Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
I. Introduction
A. Legal Method and Legal Reasoning
• Legal reasoning - mastery of an array of talents in argument and decision-making.
• Thinking like a lawyer- most important mission of law school
• Legal rules - will change over time.
• Lawyering skills – best learned in practice.
• There is legal reasoning ought not to be dismissed out of hand.
• Law schools and the lawyers and judges they train suppose that lawyers are characterized
by more than knowing things that nonlawyers do not.
• It is difficult to say what lawyers have other than their technical skills and knowledge,
easier to say what thinking like a lawyer is not. This casts doubt on the idea.
• Skeptics think that legal reasoning maybe less distinctive and less important than many
thought it is.
• The claim of legal reasoning’s existence is a hypothesis that lawyers have ways of
approaching problems and making decision that others do not.
o Heightened ability to see the other side of the argument
o Putting oneself in the shoes of another which is common to good thinkers and
people.
• Law is not a closed system.
• Various forms of odd (in a special way) reasoning exist throughout our decision-making
lives.
• Common forms of reasoning/ decision-making often dictate outcomes other than those
the cession-maker would otherwise have chosen.
• Law’s goal is to make sure that the outcome for all or atleast most of the particulars in a
given category is the right one.
o Coke: “It is better saith the Law to suffer a mischiefe (that is particular to one)
than an inconvenience that may prejudice the many,
• Ability to describe legal reasoning and example of its use says less than is commonly
supposed about how often such reasoning is an important component of what lawyers
actually do.
• The goal is to identify, describe, analyze and evaluate the characteristic modes of legal
reasoning.
From Dangat book:
• Legal method-process of arriving at the answers to legal questions.
o Legal writing, lawyering skills or legal process
o More than statutory construction.
• Statutory Construction – art or process of discovering and expounding meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where
the intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law.
• Interpreting the law.
• Legal Bibliography - course on development of skills in the use of legal materials and the
law library.
• Legal History – evolution of laws and legal systems.
• Analytical reasoning
o Deduction: rule - starting point
§ Syllogism – dominant style of legal reasoning; established structure,
consisting of a major premise (rule), minor premise (particular situation),
and conclusion (whether rule applies to situation).
§ Ex. An ordinance prohibits mode of transportation in the city. Bike is a
mode of transportation. Bike is prohibited in the city.
o Analogy – use of precedent, rule of previous case governs the case to be decided
o Deduction uses specific law while analogy uses specific case.
o Analogy is advantageous because:
§ Produces a wealth of data for decision making
§ Represent collaborative effort of judges over time
§ Corrects biases that might lead judges to discount the force prior to
decisions
§ Exerts a conservative force in law, holding development of law to a
gradual pace
C. Reason by Analogy
• Precedent v. Analogy
o In analogy, the target (current case) has the same feature as the source (earlier
case) and must be decided in the same way. Same is true in Precedent.
o There is a choice of source analogs that best assist in making decision and help
persuade others in the correctness of the decision.
o Use of analogy supports an argument.
o Mandatory precedents, current decisions, are binding.
o Use of precedent imposes itself to preclude an otherwise preferred outcome.
• Skeptic challenge questions whether analogical reasoning is distinct from precedential
constraint and whether analogies are truly distinctive or merely something else in
disguise.
Stare Decisis
-Doctrinal, doctrines will hold in other similar cases (same facts, same issues, it is expected that
ruling would be the same)
Villena v. Sps. Chavez
Doctrine: When a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same; Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different
Facts:
According to the facts of the CA the respondents owned four parcels of land subdivided
into several blocks. By mere permission/tolerance of the respondents the petitioners have
occupied and erected their homes, the respondent allowed it but they should, in consideration,
pay in certain amount as equity. The petitioners failed to pay the equity from the respondent so
the respondent in return wrote them a letter that they need to vacate the premises in a span of 30
days, but in regards to that the petitioners refused to vacate and remove their houses. The
petitioners said that the respondent does not have power to institute such orders from
the conflicted properties because the equities that they must pay is in accordance of National
Home Mortgage Finance Corp (NHMFC). They also claim that they paid already the said
equity however they were not given any receipts and copy of their contract. The petitioners also
claim that they are qualified beneficiaries under the RA no. 7279 known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act and adding that they were builder of good faith. CA ruled that the
petitioners entered with an agreement of equity with the respondent, so in return they must
pay amortization or they will face eviction.
Issue:
Whether or not, the decision of the CA needed to be redefined by the SC. (NO)
Ruling:
It is ruled that in the findings they the petitioners were in binding contract with the respondent.
Respondent’s occupation in the said land is not due to petitioner’s tolerance but an agreement
where petitioner allows them to stay in exchange of certain amount and eventually became
owners.
As correctly pleaded by petitioners, a similar case had been decided by CA in which it rule that
the proper action raise by the plaintiff should have been for rescission of contract or specific
performance, not unlawful detainer. Same applies to this case.
The CA ruling in this case is informative and straight to the point. The petition to review was
granted, the decision of the CA was overturned and the decision of the RTC and MTC was
reinstated
Facts:
Pepsi Cola launched a promotional program. code problems, they erroneously announced “349”
as winning number instead of the numbers submitted to the DTI, and deposited in the safety
deposit box in a bank. Pepsi Cola revoked and dishonored the claim of the frustrated winners,
which moved the petitioners to file breach of contract. Meanwhile, similar cases, Mendoza and
Rodrigo, are pending with the Court of Appeals. The petitioners then filed a motion for leave in
December 2000 to adopt the testimonial and documentary evidence in Mendoza and Rodrigo
cases or archive the case until final resolution of the said two cases. RTC granted the motion in
Jan. 2001.Unfortunately, Mendoza and Rodrigo cases were both dismissed. Consequently, De
Mesa et al. case was dismissed by the RTC under the principle of stare decisis which is
contemplated as well in Art. 8 of the New Civil Code.
Ruling:
The evidence presented in Mendoza and Rodrigo cases is as the current case. Whatever may be
the judgment of the Court on the case, it shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines,
and more specially, it shall apply to similar cases as the current case. The petition for review is
denied, and the judgment of RTC is affirmed.
Facts:
October 21, 1972, the 3,682.0286hectare Suntay Estate, consisting of was subjected to the
operation of Presidential Decree No. 27, under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT), with
farmerbeneficiaries declared as owners of the property. However, a 300hectare portion of the
land was subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) instead of the OLT.
Lubrica (in behalf of Suntay) filed a Petition for Summary Determination of Just Compensation
with the PARAD. PARAD fixed a just compensation of P71,634,027.30 which must be paid by
LBP immediately.
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) filed a Motion for Reconsideration but PARAD
denied the motion.
It filed a petition with RTC appealing PARAD decision. RTC ruled in favor of Lubrica and
ordered LBP to deposit preliminary compensation as determined by PARAD.
LBP filed an Omnibus Motion which was denied because RTC found no error in its previous
order.
LBP appealed to CA which also denied the petition, it moved for reconsideration which was also
denied. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the RTC/CA acted properly in ordering the deposit or payment to the landowner of the
preliminary valuation of the land made by the PARAD.
Ruling:
Lubrica (in behalf of Suntay) argues that under res juricata and stare decisis, case must be
dismissed, citing Lubrica v. LBP. In Lubrica v. LBP, SC affirmed that on March 31, 2003 Order
of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent LBP to deposit the just compensation
determined by PARAD.
However, it was held that res judicata and stare decisis are not applicable. Res judicata is a
doctrine that provides a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of a competent
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and heir privies and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. The
elements are:
The second element of res judicata is not present. The relief prayed for in Lubrica is that the
amount for deposit in favor of the landowner be determined on the basis of the time of
payment and not of the time of taking. But here, the prayer of the LBP is for the deposit of
the valuation of the LBP and DAR and not that of the PARAD. These are two distinct and
separate issues. Thus res judicata cannot apply.
Stare decisis cannot also be applied because of different issues in both cases. Stare decisis is
the adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the SC in its final decision, for
economy and stability.
Petition DENIED.
Res Judicata
-not the doctrine, if the court already made a ruling on the issue raised which is final and
executory, cannot be relitigated.
-Otherwise, there will be endless litigation.
-Quite similar to stare decisis but the established doctrine applies only to that same party or case.
PCGG v. Dumayas
Doctrine:
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes
an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.
The doctrine of res judicata has two (2) aspects. The first, known as “bar by prior judgment,” or
“estoppel by verdict,” is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action
upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second, known as “conclusiveness of
judgment,” otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same
parties involving a different cause of action.
Sps. Sy v. Young
Doctrine: Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It
means that whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case before the court.
Facts:
Lilia (Geraldyn’s mom) obtained a loan from the spouses Sy with the parcel of land inherited
from deceased husband. Lilia defaulted in payment which resulted to the foreclosure and sale of
the property to the Sps. Sy.
Geraldyn argued that the Sps. entered into contract of mortgage with the knowledge that Lilia
was unauthorized to mortgage property. Lilia acted in behalf of daughter in the partition
proceeding.
Geraldyn filed with RTC a motion to admit a supplemental complaint with the attached
supplemental complaint. –DENIED by RTC.
She filed petition for certiorari and mandamus with CA – DENIED petition because cause of
action in the supplemental complain is entirely different from her original complaint.
RTC continued and ruled despite of motion to suspend proceeding until CA decided. RTC
denied motion. Geraldyn filed motion to cancel hearing which led RTC to issue an order
dismissing the complaint on ground of non-suit. She filed an appeal with CA to annul RTC order
but was DENIED. She appealed to SC (157745)
SC denied 157745 but granted 157955 where it held that the right of legal redemption as a co-
owner is conferred by law and is merely a natural consequence of co-ownership. In effect,
Geraldyn’s cause of action for legal redemption stems from her rights as co-owner. Thus, its
ordered RTC to admit the supplemental complaint.
Issue: WON CA erred in setting aside the RTC order which dismissed the case for non-suit.
Ruling:
The present action is barred by the law of the case. SC ruling in Young which constitutes as the
controlling doctrine or the law of the case in the present case. Law of the case has been defined
as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably
established the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
The case does not have the finality of res judicata. Law of the case applies only to the same case
whereas res judicata forecloses parties in one case by what has been done in another case. The
rationale of the case of the law is to enable appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and
efficiently.
Rodriguez v. COMELEC
Facts:
In the May 1995 elections for governor, Marquez questioned Rodriguez’s candidacy via a
petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based on the allegation that Rodriguez is
a"fugitive from justice" for leaving the US where a charge against him for fraudulent insurance
claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property was pending. Marquez claims
that Rodriguez should be disqualified or held ineligible under Section 40(e) of the Local
Government Code.
COMELEC then promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 (quo warranto
case filed by Marquez in 1992 elections) and SPA No. 95-089 (present disqualification case),
where it found Rodriguez a fugitive from justice in line with the MARQUEZ Decision’s
(1995) definition of "fugitive from justice.” With Rodriguez’s walk-out during the hearing of
the case, COMELEC considered him as having waived his right to disprove the authenticity of
Marquez' documentary evidence.
Nevertheless, Rodriguez emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for
the position of governor. However, COMELEC also made a report entitled "EVIDENCE OF
THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC, after
calibrating the parties' evidence, declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as
defined in the main opinion of the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180
degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution.
COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision
definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established
that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was
instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).
The “law of the case” doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded redefinition of “fugitive
from justice.” Fugitive from justice was already defined in Marquez Decision. What was
irrevocably established as controlling legal rule in the Marquez decision and the instant petition.
However, Marquez and the COMELEC seem to urge the Court to redefine “fugitive from
justice.” They espouse the broader concept of the term as culled from foreign authorities (mainly
of U.S. vintage) cited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i.e., that one becomes a “fugitive from
justice” by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him,
regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight. Suffice it
to say that the “law of the case” doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded redefinition of
“fugitive from justice” (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision) and proceed
therefrom in resolving the instant petition.
To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a
“fugitive from justice”) are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The
MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal from (the Marquez’ quo warranto petition before the
COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal from the quo warranto petition although the
COMELEC resolved the latter jointly with the Marquez’ petition for the disqualification of
Rodriguez. Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the
MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept
of “fugitive from justice” as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which
highlights the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with
their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize. Besides, to redefine “fugitive from
justice” would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the
MARQUEZ Decision.
Veloso v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Veloso owns a parcel of land in Tondo, Manila covered by a TCT issued
by the Registry of Deeds-Manila. He acquired the subject property before he got married from
Philippine Building Corporation. Hence, the property did not belong to the
conjugal partnership.
•The said title was subsequently canceled and a new one was issued in the name of Aglaloma
B. Escario.
•The transfer of property was supported by a General Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by IrmaVeloso, wife of the petitioner.
•Petitioner denied executing the power of attorney and alleged that his signature was falsified.
He also denied having known the supposed witnesses in the execution of the power of attorney.
Thus, he contended that the sale of the property, and the subsequent transfer were null and
void.
•Defendant Aglaloma Escario alleged that she was a buyer in good faith and denied any
knowledge of the alleged irregularity. She allegedly relied on the general power of attorney
which was sufficient in form and substance and was duly notarized.
•Witness for the plaintiff Atty. Julian G. Tubig denied any participation in the execution of the
general power of attorney, and attested that he did not sign.
•RTC ruled in favor of Escario as the lawful owner of the property as she was deemed an
innocent purchaser for value. The trial court ruled that there was no need for a special power of
attorney when the special power was already mentioned in the general one.
Issue: WON the CA is correct in affirming RTC that Escario is the lawful owner. (YES)
Ruling:
Yes, the SC denied the petition and affirmed CA decision. The court cannot allow a petition
for annulment of judgment which in effect seeks a second cycle of review regarding a subject
matter which in effect has already been fully and fairly adjudicated.
The Decision
Schauer, Chapter 9 The Judicial Opinion
o The Causes and Consequences of Judicial Opinions
§ Common law has major role in telling lawyers and their clients what
the law is.
o Giving reasons
§ When a court gives reason for its decision, it created a commitment for
that court and an expectation on the part of those who seek to be
guided by judicial opinions.
§ Induces reasonable reliance and creates prima facie commitment on
the part of the court to decide subsequent cases in accordance with the
reason that it has explicitly given on a previous occasion.
§ The practice of reason giving in judicial opinion is one in which the
benefits of full explanation are not without cost.
o Holding and Dicta revisited
§ Holding- consist of what is necessary to support the case, binding if
from superior court
§ Obiter dicta – everything else, could be disregarded
§ Knowing the difference allows one to know how much weight to put
on the statement.
o The Declining Frequency of Opinion
§ Clogged dockets
§ Reasons are abbreviated
§ Okay as long as not an indication of laziness
Dangat, The Decision
o Decision – adjudication or settlement of a controversy by a court of law.
o Judgment – determination by the court that the accused is guilty or not
o Consitutional mandate
§ To be valid, should comply with form, procedure, and substantive
requirements laid by the Constitution, rules of Court and circulars and
orders of the Supreme Court.
§ Art. VIII sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and laws on which it
is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
basis therefor.
§ Rule 36, sec 1. Rules of Court. Rendition of judgments and final
orders. A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case
shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
signed by him and filed with the clerk of court.
§ Rule 120, sec 2, Rules of Court. Form and contents of judgment. The
judgment must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the
accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
§ Adm. Circular no. 1 1988 “to make complete findings of facts in their
decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the
light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to
generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which the conclusions are deducted.
§ Parts of a judgment:
ú Body – court clearly and distinctly states its finding of facts
and of law
ú Decretal portion
§ Due process – given info of how the case was decided
o Repositories of Decisions
§ Adheres to binding precedent
§ Requires publication of decisions
§ Philippine Reports
§ Unofficial source – SCRA
o Personal Opinions of Judges
§ Contain only relevant opinion, interpretation and application of law
o Form of Decisions
§ No prescribed form
§ Brevity is desirable
§ Lucidly crafted, complete in all its vital details
§ With due care, make sure that it accurately reflects their conclusion
§ Essential parts:
ú Statement of the case,
ú Statement of facts – narration of events that gave rise to issue
ú Issues
ú Court ruling
ú Dispositive
§ Outline:
ú 1. facts – narration of events that gave rise to issue
ú 2. Procedural History – events that occurred in the trial from
filing of complaint
ú 3. Question presented – issue for the court to decide on
ú 4. Rule of law – principles that must be applied to facts
ú 5. Application of law to the facts – determines whether each
element of each rule apply to the facts
ú 6. Holding – decision of court with respect to question
ú 7. Disposition – procedural directive that gives effect to court’s
decision
o Disposition or Dispositive Portion
§ Fallo – embodies court’s decisive action
§ Controlling factor in resolving issue, unless when body decision is so
clear which shows that there is error in the dispositive
§ Exception (when fallo is not controlling):
ú There is when there is uncertainty, check the body b/c
dispositive should find support from ratio decidendi.
ú Extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of issue is
found in the body.
ú Where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision
is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive
portion, the body of the decision will prevail.
o The Syllabus
§ Now court’s work but of the reporter
§ Rule 10.02, Canon 10 , Code of Prof. Responsibility, “lawyers should
not misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision for authority.
§ Decision should be cited accurately
o The Certification
§ Art VIII, sec. 13
§ to ensure implementation of the constitutional requirement that
decisions of SC and lower courts are reached after consultation with
members of court en banc or in a division.
§ Absence of certification does not necessarily mean no consultation
occurred but may be a basis for holding the official liable for the
omission.
ú Does not invalidate the decision
§ Per curiam – no ponente, does not require formal certification
§ Minute resolution – no certification
o Memorandum Decision – decisions which adopt by reference of findings of
fact and conclusions of law of inferior tribunals.
o Per curiam Decisions – opinion of courts which the judges are all of one mind
and the question involved is so clear that it is not necessary to elaborate on it
by an extended discussion.
o Minute Resolutions – not bound to render signed decisions, has discretion to
formulate decisions or minute resolutions provided a legal basis is given,
depending on its evaluation of a case.
§ - alleviates heavy dockets
The Dissent
Dangat, Chapter 8 The Dissenting Opinion
o Value and Functions of Dissent
§ Parties deserve to know all the views of the collegiate court
§ So that parties won’t have difficulty understanding the dissertation in
the ponencia that addressed the points raised and reason presented
§ Freedom of expression of minority
§ cannot be cited as precedent
§ calling out of majority’s shortcomings
§ can lead the ponente to refine and clarify her initial opinion
§ designed to appeal to the people
o Adopting the Dissent
§ SC is sometimes influenced by dissents when reviewing decisions of
lower courts or admin. bodies.
o Concurring Opinions
§ Intended to define with greater precision the scope of an opinion
§ May agree with the disposition but disagree with one or more aspects
of the case
Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome
Facts:
• The prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that “no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area” is not found in the 1935 Constitution.
• 1 Dec 1976 - The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under
Philippine laws, more than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino
citizens, filed an application for the confirmation of its title to two lots with a total area of
165m 2 located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270.
• The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the grounds that:
• The applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable public lands;
and
• The applicant and its predecessors-in- interest have not been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application.
• Lower Court: Dismissed the application because in its opinion the Meralco is not
qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Law, only Filipino citizens or natural persons can apply for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect titles to public land. The Meralco is a juridical person.
The trial court assumed that the land which it seeks to register is public land.
• Meralco appealed to SC: It contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the
concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years
before selling it to the Meralco, had become private land, and, therefore, the
constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public
land, is not applicable to the said land.
• Solicitor General: The said land is not private land because the Meralco and its
predecessors-in- interest have no composition title from the Spanish government nor
possessory information title or any other means for the acquisition of public lands such as
grants or patents.
• Issue:
WON the land in dispute is a private land. NO.
WON Meralco is qualified to own the land. NO.
Ruling:
1. NO. As between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It
would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any
Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). In Uy Un vs. Perez, it was held that
until the certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is
sought to be confirmed, remains public land.
2. NO. Because the land is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco’s application
cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
àDissents made by Justice Teehankee and Justice Fernardo regarding “doctrine that
open, exclusive and undisputed land possession of alienable public land for the
prescribed period by law creates the legal fiction that after completion, it ceases to
become public land and becomes private property without the need of judicial or any
other sanction” in the Meralco case was adopted in the case of Director of Lands v.
IAC to become its controlling rule.
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court
• Facts:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., (Acme) on October 29,1962, instituted the Land
Registration proceeding of five parcels of land measuring 481,390 sqm, more or less,
which was ancestrally acquired from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of
the Dumagat tribe.
The possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as
the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to
generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel.
Their possession of the subject land is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 and
now considered from time immemorial. The land sought to be registered is a private
land pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral
lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public
domain.
• The CFI of Isabela found during its ocular investigation on September 18,1982 of the
subject land that Acme has introduced more than P45,000,000 worth of
improvements. The ownership and possession of the subject land was duly recognized
by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have
negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme.
• The CFI ruled in favor of Acme and ordered the registration in their name the subject
land. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the CFI’s decision upon appeal.
• The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he
asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17,
1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the
correctly applicable law; and since Sec. 11 of its Art. XIV prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain,
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question)
it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme.
• Issues:
• WON the ruling in the case, Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome (114SRC 799) should be
overturned in light of jurisprudence – YES
• WON the land is already a private land – YES
• WON the provision barring private companies and associations from purchasing
public alienable lands in 1973 Constitution is applicable retroactively – NO
• Ruling:
• 1. YES. In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v. Insular Gov’t, to Susi v.
Razon, to Herico v. Dar, the court overturned the decision on Meralco v. Castro-
Bartolome, stating that a possession is said to be prescriptively acquired by the
operation of the Public Lands Act, upon conclusively presumed fulfillment of all the
necessary conditions for a Government Grant. Thus, the land in question effectively
ceased to be of the public domain and was therefore classified as private property at
the moment of the sale through the continuous and unchallenged possession of the
bona fide right to ownership from Meralco’s predecessors-interest. There being no
law prohibiting the sale of private lands to privately held corporations, the court thus
overturned the decision.
• The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority
ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding
precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is
that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessorsininterest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed
statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following
that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was
already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme
thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation’s holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical
person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its
answer in the dissent in Meralco.
• 2. YES. The land was already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient. It had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, at least by presumption. The application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was
not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law.
3. NO. If it is accepted, as it must be, that the land was already private land to which
the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when
Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect
right to make such acquisition. The only limitation then extant was that corporations
could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.
• While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent
vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and reestablished,
as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching
examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the
majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner
therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an
imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference
to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential, limited
to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
• WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this
instance.
Dangat, Chapter 9
o Ratio Decidendi – ultimate issue expressly decided in the course of the
consideration of the case
§ -constitutes binding to the case
o Obiter Dictum – matter that was not raised expressly, it is not a prerequisite in
the disposition of the case
§ -lacks force of an adjudication
§ -opinions unnecessary for the decision of the case, not binding.
o Rulings Pro Hac Vice
§ SC can limit the extent to which its decisions can constitute precedent
§ Latin for “for this one occasion”
§ Applies to extremely peculiar cases
§ Made to bypass procedural lapses by litigants in order to address the
merits of impt. Cases
§ Not to be applied in future cases
Villanueva v. CA
Facts:
• The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA which denied
Villadores’ motion for disqualifaction of Rico and Associates as private prosecutor
for petitioner Villanueva Jr.
• Villadores is one of the accused in a criminal case “People v Bernardo” for
falsification of public documents, before RTC Manila
• Villanuenva, Jr. filed before RTC a complaint for illegal dismissal against several
parties, among them, IBC 13. When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of Villanueva,
IBC 13 appealed to the NLRC. As an appeal bond, IBC 13 filed a Surety Bond,
issued by BF General Insurance Company, Inc. However, both documents were found
to be falsified.
• Thus, the 2 complaints for falsification of public document were filed before against
Villadores and Diaz. The Manila City Prosecutor’s office, which was dismissed. On a
petitioner for review before the DOJ, it affirmed the dismissal of Diaz, but ordered
the inclusion of Villadores in the 2 criminal cases. The RTC granted the motion to
admit amended informations.
• Thus, Villadores filed a petition for certiorari at the CA, which dismissed the petition.
• Subsequently, respondent moved for the disqualification of Rico and Associates in
line with the pronouncement of the appellate court: “Incidentally, We are one with the
petitioner when it argued that Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is not the offended party in
these cases. It must be underscored that it was IBC 13 who secured the falsified
surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an adverse judgment of
the labor case filed by Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. himself and wherein the latter
prevailed. We see no reason how Villanueva could have sustained damages as a result
of the falsification of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation letter when it could
have even redounded to his own benefit if the appeal would be dismissed as a result
of the forgery. If there be anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it
purchased a fake surety bond.”
• Rico and Associates opposed the opposed the motion on the ground that the above-
quoted is a mere obiter dictum.
• RTC denied the motion for disqualification agreeing with Rico and Associates
• CA reversed, hence the following petition.
Issues: WON the CA erred in failing to consider that the pronouncement was a mere
obiter dictum and in effect not appreciating that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. was in fact
an aggrieved party. (NO)
Ruling:
• First, the Court defined an Obiter Dictum as “an opinion expressed by a court upon
some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is
a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, “by
the way,” that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before
him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as
precedent.”
• Based on the foregoing, the pronouncement of the appellate court in CAG.R. SP No.
46103 is not an obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent
Villadores in his petition assailing the admission of the Amended Informations.
Among the issues upon which the petition for certiorari in CAG.R. SP No. 46103
was anchored, was “whether Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is the offended party.” It
has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the
case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent
questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in
the regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up to the final conclusion,
and to any statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated.
• So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient
to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case
as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can
be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied
authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and
considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make statements of the court
regarding other propositions dicta.
Ledesma v. CA
Doctrine: An obiter dictum, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is
susceptible to varying interpretations—it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of
the Supreme Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.
Facts:
• Atty. Ronaldo Ledesma, the petitioner, was the Chairman of the First Division of the
Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration (BID).
• The complaint filed by the FIIB against the petitioner alleged the following illegal
acts: (a) irregularly granting TRVs beyond the prescribed period; and (b) using
“recycled” or photocopied applications for a TRV extension without the applicants
affixing their signatures anew to validate the correctness and truthfulness of the
information previously stated therein. The petitioner allegedly signed the
Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of Commission (BOC) of the BID,
forwarding the applications for TRV extension of several aliens whose papers were
questionable.
• The FIIB filed the formal complaint before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau
(AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman. The complaint was treated as both a
criminal (violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of
public documents) and an administrative charge (Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty).
• The criminal charges were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
• For the administrative case, the Graft Investigation Officer suspended the petitioner
for 1 year. After a motion for reconsideration, the suspension was reduced to 9
months without pay.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the suspension but reduced the suspension to 6
months without pay.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
• Issues: WON the Ombudsman’s findings are merely advisory on the Bureau of
Immigration and the findings that the TRV applications were illegal constitutes an
indirect interference by the Ombudsman into the powers of the BOC over
immigration matters.
Ruling:
NO. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties: . . .
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
Petitioner insists that the word recommend be given its literal meaning; that is, that
the Ombudsman’s action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any
binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman: ... Besides, assuming
arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no
authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more
particularly from his position in the BID.
Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public official or employee
found to be at fault, to the public official concerned. The word recommend must be
taken in conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance therewith. The proper
interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has
the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee
at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to
implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural
aspect of the Ombudsman’s functions and not its jurisdiction.
• Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject constitutional
provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the
case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to
prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the
power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported
by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is
before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court
nor is it safe from judicial examination.
II. Statutory Construction 7/17/18 10:02 AM
Dangat, Chapter 12
• Statutory Construction
o Statutes, rules, and regulations can be vague; in these cases, courts can
construe these laws.
o Process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the
given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
o Verba legis, index maximo sermo est (speech is the index of intention): Clear
and precise statutes need not be interpreted.
o Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat: law should be
interpreted with a view of upholding it rather than destroying it.
o Looking beyond the law is warranted when the law seems to be of doubtful
import.
o The following are the means for determining the legislative intent:
§ 1. Circumstances under which the action was taken;
§ 2. What evil is sought to be redressed;
§ 3. Contemporaneous construction.
• Power to construe laws and its limitations
o Act of defining and interpreting law is a judicial function which arises out of
the principle of separation of powers.
o Legislature cannot pass a law that violates the constitution.
o The Court’s exercise of judicial review is not an assertion of superiority to the
other departments.
Caltex v. Ledesma
• Construction is the process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention
of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law.
o Case re: Caltex’s hooded pump contest does not fall within the ban of the
Postal Law and that the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution
of its rules by the mails. Judgment affirmed. Absent the element of
consideration, the scheme is a gratuitous distribution of property by chance,
which the law does not condemn.
General v. Barrameda
• Ordinary meaning of word may imply different meaning from the intent of the law
(similar doctrine for Matibag v Benepayo in Consti 1)
• Interpretation of Sec. 31, CA 459: Is the redemption period counted from the date of
the auction sale or the date of the registration of the sale in the Register of Deeds? -
Yes
• In Salazar v. Meneses, it was held that the period of redemption started only when the
sale was registered, since the registration of the deed of conveyance for properties
brought under the Torrens System is the operative act to transfer title to the property,
and registration is also the notice to the whole world that a transaction involving the
same has taken place.
• This interpretation serves the ends of justice and equity. General and Gontang would
lose nothing because the P7,271.22 paid to DBM would simply be returned to them.
• But if the Court ruled the other way around, Barrameda would lose his land to DBP,
which acquired the land for only P7,271.22.
People v. Mapa
Illustrative cases:
1. Title
Ebarle v. Sucaldito
-EO is applicable to administrative cases and not to criminal cases. Based on the title speaks of
“COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES”, there is no mention, or by implication, of criminal
offenses. More specific term had it intended to make itself applicable there to.
2. Preamble
People v. Purisima
One of the aids available to determine intent is looking at the preamble which usually starts with
“Whereas”. The preamble includes events/reasons/facts that precipitated the enactment of the
statute. In this case, it was inferred from the preamble that PD 9 that only act of carrying
blunt/bladed weapon with motivation connected with desired results of Proclamation No. 1081
(Martial law declaration) is within the intent of PD 9 (3).
3. Punctuation Marks
People v. Subido
-In this case, scrutiny of the punctuation mark (effect of comma) was resorted to determine
whether subsidiary imprisonment apply to all antecedent or only to the last antecedent. In this
case, the use/position of the comma in the part of the of the sentence is to make the the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but also to non-payment of the fine.
Florentino v. PNB
- To determine which among the antecedents in the provision does the clause “who may be
willing to accept the same for such settlement,” the court looked into the position of comma
which appeared before the words “or to any citizen, etc.” Thus it was inferred that the qualifying
clause refers only to the last antecedent.
DOCTRINE OF LAST ANTECEDENT – “this clause will only refer to the antecedent closest to
the clause.”
5. Capitalization of Letters
Unabia v. City Mayor.
-Whether or not the Capital C and S in the word Civil Service in sections 1 & 4 of Art. XII of the
CONSTI, and the use of small letters in in section 670 of RAC applies only to classified service,
and are protected in the sections of CONSTI. The Court held that there is no difference in the use
of capital or small letters. There is no reason for exluding persons in unclassified service for both
expressly belong to the Civil Service should be given the same rights and privileges. The persons
in the unclassified service are so designated because of the nature of their work and
qualifications, are not subject to classification.
6. Headnotes or Epigraphs
People v. Yabut
-In this case, the issue arises from the interpretation of the statue from Spanish to English. In the
English translation, it seemed that a person previously convicted who commits another crime
should not be meted out additional penalty (?) The SC court that in the Spanish provision, no
such confusion exist. It held that epigraphs are mere catchwords or convenient index to content,
but it should not have the effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words. Secondary
aids may be consulted to remove and NOT TO CREATE doubt.
7. Statutory Directives
Vergara v. Coca-Cola
Constitution protect the rights of workers, to promote their welfare, and to accord them full
protection. In turn, said mandate is the basis of Art. 4 of the Labor Code states that “all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be rendered in favor of the labor. In this case, Vergara could have claimed the
Sales Incentive if he has proven that he had not failed to meet the collection qualifiers of the
Sales Incentive.
7/17/18 10:02 AM
Extrinsic Aids
Illustrative of Cases
1. Origin of the Statute
Carolina Industries v. CMS Stock Brokerage
If you wish to defend client using AmJur, use this case!!!
The Securities Act was promulgated for the benefit of stockbroker’s customers and public, who,
unike the brokerage firms are highly incapable of protecting themselves. The Court generally
follow American interpretations of laws adopted from the US like the Securities Act. Not only
provisions are adopted but also the interpretations of these statutes.
US v. De Guzman
For the proper construction and application of the terms and provisions of legislative enactments
which have been borrowed from or modeled upon Anglo-American precedents, it is proper and
oftentimes essential to review the legislative history of such enactments and to find an
authorative guide for their interpretation and application in the decisions of American and
English courts of last resort construing and applying similar legislation in those countries.
After doing so, it was ascertained that since the agreement was not complied with in good faith,
he shall prosecuted again despite of the previous dismissal (on the ground that he did not what
has been promised).
Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co.
If you wish to defend client that AmJur should not be used, use this case!!!
When Ortigas cited American jurisprudence, the court held that American decisions and
authorities are not per se controlling in the Philippines, the laws of which must necessarily be
construed in accordance with the intention of its own lawmaers and such intent may be deduced
from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation. Also it held that the
jurisprudence cited actually support the lower court’s Resolution no. 27 which is the subject of
the case (not favorable for Ortigas). Hence it was held that the Resolution is an exercise of police
power and should prevail over contractual obligations.
2. Legislative History
Buenaseda v. Flavier
Francisco v. Bosier
3.
IV. …in Relation to the Language of the Statute7/17/18 10:02 AM
IV. Interpretation and Construction in Relation to the Language of the Statute
Gatmaytan, Chapter 14 Interpretation of Words and Phrases
Canons of Construction *BE SURE TO DISTINGUISH CHAPTER 3, 4, 5 of SYLLABUS
• - set of background norms and conventions widely used when interpreting statutes.
• -rule of thumb/presumptions that help extract substantive meaning
• -duty of the court: NOT to give it a construction which would be repugnant to to an
Act of Congress
• -NO unanimity in using them
3 Leading Theories
1. Intentionalist theory – work under the premise that the aim of statcon is the
realization of legislative intent
-view extrinsic legislative sources as legit sources of authority
-consider legislature’s general purpose
2. New textualist – rely on statutory language itself as last best evidence of legislative
intent
-discards legislative history
-strict vision of textualism where absurd results are discarded
-statutory text is examined in context, examine other provisions of same statute,
how borrowed statutes are interpreted, and consult contemporary dictionaries.
3. Pragmatism – relies on multiple supporting arguments than single argument.
-eclectic and there is no single authoritative source
Substantive and Linguistic Canons
• Canons of interpretation – classified as linguistic or substantive
• Linguistic canons – apply rules of syntax to statutes (e.g “inclusion of the one is
exclusion of the other” / “inclusion unius est exclusion alterius”)
o To decipher legislative intent
• Substantive canons – purpose is to promote policies external to a statute
o Reflect judicially-based concerns, grounded in the courts’ understanding of
how to treat statutory text with reference to judicially perceived constitutional
priorities, pre-enactment common law practices, or specific statutorily based
policies.
o Inspired by values drawn from common law, statutes, and the Consti
o Represent value choices by the Court
Canons and Indeterminacy
• Canons can contradict each other and be abused. (e.g de Castro v. JBC)
• To address this,
o Court should give doctrines of statutory construction (stare decisis)
o Substantive canon should be expanded/revitalized, develop set of canons for
each doctrinal area which will serve as concrete guide on how judges should
interpret statues, source of extrinsic legal principles to resolve ambiguity
Latin Maxims
• Handy interpretative maxims
• Refers to a specific principle of statutory construction that can help courts interpret
legislation
• Guide judges in construing statutes and legal instruments
o Ex. Leges posteriors abrogant – subsequent laws repeal former ones
• Maxims form a code for statutory grammar that helps in understanding patterns of
language in legislative texts
General and Particular Uses of Words
• Legislators does not have to define every word used in the statute
• Words used – be given ordinary meaning as they are commonly used
• If literal meaning leads to absurdity, be interpreted according to the spirit and reason
of the law
Associated Words
• Noscitur A Sociis –Doctrine of Associated words
o When a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear
and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with
which it is associated.
o Word or phrase meaning – be ascertained with other words or phrases it goes
with
o Doesn’t always entail an enumeration.
• Ejusdem Generis
o General words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of
the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned
o Statute describes things a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a
generic character, the generic word is usually limited to things of a similar
nature with those particular enumerated, unless there be something in the
context of the statute that would repel such inference
o A long enumeration followed by a general term
• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
o The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others.
o A statute expressly limited to certain matters by its own terms may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others
o Does not apply to statute where enumeration is only a sample of the scope
o Closely related to exception firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis – which
means that, that which is not excepted must fall within the general rule. In
other words if it is not excluded, then it must be deemed included/covered
• Dissimilum Dissimili Est Ratio
o The court may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing
that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification
o ex. Members of Katipunan ng Kabataan – twenty one years old only
§ while officials of Sangguniang Kabataan - 21 y.o on the day of
election
• Casus Omisus Pro Omisso Habendus Est
o Corollary to Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
o a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally
o applies only when omission has been clearly established
• Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debemos
o When law does not distinguish, court should not distinguish
• Reddendo Singula Singulis
o "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate
object," or
o "let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken
distributively."
o words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate
connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if
possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict
grammatical construction demands otherwise
o "Men and women may become members of fraternities and sororities." This
passage can be construed in several ways. On the one hand, perhaps it means
that men may join both fraternities and sororities and that women may join
fraternities and sororities as well.
o Reddendo suggests that men should be matched with "fraternities" and women
should be matched with "sororities," not because of the meaning of those
words, but merely because of their placement within the relevant passage.
• Doctrine of Necessary Implication Expansive in nature as it fills in the gap
o Statute enacted will always have gaps which makes this doctrine necessary.
o What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed
o Contrary to Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius – what is not included is
deemed excluded, and
o Casus Omisus Pro Omisso Habendus Est – what is omitted is intentionally
ommitted
o Contrary to Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debemos – when
the law does not distinguish, the court should distinguish (?)
• Proviso, Exceptions and Saving Clauses Doctrine of Last Antecedent
o Generally, Proviso - to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately
preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately
follows.
§ Exception - clear legislative intent is to restrain or qualify not only
the phrase immediately preceding it (the proviso) but also earlier
provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole
o Saving clause – limit the effect of law
§ Ex. Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve
the right of the State to prosecute and punish offenses for violations of
e repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending or
under investigation. ß saving clause
7/17/18 10:02 AM
HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date
of last day of filing of the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the 3-
month period begins to run so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the
case. Judge Cruz made a rendition of his decision on November 28, 1975. The date of
rendition is the date of filing of the decision with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge
Cruz was able to rule on the case within the 3-month period because November 28,
1975 was merely the 85th day from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could
not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “upon the effectivity of
this constitution, the maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or
resolved from the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court,
12 months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts. In practice, the
Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The provision is mandatory,
its merely directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such
provision as mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless,
the SC warned lower court judges to resolve cases within the prescribed period and
not take this liberal construction as an excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.
• In Marcelinov. Cruz, Jr., the Court ruled on the directory nature of constitutional
provisions on procedure when Bernardino Marcelino, charged with the crime of rape,
moved for postponement of the promulgation of his conviction. Eighty-five days after
the case was submitted for decision, Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. filed his decision on
the case with the Deputy Clerk of Court. On the date of promulgation, however, the
accused moved for the postponement of the promulgation on the ground of loss of
jurisdiction for failure to resolve the case within the 90-day period provided for in the
Constitution.
• The Court pronounced that the trial court was able to render the decision within the
90-day period, when on the eighty-fifth day, it filed the decision. First, the reckoning
date of the period was not that of the promulgation but that of the rendition of
judgment and filing with the Clerk of Court. And in any case, the 90-day period in the
Constitution is directory.
o Section 11(1), Article X of the Constitution provides that:
Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a
case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission,
shall be eighteen months for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior collegiate courts, and three
months for all other inferior courts.
• While the Court recognized that constitutional provisions are generally mandatory, it
held that there are exceptions. One such exception is the period of deciding a case
which is held widely by authoritiess' to be merely directory. Evidencing this is the
phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," which shows that such period may
be modified according to the Court's sound discretion. Characterizing such provision
as merely procedural, the Court relied upon the pronouncement in Albermarle Oil &
Gas Co. v. Morris that constitutional provisions on procedure are directory.
o If not complied with will not invalidate decision or result to loss of jurisdiction.
• Finally, the Court explained that the liberal construction of the provision would result
in less injury to the public and would avoid "absurd, impossible or mischievous"
outcomes.
Sarmiento v. Mison
• In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to
enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of
Mison’s salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Petitioners argued that
such appointment contradicted Article VII Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution which
required the consent of the Commission on Appointments, and must, therefore, be
voided.
• The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent
Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
•
• ISSUE: W/N all appointments made by the president require approval of the
Commission on Appointments to be valid?
o Aids in Interpretation
§ debates on constitutional convention
o Statutes and Executive Regulations not Binding on Courts – statutes and
implementing rules are entitled to great weight in constitutional construction
however not binding or conclusive on courts
• ISSUES:
• Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736
• HELD/RULING:
• The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article IX of the
Constitution, which states:
• Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
• The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission
wherein it was stated that the transfer of one municipality in a district to another
district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive one. Minor adjustments
does not allow the change in allocations per district.
• It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736. Section 1 is
then annulled and set aside. The petition praying for the transfer of the municipality
of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte is
denied.
• Montejo v. COMELEC resorted to the records of the Constitutional Commission
when the Court invalidated the Commission on Elections' Resolution No. 2736,
redistricting certain municipalities in the province of Leyte. The Resolution
transferred municipalities from one legislative district to another. The Court reviewed
the records of the Constitutional Commission which empowered to make minor
adjustments to the reapportionments in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The Court ruled that the power to make legislative apportionments was wielded by
the Constitutional Commission itself, and thereby struck down the resolution.
• Oposa v. Factoran
• Facts:
• The principal petitioners are 44 minors duly represented by their respective parents,
as well as the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI). Minors further aver that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." They are praying
that the DENR cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. The demand was made on the ground that the adverse and
detrimental consequences of continued deforestation caused by logging violate the
“constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.”
• DENR Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that
petitioners have no cause of action against him and the issue raised is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government.
• In their Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that the complaint shows a
clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents
a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
• RTC Judge issued an order granting the motion to dismiss and further ruled that the
cancellation of Timber License Agreements would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
• Petitioners filed special civil action for certiorari of said order.
• Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of
action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),
Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution1, the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to
a healthful environment.
• Respondents argue that they see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action.
• ISSUE: WON the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology entitles
petitioners to a valid cause of action.
• HOLDING: Yes. Provisions that state general principles are usually
not self-executing but merely “suggestions” or principles from
which Congress may derive statutes. However, if a provision supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants rights may be enjoyed or
protected, then it is considered self-executing.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is
less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation – the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. These basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second.
Then President Corazon C. Aquino also promulgated on E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the
primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and
proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the
public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided
for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare
of the present and future generations of Filipinos." E.O. NO. 1922 and the Administrative Code
of 19873 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
Even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special
attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were
issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of
each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." The
latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners and all those they represent to a balanced and healthful ecology
is as clear as the DENR's duty – under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions – to
protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is granted, challenged Order is set aside.
in Oposav. Factoran, the Court held that Sections 15 and 16 may be the bases of a suit:
• While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated
in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation- aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners -the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even
be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution
itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation,
but also for those to come - generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched
earth incapable of sustaining life.
Citing Manila PrinceHotel v. GSIS, the Court explained that a provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution is usually not self-
executing. The Court held:
o But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
o