Académique Documents
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Jim Deitsch
Joao Hoffmann
Briana Tucker
The ideological gap between Republicans and Democrats has continued to widen in every
election since the 1970s (Thomsen 2017). Even though polarization remains an ambiguous
concept, understanding the various facets of polarization has important consequences for how we
understand partisan conflict, how we evaluate congressional governance, assess representation and
ultimately seek to improve our political system. Most political scholars agree that polarization is
occurring and, perhaps of more noteworthy importance, increasing; how and why is open to debate.
In this paper, we explore a new method of explaining polarization: namely, we examine the
complicated interactions between racial groups and Congressional actors, and hypothesize how
they create additional polarizing behavior in the electorate and in Congress. In order to lay the
groundwork for this discussion, we will first turn to existing scholarship on the topic of
polarization.
Prominent literature from noteworthy political elites tend to define polarization in terms of
a roll call vote-based measure. It does not matter why someone votes the way they do, it only
matters what their actual vote is. It is an impersonal method, but it is much easier than assessing
the alternative, which would be the difficult project of quantifying why someone votes the way
they do. As an example of the roll-call based polarization technique, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal
(2006, 3) define polarization as “a separation of politics into liberal and conservative camps” based
on voting patterns. This method assumes that all votes are “liberal” or “conservative.” Although
Theriault (2008) doesn’t offer an explicit definition of polarization, his work illuminates some of
the central features of polarization, including, “disagreement about procedures,” “members who
cast increasingly ideological votes,” greater differences between the parties and increased party
voting and the division of parties into separate camps on vote-based measures (Theriault 2008).
Polarization as a concept, which focuses on ideological disagreement, is not necessarily the same
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 3
thing as polarization as a measure, which generally captures all votes that separate Democrats from
ground, which can be summarized by a statement from Dodd and Oppenheimer: “Given the
growing regional base of the two parties in the House and Senate, the decline in the number of
moderates in both parties, the increased ideological polarization, and the strength of party voting”
makes finding common ground and opportunity for compromise increasingly difficult (Harbridge
2015). By contrast, other scholars, including Fiorina, who frames her discussion of polarization
through mass behavior, suggests that there is no mass-level polarization in America, but only party
sorting, or the homogeneity of the Democratic and Republican party that results in ideological
divergence of the two parties (Fiorina 2008). We think these definitions of polarization are useful
in some circumstances, but are missing a critical element. That element is race.
The added layer of race makes this inquiry more nuanced than it already is because of the
pervasive and divisive nature that race has played in society. Simply put, one definition of racial
polarization is as follows: “a consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter and the way in
which the voter votes, or to put it differently, where black voters and white voters vote differently”
(U.S. v. Charleston County 2003). In order to examine how racial polarization intersects with
the electorate can also be politically polarizing in Congress, which leads to a multi-dimensional
power structure. This structure creates the end result of different racial groups identifying with
different political parties, and different issues becoming associated with race relations, whether
they are inherently racial or not. For example, one of major consequences of the Obama presidency
has been the racialization of ostensibly non-racial policy areas (i.e., healthcare). The correlation to
this is that differing racial groups identify with a particular party and reject the other political party
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 4
as “against their interests.” This distaste and distrust of the opposing party is often manipulated by
Congressional players to further the partisan divide-- a division supposedly based on the “interests”
of their various constituents, but is really based on the manipulation of their constituents’ racial
biases.
A prevailing belief throughout the history of the United States is that there is a biological
difference between the races, and that this difference should lead to an inequality concerning how
the different races should be treated. A manifestation of this belief was white colonists exploiting
this supposed inequality in order to enslave African-Americans, with no underlying moral qualms.
Once slavery was abolished, things ostensibly got better, but in practice, structures of white
domination were still enforced. Many whites still believed that there were biological differences
between African-Americans and white people, and used this belief to justify the creation of policies
Americans would work at plantations for free, which had the practical effect of continuing to
advantage the wealthy white capitalists who previously thrived on slave labor. As the years went
on, and paternalization broke down to a certain extent, African-Americans moved from the rural
South to Northern cities in search of manufacturing jobs. The idea that blacks could achieve the
‘American Dream’ finally achieved a mildly relevant presence in American society. However,
institutional barriers made this idea harder to achieve in reality than should have been the case.
Due to the cheap labor of African-Americans in factories, whites, particularly those in the middle
class, moved from the inner cities to the suburbs, a phenomenon called the white-flight. African-
Americans became stuck in the inner cities with low paying jobs and surrounded by businesses
owned by whites (Wilson 2012). Stuck in the inner cities without much hope for socioeconomic
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 5
mobility, African-Americans were caught in low paying jobs with deteriorating institutions. They
had followed whites to the cities, and the whites had left, once again creating a physical barrier
between the racial groups. Wilson claims that this is the reason that, on average, African-
Americans are disadvantaged in today’s society as compared to the white race. In the current age,
the belief that there is an intellectual or moral difference between races is no longer socially
acceptable, but the leftover racial biases of that belief and the harmful effects of the structure that
accompanied it still linger. Due to these biases, African-Americans still make less than white
individuals, are less likely to be hired by employers (Pager and Quillian 2015), and are more likely
to die at the hands of police than other races. The Black Lives Matter movement was started in
order to create awareness for and protest the mistreatment of African-Americans at the hands of
the police, especially after the murders of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, and Eric Garner. This
movement has been successful at raising awareness, especially through the use of social media,
but has received major backlash, with the Republican President Trump adamantly opposing the
movement. It is now more important than ever to make sure that there is research and awareness
of how African-Americans are treated not only in society but through politics as well. This reality,
combined with the clear polarization, is why our paper came into existence.
The dramatic increase in the racial and ethnic diversity of the American public has
prompted major societal and cultural shifts. These demographic changes have sparked important
questions, debates, and moral dilemmas regarding the American identity and the role that
minority’s presence plays in shaping that understanding. Current conversations about immigration
and related policies, upticks in prominent white nationalist propaganda, and social movements
echoing the structural and systematic oppression of African Americans by and within the criminal
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 6
justice system have drawn a line in the sand in Washington and forced Congressional leaders to
take a stand on these issues. Since these issues are, sadly, quite divisive, Congressional leaders
often must take a stand that may leave a portion of the electorate discontent.
The growing racial divide between the two parties is not only evidenced by the racial
composition of their respective members, but also evidenced by their respective stances on many
“social issues.” Differing experiences and opinions of and concerning minority populations,
including African Americans, prompts differing views on the role of government, party
identification and voting behavior that accompanies racial and ethnic issues. If minorities comprise
the base of a particular party and support its electoral victory through increased voter turnout, it is
likely that polarization will be somewhat affected, which in turn is likely to exacerbate this divide.
However, it is also likely to force political leaders to adopt and espouse new views that could unite
Americans, if done correctly. Sadly, this has rarely happened. Ultimately, the current political and
cultural climate of the country provides a strong basis for our research topic.
For the purposes of our research, we would like to focus our discussion of racial
polarization on the analysis of the dynamics between African Americans and White Americans.
Given the history of intense racial resentment between these two groups - from the early days of
slavery and Civil War to the Civil Rights movement and the BLM movement- it is important to
focus our analysis on these two racial groups, since any conversation concerning race relations in
America necessitates their inclusion. The racial resentment that has existed and continues to exist
between the two groups, we hypothesize, contributes to the aforementioned polarization, which is
often manifested in individuals’ racial attitudes that have spillover effects into ostensibly non-
racial policy areas. For example, issues such as health care and social welfare programs, although
not racially charged in theory, have developed extremely racialized connotations due to the
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 7
inherent racial biases of whites and their need to maintain a white racial standing against African-
Americans.
Joel Olsen (2008), in his work, Whiteness and the Polarization of the American Politics
explores the role race plays in political polarization, or the tendency for politicians and voters to
act along partisan and ideological lines. He argues that polarization has resulted, in part, from the
changing nature of white identity, or whiteness, and the strategic response to this change by
political elites. He suggests that the transformation of whiteness and subsequent polarization lies
at the root of what he deems are “culture wars,” which embody the intense political separation
During slavery and segregation, white identity functioned as a form of racialized standing
that granted all whites a superior social status to all those who were not white, particularly African
Americans. The loss of individualized standing due to the victories of the civil rights movement,
however, led to anger, anxiety, and ressentiment among many whites, and a desire to restore white
standing. This “white standing” was more than a hypothesized hierarchy because of the
accompanying sociopolitical power that the white skin color provided (Olsen). This white
ressentiment, as Olson calls it, presented a political opportunity for the minority party, if they could
mobilize it, to create backlash against the African-American constituency to form a party focused
on low-class working whites (Olsen 2008). Yet given post-civil rights movement norms against
overt racism, Republican strategists could not do so in a way that directly evoked white standing.
Republican leaders overcame this dilemma by creating a narrative that portrayed the Democrats
as the party of “intellectual elites and undeserving rabble”- a word used by Spiro Agnew to
describe minorities (Olsen 2008). The GOP, meanwhile, presenting themselves to low income
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 8
working class whites as the "virtuous middle," squeezed in between. In constructing this conflict,
Republican elites implicitly racialized both the virtuous middle and the "snobs" as white, while
Prior to the 1960s, party identification among white voters tended to reflect regional,
ethnic, and religious differences, at least as much as ideological ones (Olsen 2008). But the
aggressive effort to distinguish a virtuous middle from the snobs and the rabble contributed to,
according to Olsen, the splitting of the white vote along ideological lines. In turn, increased
ideological coherence created an incentive for each party to bundle positions on racial issues with
hot-button “cultural issues” such as welfare, abortion and gay marriage (Olsen 2008). This
contributed to a partisan realignment that made the base of each party more ideologically consistent
and more antagonistic to the other party’s ideology, paving the way for an increasingly polarized
discussion of the deep political separation of blacks and whites along racial lines in her work.
Hochschild left her liberal home in Berkeley, California to visit the deep Louisiana Bayou in an
began to interview more Trump supporters, she began to realized that these working class whites
were voting against policies that would benefit them due to racial biases, most particularly social
welfare reform (Hoschild 2016). While social welfare is available to those who need it regardless
of race, these conservative working class whites saw it as only helping minority communities.
Deemed the “Great Paradox,” Hochschild explained that working class whites felt that they were
waiting in line for the American Dream only to have immigrants, African-Americans, and women
have policies favor them and allow them to cut the line (Hoschild 2016). Hochschild’s analysis
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 9
prompted her realization that most of the policies that the conservative population voted against
had racial context and exhibited voter patterns that would seem to help whites as a whole instead
of minorities. This causes a clear shift in which people vote against policies that would help them
because they view it as helping those who do not deserve it, i.e. minority communities.
Olson’s work highlights the shift that the Republicans made to protect their own racial
power, that is the white standing of the minority party on the electorate level against those of
different races. This white standing allows for a glass floor in which no matter “how poor, mean,
or ignorant one might have been, or whatever discriminations on the basis of gender, class,
religion, or ethnicity one may have been subjected to, one could always derive social esteem by
asserting ‘At least I’m not black’” (Olson 708). This notion appealed to the poor white constituency
that followed along with the Republicans due to the belief that the Republican party would make
sure that no matter what happens, lower-class working whites would be protected and their voices
heard, unlike the “pretentious” Democratic party that would rather focus on the rich whites and
minorities in society. Hochschild’s ethnographic study proves the point that low-class whites have
such high trust in the Republican party due to the belief that the Democratic party does not care
about them. The Republicans that she spoke to voted against liberal social welfare and
environmental policies that would ultimately help their living conditions more than conservative
policies, due to the mistrust and the idea that minorities, blacks, and women will benefit from
liberal policies, while the low-class whites will be left behind. Race and white standing became
the main determinant of the way in which these people voted on representatives and policies. The
ideal set by the Republican party at the end of the Reconstruction period created not only racial
polarization, but set in place a structure of racialized society in which actors have certain roles and
boundaries placed on them through a person’s skin color. No longer is race just a social construct,
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 10
but has been transformed to a structural institution that suppresses minorities, while praising and
Henderson and Hillygus’ model includes measures of race and racial resentment to
evaluate claims made by many political pundits and journalists that health care debate became
racialized. In a Huffington Post Article, Ray Hanania articulates that although many Republicans
and “blue dog” conservatives Democrats claimed they opposed Obama’s health care plan because
it would increase the nation's debt, the real reason is “driven by racism and the fact that the majority
who would benefit from health care reform are minorities, the poor and families burdened by
uninsured health challenges” (Hanania 2009). Although highly speculative, Hanania claim echoes
findings by other prominent political theorists that “deep-seated beliefs and values generally – and
those about race specifically” – have been shown to shape attitudes across a range of policy areas
(Kinder 2001). Although public opinion on social welfare policies has been found to be tinged
Michael Tesler (2011) in his work Post-Racial Most Racial, found evidence that racial
resentment has become more predictive of health care opinion since the election of Obama, but
the analysis does not explicitly consider individual-level opinion change. Henderson and Hillygus
found that none of the demographic factors – except race – were related to changes in health care
attitudes. The theorists found a large and statistically significant effect of racial attitudes on health
care attitudes. Those with the highest levels of racial resentment were 29 percentage points more
likely to change in the negative direction between 2008 and 2010, confirming Tesler’s conclusions
that health care policy has become more racialized in the Obama presidency (Henderson, Hillygus
2011).
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 11
health care attitudes. “Republicans whose earlier attitude did not match their party’s position were
much more likely to flip to the opposing side by 2010 than were Democrats who expressed similar
positions in 2008, contributing to party polarization at the mass level” (Henderson, Hillygus 2011).
There was no parallel net increase in support for universal health care among Democrats because
a notable share of weak Democrats and Democrat-leaning independents also moved in the negative
The more interesting question for Henderson and Hillygus concerns the interplay of
partisanship and self-interest. In 2008, 27 percent of Republican constituents reported that they
worried a lot about major unexpected medical expenses. Interestingly, these Republicans were
likely following Republican leaders who opposed universal health care. Henderson and Hillygus
then asked, “does self-interest moderate the effect of partisan attachment?” The scholars found
that the probability that a partisan comes to oppose universal health care is often conditional on
perceived self-interest. Moreover, that effect is strongest for self-identified strong Republicans.
While there was some polarization in public opinion, these results offer clear evidence that health
care attitudes are not simply reflection of elite rhetoric but instead have roots in more fundamental
considerations (Henderson, Hillygus 2011). Republicans in the electorate seem to worry that
universal health care would assist African-Americans and minorities more than working-class
whites. Even though health care should not be a racial issue, due to the implication that the
“virtuous” white Republicans want to maintain their white standing, they could not and still will
not support universal health care due to the minority constituency that it is perceived to help the
most. However, their attitudes are based on racial biases, not substantive facts, and the end result
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 12
is often Republican health care policy that helps neither racial minorities nor the main Republican
base.
Racial attitudes were also already reflected in attitudes toward universal health insurance
by September 2008, suggesting either that health care policy had already been racialized in the
presidential campaign or that the measure of racial resentment could tap something other than
racism. Either way, their racial resentment measure is more strongly related to health care attitudes
in 2010 than in 2008. This is more evidence that attitudes and the tangible consequences of these
Ross Douthat’s work entitled “Republicans, White Voters and Racial Polarization” (2013)
provides a commentary on Sean Trende’s argument that the G.O.P. should try to build a “whites-
only” majority, which would, in effect, intensify the political divide and increase racial
polarization of the electorate. Douthat (2013) presents arguments from prominent political
scientist, Alan Abramowitz, who argues that the growing dependence of the Democratic Party on
nonwhite voters has contributed to the flight of racially and economically conservative white
voters to the G.O.P. This “White Flight,” according to Abramowitz, further increases the size of
the racial divide between the party coalitions. The article, also differentiates between Clinton-era
Democrats, who tried to appeal to working class whites, and Obama-era Democrats, most of whom
used “scorched earth” campaign tactics to minimize the G.O.P.’s margin. Additionally,
particularly sensitive and racially charged issues such as immigration have been indoctrinated into
increasing support amongst their predominantly whites base and through efforts to make it harder
for nonwhites to vote is, according to Abramowitz, “a recipe for a future in which America’s two
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 13
parties are largely defined by race” (2014). As a result, racially sensitive issues – welfare, social
and criminal justice reform, affirmative action– fracture both parties on racial lines. If both political
parties take stricter stances on these issues, such polarization is likely to exist within each party’s
racially distinct bases. These bases are likely affected, at least to a certain extent, by the racial
The new 115th U.S Congress of 2017 has become officially the most diverse Congress in
history. Now, one in five voting members are of an ethnic minority group. However, nonwhites
still only make up 19% of the current congress, with the other 81% being white. While some may
argue that this closely-enough resembles the diverse population of the United States, it can (and,
we think, should) be argued that this number is still not good enough, with 38% of the U.S
2017). Since 2001, the Republican party has increased the number of minority representatives from
four to twelve, while Democrats have increased from 27 to 83 members. Thus, like Olson and
Hochschild argue, we believe that Republicans choose to be the party of the “virtuous” white, not
particularly inclusive to the needs of those outside of the white race, while they labeled the
Democratic party the party of the “snobby” white and “undeserving rabble” (Olson 2008). Because
the racial demographics of the politicians themselves likely affect how the politicians vote on
specific issues, the fact that Republican Congressional members are mostly white and Democratic
Congressional Members are much more diverse, supports our conclusion that polarization exists
Additionally, because members of Congress are drawn from and shaped by their
constituencies, it’s likely that if the electorate is polarized, then members will also be polarized.
Congressional leaders are ideologically representative of their districts, suggesting that this
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 14
dynamic polarize the electorate. The adoption of ideologically distinct positions by Congressional
parties further exacerbate polarization in Congress through a direct feedback loop to the mass
population.
Minority Members of Congress will often try to represent their own minority group’s
interests, even if those issues or minorities don’t make up their constituency. For example, through
symbolic representation, black members in Congress are more likely respond to black constituents.
This seems to suggest that there is more racial and outgroup awareness that is likely to affect voting
in Congress. By the same token, the few minorities in Congress are driven to act as a voice for
minority interests regardless of the districts they represent. For an example, in an interview Rep.
Luis Gutierrez spoke passionately about immigration reform, solidarity and the U.S. government’s
responsibility to help Puerto Rico develop economically. When asked about the campaign to free
political prisoner, Oscar Lopez, an issue very important to him, Gutierrez remarked how it was
“important for him to put his life as a Puerto Rican in the United States” and spoke broadly about
William Curtis Ellis and Walter Clark Wilson, in their article Minority Chairs and
politically salient physical characteristics like race or ethnicity with their electoral constituencies
and are widely viewed as important to the representation of marginalized groups” (Ellis, Wilson
Their findings revealed that hearings chaired by Latinos and African Americans in the
House between 1979 and 2008, were more likely to address racialized issues like civil rights, social
welfare, and housing issues. For Ellis and Wilson, these findings confirm that descriptive
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 15
to minority issues and suggests that “the acquisition of institutional power by black and Latino
descriptive representation changes patterns of issue attention in Congress and affects the
representation. By contrast, while white committee chairs presided over 90% of the hearing
examined during the three decades Ellis and Wilson considered, the same chairs presided over
fewer than 70% of hearings on minority issues (Ellis, Wilson 2013). The race and ethnicity of
committee chairs seems to have a direct affect on the presence of minority issues on the
Institutional barriers, often referred to as “glass ceilings” can act as a substantial hurdle to
the incorporation and representation of minority interests that preclude minority representatives
from being elected in the first place (Ellis, Wilson 2013). Ultimately, electing descriptive
that shapes policy agendas, outputs and outcomes (Ellis, Wilson 2013).
Other scholars argue that as an alternative to increasing the number of racial minorities in
Congress, blacks and other minorities would be more politically effective if they represented a
significant minority across many districts (i.e., “influence districts”), rather than an absolute
majority in a relative few (Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996). In the article, Congressional
Representation of Black Interests, Hutchings, McClerking and Charles (2004) explore how the
linkage between race and representation might occur because of a kind of unconscious policy
agreement between constituent and legislator. On the other hand, black constituency size might be
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 16
influential because of more conscious efforts on the part of the MC to represent their black
supporters.
Implications
The increasing racial tensions between black and white communities in America has
continued to fracture the nation, the electorate and Congress along racial lines. As a result, certain
issues, including social welfare, education and health care, have not only become racially charged
but have become increasingly partisan. With Congress members seemingly taking stricter stances
on these issues and programs that are perceived by both members in Congress and the electorate
to help minorities, Congress’ efforts to make change in these areas has come to a halt. With the
upticks of political activism reminiscent of the civil rights movement of the 1960s, more blacks
and whites are expressing their distaste and distrust of elected officials to truly get things done.
Ultimately, people can’t be what they don’t see. If minorities continued to perceive a
Congressional systems that oppresses and disadvantages them, it follows that less and less
minorities with hold seats of higher offices. This not only squelches minorities voices and
concerns, but also gives them no platform to vocalize these issues. Furthermore, this while further
the divide between minorities and politics. By contrast, low income white voters, who feel that the
current system only caters to the needs of minorities, will continue to support policies that would
actually help them. This drives whites and blacks further away from one another with little
opportunities to see the other person's side and to truly work toward substantive policy agreement.
As a result, the future looks pretty pessimistic. There is no definite way to fix the issue of racial
polarization, and to be frank, there might not be a way. However, a step in the right direction is to
present the issue and hope that other researchers and those in power will work on creating a
solution.
Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 17
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Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 18
Bialik, Kristen, and Jens Manuel Krogstad. “115th Congress Sets New High for Racial, Ethnic
Diversity.” Pew Research Center, 24 Jan. 2017, www.pewresearch.org/fact-
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Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1996. “Do Majority-Minority
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Deitsch, Hoffmann, Tucker 19
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