People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004: People v.

Genosa, 341 SCRA 493

Case Digest / Digested Case Version

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code
A Landmark Case decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines

Story: The Battered Woman Syndrome

The wife had suffered maltreatment from her husband for over eight years. She was 8 months
pregnant when, one evening, her husband came home drunk and started to batter her. Shouting that
his wife "might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag" him, he dragged her towards a drawer
where he kept a gun, but was not able to open the drawer because it was locked. So he got out a
cutter from his wallet, but dropped it. She was able to hit his arm with a pipe and escape into
another room. The wife, thinking of all the suffering that her husband had been inflicting on her, and
thinking that he might really kill her and her unborn child, distorted the drawer and got the gun. She
shot her husband, who was by then asleep on the bed. She was tried and convicted for parricide,
which is punishable by reclusion perpetua (20 years and 1 day to 40 years) to death. On appeal, she
alleged "battered woman syndrome" as a form of self-defense. (For Full Case, just click here.

FACTS:

That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened
that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In
fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.

The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5)
times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the
reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his
recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.

The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered
Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found
guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while
asleep.

ISSUES:

Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held
liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery? (Whether or not treachery attended the
killing)
No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been
shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to
kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had
already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat
on her life or safety.
Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not
warrant complete or incomplete self-defense. ( Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.).

No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.

The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from
mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally
axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned
and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.

In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a
specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory
act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her
only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing
proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in
order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in her favor.

HELD:

The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two
(2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense,
her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

ADDENDUM:

When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated?

Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault
at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable
pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her
life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still, impending danger (based on the
conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must
be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.
Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

http://phjuris.blogspot.com/2015/08/people-v-genosa-gr-no-135981.html

http://lawandbar.blogspot.com/2014/05/landmark-case-people-vs-genosa-gr-no.html
PEOPLE V. ROGER TULIN, G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001: People v. Tulin, 364 SCRA
10

MT Tabangao is a cargo vessel owned by PNOC. It was sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded
with barrels of kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil with a total value of 40.4M. The vessel was suddenly
boarded by 7 fully armed pirates (accused in the case – Emilio Changco, Cecilio Changco, Tulin, Loyola,
Infante, etc.). they detained and took control of the vessel. The name MT Tabangao and the PNOC logo
were painted over with black. Then it was painted with the name Galilee. The ship crew was forced to
sail to Singapore.

In Singapore, the ship was awaiting another vessel that did not arrive. Instead, the ship went
back to Batangas Philippines and remained at sea. Days later, it went back to Singapore. This time,
another vessel called the Navi Pride anchored beside it. Another accused, Cheong San Hiong, supervised
the Navi’s crew and received the cargo on board MT Tabangao/Galilee.

After the transfer of goods were completed, MT Tabangao/Galilee went back to the Philippines
and the original crew members were released by the pirates in batches. The crew was ordered not to
tell authorities of what happened.

The chief engineer of the crew, however, reported the incident to the coast guard. Afterwards, a
series of arrests were effected in different places. An information charging the accused with qualified
piracy or violation of the PD 532 – Piracy in the Philippine Waters – was filed against the accused.

As it turns out, Navi Pride captain, Hiong, was employed with Navi Marine Services ( a
Singaporean firm, I think). Before the seizure of the MT Tabangon, Navi Marine was dealing for the first
time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker who offered to sell bunker oil to the former. When the
transaction pushed through, Hiong was assigned to supervise a ship to ship transfer. He was told that
the Galilee would be making the transfer, so Navi Pride ship-sided with Galilee and the transfer was
effected. Paul Gan received the payment. Upon arrival in Singapore, Hiong was asked again to transact
another transfer of oil. The same procedure was followed. Hiong then went to the Philippines to arrange
another transfer with Changco – the pirates head. This was how Hiong was arrested by the NBI agents.

All the accused put up denials and alibis. The trial court, with ROMEO CALLEJO deciding, ruled
that the accused were all guilty.
ISSUE: w/n the accused are guilty of qualified piracy – YES!

RULING: [only the important part for crim]

Hiong argues that he can not be convicted under PD 534 or Art 122 of the RPC as amended,
since both laws punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. Hiong also contends that the court never
acquired jurisdiction over him since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters.

Art. 122 of the RPC (piracy in general and mutiny in the high seas) provided that piracy must be
committed in the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. It
was amended by RA 7659, which broadened the law to include offenses committed in Philippine waters.
PD 532 on the other hand, embraces any person, including a passenger or member of the complement
of said vessel in the Philippine waters. Passenger or not, member of the complement or not, any person
is covered by the law. No conflict exists among the mentioned laws, they exist harmoniously as separate
laws.

The attack on and the seizure of MT Tabangao and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore, where its cargo was
off-loaded, transferred and sold. Such transfer was done under Hiong’s supervision. Although the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo was not done in Philippine waters, it is still
deemed part of the same act. Piracy falls under Title 1 of Book 2 of the RPC. It is an exception to the
rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies to the case, even if Hiong is charged
with violation of a special penal law, instead of the RPC. Regardless of the law penalizing piracy, it
remains to be a reprehensible crime against the whole world.

file:///C:/Users/luman_000/Downloads/CRIM+REVIEW+DIGESTS+(Callejo)+2011-2012.pdf

page 9-10
[576 scra 416; G.R. No. 122846; January 20, 2009] Constitutional Law| Police Power| Right to
Privacy
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM

FACTS:
In 1992, Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the Ordinance No. 7744 that prohibits hotels,
motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments from offering short-time
admission, as well as pro-rated or “wash up” rates or other similarly concocted terms, in the City
of Manila. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.

Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC) et. al. filed a petition on the ground that the
Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in
Manila. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed the decision and asserted that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE:
Whether Ordinance No. 7744 is unconstitutional. (Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.)

HELD:
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

However, the right to privacy independently identified with liberty, in itself, fully deserve a
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen.

Whether or not the depiction of the vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual
behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected
will be curtailed as well. The Court also recognize that there are very legitimate uses for a wash
rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass
the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit
passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated
stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private
spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can
legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.

Petition is granted. Ordinance No. 7744 is unconstitutional.

https://voiceofgraceweb.wordpress.com/2017/12/03/white-light-corp-vs-city-of-manila-2009/
 Estrada vs. Escritor,
492 SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

Facts:
Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas City. Estrada requested an
investigation of respondent for cohabiting with a man not her husband and having a child
with the latter while she was still married.Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a
grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Escritor admitted the above-mentioned allegations but denies any liability for the alleged
gross immoral conduct for the reason that she is a member of the religious sect Jehovah’s
Witness and Watch Tower Society and her conjugal arrangement is approved and is in
conformity with her religious beliefs. She further alleged that they executed a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” in accordance with her religion which allows members of Jehovah’s
Witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The
Declaration makes the union moral and binding within the congregation throughout the
world except in countries where divorce is allowed.

Issue:
Is Escritor guilty of gross immorality for having an illicit relationship?
Does her religious belief justify such act?

Ruling:
Yes the act was grossly immoral. In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled that government
employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" for
which he/she may be held administratively liable. In these cases, there was not one dissent
to the majority's ruling that their conduct was immoral. The respondents themselves did not
foist the defense that their conduct was not immoral, but instead sought to prove that they
did not commit the alleged act or have abated from committing the act.
No, Escritor is not guilty of gross immorality and she cannot be penalized for her freedom of
religion justifies her conjugal arraignment. In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the
realm of belief poses no difficulty. The early case of Gerona v. Secretary of Education is
instructive on the matter, viz:
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds.
One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same
may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal
standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel.

The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedom, including
religious freedom, may be enjoyed.

https://lex-scepticus.blogspot.com/2014/04/case-digest-estrada-vs-escritor-492.html
 Estrada vs. Escritor , 492 SCRA 1 ; 22 JUN 2006

FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five yearsand had a son with him as well.
Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right tofreedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s
interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete
interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the
State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it
has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right
to freedom of religion.

http://casestation.blogspot.com/2010/07/estrada-vs-escritor-492-scra-1-22-jun.html
 People v Echegaray G.R. No. 117472. February 7,
1997
Per Curiam

Facts:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for
the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April,
1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law,
was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive
of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against
the accused. This was dismissed.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and
retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of
the Philippines.
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual
and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-
appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty.

Ratio:
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and
actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and
punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these
laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in accordancewith these laws.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or
not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.
Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler,
136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word
as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life.
Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is
either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the
statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the
duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"
Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein
which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the
death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the
Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-
imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this
constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the
decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass
on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes.
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair
declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as
provided in the Revised Penal Code.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not
completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and
gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No.
7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other
crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no
less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine their
heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death
sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the
trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say,
however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally
alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death
penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of
Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death
penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a
special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very
heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate,
their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following
details of the nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative
Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists
in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose
the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in
the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1)
that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify
and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition
or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of
circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous
in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that
Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be squarely
applied.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in
fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing
as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions,
implications and consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the
context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be
frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a
requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher
incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the
death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society.
It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of
such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the
existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states
is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to
rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to
impose the death penalty for said crimes."

http://thedigester.blogspot.com/2012/04/people-v-echegaray-gr-no-117472.html
 People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant Appellant

Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.

Facts:

 The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant
for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.
 The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
 The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister
motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape
against the accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on the said
motion that can disturb the verdict.
 On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and
retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the
Philippines. (FLAG)
 A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant
aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.
 In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed
factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of
accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied
for lack of merit.

Ratio:
 Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state, however,
that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.
 The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading
the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus,
the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal
sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a
white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death
penalty.
 Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per
se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so
because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was
uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether
eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial
judges and sentencing juries.
 accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of
life.
 In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in
terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with
murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by
another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another
person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is
not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity
and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"
 The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds:
 first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper
punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in
their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman;
 Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have
any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
 second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a
woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
 Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of
whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of
death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of
retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".
 The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in
specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered
our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of
1870.
 Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence
with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with
homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with
homicide, and arson resulting in death.
 The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question
of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
 Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
 People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that
the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty
remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it
is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"
 Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision
imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a
higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the
death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society
 what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order
and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds
compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.
 Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which
the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and
mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and
inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock
the moral self of a people.
 The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of
society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her
own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and
social preferences and needs.
 Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing
acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of
the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries
were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide,
rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly
heinous by their very nature.
 SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:
 the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the
masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and
honest citizenry
 they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society
and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of
government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so
 People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It
does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral
integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is
always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but
the society itself.

http://diegestd16.blogspot.com/2012/06/people-v-echegaray-crim1.html
 People vs. Ferrer (Crim1)

People vs. Ferrer (48 SCRA 382)

Facts:

On March 10, 1970, a prima facie case was filed against Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance in
Tarlac concerning the Anti-Subversion Act. He was accused of being an officer or a ranked leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any other illegal means.
Co claimed that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. On May 25, 1970, Nilo Tayag and five others
were also charged in the same court with subversion. Tayag copied Co’s attack on the law. The court
ruled the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague overbroad.
Government appealed to the SC as a special civil action for certiorari.

Issues:

Relevant: WoN the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder

Irrelevant: WoN it is vague and overbroad

Irrelevant: WoN it denies the defendants the due process of the law

Held And Ratio:

Relevant: No. Only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members
of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder. (US v. Lovett 328 US 303 1946)

Irrelevant: No. The contention about the word “overthrow” regarding the government (peaceful
overthrowing) is clarified by the provision of the clause: by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or
any other illegal means.

Irrelevant: No. The freedom of expression and freedom of association is superseded by the right of the
state to self-preservation.

Decision: The questioned resolution is set aside.

http://diegestd16.blogspot.com/2012/06/people-vs-ferrer-crim1.html
 US vs. Diaz-Conde (Crim1)

US vs. Diaz-Conde (42 Phil 766)

Facts:

On December 30, 1915, complainants Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco entered into a contract
with the defendants concerning a debt of P300. Oliveros and co. were obligated to pay five percent
interest per month within the first ten days of every month. On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz Conde and
Apolinaria R. De Conde were charged with violating the Usury Law in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila. They were found guilty, sentenced to pay a fine of P120 and in case of insolvency, to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of law. They took it to SC to plead.

Issues:

WoN the Usury Law has a retroactive effect in this case

WoN the law impaired the contract

Held and Ratio:

No. The Usury Law, a penal law, cannot become retroactive unless it is favorable to the person accused.
(Art. 21 and 22 Penal Code)

Yes. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation.

Decision: Judgment reversed, defendants acquitted.

http://diegestd16.blogspot.com/2012/06/us-vs-diaz-conde-crim1.html
 People v. Abilong, L-1960, 26 November 1948 digest case

[G.R. No. L-1960. November 26, 1948.]THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-

appellee, vs. FLORENTINOABILONG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

That on or about the 17th day of

September,1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines,Florentino Abilong, the accused, being thena convict s
entenced and ordered to servedestierro during which he should not enterany place within the radius of
100 kilometersfrom the City of Manila for attemptedrobbery, evaded the service of said sentenceby
going beyond the limits made against himand commit vagrancy.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court erred in imposing apenalty on the accused under article 157
of the Revised Penal Code, which does notcover evasion of service of "destierro."

RULING:

It is clear that the word "imprisonment" usedin the English text is a wrong or erroneoustranslation
of the phrase "sufriendo privacionde libertad" used in the Spanish text. It
isequally clear that although the SolicitorGeneral impliedly admits destierro as notconstituting
imprisonment, it is a deprivationof liberty, though partial, in the sense that
asin the present case, the appellant by hissentence of destierro was deprived of theliberty to enter the
City of Manila. Under thecase of People vs. Samonte, as quoted in thebrief of the Solicitor General that
"it is clearthat a person under sentence of destierro issuffering deprivation of his liberty andescapes
from the restrictions of the penaltywhen he enters the prohibited area

https://www.scribd.com/doc/62410207/People-vs-Abilong-GR-No-L-1960-Digest
 PEOPLE v. FORMIGONES
November 29, 1950 (G.R. No. L-3246)

PARTIES:
plaintiff-appellee: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
defendant-appellant: ABELARDO FORMIGONES

FACTS:
From November to December 1946, defendant Abelardo Formigones together with his wife Julia Agricola,
and his five children lived in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones to find employment as
harvesters. One afternoon, the accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his
bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife at the back, the blade penetrating the right lung
which latter caused her death. When she fall ont he ground the defendant carried her up the house, laid
her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. He was convicted of parricide and was
sentenced to prison. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. His counsel presented testimonies of two
guards of the provincial jail where defendant was confined. They said that he behaved like an insane
person, that sometimes he would remove his clothes in front of others, would not take a bath, and
remained silent and indifferent to his surroundings. His counsel claimed that e is an imbecile therefore
exempt from criminal liability. Dr. Francisco Gomez told that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile so as to
be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom
of the will at the time of committing the crime.

ISSUE: WON the defendant who is suffering from feeblemindedness is exempt from criminal liability.

HELD:
No. In order that an exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason;
that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. As to
the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. He could distinguish right from wrong.

https://thelawiscool.wordpress.com/2012/08/03/people-v-formigones/
People vs. Formigones (Crim1)
People vs. Formigones (87 Phil. 658)

Facts:

On December 28, 1946, Abelardo Formigones caused his wife, Julia Agricola, lethal injury with a bolo.
Having done so, he then carried his wife to the living room and lay down beside her. This was how he
was found by the people summoned by his eldest daughter, who witnessed the stabbing. He pleaded
guilty to the Court of the First Instance in Camarines Sur citing jealousy as his motive for he believed his
wife was being intimate with his brother. He received the sentence of reclusion perpetua and the Solicitor
General filed for an appeal on the grounds that he is an imbecile.

Issues:

WoN the defendant is an imbecile

WoN the questioned imbecilic nature of the defendant can affect his punishment.

Held and Ratio:

No, the defendant is not an imbecile, evidenced by his previous sixteen years of sanity in his marriage.
Though he has procured the sympathies of the court with the circumstances of his situation.

No, the defendant is still charged with reclusion perpetua. The two mitigating circumstances, his
diminished will power and his act of passion driven by jealousy (Art. 13 of Revised Penal Code) has been
considered by the court but he is credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has
undergone.

Decision: Judgment affirmed but this case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who,
in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise
apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.

http://diegestd16.blogspot.com/2012/06/people-vs-formigones-crim1.html
People vs. Silvestre and Atienza (Crim1)
People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza, defendants-
appellants.

En Banc

Villareal, December 14, 1931

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts:
 Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage
 Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong,
Bulacan
 On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn
complaint for adultery
 After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president of
Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint
 The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again in
Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)
 On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the
justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case
 The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Niño, in Paombong
 About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in
Santo Niño and followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves)
 Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the home of
Nicolas
 On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were
gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house because he
was going to set fire to it
 He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol
who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and Romana
 Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him
 Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late
 The fire destroyed about 48 houses
 Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire
 The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson
 Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of
cadena temporal)
 Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)
 The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI
decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana:
 The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice
 The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or at
least, of reasonable doubt
Issue:
 Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice
Holding:
 No.
Ratio:
 Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who does
not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor
cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.
 In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an
agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous
acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza
to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does
not make her liable as an accomplice.
 Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by Art. 14
of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to
which one has kept silent
Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana Silvestre, who is
acquitted.

http://diegestd16.blogspot.com/2012/06/people-vs-silvestre-and-atienza.html
People vs. Talingdan (Crim1)
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto
Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, accused-appellants

En Banc

Per Curiam, July 6, 1978

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art. 3) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts:
 Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag
 No certificate or any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution
 They lived with their children in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra
 Their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles for Teresa had deserted her
family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her
 On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan has visited Teresa in their house while
Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old
daughter to go down the house and leave them
 Bernardo had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa
 About a month before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come
back for a period of more than 3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were
seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time
 Just two days before Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa had a violent
quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa several times, resulting in Theresa seeking the help of the police
 Accused Talingdan, a policeman, came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him
to come down; Bernardo ignored him; Talingdan instead left and warned Bernardo that someday he
would kill him
 On Saturday, June 24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house
 The defendants' and Corazon's accounts of what happened had variations
Corazon's version:
 Friday morning: Corazon was in a creek to wash clothes. She saw her mother Teresa meeting
with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, and Pedro Bides in a small hut
owned by Bernardo
 She heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"
 When Teresa noticed Corazon, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill
him"
 Saturday, after sunset: Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her mother go down
the house to go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants.
 She noted the long guns the appellants were carrying.
 Teresa came back to the house and proceeded to her room.
 Corazon informed Bernardo, who was then working on a plow, about the presence of persons
downstairs, but Bernardo paid no attention
 Bernardo proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door
 He was suddenly fired upon form below the stairs of the batalan
 The four accused climbed the stairs of the batalan and upon seeing that Bernardo was still alive,
Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again
 Bides and Berras did not fire at that precise time but when Corazon tried to call for helo, Bides
warned her that he will kill her if she calls for help
 Teresa came out of her room and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers, the
former threatened to kill the latter if she reveals the matter to anyone
The defendants'' version:
 Teresa loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband never maltreated her.
 Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan; an illicit
relationship never existed between them
 Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing on June 24; he escorted the Mayor in
Bangued from June 22 to June 26
 Tobias, Bides, and Berras claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan, 250-
300 meters from the place of the killing
Issue:
 Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to Bernardo's murder
 It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the
conspuracy to kill her husband because there is no showing of actual cooperation on her part with co-
appellants in their culpable acts that led to his death
 It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval thereof
on her part, which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator
Holding:
 Yes. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder.
Ratio:
 Note: The court believed Corazon's testimony.
 It is true that proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt;
she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. She had no hand in the actual shooting. It is also
not clear if she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof. But the court is convinced that she
knew it was going to be done and did not object.
 There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the
offense committed.
 She did not only order her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she also claimed to
have no suspects in mind when the peace officers came into their house later to investigate
 Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding the
conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with her co-appellants
 These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime"

Male appellants sentenced to death. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt is Teresa Domogma, sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor
as maximum.

http://diegestd16.blogspot.com/2012/06/people-vs-talingdan.html
People vs. Puno (Crim1)
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias "Beloy," and Enrique
Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry," accused-appellants

En Banc

Regalado, February 17, 1993

Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent

Facts:

 January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election
there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC
 He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so
Isabelo will temporarily take his place
 When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her
husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving
 After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused
Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
 Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from
her
 Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused
 But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more
 The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to
issue a check for P100,000
 Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
 Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned
the car again towards Pampanga
 According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because according to
her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car
 The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to
Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car
 He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer
had gotten a ride
 He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway
Issue:
1. Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
2. Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No.
532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
Holding:
1. No.
 2. No.
Ratio:
1. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or
at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
 For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty
 In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders
 This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention
2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our
country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law
against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law
was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway robbery)
 PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery
committed against only a predetermined or particular victim
 The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually
operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case
 This is not justified by the accused's intention
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual
damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)

http://diegestd16.blogspot.com/2012/06/people-vs-puno.html
US vs. Ah Chong (Crim1)
The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.

En Banc

Carson, March 19, 1910

Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact

Facts:

 The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province
 Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho
 "Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building
 No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward the
rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building
 This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height
 The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as
a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit
of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair
 On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened by
some trying to force open the door of the room
 He called out twice, "Who is there?"
 He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room
 The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
 Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at
the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual
 Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
 Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and ran
back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds
 Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day
 The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident, and
had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that the door
and acquaint his companion with his identity
 The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection because of
repeated robberies in Fort McKinley
 Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that
Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite the
defendant's warnings
 Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating (mitigating)
circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by
law
Issue:
 Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible
Holding:
 No.
Ratio:
 By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a thief, he
will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime
of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was
actually Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination)
 The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
 "The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
 The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist
 "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
 If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without
fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide
 The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense
 He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts
RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

http://diegestd16.blogspot.com/2012/06/us-vs-ah-chong.html
People vs. Oanis (Crim1)
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, defendant-
appellants.

July 27, 1943

Moran, J:

Facts:
 Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto Galanta were instructed by the Constabulary
Provincial Inspector to arrest the escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, with bailarina named Irene, and if
overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
 Upon arrival at the place where Irene could be found, Oanis approached and asked Brigada
Mallare where Irene's room was. Brigada indicated the room and said that Irene was sleeping with her
paramour.
 Oanis and Galanta then went to the room and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door, they simultaneously fired at him.
 Shocked by the entire scene, Irene fainted.
 It turned out later that the man shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent man named
Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Issue:
 Whether or not Oanis and Galanta can be held responsible for Tecson's death.
Held:
 Yes
Ratio:
 No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person
arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. A peace officer
cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary or unreasonable force in making an
arrest.
 Through impatience of desire to take chances, Oanis and Galanta have exceeded in the
fulfillment of their duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance
from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.

http://diegestd16.blogspot.com/2012/06/people-vs-oanis-crim1.html
Magno vs. CA (Crim1)
Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

Facts:
 Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.
 VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice
President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance
could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.
 The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party who
could lend him that amount.
 Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.
 As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest
had no sufficient fund.
 Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the
equipment.
 Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.
Issue:
 Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.
Held:
 No
Ratio:
 To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his
own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did
not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.

http://diegestd16.blogspot.com/2012/06/magno-vs-ca-crim1.html
 Garcia v. CA 484 SCRA 617
FACTS: Based on the complaint of Aquilino Pimentel who ran in the senatorial elections, he charged
elections officer Arsenia Garcia for willfully decreasing the votes received by senatorial candidate
Pimentel from 6,988 votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the 159 precincts of the
statement of votes by precincts of said municipality to 1921 votes with a difference of 5,077. The RTC
convicted accused and gave a prison sentence. On appeal however it was contended that there was no
criminal intent and bad faith in his actions. Respondent on the other hand contends that a violation of
an election law is a mala prohibita and good faith is not a defense.

ISSUE: WON a violation of section 27b of R.A. 6646 is a mala in se or mala prohibita? And could good
faith and lack of criminal intent be a valid defense?

HELD: mala in se

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a
special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the
crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the
criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are
forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not
necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.

An election offense is defined as:

(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers,
increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board
who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered
votes.

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and
mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be
counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to
happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors.
However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is
inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the
law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence.

During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the
figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the
board. Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC, though it was not her
duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate
the erroneous entry in the COC.

Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea
how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead
of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner’s concern was to assure
accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and
fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal
responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law.

Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the
board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting
statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents
whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.

file:///C:/Users/luman_000/Downloads/CRIM+REVIEW+DIGESTS+(Callejo)+2011-2012.pdf

page 22
 People v. Pugay, 167 SCRA 439
PEOPLE vs. PUGAY & SAMSON (may 2 or more persons kill the same victim)

FACTS: The deceased victim Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends.
During a town fiesta, Gabion, the witness, was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book. He
then saw Pugay and Samson with several companions making fun of Miranda. Pugay suddenly took a
can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its contents on the body of the
Miranda. The victim died due to the incident. Gabion, Pugay, Samson and 5 others were brought to the
municipal building for interrogation. Pugay and Samson gave statements to the police. Pugay admitted
in his statement that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof
was water and Samson set the deceased on fire. Samson alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay
pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Pugay and Samson were found
guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a conspiracy?

HELD: None, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or
Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay
and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility
of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not
collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13,
Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).

ISSUE: What is the criminal responsibility of Pugay?

HELD: Homicide through reckless imprudence. Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris
wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that
the can contained gasoline. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the
time were making fun of the deceased. A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all
his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of
incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no
one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and
property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.

ISSUE: What is the criminal responsibility of Samson?

HELD: homicide with ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed. His conviction of murder because of the presence of treachery is improper. There is
entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased
before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part
of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be
deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the
offended party might make.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the
body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act
of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it can be conceded that
as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however,
does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very
least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act
resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible
therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.

We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion
can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when
they noticed the deceased burning

file:///C:/Users/luman_000/Downloads/CRIM+REVIEW+DIGESTS+(Callejo)+2011-2012.pdf

page 19
 IVLER vs. HON. MODESTO

G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) reckless imprudence

resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2)

reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the death of respondent Ponce’s

husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.

Crimes charged: 1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries; and 2) reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide and damage to property

On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in slight

physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to

quash the Information of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for placing

him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

MeTC: denied the motion to quash

RTC: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash

ISSUE: Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further

proceedings in the information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage

to property (YES)

Defense: Ivler argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the

same offense bars his prosecution in reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property
having been previously convicted in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries

for the same offense. Ivler submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to

determine his penalty

HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s conviction in the case of reckless

imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries bars his prosecution in criminal reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide and damage to property

1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to

Determine the Penalty

Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack

of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal

act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of

intentional crimes.

2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-

offense

Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted

again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of

the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,

would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result

thereof.

The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the

substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be

split into different crimes and prosecutions.

3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two

categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from

its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The

legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties,

will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental

attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single mental attitude

regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in

one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crime resulting in one or more

consequences.

Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for

a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an

offense which is a necessary means for committing another.

Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity

of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under

Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under

Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

https://thelawiscool.wordpress.com/2017/01/25/ivler-vs-hon-modesto/
 People v. Guillen GR No. L-1477, January 18, 1950
FACTS:

The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of thecrime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the Presidentof the Philippines, Manuel
Roxas on March 10, 1947.

During the 1946 Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the opposing candidateof Manuel
Roxas. According to the accused, he was disappointed with the latter for failing toredeem and fulfill
promises made by President Roxas during the elections. Consequently, theaccused determined to
assassinate the President and found the oppoturnity to do so on thenight of March 10, 1947 when the
President attended a popular meeting by the Liberal Partyat Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. Guillen
first intended to use a revolver to accomplish hisgoal but he had previously lost his licensed firearm, so
he thought of using two handgrenades which were given to him by an American soldier in exchange for
two bottles of whisky. The accused stood on the chair he had been sitting on and hurled the grenade at
thePresident when the latter had just closed his speech. A general who was on the platform sawthe
smoking grenade and kicked it away from the platform towards an open space where hethought the
grenade was likely to do the least harm. The grenade exploded in the middle of agroup of persons
standing close to the platform and grenade fragments seriously injuredSimeon Varela, who died the
next day due to the mortal wounds caused, and several other persons. Guillen was arrested and he
readily admitted his responsibility.

ISSUE:

WON the accused was guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to
thedeath of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to the other injuredpersons.

HELD:

The facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant. In throwing the
handgrenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice andis
therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act. As provided by Art. 4 of theRevised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony althoughthe wronful act done be
different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, theinjury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another actperformed without malice. As held by thie
Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act isessentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence. Where such unlawful act iswilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered recklessimprudence.

The sentence of the trial court is affirmed by unanimous vote and death sentence shall
beexecuted in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code

https://www.scribd.com/document/99059928/People-v-Guillen
 People of the Philippines, petitioner v Rolusape Sabalones, respondent
GR No. 123485 ǀ PANGANIBAN ǀ August 31, 1998

DOCTRINE: Transferred intent- error in personae

NATURE: This is a case elevated by the CA to the SC upon refraining on entering a judgment.

FACTS:

 On June 1, 1985 at 11:45 PM, respondents including Rolusape Sabalones, armed with firearms,
attackedand ambushed individuals riding in two vehicles resulting to the death of two persons
and injury to threeothers.
 According to a witness presented, Sabalones was implicated in the killing of Nabing Velez
because of theslapping incident involving her father-in-law, Federico Sabalones, Sr. and Nabing
Velez which took placeprior to the death of Junior Sabalones (whose wake was during time of
the commission of the crime).
 The conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong
persons wasbased on the extrajudicial statement of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of
Jennifer Binghoy. Thesepieces of evidence sufficiently show that appellants believed that they
were suspected of havingkilled the recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group
to retaliate againstthem
 The Trial Court observed that “they went to their grisly destination amidst the dark and
positionedthemselves in defense of his turf against the invasion of a revengeful gang of
supporters of therecently slain Nabing Velez.”

ISSUE: W/N the case is „one of aberratio ictus‟

HELD: NO.The case is not one of aberration ictus but one of error in personae or mistake in identity,
asobserved by the OSG.

RATIO:

Transferred intent is used when a defendant intends to harm one victim, but then unintentionally harms
a secondvictim instead. In this case, the defendant's intent transfers from the intended victim to the
actual victim and can beused to satisfy the mens reaelement of the crime that the defendant is being
charged with. The transferred intentdoctrine is only used for completed crimes, and is not used for
attempted crimes.

(http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/transferred_intent)

Aberratio ictus means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the other due to
imprecision ofthe blow. In the case at bar, the appellants opened fire because they mistook the vehicles
to be carrying theavenging men of Nabing Velez . The fact that they were mistaken does not diminish
their culpability. The Courthas held that “mistake in identity of the victim carries the same gravity as
when the accused zeroes inon his intended victim.”

https://www.scribd.com/document/242170542/People-v-Sabalones-Digest
 People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150

https://www.scribd.com/document/284144111/People-vs-Albuquerque-Digest
Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181
https://www.slideshare.net/chencatarman/bataclan-vs-medina-digest
Crim Law 1 Case Digest:Intod V. CA 1992
Intod v. CA

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

Lessons Applicable:

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
• February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya
should accompany them. Otherwise, he would also be killed.
• February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at
Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
• RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness

ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)

HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay
the costs

• Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
• The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
• Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime
• Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
• Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime – this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet and finds the pocket empty
• United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held
liable for any crime

http://www.philippinelegalguide.com/2013/11/crim-law-1-case-digestintod-v-ca-1992.html
 PEOPLE v. CONRADO SALADINO Y DINGLE
G.R. Nos. 137481-83 & 138455 March 7, 2001

Accused was convicted of three (3) counts of rape for raping his 13-yr old niece. Taking into
account the qualifying circumstance of the minority of the victim and her relationship to accused-
appellant, the lower court meted three (3) death penalties pursuant to RA 7659. The trial court
also found accused-appellant guilty of attempted rape, and sentenced him to serve an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as
maximum.

HELD:

The SC said that the victim’s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary
her submission to the criminal acts of the accused-appellant. They held that the “(i)ntimidation
must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produces
fear — fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused something
would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if
she reports the incident.” The failure to shout or offer resistance was not because she consented
to the deed but because she honestly believed she would be killed if she shouted or resisted. Such
threat is sufficient intimidation as contemplated by our jurisprudence on rape. And be that as it
may, if resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then offering
none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim’s participation in the
sexual act voluntary.

However, the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty. In People v. Ramos 20 the
concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender, being special
qualifying circumstances should be alleged in the information, otherwise, the death penalty
cannot be imposed. In the case at bar, although the prosecution did prove complainant’s minority
and relationship to accused-appellant, it failed to implead both minority and relationship in the
four (4) Informations filed against accused-appellant. It is not enough that the relationship was
subsequently proved during the trial. Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the
Information to qualify the crime as punishable by death. To hold otherwise would deny accused-
appellant’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him. Thus, he can only be convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua.

The imposition of an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal minimum as maximum, in attempted rape is also erroneous. The proper penalty for rape
in the attempted stage should be two (2) degrees lower than the penalty for consummated rape,
or prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum imposable penalty
should be taken from prision mayor in its medium period and the minimum from prision
correccional.