SMALL WARS JOURNAL

smallwarsjournal.com

As Prepared Remarks to the NATO Military

Committee, Brussels, Belgium
September 27, 2010
Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV
Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan
I am Bill Caldwell, a NATO officer…Commander of the NATO Training Mission you
established last November. At that time, you charged me to generate and professionalize the
Afghan National Security Force. Today, I am here to report on our progress…and request your
assistance.

If we do not continue to resource the training mission in Afghanistan, we will definitely delay
transition.

Tactical gains on the battlefield will not be enduring without a self-sustaining Afghan Security
Force. To create this force, we must professionalize the police, army, and air forces; create
viable logistics and medical systems; and improve the infrastructure and the institutions that train
and educate them…above all, we MUST have the trainers to develop them. We cannot meet our
goals without the resources to achieve them. As our Secretary General said recently, “no
trainers, no transition.”

This transition to Afghan lead is critical to Afghanistan and requires Afghan soldiers and police
that are capable of independent security operations and have the capacity to generate and sustain
their own forces. To do this, we must support the Afghan government in the development of this
capacity, while building systems to set the conditions for transitioning the lead …in other words
…developing the Afghan National Security Force is transition.

As SACEUR said earlier this month while visiting us in Afghanistan, “Training is Job One.”
Our most urgent need to accomplish this job is getting the coalition trainers required. We are at
a critical stage in the development of the Afghan National Security Force. This past year our
focus was on generating quantity…combat formations, battalions that we sent into the fight. But
now, we must create a force that can generate, equip, and sustain itself to serve and protect its
people; therefore, we must build the critical support formations over the next year, and
professionalize this force. Accomplishing this will require additional NATO institutional
trainers with special skill sets…skill sets to create and develop Afghan logisticians, maintainers,
communicators, intel analysts, and the leaders this security force requires. The majority of this
increase occurs in the six month period between this December… and next May. If we do not
resource this critical phase of the mission…and resource it soon…the Afghan National Security
Force will not be self-sufficient… in time to begin the process of transition next year. If they are
not self-sufficient, then we… cannot transition…

We are realistic about where we stand today, so when I tell you that we have made tremendous
progress, I say it fully aware of the challenges that lay ahead. Due to the commitment of our
nations since last November, our focused efforts to build and strengthen the Afghan National
Security Force have developed a real capacity to create a professional force that can serve its
people and preserve its nation. When we stood up this command last year the prospects for
significant progress were dim. When I took one of my first trips to view the status of training in
Afghanistan it became very clear we were headed in the wrong direction.

At a Police Training Center out west in Adraskan, I observed the state of police training…and
was deeply concerned…This site was run by contractors, they trained police recruits based on
their contract, showing little initiative or flexibility for conditions on the ground. As military
professionals, we understand the three basic skills of any security force – the ability to shoot,
move, and communicate. The police recruits at Adraskan were getting none of these in their
training last year. During weapons training, they were not taught the basics of marksmanship or
expected to qualify. The contractors did not even have a sight adjustment tool to change the
sights for the recruits…they simply showed them how to load the weapon and shoot bullets
down range. While a significant portion of a police officer’s duty is to patrol in a
vehicle, no driver’s training was provided – and this for a population that largely has never
driven a vehicle…recruits that have to be taught as the first step of drivers training how to open
the door. The contract trainers also failed to communicate with recruits outside of basic
instruction. There was no professional development or mentorship.

Today… training in Adraskan is drastically improved and I was just there last week to see the
changes first hand. What I saw were…Trainers who are now more than simply instructors, they
are police professionals… Professionals who have the specialty skills required for the task and
the experience to develop and mentor the police recruits… Professionals who are training others
to be professional. As you can see, today Adraskan is run by the European Gendarmerie Force.
Upon arrival, these police professionals immediately identified the need for more advanced
training. They revamped weapons qualification training, teaching them how to shoot accurately,
and ensuring that all policemen qualify with their weapon before they graduate. They
proactively requested vehicles from the local Provincial Reconstruction Team and developed a
driver’s course. They spent time outside of official training providing professional development
and mentorship. Initiative, flexibility, and professional experience…this is what trainers from
coalition nations provide…and it is vital to the accomplishment of our mission.

Adraskan is just one example of the difference coalition trainers have made in training the
Afghan National Security Force. To understand the full picture of our progress, we must look
back over the last year.

Before November 2009, the focus for Afghan National Security Force development was
on quantity…on getting as many soldiers and police into operations as fast as possible and yet…
we were even failing at that mission. Building and developing the Afghan National Security

Page 2 of 7 Remarks As Prepared 27 September 2010 smallwarsjournal.com

© 2010, Small Wars Foundation
Force as an enduring force was not the focus of their efforts. In fact, this time last year the
overall growth of the Afghan National Army had a net loss of 1200… There was no growth…
Meanwhile, key inputs that addressed the professionalism and quality of the force, such as leader
development, losses from attrition, and literacy of soldiers and police were overlooked.
Even in quantity the development of the Afghan National Security Force was inconsistent. As
you can see in this chart…

Historical Annual Growth: ANSF

80,000
Projected
Growth Dec
70,000 70,365 Growth
Aug
63,776
60,000
ANSF GROWTH

50,000 42,364
38,326
40,000
28,726 Annual
Average
30,000 2005-2009
19,061 26,695
20,000

5,000
10,000

0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Projected
CALENDAR YEAR
as of 25 SEP 2010 1

From 2005 to November 2009, the average annual growth was around 15,000 personnel in the
Afghan National Army and 12,000 in the Afghan National Police; for a total of 27,000 in the
Afghan National Security Force. The growth was well below the requirement to meet both the
Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police end-strength goals for this year.
Today, I am pleased to report this trend has been reversed. In the past year the growth in the
Army and Police has more than doubled the average of any previous year at almost 64,000
personnel. This growth is larger than any other year in the history of the Afghan National
Security Force, leading both the Army and Police to exceed their 2010 growth goals three
months ahead of schedule.

While an increase in the quantity of the Afghan National Security Force is a sign of progress, we
realized shortly after the activation of NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan that while quantity
is important, quality is imperative…As we all know, it is the foundation of professionalism.
Our #1 challenge to building a self-sustaining Afghan National Security Force is developing
professionalism within its ranks. Professionalism is the key ingredient to an enduring force that
can serve and protect its people. The limiting factors to building this professional force are
leader development, literacy, and losses through attrition.

The first, and most important element, to professionalize the Afghan National Security Force is
leader development…it is the enduring foundation for any security force.

Our efforts to create professional officers and non-commissioned officers in the Army and Police
are focused on quality training, developing experience, and providing an appropriate education;
all dedicated to creating an ethos of service and loyalty. It is only when Afghan leaders embrace

Page 3 of 7 Remarks As Prepared 27 September 2010 smallwarsjournal.com

© 2010, Small Wars Foundation
a culture of service to their nation and their people that the Afghan National Security Force will
truly be a professional force. The only way this ethos will be developed and true leaders created
is through rigorous mentorship and development by quality trainers. We MUST provide them
our best trainers…trainers that can only be found in your nations…and can provide Afghan
leaders an example to follow.

To address the key challenge of professionalization we need one thing… YOU. Your nations
have the right people, with the right skills, in the right numbers, and the right multi-national
experience. Every one of your nations has a capability that will sustain the momentum we have
created together this past ten months. We need you to determine how else your nation can
contribute…you know what special skills your nations’ service members and civilians can bring
to this mission. While NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan makes up only 2% of the coalition
force strength in Afghanistan, its impact is enormous – our trainers have generated an Afghan
National Security Force that today makes up 63% of all security forces. By improving their
capability to generate, equip, field and sustain their Force, we have begun to create a force that
will be able to take the lead for security in the future. This would not have been possible without
the professional trainers from your countries.

Let me give you a few examples where trainers have made a significant impact…and where we
need more help.

The Afghan National Army’s Consolidated Fielding Center in Kabul, pictured here, is
an extraordinary example of how NATO trainers have made a dramatic difference. The Center’s
mission, in its simplest form, is to build, train, equip and validate infantry battalions before the
battalions are sent it into combat operations. It provides consistent quality of training, ensuring
that each unit is ready to deploy to its designated area of operation. In the past 10 months it has
validated and deployed approximately 35 battalion-sized units. Military members from 10
NATO nations form the core of support for the Center. They provide quality training to units
that are about to enter combat operations…it makes a difference in Afghan National Security
Force combat readiness… it helps units establish the cohesion and competence necessary for
real-world operations.

Though this mission has not changed in ten months, the complexity of the training and the
detailed integration of the battalion’s command and control and its internal fire power
experienced impressive gains. Just this past month, for the first time, an infantry battalion
integrated mortars, machine guns, and SPG-9s (see photo) into a culminating live fire exercise.
The result of having professional trainers is not just to make a more combat effective infantry
battalion but also to shorten the time it takes to make these units more self-reliant.
The Consolidated Fielding Center would not exist without the special skills provided by your
multinational team of trainers.

Let me shift from an infantry-centric focus to highlight how your nations have provided growing
capacity in specialty skills and support systems…as exemplified by the Afghan Air Force. At
this time last year, all basic airlift and battlefield mobility was being performed by coalition
forces alone… In the last 10 months, a portion of this capability has been created and Afghans
are now performing some, but not all of these functions…

Page 4 of 7 Remarks As Prepared 27 September 2010 smallwarsjournal.com

© 2010, Small Wars Foundation
Just last month, the AAF directly supported the Afghan people by rescuing over 2,100 citizens
threatened by rising floodwaters. Earlier this month they returned from providing disaster relief
assistance to Pakistan with no NATO advisor presence – the four Afghan Air Force helicopters
flew 211 sorties, transported 963 aid workers, rescued 120 flood victims, and delivered over 100
tons of medical and food aid. This amount of aid essentially fed 200,000 families for a week.
This is an extraordinary achievement…and an important strategic message of regional
partnership— The Government of Afghanistan has the willingness and capability to help a
neighbor in need… a capability enabled by NATO trainers. This mission saved lives and made a
dramatic difference. It would not have been possible without the extraordinary skill and efforts
of your nations’ trainers in the NATO Air Training Command. We need additional specialty
trainers to increase the critical role of training and educating additional Afghan Air Force
personnel.

Afghan Air Force Aircraft Build

# Aircraft

OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

However, as you can see in this chart, the Afghan Air Force will have dramatic growth over the
next two years that will require more trainers… specialized trainers… trainers from your
countries to see this through until completion.

These are but two examples of the progress that we have made together…and examples of why
we need more trainers. There will be a steep increase in trainer requirements over the next eight
months. With the 600 pledges that came from the Force Generation Conference last week, there
are still 900 unfilled trainer requirements. The pledges made last week are important and
appreciated, but they are not sufficient for us to accomplish the mission you have asked us to
do... We still need trainer capabilities, not just numbers…but also specific capabilities. We need
trainers with the skills and experience to grow and professionalize the Afghan National Security
Force.

Your support to the NATO Training Mission has increased both the quantity and quality of the
Afghan National Security Force, sustaining the significant momentum begun this past year.

Page 5 of 7 Remarks As Prepared 27 September 2010 smallwarsjournal.com

© 2010, Small Wars Foundation
However, we MUST fill the remaining requirements to sustain this momentum in the face of
significant challenges both in quantity and quality.

The magnitude of the challenge in quantity in the Afghan National Security Force is monumental
to say the least. To put this into context, in order to grow the Afghan National Security Force the
additional 50,000 needed to meet the 2011 growth goal of 305,000, we will need to recruit, train,
and assign 133,000 soldiers and police in the next year, which represents approximately the same
number as the total strength of the Afghan Army today.

A persistent lack of trainers will negatively impact the quality of police and soldiers and their
ability to generate and sustain their forces. Without more specialty trainers… expansion of
Afghan training bases will be hindered… specialty school development will be delayed…
creation of support units will be slowed… professionalization efforts will be hampered…and the
eventual transfer of security responsibility to Afghans will be delayed.

To address this, we have identified 15 priority capabilities that we believe you can reasonably
pledge against and begin filling by this winter and next spring. These requirements represent
half of the total current trainer shortfall, but most importantly represent the gendarmes, pilots,
doctors, and other key enablers that will get us through a critical and exponential growth period.
If these commitments are pledged and fulfilled with boots on the ground, it would cover our
critical needs through the summer of 2011…and further… allows us to begin the process of
transition. Each of you possesses a capability that exists right now that can fill these
requirements…each of you can make an even greater contribution today to greater Afghan
stability and our shared security.

Just over 9 years ago, an unstable Afghanistan led to plumes of smoke and ash floating over New
York’s skyline and out of a building in Washington, DC, killing 2,977 civilians of many
nations…over 6 years ago bombs exploded on four trains in Madrid, killing 191
commuters…and over 5 years ago backpacks across London detonated, killing 52 citizens
travelling to work and school…

Nine years ago we all determined that it was no longer safe to turn our backs on
Afghanistan...this is still true today. The safety and security of not only the Afghan people,
but our own people, require an Afghan security force that can serve and protect its people…a
security force that can prevent the proliferation of malign organizations like those that attacked
us all. This security force is being built today…but needs our help to become self-sufficient and
professionalized. Continued delay to develop the support forces and schools the Afghan
National Security Force requires to will delay their ability to achieve self-reliance. We
cannot sustain our momentum without YOUR support… If everyone at this table made a pledge
of 30 trainers with the required skill sets, we would have all that is required for us to accomplish
our mission.

I am Bill Caldwell…a NATO officer and I am here to appeal to you to resource our mission with
the critical trainers required to accomplish the mission NATO has mandated for us.

Page 6 of 7 Remarks As Prepared 27 September 2010 smallwarsjournal.com

© 2010, Small Wars Foundation
Anything less will definitely delay transition and prevent the Afghan National Security Force
from becoming a self sustaining and enduring force that can protect its people and preserve its
nation. Thank you.

Small Wars Journal Editors’ Note: Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell, IV is Commander of NATO
Training Mission-Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. You
can access LTG Caldwell's NTM-A / CSTC-A speeches, interviews, videos, and blog
entries here.

This is a single article excerpt of material published in Small Wars Journal.

Published by and COPYRIGHT © 2010, Small Wars Foundation.

Permission is granted to print single copies for personal, non-commercial use. Select non-commercial use is licensed
via a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 license and per our Terms of Use. We are in this together.

No FACTUAL STATEMENT should be relied upon without further investigation on your part sufficient to satisfy you in
your independent judgment that it is true.

Contact: comment@smallwarsjournal.com

Visit www.smallwarsjournal.com

Cover Price: Your call. Support SWJ here.

Page 7 of 7 Remarks As Prepared 27 September 2010 smallwarsjournal.com

© 2010, Small Wars Foundation