CRIMPRO OUTLINE

General Matters

1. Distinguish Jurisdiction over subject matter from jurisdiction over person of the
accused.
Cases:
Antiporda Jr. v. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos filed
before the Sandiganbayan without claiming that one of the accused is a public officer who
took advantage of his position. The information was amended to effectively describe the
offense charged herein and for the court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction over the
same by stating that Antiporda took advantage of his position. Accused filed a motion for
new preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest
issued. The same was denied. The accused subsequently filed a motion to quash the
amended information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged because of the
amended information. This was denied as well as the MR on the same. Hence, this
petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RULING: YES. They are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention
that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same
was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted
therein. However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration
and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997 filed with the same court, it was they who
"challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in
their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is,
for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the
case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. In
the case of Arula vs. Espino it was quite clear that all three requisites, i.e., jurisdiction
over the offense, territory and person, must concur before a court can acquire jurisdiction
to try a case. It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over the
case. And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that when they filed
a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Court's authority.

Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 72

Facts: Lutgarda Cruz was charged with the crime of “Estafa through Falsification of Public Document”
before the Manila Regional Trial Court. Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the
registered owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since the offended party did
not reserve the right to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense, the civil action was
deemed instituted in the criminal case. On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the decision.
On February 10, 1994, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration dated February
7, 1994, assailing the trial court’s ruling on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner furnished the
City Prosecutor a copy of the motion by registered mail. Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals to nullify the two assailed orders of the trial court.
Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to resolve her motion for
reconsideration of the decision dated February 7, 1994.After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered
its decision dated January 17, 1994acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In the same
decision, the trial court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to the
surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan
Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the civil aspect of the case?
Held: Yes. The RTC of Manila has jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the Criminal
Case. There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire criminal
jurisdiction. First, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Second, the court must have
jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed. Third, the court must have jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.
In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on
the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through falsification of a
public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was
committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the person of
accused-petitioner because she voluntarily submitted to the court’s authority. Where the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed
within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law
requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising
from the crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “[E]very person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.”Article104 of the same Code states that “civil liability x x x includes restitution.”

Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 300 SCRA 367

no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. The clause unequivocally means that the judge must make his own determination—
independent of that of the prosecutor — of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest,
based on the complainant's and his witnesses' accounts, if any. Supporting evidence other than the
report and recommendation of the investigators and the special prosecutor should be examined by the
court
FACTS:1.January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General before the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), petitioner,former Administrator of the
Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the former members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner
among them, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for having
conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of their public positions and/or using
their powers; authority, influence,connections or relationship with the former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted adonation in the
amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation
(COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits,
advantage and preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable
negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines.
2.Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary investigation conducted
by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was directed to transmit the complaints and records of
the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
3.In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the filling of an
Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.4.Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred
by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review
and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal information.5.In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992
the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated
June 2,1992.6.August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel of
investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed by respondent Lobregat.7.In a
Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators recommended that the motion to
suspend proceedings be granted.8.On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for
comment to the Office of the Special Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December 1,1993 of the
panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicialquestion.9.On February 17, 1995, an
order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan.10.On February 22,
1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise filed, through counsel, a Manifestation stating
that he was posting bail without prejudice to the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion
For Leave To File a Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution which he filed.11.In a
Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred petitioner from leaving the
country except upon approval of the court.12.On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned
pleading not guilty to the Information.13.In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995,
Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrant the filing against
petitioner and recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation for dismissal was
approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on November 15, 1996.14.On December 13, 1996 petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging that with the reversal of the earlier findings of the
Ombudsman of probable cause, there was therefore nothing on record before the respondent
Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest andthe assumption of
jurisdiction over the instant case.
ISSUES:
1.WON the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be
lifted if initially valid? YES
2.WON the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner? YES
RATIO:
1.Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to issue the warrant of
arrest against the accused :at the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Investigators of the
Office of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of the Information and the Memorandum dated June
16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial question which
will warrant the suspension of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had nothing more to support its
resolution.
2.The Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally determining the
existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. The 2 cited document above were the
product of somebody else’s determination, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the
Sandiganbayan.
3.InRoberts vs. Court of Appeals,the Court struck down as invalid an order for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest which were based only on "theinformation, amended information and Joint Resolution", without
the benefit of the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause.
4.In Ho vs. People,the Court the respondent "palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto
issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and
recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence
otherthan such bare findings and recommendation.
5.With regards to jurisdiction, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.By posting bail, herein petitioner
cannot claim exemption effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court.While petitioner has
exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting
bail, his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through
the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs.
6.In La Naval Drug vs. CA, Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have
submitted himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover,"[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of
objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction
over the person.
Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 677
2. Requisites for exercise of criminal jurisdiction.
How Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred?
Cases:
Durisol Philippines, Inc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121106, Feb 20, 2002
De Jesus v .Garcia, 19 SCRA 554
Tolentino v. Social Security Commission, 138 SCRA 428

Municipality of Sogod v. Sandiganbayan, 312 SCRA 77

Action
: petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
accused orders of respondent judge which dismissed the complaints filed with the trial court
50’, Congress passed Republic Act No. 522 creating the municipality of Bontoc
A boundary between the municipality of Bontoc and the municipality of Sogod,52, the Provincial
Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 617 directing the holding of a plebiscite purpose of the
plebiscite is to determine whether the people in these barrios would like to remain with the
municipality of Sogod or with Bontoc. more votes were cast in favor of Sogod59, the Provincial
Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 519 recommending to the President of the Philippines
and/or to the Congress of the Philippines that Republic Act 522 be amended so as to include in
said Act creating the municipality of Bontoc,59 - President, EO No. 368, which approved the
recommendation of the provincial board of Leyte, and reconstituted the barrios and sitios which
shag compose the municipalities of Bontoc and Sogod60 - BY DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT
PLEASE SUSPEND IMPLEMENTATION OF EO 36870
–
Sogod, filed certiorari and prohibition in the CFI enjoin the provincial board and provincial
governor from taking cognizance of the long pending boundary dispute between the two
municipalities and to enjoin the municipality of Bontoc from exercising territorial jurisdiction over
the barrios of Pangi, Taa Casao, Sta. Cruz,Tuburan and Laogawan all allegedly belonging to
the municipality of Sogod.73
–
CFI dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction
Hence this petition:
Issue: whether or not the trial court gravely erred in dismissing the two cases for lack of
jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction has been defined as the power and authority to hear and determine a cause or the
right to act in a case (Herrera v. Barrette and Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245; Conchada v. Director of
Prisons, 31 Phil. 4). Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be
fixed by the will of the parties nor can it be acquired or diminished by any act of the parties. In
determining whether a case lies within or outside the jurisdiction of a court, reference to the
applicable statute on the matter is indispensable. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of commencement of action (Tolentino v. Socia
lSecurity Commission, L-28870, September 6, 1985, 138 SCRA 428; Lee v. Municipal Trial
Court of Legaspi City Br. 1, No. 68789, November 10, 1986, 145 SCRA 408; Dela Cruz v. Moya,
No. 65192, April 27, 1988, 160 SCRA838).at the time the civil actions were filed with the trial
court by petitioner municipality in 1970, the applicable laws necessary for the determination of
the question of whether the trial court has the authority to decide on the municipal boundary
dispute are the following: 1) Republic Act No. 522, creating the municipality of Bontoc;2)
Republic Act No. 3590, the Revised Barrio Charter, revising Republic Act No. 2370; and 3)
Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
HELD: Considering the foregoing, We find that the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the
cases for want of jurisdiction and in allowing the provincial board to continue with the pending
investigation and proceedings on the boundary dispute.The petitions are DISMISSED.

Fukuzume v. People, 474 SCRA 570

Facts:
Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum
scrap wires, accompanied by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque.
Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa
Electric Corporation and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume
confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they
are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzume’s representation to be true, Yu
agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. This transaction later turned
uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply his undertaking to return Yu’s money when Yu
was refused by NAPOCOR, thus, prompting Yu to file an estafa case.
Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty
as charged. Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed
the trial courts’ decision modifying only the penalty, hence, the petition before the SC.
Issue: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Held: SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that the CA
erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit
subscribed by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was
presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged that he gave
Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However,
we agree with Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that
he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latter’s house. It is not disputed
that Fukuzume’s house is located in Parañaque.
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that
affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that
he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the
subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel
in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals: However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However,
aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu’s sworn statement or to prove
that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in
Makati. From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that
Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients
of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting
Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without
prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent
jurisdiction.

Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173

Facts:
Renato Cudia was arrested on June 28, 1989 in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. He was brought to Sto. Domingo,
Angeles City which a preliminary investigation wasconducted and as a result the City
Prosecutor filed an information against him.The case against him was raffled to Branch
60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. Upon his arraignment,the court called the
attention of the parties and contrary to the information, Renatio Cudia had committed
the offense inMabalacat and not in Angeles City. Thus the judge ordered that the case
should be assigned to a court involving crimescommitted outside Angeles City
consequently it was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.However, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga filed an information charging Renato Cudio with the
same crimeand it was likewise assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC which
resulted into two Information filed woth thesame crime. This prompted the City
Prosecutor to file a Motion to Dismiss/ Withdraw the Information which the trial
courtgranted.Renato filed a Motion to Quash the criminal case filed by the Provincial
Prosecutor on the ground that hiscontinued prosecution for the offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition
—
for which he had been arraignedin the first criminal case, and which had been
dismissed despite his opposition
—
would violate his right not to be puttwice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to
the Court of Appeals. Theappellate court, stating that there was no double jeopardy,
dismissed the same on the ground that the petition could nothave been convicted under
the first information as the same was defective. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
wasdenied; hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the City Prosecutor of
Angeles City did not have theauthority to file the first information.
Ruling:
No.It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file
the first information, theoffense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat,
which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No.1275, in relation to Section 9 of
the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:
Sec. 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated
all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances
within their respective jurisdictions
and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made againstthe persons
accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the
sworn statements or takeoral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the
purpose.It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who
should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of
Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a publicprosecuting officer,
cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney
or someoneauthorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.In fine, there
must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. As thefiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first
information would not be a bar to petitioner'ssubsequent prosecution. As the first
information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the
instantpetition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke
double jeopardy.Thus Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 312 SCRA 77

Cuyos v. Garcia, 160 SCRA 302
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos was charged with homicide withmultiple serious physical
injuries and damage to proeperty throughreckless imprudence before the Municipal
Court of San Fernando,Pampanga. Cuyos entered a plea of not guilty at the
arraignment andthe judge set the case for trial, but before it could commence,
petitionerfiled a Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance.
Cuyosclaimed that there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Courtand
contended that the damages suffered by the Volkswagen he hitamounted to
P18,000.00. He argued that under Art. 365, par. 3 of theRevised Penal Code, the crime
would carry a fine in an amount rangingfrom the amount of the damage to three times
the value of the damagealleged (i.e. 3 x P18,000.00=P54,000.00).Under §87 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, the Municipal Court of Pampanga only has jurisdiction over
offenses punishable by a fine notexceeding P6,000.00. Cuyos filed an Urgent Motion to
Postpone the Trial.The municipal judge denied the motion to transfer and set the case
for
trial. Cuyos‟ verbal motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San Fernando,Pampanga has
jurisdiction to try the case against Cuyos
HELD:
The Court agrees with the position of the Solicitor General that theMunicipal Court has
no jurisdiction to try the present case. The case at barinvolves a complex crime of
homicide, multiple serious physical injuriesand damage to property resulting from
reckless imprudence. Art. 365,par.2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty imposableupon petitioner, if found guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence,would be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. At
thetime the complaint was filed, the Municipal Court had jurisdiction toimpose a penalty
of imprisonment not exceeding six(6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or
both.Thus, because the penalty for damage to property throughimprudence or
negligence as provided in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code is, “a fine ranging from the amount equal to the va
lue of damagesto three times such value, the case must be forwarded to the Court of
FirstInstance. Art. 365 simply means that if there is only damage to property,the amount
fixed shall be imposed, but if there is also physical injuries,there should be an additional
penalty for the latter.The applicable rule on allocation of jurisdiction on cases
involvingcases of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries
issummarized by justice Barrera. Barrera stated that in such cases, Art. 48of the
Revised Penal Code is applicable, but there may be cases when theimposable penalty
is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court, whilethe fine is under the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance. Since theinformation cannot be split into two, the jurisdiction
of the court isdetermined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resultingfrom
the reckless imprudence. The maximum fine imposable for the crimein this case is
P54,000.00 and the maximum imprisonment for homicide issix (6) years. Therefore, the
criminal charge falls outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court and within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.The order of the Municipal Court is SET ASIDE
as null and voidand the Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT

How Jurisprudence over the subject matter is determined?

Cases:
Mobilia Products v. Umezawa, G.R. No. 149357, March 4, 2005
Umezawa, then the President and General Manager of MPI, organized another company with his wife
Kimiko, and his sister, Mitsuyo Yaguchi, to be known as Astem Philippines Corporation, without
knowledge of the Board of Directors of MPI. The said company would be engaged in the same
business as Mobilia. Umezawa stole products from MPI amounting to P3,219,875.00.MPI and public
prosecutor filed criminal complaints against Umezawa. The trial court asserted that the controversy
involving the criminal cases was between Umezawa and the other stockholders of MPI. It also held
that the SEC, not the trial court, had jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies.CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC that the dispute between Umezawa and the other stockholders and officers over the
implementation of the MPI’s standard procedure is intra-corporate in nature; hence,within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the SEC. The petitioner MPI filed the instant petition for review on certiorari .
ISSUE:WON CA is correct.
HELD: Patently, then, based on the material allegations of the Informations, the court a quo had
exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. CA erred in holding that the dispute between it and the
respondent is intra-corporate in nature; hence, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. As gleaned
from the material allegations of the Informations, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes
charged. According to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which
shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.Case law has it that in order to
determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint or Information must be examined
for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the prescribed period
provided for by law are within the jurisdiction of the court, and where the said Information or complaint
is filed. It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of
the complaint or Information and not by the findings based on the evidence of the court after trial.
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law in force at the time of the filing of the
Information or complaint. Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the
litigation.

Macasaet v. People, 452 SCRA 255

Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51
FACTS:
Mila Pangilinan was charged and convicted of the Crime of Estafa before the RTC, a
crime cognizable by MTC. He
brought the case to Court of Appeal for new trial but the same was denied. In her
Petition for Review on Certiorari
to the Supreme Court, she alleged that the Decision of the trial court is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction over the
crime charged. Relying in the land mark case of Tijam vs. Sibanghanoy, the Office of
the Solicitor General contends
that the appellant is barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction, estoppels having
already set in.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mila G. Pangilinan is barred for raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter,
having estoppels already set in?
HELD:
No. The Office of the Solicitor General's reliance on the said ruling (Tijam vs.
Sibanghanoy) is misplaced. The
doctrine laid down in the Tijam case is an exception to and not the general rule.
Estoppel attached to the party
assailing the jurisdiction of the court as it was the same party who sought recourse in
the said forum. In the case at
bar, appellant cannot in anyway be said to have invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court.
How Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired?
Cases:
Valdepenas v. People, 16 SCRA 871
NATURE Appeal by Maximino Valdepenas from a decision of the CA, affirming that of the
CFI of Cagayan, convicting him of the crime of abduction with consent. FACTS - Jan 25,
56 – Ester Ulsano filed with the justice of peace a criminal complaint charging Valdepenas
with forcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano. After the preliminary investigation, the
second stage of which was waived by Valdepenas, the justice of peace found that there
was probable cause and forwarded the complaint to the CFI. - CFI found him guilty as
charged and sentenced him accordingly. - On appeal, CA modified the decision,
convicting him of abduction with consent. - Valdepenas filed MFR and new trial contesting
the findings of CA, to the effect that complainant was below 18 y/o at the time of the
occurrence. Motion was granted. The decision was set aside and the case was remanded
to the CFI - CFI rendered decision reiterating findings of CA. Petitioner again appealed to
CA which affirmed the CFI decision. - MFR was filed on the ground that lower court had
no jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter of the action wrt the offense of abduction with consent. MFR was denied
Petitioner’s claims – there was no complaint for abduction with consent filed and that the
lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with
consent.
ISSUE WON CA erred in not reversing he decision of the TC for lack of jurisdiction over
the accused and the subject matter of the action for the offense abduction with consent
HELD NO. - Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his
apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It
is not claimed that petitioner had not been apprehended or had not submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. His actions show that he never questioned the judicial
authority of the CFI, the justice of peace and the CA. He is deemed to have waived
whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to
have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction. His behavior - particularly the motions
therein filed by him — implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but
also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person. - On the
other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is and
may be conferred only by law. That jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon
a particular court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involved in the offense; and
that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of
abduction with consent. Art 344 (3) RPC states that: ". . . the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any
case, if the offended has been expressly pardoned by the above- named persons, as the
case may be". - Art 344 RPC does not determine the jurisdiction of our courts over the
offense therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is
governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by RPC, which deals primarily with the
definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The
complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by
the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the
guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed "out of consideration for the offended
woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through with the scandal of a public trial." - The gist of petitioner's pretense is that there
are some elements of the latter which are not included in the former, and, not alleged,
according to him, in the complaint filed herein, namely: 1) that the offended party is a
virgin; and 2) that she is over 12 and under 18 years of age. The second element is clearly
set forth in said complaint, which states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor . . . 17 years of age
. . .", and, hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age. - As regards the first element, it is
settled that the virginity mentioned in Art 343 RPC, as an essential ingredient of the crime
of abduction with consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does not
exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation because the
essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the family
and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members." - The
complaint in the case at bar alleges not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17 years of age,
but also that petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously" took her by force and violence
. . . against her will and taking advantage of the absence of her mother" from their dwelling
and carried "her to a secluded spot to gain carnal intercourse with the offended party
against her will, using force, intimidation and violence, with lewd designs." This allegation
implies that Ester is a minor living under patria protestas, thus leading to the presumption
that she is a virgin apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation. The
presumption of innocence includes that of morality and decency, and of chastity.
Dispositive Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the petitioner Maximino Valdepenas. It is so ordered.
Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 4
Sagupay v Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 464
Miranda v Tuliao, G.R. No. 159763, March 31, 2006
FACTS:
On Mar. 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later
identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent
Virgilio Tulio who is now under the witness protection program.
2 informations for murder were filed against the 5 police officer including SPO2 Maderal
in RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. RTC Manila convicted
all the accused and sentenced them 2 counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal
who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. Upon automatic
review, the SC acquitted the four accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.In Sept.
1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the herein
petitioner Miranda and 4 others responsible for the death of the victims. Respondent
Tuliao then filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding
Judge Tumalian issued warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate,
and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge
Tumalian noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the said
urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. The petitioners appealed the
resolution of the Public prosecutor to the DOJ.The new Presiding Judge named Judge
Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge
Tumalian. He also ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest. Respondent Tulia
filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for TRO seeking
to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding of the case and seeking to nullify the
Joint Orders of the said Judge. The SC issued a resolution granting the prayer.
Notwithstanding the said resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing the
information against the petition. Respondent Tuliao filed a motion to cite Judge Anghad
in contempt. The SC referred the said motion to the CA. The CA rendered the assailed
decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the
RTC of Santiago City as well as the issuance of warrant of arrest. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person
to the jurisdiction of the
court
HELD:
Petition is dismissed and cost against the petitioners. It has been held that an accused
cannot seek judicial relief is he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either through compulsory process, such
as warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he
surrender to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court. Since,
petitioner were not arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty, they cannot seek judicial
relief.