CULTURE MATTERS

Barriers to Engagement: Why It Is Time for Oil and Gas

to Get Serious About Public Communication
Jen Schneider, Colorado School of Mines

Jen Schneider participated in a panel
discussion on community relations at
the SPE Annual Technical Conference
and Exhibition in San Antonio
last year. She made an interesting
presentation about barriers to
engagement, a topic that was new
to me.
I invited her to reprise her talk
for this column and trust that you
will find her insights engaging and
enlightening.—Howard Duhon, GATE,
Oil and Gas Facilities Editorial Board.
The oil and gas industry is no stranger
to controversy. As with other hot button
issues, how one views the industry is a
good indicator of where one falls on the
political spectrum.
From the Exxon Valdez oil spill
in 1989 to the Macondo blowout in
2010, the industry has had to face
intense public scrutiny and develop
effective communication and public
relations strategies.
The ongoing struggle over
hydrofracturing seems to be
qualitatively different. The challenges
the industry faces in this case are not
only or even primarily technical—they
have to do with how the industry sees
and communicates with the public, and
with demands from the public to have a
voice in decision making.
Generally speaking, these demands
are not being met. Public resistance to
hydrofracturing is proving significant
in several areas in the United States
and internationally, and may be a
harbinger of things to come. Most
industry members I speak to voice
tremendous frustration with public
misunderstandings about fracturing.
But the problem is not only with
the public. The industry erects barriers
to meaningful communication as
well. As the industry seeks to expand
operations into areas of increasing
political complexity or public
resistance, understanding the barriers
to meaningful public engagement
becomes more essential.
Making meaningful public
engagement happen is tricky. A lot
depends on context, a community’s
previous experiences with extractive
industries and its political allegiances,
and the economics and leadership (or
lack thereof) in a particular area.
Yet public engagement is becoming
more necessary. There was perhaps a
time in science and technology policy
making when the public, technical, and
political spheres of decision making
were distinct. We often hearken back
to a romanticized era—perhaps some
time in the early Cold War—when
engineers and scientists were in charge
of the technical realms, politicians “did”
politics, and the public accepted what it
was told by authorities and experts.
Things have changed—and
probably never matched the romantic
vision, anyway. My experience working
with engineers suggests that they would
like the circle containing “technical”
communication and decision making
to be the most dominant. They believe
that more technical talk will lead to
more understanding and agreement.
This column suggests that this is a
counterproductive belief. We should
instead be placing more emphasis on
meaningful engagement in the public
sphere. It does not mean developing
more sophisticated public relations
campaigns; more spin will not solve
the problem. It does mean developing
strategies for real dialogue and
processes that encourage long-term
relationships—allowing for conflict and
contentiousness—between industry
and affected communities.
There are many variables that
go into the model of community
engagement, and there will be trial and
error, even with good, experienced
people working on the ground.
However, there are four things the
industry does have control over, and
they have to do with its own worldviews
and values, which may create barriers
to engagement.

Jen Schneider is an assistant professor in liberal arts and Narrow Technical Focus
international studies at the Colorado School of Mines. Her The first basic barrier to engagement
research focuses on how scientists, engineers, industry, and stems from having a narrow
activists communicate with each other and the public about technical focus. Technical focus
the politics of energy extraction and production technologies. and specialization are good things,
She holds a PhD in cultural studies from Claremont Graduate right? They allow you to execute
University. She is a coauthor of Engineering and Sustainable large, complex projects, to ensure
Community Development published in 2010. quality control, and to manage large

April 2013 • Oil and Gas Facilities 25

CULTURE MATTERS
operations. You would not hire a recent
graduate who was not technically
proficient. At the same time, there
are some significant disadvantages to
privileging the technical above all else,
as the industry (like most engineering
fields) tends to do.
First, it encourages technological
lock-in early on. Because the
industry is operating in an incredibly
competitive environment and is
dominated by an engineering mind-set,
early technologies that function well
and are economic are quickly embraced
and implemented. Yet these are the
very technologies that may create
significant problems for the public or
the environment down the road (with
hydrofracturing, for example, the
intensive water use by first-generation
technologies has proven particularly
problematic for many members of
the public).
Perhaps things have to
incrementally evolve in this way, but a
technical mind-set tends to dig in and
defend these technologies rather than
remain agile and responsive to public
and policy concerns.
Another problem with the narrow
technical focus is that it encourages
what marketing and business gurus
and brothers Chip and Dan Heath
called the “curse of knowledge.” Put
simply, once you—as an expert—
understand something, it becomes
very difficult to remember what it was
like not to understand it.
You have a clear model
in your head of how shale is
fractured, for example, and find
yourself frustrated and angry with
members of the public who think
the hydrofracturing of rock at great
depths could endanger water supplies.
If the public does not get that, you
may be led to think that the public
is ignorant.
The Deficit Model
This leads us to the second major
barrier to engagement: the deficit
26 Oil and Gas Facilities • April 2013
model. When the industry
predominantly views the public as
uninformed, the industry is seeing
the public in terms of having a deficit
of information. The cure? More
science and technical education. More
information. The reasoning goes like
this: The public thinks hydrofracturing
is threatening water supplies. It does not
understand that, for the most part, this
is incredibly unlikely. If we can get it to
understand how fracturing works, it will
stop raising such a fuss. And then we
can hydrofracture where we like.
This reasoning is the result of a
worldview that believes if access to
information and understanding was
equal among all parties, all parties
would agree. In other words, if all of
us understood the technicalities of
fracturing, we would all go ahead and
agree with the process. This, of course,
is not the case, because we may have
different values.
The nuclear power industry has
struggled for decades with this lesson.
Many nuclear advocates continue
to believe that if the public would
just understand radiation or the
principles of nuclear fission, it would
endorse the “nuclear renaissance” and
begin a reactor-building frenzy. Yet
arguments about cost, safety, waste, and
proliferation have not been so easily put
to bed, and educated knowledgeable
people in the field continue to have
hearty disagreements about whether
nuclear power is the best path forward.
The same could be said of debates
over hydrofracturing.
The best way to know whether the
deficit model has you in its thrall is to
observe whether you frequently find
yourself making calls for improved
public education, particularly at the
elementary school level. This is a
sign of frustration, on your part, with
those who disagree with you, and you
believe the disagreements have to do
with technical misunderstandings.
Of course, there may be technical
misunderstandings—there often are.
But clarifying those—whether by
calling for revised science education
or publishing another fact sheet
debunking the documentary movie,
GasLand—does not mean someone
will end up agreeing with you.
Because, fundamentally, you may be
disagreeing not about information,
but values.
Postnormal Technologies
A third barrier to engagement,
therefore, is that large-scale
technological developments today are
often “postnormal” (a term coined
by Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome
Ravetz). These technologies, such as
hydrofracturing, nuclear power, and
nanotechnology, are typified by excess
amounts of controversy, dueling fact
sheets or information campaigns,
dramatized polarities (“for” and
“against”), and deeply entrenched
misunderstandings on both sides.
Sound familiar?
Postnormal technologies are
typified by experts on both sides
embroiled in nasty disagreements
over data. In these cases, having more
information does not always settle
public unease about extractive projects.
In fact, in a political field in
which a technology is already
controversial, more information may be
counterproductive. It may lead to what
science policy scholar Dan Sarewitz
calls “an excess of objectivity.” There are
so many “facts” that having more facts
does not tell us how to proceed. In the
words of political scientist Roger Pielke
Jr., “Science does not compel action.”
Disparate Models of Justice
The fourth barrier to engagement is
operating under disparate models
of justice. When I say we disagree
about values, it is possible that those
disagreements extend from the
competing models about what is just.
Volumes have been written about how
to define justice, extending all the
way back to the Greeks; perhaps two

definitions of justice would be most
meaningful in this context.
The first is distributive justice,
and it is the model most prevalent
in the industry—and in most
capitalist economies, for that matter.
Distributive justice focuses primarily
on outcomes. It is the business, or
legal, model of justice. It leads us to
believe that if three out of five farmers
sign leases to hydrofracture on their
land, and are happy with the monetary
compensation they have received
from those leases, then things are just.
We have accomplished the greatest
good for the greatest number, and
the outcomes have been reasonable.
The other two farmers, whose
property values or quality of life may
have been dramatically affected, are in
the minority. Tough luck. Distributive
justice gave them their opportunity to
reap financial gain, but they passed.
Distributive justice tends to be efficient,
familiar, and can be operationalized.
Many of us, however, may be
operating under a different model of
justice called procedural justice.
Procedural justice is messier and
more complicated. It takes more
time. It requires the building of
relationships. That is because
procedural justice, to function well,
requires trust. And trust is made up
of different factors, which many social
scientists spend their careers trying
to understand and measure, such as:
• Do community members
feel they have a real voice in
decision making?
• Do community members have
access to information, and is that
information comprehensive?
Are they able to trust that
the information is being
provided by an “honest broker”
as opposed to originating from
interested parties (i.e., industry
or environmental nonprofits)?
• Are decision-making processes
transparent? Do community
members know who to contact if
there are problems or questions?
Who is accountable if there
are problems? How is this
accountability enforced?
• Are there fair procedures in place
for handling conflicts?
• Are there fair outcomes?
(Distributive justice is just one
aspect of procedural justice).
• Is the dignity of citizens
preserved in processes and
outcomes? Are citizens’
voices managed, silenced,
or manipulated, or are they
allowed expression? Are
those voices involved in actual
decision making, or are hearings
primarily symbolic?
• Are people treated as ignorant,
or as obstacles? Or are they
involved in decision making?
A Look at Other Industries
This is a tall order for the oil and gas
industry. You can think of many
reasons why these efforts might not
work, whether in cases involving
fracturing or offshore drilling. It
may be helpful to consider, then,
other industries’ approaches to
public engagement.
By and large, the mining industry
has begun to meaningfully grasp
the concept of public engagement,
a complex process that goes
beyond charitable giving to affected
communities or old-school corporate
social responsibility (CSR) policies
that create quid pro quo relationships
between local power brokers and
industry. Although they still face
resistance to particular operations
around the world, some mining
companies have begun to understand
that community members are not
clients, nor obstacles, nor inferiors
to be placated. They may not be
business partners, either. They are,
fundamentally, citizens with rights and
desires of their own.
The mining industry has a
history—albeit a brief one—of
CULTURE MATTERS
engagement with citizens in these
terms. Mining companies hire
experts from anthropology, sociology,
communication, and other fields
to consult and build engagement
processes so that projects can
meet some baseline standards in
terms of respecting human and
environmental rights. They work with
nongovernmental organizations or
CSR  consultants who know how to
do this work. Many of these mining
companies understand that their “social
license to operate” depends on doing
things better and not just on corporate
philanthropy. This new model is, in
many cases, partnership building.
Egregious counterexamples
exist, but there is nonetheless a trend
toward engagement in that industry.
Their conferences feature panels and
conversations on the topic. Books and
articles have been written. There has
been a shift in emphasis toward public
engagement. Many still have work to
do. As in the oil and gas industry, there
are rogue operators and majors alike
who do things poorly and make life
difficult for everyone.
And doing public engagement
does not mean you will end public
conflict; sometimes the opposite occurs.
However, the current approach—deficit
models operating in a postnormal
situation—are both counterproductive
and undemocratic. It is time for the
oil and gas industry to move in a
new direction. OGF
For Further Reading
Pielke, R.A. Jr. 2007. The Honest
Broker: Making Sense of Science
in Policy and Politics. Cambridge
University Press.
Riley, D. 2008. Engineering and
Social Justice. Synthesis Lectures on
Engineers, Technology, and Society.
Morgan and Claypool Publishers.
April 2013 • Oil and Gas Facilities 27