadir Hudow Nutrition Monitoring Assistant
UNICEF Mohamed Ali Haji Health, Program Officer
UNICEF Ruqiya Musa Hassan Nutrition Program Assistant
UNICEF Jeylani Sharif Ibrahim Health Program Assistant, Cold Chain
UNICEF Abdulatif Ahmed Sheik Education Program Officer
UNICEF Abdirizok Osman Hussu Education Program Officer
UNICEF Abdullahi Mayow Mahad Logistics Assistant
Contact and Interview List - Bossaso (NEZ)

UNICEF Zakariya Ali Ahmed Logistics Assistant
BHM (Bossaso Hospital) Asad Abdul Partner -- LNGO
MOH Abdukidir Mohamed Government Partner
MoE Musa Jibril Mohmed Government Partner
UNICEF Sana Roumani Operations Manager
UNICEF Marianne Clark-Hattingh Chief of Field Office (NEZ)
UNICEF Mohamud Ahmed Hassan WASH Programme Officer
UNICEF Mohamed Suleiman WASH Project Officer
UNICEF Bashir Abdi Shim HIV/AIDS Programme Officer
Suppliers Mohamoud Isse Yousuf Ahmed Sud Com
Suppliers Ahmed Mohamoued Ali Aillaac Computer
Suppliers Abdullahi Isse Salah New Vision ICT
Suppliers Abdifatah Alasiz Firm Pure Tech
Suppliers Najus Abdi Arfar Jowle Enterprises
Suppliers Mohamed Nur Jama NETCO
Suppliers Mohmed Abdi Ismail Khoyrdoon Company
Suppliers Abdiwali Abdulahi Hussien National Petroleum
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Contact and Interview List - Hargesia (NWZ)
UNICEF HYDAR NASSER Chief of Field Office (NWZ)
UNICEF Mohamoud Ahmed Supply & Logistics Assist
UNICEF Kaise Mohamed Logistics Assistant
UNICEF Roda Hashi Addani Logistics Assistant
UNICEF Dr. Shahid Awar Nutrition Specialist
UNICEF Mohamed Sheikh Musa Nutrition Officer
UNICEF Marian Yenel Health
UNICEF Safia Younis CP
UNICEF Elicad Nyabeeya WASH
UNICEF Rashid Hassan Muse Education
UNICEF Nina Kokol SPPME
ICRC Nimco Saleban Partner
Merlin Abdiraham Isaq Partner
PSI Said Abdi Partner
Suppliers Osman Abdi Toyatoa
Suppliers Osman Abdi Asal Printing
Suppliers Omar Adem MEECAAD
Suppliers Mahdi Alkarim Sundus Stationary
Suppliers Mahadi Ahmed Abdi Noble Trading Company
Suppliers Idiris Muse EuroTech
Suppliers Director of Company Al-Rahma Furniture Market
Suppliers Director of Company Engery, Engineering & Marketing (EEM)
Suppliers Mohamed Abdikarim Omer Integrated Logistics Solutions inc
Contact and Interview List - Berbera (NWZ)

Berbera Port Authority Ali Omer Mohamed General Manager
64
Bosaso
Berbera
Mogadishu
North America  P.O. Box 1287 Middleburg, VA 20118

T +1 540 687 7011
F +1 540 687 7014 
Europe 20 Broadwick Street London W1F 8HT
T +44 207 479 4833
F +44 207 183 1189

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UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain Assessment

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UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain Assessment

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Assessment of the UNICEF

& the Global Emergency Group Assessment Team

Lars Jensen (Project Coordinator)

02 Shift to a Hybrid Pull-Push Supply Chain System

03 Establish a Transparent, Systematic & Inclusive Supply Chain Planning Process

04 Optimize Category Management and Ordering Processes

2 UNICEF. “Logistics Process Mapping: Process review - RO and WB.”

1.1 Assessment Objectives support to Somali women and children affected

Pre-Emptive Risk Analysis – GEG performed a Phase 4: Final Report

Figure 1 - Contingency Escalation Process

Type of Contingency Contingency Criteria Level 1 Level 2

Figure 2 – Assessment Project Team Organization

UNICEF Sponsor Committee

UNICEF Project Coordinator

Supply Chain Expert Somalia Programme Expert

0.1 Contract Finalized UNICEF 15-Apr-13 21-Aug-13 100%

Phase I: Planning & Secondary Data Review 99%

1.1 Kick-Off Meeting UNICEF/GEG 30-Aug-13 30-Aug-13 100%

Phase II: Field Visits & Data Collection 100%

2.1 Travel to Nairobi GEG 28-Aug-13 29-Aug-13 100%

Phases III & IV: Analysis & Report Writing 90%

4.1 Return Travel GEG 7-Nov-13 7-Nov-13 100%

1.6 Structure of the Report

Section 2 presents and discusses findings based on the field assessment.

Section 3 proposes recommendations aimed at solving the issues identified.

Section 5 provides the conclusion.

4 UNICEF. Somalia Country Office Annual Report 2011.

Figure 4 – Current UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain Estimated Lead Times

Berbera Via Berbera

35 – 40 Days 45 Days Via Mombasa:

Keys External Services Implemen0ng Partner Berbera Bosasso Mogadishu Mandera xx

2.3 Detailed Supply Chain Findings

Comparison of Direct Shipping to Mogadishu As Compared to Transiting Thru Mombasa

Min Max Min Max

Receiving at Mogadishu 20 20 Receiving at Mogadishu 20 20

Total 60 74 Total 78 101

Direct shipping to Mogadishu

Comparison of Direct Shipping to Berbera As Compared to Transiting Thru Mombasa

Min Max Min Max

Receiving at Berbera 27 27 Receiving at Berbera 27 27

Total 67 73 Total 128 151

Direct shipping to Berbera

Comparison of Direct Shipping to Bosaso As Compared to Transiting Thru Mombasa

Min Max Min Max

Receiving at Bosaso 27 27 Receiving at Mogadishu 27 27

Total 91 93 Total 143 166

Direct shipping to Bosaso

2.4 Additional Related Findings

2.5 Mapping the UNICEF Somalia Supply Chain

Reported items not Little Logistics

PCA Supplies Assements, Partners

71 Count based on the 2013 supply plan.

INTERNATIONAL KENYA SOMALIA SCZ, NEX, NWZ

Data consolidation PCA’s Supply List

• Requests from the field

3.2 Strategic Recommendations

02 Clarification of supply chain related roles and responsibilities between Programme

03 Establishment of a project-based entity to advance the optimization process for a minimum

02 Shift to a Combined Pull-Push Supply Chain System

The combined Pull-Push system described above is illustrated in Figure 10 adjacent.

PROPOSED COMBINED PUSH AND PULL DELIVERY MECHANISM

PCA Supplies PCA Supplies

North America  P.O. Box 1287 Middleburg, VA 20118