G.R. No.
1051 May 19, 1903
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. FRED L. DORR, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
Facts:
The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the
offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the
Government of the United States.
Based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission, which is as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or
obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate
others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or
incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the
safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such
evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom"
of April 6, 1902, under the caption of "A few hard facts."
The following are part of the article:
“…the Civil Commission has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a
protectorate over a set of men who should be in jail or deported…xxx…this
kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the Island,
reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have
during struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans.”
“The commission has exalted to the highest position in the Islands Filipinos
who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no
personal character”.
“it is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by
the Civil Commission are rotten and corrupt…xxx”.
Article 292, section 8 has provided modes for committing an offense against
it. However, albeit the article has a virulent attack against the policy of the
CC, the complaint in question cannot be regarded as having a tendency to
produce anything like what may be called disaffection or a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws.
There is a question as how the term “the Insular Government of the Phil.
Islands”, is used in Section 8, Art. 292. Is it defined as “the existing law and
institutions of the Islands” or “the aggregate of the individuals by whom the
government of the Islands is administered”?
Issue:
WON the defendant’s publishing of the truth constitutes an offense under section 8
of Act No. 292.
Ruling:
No. the article in question has no appreciable tendency to "disturb or obstruct any
lawful officer in executing his office," or to "instigate" any person or class of persons
"to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes," or to "suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots," or to "stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to
disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government." All
these various tendencies, which are described in section 8 of Act No. 292, each one
of which is made an element of a certain form of libel, may be characterized in
general terms as seditious tendencies. This is recognized in the description of the
offenses punished by this section, which is found in the title of the act, where they
are defined as the crimes of the "seditious utterances, whether written or spoken."
In modern political science, the term government is defined as “the institution or
aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out
those rules…xxx…the government is the aggregation of authorities which rule a
society (administration)”.
On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term ‘government’ is used in an
abstract sense (e.q. President, Congress), meaning the existing political system, its
laws and institutions. The Court opines that it is in this sense that the term is used in
the enactment (Art. 292) under consideration.
Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of “Insular of the Government of the Phil. Islands” is
the government as a system, however, the article in questions attacks the
‘government’ as the aggregate of public officials who run it.
The Court ruled that the article in question contains no attack upon the governmental
system of the U.S., by which the authority of the U.S. is enforced in these Islands per
se. In this case, it is the character of men who are entrusted with the administration
of the government which the writer wants to bring disrepute due to their motives,
public integrity, and private morals and wisdoms of their policy. The publication does
not constitute any seditious tendency being apparent to be in violation of Art. 292.
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, vs.RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of
Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents.
Facts:
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which
states:
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR
INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other
countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it
necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to
meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the
Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the
emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof.
Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat
of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments,
offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of
the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of precedence
of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create new subdivisions,
branches, departments, agencies or instrumentalities of government and to
abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to
modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative
character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish
those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or
otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to
authorize the national, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in
overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension
of the collection of credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such
other powers as he may deem to enable the Government to fulfill its
responsibities and to maintain and enforce the authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the
convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and
regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and
regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the
Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
While Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
 as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declared national policy.
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan
was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and
the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue
of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO
has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon
Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the
Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds
[from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds
to hold the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL
EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING
THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH
EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative and that all
EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.
Issue:
Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
Ruling:
Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the
following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the
National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made
and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening
or upon early repeal.
G.R. No. L-2089 October 31, 1949
JUSTA G. GUIDO, petitioner, vs.RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, c/o FAUSTINO
AGUILAR, Manager, Rural Progress Administration, respondent.
Facts:
This a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and Judge
Oscar Castelo of the Court of First Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the
expropriation of the petitioner Justa G. Guido's land on the grounds:
(1) That the respondent RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted without
jurisdiction or corporate power in filling the expropriation complaint and
has no authority to negotiate with the RFC a loan of P100,000 to be used as
part payment of the value of the land.
(2) That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore
excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539.
(3) That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid contracts
for lease, or option to buy at an agreed price, and expropriation would
impair those existing obligation of contract.
(4) That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the land at
P118,780 only and in ordering its delivery to the respondent RPA.

Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became inoperative Sections 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, copied verbatim, are as follows:
ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that
SECTION 1. The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In
lands or any interest therein, through purchaser or farms for resale at
setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which
reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose
tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands
and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may
“consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.”
 themselves and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the
Philippines.
SEC. 2. The President may designated any department, bureau, office, or
instrumentality of the National Government, or he may organize a new
agency to carry out the objectives of this Act. For this purpose, the agency
so created or designated shall be considered a public corporation.
Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status;
what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of
political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and received
on the basis of efforts exerted in their production.
Justa Guido, owner of the land being expropriated by the Rural Progress
Administration (RPA), filed a petition for prohibition to prevent RPA and Judge Oscar
Castelo from proceeding with the expropriation. Guido alleged, among others, that
the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the
purview of the provisions of Act 539. Commonwealth Act No. 539 authorized the
President of the Philippines to acquire private lands or any interest therein through
purchaser or farms for resale at a reasonable price. The National Assembly approved
this enactment on the authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution which
provides that the Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
individuals.
Issue:
Whether the expropriation of Guido’s land is in conformity to the principle of Social
Justice.
Ruling: NO.
Hand in hand with the principle that no one shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law, herein invoked, and that "the promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the
state," is a declaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the
Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino people "the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy."
Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary
components freedom and along with these freedoms are included economic
freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper
control. In paving the way for the breaking up of existing large estates, trust in
perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose
to destroy or undermine the property right or to advocate equal distribution of
wealth or to authorize of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving of
it to another.
The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply
paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress
Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social justice does not
champion division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the
Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights,
equality before the law, equality between values given and received on the basis of
efforts exerted in their production. As applied to metropolitan centers, especially
Manila, in relation to housing problems, it is a command to devise, among other
social measures, ways and means for the elimination of slums, shambles, shacks, and
house that are dilapidated, overcrowded, without ventilation. light and sanitation
facilities, and for the construction in their place of decent dwellings for the poor and
the destitute. As will presently be shown, condemnation of blighted urban areas
bears direct relation to public safety health, and/or morals, and is legal.
In reality, section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is in harmony with the Bill of
Rights. Without that provision the right of eminent domain, inherent in the
government, may be exercised to acquire large tracts of land as a means reasonably
calculated to solve serious economic and social problem. As Mr. Aruego says "the
primary reason" for Mr. Cuaderno's recommendation was "to remove all doubts as
to the power of the government to expropriation the then existing landed estates to
be distributed at costs to the tenant-dwellers thereof in the event that in the future
it would seem such expropriation necessary to the solution of agrarian problems
therein."
G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994
DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA, petitioners, vs.HON.
ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro
Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION, respondents.
Facts:
The crime alleged to petitioner Allado and Mendoza, by the PACC [Presidential Anti-
Crime Commission], is heinous crime of kidnapping with murder of Eugen Alexander
Van Twest, a German national, who is reportedly an international fugitive from
justice.
Other incidental crimes charged were illegal possession of firearms and ammunition,
carnapping, and usurpation of authority. The whole investigation was triggered by an
extrajudicial confession by a Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a discharge of the
Philippine Constabulary. Based on the confession of Umbal, Judge Barrios of RTC Br
11 issued a search warrant against petitioners. For the institution of criminal
proceedings the DOJ took over the case, after a new panel of prosecutors were
recommended and after preliminary investigation found probable cause that accused
committed the crime and submitted the case for trial which was assigned to Judge
Diokno of Br 62. Judge Diokno after finding probable cause issued warrant of arrest.
Issue:
WON the judge erred in finding probable cause issuing the search warrant.
Ruling:
Yes, there is no probable cause in this case. The probable cause test is an objective
one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be
such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the
accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. There is serious doubt
on Van Twest’s reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor
have his remains been recovered. We are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v.
Samarin, decided ninety-two years ago where this Court ruled that when the
supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is but one witness
who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved. In People v.
Inting, we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The
determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial
fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this
determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the
judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge
does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the
prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
documents behind the prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the
judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike
should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two
inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should
be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged
and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial is a function of the prosecutor The extrajudicial statement of
Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies. In Lim v. Felix , where we reiterated
Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said The Judge does not have to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform
the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there
should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal’s bare
certification. All these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge’s personal examination of the report and its annexes depends
on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or
exhaustive the Judge’s examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound
discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case
require. To be sure, the judge must go beyond the Prosecutor’s certification and
investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and
witnesses themselves to answer the court’s probing questions when the
circumstances of the case so require.
G.R. No. 168081 October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners, vs.PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Armando Yrasuegui was a flight steward of respondent Philippine Airlines
who was terminated due to
his failure to adhere to the latter’s mandated weight.
According to respondent’s Cabin and Crew Administration Manual, petitioner’s ideal
weight is 166lbs.
However, he was unable to maintain the required weight.
For 4 years, petitioner was removed from fight duty in order to meet the weight
standards, and was even offered the services of the company physician.
Despite the leniency, petitioner still failed to comply with the company policy. Hence,
respondent was terminated for the violation of company standards on weight
requirements.
LA–ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed ruling. Both found the
company standards of respondent on weight requirements to be reasonable.
CA set aside the ruling of NLRC, and held that the failure to adhere to the weight
standards is an analogous case for the dismissal of an employee under Art. 282(e) of
the Labor Code in relation to Art. 282(a). The CA also held that the weight standards
are a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), and if violated “justifies an
employee’s separation from the service.”
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was dismissed
by respondent.
RULING:
No. The SC held that petitioner failed to prove his allegations with particularity i.e.,
he merely mentioned the names of other cabin crew members that were overweight.
Furthermore, petitioner cannot invoke the equal protection clause guaranty of the
Constitution, since such liberty is only addressed to the State or those acting under
its authority. The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals.
In addition, the SC also held that the company standards/BFOQ of the respondent is
valid. Such qualifications are reasonably related or essential to the operation of the
job involved. As a common carrier, respondent is bound to observe extraordinary
diligence for the safety of its passengers. Hence, the dismissal of petitioner is valid.
His failure to comply with the weight requirement is a ground for dismissal, as
provided in Art. 282(e) of the Labor Code.
Social Justice Society vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of
kidnapping for ransom was released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily
searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his
waist. The subject firearm was later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued
to the petitioner but to another person.
The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched
(without a search warrant) in the boarding house of his children. They pointed their
guns on him and tied him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went
back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the
room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. The firearm according to the
petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.
Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for
illegally possessing a revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the
necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of appeal asked the court
to be reconsidered.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit
and valid
HELD/DECISION:
Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person who
was arrested lawfully may be searched so that the officer may remove any weapons
that the accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare of the
officers and to make sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to find evidence that
otherwise can be destroyed by the accused. Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure
of evidence or any weapons either on the person or within the area of his immediate
control. Based on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner did not resist arrest,
He was tied and placed outside the room where the gun was found; therefore the
room where the gun was found could not be “in his immediate control.” Incidental
searches without a warrant states that officers are permitted to seize any weapon
that they can inadvertently found during the arrest under the “plain view doctrine.”
However, the firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched and
therefore not incidental. Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained is
inadmissible to court and cannot be used against him.
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a
legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express
their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration
at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police,
to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well
as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M.
to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their
proposed demonstration.
The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO
after learning about the planned mass demonstration. During the meeting, the
planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out by the
union that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in factual
exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression,
freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the
normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was
backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if
they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while
the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts
should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed.
Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the
PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’
clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and the
officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The PBMEO’s
motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial
Relations for being filed two days late.
Issue:
Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as a violation of freedom expression in general and of their right of
assembly and petition for redress of grievances
Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of the rights of
free expression, free assembly and petition of the employers
Held:Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill
of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an
efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was
against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein
private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of
their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for
redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the
Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise
their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe
were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent
firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local
police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to
work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.
To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is “a potent means of inhibiting speech” and therefore inflicts a moral as
well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition.
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees,
according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the
workers the “duty … to observe regular working hours.” The strain construction of
the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the
right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours,
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe
condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a
slender ground.
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the
refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to
join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent
separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and
freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No.
875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8
guarantees to the employees the right “to engage in concert activities for … mutual
aid or protection”; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three.
The Supreme Court set aside as null and void the orders of Court of Industrial
Relations. The Supreme Court also directed the re-instatement of the herein eight (8)
petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until
re-instated, minus one day’s pay and whatever earnings they might have realized
from other sources during their separation from the service.
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL
MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR
OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel
del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be
applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to
regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void
for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose
P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class
motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form
specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this
to be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due
process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the
hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process
clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police
power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter
on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail
and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due
process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to
which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of
due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free
the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled
out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged
failure to meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police
power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are
allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside
from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to
interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were
viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every
24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies,
is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for
the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society
and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established
the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in
the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given
way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."
G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968
JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary,
ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Facts:
The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019)
Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or after his assumption of office
“and within the month of January of every year thereafter”, as well as upon
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which
he belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal
and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year”.
Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission “within the
month of January of every other year thereafter” of their sworn statement of assets
and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police
power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy implicit on
the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the
prohibition against self-incrimination.
Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
Acceptance of public position = voluntary assumption of obligation
Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest of general
welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of
police power.
CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the
police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause
Issue/s:
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is: 1. An oppressive
exercise of police power; 2. Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the
right to privacy implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed
together with the prohibition against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the personal
integrity and official dignity of public officials.
Ruling:
Decision reversed. Presumption of validity
Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable requirement for
employment so a public officer can make of record his assets and liabilities upon
assumption of office. Plaintiff did not present evidence to rebut the presumption of
validity.
“If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.” (Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila)
Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process Clause
“inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful
to the comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm)
The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of
its domain (Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights)
Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to
regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the protection
of due process.
It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the
security of tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore he
could also use due process to strike down what he considers as an infringement of
his liberty.
Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process
is observed.
The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not
outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.
“It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and
compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call
of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that
imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets
and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office…There was
therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.”
Right to privacy
Right to be let alone
“It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of
information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied
that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective of a
valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of such character. This
is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft of
constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a
further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of
the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid
for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what
otherwise would be a private sphere.”
Unreasonable Search and Seizure
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give
freedom from testimonial compulsion.
Right against self-incrimination
We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s
conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.
Insult to personal integrity and official dignity
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, mey
be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.
TUMBOKON, Petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of
the City of Manila, Respondent.
Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified
the area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated
in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed
that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and
practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to remove 28 tanks
starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of safety buffer
and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor
and the DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited
area resulting from joint operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang
Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.
Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.
Issue:
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
Ruling:
Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because
the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
“enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of these
is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled
by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty
on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.
NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.
MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
FACTS: HELD:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private FIRST ISSUE: No.
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front
prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court
walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section
“IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act
1 of the Constitution..
No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the
Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while the fundamental right to expression.
those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the
for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election. examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted
within such limits.
ISSUES:
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
(1) Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
a political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s
bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the
power of review.
official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
(2) Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions. speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It
(3) Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
citizens.
(4) Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the SECOND ISSUE: No.
tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies
(5) Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or
is not proper in this case.
content-neutral regulation.
(6) Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
(7) Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious
speech.
 Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included,
that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite while sponsored messages are covered.
that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
this case, organ of government before a court may come into the picture.”
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s
deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech
letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as
COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the
speech. subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation
includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or
THIRD ISSUE: No.
manner of the speech.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are
not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this
the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes. substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only
when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
enjoys a high degree of protection.
presumed unconstitutionality.”
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the
the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by
RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate
of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin
election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public,
the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their
property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property
rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process
and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals
and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s
private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process
of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of
a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates
on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with
political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account
not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals
and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect
therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or
institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into
account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental
regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby
be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which
voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DOCTRINE:
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in any
democracy. It includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge others to
vote for a particular candidate. The right to express one’s preference for a candidate
is likewise part of the fundamental right to free speech. Thus, any governmental
restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a candidate carries with it a
heavy presumption of invalidity.
FACTS:
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which
provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13,
2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which
enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it is
unlawful:
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside
of authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without
the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
and tricycles, whether motorized or not; 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech.
Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports,
private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of
seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the them.
revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election
the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense under
campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of owner thereof liable for an election offense.
REsolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of
7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals.
the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners
The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the
of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from
assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post
expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and
election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied the
The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid content-
petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and
neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.
(6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.

A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the

ISSUE:
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the
No. 9615 are constitutional. right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:

HELD: The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government;

The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are
The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to
prior restraints on speech
the furtherance of that interest.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral
regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign materials
may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause
as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are
not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the
right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of
supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As
worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory
and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or permits
for the operation,” inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The
COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not
extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the
franchise or permit to operate the same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the
constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. The posting of election
campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is
not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership – it has nothing
to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified under the
captive-audience doctrine.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical
matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The “captive-
audience” doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an
unwanted message in circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided.
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship,
which undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the
ground that they are more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have
been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the
degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer
or auditor to avoid exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be
justified if the supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise
intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-audience doctrine; the
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials
posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to
receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they
may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.
Lehman’s case not applicable
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of election
campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city
government, which prohibits political advertisements on government-run buses, was
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the advertising
space on the buses was not a public forum, pointing out that advertisement space on
government-run buses, “although incidental to the provision of public
transportation, is a part of commercial venture.” In the same way that other
commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of advertising from the general
public, the city’s transit system has the discretion on the type of advertising that may
be displayed on its vehicles.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by the city
government; the city government, as owner of the buses, had the right to decide
which type of advertisements would be placed on its buses.
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles, i.e., the city
government, in choosing the types of advertisements that would be placed on its
properties. In stark contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals on the
advertisements that may be posted on their properties.
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse political
advertisements on their buses. Considering that what were involved were facilities
owned by the city government, impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a
necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals
remains private; there exists no valid reason to suppress their political views by
proscribing the posting of election campaign materials on their properties.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign
materials violates the equal protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free
speech clause, but also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic principles on
which this government was founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied
in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution
No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies equally to the members of
the purported class. However, the classification remains constitutionally
impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction and is not germane to
the purpose of the law. A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals
and private vehicles and other properties in that the former, to be considered as
such, needs to secure from the government either a franchise or a permit to operate.
Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV
and transport terminals; the prohibition does not in any manner affect the franchise
or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.
ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public
is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and
other properties. Admittedly, any election campaign material that would be posted
on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many people. However, election
campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the
public, e.g.,commercial establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus,
there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the
prohibition against posting of election campaign materials.
Summary
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
violate the free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not
within the constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to
further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the
candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also
violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial distinction between
owners of PUV s and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other
properties.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one’s political
candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression. A restriction on
this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of
the democratic way of life.

As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs

and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As
already explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made
available for use by the public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and
other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting
election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny
the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of