PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
EDGARDO test of sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is
DIMAANO
G.R. No. 168168 September 14, 2005
PER CURIAM:
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it
does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the
crime charged. Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information.
***********
Facts:
In 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo
Dimaano with two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of
attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape stated as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the
Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar
Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of
the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless
did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other
than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely
arrival of the complainant's mother.
Issue:
Did the complaint or information for attempted rape
sufficiently alleged the specific acts or omissions
constituting the offense?
Held:
No. For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must
state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission
of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or
part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must
be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege
the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the
offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must
be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against
him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.
The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the
appellant was arraigned does not allege specific acts or
omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape.
Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements
for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness.
The allegation therein that the appellant 'tr[ied] and
attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not satisfy the
merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted the
complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court
from rendering a judgment of conviction; otherwise we
would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed
of the nature of the accusation against him.
MELBAROSE R. SASOT and ALLANDALE R. SASOT
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 143193 June 29, 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article
189 of the Revised Penal Code is a public crime. It is
essentially an act against the State and it is the latter
which principally stands as the injured party. The
complainant's capacity to sue in such case becomes
immaterial.
**********
Facts:
In May 1997, the NBI conducted an investigation pursuant
to a complaint by the NBA Properties, Inc., against
petitioners for possible violation of Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code on unfair competition. In its Report,
the NBI stated that NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign
corporation organized under the laws of the United States
of America, and is the registered owner of NBA
trademarks and names of NBA basketball teams such as
Chicago Bulls, etc. These names are used on hosiery,
footwear, t-shirts, sweatshirts, tank tops, pajamas, sport
shirts, and other garment products, which are allegedly
registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer. The Report further stated that
during the investigation, it was discovered that petitioners
are engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and
distribution of counterfeit NBA garment products. Hence,
it recommended petitioners prosecution for unfair
competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
In a Special Power of Attorney, Rick Welts, as President
of NBA Properties, Inc., constituted the law firm of Ortega,
Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the
companys attorney-in-fact, and to act for and on behalf of
the company, in the filing of criminal, civil and
administrative complaints, among others. The Special
Power of Attorney was notarized by Nicole Brown of New
York County and certified by Norman Goodman, County
Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of New
York. Consul Cecilia B. Rebong of the Consulate General
of the Philippines, New York, authenticated the
certification. Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit on
February 12, 1998, before Notary Public Nicole J. Brown
of the State of New York.
Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash
the Information on the following grounds: (1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense and (2) the court has
no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of
the accused. Petitioners argue that the fiscal should have
dismissed Welts's complaint because under the rules, the
complaint must be sworn to before the prosecutor and the
copy on record appears to be only a fax transmittal.
The prosecutor filed his Comment/Opposition to the
motion to quash, stating that he has the original copy of
the complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-in-
fact to represent it. The prosecutor also contended that
the State is entitled to prosecute the offense even without
the participation of the private offended party, as the crime
charged is a public crime.
The trial court sustained the prosecutions arguments and
denied petitioners motion to quash.

Issue:
Was the complaint substantially sufficient?
Held:
Yes. Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient
if it states the known address of the respondent, it is
accompanied by complainant's affidavit and his witnesses
and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn
to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence
or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he
personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in the
complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie
S. Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the absence of an
oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it
invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does
not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the
merits.
In this case, Welts's Complaint-Affidavit contains an
acknowledgement by Notary Public Nicole Brown of the
State of New York that the same has been subscribed and
sworn to before her on February 12, 1998, duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. While the copy
on record of the complaint-affidavit appears to be merely
a photocopy thereof, Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez
stated that complainants representative will present the
authenticated notarized original in court, and Prosecutor
Guray manifested that the original copy is already on
hand. It is apt to state at this point that the prosecutor
enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties and functions, which in turn
gives his report the presumption of accuracy.
Moreover, records show that there are other supporting
documents from which the prosecutor based his
recommendation.
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and
there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of
discretion and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor,
as in the present case, the trial court should respect such
determination.
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition
punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code
is a public crime. It is essentially an act against the State
and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured
party. The complainant's capacity to sue in such case
becomes immaterial.
MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA vs. HON.
MONINA A. ZENAROSA
G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof.
***********
Facts:
Lasoy and Banisa were charged before the RTC with
violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for transporting
and selling 42.41 grams of marijuana fruiting tops. Both
pleaded guilty on arraignment and were later on
sentenced to suffer a jail term of 6 months and 1 day. Both
accused applied for probation.
Subsequently, the prosecutor filed two separate motions:
(1) to admit amended Information, and (2) to set aside the
arraignment of the accused. The prosecutor intended to
amend the filed information because for some reason,
Lasoy and Banisa were charged of selling 42.41 grams
instead of 42.41 kilograms of marijuana.
The motions were granted. Thus the information now
states “kilograms” instead of “grams". Both accused filed
a motion to quash.
Judge Zenarosa denied the motion to quash and
scheduled the arraignment of the accused under the
amended information. Lasoy and Banisa raises a petition
for certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy. In
response, respondent claims that the trial based on the
first information was a sham and that the petitioners
participated in tampering the information.
Issue:
Whether or not double jeopardy attaches
Held:
Yes. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the
following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint
or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case;
(3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has
been convicted or acquitted or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
The issue boil down to whether or not the first information
is valid.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof.
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that
a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know
what is meant, and the court can decide the matter
according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the
information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the
language of the statute in the information. The information
will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that
the first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently
alleges the manner by which the crime was committed.
Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the
accused of the nature of the charge against them, is
reasonably complied with.
With respect specifically to the trial courts point of view
that the accused cannot claim their right against double
jeopardy because they participated/acquiesced to the
tampering, we hold that while this may not be far-fetched,
there is actually no hard evidence thereof. Worse, we
cannot overlook the fact that accused were arraigned,
entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the first
information. Granting that alteration/tampering took place
and the accused had a hand in it, this does not justify the
setting aside of the decision dated 16 July 1996. The
alleged tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by
the accused may well be the subject of another inquiry.
In Sanvicente v. People, this Court held that given the far-
reaching scope of an accused’s right against double
jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance
when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case or where the
trial was a sham.
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21,
mandates that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. In this case, the
accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they
were already in the stage where they were applying for
probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution to
ask for the amendment of the information and seek to try
again accused for the same offense without violating
procedural rules and their rights guaranteed under the
Constitution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CASTOR BATIN
G.R. No. 177223 November 28, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Eugenio’s wife, Josephine Refugio, was with him when he
was shot, facing him as he leaned against the mango tree
and, in fact, had her arms resting on his shoulders. She
recalled that before the shooting, she was at home at No.
4-A St. Peter Street that afternoon when, looking out of
the window, she caught sight of Castor Batin washing his
feet at a nearby faucet. Castor was angrily muttering, and
she distinctly heard him say, among the other things he
said: "Mga matatandang kunsintidor, dapat manahimik
na." Then, being through with washing himself, Castor
moved towards the street. Seeing this, she went down
and also went to the street because of a feeling of
uneasiness ("Para po akong kinakabahan, kasi, ganoon
naman ang ginagawa nila lagi, eh, pag nalalasing").
Finding her husband leaning against the mango tree on
the side of St. Peter Street, she went to him. She tried to
talk Eugenio into going home with her because Castor
was again into one of his wild ways ("Nagwawala na
naman, daldal ng daldal"). As he was talking with
Eugenio, she glanced to her left and saw Neil Batin
standing at the gate to their (Batins’) compound, looking
towards her and her husband. A few moments later, Neil
went to one of the parked cars, opened its door, and took
a gun from inside. She next noticed Castor going towards
Neil as the latter stood at the side of the car and shouting:
"Huwag!" Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the gun
was taken from him, Neil just proceeded towards the right
rear of the car. Castor followed Neil and handed the gun
back to him.
When she shifted her glance from the Batins, Josephine
heard Castor ordering his son: "Sige, banatan mo na."
Neil responded by drawing the gun from his waistline,
raising and aiming it at her and her husband, and firing
twice from his eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell
to the ground, the former, backwards, and the latter
landing on top of her. As they tried to get up, Eugenio
uttered to her: "Nanay, may tama ako." She then pulled
her husband by the shoulder of his shirt so that she could
take him to their house as he was already slumped to the
right. She later rushed her husband to the Quezon City
General Hospital, where he underwent surgery, but later
expired.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding both accused
guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in appreciating
the aggravating circumstance of treachery.
HELD:
Castor does not refute the above findings of the trial court
that treachery was sufficiently proven during the trial. All
that Castor claims before us is that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was not specifically alleged in
the Information. The Information filed against the Batins
states that the accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, with treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, and with evident premeditation, attack, assault
and employ personal violence upon the person of one
EUGENIO REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting
him with a handgun, hitting him on the right side of his
stomach, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
untimely death.[28] Castor claims that this charge does
not allege the specific treacherous acts of the accused.
According to Castor, the allegation therein that the
accused with treachery x x x, attack, assault and employ
personal violence is a mere conclusion of law by the one
who drafted the said Information. Hence, it did not satisfy
the test of sufficiency of Information as provided in
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
This Court went on to affirm the conviction of the accused
therein with murder qualified by treachery. Jurisprudence
is replete with cases wherein we found the allegation of
treachery sufficient without any further explanation as to
the circumstances surrounding it.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LARRY
CACHAPERO
G.R. No. 153008 May 20, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
CASE: Larry Cachapero was accused of raping 7-year-
old Anna Toledo. Anna confessed the matter to her
teacher, and a medical examination showed hymenal
lacerations. Cachapero denied it saying that he was at his
parents' at the time of the incident, and that the case was
filed against him because his family and that of the girl
had a long-standing feud. He alleges that the information
was insufficient.
The Supreme Court ruled that the lack of a specific hour
and date of the crime is not fatal to the information.
Furthermore, such is not an element of the offense. All
that the law requires is the approximate time of the
commission of the crime, and this was sufficiently proven.
DOCTRINE: The approximate time of the commission of
the crime is sufficient to support filing of the information,
UNLESS the exact hour and date is a necessary element
of the offense charged.
FACTS:
Sometime in March 1998, complainant Anna Toledo, who
was seven (7) years old, went to play with Lorena
Cachapero and Dino Cachapero at a nearby house in
Barrio Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. During that occasion,
appellant Larry Cachapero, brother of Lorena, made her
lie down and removed her shorts and panty. He inserted
his penis into her sexual organ and she felt pain. Larry
told her not to tell her parents because he might be
scolded.
On September 2, 1998, witness Conchita Donato was
conducting a remedial class in Reading to her Grade I and
II students. While they were reading the word ‘tagtuyot’ or
‘saluyot,’ one of her students Jocelyn Meneses told her
that Anna was sexually abused by ‘Manong Larry.’ She
then ordered the students to leave the room and asked
Jocelyn and Anna to stay behind. She confronted Anna
and asked her the truth. Anna covered her face with her
two hands, cried, and said yes. The teachers had a
conference, after which they decided to report the matter
to the parents of Anna.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information filed was suffiecient.
HELD:
Major Point 1: The time of occurrence is not an essential
element of rape. This being so, the precise date and hour
of the rape's commission need not be alleged in the
complaint or information, and such absence is not fatal to
the filing of information.
Section 11 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary
to state in the complaint or information the precise date
the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to
have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission.
Major Point 2: All that Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court merely requires that the information must state,
among others, the approximate time of the commission of
the offense. The Information in this case alleged that the
crime was committed "sometime in March 1998" which,
according to private complainant, was more or less at the
closing of the school year. Being reasonably definite and
certain, this approximation sufficiently meets the
requirement of the law.
Major Point 3: Objections as to the form of the complaint
or information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
Failure to object is deemed a waiver to any formal defect
in the information. If Cachapero found the Information
insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment
either for a bill of particulars, for him to be properly
informed of the exact date of the alleged rape, or for the
quashal of the Information, on the ground that it did not
conform with the prescribed form.
Saludaga and Genio vs Sandiganbayan
GR No. 184537 April 23, 2010
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for
the construction of Barangay Day Care Centers without
conducting a competitive public bidding as required by
law, which caused damage and prejudice to the
government. An information was filed for violation of Sec.
3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing undue injury to the
Government. The information was quashed for failure to
prove the actual damage, hence a new information was
filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by giving
unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused
moved for a new preliminary investigation to be
conducted on the ground that there is substitution and/or
substantial amendment of the first information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial
amendment of the information that would warrant an new
preliminary investigation.
HELD:
No, there is no substitution and/or substantial
amendment.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
That there are two (2) different modes of committing the
offense: either by causing undue injury or by giving private
person unwarranted benefit. That accused may be
charged under either mode or under both. Hence a new
preliminary investigation is unnecessary.
SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY vs. HON. AFABLE E.
CAJIGAL
G.R. NO. 157472 September 28, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
SSGT. Jose Pacoy seeks to annul the order of
Presiding Judge Afable Cajigal of RTC 68 of Camiling
Tarlac.
On July 4, 2002, an information for Homicide was filed in
the RTC against petitioner for shooting and killing
his commanding officer, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with an
armalite rifle. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not
guilty.
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the
respondent judge issued another Order, likewise
dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor
to correct and amend the Information to Murder in
view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank alleged in the Information which public respondent
registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.
The prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out
the word Homicide and instead wrote the word Murder
in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the
Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the
same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with
the correction of the spelling of the victims name from
Escuita to Escueta.
Petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of
Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that
the latter would be placed in double jeopardy,
considering that his Homicide case had been
terminated without his express consent, resulting in
the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter
his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the
public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.
Respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. The MR
was likewise denied. Thus, petitioner went straight
to SC and filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge erred in amending the
Information after petitioner had already entered in
plea to the charge of information for homicide.
HELD:
In the present case, the change of the offense charged
from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment
and not a substantial amendment or a substitution
as defined in Teehankee.

While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading
of the Information shows that the only change made was
in the caption of the case; and in the opening
paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the
crossing out of word Homicide and its replacement by
the word Murder. There was no change in the recital
of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The
averments in the amended Information for Murder are
exactly the same as those already alleged in the
original Information for Homicide, as there was not at
all any change in the act imputed to petitioner,
i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made
in the caption and preamble from Homicide to
Murder as purely formal.
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal
amendments in cases in which the accused has
already pleaded, it is necessary that the
amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused.
The test of whether the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is whether a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood,
would no longer be available after the amendment is
made; and when any evidence the accused might have
would be in applicable to the complaint or information.
Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the
amended Information are identical with those of the
original Information for Homicide, there could not be
any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case;
neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights
or defense of petitioner.
Jocelyn Cabo v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 169509 June 16, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
On June 24, 2000, Cabo and Bonifacio Balahay, Mayor of
Barobo, Surigao del Sur, were charged for violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019. In the information, it was alleged
that Mayor Balahay received from Cabo the amount
of P104,000, and that said mayor “intervened in the
undertaking by Cabo’s company (OIDCI) for
consultancy services with the Municipality of Barobo”.
Cabo claimed that she was deprived of her right
to preliminary investigation so she filed a motion
for reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan (SB) granted her
motion and directed the Special Prosecutor to conduct
one.
Meanwhile, Cabo filed another motion seeking
permission to travel abroad for a family vacation. The SB
granted it in an order dated May 2004, which stated that,
in light of the case still being under reinvestigation,
and considering that she had not yet been arraigned,
Cabo expressly consented to the order that she be
arraigned conditionally.
[CONDITIONS:] If it is found that there is no probable
cause to proceed against her, the arraignment will
have no effect. However, if there is a need to amend the
present information, then Cabo would have then
waived her right to object under Section 14,Rule 110 of
the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure as well as her
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
When she was arraigned, she was duly assisted by her
counsel and pleaded NOT GUILTY to the offense
charged. She also duly affixed her signature in
the minutes to signify her conformity to the
conditional arraignment and the legal consequence
thereof.
Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor concluded his
reinvestigation and found probable cause to charge her
with the violation of RA 3019. The SB then set a new
schedule for arraignment in October 2004. On the day
before arraignment, Cabo filed a motion (“reiterate-not-
guilty motion”) praying that she be allowed to reiterate her
previous plea in the conditional arraignment so that she
may be excused from attending the arraignment the
next day. SB, however, did not act on her said
motion.
Balahay, on the other hand, filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the same did not charge
any offense. It failed to allege that Balahay had
to intervene in the said contract under the law,
in his official capacity as mayor.
The SB sustained Balahay’s contention that the
information was defective for lack of necessary facts, but
it did not immediately quash the complaint. Instead, the
court, in accordance with Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court, ordered only the amendment of the
information and ordered the prosecution to correct the
defect. The amended information was filed in
February2005 containing all the necessary elements
of the crime charged.
cabo was notified of her re-arraignment in April 2005,but
she filed a Motion to Cancel Second Arraignment on the
ground that she could no longer be re-arraigned on the
amended information since amendment of the information
based on the substance is not allowed after the plea has
been made.
SB denied petitioner’s motion. It held that her
arraignment on the original information was only
conditional in nature to accommodate her request to
travel abroad so that she could be tried in absentia. She
agreed to the condition that should the information be
amended, she is deemed to waive her right to
object to the amendment and to waive her
constitutional protection against double jeopardy. She
was considered estopped from raising her objection to the
amended complaint. Petitioner filed an MR on the ground
that double jeopardy had set in. She asserted that her
conditional arraignment had been confirmed by her
October motion (“reiterate-not-guilty motion”)
reiterating her plea of not guilty. Thus, her arraignment on
the original information was no longer conditional, and
double jeopardy must consequently attach. SB
denied her resolution. This prompted her to file
the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON double jeopardy had attached on the basis
of the“NOT GUILTY” plea.
HELD:
NO. DJ did not attach. The SB was declared to have
unequivocally laid down petitioner’s conditions for
arraignment. Among those specified was that if there
was a need to amend the original information, she forfeits
her right to object and her RIGHT TO DOUBLE
JEOPARDY”. She was assisted by counsel and thereby
informed of the legal consequences of such conditions.
With regard to her formal manifestation reiterating her not
guilty plea (“reiterate-not-guilty motion”), there was no
showing that Sandiganbayan affirmed her motion.
Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court explicitly
requires the accused to be present at arraignment
and personally enter his plea. With respect to the
applicability of double jeopardy to the case, two
requisites were absent: The first requisite of double
jeopardy was not present since the original
information failed to allege the essential elements forthe
violations allegedly committed by petitioner and her co-
accused. There was also NO DISMISSAL
ORTERMINATION OF THE CASE
AGAINSTPETITIONER (fourth requisite). The SB
merely ordered an AMENDMENT. According to
Section 4,Rule 117, the prosecution is given an
opportunity to amend the defective information if the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. It is only
when the prosecution fails to properly amend the
information that the motion to quash be granted. -
Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the original
information can be cured by amendment even after she
had pleaded thereto, since the amendments ordered
by the court below were only as to matters of form and not
of substance (Section 14, Rule 110)