RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE

PEOPLE VS. UMANITO

FACTS:

The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant,
AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child hereinafter identified as “BBB.”

In view of that fact, as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering
whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB.

With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with
reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA’s child.

The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore,
enjoined not to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test results. The [NBI] is further enjoined to
observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA
testing and is hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as the accused has been
acquitted or served his sentence.

The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and
Umanito, to determine whether or not Umanito is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is
a Complete Match in allof the 15 loci tested between the alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That based on
the above findings, there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Umanito is the biological father of
BBB.

The defense admitted that if the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be
a disputable presumption of paternity.

ISSUE:

Whether Umanito is the biological father of [BBB].

RULING:

Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on
DNA Evidence (DNA Rules). The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to
by AAA, Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day
she said she was raped by Umanito.

Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted andovercome by

other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3).

The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted
and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did not object to the admission of the
results of the DNA testing (Exhibits “A” and “B” inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to
rebut the same.

By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC
and the Courtof Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and the indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of
P50,000.00.

Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower
courts, and that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court
sees no reason to deny Umanitos Motion to Withdraw Appeal.The instant case is now CLOSED and
TERMINATED.

PEOPLE VS. YATAR

FACTS:

On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmother’s (Isabel Dawang’s) house, despite her
intention to go forth Tuguegarao City, as her other former’s housemate-relatives left in the morning.
At 10:00 am, accused-appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where Kathylyn
stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyn’s first cousin saw Yatar, who was then wearing
a white shirt with collar and black pants, descended from the second floor and was pacing back and
forth at the back of Isabel Dawang’s house, Judilyn didn’t find this unusual since Yatar and his wife
used to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn, telling the latter that he would not be
getting the lumber he had been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now wearing a black
shirt (without collar) and blue pants; and noticed that the latter’s eyes were “reddish and sharp”.
Accused-appellant asked about the whereabouts of Judilyn’s husband, as the former purports to talk
with the latter. Then, Yatar immediately left when Judilyn’s husband arrived. In the evening, when
Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her house turned off, the door of the ground
floor opened, and the containers, which she asked Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending
the second floor to check whether the teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the door therein was
tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded opening the tied door with a knife, and as she groped in the
darkness of the second level of her house, she felt Kathylyn’s lifeless and naked body, with some
intestines protruding out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide
assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyn’s clothes and undergarments beside her body. Amongst
others, a white collared shirt splattered with blood was also found 50-meters away from Isabel’s
house. Meanwhile, semen has also been found upon Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on
2004, which was three (3) years before the Rules on DNA evidence took effect. The Supreme Court in
this case ruled based on the US case of Daubert vs. Merrell Dow as a precedent. In the said US
jurisprudence, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be
used, so long as the same is RELEVANT and RELIABLE. Hence, it was called then as the DAUBERT TEST.
RULE: At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the legal basis. Sec. 7 of the
Rules on DNA evidence, which took effect on 2007, provides for the factors to be HELD.

ISUUE:
Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as evidence
for Yatar’s conviction?
RULING:
Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the
same by the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an appeal to the Honorable
Supreme Court in order to assail the court a quo’s decision. On appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial
court erred in giving much weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on him, in lieu of the
seminal fluid found inside the victim’s (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2) the blood sample taken from is
violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the conduct of DNA testing is also in
violation on prohibition against ex-post facto laws. comprising the sperm specimen is identical to
Yatar’s genotype.

Examination of Kathylyn’s cadaver. When subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA
considered in assessing the probative weight or value to be given on evidence derived or generated
from DNA testing. Such factors, are, to wit:
(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were handled,
and the possibility of contamination of the samples; (b) The DNA testing methodology, including the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and
compliance with the scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests; (c) The forensic DNA
laboratory, including accreditation qualification by of the any reputable who standards-setting
institution and the analyst conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant
experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be properly established; and (d)
The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.

From the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court considered the qualification of the DNA analyst, the
facility or laboratory in which the DNA testing had been performed, and the methodology used in
performing the DNA test. In the said case, the DNA test was done at the UP National Science Research
Institute (NSRI). The method used was Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short
Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis, which enables a tiny amount of DNA sequence to be replicated
exponentially in a span of few hours. Hence, sufficient DNA analysis may be made easier even with
small DNA samples at hand. The analyst who performed the procedure was Dr. Maria Corazon
Abogado de Ungria, who is a duly qualified expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.
CONCLUSION: Hence, apart from the other sets of circumstantial evidence correctly appreciated by
the trial court, the said DNA evidence is sufficient to be admitted as evidence to warrant the accused-
appellant’s conviction of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
APPLICATION – DAUBERT TEST: The Honorable Supreme Court in this case upheld the probative value
of the DNA test result yielded from the analysis of Yatar’s blood sample from that of the semen
specimen obtained from the cadaver’s vaginal canal. Accordingly, it held that the DNA evidence is both
reliable and relevant.  In ascertaining the relevance of the evidence in a case, it must be determined
whether or not the same directly relates to a fact in issue, as to induce belief in its existence or
nonexistence. In this case, the evidence is relevant in determining the perpetrator of the crime;  In
giving probative value on the DNA testing result, yielded from the analysis of Yatar’s blood sample
from that of the biological sample (semen) obtained

ANNOTATIONS – WHAT IS DNA? – culled from this Case

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A person’s DNA is the
same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is
the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine,
skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human
genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins; DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link
a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been
left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory
and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime
committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent,
and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case. DNA evidence collected from a crime
scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as
fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair,
skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair
and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body
during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact
between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA
can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
 JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCAS

Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification
under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a
compulsory blood test.

FACTS:

Jesse U. Lucas (Jesse), filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties
to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse narrated his mother’s account of her
history with Jesus S. Lucas (Jesus) and attached several copies of his personal documents.

Though Jesus was not summoned and was not served a copy of the petition, he nevertheless learned
of it and obtained for himself a copy. He then filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting
among others that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on
him as respondent.

Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day before he filed his Comment, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try
and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing.

After learning of the RTC’s order, Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing
cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to
establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of
Herrera v. Alba.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration of his own which the RTC granted. A new
hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing
the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place.
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to
show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that
DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case.
A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this
initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s
observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a
paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence.

The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of
DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the “prescribed parameters on the requisite elements
for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.),
the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence
as well as the probative value of DNA evidence.” It seeks “to ensure that the evidence gathered, using
various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or
abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects,
rather than prejudice the public.”

Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed
to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states: The appropriate court
may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b)
The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
(ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good
reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific
potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or
integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court
order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.

This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the
hearing, the said conditions are established.

Court order for blood testing equivalent to “search” under the Constitution.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie
case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable
cause.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained; “Although a paternity action is civil, not
criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable,
and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case
must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have
differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before
the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and
a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in
which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.”

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from
mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Herrera vs. Alba

Facts:
1. then 13 yr old Rosendo Alba (“respondent”), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before
the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner.

2. Petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of
respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s mother.
3. Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings.
a. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D.; In her
testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an
accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.

4. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

5. RTC: granted respondent’s motion to conduct DNA paternity testing

6. Petitioner filed a MR and asserted that “under the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is
compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite
specimen..., unconstitutional.”- DENIED

7. Petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 He asserted that
the trial court rendered the Orders“in excess of, or without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” Petitioner further contended that there is “no
appeal nor any [other] plain, adequateand speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.

8. CA: Denied petition; Affirmed RTC; stated that petitioner merely desires to correct the trial court’s
evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of judgment that the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA
paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right applies only to
testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a
possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing.

9. Petitioner further submits that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it
authorized the trial court “to embark in [sic] a new procedure xxx to determine filiation despite the
absence of legislation to ensure its reliability and integrity, want of official recognition as made clear in
Lim vs. Court of Appeals and the presence of technical and legal constraints in respect of [sic] its
implementation.” Petitioner maintains that the proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right
against self-incrimination.

Issue:
whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation or whether DNA
analysis may be admitted as evidence to prove paternity.

Held: Yes

Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence

People v. Vallejo- “DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet been accorded official
recognition by our courts.” In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape
victim matched the accused’s DNA profile. We affirmed the accused’s conviction of rape with homicide
and sentenced him to death. We declared:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.

Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no longer
any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue
of according “official recognition” to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of
procedures in conducting DNA analysis.

People v. Yatar- a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the
DNA profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open court. The Court, following Vallejo’s
footsteps, affirmed the conviction of appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by
circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape with homicide

In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.- the convict-petitioner presented DNA test
results to prove that he is not the father of the child conceived at the time of commission of the rape.
The Court ruled that a difference between the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA
profile of the victim’s child does not preclude the convict-petitioner’s commission of rape.

In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and respondent refer to two United
States cases to support their respective positions on the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence:

Frye v. US - Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.

*State v. Shwartz - modified Frye standard ; While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA
typing has gained general acceptance in the scientific community, we hold that admissibility of specific
test results in a particular case hinges on the laboratory’s compliance with appropriate standards and
controls, and the availability of their testing data and results.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. - cautions that departure from the Frye standard of
general acceptance does not mean that the Federal Rules do not place limits on the admissibility of
scientific evidence. Rather, the judge must ensure that the testimony’s reasoning or method is
scientifically valid and is relevant to the issue. Admissibility would depend on factors such as (1)
whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (5) whether the
theory or technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.
*Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael, further modified the Daubert standard- If scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Obviously, neither the Frye- Schwartz standard nor the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in the
Philippines. At best, American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our decisions. Here,
evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute
or the Rules of Court. Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of
expert testimony, provides as follows:

The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which
he is shown to possess may be received in evidence.

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed,
even evidence on collateral matters is allowed “when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish
the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.”

Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions in Tijing, Vallejo and
Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. In our jurisdiction, the restrictive tests
for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into the weight of the evidence.

Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence

Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to
DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.

We also repeat the trial court’s explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases:
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual
to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have
been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain
whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s
DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match,
then he is not excluded as the father.

It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A complete
match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not
necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard adopted in an American
jurisdiction, trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of
Paternity (“W”) prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity
of a putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An
appropriate reference population database, such as the Philippine population database, is required to
compute for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%.
However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and child are
subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted between the putative father and child alone.

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-
paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of
paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
Right Against Self-Incrimination

Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case,
contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination.
This privilege applies only to evidence that is “communicative” in essence taken underduress.

The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant,
not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a defendant can
be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his; the substance emitting from the body of the
accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness; morphine forced out of the mouth was
received as proof; an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed;
and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test, since the gist of
the privilege is the restriction on “testimonial compulsion.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8
June 2000 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759.
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City)

FACTS:

This is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief:
First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo
de Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial. These reliefs are sought on the basis of
purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on
samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child born to the victim of the rape.

By final judgment, petitioner de Villa, the trial court found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen
Mendoza when she was 12 years old, his niece by affinity and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusión perpetua; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs
of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is
currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. Petitioner’s defense, at the
time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him
incapable of having an erection. On automatic review, the court found that the date of birth of Aileen’s
child was medically consistent with the time of the rape.

Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, there was a question of Reynaldo de Villa’s guilt or
innocence. Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that during
the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for
all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim’s child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed during
the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner’s case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of
paternity. This information was apparently furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-
Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner. Thus, petitioner’s brief in People v.
de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of
the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape and the relief was implicitly denied. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA
tests be conducted and it was denied with finality in a Resolution. Petitioner-relator was undaunted by
these challenges, for having been informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted
from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate
of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup and used as a sample. Petitioner-
relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. Petitioner-relator
requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by
the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of
the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to
the DNA Analysis Laboratory.

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report and showed that Reynaldo de Villa
could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match
between the pertinent genetic markers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DNA result is a valid basis for habeas corpus and new trial?

HELD:

No. The most criterion for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, is that the individual seeking such
relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint.
If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some the legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing. In the recent case of Feria v. CA, it was held that review of judgment of conviction is
allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in a very specific instances,
such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose
the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
This court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not
be thus used.

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trail even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that
it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such
weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment.
Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was “unaware” of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was
concluded carries no weight with this court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks
of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner’s counsel. In either instance,
however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner.

AGUSTIN V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. 137757

FACTS:

Fe Angela and her son Martin sued Arnel Agustin, the alleged biological father of the latter; for
support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Fe Angela alleged
that Arnel courted Fe on her 34th birthday and impregnated her. After Fe Angela delivered birth, Arnel
allegedly signed the child's birth certificate as the father. He gave support initially but refused later on
and even denied being the father. In pre-trial brief, Arnel still denied being Martin's father yet
expressed his proposal to settle the case. Meanwhile, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of order
directing all parties to submit themselves to DNA. However, Arnel invoked his constitutional right
against self-incrimination and opposed the said motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DNA is not recognized by the Court as a conclusive means of proving parternity,
and whether or not DNA testing violates Arnel's right against self-incrimination?

COURT RULING:

The Court in this case listed down several jurisprudence which lead to the advancement of DNA
testing, which started in Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals which says that DNA testing has not yet been
accorded recognition by the courts. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, the court opened the possibility of
DNA testing. In People v. Vallejo, the court ruled that the purpose of DNA testing was to ascertain
whether or not an association existed between evidence sample and reference sample. In People v.
Janson, the court ruled that the evidence is inadmissible because of the doubt as to who are the real
malefactors. In Tecson v. Comelec, the court rule dthat it will be unlikely to obtain DNA testing from
the physical residue of a long dead parent.

In ascertaining the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider the following:

(1) how the samples are collected

(2) how they are handled

(3) whether they are contaminated or not

(4) the procedure followed

(5) the qualification of the analyst.

Moreover, foreign jurisprudence provide in Daubert v. Merell Dow that evidence based on science is
admissible as long as it is relevant and reliable. As to whether it violates the accused's right against
self-incrimination, the court ruled in the negative; as self-incrimination is a legal process of extracting
from the lips of the accused the admission of guilt, which the court is against at.
 RULE ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

PEOPLE V ENOJAS (GR No. 204894, March 10, 2014)

Facts:
PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall
when they spotted a suspiciously parked taxi. They approached the taxi driver Enojas and asked for his
documents. Having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they invited
him in their mobile car to the police station for further questioning. Enojas complied leaving his taxi
behind. Upon reaching 7-11 on Zapote-Alabang Road, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to
relieve himself there. As he approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected
robbers and a shootout ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still
managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death. PO2 Gregorio was also
engaged in a shootout with two more armed robbers who managed to escape. He then went back to
the patrol car and noticed that Enojas fled. Suspecting that Enojas was involved in the attempted
robbery, they searched his abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone apparently left behind by
Enojas. The police officers monitored the incoming messages and posed as Enojas. The accused
appellants were later on arrested in an entrapment operation and were convicted of murder by RTC
Las Pinas.

Issues:
 Whether or not the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.
 Whether or not circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a conviction.

Held:
1. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text
messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of
 those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
2. This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that
meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides
basis for the conviction of all the accused.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NAPOCOR) vs. CODILLA, JR., BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY
(BANGPAI)and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED (WALLEM)

Facts:
NAPOCOR filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against BANGPAI for the alleged damages
caused on NAPOCOR's power barges. WALLEM, on the other hand, was impleaded by NAPOCOR as
additional defendant for being allegedly the ship agent of BANGPAI.

NAPOCOR, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before
the said court consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions thereof.
Consequently, BANGPAI and WALLEM filed their respective objections to NAPOCOR's formal offer of
evidence for being mere Xerox or photocopies.

The RTC denied the admission and excluded from the records NAPOCOR’s exhibits and its sub-
markings.

NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside the Order of the RTC. Accordingly, the
photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the document on the basis of the Electronic
Evidence.

The CA denied the Petition of NAPOCOR. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the Xerox or photocopies offered by NAPOCOR are admissible as evidence for being
equivalent to the “original of the document” on the basis of the Electronic Evidence.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that Xerox or photocopies offered by NAPOCOR are inadmissible as evidence.
Accordingly, it does not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence as follows:

"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately
reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For the purpose of these Rules, the term
"electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".

The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence must be authenticated (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 5,
Rules on Electronic Evidence), which NAPOCOR failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit to prove the
admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9) was not
executed, much less presented in evidence.

Hence, the Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore, be stricken off the record. (The Court
denied the Petition of NAPOCOR and affirmed the decision of the CA)

CASE: MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION VS. SSANGYONG CORPORATION

G.R. No. 170633
October 17, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is
engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is
the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading company with head office in Seoul,
South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted
business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send the
pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms
thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong,
again by fax.

Following the failure of MCC to open a letters of credit to facilitate the payment of imported stainless
steel products, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling
the sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment of
US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests and charges.

Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract
against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to
open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma
Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong
failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. In
an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence
presented had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Order and their admissibility finds
support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000.
According to the aforesaid Order, considering that both testimonial and documentary evidence tended
to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes
of a prima facie case.

ISSUE:

Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible in evidence as such?

HELD:
R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary
purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence
if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is
authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable
by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.

Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional

equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an
"electronic data message" or an "electronic document."

In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is
scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the
functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a
virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct
printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals .
Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable
with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original
paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct
from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in
communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of
technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer
development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined
the term "electronic data message." We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message"
and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a
facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic
evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not
admissible as electronic evidence.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and
cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such
a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original
fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the
appellate courts.

AZNAR V CITIBANK
G.R. NO. 164273; 28 MARCH 2007

FACTS:
Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit
Card (Mastercard) issued by Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida,
planned to take their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a
total advance deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of increasing his credit limit
to P635,000.00. With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his
group worth P237,000.00. On July 17, 1994, Aznar, his wife and grandchildren left Cebu for the said
destination. Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments
in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored. And when he tried to use the same
in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was
again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to
buy the tickets in cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was
aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards. Aznar and his group
returned to the Philippines on August 10, 1994.
On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank claiming that
Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife
and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and prevented them from buying certain items
in their tour. To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out,
denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him
by Ingtan Agency (Exh. “G”) with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his
card in question was “DECL OVERLIMIT” or declared over the limit. itibank denied the allegation that it
blacklisted Aznar’s card.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the “On Line Authorization Report” is an electronic document
2. Whether or not the “On Line Authorization Report” constitutes electronic evidence

RULING:

Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of evidence that Citibank blacklisted

his Mastercard or placed the same on the “hot list.” Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed
to Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. “G”, to prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for being
blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words “DECL OVERLIMIT” opposite Account No. 5423-3920-
0786-7012.

As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be considered
admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.

The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.

Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. “G,” did not actually see the document
executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.
 Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001,
and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. “G” would still be found
wanting.

Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:

Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an

electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity
in the manner provided in this Rule.

Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document

offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of
the following means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to
have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as
may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for
authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction
of the judge.

Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the “other evidence
showing integrity and reliability of Exh. “G” to the satisfaction of the judge.” The Court is not
convinced. Aznar’s testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer
print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient
to show said print-out’s integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos, Exh. “G”
does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in passing
how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific
business address of the source of the computer print-out because while the name
of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not reflected in the print-
out. Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was
generated and how the said information could be relied upon as true.
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR

*ang issue kai pangitaunon pa.

Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.

The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to
be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter
of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election
Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that petitioner, who was then twenty-one
years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan
as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.

On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and
Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a
decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as
member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan.[1] The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the
Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte.[2] The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however,
inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner. [3]

On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman,
Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a
letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial
Election Supervisor Noli Pipo,[4] disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age.
[5]
Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the
order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.[6]

On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her
ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be
disapproved.[7] Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent
Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the
COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against
petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The
petition was sent by facsimile[8] and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections
National Office, Manila.

On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the
COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of
Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the
election. The order reads as follows:

"Acting on the Fax "Petition for Denial And/Or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" by
petitioner Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against Lynette G. Garvida, received on April 29, 1996, the
pertinent allegations of which reads:

5. That the said respondent is disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason
that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was born on June
11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her birth certificate, a copy of which is hereto attached and marked
as Annex "A";

6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as candidate for SK of Bgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, she made material representation which is false and as such, she is disqualified; that her
certificate of candidacy should not be given due course and that said candidacy must be cancelled;

the Commission, it appearing that the petition is meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the Board of
Election Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to
suspend the proclamation of Lynette G. Garvida in the event she garners the highest number
of votes for the position of Sangguniang Kabataan [sic].

Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit immediately ten (10) copies of his petition
and to pay the filing and legal research fees in the amount of P510.00.
 SO ORDERED."[9]

On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes
of 76.[10] In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election
Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on
May 27, 1996.

On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the
position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. [11] The proclamation was
"without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested
party."[12] On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan
for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the
elected officials of the Pederasyon.[13]

Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en
banc to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy; the second, the cancellation
of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an
elective official of the SK.

Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK
elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election
Code.[14] The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz:

"Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before election."
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law
Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material
representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence received by any official
designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself.[15]

Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy
lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained
by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or
ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions,
orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. [16] It is therefore
the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. This is clear from Section 3
of the said Rules thus:

"Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. -- The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to
hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases,
provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens'
arms of the Commission."[17]

In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon
receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996. [18]

II

The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply
with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.These
requirements are:

"Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. -- Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten
(10) legible copies. However, when there is more than one respondent or protestee, the
petitioner or protestant must file additional number of copies of the petition or protest as
there are additional respondents or protestees.
 Sec. 2. How Filed. -- The documents referred to in the immediately preceding section must be
filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally, or, unless
otherwise provided in these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is
the date of filing and the requirement as to the number of copies must be complied with.

Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. -- (a) All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be printed,
mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper and shall be in English or Filipino.

Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond
paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk
of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.

In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition
were filed with the COMELEC.[19] Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the
petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed
and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the
shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. [20] The current is transmitted as a
signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an
image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. [21] The receiver is equipped
with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. [22]

Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an
exact copy preserving all the marks of an original.[23]

Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a
sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have restrained the
COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing the questioned order. The COMELEC en
banc should have waited until it received the petition filed by registered mail.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared
ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the
Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by
simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office ofSangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.SO ORDERED.