AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA S.

INTON

G.R. No. 184202 (January 26, 2011)

FACTS

This case is about the private school’s liability for the outside catechist’s act of shoving a student and
kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not move around the
classroom

In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent
SisterMargarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June
of that year, taught Jose Luis’ grade three religion class. Jose Luis left his seat and went over to a classmate
to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back to his seat. After a while, Jose
Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate

Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved
his head on the classmate’s seat. She also made the child copy the notes on the blackboard while seating on
the floor. Respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their
son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Pasig City in Civil
Case 67427.The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610
to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. With regard to the action for damages, the
Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for the hurt that
Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victoria’s personal claims but ruled in Jose
Luis’ favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of
P25,000.00, and attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. They elevate the case to the CA to
increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages
awarded to Jose Luis.

Ruling on the Issue

At first Auinas was held liable to Luis Inton based on Article 2180 upon the cicvil code because the Court
of Appeals believe that the school was Yamyamins employer but Aquinas contests this and the school
directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to
fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its
students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her
for the task of catechizing the school’s grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the
catechists who would teach religion. in public schools. Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin’s
teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school directress’ testimony in this regard. Aquinas still
had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its
young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of
improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher. They showed records, certificates and
diploma that Yamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question that she came from a legitimate
congregation of sisters. They provided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the students. They pre-approved
the content of the course she wanted to teach. They have a classroom evaluation program for her
unfortunately, she was new, therefore do not have sufficient opportunity to observe her.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV88106 dated August 4, 2008, and HOLDS petitioner Aquinas School not liable in damages
to respondent Jose Luis Inton.

REFLECTION ON THE CASE

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. VICTORIO N. MEDRANO

G.R. No.177580 (October 17,2008)

Facts:

Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog, a teacher filed before the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman a sworn
letter-complaint against her superior herein-respondent Victorio N. Medrano for violation of
Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) (criminal case), and grave
misconduct (administrative case). While the administrative case was pending investigation,
Dumalaog filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive Suspension, and was granted by the
Ombudsman ordering the preventive suspension of Medrano for six months without pay. Medrano
moved for lifting the suspension but was denied. When Medrano filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, Ombudsman lifted the preventive suspension order.

The Ombudsman rendered its decision with the administrative case and found Medrano guilty of
grave misconduct. Medrano moved for reconsideration of the decision and assailed not only the
factual findings and conclusions of the Ombudsman, but for the first time, challenged its
jurisdiction over the case. With regard to the criminal case, Ombudsman found probable cause to
indict Medrano and a criminal case was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Biñan,
Laguna against him. By joint order, the Ombudsman affirmed its Resolution in the criminal case
but modified its decision in the administrative case.

Medrano filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing Ombudsman‘s
jurisdiction over the administrative case. The CA annulled Ombudsman‘s decision in the
administrative case and dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over it. The Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA‘s decision but
was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint
against Medrano even if an affidavit of desistance has already been filed by Dumalaog

HELD:

The flaw in Medrano‘s argument that the execution of Dumalaog‘s Affidavit of Desistance and
the dismissal of the criminal case must result in the dismissal of the administrative case is that it
ignores the whale of a difference between those two remedies. In Gerardo R. Villaseñor and Rodel
A. Mesa v. Sandiganbayan and Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra (Office of the Special Prosecutor,
Ombudsman), the Court stressed the distinct and independent character of the remedies available
to an offended party against any impropriety or wrongdoing committed by a public officer. It
provides the three remedies available: 1.) civil, 2.) criminal, and 3.) administrative. These remedies
may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same
offense may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.
At any rate, an affidavit of desistance (or recantation) is, as a rule, viewed with suspicion and
reservation because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through
intimidation or for monetary consideration. And there is always the probability that it would later
be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable. Hence, such desistance, by
itself, is not usually a ground for the dismissal of an action once it has been instituted in court.

With regard to whether Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint, Section 5,
Article XI of the Constitution “created the independent Office of the Ombudsman.” Hailed as the
“protectors of the people,” the Ombudsman and his Deputies are bestowed with overreaching
authority, powers, functions, and duties to act on complaints against public officials and
employees, as provided in Sections 12 and 13.

When an administrative charge is initiated against a public school teacher, however, Section 9 of
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers specifically provides that the same shall be heard
initially by an investigating committee composed of the school superintendent of the division, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national
teachers‘ organization, and a supervisor of the division. Thus, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act
of 1989 directs that the petitioner “may refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority
for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers or
employees.”

In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman
over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee
of the DepEd.

While Ombudsman should have desisted from hearing the administrative complaint against
Medrano and referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given that it had already concluded the
proceedings and had rendered a decision thereon, Medrano is now barred from assailing
Ombudsman‘s acts under the principle of estoppel. He had actively participated in the
administrative proceedings before the Ombudsman. In his Counter-Affidavit, he asked
Ombudsman for affirmative relief by seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint
allegedly for being baseless. Verily, Medrano cannot be permitted to challenge Ombudsman‘s acts
belatedly.