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the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan on June 10, 1991, the respondents Rosario
Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang asserted
their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners Nora
B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two
marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother
Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this marriage, their
parents acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from their maternal
grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession
of the land, however, their parents failed to register the same. On June 7,
1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion
Silverio.
Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who
then gave birth to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Rolando
Calalang. According to the respondents, it was only during this time that
Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land
with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such
application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the land since
1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children with his first
spouse.
Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan
respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 on two grounds. First,
the respondents argued that the sale of the land was void because Pedro
Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the respondents who were co-
owners of the same. As compulsory heirs upon the death of Encarnacion
Silverio, the respondents claimed that they acquired successional rights
over the land. Thus, in alienating the land without their consent, Pedro
Calalang allegedly deprived them of their pro indiviso share in the
property. Second, the respondents claimed that the sale was absolutely
simulated as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan did not have the capacity to pay for
the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale.
whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed property
prior to its transfer to his daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
records are bereft of any concrete proof to show that the subject property
indeed belonged to respondents’ maternal grandparents. The evidence
respondents adduced merely consisted of testimonial evidence such as the
declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on the
Calalang v Calalang-Garcia property as far as she can remember and that the property was acquired
by her parents through purchase from her maternal Art 886
grandparents. However, she was unable to produce any document to
evidence the said sale, nor was she able to present any documentary Spouses Joaquin v CA
evidence such as the tax declaration issued in the name of either of her Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the
parents. Moreover, we note that the free patent was issued solely in the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of
name of Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more than 30 years after the defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all
death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this action
gains of the first marriage. Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents’ by their respective spouses.
submission that the subject property originally belonged to the parents of Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of
Encarnacion and was acquired by Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion. real property executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and
We likewise cannot sustain the argument of the petitioners that the Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the
disputed property belongs to the conjugal partnership of the second corresponding certificates of title issued in their names
marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang on the ground that the plaintiffs-appellants, like their defendant brothers and sisters, are
title was issued in the name of “Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba compulsory heirs of defendant spouses, Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana
[Calalang]. merely describes the civil status and identifies the spouse of the Landrito, who are their parents. However, their right to the properties of
registered owner Pedro Calalang. Evidently, this does not mean that the their defendant parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests
property is conjugal. only upon the latters death. While still alive, defendant parents are free to
in his application for free patent,16 applicant Pedro Calalang averred that dispose of their properties, provided that such dispositions are not made
the land was first occupied and cultivated by him since 1935 and that he in fraud of creditors.
had planted mango trees, coconut plants, caimito trees, banana plants and Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in
seasonal crops and built his house on the subject lot. But he applied for question. Neither do they claim to be creditors of their defendant parents.
free patent only in 1974 and was issued a free patent while already Consequently, they cannot be considered as real parties in interest to
married to Elvira B. Calalang. Thus, having possessed the subject land in assail the validity of said deeds either for gross inadequacy or lack of
the manner and for the period required by law after the dissolution of the consideration or for failure to express the true intent of the parties. –
first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject property ipso Hence not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or
jure became private property and formed part of Pedro Calalang’s subsidiarily bound thereby; hence, they have no legal capacity to challenge
exclusive property.17 It was therefore excluded from the conjugal their validity.
partnership of gains of the second marriage.
only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs Manonongsong v Estimo
acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso Allegedly, AgatonaGuevarra (“Guevarra”) inherited a property from
shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, Justina Navarro, which is now under possession of the heirs of Guevarra.
the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Guevarra had six children, one of them is Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner
Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was Milagros Lopez Manongsong (“Manongsong”). The respondents, the Jumaquio
fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an sisters and Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was actually sold to them
inofficious donation inter vivos), the respondents have no right to question by Justina Navarro prior to her death. The respondents presented deed of sale
the sale dated October 11, 1957. Milagros and CarlitoManongsong (“petitioners”) filed a
Complaint on June 19, 1992 praying for the partition and award to them of an
area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5), by right of representation. The RTC ruled
that the conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the
property conveyed had a conjugal character and that AgatonaGuevarra as her
compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the distribution
of the estate under question to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did not According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.
at all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has
no force and effect against AgatonaGuevarra and should be declared a nullity ab Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John. – Yes
initio.
The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a
alleged sale of the property by Justina. - NO dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority.
Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner,
sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When John’s sole remaining beneficiary.
the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the
estate but merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced Art 854
by the equivalent monetary consideration. The Property was sold in 1957 for
P250.00. Reyes v. Barretto-Datu
trial court’s conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is void ab Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died he
initio was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article left his share in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small
160 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the marriage is portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow,
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” The presumption under Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project of partition.
Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property It was approved and the estate was distributed and the shares delivered.
was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she
an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the executed two wills, in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both
conjugal partnership. There was no evidence presented to establish surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and
that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage. left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was
allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso
Bartolome v SSS Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that Salud was
not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same.
was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a
(ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of
time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion,
filed a claim for death benefits. thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other
considered as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and
Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly
beneficiary, not petitioner.
attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee
the court based thereon as well. as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other
persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled
W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.
Salud did not acquire valid title to it.
Nuguid v Nuguid
NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano
Barretto’s last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the
partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was
believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void. The
legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of
heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the
fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude
her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano
Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever
he chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of
Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of
Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father’s will a share smaller
than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here
no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir.
Aznar v Duncan
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared
that Helen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. The Court of First
Instance equally divided the properties of the estate of Christensen between
Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly recognized in his will as his daughter)
and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was preterited in
the will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and the
properties passed to both of them as if the deceased died intestate.
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or
whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to
the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of
the entire estate.
Acain v CA