Non-essential: Marriage certificate
43. Delgado v. Rustia, GR 155733 (2006)
Case digest:
CASE DIGEST: DELGADO V. DE DAMIAN
IN THE MATTER OF THE
INTESTATE ESTATES OF
THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADOAND GUI
LLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
and other HEIRSOF LUIS DELGADO,
petitioners, v.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE
DAMIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006.
Facts:
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa,
filed a Petition on Letters of Administration of the
estate of deceased spouses
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia (died 1972 and
1974 respectively). Such letter was opposed by
Marciana Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that
they should be the beneficiaries of the estate. The trial
court then allowed Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate
child of Guillermo, to intervene in the case as she
claimed that she possessed the status of an
acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence, she
should be the sole heir of the estate. Later,
Luisa Delgado said that the spouses were living
together without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and
was substituted dela Rosa (herein petitioner) in this
case. The RTC appointed dela Rosa as the
administrator of the estates of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole
administrator of the estate noting that Josefa and
Guillermo did not contract marriage.
Ruling:
The Court held, through the testimonies of the
witnesses, that marriage between Josefa
and Guillermonever occurred. Although it is
presumed that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage, such testimonies shall
prevail. Since, no marriage had occurred between the
two, the estate must be settled in different
proceedings. Therefore, dela Rosa cannot be
appointed as the sole administrator of the estate of
the deceased.
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES
OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND
GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA.
DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS
DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE
AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE
DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA,
TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA
DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO
DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA
DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS
OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON
DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO,
CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA
DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-
ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-
MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN,
namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R.
DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ,
namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R.
CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-
ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF
ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA
ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN
RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO
RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and
GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as
Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek
to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case
No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the
Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24,
2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate
estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The
main issue in this case is relatively simple: who,
between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful
heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by
several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1)
the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her
half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged
heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his
nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and
the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the
decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of
Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from
Josefa, five other children were born to the couple,
namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and
Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was
never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her
full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa
Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man
in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon
Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.
But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which
was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage,
the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa
Delgado’s union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants
because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule
against reciprocal intestate succession between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio
and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then
their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-
blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore
excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his
heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families. Conversely, if the couple were never
married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled
to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as
they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa
Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they
assert that no evidence was ever presented to
establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the
date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear,
however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado.
So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on,
when Luis got married, his Partida de
Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the
name and other circumstances of his
father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents)
insist that the absence of a record of the alleged
marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage
ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a
will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some
collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several
months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia
executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising
her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed
marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a marriage
in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners,
the two eventually lived together as husband and wife
but were never married. To prove their assertion,
petitioners point out that no record of the contested
marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a
baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of
the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or
unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand,
insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not
of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They
maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived
together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa
on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning
more than half a century, they were known among
their relatives and friends to have in fact been
married. To support their proposition, oppositors
presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated
[December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo
J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then
Resident Commissioner to the United States
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to
Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or
Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces
of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004,
503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans
Administration of the United States of
America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein
Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his
marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3
June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of
Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was
married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any
children. With no children of their own, they took into
their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia
and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally
adopted by the couple, were what was known in the
local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia
did manage to father an illegitimate child,19 the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one
Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma,
Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own
flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and
continuous possession of that status from her birth in
1920 until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa
Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo
Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of
their children. Also, her report card from the University
of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her
parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that
Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate
of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend
that her right to compulsory acknowledgement
prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she
cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the
documents she presented were not the authentic
writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death
of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for
the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina
Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children
or natural children by legal fiction."23 The petition was
overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a
will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana
Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz,
and by the children of his predeceased brother
Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano,
Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio
Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the
daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for
letters of administration of the intestate estates of the
"spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with
the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was
opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo
Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo
Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3)
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The
opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were
barred under the law from inheriting from their
illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion
to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the
only surviving descendant in the direct line of
Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the
oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was
granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of
administration was amended to state that Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but
had merely lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein)
filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC
insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was
concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that
the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants
remained in issue and should be properly threshed
out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la
Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both
estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner
and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa
Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated
elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the
only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died
intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972,
and entitled to partition the same among themselves
in accordance with the proportions referred to in this
Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby
declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late
Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire
estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the
oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of
Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J.
Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet
been settled, and their settlement [is] considered
consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with
law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and
necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado
Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the
appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court
hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of
the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR.
GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of
the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is
hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates, and is likewise
ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all
her collections of the rentals and income due on the
assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to
such estates to the petitioner and appointed
administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA
ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The
same oppositor is hereby required to render an
accounting of her actual administration of the estates
in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which
was denied on the ground that the record on appeal
was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus30 which was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for
reconsideration and after hearing the parties’ oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and
gave due course to oppositors’ appeal in the interest
of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners
assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the
ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record on
appeal within the reglementary period was a
jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On
October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance
of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our
decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must
be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may
be excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial
court’s pronouncements as to certain matters of
substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of
the decedents and the party entitled to the
administration of their estate, which were to be raised
in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial
of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of
late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise
valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not
have been construed as an attempt to delay or
prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for
the APPROVAL of the private respondents’ Record
on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal
from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court’s
May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially
set aside the trial court’s decision. Upon motion for
reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its
earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the
amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently,
the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring:
1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to
have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of
Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and
the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to
partition among themselves the intestate estate of
Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion
referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-
appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in
accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and
4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as
ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia;
thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his
estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate
of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the
oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and
filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is
hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates and to turn over
to the appointed administrator all her collections of the
rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates
in question, including all documents, papers, records
and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed
administrator, immediately upon notice of his
qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to
render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia
Rustia) actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from
notice of the administrator’s qualification and posting
of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-
adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on
June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings to determine the extent of the
shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said
adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of
administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-
existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw
from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified
into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact.
Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or
disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their
cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be
married. Their reputed status as husband and wife
was such that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao
in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
They make much of the absence of a record of the
contested marriage, the testimony of a
witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a
baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado
as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a
primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not
always proof that no marriage in fact took
place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises,
other evidence may be presented in support thereof.
The evidence need not necessarily or directly
establish the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the
certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs.
Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as
Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no
less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to
Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the
name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents
which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient
to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness
whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support
their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had
proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that
eventually, the two had "lived together as husband
and wife." This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof
only of the baptism administered by the priest who
baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained
therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried
("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no
hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage
of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this
jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward
legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married. This is the usual order of things in society
and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves
out to be, they would be living in constant violation of
the common rules of law and propriety. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado
are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her
mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first
be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either
conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions
are inferences which the law makes so peremptory
that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may
overturn them.48On the other hand, disputable
presumptions, one of which is the presumption of
marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of
sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage
of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors
(now respondents) chose merely to rely on the
disputable presumption of marriage even in the face
of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued
use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio)
of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and
Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de
Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors
sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of
marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were
never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa
Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and
Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the
decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51 were her
natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with
another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural
brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship.
Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between
illegitimate children and legitimate children of the
same parent, even though there is unquestionably a
tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an
illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from)
another illegitimate child begotten with a parent
different from that of the former, would be allowing the
illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child.
Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the
illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-
blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on
reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case under
consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the
difference in category between illegitimate and
legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when
all the children are illegitimate children of the same
parent, even if begotten with different persons. They
all stand on the same footing before the law, just like
legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit,
therefore, that the rules regarding succession of
legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to
them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters
should receive double the portion of half-blood
brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full
blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado
were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado,
her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all
illegitimate, they may inherit from each other.
Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are
already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of
the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of the children
of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by
grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only
collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled
to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and
sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time
of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a
vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The
records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the
trial court to determine who were the surviving
brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa
Delgado at the time of her death. Together with
Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the
new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo
Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated
Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the
decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an
affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the
estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement
between heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of
a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by
means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an
illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she
may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof
of an admission or recognition of paternity.59 She,
however, claimed the status of an acknowledged
illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the
death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time
it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till
August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had
no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was,
however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which
granted certain successional rights to illegitimate
children but only on condition that they were first
recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or
voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the
following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction,
when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous
possession of status of a child of the alleged
father (or mother)61 by the direct acts of the
latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the
time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two
grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the
open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition
through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed
the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until
the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia.
However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but
a mere ground by which she could have compelled
acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment
has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s
right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed
upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28,
1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s
second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic
writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is
understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the
parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a
public instrument or a private writing admitted by the
father to be his.67 Did intervenor’s report card from the
University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s
obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as
authentic writings under the new Civil Code?
Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor
Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo
Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since he
had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while
witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself
who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado
which was published in the Sunday Times on
September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not
the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What
could have been admitted as an authentic writing was
the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by
him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The
failure to present the original signed manuscript was
fatal to intervenor’s claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan,
Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in
accordance with law. Although a petition for her
adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came
to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death.
We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the
deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit
from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which
[created] between two persons a relationship similar
to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or
in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule
99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is
not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely
artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise,
the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of
adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively
[proven] by the person claiming its existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the
claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful
heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new
Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo
Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his
sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to
administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule
78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an
order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the
case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the
case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next
of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that the
administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of
the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to
be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule
out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in
cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the
estates,72 a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint
administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda.
de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and
nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of
the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate
the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch
55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24,
2002 decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit
of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia
shall inherit half of the intestate estate of
Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall
pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of
Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the
children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or
half-siblings who may have predeceased
her, also surviving at the time of her death.
Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In
this connection, the trial court is hereby
ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled
to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its
one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate)
shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz
(whose respective shares shall
be per capita) and the children of the late
 Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo
Rustia and whose respective shares shall
be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia
Cruz are now deceased, their respective READ THE FULL TEXT OF THE DECISION IN jabbulao.com
shares shall pertain to their estates. under the category RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

4. Letters of administration over the still

unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo
DIGEST:
Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to
Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a
nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in
such amount as may be determined by the
trial court.
FACTS:
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Anonuevo v. Intestate of Rodolfo Jalandoni,
GR 178221 (2010)
Case digest
CASE DIGEST 0008: MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE
DESANTIS AND JOHN DESANTIS NERI, PETITIONERS VS.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI,
REPRESENTED BY BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI AS SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, RESPONDENT (FIRS DIVISION, G.R. NO.
178221, O1 DECEMBER 2010) SUBJECT: MARRIAGE;
INTERVENTION IN INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS)
Filed under: LEGAL DIGESTS, Uncategorized — Leave a
comment December 12, 2010
RODOLFO DIED. HIS BROTHER FILED AT RTC PETITION FOR
ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. ANONUEVO
ET AL INTERVENED. THEY SAID THEIR MOTHER SYLVIA
WAS DAUGHTER OF ISABEL AND JOHN. BUT AT THE TIME
OF RODOLFO’S DEATH, THEIR GRANDMOTHER ISABEL
WAS THE LAWFUL WIFE OF RODOLFO BASED ON A
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE. RODOLFO’S BROTHER OPPOSED
THEIR INTERVENTION BECAUSE THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF
SYLVIA STATES THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE MARRIED.
THEREFORE ISABEL’S MARRIAGE TO RODOLFO WAS NULL
AND VOID. ANONUEVO ET AL HOWEVER ARGUED THAT
THE ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA COULD
NOT BE USED AS PROOF THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE
INDEED MARRIED. FURTHER, SUCH STATEMENT OF
MARRIAGE IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE IS JUST TO SAVE
FACE AND IS CUSTOMARY.

MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS AND

JOHN DESANTIS NERI, PETITIONERS VS. INTESTATE ESTATE
ISSUE:
OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, REPRESENTED BY
BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, CAN ANONUEVO ET AL INTERVENE?
RESPONDENT (FIRS DIVISION, G.R. NO. 178221, O1
DECEMBER 2010)

RULING:

NO. THEY HAVE NO PERSONAL STANDING TO INTERVENE.

THIS CASE IS ABOUT LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE.
BIRTH CERTIFICATE STATING THAT ONE’S PARENTS WERE
MARRIED ESTABLISHES THE PRESUMPTION THAT INDEED
THEY WERE MARRIED.
THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA WHICH SHOWS THAT
ISABEL AND JOHN WERE MARRIED IS SUFFICIENT PROOF
THAT INDEED THEY WERE MARRIED. THEREFORE ISABEL’S
MARRIAGE TO RODOLFO IS VOID SINCE AT THAT TIME
ISABEL WAS STILL MARRIED TO JOHN. BEING NOT
MARRIED TO RODOLFO, ISABEL AND HER DESCENDANTS
HAVE NO SHARE IN THE ESTATE OF RODOLFO.
WHILE A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE IS CONSIDERED THE
PRIMARY EVIDENCE OF A MARITAL UNION, IT IS NOT
REGARDED AS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF
MARRIAGE.[1][47] JURISPRUDENCE TEACHES THAT THE
FACT OF MARRIAGE MAY BE PROVEN BY RELEVANT
EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE MARRIAGE
CERTIFICATE.[2][48] HENCE, EVEN A PERSON’S BIRTH
CERTIFICATE MAY BE RECOGNIZED AS COMPETENT
EVIDENCE OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN HIS PARENTS. THE
REASON “FACE SAVING/ CUSTOMARY” IS WITHOUT MERIT.
THE COURT CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A
FOLKWAY.
The ruling of the Court:
PEREZ, J.:
XXXXXX
The second argument of the petitioners is also without
merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals
that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer
sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal
spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners
and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has
interest in Rodolfo’s estate.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis was adequately established. This holds true
notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate
between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole
and exclusive evidence of marriage.[3][47] Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate.[4][48] Hence, even a person’s birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.[5][49]
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely
serves as the competent evidence of marriage between
Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains
the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John
Desantis were “married” and (b) that Sylvia is their
“legitimate” child.[6][50] In clear and categorical
language, Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a subsisting
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,[7][51] the foregoing entries are
accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be
true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts
attested.[8][52] In the case at bench, the petitioners and
their siblings offered no such rebuttal.
The petitioners did no better than to explain away the
entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful statements
made only in order to “save face.”[9][53] They urge this
Court to take note of a “typical” practice among unwed
Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and
make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate.
That, the Court cannot countenance.
The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and
unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish the
probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the
petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice
of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the
usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the
petitioners would themselves argue that the document on
which they based their interest in intervention contains
untruthful statements in its vital entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners
and their siblings themselves which, properly appreciated,
supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously
married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of
any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the
time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
therefore, void ab initio.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present
evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage was
dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has
interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention
by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement
proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly,
the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Fulltext
G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010
MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE
DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI, Petitioners,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G.
JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G.
JALANDONI as Special
Administrator, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal1 Decision2
is the dated 31 May 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576. In the
said decision, the Court of Appeals nullified, on
certiorari, the Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 40, of Negros Occidental (intestate court)
allowing herein petitioners and their siblings4 to
intervene in the estate proceedings of the late Rodolfo
G. Jalandoni.5 The decretal portion of the decision of
the appellate court reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby
GRANTED, the assailed Orders dated July 2, 2004
and January 26, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in
Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET ASIDE and
NULLIFIED, and a permanent injunction is hereby
issued enjoining respondents [petitioners], their
agents and anyone acting for and in their behalves,
from enforcing the assailed Orders. No costs.6
The antecedents are:
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20
December 1966.7 He died without issue.8
On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni
(Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration9 with the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to
commence the judicial settlement of the latter’s
estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No.
338 and is currently pending before the intestate
court.10
On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings
filed a Manifestation11 before the intestate court. In
the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the
children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)—who, in
turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee
(Isabel) with one John Desantis.12
The petitioners and their siblings contend that their
grandmother—Isabel—was, at the time of Rodolfo’s
death, the legal spouse of the latter.13 For which
reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of
Rodolfo.
Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners
and their siblings pray that they be allowed to
intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of
the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.14 As it was, by the time
the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel
have already passed away with the former
predeceasing the latter.15
To support their cause, the petitioners and their
siblings appended in their Manifestation, the following
documents:
a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between
Isabel and Rodolfo;16
b.) The birth certificate of their mother,
Sylvia;17 and
c.) Their respective proof of births.18
It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings
that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently
establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and
that they are her lawful representatives.
The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G.
Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as its
Special Administrator, however, begged to differ. It
opposed the intervention on the ground that the
petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish
the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very
evidence presented by the petitioners and their
siblings showed that Isabel had a previous and
subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time
she was purportedly married to Rodolfo.
In its Comment to the Manifestation,19 the respondent
called attention to the entries in the birth certificate of
Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946.20 As it
turned out, the record of birth of Sylvia states that she
was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and John
Desantis.21 The document also certifies the status of
both Isabel and John Desantis as "married."22 The
respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having
been made in an official registry, constitute prima
facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and
John Desantis.23
According to the respondent, Isabel’s previous
marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was
dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with
Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.24
On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order
allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part
in the settlement proceedings.25 The intestate court
was convinced that the evidence at hand adequately
establish Isabel’s status as the legal spouse of
Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the petitioners
and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on
her behalf.26
The intestate court also held that the birth certificate
of Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there was a
previous marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis.27 It ventured on the possibility that the
entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her
legitimacy and the status of her parents, may have
been made only in order to save Isabel and her family
from the social condemnation of having a child out of
wedlock.28
The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was
denied by the intestate court in its order dated 26
January 2006.29 Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court. 30
In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals
found that it was an error on the part of the intestate
court to have disregarded the probative value of
Sylvia’s birth certificate.31 The appellate court, siding
with the respondent, held that Sylvia’s birth certificate
serves as prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated—which includes the civil status of her
parents.32 Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with
John Desantis should have been taken as
established.
The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners
and their siblings failed to offer any other evidence
proving that the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis
had been dissolved by the time she was married to
Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriage—the
Isabel-Rodolfo union—is a nullity for being
bigamous.33 From that premise, Isabel cannot be
considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The
petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to show
that Isabel has any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.
Hence, the instant appeal.34
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of
Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the
intestate court allowing the petitioners and their
siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.
The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer
the following arguments:
One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of
review under a writ of certiorari.35 In nullifying the
intestate court’s order, the appellate court did not
confine itself to the issue of whether the same was
issued with grave abuse of discretion.36 Rather, it
chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon the
issue pertaining to Isabel’s right to inherit from
Rodolfo.37
Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of
whether grave abuse of discretion exists, it would
have found that the intestate court did not act
whimsically or capriciously in issuing its assailed
orders.38 Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
intestate court is belied by the fact that the said orders
may be supported by the two (2) marriage certificates
between Isabel and Rodolfo.39
Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court
of Appeals was correct in addressing the issue of
whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that
Isabel has a right to inherit from Rodolfo, it
nevertheless erred in finding that there was none. 40 A
proper evaluation of the evidence at hand does not
support the conclusion that Isabel had a previous
marriage with John Desantis.41
To begin with, the respondent was not able to
produce any marriage certificate executed between
Isabel and John Desantis.42 The conspicuous
absence of such certificate can, in turn, only lend
credibility to the position that no such marriage ever
took place.
Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia
do not carry the necessary weight to be able to prove
a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.43 In
assessing the probative value of such entries, the
Court of Appeals should have taken note of a "typical"
practice among unwed Filipino couples who, in order
to "save face" and "not to embarrass their families,"
concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear
that a child begot by them is legitimate.44
Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with
John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven, the Court
of Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage
with Rodolfo is bigamous.
We are not impressed.
First Argument
The first argument raised by the petitioners is
specious at best. The question of whether the
intestate court gravely abused its discretion is
intricately linked with the issue of whether there was
sufficient evidence to establish Isabel’s status as the
legal spouse of Rodolfo.
A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit
discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic
demand of sound judicial procedure that only a
person with interest in an action or proceeding may be
allowed to intervene.45Otherwise stated, a court has
no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in
an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.46
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and
allows an uninterested person to intervene in a
case—the mistake is not simply an error of judgment,
but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is
made in excess of the court’s jurisdiction and can only
be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely
abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a
special civil action for certiorari.
Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the
limits of review under a writ of certiorari, when it
examined the evidence proving Isabel’s right to inherit
from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such
evidence determines whether the petitioners and their
siblings have successfully established Isabel’s interest
in Rodolfo’s estate—which, as already mentioned, is
an indispensable requisite to justify any intervention.
Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence
presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell
if the assailed orders of the intestate court were
issued in excess of the latter’s jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.
We now proceed to the second argument of the
petitioners.
Second Argument
The second argument of the petitioners is also without
merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to
offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was
the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the
petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that
Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s estate.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and
John Desantis was adequately established. This holds
true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage
certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists
on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage.47 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate.48 Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.49
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia
precisely serves as the competent evidence of
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As
mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable
entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were
"married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate"
child.50 In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s
birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,51 the foregoing entries are
accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to
be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as
proof of the facts attested.52In the case at bench, the
petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.
The petitioners did no better than to explain away the
entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful
statements made only in order to "save face."53 They
urge this Court to take note of a "typical" practice
among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion
of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by
them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot
countenance.
The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and
unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish
the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot,
as the petitioners would like Us to do, simply take
judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude
therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It
certainly is odd that the petitioners would themselves
argue that the document on which they based their
interest in intervention contains untruthful statements
in its vital entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the
petitioners and their siblings themselves which,
properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel
was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis.
Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such
marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was
married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that
the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab
initio.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to
present evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage
was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she
has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an
intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the
settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm
the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.
Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Marriages celebrated outside the Philippines (lex loci
celebrationis)
Exceptions to the lex loci celebrationis
Foreign divorce
45. Garcia v. Recio, GR 138322 (2001)
CD: Garcia-Recio vs. Recio
TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March
1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia.
However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a
decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and
Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia
where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help
Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the
couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of
their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998,
claiming that she learned only in November 1997,
Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by
Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal
capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD:
The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by
the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the
Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized
Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that
proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner
though the former presented a divorce decree. The said
decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to
court as evidence primarily because it was not
authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country
where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence
that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to
marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of
bigamy.
Fulltext:
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.
RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case
No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between
Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on
January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both
parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws
to any and/or both parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the
above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March
1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship
issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a
Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12,
1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.[7]In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as single and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent
lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on
the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January
12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as
1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended
that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been
validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia
in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the
couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a
divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia
because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint
be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.[16] After they
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the
ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage
ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of
legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on
the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more
marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce
decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson
thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with
the petitioner.
2 abroad are governed by the law of the place where they
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized
Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding
the petitioners marriage to the respondent
3 principles as the take-off points for our
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26
of the Family Code in this case.
4 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding
Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as
the applicable provisions in this case.
5 respective national laws.[27]
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso
facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce
decree before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of
this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was
proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no
more necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha
Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the
divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner
argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign
judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish
these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized
were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the
Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show
the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21] A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22] and
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case
the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far
as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van
Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be
admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of
the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the
contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application
for such license with the proper local civil registrar which
shall specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be required to
furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required
in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the
deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute
divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration
of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity
of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate
civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same
shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the
Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written
official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it
requires no further proof of its authenticity and due
execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a
foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to
be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested[33] by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel
for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to
the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil
Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioners
qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. [38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52)
of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal
act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political
and civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized
citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance
to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him
to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove
Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is
the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of
the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country
for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is
allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound
discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with
the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied
by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian
law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[43] Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised
with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient
proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated
to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their
marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree,
which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian
law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union
for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of
different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa
et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type
of divorce was procured by respondent.
 Respondent presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation
from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may
follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which
no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court
may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may
be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce
which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree
contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the
divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It
did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that
the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this
matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the
divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section
48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason
that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the
divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity
required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage
license. According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract
marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the
legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in
court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part
of the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that
proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court shows that only the
following exhibits were presented before the lower court:
(1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c)
Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.
Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on
March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between
Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its
records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a)
Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law
Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the
Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit
4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family
Court of Australia Certificate;[59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A.
Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a
quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at
the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law,
he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct
result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the
most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the
court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on
the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in
the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated
January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure
and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., concur.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
46. Republic v. Iyoy, GR 152577 (2005)
Cd: Facts:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for
thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001
affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage
of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and
void based on Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy
married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely
went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus
asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned
that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went
back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one
she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich
she used her husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought “danger and
dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her
psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony,
the certification of the recording of their marriage
contract, and the invitation where Fely used her
newhusband’s last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a
drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she
was already an American citizen and not covered by our
laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted
thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.
Issue:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute
psychological incapacity?
Held:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to
establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.”
Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law
thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”
Fulltext:
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July
2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and
void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her

filing of a Complaint[3] for declaration of nullity of marriage American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly

by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the using the surname of her American husband in the

said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr.,

December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named

Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was

children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned

who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of

marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot- reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally

tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and

Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her

leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being psychological incapacity to perform the essential

only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable

a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of

received a letter from her requesting that he sign the nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles

enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through

the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got

married to an American, with whom she eventually had a Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with

child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was

American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. already an American citizen since 1988 and was now

Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because

married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being
he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and
previously married to respondent Crasus and having five
the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the
children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made
Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of

their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that

operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and
she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain respondent Crasus himself was presently living with

occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, another woman who bore him a child. She also accused

womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00

and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of

She could not have been extravagant since the family their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also

hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent

for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be

no job and what she was then earning as the sole ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him,

breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,

their family. Although she left all of her children with attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.

respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial

support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective

Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both parties the

Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the
opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic
U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for
participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor
medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from
of Cebu.[6]

respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to

respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of
divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent
evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own
Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired
testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially

American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;[7] (2) the

American husband was legal because now being an Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health

American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage

Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the

her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that
Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place
on 16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely
openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus.[9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a
Motion,[11] to take the deposition of witnesses, namely,
Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written
interrogatories, before the consular officers of the
Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the
said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders[12] and
Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the Philippine
Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the
depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories,
not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC.
Taking into account that it had been over a year since
respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that
Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the
RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October
1998,[14] considering Fely to have waived her right to
present her evidence. The case was thus deemed
submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated
its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus
and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the
following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological
incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration.
As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly
credible. The Court finds that defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
psychological incapacity to comply with her
marital duties such as striving for family unity,
observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and
support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff
adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him. She obtained a
divorce decree in the United States of America
and married another man and has establish [sic]
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an
anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a
wife who is already married to another man in
another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been
apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment
of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It
appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an
irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low
regard for that sacred and inviolable institution
of marriage which is the foundation of human
society throughout the civilized world. It is quite
evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind,
will and heart to comply with her marital
obligations, such incapacity was already there at
the time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendants own attitude towards her marriage
to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is
defendants psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations which
already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The
evidence in herein case establishes the
irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy,
firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is
decidedly credible, the Court finds that the
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of such psychological incapacity to comply
with her marital obligations. These are her
excessive disposition to material things over and
above the marital stability. That such incapacity
was already there at the time of the marriage in
question is shown by defendants own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these
reasons there is a legal ground to declare the
marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant
Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted
Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence,
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed
the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible
error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for
declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and
Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-
appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now
permanently residing in the United States.
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one
of his reasons for seeking the declaration of
nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A
FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS
VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE
IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE
CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL
LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO
REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph of
the above-quoted provision is to avoid the
absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen
still being married to his or her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a
divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the
defendant has undoubtedly acquired her
American husbands citizenship and thus has
become an alien as well. This Court cannot see
why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not
be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse
eventually embraces another citizenship and
thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under
these circumstances, plaintiff would still be
considered as married to defendant, given her
total incapacity to honor her marital covenants
to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain
shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact
does not exist and to remain married to a spouse
who is incapacitated to discharge essential
marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a
perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice
dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming
the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.[16]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated
08 March 2002,[17] denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the
instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of
respondents wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of
substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of
Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling
that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is
inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]
In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus
maintained that Felys psychological incapacity was clearly
established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was
indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and
Fely, because the latter had already become an American
citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner
Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48
of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not
the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the
applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the
instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is
insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial
provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes
psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid
down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological
incapacity was defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated[21]
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.[22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which, although quite
lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced
below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of
the nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict
on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I do's.
The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.[24]

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring

about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must
obligations essential to marriage.
be established by the totality of the evidence presented

(6) The essential marital obligations must be during the trial.

those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by Using the guidelines established by the afore-
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of

(7) Interpretations given by the National evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife
or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts
Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their
marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code much less, ill will, on the part of the errant

of the Philippines. spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting

personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,

The only substantial evidence presented by physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or

respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not

which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said

in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He Article.[27]

submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the

Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of As has already been stressed by this Court in previous

the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, cases, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law

such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore

(2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological

son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of

Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to

her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities

RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]

Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her

from assuming the essential obligations of marriage. The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts

that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her

Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an

or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic American; and even her flaunting of her American family

marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations
of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code of the Philippines is not
obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not applicable to the case at bar.

identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not

identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the

psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave;

Family Code of the Philippines

neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of

Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.

nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to
Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling
a special situation wherein one of the couple getting
in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have
married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the
complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v.
time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
Court of Appeals and Molina[30] that the root cause of the
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that
the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because
its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a

Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed
validity of the marriage.[31] No less than the Constitution of
before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as
Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in
the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation
1984, after which she married her American husband in
of the family.[32]
1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the

divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides

the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil

ART. 48. In all cases of
annulment or declaration of absolute
Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.

Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and

recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor
could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in
Crasus.
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of

marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as

III
the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor
The Solicitor General is authorized to
intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in General as the principal law officer and legal defender of
proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent the

Government of the Philippines, its agencies and

instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any

litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the

services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General

Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the

shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as

prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may

such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of

intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for

lawyers.[34]
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is
the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then
his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and
contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than
thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor
General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf
of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the
case is brought before this Court or the Court of
Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of
Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually
responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when
circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and
practical that even while the proceeding is still being held
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can
already exercise supervision and control over the conduct
of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better
guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the
role of the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed
before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v.
Ancheta[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268
SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v.
Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State[37]
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which became
effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts
of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor
General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.
The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General
to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and
on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the
said Rule are reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner
shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the
date of its filing and submit to the court proof of
such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the
parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation
with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file
their respective memoranda in support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date the trial
is terminated. It may require the Office of the
Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if
the case is of significant interest to the State. No
other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the
period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or
without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General
and the public prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally or by registered
mail. If the respondent summoned by publication
failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part
of the decision shall be published once in a
newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the
expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal
is filed by any of the parties, the public
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the
Solicitor General may appeal from the decision
by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days
from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall
serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion
contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and
sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment,
sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus
grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code.
While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for
being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and

loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where
neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to
every individual problem.[39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-
20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
47. San Luis v. San Luis, GR 133743 (2007)
Case digest:
CASE DIGEST: SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS
Published by paul on August 19, 2013 | Leave a response
EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad
San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order
denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12,
1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident
of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should
have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati
City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous,
thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the
case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration
Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue
of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered
as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary that
the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts
and industry. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the
co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary
is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.
Full text:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing
the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the
September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in
SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry
Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad
San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He
had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-
3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo;
that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at
100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the
decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent
does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that
the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of
the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to
file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds
and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10
of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued
an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss,
respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12
thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing
that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public
office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they
bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage
of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to
marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the
Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San
Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the
Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted
that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested
rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo
from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17
denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was
deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting
Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador
S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan
on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a
motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying
their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not
state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21
granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled
to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to
submit their respective position papers on the twin issues
of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the
petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his
previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on
June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the
petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the
petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and
not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was
without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry
Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested
rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions
were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and
January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the
Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode
of a person as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in
Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal
capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that
the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph
2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there
is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view —
sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article
26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy
of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever."
Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that
the courts should do is to give force and effect to the
express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32
the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry
under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not be
denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the
instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later
filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo
insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v.
Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
intends to return. They claim that a person can only have
one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
changed his domicile, the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was
performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage
to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As
such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife
of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly
laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the
province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In
the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid
down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court
is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and
not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence
in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41
(Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The
rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the
instant case because they involve election cases. Needless
to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of
fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence"
and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is,
the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes
of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of
a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence,
it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented
billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at
"100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa."
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and
Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988
to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his
Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49
stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident
of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed
on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51
Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality
to file the petition for letters of administration, we must
first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced
by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving
this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions
of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering
that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage
between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage
was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not
valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had
no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife
after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the
Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery
suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence
the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on
the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated
that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said
case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions
were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development
of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot
be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage
and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating
that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise
cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the
historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed,
to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed
into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member
of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to
the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn
case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis
added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified
the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage,
being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state
of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in
stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar
as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s
rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the
law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume
the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of
but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply
them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
What we do instead is find a balance between the word
and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must
not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by
Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy
that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice
"as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one
his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when
it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it
for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was
the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law
be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However,
the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as
well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under
the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid
down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving
foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and
that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated
text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court
for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the
co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were
acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that
letters of administration may be granted to the surviving
spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79
thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. –
A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry,
but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil
Code. This provision governs the property relations
between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that
the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts
and industry. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-
owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both
the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled
the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together
as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In
Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80
The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing
the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during
said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent
of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed
to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof
of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature
of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must
be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28,
1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
X___________________________x
48. Amor-Catalan v. CA, GR 167109 (2007)
CD:Catalan vs. CA
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent
Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America
and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38
years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988,
Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was bigamous
since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio
Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City
against Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as
petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it
was denied. Trial on the merits ensued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has legal personality to file the
petition for nullity of marriage between Orlando and
Merope
RULING:
Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing
it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce
decree and whether the foreign law which granted the
same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a
valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not
allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial
court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous
and void ab initio. On the contrary, if it is proved that a
valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando
to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant
petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that
petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to
file the same. The case was remanded to the trial court for
its proper disposition.
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at
the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate “proper interest” can
file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interestand must be based on
a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the Court held
that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father
to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003,
now specifically provides: a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
FULL TEXT:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated August 6, 2004,
which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-
10636, declaring the marriage between respondents
Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the
ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution3 dated
January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent
Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.4
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America
and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38
years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988.5
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988,
Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao,
Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage was bigamous
since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio
Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7
against Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of
lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a
real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the
merits ensued.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor
of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff
Felicitas Amor Catalan and against defendants Orlando B.
Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with
Orlando B. Catalan is declared null and void ab initio
2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay
plaintiff by way of moral damages the amount of
P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of
P50,000.00, including costs of this suit; and
3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered
revoked and the property donated is ordered awarded to
the heirs of Juliana Braganza.
Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas,
Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista.
SO ORDERED.10
Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the
appeal and consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No. D-
10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
After the motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising the
following issues:
I.
WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN
COURT TO QUESTION THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;
II.
WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO
DECLARE THE QUESTIONED MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES
REVERSIBLE ERROR.12
Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the
respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and
her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial
remedy to address her grievances and to protect her
family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She
claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in not declaring the marriage void despite
overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging
illegal and immoral marriages.13
The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has
the personality to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of
bigamy. However, this issue may not be resolved without
first determining the corollary factual issues of whether
the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed
become naturalized American citizens and whether they
had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.
While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts
and does not normally undertake the re-examination of
the evidence presented by the contending parties during
the trial of the case,14 there are, however, exceptions to
this rule, like when the findings of facts of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based.15
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that
petitioner and respondent Orlando were naturalized
American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree
in April 1988. However, after a careful review of the
records, we note that other than the allegations in the
complaint and the testimony during the trial, the records
are bereft of competent evidence to prove their
naturalization and divorce.
The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:
In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the
documentary and testimonial evidence she presented, we
deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are
American citizens and had this citizenship status when
they secured their divorce decree in April 1988. We are
not therefore dealing in this case with Filipino citizens
whose marital status is governed by the Family Code and
our Civil Code, but with American citizens who secured
their divorce in the U.S. and who are considered by their
national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x
x16
Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the
failure of the petitioner to refute or contest the allegation
in respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando
were American citizens at the time they secured their
divorce in April 1988, as sufficient to establish the fact of
naturalization and divorce.17 We note that it was the
petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired
American citizenship and that respondent Orlando
obtained a judicial divorce decree.18 It is settled rule that
one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.19
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.20 A
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner.21 However, before it can
be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.22
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the
evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether
petitioner has the personality to file the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have
the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree
obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the
foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce
decree becomes absolute.23 In such case, the RTC would
be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void
for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in
the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated
December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and
respondent Merope,24 and the other, in Calasiao,
Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the
respondents.25
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained
and which, following the national law of Orlando, does not
restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct
in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a
petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former
spouses no longer has any interest nor should each have
the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other
might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another
perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s
subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any
defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not
affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at
the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can
file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest27 and must be based
on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog,29 the
Court held that the children have the personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.1awphi1.net
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003,
now specifically provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife.
xxxx
In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the
foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the
trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary
to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a
divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted
the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that
a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not
allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial
court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous
and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral
damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 and exemplary
damages from ₱200,000.00 to ₱25,000.00. On the
contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial
court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of
marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-
Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be
REMANDED to the trial court for its proper disposition. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Bayot v. CA, GR 155635 (2008)
Cd: BAYOT VS CA G.R. NO. 155635
Posted by kaye lee on 6:57 PM
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008
FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an
American, were married in Muntinlupa. They had a child
name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.
In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce
proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was docketed
as Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the
marriage. The same court also issued Civil Decree No.
406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in
Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997.
She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity,
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution
of the conjugal partnerships of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed
that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly
support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P
220,000.00.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is
barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil
Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's incidental orders.
According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's
motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the
spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was
granted since Rebecca was an American citizen when she
applied for the decree.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in
Dominican Republic is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.
Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce
was an American citizen and remains to be one, being born
to American parents in Guam, an American territory which
follows the principle of jus soli granting American
citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still
may be, a holder of American passport.
She had consistently professed, asserted and represented
herself as an American citizen, as shown in her marriage
certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured
divorce in Dominican Republic.
Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the
national laws of the United States of America, a country
which allows divorce.
The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican
Republic court properly adjudicated the ex-couple's
property relations.
The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, the divorce decree must be proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien
spouse.
The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen
when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,
the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is,
as here, sufficient.
Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the
Dominican Republic court are valid, and consequently,
bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a
Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by
the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of
Recognition will not, stand alone, work to nullify or
invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a
divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of
the country's policy against absolute divorce, the
reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time
a valid divorce is obtained.
Fulltext:
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner
Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain
issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 and
docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to
nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution[2] of the CA, as
reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,[3]
granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private
respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial
courts grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,[4]
docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004
Decision[5] of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094,
a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with
application for support commenced by Rebecca against
Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a
resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered
the consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in
Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On
its face, the Marriage Certificate[6] identified Rebecca,
then 26 years old, to be an American citizen[7] born in
Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California,
Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix.
From then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital relationship
seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996,
initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial
District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared,
while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On
February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree
No. 362/96,[8] ordering the dissolution of the couples
marriage and leaving them to remarry after completing
the legal requirements, but giving them joint custody and
guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court
would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,[9] settling the
couples property relations pursuant to an Agreement[10]
they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement
specifically stated that the conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real
property and all the improvements and personal
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue,
Alabang, Muntinlupa.[11]
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from
the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with
the Makati City RTC a petition[12] dated January 26, 1996,
with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage,
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later
moved[13] and secured approval[14] of the motion to
withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment[15] stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have
been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not
of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this
time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage[16] on the ground of Vicentes
alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case
No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay
Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was
eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca
also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains with application for support pendente lite for her
and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to
pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix
in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss[17] on,
inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the
allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an
opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed
by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore,
there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted
another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several
criminal complaints against each other. Specifically,
Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against
Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente
with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[18] denying
Vicentes motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and
granting Rebeccas application for support pendente lite,
disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss
filed by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioners Application
in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is
hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit
the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support
for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant
Petition.
SO ORDERED.[19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce
judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of
defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of
support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to
preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial[20] of his motion for reconsideration
of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to
the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
writ of preliminary injunction.[21] His petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.[22] On
April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a
Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution
of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court
from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated
August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001,
and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No.
01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the
amount of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Rebecca moved[24] but was denied reconsideration of the
aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the
meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive
writ[25] was issued. Rebecca also moved for
reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution
dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and
September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in
Rebeccas petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No.
155635
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a
Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil
Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC
issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently
assailed CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure
to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicentes motion
to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in
determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause
of action.[27] Applying said rule in the light of the essential
elements of a cause of action,[28] Rebecca had no cause of
action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction
to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union
having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by
the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an
American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored
Vicentes capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebeccas contention about the nullity of a divorce, she
being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce
decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to
her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was
not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still
a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca
issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate
the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American
citizenship, having professed to have that nationality
status and having made representations to that effect
during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during
her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c)
when she applied for and eventually secured an American
passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before
she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for
nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March
14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a
purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the
jus soli principle, Rebeccas representation and assertion
about being an American citizen when she secured her
foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship
and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of
the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the
equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.[29] Hence,
Rebeccas Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of
errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of
which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in
enjoining the implementation of the RTCs orders which
would have entitled her to support pending final
resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the
assailed CA decision submitting as follows:
I parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN
ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF
PETITIONERS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY
STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY
ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE
MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM
CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD
ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT
AND CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.[30]
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its
outcome being determinative of the success or failure of
the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the
outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner.[31] Second,
the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad.
And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino
married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in
this jurisdiction.[32]
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue
tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the
granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court,
resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether
petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the
divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic
on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment
of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal
effects?
The Courts Rulin
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time
she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente,
was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent
proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The
following are compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam,
USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this
American territory granting American citizenship to those
who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a
holder of an American passport.[33]
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently
professed, asserted, and represented herself as an
American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as
shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth
certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce
from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of
the Affidavit of Acknowledgment[34] in which she stated
being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of
Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No.
RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has
indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be
over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was
given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the
Secretary of Justice of Rebeccas recognition pursuant to
the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate
Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID
Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed
hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and
whose other particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none
was r e c o g n i z e d as a citizen of the Philippines as per
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935
Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6,
1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G.
Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for
travel purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October,
1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following
material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of
Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement
of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on
June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the
order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778
was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the
payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR
No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above
certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on
October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the
required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation
was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no
error with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement
by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial
notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February
16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid
reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be
spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for
recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation
by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the
Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the
1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III,
Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to
provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services
and implement the laws governing citizenship and the
admission and stay of aliens. Thus, the confirmation by the
DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship
issued by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002[35] on
Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section
shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an
official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days
from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for
confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation
by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification
Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of
Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her
Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days
after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st
Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may
be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual
sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that
prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not
yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence
would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not
have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No.
RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate
shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or
confirmation of Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen
through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000
by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the
eventual issuance of Rebeccas passport a few days later, or
on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a
Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is
indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at
least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from
the Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out
that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati
City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of
her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of
that petition shows that, while bearing the date January
26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996
or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February
22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question.
Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in
the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended
as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-
Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Birth Certificate
of Alix (Annex B). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from
the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not
but logical to expect that this piece of document be
appended to form part of the petition, the question of her
citizenship being crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the
withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID
Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were
attached consisted of the following material documents:
Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Divorce Decree. It was
only through her Opposition (To Respondents Motion to
Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)[36] did Rebecca attach as
Annex C ID Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had
sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken
together with Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas
opposition to motion, with their respective attachments,
clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which
we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos.
362/96 and 406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated,
Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument
that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen,
but represented herself in public documents as an
American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before,
during, and shortly after her divorce, her American
citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she
secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as
is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently
declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties
expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason
of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The
parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States
nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and
residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa,
Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this
court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO,
attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of
Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang,
Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x,
revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19th of
February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L.
Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and
authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this
case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by
the national laws of the United States of America, a
country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly
adjudicated through their Agreement[38] executed on
December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was
rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil
Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in
Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized
here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and
as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.[39] Be
this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an
American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of
the Union,[40] the presentation of a copy of foreign
divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court
issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree
has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties.
And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the
divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings
on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact
or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do
so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of
partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained
in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under
Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but
the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in
this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes
prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party
and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.[41]
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel,
personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was
duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro
Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign
divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican
Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both
Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly
recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October
6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing
alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22,
1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining
whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come
within the pale of the countrys policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the
parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.[42]
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by
Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in
this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree
obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and
Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from
the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and
Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As
the divorce court formally pronounced: [T]hat the
marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x
leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal
requirements.[43]
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente
could no longer be subject to a husbands obligation under
the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
Rebecca.[44]
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the
second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing
as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin
elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of
Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.[45]
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not
belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and
Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their
professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree
No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14,
1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their
property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-
couples conjugal property consisted only their family
home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage consists only of
the real property and all the improvements and personal
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated
Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati,
Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot,
married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.[46] (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was
affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce
decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997,
ordered that, THIRD: That the agreement entered into
between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in
Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of
divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties
are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and
every provision of said agreement.[47]
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement
contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting
that her and Vicentes conjugal property was not limited to
their family home in Ayala Alabang.[48]
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to
the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of
action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo
explains the concept and elements of a cause of action,
thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to
dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically
admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The
allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements
are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3)
an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative
of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[49]
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas underlying
petition before the RTC, Vicentes motion to dismiss and
Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the documentary
evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of
action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action,
the movant must show that the claim for relief does not
exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated
or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.[50] With the
valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more
marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more
marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal
obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of
their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how
he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the
support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do
note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982,
reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four
months before her mother initiated her petition for
declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old.
Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been
partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a
separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the
actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well
as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The
trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any,
considering that support includes provisions until the child
concerned shall have finished her education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer
need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635,
that is, Rebeccas right to support pendente lite. As it were,
her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the
tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil
Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal
anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for
support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635
is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the
petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision
and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
X______________________________________________x
50. Corpuz v. Sto Tomas, GR 186571 (2010)
Case digest: Nature of the Case: Direct Appeal from RTC
decision, a petition for review on certiorari
Facts: Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He
was married to the respondent but was shocked of the
infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Desirous
to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the
divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was
informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner
filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where
respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC denied
the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus
standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court.
Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Decision: The alien spouse cannot claim under the
second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code because
the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the
Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the
petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner,
being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the
presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign
divorce decree with conformity to alien’s national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it
registered the foreign decree of divorce on the petitioner
and respondent’s marriage certificate without judicial
order recognizing the said decree. The registration of the
foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is void.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC
decision is reversed and Court ordered t6he remand of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of
the ruling.
Fulltext:
DECISION
BRION, J.
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevated via a petition for review on certiorari[2] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen
who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in
Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover
that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt
and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for
divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took
effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and
has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his
new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.[6]
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact,
alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was
prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She,
thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied
Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not
the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,[8] in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.[9]
Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the
legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision
was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.[11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present
petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is
essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his
rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he
contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit
of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing
to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an
interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient
legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility
that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his
Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,[14] both support
Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the
time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not
recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted Executive
Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family
Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights
after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien
and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the
foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse]
has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and
still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the
alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.[22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in
the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode
of severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil
Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in
Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception
to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds
that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,
the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by
the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and
the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a
right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition
for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens
national law have been duly proven according to our rules
of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in
favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for
the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by
a tribunal of another country.[28] This means that the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either
by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to
include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under
this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC
to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served
and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with
the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless
to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure (a) births;
conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the (b) deaths;
effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided (c) marriages;
in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[33]
(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by
the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments (f) legitimations;
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for (g) adoptions;
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien (h) acknowledgment of natural children;
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not (i) naturalization; and
for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides. (j) changes of name.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign xxxx

divorce decree

As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep
Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
and preserve in their offices the following books, in which
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
they shall, respectively make the proper entries
certificate based on the mere presentation of the
concerning the civil status of persons
decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench (1) Birth and death register;
and the bar to what had been done.
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall marriages.
be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry
in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of
status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and
name and naturalization register.
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree
in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a
decrees registration. The law should be read in relation
foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the
that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on
foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.
Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration
In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet
of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
entered: presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of
the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] both of which required
a final order from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered
in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may
be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among
others, that the verified petition must be filed with the
RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry
is located;[38] that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing
must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements
have not been met in the present case, we cannot
consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one
filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should
not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings
for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as
the appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and
tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on
certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as
its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
Enriquez Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, GR 183622
(2012)
CD:
VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE
G. R. No. 183622, [February 08, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid ac-
cording to their national law.
FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American
citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the United States
from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a
second marriage with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines,
petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of
letters of administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate. While the case was
pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the
children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar
petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by
the respondent on the ground of litis pendentia.
Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered
an interested person qualified to file the petition.
Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for
bigamy was filed against petitioner by Felicitas Amor
contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage
to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio
Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and
ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American
citizen, and that divorce was not recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and
petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note of the action
for declaration of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas
Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered
the pending action to be a prejudicial question in
determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of
bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never
been married to Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner
and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its
findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the
marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was
valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC
held that petitioner was not an interested party who may
file said petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the
lower court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case
for bigamy meant that the marriage with Bristol was still
valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may
be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.
HELD:
It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the
validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be
issued the letters of administration over the estate of
Orlando. Petition is partially granted. Case is remanded
to RTC.
1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to
appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case that
petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It
concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of
bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still
existed and was valid.
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a
spouse of for-eign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven
by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1)
an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. It is well-settled in our
jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged
and proved.

LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,
It appears that the trial court no longer required
petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce
under the laws of the United States and the marriage Respondent.
between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a
need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for
further reception of evidence to establish the fact of
divorce.

FULLTEXT: G. R. No. 183622

SECOND DIVISION

Present:

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN,

Petitioner,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

PEREZ,

SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:
February 8, 2012
x--------------------------------------------
------x
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision[1] and Resolution[2] regarding the
issuance of letters of administration of the intestate
estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen.
After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States
from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second
marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the
Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for
the issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of
Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings
(Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending,
respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of
Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition
with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232
on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec.
Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already
pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner
was not considered an interested person qualified to file
a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of
the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention,
respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was
filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of
Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No.
2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy,
alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to
Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio
Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of
bigamy.[3] The trial court ruled that since the deceased
was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce
was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the
marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of
nullity then pending action with the trial court in
Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased
and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a
prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner
for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place,
petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos,
Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of
letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted
that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in
Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage
between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and
subsisting when she married Orlando. Without
expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the
previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the
trial court held that petitioner was not an interested
party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.[4]
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed
by respondent should have been dismissed on the ground
of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition
for letters of administration may have been filed by an
uninterested person, the defect was cured by the
appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted
that, to determine who has a better right to administer
the decedents properties, the RTC should have first
required the parties to present their evidence before it
ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed
Decision. First, it held that petitioner undertook the
wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition
for review rather than a petition for certiorari.
Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed
within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a
petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA
allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the
merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable
in the case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the
dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the
parties or at least such as to represent the same interest
in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts,
and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that
the judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other. A petition for letters of
administration is a special proceeding. A special
proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in
contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding
involves no defendant or respondent. The only party in
this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant.
Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters
of administration can hardly be barred by a similar
pending petition involving the estate of the same
decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same
person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party
to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the
same manner that the latter was not made a party to the
petition filed by the former. The first element of litis
pendentia is wanting. The contention of the petitioner
must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner
would render nugatory the provision of the Rules
requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be
an interested party, inasmuch as any person, for that
matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the
estate sought to be administered, could be appointed as
administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of
any other person, in derogation of the rights of those
specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed
her petition for letters of administration. As a spouse, the
petitioner would have been preferred to administer the
estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage
certificate, like any other public document, is only prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that
the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was
acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage
has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in
a proper proceedings. The deduction of the trial court
that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case
negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with
Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There
was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the
findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for
us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an
interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando
B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of
administration by the trial court is in place.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this
Decision.[6] She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was
illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was
acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still
holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She
insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the
marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special
proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in
Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married
to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that,
because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows
that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was
valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the
nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and
Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not
an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the
bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we
had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a
spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was
established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[7]
wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In
this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of
Appeals,[8] to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In
the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court
of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce
from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce
obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the
Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as
a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven
as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,[9] to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to
be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand,
a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility,
but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court
ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure
to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of
the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is
the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum
juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove
Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she
is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment.
He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the
original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the
marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and
worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the
Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine
courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the
party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are
denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden
of proving the material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon
him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws
are not among those matters that judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function. The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required
petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos divorce under
the laws of the United States and the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to
remand the proceedings to the trial court for further
reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and
the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right
to be issued the letters of administration over the estate.
Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to
respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of
kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78
of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San
Luis,[10] in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,
the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading
and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1)
an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court
for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine
the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party
to be issued the letters of administration over the estate
of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October
2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court
of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this
case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial
Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
52. Fujiki v. Marinay, GR 196049 (2013)
CASE DIGEST:
Fujiki vs Marinay (art.41)
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national
who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May
2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage).”
The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the
petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)"
based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the
foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
Held:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines has
no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can
prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact.”
Rule 108, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil register,
may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis
supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal
and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it.
3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine
law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an
action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment,
which presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts
are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide
on the “family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is
a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts
are limited to the question of whether to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article
15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to
repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations.
FULLTEXT:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition
assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2
March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue
and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to
file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national
who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May
2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate
the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC
immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and
withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The
RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family
Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior
to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident
respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at
the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the
petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions.
The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply
with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground
for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently,
the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the
wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the
petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil
actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or
a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the
RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant
rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2)
the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent
with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11
on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by
Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of
the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy
would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be
permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of
course, difficult to realize that the party interested in
having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be
the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the personality to
nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation"
of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to
Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law
imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce
or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final
decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage
was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that
entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject
to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC
sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also
asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its
own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue.
Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept
of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is
lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case
on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate
Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot
pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing
the case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial
court should not have "immediately dismissed" the
petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because
he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC
stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the
petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds
for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree
of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he
now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the
other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of
impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the
Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal
of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other
ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the
petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in
Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction
of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza
emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on
the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to
dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and
certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the
"immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same
provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file
their comment on the petition for review.30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed
that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed
to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set
aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court
for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued
that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an
injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The
Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court
explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take
action if he or she had only discovered during the
connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the
bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden
to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always
be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court
judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in
the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil
Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the
civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x
x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should
therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under
Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the
Court to comply with the directive for them to comment
on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously
married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted
any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand,
Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the
petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear
that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the
foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49
Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody
is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may
be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of
the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated
by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition
for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the
trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition,51 the
service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and
the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because
it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the
case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be
forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering
immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in
the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in
private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may
require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction
relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such
citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to
the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that
a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates
a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states
that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the
merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be
repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited
review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting
the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine
courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between
a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully
proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves
the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended
procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse
obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can
prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires
proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108
creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which
are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register
Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which
the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court
declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108
of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil register,
may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis
supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize
the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground
of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status
as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the
entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the
civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal
and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation
of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These
property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected
by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title
III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife")
of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of
the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In
any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves
this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to
the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of
a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to
the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.
Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties
in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the
wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can
initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband
or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse
does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting
and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in
the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is
violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79
Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the
aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real
party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially
declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage
in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has
no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of
marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action"
to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign
judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an
entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action
to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support
pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in
the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil
registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction
or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts
under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment
is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In
Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the
case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a
case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective
measure to address the anomaly that results from a
marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce.
The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry
under the laws of his or her country. The correction is
made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s
decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse,
after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the
Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the
foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a
situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the
extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the
case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of
the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full
trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the
only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts
are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide
on the "family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is
a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts
are limited to the question of whether to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article
15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to
repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the
civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency
between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution
for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised
Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no
longer sees the need to address the questions on venue
and the contents and form of the petition under Sections
4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil
Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the
petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Impugning the validity of a marriage & necessity of court
declaration
53. Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli, GR 173614 (2007)
CASE DIGEST:
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ANNULMENT OR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY
ENRICO VS. MEDINACELI
G.R. NO. 173614, SEPTEMBER 28, 2007
Doctrine:
Nial Case
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
governs petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code.
governs petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage celebrated during the effectivity of the Family
Code.
Coverage:
ü Marriages celebrated during effectivity of Civil Code
Coverage:
ü Marriages celebrated on and after March 15, 2003 (this
rule being prospective)
ü How about marriages celebrated during the effectivity
of the Civil Code but the action was commenced only
after the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC?
Does not cover: Cases already commenced before March
15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the
coverage of the Family Code. (Which law governs this
then?)
Petitioner: a person who must be the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Ex. heirs
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
FACTS:
· Respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B.
Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli filed an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and
petitioner Lolita D. Enrico.
· Complaint alleged that Eulogio and Trinidad were
married on 14 June 1962 and begot seven children,
herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma,
Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. On 1 May
2004, Trinidad died. On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married
petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.
Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed
away.
In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio,
respondents averred that the same was entered into
without the requisite marriage license. They argued that
Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a
woman who have been living together for at least five
years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and
Eulogio because they could not have lived together under
the circumstances required by said provision.
Petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together
as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly
and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. As an affirmative
defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the
ground that it is only the contracting parties while living
who can file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
· RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of
action, citing Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC
promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on
March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a) that a
petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void
Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
· Respondents filed a MR.
· RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination
that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog, which was on the authority for holding that the
heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a
void marriage even after the death of the latter. It held
that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife,
applies only where both parties to a void marriage are
still living.
ISSUE: Which applies in the case at bar: the case law as
embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC?
HELD:
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because it is the law that
governs petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage celebrated during the effectivity of the Family
Code. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was
celebrated on 26 August 2004.
While it is true that Nial allowed therein petitioners to
file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death
of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for
the reason that the impugned marriage therein was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to
determine the validity of the two marriages involved
therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at
the time of their celebration. What we have before us
belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to
be declared void was entered into during the effectivity
of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts,
petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves
no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003. Thus,
contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to
reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the
ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope and application.
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and
is prospective in its application.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. (a) Who may file. A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife.
Rationale: Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs
of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the
belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only
inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and hence can only question the validity of the marriage
of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage
and not to seek its dissolution.
FULLTEXT:
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order,[1]
dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057,
granting reconsideration of its Order,[2] dated 11
October 2005, and reinstating respondents Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio
B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli
(Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D.
Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia,
that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962,
in Lal-lo, Cagayan.[3] They begot seven children, herein
respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane,
Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.[4] On 1 May 2004,
Trinidad died.[5] On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married
petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo,
Cagayan.[6] Six months later, or on 10 February 2005,
Eulogio passed away.[7]
In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio,
respondents averred that the same was entered into
without the requisite marriage license. They argued that
Article 34[8] of the Family Code, which exempts a man
and a woman who have been living together for at least
five years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and
Eulogio because they could not have lived together under
the circumstances required by said provision.
Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to
Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on
1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the
date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore,
petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. To further their
cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack
of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness
which made its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and
Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one
roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were
exempted from the requirement of a marriage license.
From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco
Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and
30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended
that the marriage ceremony was performed in the
Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the
Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought
the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only
the contracting parties while living who can file an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,[9] granting
the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action.
It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,[10] dated 7 March 2003,
promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The
RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated
by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15,
2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)[11] that a petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The language
of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a
petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband
or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this
Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive
and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the
heirs of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late
father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null
and void.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an
affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is
hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. [13]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the
said motion, the RTC rendered an Order[14] dated 3 May
2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the
RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that
the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog,[15] which was on the authority for holding that
the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail
a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It held
that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife,
applies only where both parties to a void marriage are
still living.[16] Where one or both parties are deceased,
the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare
the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance,
thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs.
Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the
Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a
deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of
his marriage after his death. The Order subject of this
motion for reconsideration held that the case of Nial vs.
Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter
referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has
rejected the case of Nial vs. Bayadog by approving the
Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held
that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the
only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of
nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal
and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between
the case of Nial vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule.
In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of
Nial vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will
have to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The
rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered
into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with
respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of
the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over
the property of the said parents. Hence, during the
lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should
solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a
petition to declare his marriage void. However, upon the
death of the parent his heirs have already a vested right
over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested
right should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure
such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights
granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal
standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void
marriage entered by their parent, especially when the
marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give
premium to such union because the guilty parties will
seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the
marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance
of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the
petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the
Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is
applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage
are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty
party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to
declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not
applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It
shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be
applicable.[17]
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May
2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for
reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate
this case.[18]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC
denied the said motion on the ground that no new
matter was raised therein.[19]
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether
the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case
at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated
route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme
Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their
respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised
against taking a direct recourse to this Court.[20] Instead,
they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower
courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is
concurrently within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle
of hierarchy of courts.[21] However, it cannot be gainsaid
that this Court has the discretionary power to brush aside
procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature
and importance of the issues raised, warrant the
immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.[22] Moreover,
notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition
for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case
grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs
the instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is
Nial which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the
deceased person were granted the right to file a petition
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent
after the death of their father, we cannot, however,
apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned
marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the
applicable law to determine the validity of the two
marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[23]
What we have before us belongs to a different milieu,
i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be
gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio
was celebrated in 2004.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope,
to wit:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code
of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves
no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.[24]
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March
2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC,
there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in
scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The
marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26
August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil
expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is
clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or
the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions
for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot
be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph
a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they
do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory
or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[25]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the
court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean
that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already
without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-
4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without
prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of
Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.
54. Carlos v. Sandoval, GR 179922 (2008)
Case digest:
CARLOS V. SANDOVAL, G.R. NO. 179922, DECEMBER 16,
2008FACTS: Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia
died intestate. They left sixparcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De
DiosCarlos. Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son,Teofilo II. Upon
Teofilo’s death, 2 parcel of land were registered in
the name ofrespondent Felicidad and co-respondent,
Teofilo II. An action was instituted by the petitioner against
respondents regarding the shares ofthe land which lead to
compromise agreements in relation to the divisions of
proceedsin the sale of the lands. Subsequently, in 1995,
petitioner commenced an action against respondents
before theRTC for, among others, declaration of nullity of
marriage of his late brother Teofilo andrespondent
Felicidad in view of the absence of the required
marriage license. Thereason for the action is that
petitioner alleges that the marriage is null and void, thus
thelands should be reconveyed to him.Respondents
contended in their answer that the lack of details regarding
the requisitemarriage license did not invalidate Felicidad’s
marriage to Teofilo. They prayed for thedismissal of the
case on the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdictionover subject matter.RTC rendered judgment,
granting petitioner’s counter motion for summary
judgment.Declaring the marriage between defendant
Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos nulland void ab initio
for lack of the requisite marriage license.In the appeal,
respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted
without or inexcess of jurisdiction in rendering summary
judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo,Sr. and
Felicidad.CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. Basis:
The Civil Code expressly prohibit therendition of decree
of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of
facts or aconfession of judgment. Hence this appeal.ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos is a real party
interest in theannulment of the marriage between his
brother Teofilo and Felicidad.RULING: No. Under the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment ofVoidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
which became effective on March 15,2003, the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be
filed by anyparty outside of the marriage. Exceptions: 1.
Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (or before March 15, 2003); and 2.
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case
against respondent Felicidad in1995. The marriage in
controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law
wouldgovern depends upon when the marriage took
place.The marriage having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code whichtook effect on August
3, 1988, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the
law ineffect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil
Code is silent as to who may bring an action to
declare the marriagevoid. Does this mean that any person
can bring an action for the declaration of nullity
ofmarriage?SC responded in the negative. The absence of
a provision in the Civil Code cannot beconstrued as a
license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage
case. Suchperson must appear to be the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by thejudgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Elsewise stated,plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.
For it is basic in procedural law that everyaction must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.Interest within the meaning of the rule means
material interest or an interest in issue tobe affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
curiosityabout the question involved or a mere
incidental interest. One having no materialinterest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court
as plaintiff in anaction. When plaintiff is not the real
party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on theground
of lack of cause of action
Fulltext:
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital
bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of
the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March
15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot
be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on
certiorari the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which reversed and set aside the summary judgment[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child,
recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and
damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit
are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate.
They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs,
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots
are particularly described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION,
Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil
Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot
159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441)
square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-
325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a
portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on
the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on
the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1
by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1
(Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area
of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or
less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-
007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate,
L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang,
Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE,
along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East
& SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the
West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x
containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX
(1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la
subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por
el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por
el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto
marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W,
72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un
mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la
subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por
el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el
SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto
Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E,
82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un
mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de
CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.[3]
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer
his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order
to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in
turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the
other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were
transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These
three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The
lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived
by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II
(Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were
registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-
respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are
covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively,
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents
before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and
caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement.
Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their
respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a
portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the
remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the
first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4]
2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were
adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining
10,000-square meter portion was later divided between
petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental
compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994,
with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties
submitted the supplemental compromise agreement,
which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more
contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties
equally divided between them the third and fourth
parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action,
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents
before the court a quo with the following causes of
action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of
a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and
(e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was
raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage
between his late brother Teofilo and respondent
Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the
required marriage license. He likewise maintained that
his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the
adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts
he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to
the subject real properties. He also prayed for the
cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name
of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by
such certificates of title, including the sums received by
respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way
of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their
answer. They denied the material averments of
petitioners complaint. Respondents contended that the
dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license
did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo.
Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate
child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed
for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They
also asked that their counterclaims for moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, be
granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial,
respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to
the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace
who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also
submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent
Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and
respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for
summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the
contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no
record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for
summary judgment the testimony of respondent
Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in
Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before
the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony,
respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo
II is her child with Teofilo.[5]
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and
manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion
between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants
(respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as
follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad
Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite
on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of
the requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II,
is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of
the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to
plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the
interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the
instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of
the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No.
139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and
ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to
issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT
No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue
another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint,
between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the
names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor
Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of
plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name
of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S.
Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to
issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of
plaintiffs evidence on his claim for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, appearance fees,
and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in
the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the
appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering
summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr.
and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an
illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is
entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary
judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public
policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact
that it was appellants who first sought summary
judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant
thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action to
recover upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, the
rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to
annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue
was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition
of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule.
The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code
expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment
of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession
of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition
for summary judgment practically amount to these
methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the
foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to
prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution
of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May
13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein
impugned. The fact, however, that appellees own brother
and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as
husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment
of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is
sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate
left by the former call for a closer and more thorough
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case.
Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo
resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect
that the material facts alleged in the complaint for
annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section
1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of
the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our
perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a
quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it
may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is
among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the
failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license
on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage
between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval,
although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it
to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary,
appellant Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the existence
of said marriage license is corroborated by the following
statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas,
then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned
marriage, to wit:
That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage
license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis
of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos
and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage
license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage
contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who
filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn,
may have overlooked the same.
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial
court, We are of the considered view that the veracity
and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the
motivations underlying the same should be properly
threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the
primary evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage
did not take place, neither should appellants non-
presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as
proof that the same was not procured. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be
emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the
party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party,
the same may be said of the trial courts rejection of the
relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his
putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in
appellant Felicidad Sandovals statements. Although it
had effectively disavowed appellants prior claims
regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the
averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of
appellees brother, to Our mind, did not altogether
foreclose the possibility of the said appellants illegitimate
filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter,
his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the
case, We find appellees bare allegation that appellant
Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent
couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole,
insufficient to support what could well be a minors total
forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation.
Inconsistent though it may be to her previous
statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is
more credible when considered in the light of the fact
that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos
allowed said appellant the use of his name and the
shelter of his household. The least that the trial court
could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on
the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the
issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo
Carlos II.[8]
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for
reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente,
Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the
twin motions.
Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the
following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary
Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in
denying petitioners Motion for reconsideration under the
Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of
the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible
error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code,
despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are
different from that contemplated and intended by law, or
has otherwise decided a question of substance not
theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided
it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary
Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the
Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in
applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the
Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings,
instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary
Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion,
disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground
of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise
committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a
marriage may be declared void ab initio through a
judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and
without the benefit of a trial. But there are other
procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is
not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the
pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is
confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19[10]
of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of
the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding
solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on
the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA
likewise considered the provisions on summary
judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of
the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our
perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court
a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x[11]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the
rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary
judgments have no place in cases of declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of
marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on
the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage
has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle
laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March
15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally
conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence
to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on
the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in
Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We excluded
actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the
application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for
annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for
legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all
kinds of actions.[14] (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has
divested the State of its lawful right and duty to
intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not
terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor
that no collusion exists between the parties. The State
should have been given the opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was
rendered.[15]
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the
court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear
and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the
public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression
of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no
suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to
make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid
down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of
marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public
prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x
x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the
public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the
trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication
of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public
prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.[16]
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage.
The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by
stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the
husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the
Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they
do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory
or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[17]
(Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife
are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful
marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when
and how to build the foundations of marriage. The
spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They
are simultaneously the directors and actors of their
matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and
should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance
with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets
forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988.[18]
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the
right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity
of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the
Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or
intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that
the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the
Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.[19]
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply
to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003
although the marriage involved is within the coverage of
the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which
became effective on March 15, 2003[20] is prospective in
its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of
Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and
is prospective in its application.[22] (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case
against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in
controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law
would govern depends upon when the marriage took
place.[23]
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may
bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this
mean that any person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in
the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any
person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person
must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.[25] Elsewise stated,
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic
in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.[26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere
incidental interest. One having no material interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-
in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack
of cause of action.[27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of
Appeals,[28] where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force
at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file
the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based
on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court
held that the children have the personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the
foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to
the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was
granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If
it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and
the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage,
then the trial court should declare respondents marriage
as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount
of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On
the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then
the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare
nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas
Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.[29]
(Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or
not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo
died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs
are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under
the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent and the
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of
law.[30]
Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance
are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving
spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory
heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children
by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of
the Civil Code.[31]
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as
compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such
as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a
compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the
estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code
provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
(Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or
illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from
succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of
the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the decedent.[33]
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not
to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of
Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek
the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that
collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire
successional right over the estate if the decedent dies
without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his
parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if
Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his
brother, the first half being allotted to the widow
pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This
makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the
subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner
succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of
petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is
contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not
a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or
legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no
legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based
on the ground that he has no successional right to be
protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For
although the marriage in controversy may be found to be
void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not
inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,[34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes
the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial
on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the
subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly
instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack
of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II
is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of
Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation
of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a
need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the
other causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the
ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the
filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding,
We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not
specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
resolution of the case.[36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits
having been conducted in the case, petitioners bare
allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from
an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total
forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation.
However, We are not inclined to support its
pronouncement that the declaration of respondent
Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the
appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad
should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of
the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code
to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
(Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the
legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The
language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the
mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect
the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid
marriage.[37]
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of
petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance,
recovery of property, and sum of money must be
vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made
on the basis of its finding that the marriage in
controversy was null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as
follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in
regard to the action on the status and filiation of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of
marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the
late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo
Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the
action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of
its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on
the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in
its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
55. Ablaza v. Republic, GR 158298 (2010)
Case digest:
SIDRO ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010
DOCTRINE:
The plaintiff must be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Every action must be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the
party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file
the action.
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in
Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December
26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza
and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on
January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab
initio for having been solemnized without a marriage
license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him
to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano
before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could
impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on
the ground that petition is filed out of time and that
petitioner is not a party to marriage. Motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC
on the ground that the action must be filed by the proper
party, which in this case should be filed by any of the
parties to the marriage. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest inthe
action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of
his deceased brother?
HELD:
Yes. The applicable law when marriage was contracted
between Cresenciano and Leonila on December 26, 1949,
is the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the
exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the
right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no
application to the petitioner. The case was reinstated and
its records returned to RTC for further proceedings.
Ratio:
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SCexplicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation
demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under
the regime of the Civil Code. This specifically extends only
to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule
that is prospective in application, is confined only to
proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself
to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of
Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the
petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir, has the right to
succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the
conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the
Civil Code. The plaintiff must still be the party who stands
to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party
who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the
action. One having no material interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an
action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest,
the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.
FULLTEXT:
X_____________________________X
56. Bolos v. Bolos, GR 186400 (2010)
CASE DIGEST:
BOLOS V. BOLOS
634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, which the Court promulgated on 15
March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on 3 August 1988.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Respondent
Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for
annulment. A copy of said decision was received by
respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the
Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s
failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or
new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC
issued the order declaring its decision declaring the
marriage null and void as final and executory and
granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by
Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a
petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared
psychologically capacitated to render the essential
marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared
guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their
children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside
the assailed orders of the RTC declaring the nullity of
marriage as final and executory. The appellate court
stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February
14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also
applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity
of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase
“under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers
to the word “petitions” rather than to the word
“marriages.” Such that petitions filed after the effectivity
of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if
the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in
his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not
applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was
solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its
effectivity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the
case at bench.
HELD:
No, it does not.
RATIO:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code
of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves
no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The
rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered
by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to
petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the
Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word
“petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting
aside the RTC decision which denied due course to
respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
FULTEXT:
X_________________________________________X
57. Juliajvo-Llave v. Republic, GR 169766 (2011) [unions
between christians & moslems]
CASE DIGEST:
LLAVE V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision
dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89
declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as
void ab initio.
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried
Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and
tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC
Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In
their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was
indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s
wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the
rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda,
filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and
Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged
that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958
under civil rites, and that this marriage remained
subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late
Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
HELD:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand
late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated
by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.
RATIO:
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda
was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and
Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike
was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which
only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the
marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior
marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce
under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal
laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly,
Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to
“marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims,
or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of
PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”
HELD:
The petition is DENIED.
FULLTEXT:
X________________________________________x
58. Yu v. Carpio, GR 189207 (2011)
CASE DIGEST:
YU V. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU
G.R. No. 189207, [June 15, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of each party’s psychological
incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations.
If the Court eventually finds that the parties’ respective
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed
meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties’
psychological incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to
comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before
a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be
issued. Pending such ruling on the declaration of nullity
of the parties’ marriage, the Court finds no legal ground,
at this stage, to proceed with the reception of evidence in
regard the issues on custody and property relations, since
these are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties’
marriage.
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of Pasig.
Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating
that Eric’s partial offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006
would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits
have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative
to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric and
Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to
submit the case for resolution, considering that the
incidents on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) were mere consequences of the
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on
declaration of nullity cannot be resolved without
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations. Eric added that the
incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity
can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC
ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that
the case was re-raffled to another branch presided by
Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by
Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion
seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage
as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on
the declaration on nullity be already submitted for
resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not
simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying
that the main cause of action is the declaration of nullity
of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely
ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-
Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under
Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be
submitted for resolution first before the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) – NO.
RATIO:
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or
what are alleged to have been exercised with grave
abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An
interlocutory order is one which “does not finally dispose
of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done
by the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the assailed orders
were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those
were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites
that would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to
assail an interlocutory order have not been complied
with, the proper recourse for petitioner should have been
an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court
on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow
the presentation of evidence on the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed
orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the
reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and
property relations. And the trial judge’s decision was not
without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the
Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs.
19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations
after the trial court renders a decision granting the
petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution,
custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the
judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate
court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion
of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, including custody, support of common children
and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters
had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception
of evidence on custody, support, and property relations
but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued
by this Court, to a time when a decision granting the
petition is already at hand and before a final decree is
issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly
the family court, shall proceed with the liquidation,
partition and distribution, custody, support of common
children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
upon entry of judgment granting the petition. And
following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc
Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is
undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts.
Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide
for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive
legitimes of all common children, computed as of the
date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment
of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive
evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment
granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or
annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge
Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the
assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric
Yu’s assertion that ruling the main issue without
receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result
in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly
speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal
presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and
appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio
acted in a capricious and whimsical manner, much less in
a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she
issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To
reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom
and legal soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA
cannot likewise be said to have committed grave abuse
of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-
Carpio and in ultimately finding an absence of grave
abuse of discretion on her part.
FULLTEXT:
X___________________X
59. Teves v. People, GR 188775 (2011)
CASE DIGEST:
TEVES V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 188775, [August 24, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
FACTS:
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized
between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves
(Thelma). After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad
and would only come home to the Philippines for
vacations. In 2002, Thelma was informed that her
husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita
Calderon. Thelma then went to the National Statistics
Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage
indicating that her husband (Cenon) and Edita contracted
marriage on 10 December 2001 in Bulacan. In 2006, the
uncle of Thelma, filed a complaint accusing petitioner
Cenon of bigamy. Petitioner was charged with bigamy
under Article 349 of the RPC on June 2006. However,
during the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the
RTC of Caloocan City, rendered a decision dated May
2006 (one month before the case for bigamy was
decided) declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma
null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations pursuant to Article 36, Family Code. Said
decision became final by a Certification of Finality issued
on 27 June 2006. Petitioner Cenon appealed before the
CA contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling
that his criminal liability had already been extinguished.
Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was
declared null and void, “there is in effect no marriage at
all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.”
Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in
Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his case because in the
Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated
before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed.
Petitioner says that in his case, the first marriage had
already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy
case was filed in court.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of
Bigamy (Article 346, RPC) despite the judicial declaration
that his previous marriage with Thema is null and void.
HELD:
YES. The court held that it does not matter whether the
case for declaration of nullity was filed before the case
for bigamy was instituted, for as long as the offender
contracted a subsequent marriage while his previous
marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a
Declaration of Nullity of the First marriage AT THE TIME
HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
RATIO:
The instant case has all the elements of the crimeof
bigamy under Art. 346 of the RPC. Thus, the CA was
correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November
1992. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage
with Edita on 10 December 2001. At the time of his
second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma
was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the
decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with
Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years
after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or
subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the
essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not
disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.
His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in
view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is
bereft of merit. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. Parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they
can be allowed to marry again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity is required before
a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible
and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person
who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision
is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him. We note that in petitioner’s case the
complaint was filed before the first marriage was
declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information
that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. Following petitioner’s argument, even
assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in
this case, the offender can still escape liability provided
that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes
the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be
allowed.
FULLTEXT:
X_______________________________________X
Void Marriages
60. Republic v. CA, GR GR 103047 (1994) [marriage
license]
Case digest:
Republic vs CA and Castro
Republic vs. CA and Castro
GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994
FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a
civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not
immediately live together and it was only upon Castro
found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live
together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave
birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent
of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest
desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in order her
marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition
seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her
lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license
issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven
by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial
evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish
that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to
the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of CA that the
certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied
by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that
the office did not issue a marriage license to the
contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of
Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a
ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar
circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was
duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he
chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary
and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of
the subject marriage license.
FULL TEXT:
X________________________________________X
61. Republic v. Cantor, GR 184621 (2010) [declaration of
presumptive death]
CASE DIGEST:
G.R. No. 184621
BRION, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari[1] before us assails
the decision[2] dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed
the order[3] dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F.
Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor's husband,
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent and Jerry were married on September
20, 1997. They lived together as husband and wife in
their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City,
South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple
had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the
respondent's inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever
she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2)
Jerry's expression of animosity toward the respondent's
father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and
this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him.
Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard
anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the
time of Jerry's disappearance, the respondent filed
before the RTC a petition[4] for her husband's declaration
of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-
25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that
Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired
from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-
in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no
avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly
made it a point to check the patients' directory whenever
she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the
respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file
the petition in court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting
the respondent's petition and declaring Jerry
presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent
had a well-founded belief that her husband was already
dead since more than four (4) years had passed without
the former receiving any news about the latter or his
whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order dated
December 15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby
declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor is presumptively
dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.[5]
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for
certiorari[6] filed by the petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision, the CA dismissed
the petitioner's petition, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the RTC's part, and, accordingly, fully
affirmed the latter's order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Order
dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor
presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[7]
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition
before this Court.
The Petition
The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to challenge
the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in
petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It
maintains that although judgments of trial courts in
summary judicial proceedings, including presumptive
death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory
(hence, not appealable under Article 247 of the Family
Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject
to review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not
have a well-founded belief to justify the declaration of
her husband's presumptive death. It claims that the
respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent search
for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites
this Court's attention to the attendant circumstances
surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of search
conducted and the respondent's resultant failure to meet
the strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Issues
The petition poses to us the following issues:
(1) Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions,
judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief
that Jerry is already dead.
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition.
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
Court's Judgment in the Judicial Proceedings for
Declaration of Presumptive Death Is Final and Executory,
Hence, Unappealable
The Family Code was explicit that the court's judgment in
summary proceedings, such as the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41
of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and
executory.
Article 41, in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code
provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately
final and executory. [underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that
it is no longer subject to an appeal, the dispositions and
conclusions therein having become immutable and
unalterable not only as against the parties but even as
against the courts.[8] Modification of the court's ruling,
no matter how erroneous is no longer permissible. The
final and executory nature of this summary proceeding
thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in
Republic of the Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,[9] the right to
appeal is not granted to parties because of the express
mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code,
there is no reglementary period within which to perfect
an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of [Article] 247, Family
Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory." It
was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give
due course to the Republic's appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court
of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a
judgment which, by express provision of law, is
immediately final and executory. As we have said in
Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural
right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a
statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article
247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in
summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are
"immediately final and executory," the right to appeal
was not granted to any of the parties therein. The
Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition
for declaration of presumptive death, should not be
treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics
supplied]
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the Decisions, Judgments or
Final Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary Proceeding for
the Declaration of Presumptive Death Under the Family
Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely
left without a remedy. While jurisprudence tells us that
no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment,
an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question
any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in De los Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,[10] the fact
that a decision has become final does not automatically
negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in connection with orders or
processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be
availed of where a court has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and where
the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a
procedure finds support in the case of Republic v.
Tango,[11] wherein we held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule
on appeal of judgments rendered in summary
proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly,
refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes
the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the
Family Code:
"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the
procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases
provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases
covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the
same title. It states:
"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof
shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under
Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they
are applicable." (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title
reads:
"ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be
immediately final and executory."
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in
a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no
appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To
be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the
Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does
not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. [emphasis ours]
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner's resort to
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question
the RTC's order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was
proper.
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief
The Essential Requisites for the Declaration of
Presumptive Death Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be
obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse
was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code,
there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration
of presumptive death:
That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead; and
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.[12]
The Present Spouse Has the Burden of Proof to Show that
All the Requisites Under Article 41 of the Family Code Are
Present
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show
that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code
are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for
purposes of declaration of presumptive death,
substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands
to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.[13]
Declaration of Presumptive Death Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Imposes a Stricter Standard
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the
old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded,
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded
belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted. We have had occasion to make the same
observation in Republic v. Nolasco,[14] where we noted
the crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family
Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption
to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however,
there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also,
Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard
than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely
requires either that there be no news that such absentee
is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is
presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes
as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive
death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period
required by the law), lack of any news that such absentee
is still alive, failure to communicate or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that
Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present
spouse the burden of proving the additional and more
stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can
only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-
to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only
the absent spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly,
that the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.[15]
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded
belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each
particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains
on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this
requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts
and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under
the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive
one).
To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable
search" required by the law, an analysis of the following
relevant cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.)[16]
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),[17] the Court ruled that the present spouse failed
to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent
spouse was already dead before he filed his petition. His
efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the
following:
(1) He went to his in-laws' house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captain's aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends' houses to find her and
inquired about her whereabouts among his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi
driver to look for her in malls during his free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her;
and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police
station and to the NBI.
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still
ruled against the present spouse. The Court found that he
failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly
made inquiries and only reported his wife's absence after
the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for
determining the existence of a "well-founded belief"
under Article 41 of the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of
proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends
upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse.[18]
ii. Republic v. Granada[19]
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent
spouse failed to prove her "well-founded belief" that her
absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
petition. In this case, the present spouse alleged that her
brother had made inquiries from their relatives regarding
the absent spouse's whereabouts. The present spouse
did not report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass
media. Applying the standards in Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),[20] the Court
ruled against the present spouse, as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case,
petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not
initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having
inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the
latter's relatives, these relatives were not presented to
corroborate Diosdado's testimony. In short, respondent
was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband.
Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought
information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or
assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or
the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media
for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain
these omissions.
iii. Republic v. Nolasco[21]
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for
declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who had
been missing for more than four years. He testified that
his efforts to find her consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in
England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him;
and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her
whereabouts, which all proved fruitless.
The Court ruled that the present spouse's investigations
were too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was
already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only
proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate
with their common acquaintances, and not that she was
dead.
iv. The present case
In the case at bar, the respondent's "well-founded belief"
was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate
Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1)
She made inquiries about Jerry's whereabouts from her
in-laws, neighbors and friends; and
(2)
Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she
looked through the patients' directory, hoping to find
Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent
standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing
husband. It can be inferred from the records that her
hospital visits and her consequent checking of the
patients' directory therein were unintentional. She did
not purposely undertake a diligent search for her
husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor
primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus
considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief
that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry's absence to the police
nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him.
While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the
nature of the situation in which the present spouse is
placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and
prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been
missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very
least, report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry's relatives or
their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her
efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom
she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As
held in Nolasco, the present spouse's bare assertion that
he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse's
whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends
from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the
testimony nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to
support the respondent's claim that she conducted a
diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence
proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her
bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-
laws about her husband's whereabouts.
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent
merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on
uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because
her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded
belief that her husband was already dead. As held in
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),[22] "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on
a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great
many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."
Strict Standard Approach Is Consistent with the State's
Policy to Protect and Strengthen Marriage
In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the
possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage,
has consistently applied the "strict standard" approach.
This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is
not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws.
Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and
should ensure that the stricter standard required by the
Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals (Tenth Div.),[23] we emphasized that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under
Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of one's spouse, the degree of due
diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-
mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing
spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been
times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been
resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully
well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well.
It is even possible that those who cannot have their
marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code
for relief because of the xxx summary nature of its
proceedings.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even
more imperative if we consider the State's policy to
protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.[24]
Since marriage serves as the family's foundation[25] and
since it is the state's policy to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic social institution,[26] marriage should
not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the
underlying rationale to uphold the sanctity of marriage.
Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[27] reflected this
sentiment when we stressed:
[The] protection of the basic social institutions of
marriage and the family in the preservation of which the
State has the strongest interest; the public policy here
involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the
following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under Article 41 of the Family
Code Is for the Present Spouse's Benefit
The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of
the absent spouse (and consequently, the application of a
stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present
spouse's benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a
criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code which might come into play if he/she
would prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration.
Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her
absent spouse presumptively dead, the present spouse's
good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively
established. The decision of the competent court
constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and
his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively
negated.[28] Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is
necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard
and have the absent spouse judicially declared
presumptively dead.
Final Word
As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention
that the strict standard required in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death has not been fully
observed by the lower courts. We need only to cite the
instances when this Court, on review, has consistently
ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that
anything less than the use of the strict standard
necessitates a denial. To rectify this situation, lower
courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict
standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of
the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed
decision dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, and
Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., see concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., see dissenting opinion.
Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., join the dissenting opinion of
Justice Leonen.
FULLTEXT:
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62. Republic v. CA and Molina, GR 108763 (1997)
[psychological incapacity]
CASE DIGEST:
Republic vs CA and Molina
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming
the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological
incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year,
Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring
to spend more time with friends whom he squandered
his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance
and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and
as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit
her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City
in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their
child. Since then he abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and
remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity
is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the
parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet
the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to
some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time
of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that
would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.
The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she
and her husband cannot get along with each other and
had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert
testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered
as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of
psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and
clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the
marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person
in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of
marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as
Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or
the Catholic Church must be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal
assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.
FULLTEXT:
X____________________________________________X
63. Bier v. Bier, 173294, GR (2008)
CASE DIGEST:
G.R. No. 173294 February 27, 2008
Renne Enrique Bier vs. Ma. Lourdes A. Bier and RP
Facts: Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier met respondent
Ma. Lourdes A. Bier through his sister. On
July 26, 1992, six months after their first meeting, they
were married at the UST Santissimo Rosario
Parish Church. Everything went well for the first three
years of their marriage. As petitioner was
based in Saudi Arabia as an electronics technician
at Saudia Airlines, the parties decided to
maintain two residences, one in the Philippines
and another in Saudi Arabia. They took turns
shuttling between the two countries just so they could
spend time together.
The couple started experiencing marital problems
after three years of marriage. She started
becoming aloof towards him and began to spend more
time with her friends than with him, refusing
even to have sexual relations with him for no apparent
reason. She became an alcoholic and a
chain-smoker. She also started neglecting her husband's
needs and the upkeep of their home, and
became an absentee wife. After being gone from their
home for days on end, she would return
without bothering to account for her absence. As a result,
they frequently quarreled. Finally, on April
10, 1997, respondent suddenly left for the United States.
Petitioner has not heard from her since.
On April 1, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
her essential marital obligations to petitioner.
After trial, trial court rendered judgment granting
the petition. Respondent Republic of the
Philippines, through the OSG, appealed the decision of
the RTC to the CA. the appeal was granted.
Decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside. CA
held that petitioner failed to comply with
the guidelines laid down in Molina as the root cause of
respondent's psychological incapacity was
not medically or clinically identified. Worse, the same
was not even alleged in the petition filed in the
court a quo. As such, it granted the appeal and reversed
the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA decision.
The same was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether petition should be denied because of its
non-observance from the requirements laid
down in the Molina case and whether the totality of
evidence constitutes psychological incapacity.
Ruling: The guidelines set in Molina incorporate the three
basic requirements earlier mandated by
the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: “psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is
important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
Dr. Tayag's report, which found respondent to be
suffering from psychological incapacity, particularly
a narcissistic personality disorder, relied only on the
information fed by petitioner. This was admitted
by petitioner in his petition for review on certiorari and
memorandum filed in this Court. Furthermore,
as already stated, the report also failed to
identify the root cause of respondent's narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the
inception of the marriage.
Although there is no requirement that a party to be
declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or a
psychologist (as a condition sine qua non), there
is
nevertheless still a need to prove the
psychological incapacity
through independent evidence adduced by the person
alleging said disorder.[16]
In the case at bar, petitioner was able to establish that
respondent was remiss in her duties as a
wife and had become a happy-go-lucky woman who
failed to attend to her husband's needs and
who eventually abandoned him. However, the totality of
her acts, as testified to by petitioner and his
brother, was not tantamount to a psychological
incapacity, as petitioner would have us believe.
Habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure or refusal to
meet one's duties and responsibilities as a
married person and eventual abandonment of a spouse
do not suffice to nullify a marriage on the
basis of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be
due to some psychological (as opposed to
physical) illness.
Petition is denied and CA decision affirmed
FULLTEXT:
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64. Ting v. Velez-Ting, GR 166562 (2009)
CASE DIGEST:
Ting vs Ting
BENJAMIN G. TING,
Petitioner,
- versus -
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 166562
March 31, 2009
Facts:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972
while they were classmates in medical school. They fell in
love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City
when respondent was already pregnant with their first
child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more
than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child
was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition
before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only
became manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological
incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his
family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his
excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which
Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice
and the property he inherited from his father in order to
pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay
the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by
his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to
his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically
incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable
person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out
that it was he who often comforted and took care of their
children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends
twice a week. Both presented expert witnesses
(psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in
favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and
void.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s
decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied
to this case
Issues:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when
it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the
Santos and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the
requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized,
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void is in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Held:
1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal
guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be
applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of
stare decisis is no longer new.
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be
treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically
unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from
such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
Fulltext:
X_____________________________________X
65. Te v. Yu-Te, GR 116607 (2009)
Case digest:
Te v. Te , GR 161793 February 13, 2009
ARTICLE 36 OF FAMILY CODE
FACTS:
On January 1996 Edward Kenneth Ngo Te a sophomore
met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te a freshman in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in
their college. They developed a certain degree of
closeness towards each other. On March 1996, Rowena
asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused but
Rowena’s persistence made him relent. They left Manila
and went to Cebu that month. Edwards money lasted for
only a month and they could not find a job. On April
1996, they returned to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her
uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his
family was away, Rowena threathened him that she
would commit suicide, Edward go to Rowena’s house. On
April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court
to get married. The couple continued to stay at Rowena’s
uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisoner
and was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. After a
month, Edward escaped from the house and stayed with
his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena. On
June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena and told
her that they should live with his parents but she said
that it was better for them to live separate lives. On
January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the RTC
of Quezon City, for the annulment of his marriage to
Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological
incapacity. On July 30, 2001, the trial court rendered the
marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that
both parties were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. On review,
the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s
court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and
relied only on the information provided by petitioner. In
sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements
stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Because of dissatisfaction, petitioner filed before the SC
the instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited
that the trial court declared the marriage void, not only
because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but
rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. He
also pointed out that there is no requirement for the
psychologist to personally examine respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Yes. The psychologist who provided expert testimony
found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Edward’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification
of dependent personality disorder, and Rowena’s, that of
the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
There is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by
a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and
incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus,
declared null and void.
FULLTEXT
X__________________________________x
66. Ochosa v. Alano, GR 167459 (2011)
Case digest:
Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the onset
of their marriage on October 27, 1973, when Jose was
assigned in various parts of the country as an officer in
the AFP. She continued her infidelity even when they
lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime in
1985, whenever Jose was out of their living quarters.
In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for
rebellion for the alleged participation of the failed coup
d’etat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona getting
caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin.
He got a military pass from his jail warden and
confronted Bona about the rumors, which she and
Gagarin admitted. Since then they were separated, and
their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in
Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose.
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between him and Bona
J. Alano, based on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations of
marriage.
Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses,
testified and submitted a psychological evaluation report
on Bona’s mental state. The interviews she had with Jose
and two of his witnesses brought her to the conclusion
that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality
disorder, and it was traceable to her family history.
On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial
court declared the marriage of Jose and Bona void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity of the
respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
Court finds that Bona’s illness exhibited gravity,
antecedence, and incurability.
OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA
subsequently granted the appeal and reversed the ruling
of the trial court decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Ruling:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her
defects were already present at the inception of, or prior
to, the marriage. Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity
did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of “juridical
antecedence”. Her persistent sexual infidelity and
abandonment are not badges of psychological incapacity
nor can’t it be traced to the inception of their marriage.
The psychiatrist’s conclusion about Bona’s HPD which
made her prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity
existed before her marriage to Jose, cannot be taken as
credible proof of antecedence since the method by which
such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired
in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in
determining psychological incapacity.
Dr. Rondain’s conclusion was based solely on the
assumed truthful knowledge of Jose. No other witness
testified to Bona’s family history or her behavior prior to
or at the beginning of their marriage. The two witnesses
only started to live with them in 1980 and 1986,
respectively.
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological
condition directly from the information gathered solely
from Jose and his witnesses. These factual circumstances
evoke the possibility that the information fed to the
psychiatrists is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the
absence of sufficient corroboration.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. These marital obligations are those
provided under Article 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.
Fulltext
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67. Baccay v. Baccay, GR 173138 (2013)
Case digest: BACCAY VS BACCAY AND REPUBLIC, G.R. NO.
173138
Posted by kaye lee on 7:04 PM
G.R. No. 173138
Baccay vs Baccay and Republic
FACTS:
Noel and Maribel were sweethearts. He found Maribel's
snobbish and hard-to get traits attractive.
Around 1997, he decided to break up with Maribel
because he was already involved with another woman.
They agreed to see each other on a friendly basis but the
two had several romantic episodes.
In November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was
pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel
grudgingly married Maribel. The two lived on Noel's
family. Maribel remained aloof and didn't contribute to
his family's coffer. She refused to have sex with him.
Sometime in 1999, Noel and Maribel had an intense
quarrel about Maribel's alleged miscarriage causing the
latter to leave the house and never came back.
Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
with the RTC of Manila. RTC declared the marriage null
and void on the ground of Maribel's alleged psychological
incapacity. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist who
presented as Noel's witness, found Maribel unable to
perform the essential marital obligations of marriage due
to a Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Noel and Maribel
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
No. Noel failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain a
finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated.
Noel's evidence merely established that Maribel refused
to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage,
and that she left him after their quarrel when he
confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. The
psychologist failed to establish that Maribel's alleged
Narcissistic Personality Disorder incapacitated her from
validly assuming the essential obligations of the
marriage. The same psychologist even testified that
Maribel was capable of entering into marriage except
that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere
difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity
contemplated under the Article 36 of the Family Code.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is
not a null and void marriage.
68. Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador, GR
170729 (2010)
Case digest :
AGRAVIADOR V. AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR
G.R. No. 170729, [December 8, 2010]
DOCTRINE/RULING:
The court held that both Enrique’s court testimony, as
well as Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short
in proving that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties.
FACTS:
Petitioner Enrique Agraviador y Alunan
(Enrique)challenges the resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which reversed the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) MuntinlupaCity, declaring the
marriage of the petitioner and respondent Erlinda
Amparo-Agraviador (Erlinda) null and void on the ground
of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
In 1971, Enrique, then a security guard, first met Erlinda
at a beerhouse where the latter worked, and later on
became sweethearts after courtship. They soon entered
into a common-law relationship, but later contracted
marriage in 1973, whereby they begot four children.
Enrique’s family, however, expressed their
apprehensions because Erlinda came from a broken
family and because of the nature of her work.
In 2001, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage on the basis of respondent’s
psychological incapacity, alleging that she was carefree
and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores
like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house
for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did
not take care of their sick child to the point of his death;
consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate;
and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her
activities. He also claimed that she refused to have sex
with him because she became very close to a male border
of their house, and even caught their love notes and
trysts. However, because the root cause of her
psychological incapacity was not medically identified and
alleged in the petition, motion was denied. The
petitioner, thus, presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to substantiate his claims through the
psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac,
who claimed that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality
Disorder (Mixed Personality Disorder). She was said to
been having this disorder since her adolescence, with no
definite treatment for her disorder.
ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage
to the respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
HELD:
No, the totality of evidence presented failed to establish
the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
RATIO:
The court held that both Enrique’s court testimony,as Case digest:
well as Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short
in proving that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties.
First, petitioner’s claims should be distinguished from the
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect,” in the
performance of some marital obligations that
characterize some marriages to the level of psychological
incapacity that the law requires. He merely showed that
Erlinda had some personality defects that showed their
manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely
lacked details necessary to establish that the
respondent’s defects existed at the inception of the
marriage. His claims that Erlinda “does not accept her
fault,” “does not want to change,” and “refused to
reform” are insufficient to establish a psychological or
mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.

Second, Dr. Patac failed to clarify the circumstances that

led the respondent to act the way she did in her attempt
to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondent’s
condition. The report that he submit likewise failed to
prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondent’s
condition, as his enumeration of the respondent’s
purported behavioural defects (as related to him by third
persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent
to be suffering from mixed personality disorder deemed
insufficient. There was no other statement regarding the
degree of severity of the respondent’s condition, why
and to what extent the disorder is grave, and how it
incapacitated her to comply with the duties required in
marriage. The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise
failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the
conclusion that the respondent’s personality disorder
had “no definite treatment.” It did not discuss the
concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its
classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to
show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited
this disorder in order to create a necessary inference that
the respondent’s condition had no definite treatment or
is incurable.

Fulltext:

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69. Calderon v. Roxas, GR 185595 (2013)

[support pendent lite, pending PI]