1
Petitioner’s arguments are unpersuasive. It is a general rule that a power of
attorney must be strictly construed; the instrument will be held to grant only
those powers that are specified, and the agent may neither go beyond nor
deviate from the power of attorney. However, the rule is not absolute and
should not be applied to the extent of destroying the very purpose of the
power. If the language will permit, the construction that should be adopted
is that which will carry out instead of defeat the purpose of the appointment.
Clauses in a power of attorney that are repugnant to each other should be
reconciled so as to give effect to the instrument in accordance with its
general intent or predominant purpose. Furthermore, the instrument
should always be deemed to give such powers as essential or usual in
effectuating the express powers.
In the present case, limiting the definitions of “absence” to that provided
under Article 381 of the Civil Code and of “incapacity” under Article 38 of
the same Code negates the effect of the power of attorney by creating
absurd, if not impossible, legal situations. Article 381 provides the
necessarily stringent standards that would justify the appointment of a
representative by a judge. Among the standards the said article enumerates
is that no agent has been appointed to administer the property. In the
present case, petitioner himself had already authorized agents to do specific
acts of administration and thus, no longer necessitated the appointment of
one by the court. Likewise, limiting the construction of “incapacity” to
“minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality
and civil interdiction,” as provided under Article 38, would render the SPA
ineffective. Article 1919(3) of the Civil Code provides that the death, civil
interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent
extinguishes the agency. It would be equally incongruous, if not outright
impossible, for the petitioner to require himself to qualify as a minor, an
imbecile, a deaf-mute, or a prodigal before the SPA becomes operative. In
such cases, not only would he be prevented from appointing an agent, he
himself would be unable to administer his property.
In the present case, limiting the definitions of “absence” to that provided
under Article 381 of the Civil Code and of “incapacity” under Article 38 of
the same Code negates the effect of the power of attorney by creating
absurd, if not impossible, legal situations. Article 381 provides the
necessarily stringent standards that would justify the appointment of a
representative by a judge. Among the standards the said article enumerates
is that no agent has been appointed to administer the property. In the
present case, petitioner himself had already authorized agents to do specific
acts of administration and thus, no longer necessitated the appointment of
one by the court. Likewise, limiting the construction of “incapacity” to
“minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality
and civil interdiction,” as provided under Article 38, would render the SPA
ineffective. Article 1919(3) of the Civil Code provides that the death, civil
interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent
extinguishes the agency. It would be equally incongruous, if not outright
impossible, for the petitioner to require himself to qualify as a minor, an
imbecile, a deaf-mute, or a prodigal before the SPA becomes operative. In
such cases, not only would he be prevented from appointing an agent, he
himself would be unable to administer his property. Olaguer vs. Purugganan
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC’S Second Division reveals a
startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of “Domicile” and
“Residence” in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement
with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence
is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a
conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s
qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the
1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that “[f]or the exercise of civil rights and
the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their
place of habitual residence.” In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept
of domicile to mean an individual’s “permanent home,” “a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.”
Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of

residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.
Domicile and Residence, Distinguished.—Residence, in its ordinary
conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is
that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes
such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s intent be to remain, it
becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual
to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons
his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is
used synonymously with domicile.—For political purposes the concepts of
residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws.
As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is
used synonymously with domicile.
Constitutional Law; When the Constitution speaks of “residence ” in election
law, it actually means only “domicile.”—The deliberations of the 1987
Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks
of “residence” in election law, it actually means only “domicile.”
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.—It is the
fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought
to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt
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to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which would lead to his or her disqualification.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual
residence in Leyte instead of petitioner’s claimed domicile, it appears that
petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a
space which required her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile.
The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8—the first requiring actual
residence and the second requiring domicile—coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner’s registration as a voter in Tolosa
obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could
be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to
negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established
by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things
of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that “she could not have
been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places” flies
in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made
distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law
purposes.
Domicile of Origin; A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile,
once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of
the fact of petitioner’s being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her
domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only
when she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his
family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent’s averments.

Requisites for a change of domicile.—Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).—In the absence of clear and positive
proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements
can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of
persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect
an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s
former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of
her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
Marriages; Husband and Wife; The presumption that the wife automatically
gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be
inferred from the use of the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated.—In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner
lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly
established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of “domicile” and
“residence.” The presumption that the wife automatically gains the
husband’s domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred
from the use of the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code because
the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.
A survey of jurisprudence yields nothing which would suggest that the
female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the
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husband’s choice of residence upon marriage.—A survey of jurisprudence
relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they
affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest
that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of
the husband’s choice of residence upon marriage.
It is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 of the Civil Code refers to “domicile”
and not to “residence.”—The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the
husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the
situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their
residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may
“live together.” Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to
“domicile” and not to “residence.” Otherwise, we shall be faced with a
situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for
professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences.
What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence—she did not
lose her domicile of origin.—Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to
then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged—by virtue of
Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband’s actual place of
residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos
had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and
Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos
did fix as his family’s residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any
of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300, G.R. No.
119976 September 18, 1995
Equal Protection Clause; It can hardly be doubted that the common law
imposition on a married woman of her dead husband’s domicile even
beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women—it cannot survive a
constitutional challenge.—Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we
have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and
equal protection of law. It can hardly be doubted that the common law

imposition on a married woman of her dead husband’s domicile even
beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based
discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting
family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge.
Domicile; The better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban
domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989.—Prescinding from these
premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that
petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband
in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner’s
Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband’s death;
otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal
rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This
stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it
was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by
the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Romualdez-Marcos vs.
Commission on Elections
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
“domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the
instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a
distinction between “residence” for purposes of election laws and
“residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
“residence” and “domicile” are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another. San Luis vs. San Luis
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first
marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
4
“retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent
has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article 40 to his case Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr
The Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested
rights.—Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first dispose of
preliminary matters relating to the applicable law and the guiding principles
in paternity suits. As to the former, plainly, the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209) governs the present controversy. As
correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, Uyguangco served as a judicial
confirmation of Article 256 of the Family Code regarding its retroactive
effect unless there be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold true
here, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the child has passed
away and the former having actually resisted the latter’s claim below.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the
second paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of
the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a “high standard of proof” is
required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which
cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire
to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously. By “continuous” is meant uninterrupted and
consistent, but does not require any particular length of time.
Rationale for the “High Standard of Proof” Requirement in Filiation
Proceedings.—The foregoing standard of proof required to establish one’s
filiation is founded on the principle that an order for recognition and support
may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family
or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence. Jison vs. Court of Appeals

Rule on constructive notice cannot apply in the crime of bigamy
notwithstanding the possibility of its being more favorable to the accused.—
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil cases
may be applied in criminal actions if the factual and legal circumstances so
warrant, we agree with the view expounded by the Court of Appeals that it
cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the possibility of its
being more favorable to the accused.
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not
be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken
of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the
offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage.
Also, a bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place where the
offender is not known to be still a married person, in order to conceal his
legal impediment to contract another marriage.
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any
right or interest therein is made in the Register of Deeds of the place where
the said property is located. Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds
concerned of the transactions involving the said property can easily be made
by any interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage, verification by
the offended person or the authorities of the same would indeed be quite
difficult as such a marriage may be entered into in a place where the
offender is not known to be still a married person. Be it noted that in the
criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive notice was
applied, involved therein were land or property disputes and certainly,
marriage is not property.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive
notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should
be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive
period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to
almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the
celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of
public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he
conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of
5
his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a
married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his
bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a
place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place
may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous
marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore
reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be
counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if
the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from
the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators of the said
offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the
petitioner would encourage fearless violations of a social institution
cherished and protected by law.
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make de
rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the
National Census Office and in various local civil registries all over the country
to make certain that no second or even third marriage has been contracted
without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is too formidable a
task to even contemplate.
While Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for
constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land
filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land to which it relates lies from the time of such registering, filing
or entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act No. 3753 (Act to
Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads
us to the conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the constructive
notice rule to the documents registered in the Civil Register.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all
likelihood we would be playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we
would be equating the contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of

conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the stability
of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a
primary concern of our society. Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals
NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION.—Marriage is something more than a
contract, though founded upon the agreement of the parties. When once
formed a relation is created between the parties which they cannot change
by agreement, and the rights and obligations of which depend not upon their
agreement but upon the law. The spouses must be faithful to, assist,
support, and live with each other.
2.HUSBAND AND WlFE; ACTION FOR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE.—The wife,
who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on
her part, may maintain an action against the husband for separate
maintenance when she has no other remedy, notwithstanding the
provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to
furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by
receiving and maintaining in his own home the one having the right to the
same.
SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT.—The complaint of the wife which alleges
unbearable conduct and treatment on the part of the husband is sufficient
to constitute a cause of action for separate maintenance. Goitia vs. Campos
Rueda., 35 Phil., 252, No. 11263 November 2, 1916
The statement of the civil status of a person in a certificate of title issued to
him is not conclusive to show that he is not actually married to another. It is
weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together
as husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption, especially
where the legitimacy of the issue is involved, may be overcome only by
cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy .
Reason for presumption of marriage.—The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
6
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is
the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation
of decency and law. Perido vs. Perido
Sex Change; A change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status—RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of
sex reassignment.— Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first
name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or
civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s
first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change
his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he
failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result
of using his true and official name. Silverio vs. Republic
The respondent, in effect, pleads for clemency, claiming that the
notarization of the questioned document was due to his negligence.
However, the document could not have been notarized if the respondent
had only exercised the requisite care required by law in the exercise of his
duties as notary public. Held, the respondent is guilty of malpractice and is
hereby suspended from the office of notary public for a period of six (6)
months, with the admonition that a repetition of the same or a similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
The Agreement is contrary to law, morals and good customs. Marriage is an
inviolable social institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the
public is deeply interested for it is the foundation of the family and of
society, without which there could be neither civilization nor progress. The
contract, in substance, purports to formulate an agreement between the

husband and the wife to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live
in adulterous relations with another man, without opposition from either
one, and what is more, it induces each party to commit bigamy. This is not
only immoral but in effect abets the commission of a crime. In re: Atty.
Rufillo D. Bucana
This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a
notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this
case.
We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-time office staff
who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaña herself
notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff
who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaña’s negligence in doing her
notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible
for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his
staff. Espinosa vs. Omaña
DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; NOT ACTIONABLE.—It is the
clear and manifest intent of Congress not to sanction actions for breach of
promise to marry.
2.ID.; ID.; SEDUCTION AS GROUND FOR AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES;
NATURE OF SEDUCTION CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 2219 OF NEW CIVIL
CODE.—The "seduction" contemplated in Article 2219 of the New Civil Code
as one of the cases where moral damages may be recovered, is the crime
punished as such in Articles 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEN SEDUCTION DOES NOT EXIST.—Where a woman, who was an
insurance agent and former high school teacher, around 36 years of age and
approximately 10 years older than the man, "overwhelmed by her love" for
a man approximately 10 years younger than her, had intimate relations with
him, because she "wanted to bind" him "by having a fruit of their
7
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy," it cannot be said
that he is morally guilty of seduction. Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 109 Phil. 629, No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
Mere sexual relations between two unmarried and consenting adults are not
enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has
repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who
are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and
where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that
would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action.
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain
extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on matters
touching on employees’ personal lives, especially those that will affect their
and their family’s future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether
they should or should not marry. However, we take this occasion to remind
judiciary employees to be more circumspect in their adherence to their
obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of
court personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not
only with respect to their official duties but also in their behavior outside the
Court as private individuals. This is the best way to preserve and protect the
integrity and the good name of our courts. Abanag vs. Mabute
The case under Article 21, cited as an example by the Code Commission, ref
ers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of
promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which
the woman has yielded. Where for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with the defendant, with repeated acts of intercourse, such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived, had
she surrendered exclusively because of deceit, artful persuasions and wiles
of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much
less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises

of marriage,' and she would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding
that the defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, no case is
made under Article 21 of the Civil Code and, no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing
the complaint. Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without
prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff
against defendant-appellant, if any. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
But to formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations
and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
good customs, for which the erring promissor must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil
Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of ,the said
Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said
Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner. Wassmer vs. Velez
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books.
ln the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
8
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him
and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is
founded on the following rationale: "The basis of human society throughout
the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only
a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law x x x." (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee,
43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban,
139 SCRA 230 [1985]). So much so that once a man and a woman have lived
as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted,
the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado
v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children
may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the
private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth referred to
in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts
contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the
two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have
presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they
continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same
manner as their brother Jacinto. Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
 9

Intersexuality; Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH); Words and Phrases; middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals
During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term “intersexuality” who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female.’” The current state of
to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as
female—an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances
both male and female sexes.—Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
condition causes the early or “inappropriate” appearance of male
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too
and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening
respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones
at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female;
(androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the
(2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the
phenotypic features of a male. Ultimately, we are of the view that where the
ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features
person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure
gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
CAH. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. During
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term “intersexuality” to apply
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant
to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. The term
biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in
is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality “is the state
cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes,
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither
respondent, is fixed.
exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes.” In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
a male or female gender role. Since the rise of modern medical science in
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment
Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia
in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the
female genitals. More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as
mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the
suffering from a “disorder” which is almost always recommended to be
human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of
mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of
female. In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not
the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the
be subject to outright denial. “It has been suggested that there is some
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm

other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the
law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his
personal judgment of being a male.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that
a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will
follow. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer
to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male. Republic vs. Cagandahan
The absence of a certificate of legal capacity is merely an irregularity in
complying with the formal requirements for procuring a marriage license, an
irregularity which will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the
basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate.—In passing, we
note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in
complying with the formal requirement for procuring a marriage license.
Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity
of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without
that certificate.
A divorce decree does not ipso facto clothed a divorcee with the legal
capacity to remarry—he must still adduce sufficient evidence to show the
foreign State’s personal law governing his status, or at the very least, he
should still prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.—Based
on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then
a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner
on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner’s contention that the court a
quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent
with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the
very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
10
The Court may not declare the second marriage of a divorcee null and void
on the ground of bigamy where there is a possibility that, under the foreign
law, the divorcee was really capacitated to remarry as a result of the divorce
decree—the most judicious course is to remand the case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show the divorcee’s legal capacity to
remarry.—Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage
to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn
out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner
as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence,
if any, which show petitioner’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in
that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’ marriage on
the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon,
Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated
January 12, 1994. Garcia vs. Recio
Marriage; Husband and Wife; Annulment of Marriage; Bigamy; The outcome
of the civil case for annulment of marriage has no bearing upon the
determination of the accused’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted; The ruling in People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843 (1954) and People
v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957) that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been
overturned—the prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code.—
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to
private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the
nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the
civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a
declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve
him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza

and People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary
to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been
overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code,
which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless
there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under
the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the
suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRO Board. As
discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a
criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question
where one case is administrative and the other is civil. Te vs. Court of
Appeals
For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its
annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code. This fraud, as a
vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud
enumerated in Article 86.
Legislative Intention.—The intention of Congress to confine the
circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of
marriage to three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the causes
of nullity enumerated in Article 85, Civil Code, fraud is the only one given
special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and
voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have
stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned
therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly
and specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding
article," and proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds
(misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a previous conviction,
and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to
exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the
enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: "No
11
other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment
of marriage."
Non-disclosure of a husband's premarital relationship, not a fraud.—Non-
disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is
not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground
for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of Article 86,
Civil Code. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital
lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the
marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent
was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in
which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent
being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees
with the rule or not. Anaya vs. Palaroan
Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise,
the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can
terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate.—As to the second
assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be
annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack
of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the
validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can
terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent,
insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant
failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr., 419 SCRA 118 [2004], we held that: In order
that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of
moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent
alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial.
Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness stand and should have

testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other
emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim
for moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be
substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person could have
proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely
personal to him.
Exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that
no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes
his clear right to moral damages. In the instant case, private respondent
failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not
likewise entitled to exemplary damages. Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to
exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the
annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony
of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at
securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the
wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established because from the commencement of the proceedings until the
entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein.
WOMAN'S REFUSAL FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION; NOT SUPPRESSION OF
EVIDENCE.—Although the wife's refusal to be examined or failure to appear
in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be
inferred, because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy
and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by
competent authority. This the court may do without doing violence to and
infringing upon her constitutional right. A physical examination in this case
is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being
compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotency being an abnormal
condition should not be presumed.
ANNULMENT; PRESUMPTION OF POTENCY; HUSBAND'S LONE TESTIMONY
INSUFFICIENT.—The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony
of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
12
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife. Jimenez vs. Republic of the Philippines, 109 Phil. 273, No.
L-12790 August 31, 1960
Husband and Wife; Marriage; Marriage License; A marriage license is a
formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio.—
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in
both their son’s and daughter’s birth certificates, which are also attached as
Annexes “B” and “C” in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits “B” and
“C” in the course of the trial. These pieces of evidence on record plainly and
indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence
renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows
that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona,
Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only
photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter
Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits
during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been
examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been
made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was
interposed to petitioner’s testimony in open court when she affirmed that
the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15,
1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence,
with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are
deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. Sy vs. Court of
Appeals
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35
of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the
beginning.” In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was

solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage
license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not
match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of
Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio. The
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the
general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent
and void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.
In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally
just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The
supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only
the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by
Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance
inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of
properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally.
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the
Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the
property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin
and Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were
in the name of Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The
13
property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name
of Sally with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally
as a single individual. We have ruled that the words “married to” preceding
the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-
ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code. Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan,
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that
no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a
local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
The certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil
registrar enjoys probative value and sufficiently proves that his office did not
issue a particular marriage license.—The above Rule authorized the
custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents,
civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications
for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The certification
of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar of Pasig
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section
29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of “due search and inability
to find” sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.
“Secret marriage” is a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to
refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives
and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties.—The fact that

private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her
petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer
any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage
was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject
marriage is one of those commonly known as a “secret marriage”—a legally
non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either
or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage
between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the
former. Republic vs. Court of Appeals
The Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA
122 (2000), we held: However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family
Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
In Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 351 SCRA 127 (2001), the Court ruled that it
is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages
despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we
held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it
is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
14
rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. De Castro vs. Assidao-De
Castro
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982,
or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine
its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio
pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the
ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence
of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at
the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that
no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil
registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact
that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in
the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome
by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless
the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt
as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor
of its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel,
admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of
either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite
the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period
 15

for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the The certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically
validity of the marriage; An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry
marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification
the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.— Petitioner, shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28,
in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost
then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and
efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No.
respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to
certifications, is effectively rebutted. According to Section 3(m), Rule 131 of
the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity
performed is among the disputable presumptions. The presumption of
in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption of regularity of
administratively liable.
performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other
The issue raised by petitioner—that they appeared before a “fixer” who evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively
arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.
certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR
The rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
Chapel—will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts
clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed
look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled;
in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing
on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of
officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license
the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the
the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license
marriage.
that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting
parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a
basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
Presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.—Semper
not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward
happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members
with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
alone.
presumption is of great weight. Alcantara vs. Alcantara

Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation,
an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested;
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.—“The basis
of human society through-out the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage
in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. Sevilla vs. Cardenas
Considering the admissions made by respondent, and as observed in the
Memorandum Report dated 22 October 1980 submitted by Deputy Court
Administrator, Leo D. Medialdea, concurred in by Court Administrator,
Justice Lorenzo Relova, there was no more need for a formal investigation
to determine the administrative liability of respondent Judge. Respondent
must be held guilty of the charge filed for in solemnizing the marriage of
Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy on 14 April 1978 without requiring the
essential pre-requisite of a marriage license, respondent had undoubtedly
transgressed Article 53(4) of the Civil Code in the absence of any showing
that the subject marriage falls under marriages of an exceptional character
wherein a license is not mandatorily required. Respondent was likewise
remiss in his duty under Article 68 of the Civil Code to transmit to the Local
Civil Registrar of Toledo City, within fifteen (15) days from the date of
solemnization of the marriage in question, a copy of the marriage contract
duly signed by him as the solemnizing officer and by the contracting parties.
The defense of good faith interposed by respondent is unavailing. As a
judicial officer, he is expected to know the law on the solemnization of
marriages. His feeling of "sympathy and fairness to the widow, Marlyn
Jagonoy" cannot serve as a license for him to deliberately transgress or
dispense with legal requisites.
In view, however, of respondent's twenty-seven (27) years and seven (7)
months of service in the Judiciary, and considering that he has applied for
retirement under Republic Act No. 5095 due to schemic heart ailment, we
16
have mitigated the corresponding administrative sanction. xxx finding
respondent Judge to be guilty of gross neglect of duty, he shall pay a fine
equivalent to three (3) months salary, the same to be deducted from his
gratuity upon his retirement from the service. Seguisabal us. Cabrera, 106
SCRA 670, Adm. Matter No. 2209-CTJ August 27, 1981
A judge who solemnizes a marriage without the required marriage license
dismally fails to live up to his commitment to be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.—Respondent, by his own
admission that he solemnized the marriage between complainant and
Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has dismally failed
to live up to his commitment to be the “embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence” and to his promise to be “faithful to the law.”
Good intentions could never justify violation of the law.—Respondent
cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Chris-tian motives which, at
most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him
completely. Good intentions could never justify violation of the law.
The judge must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for
the others to follow.—Must we always repeat our reminder in Uy v. Dizon
Capulong and several other cases that—. . . the judge is the visible
representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and
awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter
must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others
to follow. The judge should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law. To fulfill this mission, the judge should keep abreast of
the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. If the judge is already aware
of them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying them;
otherwise such omission can never be excused.
The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative
case against a respondent judge will not necessarily warrant dismissal
thereof.—Finally, on the alleged withdrawal of the complaint against
Respondent, we reiterate our ruling in Imbing v. Tiongson: The fact that
complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against
herein respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof.

Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its
jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the
complaint. The Court has an interest in the conduct of members of the
Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts
in that direction may not be derailed by the complainant’s desistance from
further prosecuting the case he or she initiated. Moreno vs. Bernabe
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. The requirement and issuance of
marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic “autonomous social institution.”
Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an “inviolable social
institution,” and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by
the State. This is why the Family Code considers marriage as “a special
contract of permanent union” and case law considers it “not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment.”
There are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why
no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.
To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of
public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication
of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt
them from that requirement.
17
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-
year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as “husband
and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage
to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to
not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be
noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons
are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known
to the local civil registrar.
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during
the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the

contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs
are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. The law
sanctions monogamy.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other
that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year
period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should
be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent.
It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with
any third party as being one as “husband and wife.”
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage
that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place and
cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary
in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. “A void marriage does not
require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
18
make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace
of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction.”
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause
“on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage. Niñal vs. Bayadog
Exceptions to the Rule that Marriage Should be Held in the Judge’s
Chambers.—As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be
held outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with
Article 29; or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect.
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must
also live and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to
shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the
law; he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly,
judges, by the very delicate nature of their office should be more
circumspect in the performance of their duties.
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried
solemnization of the marriage in this case only tend to degrade the revered
position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of social institutions in the
country. They also betray respondent’s cavalier proclivity on its significance

in our culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of
engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-
timed marital unions.
An elementary regard for the sacredness of lawslet alone that enacted in
order to preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as
marriageand the stability of judicial doctrines laid down by superior
authority should have given respondent judge pause and made him more
vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties as
a solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know the
constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court. Thus
respondent Judge should be reminded thatA priest who is commissioned
and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only
within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate
court justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed
to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down
in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Beso vs. Daguman,
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of
the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry
the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant
19
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.”
In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such
license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge
did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the
law. Arañes vs. Occiano
An ecclesiastic is ineligible to hold a municipal office under section 2175 of
the Revised Administrative Code. An Ordained minister of the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines registered as such in the Bureau of Public Libraries
with authority to solemnize marriages, is an ecclesiastic and ineligible to
hold the office of the Municipal Mayor. Resignation as such minister and
acceptance thereof by the cabinet of his church, are but self-serving
evidence if the resignation and its acceptance are not registered with the
Bureau of Public Libraries. If a candidate to a municipal office is a minister of
a church with license to solemnize marriages, it is his duty (and not of his
church) to secure from the Bureau of Public Libraries the cancellation of his
resignation as minister and to attach to his certificate of candidacy a copy of
such resignation.
The importance of registration cannot be underestimated. The purpose of
registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the
minister to discharge religious functions but equally to keep it informed of
any change in his religious status. This information is necessary for the
protection of the public. This is especially so with regard to the authority to
solemnize marriages, the registration of which is made by the law
mandatory (Articles 92-96, New Civil Code). Vilar vs. Paraiso
A man and woman appeared before a justice of the peace and there signed
a statement setting forth that they had agreed to marry each other and
asked the justice to solemnize the marriage. Another document was then

signed by them, by the justice and by two witnesses, stating that the man
and woman appeared before the justice and ratified all that was contained
in the preceding instrument and insisted upon the marriage. After the
signing of these documents the justice announced to the man and woman
that they were married. Held, That, under the circumstances in this case,
there was a sufficient compliance with section 6 of General Orders, No. 68,
to constitute a valid marriage. Martinez vs. Tan
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing
officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The
elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer;
and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case,
the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.
Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged “blessing” by the
petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an “illegal marriage
ceremony” which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a
“marriage ceremony” and what constitutes its “illegal” performance,
Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These
provisions were taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which, in turn,
was copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law with no substantial
amendments. Article 6 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It
shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.”
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of
church and State precludes the State from qualifying the church “blessing”
into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this
principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it
provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the
freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to
20
the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed. Ronulo vs.
People, 728 SCRA 675, G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
riminal Law; Bigamy; Elements; In Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis, the elements of
bigamy were laid down.—In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis we laid down the
elements of bigamy thus: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the
first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively
dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent
marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
There was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as
void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married. Morigo vs. People
There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of
the existence of such marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras, 122 SCRA 525).
Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would
be living in constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco,
22 Phil. 216) The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest
known in law. The law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and
not concubinage; legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption
that persons living together as husband and wife are married to each other.
The reason for this presumption of marriage is well stated in Perido vs.
Perido, 63 SCRA 97, thus: “The basis of human society throughout the
civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is not only a civil contract, but it
is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. x x x”

Same; Same; Same; Mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the
marriage registry does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites
for its validity are present.—And, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage,
as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present.
The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one
of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849)
Anent the second and third assigned errors, suffice it to say that the penalty
for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. (Article 246, Revised Penal Code)
Paragraph 3, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that where the
law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and the
commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances, with
no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus,
assuming the presence of the mitigating circumstances of provocation or
obfuscation and voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance
to offset the same, the penalty is still reclusion perpetua. People vs.
Borromeo
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father
and mother, while the latter was in artículo mortis, failed to send a copy of
the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said
marriage, since it does not appear that in tlTe celebration thereof all
requisites for its validity were not present, and the forwarding of a copy of
the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites. Madridejo vs. De
Leon
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord
with the findings and recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein
respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He
has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to
herein complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his
first wife, Librada Peña, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months
after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia
21
Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for
marriage license that his previous marriage had been annulled.
Respondent’s subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a “sham”
marriage will not justify his actuations.—Respondent’s subterfuge that his
marriage to petitioner was just a “sham” marriage will not justify his
actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste,
a defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not
speak well of respondent’s sense of social propriety and moral values. This
is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinary
lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a
Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the
consequence of a marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites.
Vda. de Mijares vs. Villaluz
If the money paid by the deceased was his own exclusively, the mere fact
that it was returned or repaid after marriage cannot convert it into conjugal
property. It is true that under Article 1401 of the Civil Code of 1889 property
obtained by the industry, wages or work of the spouses or of either of them
belongs to the conjugal partnership. But the article refers to property
obtained during the marriage.
Although there is no technical marital partnership between persons living
maritally without being lawfully married, nevertheless there is between
them an informal civil partnership -which would entitle the parties to an
equal interest in property acquired by their joint efforts. Where there is no
showing that the property was earned by the joint efforts of the two the
property must be deemed to have been the property of the party who
acquired it.
A standing crop of palay planted during the coverture, and harvested after
the death of one of the consorts, constitutes fruits and income within the
purview of Art. 1401 of the Civil Code and, therefore, should be considered
conjugal property. It is immaterial that the palay was actually received after
the dissolution of the marriage through the death of one of the spouses. It
is the date of accrual that is important. Lesaca vs. Lesaca

Indeed, it is not quite possible to state with precision and fix an inflexible
standard for the administrative offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct,
or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity that should render
employees of the judiciary unworthy of the public trust. Immorality covers a
multitude of sins and it may be doubted whether there are in the entire civil
service many persons so saintly as never to have done any act which is
disapproved by the prevailing mores of our society. Truly, while in the
opinion of many, laziness, gluttony, vanity, selfishness, avarice and
cowardice constitute in themselves immoral conduct, moral guardians get
around or avoid punishing them tangibly.
“Disgraceful and immoral conduct” is never considered in the abstract but
always in the context of conduct that is hostile to the welfare of a particular
profession or the specific governmental position to which the alleged
disgraceful and immoral employee belongs. To some degree the
determination of disgracefulness and immorality must depend upon the
nature of the acts, the circumspection or notoriety with which they are
performed and the atmosphere of the community, i.e., the standards of the
general public and not some higher standard, in which they take place.
Moreover, there is simply nothing disgraceful and immoral in respondent’s
decision to pursue her happiness, and perhaps security, after her lawful
husband abandoned her for another woman. She did not forsake any child
nor desert her household. It was her philandering husband who left her for
another woman. To paraphrase Judge Learned Hand, Soledad was not
obligated to live in complete celibacy otherwise forfeit her claim to good
moral character. There ought to be a better order of moral priorities to avoid
the perceived fixation on sex where a person may have impeccable sexual
standards—or indeed be celibate—and yet steal. To be sure, there are
matters that are best left to the conscience and the moral beliefs of an
individual, and matters of which public law may take cognizance. Obviously,
while the latter pertains to matters affecting society and public life, not
every “irregular union” constitutes immorality that is actionable under
administrative law. Consider this: a Catholic who obtains a decree of nullity
from his church would be available to remarry by the norms and precepts of
his faith and moral standards. Before civil law, however, his marriage would
22
be bigamous. The second union may be categorized as a crime, but one
would hardly be justified in classifying it as “immoral conduct” because the
moral standards he lives by—those of his faith—precisely permit him the
second marriage. To hold that the second union is immoral would be to bind
him to follow moral precepts divergent from those imposed upon him by his
faith, contrary to the freedom of conscience and practice of his religion
guaranteed under the Constitution. Estrada vs. Escritor
For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated
to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife;
and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is
void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. Mercado-Fehr vs.
Fehr
While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16, 1978, it is
still the Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships, however, which
will govern the property relations between Deogracio and Virginia even if
they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 105 of
the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to
conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice
to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus,
under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage,
the presumption is that they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on
the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the
requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired
during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.
The applicable law, however, insofar as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liability is concerned, is Article 129 of the Family Code
in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who
are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case.

Same; Same; Same; Same; For Article 147 to operate, the man and the
woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit
of marriage or their marriage is void, as in the instant case.—This particular
kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear,
therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must
be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term “capacitated” in the
first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to
contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have
existed on the part of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived exclusively
with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to
be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A party who did not participate in the acquisition
of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly
if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household.—Property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry should, therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-
-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed to the same jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to
the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or
work or industry.
Same; Same; Same; Conjugal Properties; All properties acquired by the
spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are
registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The
presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of
23
the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one (1) of the spouses
only.—We note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they
acquired the subject properties during the subsistence of their marriage. The
certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome
the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties
acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the
properties are registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise.
The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title
of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses
only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if
the property is “registered in the name of one or both of the spouses.” Thus,
the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were
obtained by the spouses’ joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly
owned by them in equal shares. Accordingly, the partition of the former
spouses’ properties on the basis of co-ownership, as ordered by the RTC and
the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. Ocampo vs. Ocampo,
Circumstances which would constitute competent evidence to prove the
fact of marriage.—Pugeda vs. Trias ruled that when the question of whether
a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following
would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the
matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife
after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children
born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
Same; Same; Paternity and Filiation; A baptismal certificate though not a
conclusive proof of filiation, is one of “the other means allowed under the
Rules of Court and special laws” to show pedigree.—Although a baptismal
certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of “the other
means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws” to show pedigree,
as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals: “What both the trial
court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by ‘any other

means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,’ according to the Civil
Code, or ‘by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,’
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence,
the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals,
Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and
documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.–In the
present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela
Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner
herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the
testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well
as by petitioner’s own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent
and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact
of marriage.
Certificates; Failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record
purposes does not invalidate the marriage.–Respondent Pedro Pilapil
misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the
Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National
Census and Statistics Office (NCSO). He finds it quite “bizarre– for petitioner
to have waited three years before registering their marriage. On both
counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to
send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate
the marriage. In the second place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to send a
copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell
upon the solemnizing officer. Vda. de. Jacob vs. Court of Appeals
Ratification of Marital Cohabitation; The reason for the law on ratification of
marital cohabitation, whereby no marriage license is required, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who
24
have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.—The instant
case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the
Civil Code, which provides: ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage. The reason for the law, as espoused by
the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.
The falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in
truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders
the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.—It is not contested
herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that
“they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because
of this union, they desire to marry each other.” One of the central issues in
the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital
cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum
five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack
of a marriage license. We answer in the affirmative. Republic vs. Dayot
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of
the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex—at the very
least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the
marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such, and secret meetings or nights
clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such
kind of cohabitation.—In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term
“cohabitation” or “living together as husband and wife” means not only

residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse.
Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially
when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in
sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a
woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife,
thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or
nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not
constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this
jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law
relationship the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of
concubinage, or the existence of illegitimate children. Arcaba vs. Vda. de
Batocael, 370 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
Proof that first marriage was vitiated by force, not necessary in an action for
a declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the second husband; Reason.—
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated
by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the
marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80,
Civil Code)
Introducing evidence about existing prior marriage, not necessary as the first
marriage though void, still needs a judicial declaration of such fact; Woman’s
marriage to second husband void; Case at bar.—There is likewise no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void
still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for
all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law. Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy
A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact under
the. Family Code even for purposes other than remarriage.—Came the
25
Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on
the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage
is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity
of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy.
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes
that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive
of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters’
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously
contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into
another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove
that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Actions; Declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for
the liquidation of property, custody and support of children, etc. There is no
need of filing a separate civil action for such purposes.—Based on the
foregoing provisions, private respondent’s ultimate prayer for separation of

property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner’s
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary
civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code
has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one
of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property
relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before
whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed
with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple’s
properties. Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
Article 40 of the Family Code requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of
a previous marriage before a party may remarry.—Article 40 of the Family
Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage,
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before
a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the
parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the
marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is
a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity
at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered
that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements
concur—two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage
which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the
material time of the first marriage.
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, only competent courts having such authority.—Respondent’s clear
intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for
bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code,
contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is
equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A
party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—
usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent
26
marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A
party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis
Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.—It is evident therefore that
petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention that he cannot
be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity
of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The finality of the judicial declaration of the nullity of previous marriage of
the accused cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous
marriage.—Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the
offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability
appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of
filing of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material
only for determining prescription. The crime of bigamy was committed by
petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage
with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the
nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the
date of the bigamous marriage. Teves vs. People

This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as
provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is
what transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the
documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the
marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their
marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that
private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila;
(2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with
petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo
at the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009
and that it was only on said date that private respondent’s marriage with
Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second
marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and
void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second
marriage was contracted. Iwasawa vs. Gangan
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of
petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas
would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.” A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.
The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code
into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent
27
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority
of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony
wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).–Moreover,
the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the
validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal
capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the
presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing
officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties
personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer
in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family
Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under
any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may contract
marriage.
The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it
does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage.–Since
psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an
infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contracting a valid
marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage
due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal
charge for bigamy. Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage.―The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
(a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony
is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second

marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not
for the subsistence of the first marriage.
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage.―At the time respondent contracted the
second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been
legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of
the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged
were sufficiently alleged. Montañez vs. Cipriano,
He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.—The Court
recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It
further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
It is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon
the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to
him until extinguished as provided by law.—It is a settled rule that the
criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
provided by law. It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by
petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private
respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of
28
petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge
for bigamy against him. Capili vs. People
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court
makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained
valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the
United States of America (USA) for the added security of avoiding any charge
of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine
jurisdiction.—From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce
decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was not
recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at
that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot
marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity.
Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding,
he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty.
Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and
purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage. It has also not escaped the
attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained
valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA
for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the
subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. Moreover, assuming
arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez
knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted
to various legal strategies in order to render a facade of validity to his
otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree. Perez vs. Catindig

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a
subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the
ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife” — it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Fujiki vs. Marinay
Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal
spouse of the deceased member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the
latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo
contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by their
marriage contract. Edgardo even acknowledged his married status when he
filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his spouse.
Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna,
without doubt, failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the
impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her
marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule that “whoever claims entitlement to
the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by
substantial evidence.” Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the
earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether
there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her
marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of
Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal
spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be
the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.
Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of
marriages, it is required by Section 4(b)(7) of R.A. No. 8282 to examine
available statistical and economic data to ensure that the benefits fall into
the rightful beneficiaries. As held in Social Security Commission v. Favila, 646
29
SCRA 462 (2011): SSS, as the primary institution in charge of extending social
security protection to workers and their beneficiaries is mandated by
Section 4(b)(7) of RA 8282 to require reports, compilations and analyses of
statistical and economic data and to make an investigation as may be
needed for its proper administration and development. Precisely, the
investigations conducted by SSS are appropriate in order to ensure that the
benefits provided under the SS Law are received by the rightful beneficiaries.
It is not hard to see that such measure is necessary for the system’s proper
administration, otherwise, it will be swamped with bogus claims that will
pointlessly deplete its funds. Such scenario will certainly frustrate the
purpose of the law which is to provide covered employees and their families
protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death, with
a view to promoting their well-being in the spirit of social justice. Moreover
and as correctly pointed out by SSC, such investigations are likewise
necessary to carry out the mandate of Section 15 of the SS Law which
provides in part, viz.: Sec. 15. Non-transferability of Benefits.—The SSS shall
pay the benefits provided for in this Act to such [x x x] persons as may be
entitled thereto in accordance with the provisions of this Act x x x Social
Security Commission vs. Azote
The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary
proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and
executory. Article 41, in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the
purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent

spouse. Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory. With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no
longer subject to an appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein having
become immutable and unalterable not only as against the parties but even
as against the courts. Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter how
erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and executory nature of this
summary proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal.
While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial
court’s judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired. As held
in De los Santos v. Rodriguez, et al., 22 SCRA 451, 455 (1968), the fact that a
decision has become final does not automatically negate the original action
of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in connection with
orders or processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of
where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not
available.
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must
be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: 1. That the
absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That
the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-
founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse
files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code
which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a “well-founded
belief” that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
30
presumptive death can be granted. We have had occasion to make the same
observation in Republic v. Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20 (1993), where we noted the
crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of
the Civil Code, to wit: Under Article 41, the time required for the
presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there
is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter
standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires
either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee
is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as “well founded belief”
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted. Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even
for such period required by the law), lack of any news that such absentee is
still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under
the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise
that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of “well-
founded belief” which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead.
The law did not define what is meant by “well-founded belief.” It depends
upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to
speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this
requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
The Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their
marriage, has consistently applied the “strict standard” approach. This is to
ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41

of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws.
Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the
stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.), we emphasized that: In view of
the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due
diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in
locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with.
There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been
resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their
alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who
cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of
the xxx summary nature of its proceedings. Republic vs. Cantor
Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of
presumptive death may be granted, the present spouse must prove that
he/she has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. In this case, Edna
failed. The RTC and the CA overlooked Edna’s patent noncompliance with
the said requirement. The well-founded belief in the absentee’s death
requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort
(not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the
period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still
alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence
under the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the
Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with
the stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more
importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases,
particularly Republic v. Cantor, 712 SCRA 1 (2013), Edna’s efforts failed to
31
satisfy the required well-founded belief of her absent husband’s death. Her
claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it
merely consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on
record. She also failed to present any person from whom she inquired about
the whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her children from
whom she learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact, she was the
lone witness. Following the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence
and is not equivalent to proof, the Court cannot give credence to her claims
that she indeed exerted diligent efforts to locate her husband. Moreover, no
document was submitted to corroborate the allegation that her husband
had been missing for at least fifteen (15) years already. As the OSG observed,
there was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at the time
her husband disappeared. In Cantor, the present spouse claimed to have
sought the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, reported his absence
to the police. Yet, the Court denied her pleas. Republic vs. Orcelino-
Villanueva
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence
made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the- celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that
the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that
such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present
so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage Jones vs.
Hortigüela
The four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the
Family Code are as follows: 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for
four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3.
That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;

and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her
“well-founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her
filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and
can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in
law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.” Republic vs. Granada
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration
of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article
41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article
83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such
absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article
390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes a "well founded belief' that the absentee is already dead before
a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. Republic vs.
Nolasco
Exceptions when the subsequent marriage will not be considered void.—
Paragraph 2 mentions three cases when the subsequent marriage will not
be considered void: (1) when the absent spouse has not been heard from for
seven consecutive years and the present spouse has no news that he/she is
alive; (2) when, although he/she has been absent for less than seven years,
the absent spouse is generally considered to be dead and believed to be by
the spouse present; and (3) when he/she is presumed to be dead after four
years from the occurrence of any of the events enumerated in Art. 391 of
the Civil Code.
It has been held that the first exception refers to the subsequent marriage
of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse,
after the period of seven years has lapsed. This exception cannot be invoked
32
in this case in order to sustain the validity of Aurelio’s marriage to Luisita
because apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the time of
his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had already been living
together as husband and wife for five years. In fact the couple begot a child,
in 1961, even before their marriage in 1962. Bienvenido vs. Court of Appeals
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated
by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse
who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent
marriage is necessary. x x x The termination of the subsequent marriage by
affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the Family Code does
not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent
marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere
reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent
marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has
been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead,
such presumption continues in spite of the spouse’s physical reappearance,
and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee
until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. Social Security System vs. Jarque
Vda. de Bailon
The Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy
of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance. The filing of
an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse
that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or

she was declared absent or presumptively dead. Moreover, a close reading
of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent
marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the
nonexistence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it
void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties
to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of
reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of
presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already
dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail
over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. The
second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of
proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the
person assailing the validity of the second marriage.
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for
terminating the subsequent marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de
Bailon, 485 SCRA 376 (2006). This court noted that mere reappearance will
not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent
marriage were notified if there was “no step . . . taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by
court action[.]” “Since the second marriage has been contracted because of
a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or
she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law.”
Same; Same; Same; Conditions for a Bigamous Subsequent Marriage to be
Considered Valid.—A second marriage is bigamous while the first
subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered
valid when the following are present: 1) The prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years; 2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead; 3) There must be a summary
33
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse;
and 4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted
after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a
well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will
not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the
valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered
bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is
protected by law.
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the
termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who
was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in
law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also
be terminated by filing “an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage.” Santos vs. Santos
The term “psychological incapacity,” as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained
by the Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos,
concluded: “It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase ‘psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend
all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, ‘psychological incapacity’ should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations

to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.”
Pesca vs. Pesca
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties,
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity” under Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriages. Thus
correlated, “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
34
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however,
do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder,
indicia of psychological incapacity. Santos vs. Court of Appeals
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does
not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be “legitimate.”
It must be shown that the disordered personality completely unable
respondent to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.—
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
Dedel vs. Court of Appeals
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the
law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment
of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all fours” with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
 35

The root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
identified and sufficiently proven by experts.—Taking into consideration cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves.
these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above- It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline celebration of the marriage. Ochosa vs.Alano
No. 2 which requires that the root “cause of psychological incapacity must
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz.:
incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of
fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which
voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was
Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the
likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since
spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a] Only an aggrieved
the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered. Republic vs. Dagdag
or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the
marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly
On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not
incognitive of the basic marital covenants. It is a malady so grave and so
to seek its dissolution. Enrico vs. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect
in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists
of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as
a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological illness. Yambao vs. Republic