G.R. No.

79167 May 7, 1992

THE HEIRS OF PROCESO BAUTISTA represented by PEDRO BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES SEVERO BARZA and ESTER P. BARZA, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Miguel and Valenson Law Offices for petitioners.
Rogelio A. Barba and Aguinaldo, Barza & Associates for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
The facts of this case began as far back as 1946, when the Philippines was still a new republic and frontier
lands and bountiful natural resources down south beckoned the adventurous-like Proceso Bautista and
Ester Barza.
It was on October 25, 1946, to be exact, when Proceso Bautista applied for a fishpond permit over a thirty-
hectare parcel of marshy public land located in Sitio Central, Lupon, Davao (Fishpond Application No.
1205). The application was acknowledge on December 12, 1946, by the then Division of Fisheries. Said
application was, however, rejected by the same office on November 9, 1948 because the area applied for
was needed for firewood production as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry. The rejection covered an area
of 49 hectares as against the 30 hectares applied for by Proceso Bautista. 1 Between October 25, 1946
and November 9, 1948, Bautista occupied an area which extended beyond the boundary of the one he had
applied for and introduced improvements thereon. 2
On September 23, 1948, Ester Barza filed a fishpond application covering an area of approximately 14.85
hectares at Sitio Bundas, Lupon, Davao (Fishpond Application. No. 2984). Subsequent investigation
revealed that the portion applied for by Barza overlapped the area originally applied for by Proceso
Bautista. 3
Despite the rejection of his application, Proceso Bautista filed another fishpond application on February 8,
1949 with the Bureau of Fisheries (Fishpond Application No. 3346). The 49 hectares applied for was in Sitio
Bundas instead of Sitio Central. 4
The records of the Bureau of Fisheries further show that while the 14.85 hectares applied for by Barza in
Fishpond Application No. 2984 had been released by the Bureau of Forestry as available for fishpond
purposes, the 49 hectares applied for by Bautista in Fishpond Application No. 3346 had not yet been
similarly released by the said bureau. It must be emphasized that the area, including the portion applied for
by Barza had been greatly improved by Proceso Bautista. 5 As expected, an administrative case involving
the two applicants arose.
On September 19, 1953, the Director of Fisheries ruled in favor of Ester Barza. The dispositive portion 6 of
his order reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Fp. A. No. 2984 of Ester F. Barza should be, as hereby it
is, GIVEN DUE COURSE, subject however to the reimbursement of the amounts of
improvements in the area to Proceso Bautista within a period of sixty days from the date
hereof, the said amounts to be appraised and determined by the District Fishery Officer at
Davao City; and Fp. A. No. 3346 of Proceso Bautista should be, as hereby it is, REJECTED.
SO ORDERED.
Bautista appealed the said order to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR Case No.
836). In a decision dated April 28, 1954, the Secretary, through Undersecretary Jaime M. Ferrer, dismissed
the appeal and affirmed in toto the order of the Director of Fisheries giving due course to the fishpond
application of Barza. 7Bautista moved for reconsideration but the same was denied on October 8, 1954. 8
It was not until February 2, 1955, that the Director of Fisheries, in pursuance of the order of September 19, 1953, required Ester Barza to remit the amount of
P3,391.34 which represented the value of the improvements introduced by Bautista. 9 This figure was protested by Mrs. Barza in her letter dated March 6, 1955
where she expressed her willingness to pay the amount of P1,763.31 only. On April 18, 1955, the Director of Fisheries advised her to remit a reappraised amount
of P2,263.33. Subsequent reappraisals on the value of the improvements became necessary in view of Bautista's claim that the improvements were worth
P14,000. 10
Meanwhile, since the parties could not agree on the amount of reimbursement, on October 13, 1956,
Bautista moved for the rejection of the fishpond application of Barza in view of her non-compliance with the
order of the Director of Fisheries dated September 19, 1953 mandating Barza's deposit of the value of the
improvements. 11Bautista appealed to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who, in his
decision dated May 5, 1959 denied Bautista's appeal thereby enforcing the Director of Fisheries order of
September 19, 1953. 12
On October 19, 1960, Jose Montilla, Assistant Director of Fisheries, ordered Ester Barza by letter to
reimburse Bautista P1,789.18, the total value of the improvements pursuant to the appraisal report of
District Fishery Officer Crispin Mondragon dated October 31, 1958. 13 On December 22, 1960, Barza,
agreeing to said appraisal, consigned the sum of P1,789.18 with the then Justice of the Peace of Lupon,
Davao. 14 Bautista, however, refused to accept the same. On July 11, 1961, another reappraisal of the
improvements was made establishing the value of the dikes, dams, trees and houses in the area involved
to be P14,569.08. 15 On December 12, 1962, this amount was reduced to P9,514.33 in view of the finding
that certain improvements were suitable for agricultural and not for fishpond purposes. 16 In the meantime,
the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated May 5, 1959 became final. 17
More than seven years after the last reappraisal of the improvements or on December 12, 1968, Ester
Barza and her husband, Engr. Severo M. Barza, filed in the then Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental,
an action against Bautista praying for recovery of possession over the 14.85-hectare fishpond area she had
applied for, a declaration of the validity of the consignation made before the Justice of the Peace of Lupon,
and damages and attorney's fees.
On January 30, 1971, while the case was pending resolution, Proceso Bautista died. 18 Consequently, his
heirs were substituted as party defendants.
The lower court at first dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction but later, it reconsidered the
dismissal. 19 After a protracted trial, on November 15, 1983, the Regional Trial Court of Davao
Oriental, 20 rendered a decision 21 in favor of defendant Bautista. While disagreeing with the Bautistas that
the priority rule in applications for permits was inapplicable because Proceso Bautista's application was
made before the area was declared available for fishpond purposes, the lower court ruled that the Barzas
had not acquired a vested right to possess the areas concerned as they had not complied with the
"condition precedent" to such possession –– the reimbursement of the value of the improvements made by
Bautista. Hence, the court ruled, it was premature for the Barzas to demand possession of the area.
On whether the action for recovery of possession had prescribed, 22 the lower court said:
. . . Besides, a review of the established facts and circumstances would show that Proceso
Bautista started to possess the property adversely as early as 1946. It was only on
September 23, 1948 when Ester Barza filed her application and protested Bautista's entry.
Under Article 2253 of the New Civil Code, "the Civil Code of 1899 and other previous laws
shall govern rights originating, under said laws, from acts done or events which took place
under their regime, even though this Code may regulate them in a different manner or may
not recognize them." Prescription therefore which started prior to the effectivity of the New
Civil Code on August 30, 1950 should be governed by the law prior to the effectivity of the
New Civil Code, which was the Code of Civil Procedure, under which the action of recovery
of (possession) prescribed within ten (10) years. In this case, the adverse possession of
Proceso Bautista which could be a basis for prescription was interrupted with the filing of the
application of Ester Barza and her protest against the acts of the former which she lodged
with the Bureau of Fisheries in 1948. When the decision of the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources dated May 5, 1959 became final on July 4, 1959 as per Exhibit "D"
and as in fact admitted by the parties, the said prescription by adverse possession
continued (sic). This is clear from the provision of Art. 1123 of the New Civil Code which
provides that civil interruption of possession for the purpose of prescription is produced by
the judicial summons to the possessor which, in the conflict between the parties, took the
form of the fishpond application and the protest filed by Ester Barza with the Bureau of
Fisheries in 1948. From July 4, 1959 to December 12, 1968, a period of more than nine (9)
years elapsed, and as the same should be tacked with the period of almost two (2) years
which elapsed from 1946 to 1948, when Proceso Bautista started to adversely possess the
 area and when, on September 23, 1948, Ester Barza filed her application, more than ten
(10) years had expired and therefore by reason of prescription, the recovery of possession
is also barred.
Emphasizing that Barza's failure to reimburse Bautista for the improvements introduced on the area was
inconsistent with good faith, the lower court held that the order of the Director of Fisheries giving due
course to her fishpond application and the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
"had all become stale." Moreover, the consignation of the amount of P1,789.18 was illegal as it was not in
accordance with Art. 1258 of the New Civil Code and, the court added, Barza's failure to pay the sum
required of her and to file the necessary action within ten years was tantamount to a non-user of her rights
under the September 19, 1953 order of the Director of Fisheries. Citing by analogy Art. 506 of the Civil
Code providing that the right to make use of public waters is extinguished by the lapse of the concession
and by non-user for five (5) years, the lower court held that the cancellation of Barza's application, as
recommended by Fishery Product Examiner Abdul Bakir, was proper.
On the other hand, the lower court ruled that Bautista's right to retain possession over his improvements
was implied by the order of September 19, 1953 while Barza's failure to pay the value of the improvements
was "unfair and unsporting" and violative of Art. 19 of the New Civil Code. The lower court believed that
P9,514.33 was the "right amount" that Barza should have properly consigned. The dispositive portion of the
decision 23 reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs, dismissing the complaint and the plaintiffs are hereby directed to pay defendants
the sum of P10,000 by way of litigation expenses and P10,000 by way of attorney's fees
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The Barzas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On June 30, 1986 said court reversed the decision of the
lower court. 24 It interpreted the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as an
"official imprimatur" on the application of Barza and as an implication that Bautista had no right to continue
possession over the 49 hectares covered by Fishpond Application No. 3346.
While stating that consignation in an action for recovery of possession of realty is not required by law and
that the reimbursement of the value of the improvements is not an obligation, the appellate court
nonetheless held that the consignation of P1,789.18 was "proper and effective." 25 It found that Bautista
was not a possessor in good faith nor a planter in good faith because he filed Fishpond Application No.
3346 after Barza had filed Fishpond Application No. 2984. It concluded that Bautista's claim to prescriptive
rights, acquired or vested, did not arise "because it infringe(d) on the rights of other(s) like Barza whose
Fishpond Application No. 2984 was given due course by the proper officials of the government." 26 It
disposed of the case as follows:
Wherefore, the decision a quo is hereby set aside and reversed and another one is
rendered ordering the heirs of Proceso Bautista to accept or withdraw the sum of P1,789.18
from the Municipal Trial Court Lupon, Davao Oriental (formerly Municipal Court of Lupon,
Davao Oriental) representing the value of the improvements introduced on the controverted
area and to surrender possession of the contested area to the heirs of Ester Barza both
within 10 days from receipt of the entry of judgment. No damages and cost.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 55)
On July 29, 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but
the same was denied on June 18, 1987. 27
Hence, this recourse. Petitioners contend that the private respondents cannot be given the right to possess
the fishpond in question as they themselves did not comply with the Director of Fisheries' order to
reimburse Bautista for the improvements thereon. They assert that whatever rights the Barzas had under
their fishpond application had become stale by non-user.
At the outset, it should be remembered that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable or
alienable, neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or
otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing purposes, fishpond
leases and other modes of utilization. 28 On October 25, 1946 when Bautista filed Fishpond Application No.
1205, the area applied for could not yet be granted to him as it was yet to be released for public utilization.
The situation, however, changed when Barza filed Fishpond Application No. 2984 for the area had, by then,
been opened for fishpond purposes.
Thus, even if Bautista were ahead of Barza by two years in terms of occupation, possession and
introduction of substantial improvements, he was not placed in a better position than Barza. The priority
rule under Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 applies only to public lands already released by the
Bureau of Fisheries. Until such lands had been properly declared available for fishpond purposes, any
application is ineffective because there is no disposable land to speak of. 29 Accordingly, Bautista's
application was premature and the ruling of the Director of Fisheries on this matter was, therefore, correct.
Although in administrative decision does not necessarily bind us, it is entitled to great weight and respect. It
should be stressed that the function of administering and disposing of lands of the public domain in the
manner prescribed by law is not entrusted to the courts but to executive officials. 30 Matters involved in the
grant, cancellation, reinstatement and revision of fishpond licenses and permits are vested under the
executive supervision of the appropriate department head who in this case is the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. As such, his discretion must be respected in the absence of a clear showing of
abuse. 31 This is in consonance with our well settled ruling that administrative decisions on matters within
the jurisdiction of the executive department can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of jurisdiction,
fraud or error of law. 32 As earlier noted, and there being no motion for its reconsideration, the decision of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources become final on July 3, 1959, thirty (30) days from
receipt by the parties of copies of the decision. 33
Petitioners' contention that the action for recovery of possession had prescribed when the Barzas filed it on
December 12, 1968 is erroneous for it was filed within the ten-year period for enforcing a judgment, which
in this case is the May 5, 1959 decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
as provided for in Art. 1144 of the Civil Code. Hence, the ultimate issue in this case is whether or not the
Barzas may rightfully seek enforcement of the decision of the Director of Fisheries and that of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, notwithstanding their refusal to reimburse the Bautistas for the
improvements in the area. We find that the peculiar circumstances of this case compel as to rule in the
affirmative.
Although Bautista was in possession of the area for quite a number of years, he ceased to become a bona
fidepossessor upon receipt of the decision of the Director of Fisheries granting due course to Barza's
fishpond application. Under Art. 528 of the Civil Code, "(p)ossession acquired in good faith does not lose its
character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not
unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully." Thus, Bautista should have desisted from
introducing improvements on the property when he learned that Barza's application had been approved.
However, Bautista may not be solely faulted for holding on to the area notwithstanding that he had no right
over it. The Barzas, after receiving the administrative decision in their favor, should have complied with its
directive to reimburse the Bautistas for the improvements introduced thereon. This is not to say; however,
that such failure to abide by the decision of the Director of Fisheries rendered "stale" the said decision.
There is also the established fact that Bautista refused the payments tendered by the Barzas. However, the
Barzas' failure to question the last reappraisal of the improvements constituted inaction on their part, for
which they should bear its consequences.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that
the petitioners shall be REIMBURSED the amount of P9,514.33 (inclusive of the consigned amount of
P1,789.18) with legal interest from December 12, 1962 until fully paid. Upon payment of said
reimbursement, the Bautistas shall SURRENDER possession of the 14.85 hectares, including the
improvements thereon, for which the Barzas had been granted the right to operate as fishpond. This
decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO, FLORENCIO T. CASTILLO, SOLEDAD LOTA CASTILLO, CARLOS
L. CASTILLO, NIEVES KATIGBAK CASTILLO, MARIANO L. CASTILLO, HIPOLITA DYTIAPCO
CASTILLO, AIDA CASTILLO HERRERA, HERMITO HERRERA, JOSE L. CASTILLO, LILIA MACEDA
CASTILLO, TERESITA L. CASTILLO, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATANGAS and THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
Castro, Nardo, Quintanilla, Gonzales & Macatangay Law Office for respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the April 26, 1984 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * reversing the February 6, 1976 Decision of the
then Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, in Civil Case No. 2044.

The antecedental facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as follows:
Sometime in 1951, the late Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of
land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas, described in Plan Psu-119166,
with a total area of 39,755 square meters. In a decision dated August 31, 1951, the said
Modesto Castillo, married to Amanda Lat, was declared the true and absolute owner of the
land with the improvements thereon, for which Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 was,
issued to him by the Register of Deeds at Batangas, Batangas, on February 7, 1952. By
virtue of an instrument dated March 18, 1960, the said Lots 1 and 2 covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-665, together with Lot No. 12374 covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 3254-A and Lot No. 12377 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3251-A,
were consolidated and sub-divided into Lots 1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. After the death of
Modesto Castillo, or on August 31, 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., executed a
deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a
result of which Original Certificate of Title No. D-665 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new
transfer cerfificates of title were issued to Florencio Castillo, et al., to wit: Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 21703 (Lot 4) (and) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21704 to Florencio Castillo
(Lot 5); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21708 to Carlos L. Castillo (Lot 7); Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-21712 to Mariano L. Castillo (Lot 6); Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-21713 to Jose L. Castillo (Lot 9); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21718 to Aida C.
Herrera (Lot 2); and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21727 to Teresita L. Castillo (Lot 8).
The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower court for the
annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et
al., as heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands covered
thereby (Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State. It was alleged that said lands had always
formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof, and being of
public ownership, it could not be the subject of registration as private property. Appellants
herein, defendants below, alleged in their answer that the Government's action was already
barred by the decision of the registration court; that the action has prescribed; and that the
government was estopped from questioning the ownership and possession of appellants.
After trial, the then Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, presided over by Honorable Benjamin
Relova, in a Decision dated February 6, 1976 (Record on Appeal, pp. 62-69), ruled in favor of herein
petitioner Republic of the Philippines. The decretal portion of the said decision, reads:
 WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Batangas is hereby ordered to cancel Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-665 in the name of Modesto Castillo and the subsequent Transfer
of Certificates of Title issued over the property in the names of the defendants. Lots Nos. 1
and 2 of Plan Psu-19166 are hereby declared public lands belonging to the state. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, in a Decision promulgated on April 26,1984, reversed and set aside the
appealed decision, and dismissed the complaint (Record, pp. 31-41). Herein petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (Record, pp. 42-51), but the same was denied in a Resolution promulgated on October
12,1984 (Record, p. 52). Hence, the instant petition.
The sole issue raised in this case is whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court involving
shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
There is no question that one of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the final judgment
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter (Ramos v. Pablo, 146 SCRA 24 [1986]; that shores are
properties of the public domain intended for public use (Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not
registrable. Thus, it has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters and
beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into
properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant (Republic v. Ayala y Cia, 14 SCRA, 259
[1965], citing the cases of Dizon, et al. v. Bayona, et al., 98 Phil. 943; and Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al.,
13 SCRA 704).
But an important bone of contention is the nature of the lands involved in this case.
Petitioner contends "that "Lots 1 and 2, PSU-119166 had always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and
inundated by the waters thereof. Consequently, the same were not subject to registration, being outside the
commerce of men; and that since the lots in litigation are of public domain (Art. 502), par. 4 Civil Code) the
registration court (of 1951) did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands as private property, hence, res
judicata does not apply. (Rollo, pp. 37-38).
The Government presented both oral and documentary evidence.
As summarized by the Intermediate Appelate Court (now Court of Appeals), the testimonies of the
witnesses for the petitioner are as follows:
1. Rosendo Arcenas, a Geodetic Engineer connected with the Bureau of Lands since 1961,
testified to the effect that Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166, which are the lots in question, adjoin
the cadastral survey of Tanauan, Batangas (Cad. 168); that the original boundary of the
original cadastral survey was foreshore land as indicated on the plan; that the cadastral
survey of Tanauan was executed sometime in 1923; that the first survey executed of the
land after 1923 was the one executed in 1948 under Plan Psu-119166 that in the relocation
survey of the disputed lots in 1962 under SWO-40601, said lots were annotated on the plan
as claimed by the Republic of the Philippines in the same manner that it was so annotated
in Plan Psu-119166; thus showing that the Government was the only claimant of the land
during the survey in 1948; that during the relocation survey made in 1962, old points cannot
be Identified or located because they were under water by about forty centimeters; that
during the ocular inspection of the premises on November 23, 1970, he found that 2
monuments of the lots in question were washed out by the waters of the Baloyboy Creek;
that he also found duck pens along the lots in question; that there are houses in the
premises as well as some camotes and bananas; and that he found also some shells
('suso') along the banks of the Taal lake (Tsn, Nov. 16, 1970, pp. 13-21; Feb. 16, 1971, pp.
4-36).
2. Braulio Almendral testified to the effect that he is a resident of Tanauan, Batangas, near
the Taal lake; that like himself there are other occupants of the land among whom are
Atanacio Tironas, Gavino Mendoza, Juliano Tirones, Agapito Llarena, etc.; that it was they
who filled up the area to make it habitable; that they filled up the area with shells and sand;
that their occupation is duck raising; and that the Castillos never stayed in or occupied the
premises (Tsn, Nov. 16, 1970, pp. 32-50).
 3. Arsenio Ibay, a Geodetic Engineer connected with the Bureau of Lands since 1968, also
testified to the effect that in accordance with the cadastral plan of Tanauan, the only private
claim of Sixto Castillo referred to Lots 1006 to 1008; that the Castillos never asserted any
private claim to the lots in question during the cadastral survey;' that in the preparation of
plan Psu-119166, Lots 12374 and 12377 were made as reference to conform to previously
approved plans; that lot 12374 is a portion of cadastral lot 10107, SWO-86738 while Lot
22377 is a portion of Lot 10108 of the same plan (Tsn, Nov. 25, 1970, pp. 115-137).
4. Jose Isidro, a Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, testified to the effect that
pursuant to the order of the Director of Lands, he, together with Engineer Rufino Santiago
and the barrio captain of Tanauan, Batangas, conducted an investigation of the land in
question; that he submitted a report of investigation, dated October 19, 1970 (Exh. H-1);
that portions of the lot in question were covered by public land applications filed by the
occupants thereof; that Engineer Santiago also submitted a report (Exh. H-8); that he had
notified Dr. Mariano Castillo before conducting the investigation (Tsn, Nov. 25,1970, pp.
137-162).
5. Rufino Santiago, another Geodetic Engineer connected with the Bureau of Lands,
testified to the effect that on October 19,1970, he submitted a report of investigation
regarding the land in question; that he noted on the plan Exhibit H-9 the areas on which the
houses of Severo Alcantara and others were built; that he found that the land was planted to
coconuts which are about 15 years old; that the land is likewise improved with rice paddies;
that the occupants thereof are duck raisers; that the area had been elevated because of the
waste matters and duck feeds that have accumulated on the ground through the years (Tsn,
Nov. 26,1970, pp. 163-196).
6. Pablo Tapia, Barrio Captain of Tanauan, Batangas, since 1957, testified to the effect that
the actual occupants of Lots I and 2 are Atanacio Tirones,tc.; that during the war the water
line reached up to a point marked Exhibit A-9 and at present the water has receded to a
point up to Exhibit A-12; that the reasons why the waters of Taal lake have receded to the
present level is because of the fillings made by the people living in Lots 1 and 2; that there
are several duck pens all over the place; that the composition of the soil is a mixture of mud
and duck feeds; that improvements consist of bananas, bamboos and palay; that the
shoreline is not even in shape because of the Baloyboy Creek; that the people in the area
never came to know about the registration case in which the lots in question were
registered; that the people living in the area, even without any government aid, helped one
another in the construction of irrigated rice paddies; that he helped them file their public land
applications for the portions occupied by them; that the Castillos have never been in
possession of the premises; that the people depend upon duck raising as their means of
their livelihood; that Lots 1 and 2 were yet inexistent during the Japanese occupation; and
that the people started improving the area only during liberation and began to build their
houses thereon. (Tsn, Nov. 26,1970, pp. 197-234).
Among the exhibits formally offered by the Government are: the Original Plan of Tanauan, Batangas,
particularly the Banader Estate, the Original Plan of PSU-119166, Relocation Verification Survey Plan,
maps, and reports of Geodetic Engineers, all showing the original shoreline of the disputed areas and the
fact that the properties in question were under water at the time and are still under water especially during
the rainy season (Hearing, March 17,1971, TSN, pp. 46-47).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that Lots 1 and 2 have always been in the possession of
the Castillo family for more than 76 years and that their possession was public, peaceful, continuous, and
adverse against the whole world and that said lots were not titled during the cadastral survey of Tanauan,
because they were still under water as a result of the eruption of Taal Volcano on May 5, 1911 and that the
inundation of the land in question by the waters of Taal Lake was merely accidental and does not affect
private respondents' ownership and possession thereof pursuant to Article 778 of the Law of Waters. They
finally insisted that this issue of facts had been squarely raised at the hearing of the land registration case
and, therefore, res judicata (Record on Appeal, pp. 63-64). They submitted oral and documentary evidence
in support of their claim.
Also summarized by respondent Appellate Court, the testimonies of the witnesses of private respondents
are as follows:
1. Silvano Reano, testified to the effect that he was the overseer of the property of the late
Modesto Castillo located at Banadero,Tanauan, Batangas since 1944 to 1965; that he also
knows Lots 1 and 2, the parcels of land in question, since he was managing said property;
that the occupants of said Lots 1 and 2 were engaged in duck raising; that those occupants
were paying the Castillos certain amount of money because their animals used to get inside
the lots in question; that he was present during the survey of the land in 1948; and that
aside from the duck pens which are built in the premises, the land is planted to rice (Tsn,
April 14, 1971, pp. 62-88).
2. Dr. Mariano Castillo, testified to the effect that the late Modesto Castillo was a
government official who held high positions in the Government; and that upon his death the
land was subdivided among his legal heirs. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 4-9).
As above-stated, the trial court decided the case in favor of the government but the decision was reversed
on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
A careful study of the merits of their varied contentions readily shows that the evidence for the government
has far outweighed the evidence for the private respondents. Otherwise stated, it has been satisfactorily
established as found by the trial court, that the properties in question were the shorelands of Taal Lake
during the cadastral survey of 1923.
Explaining the first survey of 1923, which showed that Lots 1 and 2 are parts of the Taal Lake, Engineer
Rosendo Arcenas testified as follows:
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
Q Now, you mentioned Engineer that a subject matter of that plan which
appears to be Lots 1 and 2 are adjoining cadastral lots of the Tanauan
Cadastre, now, will you please state to the Court what is the basis of that
statement of yours?
A The basis of that statement is the plan itself, because there is here an
annotation that the boundary on the northeastern side is Tanauan Cadastre
168 which indicates that the boundary of the original cadastral survey of
Tanauan Cadastre way back in the year 1923 adjoins a foreshore land which
is also indicated in this plan as foreshore lands of Taal lake, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, on this plan Exhibit "A-2", there are two lots indicated namely, Lots
12374 and 12377, what do these lots represent?
A This is the cadastral lot executed in favor of a certain Modesto Castillo that
corresponds to Lots 12374 and another Lot 12377, sir.
Q At the time this survey plan Psu-119166 and marked as Exhibit "A-2" was
executed in 1948, were these lots 1 and 2 already in existence as part of the
cadastral survey?
A No, sir, because there is already a foreshore boundary.
Q Do I understand from you Mr. Witness at the time of the survey of this land
these two lots form part of this portion?
A Yes, sir.
Q When again was the cadastral survey of Tanauan, Batangas, executed if
you know?
A In the year 1923, sir. (Hearing of Nov. 16, 1970, TSN pp. 15-17).
Such fact was further verified in the Verification-Relocation Survey of 1948 by Engineer Arcenas who
conducted said survey himself and reported the following:
That as per original plan Psu-119166, it appears that Lot 1 and Lot 2, Psu-119166 surveyed
and approved in the name of Modesto Castillo is a portion of Taal Lake and as such it
appears to be under water during the survey of cadastral Lot No. 12374 and Lot No. 12377,
which was surveyed and approved in the name of Modesto Castillo under Cad. 168. To
support this theory is the annotation appearing and printed along lines 2-3-4-5 of Lot 1, Psu-
119166 and along lines 4-5-6 of Lot 2, Psu-119166 which notations clearly indicates that
such boundary of property was a former shorelines of Taal Lake, in other words, it was the
extent of cultivation being the shorelines and the rest of the area going to the southwestern
direction are already covered by water level.
Another theory to bolster and support this Idea is the actual location now in the verification-
relocation survey of a known geographic point were Barrio Boundary Monument (BBM N.
22) is under water level quite for sometimes as evidence by earthworks (collection of mud)
that amount over its surface by eighty (80) centimeters below the ground, see notation
appearing on verification-relocation plan previously submitted. (Re-Verification-Relocation
Survey Exhibits, pp. 64-65).
Said surveys were further confirmed by the testimonies of witnesses to the effect that from 1950 to 1969,
during rainy season, the water of Taal lake even went beyond the questioned lots; and that the water, which
was about one (1) foot, stayed up to more or less two (2) to three (3) months (Testimonies of Braulio
Almendral and Anastacio Tirones both residents of Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas (Hearing of Nov. 16,
1970, TSN, pp. 41-42 and Hearing of Nov. 23, 1970, TSN, pp. 93, 98-99, respectively). In the Relocation
Survey of 1962, there were no definite boundary or area of Lots 1 and 2 because a certain point is existing
which was under water by 40 centimeters (Testimony of Engineer Arcena, Hearing of Nov. 16,1970, TSN,
p. 20).
Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question must be differentiated from
foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the
ordinary flow of the tides (Castillo, Law on Natural Resources, Fifth Edition, 1954, p. 67).
Such distinction draws importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay,
belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added (Gov't. v. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil.
423) while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for private
ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use (Ignacio v.
Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
But said distinction will not help private respondents because there is no accretion shown to exist in the
case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck
raising filled up the area with shells and sand to make it habitable.
The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, as already ruled by this
Court, mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character
(Cuevas v. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1968]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the April 26,1984 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby
SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the February 6,1976 Decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Batangas is hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
G.R. No. L-66575 May 24, 1988
ADRIANO MANECLANG, JULIETA, RAMONA, VICTOR, ANTONINA, LOURDES, TEODORO and
MYRNA, all surnamed MANECLANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ALFREDO MAZA, CORLETO CASTRO, SALOME
RODRIGUEZ, EDUCARDO CUISON, FERNANDO ZARCILLA, MARIANO GABRIEL, NICOMEDES
CORDERO, CLETO PEDROZO, FELIX SALARY and JOSE PANLILIO, respondents.
Loreto Novisteros for petitioners.
Corleto R. Castro for respondents.
RESOLUTION

FERNAN, J.:
Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et al. filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XI a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond
located within the four [4] parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment of Resolutions Nos. 38 and
95 of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan. The trial court dismmissed the complaint in a decision dated August 15, 1975 upon a finding that the body
of water traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. The lower court likewise held that Resolution No. 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios Salomague
Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution No. 95 authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries, including the fishpond under
consideration, were passed by respondents herein as members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise of their legislative powers.

Petitioners appealed said decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the same on April
29,1983. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Acting on the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment thereon. However, before
respondents could do so, petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the part of respondent Alfredo
Maza, the awardee in the public bidding of the fishpond, the parties desire to amicably settle the case by
submitting to the Court a Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing the
ownership of petitioners over the land the body of water found within their titled properties, stating therein,
among other things, that "to pursue the case, the same will not amount to any benefit of the parties, on the
other hand it is to the advantage and benefit of the municipality if the ownership of the land and the water
found therein belonging to petitioners be recognized in their favor as it is now clear that after the National
Irrigation Administration [NIA] had built the dike around the land, no water gets in or out of the land. 1
The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of an adjudication of
ownership in favor of herein petitioners of the fishpond in dispute, which, as clearly found by the lower and
appellate courts, was originally a creek forming a txibutary of the Agno River. Considering that as held in
the case of Mercado vs. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592 [1934], a creek, defined as a
recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property
belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription,
and as a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual
[Diego v. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil. 494; Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38 Phil. 455]; and considering further
that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which
prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter
or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain, the Court finds the Compromise
Agreement null and void and of no legal effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.
The finding that the subject body of water is a creek belonging to the public domain is a factual
determination binding upon this Court. The Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted
municipal council is clothed with authority to pass, as it did the two resolutions dealing with its municipal
waters, and it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of their right to due process as mere publication
of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a constructive notice to the whole world.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to set aside the Compromise Agreement and declare
the same null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. The Court further resolved to DISMISS
the instant petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 p. 60, Rollo.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. Nos. 175806 and 175810 October 20, 2010

MANUEL ALMAGRO joined by his spouse, ELIZABETH ALMAGRO, Petitioners,
vs.
SALVACION C. KWAN, WILLIAM C. KWAN, VICTORIA C. KWAN, assisted by her husband, JOSE A.
ARBAS, and CECILIA C. KWAN, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 175849
Petitioners,
vs.
WILLIAM C. KWAN, SALVACION C. KWAN, VICTORIA C. KWAN, assisted by her husband, JOSE A.
ARBAS, and CECILIA C. KWAN, Respondents.
MARGARITA PACHORO, DRONICA ORLINA, PIO TUBAT, JR., ANDRES TUBAT, EDUVIGIS KISKIS,
ELSA BIÑALBER, NOELA TUBAT, ELSA TUBAT, and ROGELIO DURAN,
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review,1 assailing the 4 April 2006 Decision2 and the 31
October 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 71237 and 71437.
This case involves Lot No. 6278-M, a 17,181 square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-11397. Lot
No. 6278-M is located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental and is registered in the name of spouses Kwan
Chin and Zosima Sarana. Respondents are the legitimate children of spouses Kwan Chin and Zosima
Sarana, who both died intestate on 2 November 1986 and 23 January 1976, respectively, in Dumaguete
City. Upon the death of their parents, respondents inherited Lot No. 6278-M through hereditary succession.
On 18 September 1996, respondents filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) an action for recovery of
possession and damages against spouses Rogelio and Lourdes Duran, spouses Romulo Vinalver and Elsa
Vinalver,4 spouses Marte5 Bati-on and Liz E. Bati-on, spouses Pablo Deciar and Marlyn Deciar, spouses
Salvador Palongpalong and Bienvenida Palongpalong, spouses Sabas Kiskis and Eduvigis Kiskis, spouses
Pio Tubat, Jr. and Encarnita Tubat, spouses Andres Tubat and Leonides Tubat, spouses George Tubat and
Noela Tubat, spouses Dodong Go and Alice Go, spouses Delano Bangay and Maria Bangay, 6 spouses
Simeon Pachoro and Margarita Pachoro, spouses Cepriano7 Tubat and Elsa Tubat, spouses Jovito
Remolano and Editha Orlina Remolano, spouses Nelson Miravalles and Erlene Miravalles, Dronica
Orlina,8 Clarita Barot Lara, Conchita Orlina, Antonia Malahay and the Philippine National Police
(PNP),9 Agan-an, Sibulan, Negros Oriental. Subsequently, spouses Manuel Almagro and Elizabeth
Almagro intervened as successors-in-interest of spouses Delano Bangay and Maria Bangay.
During pre-trial, the parties agreed to refer the case to the Chief of the Land Management Services
Division, PENRO-DENR, Dumaguete City, to conduct a verification survey of Lot No. 6278-M. When the
PENRO personnel failed to conduct the verification survey, the court and the parties designated Geodetic
Engineer Jorge Suasin, Sr. (Engr. Suasin) as joint commissioner to do the task. Engr. Suasin conducted the
verification and relocation survey of Lot No. 6278-M on 12-13 September 2000 in the presence of the
parties, some of their lawyers, and the MTC Clerk of Court. Thereafter, Engr. Suasin submitted a written
report with the following findings:
WRITTEN REPORT

Comes now, the undersigned Geodetic Engineer Jorge S. Suasin, Sr., to this Honorable Court,
most respectfully submit the following written report of the verification and relocation survey of
the lot 6278-M located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental with T.C.T. No. T-11397 owned by
Salvacion G. Kwan, et al.

A. That a big portion of the lot is submerged under the sea and only a small portion
remain as dry land.

B. That some of the defendants have constructed their buildings or houses inside the
dry land while others have constructed outside or only a small portion of their buildings
or houses are on the said dry land.

The defendants and their buildings or houses are as follows:

1. Sps. Rogelio Duran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inside

2. Sps. Romulo Vinalver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inside
3. Sps. Marto Bati-on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inside
4. Sps. Salvador Palongpalong . . . . . . . . . . . inside
5. Sps. Pablo Deciar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inside
6. Sps. Sabas Kiskis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inside
7. Sps. Pio Tubat, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 houses, the first house a portion,
and the second one - inside
8. Sps. Andres Tubat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inside
9. Sps. George Tubat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . portion
10. Sps. Dodong Go . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inside
11. Sps. Delano Bangay-Almagro . . . . . . . . . portion
12. Sps. Simeon Pachoro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inside
13. Sps. Cipriano Tubat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inside
14. Sps. Jovito Remolano . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . inside
15. Sps. Nelson Miravalles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cottage and house - outside
16. Monica Orlina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cottage inside and house - portion
17. Clarita Barot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . outside
18. Conchita Orlina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . outside
19. Antonia Malahay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . outside
The verification and relocation survey was executed last September 12-13, 2000 with the
 presence of both parties and of the Clerk of Court. The cost of the survey was FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS(P15,000) shouldered by the plaintiffs and the defendants equally.

Enclosed are a blue print of the sketch plan and a xerox copy of the land title of the said lot.

Respectfully submitted by:

(Sgd) JORGE SUASIN, SR.

Geodetic Engineer10

After the court admitted Engr. Suasin's report and the pleadings of the parties, respondents filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, which the MTC granted.
In its Judgment dated 11 May 2001, the MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the remaining dry
portion of Lot No. 6278-M has become foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain. The
MTC explained:
The term "foreshore" refers to that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left
dry by the ordinary flow of the tides. "Foreshore lands" refers to the strip of land that lies between the high
and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The term
"foreshore land" clearly does not include submerged lands.
From these definitions, it is safe to conclude that the remaining dry portion of Lot No. 6278-M is now
"foreshore land." A big portion of the said lot is presently underwater or submerged under the sea. When
the sea moves towards the estate and the tide invades it, the invaded property becomes foreshore land
and passes to the realm of public domain. The subject land, being foreshore land, should therefore be
returned to the public domain. Besides, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 420. The following thin[g]s are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
Plaintiff cannot use the doctrine of indefeasibility of their Torrens title, as property in question is clearly
foreshore land. At the time of its registration, property was along the shores. In fact, it is bounded by the
Tañon Strait on the NW along lines 2-3-4. The property was of public dominion and should not have been
subject of registration. The survey showed that the sea had advanced and the waves permanently invaded
a big portion of the property making the land part of the shore or the beach. The remaining dry land is
foreshore and therefore should be returned to the public domain.11
Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC conducted ocular inspections of Lot
No. 6278-M on two separate dates: on 5 October 2001 during low tide and on 15 October 2001 when the
high tide registered 1.5 meters. All the parties and their lawyers were notified before the two ocular
inspections were conducted. During the ocular inspections, in which some parties and their lawyers were
present, the RTC observed that the small portion referred to by Engr. Suasin as dry land in his report
actually remained dry even during high tide.12 Thus, the RTC concluded that the disputed remaining
portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore land. The RTC stated:
It is the Court's considered view that the small portion of plaintiff's property which remains as dry land is not
within the scope of the well-settled definition of foreshore and foreshore land as mentioned above. For one
thing, the small dry portion is not adjacent to the sea as the term adjacent as defined in Webster's
Dictionary means "contiguous or touching one another or lying next to." Secondly, the small dry portion is
not alternately wet and dry by the ordinary flow of the tides as it is dry land. Granting, as posited by
defendants, that at certain times of the year, said dry portion is reached by the waves, then that is not
anymore caused by the ordinary flow of the tide as contemplated in the above definition. The Court then
finds that the testimony of Engr. Suasin dovetails with the import and meaning of foreshore and foreshore
land as defined above. 1avvphil

Anent the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 639, also cited in the appealed judgment, the
same has a different factual milieu. Said case involves a holder of a free patent on a parcel of land situated
at Pinagtalleran, Caluag, Quezon who mortgaged and leased portions thereof within the prescribed five-
year period from the date of issuance of the patent. It was established in said case that the land subject of
the free patent is five (5) to six (6) feet deep under water during high tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide.
Such is not the situation of the "remaining small dry portion" which plaintiffs seek to recover in the case at
bar.13
On 8 January 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision,14 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all told and circumspectly considered, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and set
aside insofar as it states that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of the property in question.
Plaintiffs-appellants have the right to recover possession of the remaining small dry portion of the subject
property in question. It is further ordered to remand this case to the court of origin for the reception of
further evidence to determine who among the defendants-appellees are builders or possessors in good
faith and who are not and once determined, to apply accordingly the pertinent laws and jurisprudence on
the matter.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its Order16 dated 6 May 2002.
Petitioners filed separate petitions for review with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the disputed portion of
Lot No. 6278-M is no longer private land but has become foreshore land and is now part of the public
domain.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 4 April 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the RTC
Decision. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision17 reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions for review are DENIED. And the Decision dated January 8, 2002 of
Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as
regards the dispositive portion only. Based on the written report of Geodetic Engr. Suasin categorically
indentifying who among herein petitioners are illegally occupying a portion of Lot No. 6278-M, the following
petitioners are ordered to vacate the premises and/or remove the houses and/or cottages
constructed on Lot No. 6278-M within thirty (30) days from finality of judgment, namely: 1)Sps.
Rogelio Duran, 2) Sps. Romulo Vinalver, 3) Sps. Marto Bati-on, 4) Sps. Salvador Palongpalong, 5) Sps.
Pablo Deciar, 6) Sps. Sabas Kiskis, 7) Sps. Pio Tubat, Jr. (first house – portion, second house– inside), 8)
Sps. Andres Tubat, 9) George Tubat (portion), 10) Sps. Dodong Go, 11) Sps. Delano Bangay-Almagro
(portion), 12) Sps. Simeon Pachoro, 13) Sps. Cipriano Tubat, 14) Sps. Jovito Remolano and 15) Monica
Orlina (cottage–inside and house– portion).
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.18
In modifying the RTC Decision, the Court of Appeals explained:
Lastly, the argument that the RTC decision was "vague and indefinite" is utterly bereft of merit. We have
found no reversible error in the appreciation of the facts and in the application of the law by the RTC which
will warrant the reversal of the questioned decision. However, litigation must end and terminate sometime
and somewhere, and it is essential to the administration of justice that the issues or causes therein should
be laid to rest. Hence, in keeping with this principle, We modify the assailed decision insofar as the
dispositive portion is concerned. It is our considered view that there is no longer a need to determine who
among the petitioners are builders in good faith or not considering that it has been established in the MTC
that they knew all along that the subject lot is a titled property. As such, petitioners should vacate and/or
demolish the houses and/or cottages they constructed on Lot No. 6278-M as stated in the written report of
Geodetic Engineer Jorge S. Suasin, Sr. Remanding this case to the court of origin would not only unduly
prolong the resolution of the issues of this case, but would also subject the parties to unnecessary
expenses.19
Hence, these consolidated petitions.
 The Issue
The primary issue in this case is whether the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is still private land or has
become foreshore land which forms part of the public domain.
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petitions without merit.
Petitioners contend that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is already foreshore land. In fact, most of
them allegedly have foreshore lease permits from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) on the said foreshore land.
However, petitioners failed to present evidence to prove their claim that they are holders of foreshore lease
permits from the DENR. Thus, the RTC Order dated 6 May 2002 stated:
Defendants-appellees have been harping that they have been granted foreshore leases by DENR.
However, this is merely lip service and not supported at all by concrete evidence. Not even an iota of
evidence was submitted to the lower court to show that defendants-appellees herein have been granted
foreshore leases.20
Although the MTC concluded that the subject land is foreshore land, we find such conclusion contrary to
the evidence on record.
It is undisputed that the subject land is part of Lot No. 6278-M, which is covered by TCT No. T-11397,
registered in the name of respondents' parents, Kwan Chin and Zosimo Sarana. In fact, as found by the
Court of Appeals, even the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) declared in
May 1996 that Lot No. 6278-M is a private property covered by a Torrens Title and that petitioners should
vacate the disputed property or make other arrangements with respondents.21
Furthermore, from the report of Engr. Suasin, the geodetic engineer designated by the court and the parties
as joint commissioner to conduct the survey, it can be clearly gleaned that the contested land is the small
portion of dry land of Lot No. 6278-M. Even in his testimony, Engr. Suasin was adamant in stating that the
remaining portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore because "it is already dry land" and is "away from
the shoreline."22 Because of this apparent contradiction between the evidence and the conclusion of the
MTC, the RTC conducted ocular inspection twice, during low tide and high tide, and observed that the
disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M actually remained dry land even during high tide. Thus, the RTC
concluded that the said land is not foreshore land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals adopted the findings
and conclusion of the RTC that the disputed land is not foreshore land and that it remains as private land
owned by respondents.
We are in accord with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals and the RTC that the disputed land is not
foreshore land. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high and low
water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. 23 The land's proximity to the
waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land.24
Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Lensico,25 the Court held that although the two corners of the
subject lot adjoins the sea, the lot cannot be considered as foreshore land since it has not been proven that
the lot was covered by water during high tide.
Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed land remained dry even during high tide.
Indeed, all the evidence supports the conclusion that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not
foreshore land but remains private land owned by respondents.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 4 April 2006 Decision and the 31 October 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 71237 and 71437.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
G.R. No. L-15829 December 4, 1967
ROMAN R. SANTOS, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and Communications and JULIAN C.
CARGULLO, respondents-appellants.
Gil R. Carlos and Associates for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
THE APPEAL
The Honorable Secretary of Public Works & Communications appeals from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila declaring of private ownership certain creeks situated in barrio San Esteban,
Macabebe, Pampanga.
THE BACKGROUND
The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned vast track of marshland in the municipality of Macabebe,
Pampanga province. Called Hacienda San Esteban, it was administered and managed by the Ayala y Cia.
From the year 1860 to about the year 1924 Ayala y Cia., devoted the hacienda to the planting and
cultivation of nipa palms from which it gathered nipa sap or "tuba." It operated a distillery plant in barrio San
Esteban to turn nipa tuba into potable alcohol which was in turn manufactured into liquor.
Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda posed as a problem. Ayala y Cia., therefore
dug canals leading towards the hacienda's interior where most of them interlinked with each other. The
canals facilitated the gathering of tuba and the guarding and patrolling of the hacienda by security guards
called "arundines." By the gradual process of erosion these canals acquired the characteristics and
dimensions of rivers.
In 1924 Ayala y Cia shifted from the business of alcohol production to bangus culture. It converted
Hacienda San Esteban from a forest of nipa groves to a web of fishponds. To do so, it cut down the nipa
palm, constructed dikes and closed the canals criss-crossing the hacienda.
Sometime in 1925 or 1926 Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of Hacienda San Esteban to Roman Santos who
also transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In so doing, he closed and built dikes across Sapang
Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi.
The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San Esteban drew complaints from residents of the
surrounding communities. Claiming that the closing of the canals caused floods during the rainy season,
and that it deprived them of their means of transportation and fishing grounds, said residents demanded re-
opening of those canals. Subsequently, Mayor Lazaro Yambao of Macabebe, accompanied by policemen
and some residents went to Hacienda San Esteban and opened the closure dikes at Sapang Malauling
Maragul Nigui and Quiñorang Silab. Whereupon, Roman Santos filed Civil Case No. 4488 in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga which preliminarily enjoined Mayor Yambao and others from demolishing the
dikes across the canals. The municipal officials of Macabebe countered by filing a complaint (docketed as
Civil Case No. 4527) in the same court. The Pampanga Court of First Instance rendered judgment in both
cases against Roman Santos who immediately elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
In the meantime, the Secretary of Commerce and Communications1 conducted his own investigation and
found that the aforementioned six streams closed by Roman Santos were natural, floatable and navigable
and were utilized by the public for transportation since time immemorial. He consequently ordered Roman
Santos on November 3, 1930 to demolish the dikes across said six streams. However, on May 8, 1931 the
said official revoked his decision of November 3, 1930 and declared the streams in question privately
owned because they were artificially constructed. Subsequently, upon authority granted under Act 3982 the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications entered into a contract with Roman Santos whereby the
former recognized the private ownership of Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Pepangebunan,
Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi and the latter turned over for public use two artificial canals and bound himself to
maintain them in navigable state. The Provincial Board of Pampanga and the municipal councils of
Macabebe and Masantol objected to the contract. However, the Secretary of Justice, in his opinion dated
March 6, 1934, upheld its legality. Roman Santos withdraw his appeals in the Supreme Court.
With respect to the portion of Hacienda San Esteban still owned by the Zobel family, the municipal
authorities of Macabebe filed in 1930 an administrative complaint, in the Bureau of Public Works praying for
the opening of the dikes and dams across certain streams in Hacienda San Esteban. Whereupon, the
district engineer of Pampanga and a representative of the Bureau of Public Works conducted
investigations. In the meantime, the Attorney General, upon a query from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, rendered an opinion dated October 11, 1930 sustaining the latter's power to declare
streams as publicly owned under Sec. 4 of Act 2152, as amended by Act 3208.
On September 29, 1930 the investigator of the Bureau of Public Works, Eliseo Panopio, submitted his
report recommending the removal of the dikes and dams in question. And on the basis of said report, the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications rendered his decision on November 3, 1930 ordering Ayala y
Cia., to demolish the dikes and dams across the streams named therein situated in Hacienda San Esteban.
Ayala y Cia., moved for reconsideration, questioning the power of the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications to order the demolition of said dikes.
Days before the Secretary of Commerce and Communications rendered his aforementioned decision,
Ayala y Cia., thru counsel, made representations with the Director of Public Works for a compromise
agreement. In its letter dated October 11, 1930, Ayala y Cia., offered to admit public ownership of the
following creeks:
Antipolo, Batasan Teracan, Biuas or Batasan, Capiz, Carbon, Cutut, Dalayap, Enrique, Iba, Inaun,
Margarita, Malauli or Budbud, Matalaba Palapat, Palipit Maisao, Panlovenas, Panquitan, Quinapati,
Quiñorang, Bubong or Malauli Malati, Salop, Sinubli and Vitas.
provided the rest of the streams were declared private. Acting on said offer, the Director of Public Works
instructed the surveyor in his office, Eliseo Panopio, to proceed to Pampanga and conduct another
investigation.
On January 23, 1931 Panopio submitted his report to the Director of Public Works recommending that
some streams enumerated therein be declared public and some private on the ground that they were
originally dug by the hacienda owners. The private streams were:
Agape, Atlong, Cruz, Balanga, Batasan, Batasan Matlaue, Balibago, Baliti, Bato, Buengco Malati,
Bungalin, Bungo Malati, Bungo Maragui, Buta-buta, Camastiles, Catlu, Cauayan or Biabas, Cela,
Dampalit, Danlimpu, Dilinquente, Fabian, Laguzan, Lalap Maburac, Mabutol, Macabacle, Maragul
or Macanduli, Macabacle or Mababo, Maisac, Malande, Malati, Magasawa, Maniup, Manulit,
Mapanlao, Maisac, Maragul Mariablus Malate, Masamaral, Mitulid, Nasi, Nigui or Bulacus, Palipit,
Maragul, Pangebonan, Paumbong, Pasco or Culali, Pilapil, Pinac Malati, Pinac, Maragul or
Macabacle, Quiñorang Silab or Malauli Maragul, Raymundo, Salamin, Salop Maisac, Salop
Maragul, Sermon and Sinca or Mabulog.
He therefore recommended revocation of the decision already mentioned above, dated November 3, 1930
of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications ordering the demolition of the dikes closing Malauling
Maragul, Quiñorang, Silab, Pepangebonan, Nigui, Bulacus, Nasi, and Pinac. On February 13, 1931 the
Director of Public Works concurred in Panopio's report and forwarded the same the Secretary of
Commerce and Communications.
On February 25, 1935 the municipality of Macabebe and the Zobel family executed an agreement whereby
they recognized the nature of the streams mentioned in Panopio's report as public or private, depending on
the findings in said report. This agreement was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications on February 27, 1935 and confirmed the next day by the municipal council of Macabebe
under Resolution No. 36.
A few months later, that is, on June 12, 1935, the then Secretary of Justice issued an opinion holding that
the contract executed by the Zobel family and the municipality of Macabebe has no validity for two reasons,
namely, (1) the streams although originally dug by Ayala y Cia., lost their private nature by prescription
inasmuch as the public was allowed to use them for navigation and fishing, citing Mercado vs. Municipality
of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592; and (2) at the time the Secretary of Commerce and Communications approved
the said contract, he had no more power so to do, because such power under Sec. 2 of Act 2152 was
revoked by the amending Act 4175 which took effect on December 7, 1934.
Despite the above ruling of the Secretary of Justice, the streams in question remained closed.
In 1939 administrative investigations were again conducted by various agencies of the Executive branch of
our government culminating in an order of President Manuel Quezon immediately before the national
elections in 1941 requiring the opening of Sapang Macanduling, Maragul Macabacle, Balbaro and
Cansusu. Said streams were again closed in 1942 allegedly upon order of President Quezon.
THE CASE
Roman Santos acquired in 1940 from the Zobel family a larger portion of Hacienda San Esteban wherein
are located 25 streams which were closed by Ayala y Cia., and are now the subject matter in the instant
controversy.
Eighteen years later, that is in 1958, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 2056 2 following a congressional
inquiry which was kindled by a speech delivered by Senator Rogelio de la Rosa in the Senate. On August
15, 1958 Senator de la Rosa requested in writing the Secretary of Public Works and communications to
proceed in pursuance of Republic Act No. 2056 against fishpond owners in the province of Pampanga who
have closed rivers and appropriated them as fishponds without color of title. On the same day, Benigno
Musni and other residents in the vicinity of Hacienda San Esteban petitioned the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications to open the following streams:
Balbaro, Batasan Matua, Bunga, Cansusu, Macabacle, Macanduling, Maragul, Mariablus, Malate,
Matalabang, Maisac, Nigui, Quiñorang Silab, Sapang Maragul and Sepung Bato.
Thereupon, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications instructed Julian C. Cargullo to conduct an
investigation on the above named streams.
On October 20, 1958 Musni and his co-petitioners amended their petition to include other streams. The
amended petition therefore covered the following streams:
Balbaro, Balili, Banawa, Batasan Matua Bato, Bengco, Bunga, Buta-buta, Camastiles, Cansusu,
Cela, Don Timpo, Mabalanga, Mabutol, Macabacle, Macabacle qng. Iba, Macanduling, Maragul,
Malauli, Magasawa, Mariablus Malate Masamaral, Matalabang Maisa, Mariablus,3 Nigui, Pita,
Quiñorang, Silab, Sapang Maragul, Sepung Bato, Sinag and Tumbong.
On March 2, 4, 10, 30 and 31, and April 1, 1959, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
rendered his decisions ordering the opening and restoration of the channel of all the streams in controversy
except Sapang Malauling, Maragul, Quiñorang, Silab, Nigui Pepangebonan, Nasi and Bulacus, within 30
days on the ground that said streams belong to the public domain.
On April 29, 1959, that is, after receipt of the Secretary's decision dated March 4, 1959, Roman Santos
filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Man for junction against the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and Julian C. Cargullo. As prayed for preliminary injunction was granted on May 8, 1959.
The Secretary of Public Work and Communications answered and alleged as defense that venue was
improperly laid; that Roman Santos failed to exhaust administrative remedies; that the contract between
Ayala y Cia., and the Municipality of Macabebe is null and void; and, that Section 39 of Act 496 excludes
public streams from the operation of the Torrens System.
On April 29 and June 12, 1969, Roman Santos received the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications dated March 10 and March 30, March 31, and April 1, 1959. Consequently, on June 24,
1959 he asked the court to cite in contempt Secretary Florendo Moreno, Undersecretary M.D. Bautista and
Julian Cargullo for issuing and serving upon him the said decisions despite the existence of the preliminary
injunction. The Solicitor General opposed the motion alleging that the decisions in question had long been
issued when the petition for injunction was filed, that they were received after preliminary injunction issued
because they were transmitted through the District Engineer of Pampanga to Roman Santos; that their
issuance was for Roman Santos' information and guidance; and, that the motion did not allege that
respondents took steps to enforce the decision. Acting upon said motion, on July 17, 1959, the trial court
considered unsatisfactory the explanation of the Solicitor General but ruled that Secretary Florencio
Moreno, Undersecretary M.D. Bautista and Julian Cargullo acted in good faith. Hence, they were merely
"admonished to desist from any and further action in this case, observe the preliminary injunction issued by
this Court, with the stern warning, however, that a repetition of the acts complained of shall be dealt with
severely."
On July 18, 1959 the trial court declared all the streams under litigation private, and rendered the following
judgment:
The Writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Secretary of Public Works &
Communications from enforcing the decisions of March 2 And 4, 1959 and all other similar
decisions is hereby made permanent.
The Secretary of Public Works and Communication and Julian Cargullo appealed to this Court from the
order of July 17, 1959 issued in connection with Roman Santos' motion for contempt and from the decision
of the lower court on the merits of the case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) Did Roman Santos exhaust administrative remedies? (2) Was venue properly laid? (3)
Did the lower court err in conducting a trial de novo of the case and in admitting evidence not presented
during the administrative proceeding? (4) Do the streams involved in this case belong to the public domain
or to the owner of Hacienda San Esteban according to law and the evidence submitted to the Department
of Public Works and Communications?
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
1. Respondents maintain that Roman Santos resorted to the courts without first exhausting administrative
remedies available to him, namely, (a) motion for reconsideration of the decisions of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications; and, (b) appeal to the President of the Philippines.
Whether a litigant, in exhausting available administrative remedies, need move for the reconsideration of
an administrative decision before he can turn to the courts for relief, would largely depend upon the
pertinent law,4the rules of procedure and the usual practice followed in a particular office.5
Republic Act No. 2056 does not require the filing of a motion for reconsideration as a condition precedent to
judicial relief. From the context of the law, the intention of the legislators to forego a motion for
reconsideration manifests itself clearly. Republic Act No. 2056 underscores the urgency and summary
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nature of the proceedings authorized thereunder. Thus in Section 2 thereof the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications under pain of criminal liability is duty bound to terminate the proceedings and render
his decision within a period not exceeding 90 days from the filing of the complaint. Under the same section,
the party respondent concerned is given not than 30 days within which to comply with the decision of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, otherwise the removal of the dams would be done by the
Government at the expense of said party. Congress has precisely provided for a speedy and a most
expeditious proceeding for the removal of illegal obstructions to rivers and on the basis of such a provision
it would be preposterous to conclude that it had in mind to require a party to file a motion for
reconsideration — an additional proceeding which would certainly lengthen the time towards the final
settlement of existing controversies. The logical conclusion is that Congress intended the decision of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to be final and executory subject to a timely review by the
courts without going through formal and time consuming preliminaries.
Moreover, the issues raised during the administrative proceedings of this case are the same ones
submitted to court for resolution. No new matter was introduced during the proceeding in the court below
which the Secretary of Public Works and Communications had no opportunity to correct under his authority.
Furthermore, Roman Santos assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056 and the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to order the demolition of dams across rivers or
streams. Those questions are not within the competence of said Secretary to decide upon a motion for
reconsideration. They are purely legal questions, not administrative in nature, and should properly be aired
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before a competent court as was rightly done by petitioner Roman Santos .

At any rate, there is no showing in the records of this case that the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications adopted rule of procedure in investigations authorized under Republic Act No. 2056 which
require a party litigant to file a motion for the reconsideration of the Secretary's decision before he can
appeal to the courts. Roman Santos however stated in his brief that the practice is not to entertain motions
for reconsideration for the reason that Republic Act No. 2056 does not expressly or impliedly allow the
Secretary to grant the same. Roman Santos' statement is supported by Opinion No. 61, Series of 1959,
dated April 14, 1959 of the Secretary of Justice.
As to the failure of Roman Santos to appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications to the President of the Philippines, suffice it to state that such appeal could be dispensed
with because said Secretary is the alter ego of the President. The actions of the former are presumed to
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have the implied sanction of the latter.6

2. It is contended that if this case were considered as an ordinary civil action, venue was improperly laid
when the same was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the reason that the case affects
the title of a real property. In fine, the proposition is that since the controversy dwells on the ownership of or
title to the streams located in Hacienda San Esteban, the case is real action which, pursuant to Sec. 3 of
Rule 5 of the Rules of Court should have been filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
The mere fact that the resolution of the controversy in this case would wholly rest on the ownership of the
streams involved herein would not necessarily classify it as a real action. The purpose of this suit is to
review the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to enjoin him from enforcing
them and to prevent him from making and issuing similar decisions concerning the stream in Hacienda San
Esteban. The acts of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications are the object of the litigation,
that is, petitioner Roman Santos seeks to control them, hence, the suit ought to be filed in the Court of First
Instance whose territorial jurisdiction encompasses the place where the respondent Secretary is found or is
holding office. For the rule is that outside its territorial limits, the court has no power to enforce its order.7
Section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court does not apply to determine venue of this action. Applicable is
Sec. 1 the same rule, which states:
Sec. 1. General rule. — Civil actions in Courts of First Instance may be commenced and tried
where the defendant any of the defendants residents or may be found or where the plaintiff or any
of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Accordingly, the Petition for injunction who correctly filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Julian Cargullo are found and hold office
in the City of Manila.
3. The lower court tried this case de novo. Against this procedure respondents objected and maintained
that the action, although captioned as an injunction is really a petition for certiorari to review the decision of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Therefore they now contend that the court should
have confined itself to reviewing the decisions of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and
Communications only on the basis of the evidence presented in the administrative proceedings. On the
other hand, Roman Santos now, submits that the action is a proceeding independent and distinct from the
administrative investigation; that, accordingly, the lower court correctly acted in trying the case anew and
rendering judgment upon evidence adduced during the trial.
Whether the action instituted in the Court of First Instance be for mandamus, injunction or certiorari is not
very material. In reviewing the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Court of
First Instance shall confine its inquiry to the evidence presented during, the administrative proceedings.
Evidence not presented therein shall not be admitted, and considered by the trial court. As aptly by this
Court speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in a similar case:
The findings of the Secretary can not be enervated by new evidence not laid before him, for that
would be tantamount to holding a new investigation, and to substitute for the discretion and
judgment of the Secretary the discretion and judgment of the court, to whom the statute had not
entrusted the case. It is immaterial that the present action should be one for prohibition or injunction
and not one for certiorari; in either event the case must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to
the Secretary, since a judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de novo, but only
an ascertainment of whether the "executive findings are not in violation of the Constitution or of the
laws, and are free from fraud or imposition, and whether they find reasonable support in the
evidence. . . .8
The case at bar, no matter what the parties call it, is in reality a review of several administrative decisions of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Being so, it was error for the lower court to conduct a
trial de novo. Accordingly, for purposes of this review, only the evidence presented and admitted in the
administrative investigation will be considered in our determination of whether on the basis thereof the
decisions of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications were correct.
4. We come to the question whether the streams involved in this case belong to the public domain or to the
owner of Hacienda San Esteban. If said streams are public, then Republic Act 2056 applies, if private, then
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications cannot order demolition of the dikes and dams across
them pursuant to his authority granted by said law.
First, we come to the question of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056. The lower court held
Republic Act No. 2056 constitutional but ruled that it was applied by respondents unconstitutionally. That is,
it held that Roman Santos was being deprived of his property without due process of law, for the dikes of
his fishponds were ordered demolished through an administrative, instead of a judicial, proceeding. This
conclusion and rationalization of the lower court amount in effect to declaring the law unconstitutional,
stated inversely. Note that the law provides for an expeditious administrative process to determine whether
or not a dam or dike should be declare a public nuisance and ordered demolished. And to say that such an
administrative process, when put to operation, is unconstitutional is tantamount to saying that the law itself
violates the Constitution. In Lovina vs. Moreno, supra, We held said law constitutional. We see no reason
here to hold otherwise.
Discussing now the applicability of Republic Act 2056, the same applies to two types of bodies of water,
namely (1)public navigable rivers, streams, coastal waters, or waterways and (b) areas declared as
communal fishing grounds, as provided for in Section 1 thereof:
Sec. 1. . . . the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works which encroaches into
any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other navigable public waters or
waterways as well as the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works in areas
declared as communal fishing grounds, shall be ordered removed as public nuisances or as
prohibited constructions as herein provided: . . .
We are not concerned with communal fishing grounds because the streams here involved have not been
so declared, but with public navigable streams. The question therefore is: Are the streams in Hacienda San
Esteban which are mentioned in the petition of Benigno Musni and others, public and navigable?
Respondents contend that said streams are public on the following grounds:
(1) Hacienda San Esteban was formerly a marshland and being so, it is not susceptible to appropriation. It
therefore belongs to the State. Respondents rely on Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572.
(2) The streams in question are natural streams. They are tributaries of public streams. Cited are the cases
ofSamson vs. Dionisio, et al., 11 Phil. 538 and Bautista vs. Alarcon, 23 Phil. 636.
(3) The streams have for their source public rivers, therefore they cannot be classified as canals.
(4) Assuming the streams were artificially made by Ayala y Cia., said titleholder lost ownership over them
by prescription when it allowed the public to use them for navigation for a long time. Respondents
cite Mercado vs. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592.
(5) Assuming the streams in question are not mentioned as public in the certificates of title held by Ayala y
Cia., over Hacienda San Esteban, still they cannot be considered as privately owned for Section 39 of Act
496 expressly excepts public streams from private ownership.
(6) The Panopio Report, which found the streams in question of private ownership was nullified by the
Secretary of Justice in his opinion dated June 12, 1935. And, the contract between Ayala y Cia., and the
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Secretary of Commerce and Communications agreeing on the ownership of the streams in question is ultra
vires.
The doctrine in Montano vs. Insular Government, supra, that a marshland which is inundated by the rise of
the tides belongs to the State and is not susceptible to appropriation by occupation — has no application
here inasmuch as in said case the land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled and precisely
Isabelo Montano sought title thereon on the strength of ten years' occupation pursuant to paragraph 6,
section 54 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission. Whereas, the subject matter in this case — Hacienda
San Esteban — is titled land and private ownership thereof by Ayala y Cia., has been recognized by the
King of Spain and later by the Philippine Government when the same was registered under Act 496.
Respondents further cite Bautista vs. Alarcon, 23 Phil. 631, where the plaintiff sought injunction against the
defendants who allegedly constructed a dam across a public canal which conveyed water from the Obando
River to fishponds belonging to several persons. The canal was situated within a public land. In sustaining
the injunction granted by the Court of First Instance, this Court said:
No private persons has right to usurp possession of a watercourse, branch of a river, or lake of the
public domain and use, unless it shall have been proved that he constructed the same within in
property of his exclusive ownership, and such usurpation constitutes a violation of the legal
provisions which explicity exclude such waterways from the exclusive use or possession of a
private party. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in the above-cited case, a private person may take possession of a watercourse if he
constructed the same within his property. This puts Us into inquiry whether the streams in question are
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natural or artificial. In so doing, We shall examine only the evidence presented before the Department of
Public Works and Communications and disregard that which was presented for the first time before the
lower court, following our ruling in Lovina vs. Moreno, supra.
(1) Sapang Macanduling Maragul or Macanduli is presently enclosed in Fishpond No. 12 of Roman Santos.
Its banks cannot anymore be seen but some traces of them could be noted by a row of isolated nipa palms.
Its water is subject to the rise and fall of the tides coming from Guagua and Antipolo Rivers and it is
navigable by light watercrafts. Its inlet is Antipolo River; another dike at its outlet along the Palapat River. 9 It
is closed by four dikes: One dike at its inlet along the Antipolo River; another dike at its cutlet along the
Palatpat River; and, two dikes in between. Then exist channel at the Palapat River where the fishpond gate
lies has been filled up with dredge spoils from the Pampanga River Control Project.
(2) Sapang Macabacle is found in Fishpond No. 13. Its banks are still evident. This stream is about 30
meters wide, two meters deep and one and one-half to two kilometers long. Its source is Rio Cansusu. Like
Macanduli, its channel is obstructed by four dikes. One of them was constructed by the engineers of the
Pampanga River Control Project.
(3) Sapang Balbaro which is found in Fishpond No. 13, runs from Canal Enrique near Rio Cansusu to
Sapang Macabacle, a distance of about one-half kilometer. It is passable by banca. The closures of this
stream consist of two dikes located at each ends on Canal Enrique and Sapang Macabacle.
(4) Sapang Cansusu is a continuation of the Cansusu River. The Cansusu River opens at the Guagua
River and allegedly ends at the Palanas River in front of Barrio San Esteban. At a point near the mouth of
Sapang Balbaro, the owners of Hacienda San Esteban built a canal leading straight to one end of Barrio
San Esteban. They called this canal "Canal Enrique." And at the point where Canal Enrique joins Cansusu
they built a dike across Cansusu, thus closing this very portion of the river which extends up to Palanas
River where they built another closure dike. This closed portion, called "Sapang Cansusu," is now part of
Fishpond No. 1.
Sapang Cansusu is half a kilometer long and navigable by banca.
Appellant's witnesses, Beligno Musni, 41, Macario Quiambao, 96, Roman Manansala, 55 and Castor
Quiambao, 76, all residents of Barrio San Esteban, testified that prior to their closure, Sapang Macaduli,
Macabacle, Balbaro and Cansusu were used as passageway and as fishing grounds; that people
transported through them tuba,10wood and sasa,11 and that the tuba was brought to the distillery in Barrio
San Esteban. Macario Quiambao testified also that said four streams "were created by God for the town
people"; and that if any digging was done it was only to deepen the shallow parts to make passage easier.
According to witness Anastacio Quiambao said streams were navigable, even Yangco's ship "Cababayan"
could pass through. Simplicio Quiambao, 36, and Marcelino Ocampo, 55, stated on direct examination that
before closure of the above named four streams, people from the surrounding towns of Guagua, Bacolor,
Macabebe, Masantol and Sexmoan fished and navigated in them.
Against the aforementioned, testimonial evidence Roman Santos presented the testimony of Nicanor
Donarber, 80, Mariano Guinto, 71, and his own. Donarber, who started working as an arundin12 testified
that Ayala y Cia., dug Sapang Macanduli, Balbaro and Macabacle; that he worked also in the construction
together with other workers; and, that as an overseer he inspected their work. Mariano Guinto testified that
he worked for Ayala y Cia., as a tuba gatherer; that in order to reach remote nipa groves by banca, they
made canals; and, that he was one of the who worked in the construction of those canals. Roman Santos
also testified that Sapang Macanduli, Macabacle, Balbaro and Cansusu are artificial canals excavated as
far back as 1850 and due to erosion coupled with the spongy nature of the land, they acquired the
proportion of rivers; that he joined Sapang Balbaro to Sapang Macabacle because the former was a dying
canal; and that Cansusu River is different from Sapang Cansusu Witness Domingo Yumang likewise
testified that Sapang Balbaro man-made.
We observe that witnesses positively stated that Sapang Macanduli, Macabacle and Balbaro were made by
the owners of Hacienda San Esteban. With respect to Sapang Cansusu none, except Roman Santos
himself, testified that Sapang Cansusu is an artificial canal. It is not one of the streams found and
recommended to be declared private in the Panopio Report. Sapang Cansusu follows a winding course
different and, distinct from that of a canal such as that of Canal Enrique which is straight. Moreover,
Sapang Cansusu is a part of Cansusu River, admittedly a public stream.
(5) Sapang Maragul, Mabalanga and Don Timpo are all part of Fishpond No. 1. Maragul is 600 meters long
and 30 to 35 meters wide. Mabalanga is 250 meters in length and 50 meters in width. Don Timpo is 220
meters long and 20 meters wide. All of them are navigable by banca. Maragul and Mabalanga open at
Guagua River and join each other inside the hacienda to form one single stream, Sapang Don Timpo,
which leads to the Matalaba River. Maragul, Mabalanga and Don Timpo, formerly ended inside the
hacienda but later Mabalanga was connected to Don Timpo. Maragul was connected to Mabalanga and
Sapang Cela was extended to join Maragul.
Witnesses Nicanor Donarber, Mariano Ocampo and Mariano Guinto testified that Maragul, Mabalanga and
Don Timpo are artificial canals dug by Ayala y Cia., and that they (Donarber and Mariano Guinto) worked in
said excavations.13 Witness Mariano Guinto clarified that Don Timpo was originally dug but Mabalanga and
Maragul were formerly small non-navigable streams which were deepened into artificial navigable canals
by Ayala y Cia.14
Exhibit F, which is a map showing the streams and rivers in Hacienda San Esteban, shows that Maragul,
Mabalanga and Don Timpo are more or less straight. From the big rivers (Guagua and Matalaba Rivers)
they lead deep into the interior of the hacienda, thus confirming the testimony that they were built precisely
as a means of reaching the interior of the estate by banca. The weight of evidence, therefore, indicate that
said streams are manmade.
(6) Sapang Bunga, now part of Bunga fishpond, gets its water from Sapanga Iba and empties at Sta. Cruz
River. It is about 300-400 meters long, 5-6 meters wide and 1-1.60 meters deep.
(7) Sapang Batu is found in Capiz Fishpond. About 300-400 meters long, 4-5 meters wide and 1.50-2.20
meters deep, it starts at Capiz River and ends at Malauling Maragul. From Capiz River until it intersects
Sapang Nigui the stream is called Sapang Batu Commencing from Sapang Nigui and up to its end at
Sapang Malauling Maragul, the stream is called Sapang Batu. Commencing from Sapang Nigui and up to
its end at Sapang Malauling Maragul, the stream is called Sepong Batu. Sepong Batu is not among those
streams declared in the Panopio Report as private.
(8) Sapang Banawa has one end at Palanas River and the other at Sapang Macabacle. It is about 300
meters long, 3-4 meters wide and 1.30-1.40 meters deep. Its whole length is within Fishpond No. 13 of
Roman Santos.
(9) Sapang Mabutol is a dead-end stream, that is, it ends inside the hacienda. It opens along Guagua river.
Since its closure, it has become part of Fishpond No. 1.
(10) Sapang Buta-buta, like Mabutol, dies inside the hacienda. It connects with Cansusu River and is about
100 meters long, 3-4 meters wide and 1.2-1.5 meters deep. It is now a part of Fishpond No. 13.
(11) Sapang Masamaral, another stream which opens at Cansusu River And ends inside the hacienda., is
100-200 meters long, 3-4 meters wide and 1.50-2 meters deep. It now forms part of Fishpond No. 13.
The uncontradicted testimony of Marcos Guinto is that Sapang Bunga, Batu, Sepong Batu, Banawa,
Mabutol, Buta-Buta and Masamaral were constructed by Ayala y Cia., to gain access to the nipa the,
interior of the hacienda. This testimony tallies with the findings in the Panopio Report which will be
discussed herein later. The evidence adduced in the administrative proceeding conducted before a
representative of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications supports the contention that said
streams are merely canals built by Ayala y Cia., for easy passage into the hinterland of its hacienda.
(12) Sapang Magasawa consists of two streams running parallel to each other commencing from Matalaba
River and terminating at Mariablus Rivers. About 600-700 meters long, 4-5 meters wide and 1.5-2 meters
deep, these two streams are navigable by banca. They are enclosed within Fishpond No. 1.
(13) Sapang Mariablus Malate, about 3-4 meters wide and 250 meters long, is another stream that ends
inside the hacienda and gets its water from Guagua River. It is no part of Fishpond No. 1.
(14) Sapang Matalabang Malate or Maisac opens at Guagua River and ends at Sapang Cela and
Matalabang Maragul. This stream, which is about 800 meters long and 18 meters wide, forms part of
Fishpond No. 1 of Roman Santos.
(15) Sapang Batasan Matua about 600 meters long, three meters wide and .80 meters deep at low tide and
1.90 meters deep at high tide crosses the hacienda from Mariablus River to Cansusu River. It is at present
a part of Fishpond No. 1-A.
(16) Sapang Camastiles, a dead end stream of about 200 to 300 meters in length, gets its water from Biuas
River. It is within Fishpond No. 1.
(17) Sapang Cela is within Fishpond No. 1. Its whole length situated inside the hacienda, it opens at
Sapang Matalabang Malate or Maisac and ends at Sapang Malungkot. Latter Cela was extended to
connect with Sapang Maragul. It is about 200 meters long and four meters wide.
Mariano Guinto, 71, testified without contradiction that Sapang Mariablus Malate and Matalabang Malate
were formerly small and non-navigable streams which were dug by Ayala y Cia., 15 while Batasan Matua
Camastiles, Magasawa and Cela are original canals made by Ayala y Cia., 16 that he was one of those who
worked in the construction of said canals; and that it took years to construct them. All these streams were
recommended in the Panopio Report for declaration as private streams.
(18) Sapang Sinag, 200 meters long, four to five meters wide, one meter and one and one-half meters
deep at low and high tides, respectively, gets its water from Cutod River and leads inside the hacienda to
connect with Sapang Atlong Cruz, a stream declared private in the Panopio Report. It is now inside
Fishpond No. 14.
(19) Sapang Balili, also found inside Fishpond No. 14, is about 200 meters long, three to four meters wide
and one meter deep at low tide. From its mouth at Cutod River it drifts into the interior of the hacienda and
joins Sapang Bengco.17
(20) Sapang Pita is within Fishpond Capiz. It takes water from Capiz River but dies 250 meters inside the
hacienda. It is about four to five meters wide, and one meter deep at low tide and 1.50 meters deep at high
tide.
(21) Sapang Tumbong, situated inside Capiz Fishpond, derives its water from Sapang Quiñorang Silab, a
stream declared private by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and ends inside the
hacienda.18
(22) Sapang Bengco is found within Fishpond No. 14. Two hundred meters long, five meters wide, and
1awphil.net

one meter deep at low tide and 1.50 meters deep at high tide it gets water from Sapang Biabas and
connects with Baliling Maisac.19
According to Marcos Guinto, a witness for Roman Santos, Sapang Sinag, Balili, Pita Tumbong and Bengco
were excavated a long time ago by Ayala y Cia.; and that they have a winding course because when they
were made the workers followed the location of the nipa palms.20 On the other hand, Marcelo Quiambao,
testified that Sapang Tumbong is a natural stream and that the reason he said so is because the stream
was already there as far back as 1910 when he reached the age of ten. No other oral evidence was
presented to contradict the testimony of Marcos Guinto that the said five streams were artificially made by
Ayala y Cia.
To show that the streams involved in this case were used exclusively by the hacienda personnel and
occasionally by members of their families, Roman Santos introduced the testimony of Eliseo Panopio,
Nicanor Donarber, Blas Gaddi, Mariano Ocampo, Mariano Guinto, Alejandro Manansala and himself. The
witnesses categorically testified that the public was prohibited from using the streams as a means of
navigation and that the prohibition was enforced by guards called arundines.
One and all, the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by Roman Santos in the administrative
proceedings supports the conclusion of the lower court that the streams involved in this case were
originally man-made canals constructed by the former owners of Hacienda San Esteban and that said
streams were not held open for public use. This same conclusion was reached 27 years earlier by an
investigator of the Bureau of Public Works whose report and recommendations were approved by the
Director of Public Works and submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications.
As stated, pursuant to Act 2152, as amended by Act 3208, the Bureau of Public Works and the Department
of Commerce and Communications locked into and settled the question of whether or not the streams
situated within Hacienda San Esteban are publicly or privately owned. We refer to the so-called Panopio
Report which contains the findings and recommendations of Eliseo Panopio, a surveyor in the Bureau of
Public Works, who was designated to conduct formal hearings and investigation. Said report found the
following streams, among others, of private ownership:
Camastiles, Cela Balanga, Bato, Batasan, Bengco, Buta-buta, Don Timpo, Mabutol, Macabacle,
Macanduli, Malande Malate (Bunga), Magasawa, Masamaral, Maragul, Mariablus Malate, Matalaba
Malate, Nasi, Nigui, Pangebonan and Quiñorang Silab
on the ground that —
The preponderance of the probatory facts, . . ., shows that the rivers, creeks, esteros and canals
listed in (1) have originally been constructed, deepened, widened, and lengthened by the owners of
the Hacienda San Esteban. That they have been used as means of communication from one place
to another and to the inner most of the nipales, exclusively for the employees, colonos and laborers
of the said Hacienda San Esteban. That they have never been used by the public for navigation
without the express consent of the owners of the said Hacienda.21
Bases for the above-quoted conclusion were "the reliable informations gathered from old residents of the
locality, from outsiders, the sworn statements obtained from different persons not interested in this case
and the comparison of the three plans prepared in 1880, 1906 and 1930. 22 The persons referred to are
Martin Isip, Hilarion Lobo, Emigdio Ignacio, Castor Quiambao, Matias Sunga facio Cruz, Inocencio Dayrit,
Gabriel Manansala, Lope Quiambao, Marcelino Bustos and Juan Lara .
On February 13, 1931 the Director of Public Works transmitted the Panopio Report to the Secretary of
Commerce and Communications recommending approval thereof. Later, on February 27, 1935, Secretary
of Public Works and Communications De las Alas approved the agreement of Ayala y Cia., and the
Municipality of Macabebe, concerning the ownership of the streams in Hacienda San Esteban, for being in
conformity with said Panopio Report.
This agreement of Ayala y Cia and the Municipality of Macabebe which was approved by the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications only on February 27, 1935, could not however bind the Government
because the power of the Secretary of Public Works and Communication to enter thereto had been
suppressed by the Philppine Legislature when it enacted Act 4175 which effect on December 7, 1934.
Nullity of the aforesaid contract would not of course affect the findings of fact contained in the Panopio
Report.
In weighing the evidence presented before the administrative investigation which culminated in this appeal,
respondent Secretary seemed to have ignored the Panopio Report and other documentary evidence as
well as the testimony of witnesses presented by petitioner but instead gave credence only to the witnesses
of Benigno Musni, et al. Upon review, however, the lower court, taking into account all the evidence
adduced in the administrative hearing, including the Panopio Report, as well as those presented for the first
time before it, sustained petitioner's averment that the streams in question were artificially made, hence of
private ownership. As stated, this conclusion of the lower court which is in accord with the findings of
Panopio as contained in his report, finds ample support from the evidence presented and admitted in the
administrative investigation. Accordingly, we see no merit in disturbing the lower court's findings fact.
We next consider the issue of whether under pertinent laws, the streams in question are public or private.
We quote Articles 339, 407 and 408 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889:
Art. 339. Property of public ownerships is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, river banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
Art. 407. The following are of public ownership:
1. Rivers and their natural channels;
2. Continuous or intermittent waters from springs or brooks running in their natural channels and
the channels themselves.
3. Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public ownership;
4. Lakes and ponds formed by nature, on public lands, and their beds;
5. Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds, the channels of which are of public
ownership;
6. Subterranean waters on public lands;
7. Waters found within the zone of operation of public works, even though constructed under
contract;
8. Waters which flow continuously or intermittently from lands belonging to private persons, to the
State, to provinces, or to towns, from the moment they leave such lands;
9. The waste waters of fountains, sewers, and public institutions.
Art. 408. The following are of private ownership:
1. Waters, either continuous or intermittent rising on private etates, while they run through them;
2. Lakes and ponds and their beds when formed by nature on such estates;
3. Subterranean waters found therein;
4. Rain water falling thereon as long as their bounderies.
5. The channels of flowing streams, continuous or intermittent, formed by rain water, and those of
brooks crossing estates which are not of public ownership.
The water, bed, banks, and floodgates of a ditch or aqueduct are deemed to be an integral part of
the estate or building for which the waters are intended. The owners of estates through or along the
boundaries of which the aqueduct passes can assert no ownership over it, nor any right to make
use. of it beds or banks, unless they base their claims on title deed which specify the right or the
ownership claimed.
Articles 71 and 72 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 state:
Art. 71. The water-beds of all creeks belong to the owners of the estates or lands over which they
flow.
Art. 72. The water-beds on public land, of creeks through which spring waters run, are a part of the
public domain.
The natural water-beds or channels of rivers are also part of the public domain.
Pursuant to Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, and Article 408(5) of the Spanish
Civil Code, channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners of estates over which they flow. The
channels, therefore, of the streams in question which may be classified creeks, belong to the owners of
Hacienda San Esteban.
The said streams, considered as canals, of which they originally were, are of private ownership in
contemplation of Article 339(l) of the Spanish Civil Code. Under Article 339, canals constructed by the State
and devoted to public use are of public ownership. Conversely, canals constructed by private persons
within private lands and devoted exclusively for private use must be of private ownership.
Our attention has been called to the case of Mercado v. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592.
There the creek (Batasan-Limasan) involved was originally dug by the estate's owner who, subsequently
allowed said creek to be used by the public for navigation and fishing purposes for a period of 22 years.
Said this Court through Mr. Justice Diaz:
And even granting that the Batasan-Limasan creek acquired the proportions which it had, before it
was closed, as a result of excavations made by laborers of the appellant's predecesor in interest, it
being a fact that, since the time it was opened as a water route between the Nasi River and
Limasan creek, the owners thereof as well as strangers, that is, both the residents of the hacienda
and those of other nearby barrios and municipalities, had been using it not only for their bancas to
pass through but also for fishing purposes, and it being also a fact that such was the condition of
the creek at least since 1906 until it was closed in 1928, if the appellant and her predecessors in
interest had acquired any right to the creek in question by virtue of excavations which they had
made thereon, they had such right through prescription, inasmuch as they failed to obtain, and in
fact they have not obtained, the necessary authorization to devote it to their own use to the
exclusion of all others. The use and enjoyment of a creek, as any other property simceptible of
appropriation, may be acquired or lost through prescription, and the appellant and her predecessors
in interest certainly lost such right through the said cause, and they cannot now claim it exclusively
for themselves after the general public had been openly using the same from 1906 to 1928. . . .
In the cited case, the creek could have been of private ownership had not its builder lost it by prescription.
Applying the principle therein enunciated to the case at bar, the conclusion would be inevitably in favor of
private ownership, considering that the owners of Hacienda San Esteban held them for their exclusive use
and prohibited the public from using them.
It may be noted that in the opinion, mentioned earlier, issued on June 12, 1935, the Secretary of Justice
answered in the negative the query of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications whether the
latter can declare of private ownership those streams which "were dug up artificially", because it was
assumed that the streams were used "by the public as fishing ground and in transporting their commerce in
bancas or in small crafts without the objection of the parties who dug" them. Precisely, Mercado v.
Municipality of Macabebe was given application therein. However, the facts, as then found by the Bureau of
Public Works, do not support the factual premise that the streams in question were used by the public
"without the objection of the parties who dug" them. We cannot therefore take as controlling in determining
the merits of this the factual premises and the legal conclusion contained in said opinion.
The case at bar should be differentiated from those cases where We held illegal the closing and/or
appropriation of rivers or streams by owners of estates through which they flow for purposes of converting
them into fishponds or other works.23 In those cases, the watercourses which were dammed were natural
navigable streams and used habitually by the public for a long time as a means of navigation.
Consequently, they belong to the public domain either as rivers pursuant to Article 407 (1) of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889 or as property devoted to public use under Article 339 of the same code. Whereas, the
streams involved in this case were artificially made and devoted to the exclusive use of the hacienda
owner.
Finally, Sapang Cansusu, being a natural stream and a continuation of the Cansusu River, admittedly a
public stream, belongs to the public domain. Its closure therefore by the predecessors of Roman Santos
was illegal.
The petition for the opening of Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Nigui, Pepangebunan, Nasi
and Bulacus was dismissed by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the case
considered closed. The said administrative decision has not been questioned in this appeal by either party.
Hence, they are deemed excluded herein.
All the other streams, being artificial and devoted exclusively for the use of the hacienda owner and his
personnel, are declared of private ownership. Hence, the dams across them should not he ordered
demolished as public nuisances.
With respect to the issue of contempt of court on the part of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and Julian Cargullo for the alleged issuance of a administrative decisions ordering
demolition of dikes involved in this case after the writ of injunction was granted and served, suffice it to
state that the lower court made no finding of contempt of court. Necessarily, there is no conviction for
contempt reviewable by this Court and any discussion on the matter would be academic.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, except as to Sapang Cansusu which is hereby
declared public and as to which the judgment of the lower court is reversed. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal. Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ.,concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19570 April 27, 1967
JOSE V. HILARIO, JR., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellee,
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS, CITY ENGINEER OF MANILA, FERNANDO BUSUEGO and
EUGENIO SESE,defendants-appellants,
MAXIMO CALALANG, intervenor;
DIRECTOR OF MINES, intervenor.
Maximo Calalang for plaintiff and appellant.
Gregorio Ejercito and Leandro L. Arguelles for defendant-appellee City of Manila.
Office of the Solicitor General for other defendants and appellants.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land — around 49 hectares in area — located
at Barrio Guinayang, in San Mateo, Rizal. 1 Upon his death, this property was inherited by his son, herein
plaintiff-appellant Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new certificate of title2 was issued.
During the lifetime of plaintiff's father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the San Mateo
River.3 To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the
northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. For years, these
safeguards served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great and extraordinary flood occurred which
inundated the entire place including the neighboring barrios and municipalities. The river destroyed the dike
on the northwest, left its original bed and meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest
thereof a lenticular place of land. The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip which now
stands between the old riverbed site and the new course.4
In 1945 the U.S. Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises 5 and started scraping,
excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby areas the River. The operations eventually
extended northward into this strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages was filed with the U.S. War
Department by Luis Hilario, the then administrator of Dr. Hilario's estate. The U.S. Army paid.6 In 1947, the
plant was turned over to herein defendants-appellants and appellee who took over its operations and
continued the extractions and excavations of gravel and sand from the strip of land along an area near the
River.
On October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint 7 for injunction and damages against the defendants City
Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the
Engineer-in-charge of the plant. It was prayed that the latter be restrained from excavating, bulldozing and
extracting gravel, sand and soil from his property and that they solidarily pay to him P5,000.00 as
damages. Defendants' answer alleged, in affirmative defense, that the extractions were made from the
riverbed while counterclaiming with a prayer for injunction against plaintiff—who, it was claimed, was
preventing them from their operations.
Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were respectively allowed to join the
litigation as intervenors. The former complained that the disputed area was within the bed of the river so
that plaintiff should not only be enjoined from making extractions therefrom but should also be ordered to
pay the fees and penalties for the materials taken by him. On the other hand, the latter claimed that he was
authorized by plaintiff to extract materials from the disputed area but this notwithstanding, the Provincial
Treasurer of Rizal collected from him a sand and gravel fee which would be an illegal exaction if the
disputed area turns out to be of private ownership. Answers to the two complaints in intervention were duly
filed by the affected parties.
On March 14, 1954, defendants filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and intervenor Calalang in the
same case, alleging that the latter have fenced off the disputed area in contravention of an agreement 8 had
between the latter and the Director of Public Works wherein he defendants were allowed to continue their
operations but subject to the final outcome of the pending suit. It was prayed that plaintiff and intervenor
Calalang be ordered to remove the fence and allow defendants' men to continue their operations
unhampered. Opposition to this petition was filed by the other side, with a prayer for counter injunction. On
March 23, 1954, the lower court issued an order maintaining the status quo and allowing the defendants to
continue their extractions from the disputed area provided a receipt 9 in plaintiff's favor be issued for all the
materials taken.
On May 13, 1954, plaintiff amended his complaint. Impleaded as additional defendants were the City of
Manila,10the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal,11 and Engr. Eugenio Sese, the new Engineer-in-charge of the
plant. Plaintiff also converted his claim to one purely for damages directed against the City of Manila and
the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in the amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials taken since
1949, as well as those to be extracted therefrom until defendants stop their operations.
Came the separate amended answers of the several defendants. Manila City denied ownership of the plant
and claimed that the City Engineer, acted merely as a deputy of the Public Works Director. The other
defendants12 put up, as special defense, the agreement between plaintiff and the Public Works Director,
and asserted a P1.2 million counterclaim for damages against plaintiff. The rest13 renewed the same
defense; that the disputed area was part of the public domain, since it was situated on the riverbanks.
On November 3, 1954, the defendant City Engineer of Manila filed a petition to delimit the area of
excavation and asked the lower court to authorize his men to extend their operations west of the camachile
tree in the disputed area. This met vigorous opposition from plaintiff and intervenor Calalang. On May 27,
1955, the petition was denied.
Finally, on December 21, 1956, the lower court rendered its decision on the merits. The dispositive portion
provided:14
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants City of Manila and the Director
of Public Works, to pay solidarily the herein plaintiff the sum of P376,989.60, as the cost of gravel
and sand extracted from plaintiff's land, plus costs. Judgment is likewise hereby rendered against
the defendant Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, ordering him to reimburse to intervenor Maximo
Calalang the amount of P236.80 representing gravel fees illegally collected. Finally, defendants
herein are perpetually enjoined from extracting any sand or gravel from plaintiff's property which is
two-fifths northern portion of the disputed area.
It is so ordered.
None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and they all sought a reconsideration of the
same. On August 30, 1957, the lower court resolved the motions to reconsider with an order, the dispositive
portion of which provided:15
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff and
 intervenor Calalang; dismisses the complaint with respect to defendant City of Manila; holds that
the northern two-fifths portion of the area in controversy belongs to the plaintiff with right to the
immediate possession thereof and hereby enjoins the defendants and intervenor Bureau of Mines
to vacate the same and to stop from extracting gravel thereon. The Court however hereby
dismisses the case against the defendant Bureau of Public Works and its agents and employees
insofar as the claim for money is concerned without prejudice to plaintiffs taking such action as he
may deem proper to enforce said claim against the proper party in accordance with law.
It is so ordered.
Still unsatisfied, plaintiff and intervenor Calalang filed a second motion for reconsideration. The lower court
stood firm on its ruling of August 30, 1957.16
Hence, this appeal.17 The defendants Director of Public Works, City Engineer of Manila, and Engrs.
Busuego and Sese have also appealed from the declaration made by the lower court that the northern two-
fifths of the disputed area belongs to plaintiff Hilario.
The parties herein have presented before this Court mixed questions of law and fact for resolution and
adjudication. Foremost among them is this legal query; when a river, leaving its old bed, changes its
original course and opens a new one through private property, would the new riverbanks lining said course
be of public ownership also?18
The defendants answer in the affirmative. They claim that under the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, the
riverbanks are, by definition, considered part of the riverbed which is always of public ownership. On the
other hand, plaintiff would have the question resolved in the negative. He maintains that not all riverbanks
are of public ownership because: (1) Art. 372 of the old Civil Code, which governs this particular case,
speaks only of the new bed; nothing is said about the new banks; (2) Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which
defines the phrase "banks of a river" cannot be applied in the case at bar in conjunction with the other
articles cited by defendants since that article applies only to banks of natural riverbeds and the present,
River is not in its natural bed; and (3) if all banks were of public ownership, then Art. 553 of the old Civil
Code and the second sentence, first paragraph of Art. 73 of the Law of Waters can never have any
application.
Since the change in the course of the River took place in 1937, long before the present Civil Code took
effect,19the question before Us should be determined in accordance with the provisions of the old Civil
Code and those of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866.
We agree with defendants that under the cited laws, all riverbanks are of public ownership — including
those formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. Art. 339 of
the old Civil Code is very clear. Without any qualifications, it provides:
Property of public ownership is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character; (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, as correctly contended by defendants, the riverbank is part of the riverbed. Art. 73 of the Law of
Waters which defines the phrase "banks of a river" provides:
By the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which are
washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. ... (Emphasis
supplied)
The use the of words "of its bed [de sus alveos]" clearly indicates the intent of the law to consider
the banks — for all legal purposes — as part of the riverbed. The lower court also ruled — correctly
— that the banks of the River are paint of its bed. 20 Since undeniably all beds of rivers are of public
ownership,21 it follows that the banks, which form part of them, are also of public ownership.
Plaintiff's contention that Arts. 70 and 73 of the Law of Waters cannot apply because Art. 312 of the old
Civil Code mentions only the new bed but omits the banks, and that said articles only apply to natural —
meaning original — bed and banks is untenable. Art. 70, which defines beds of rivers and creeks, provides:
The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest
 [ordinary] floods.22 (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that —
Whenever a navigable or floatable river changes its course from natural causes and opens a new
bedthrough a private estate, the new bed shall be of public ownership, but the owner of the estate
shall recover it in the event that the waters leave it dry again either naturally or as the result of any
work legally authorized for this purpose. (Emphasis supplied)
did not have to mention the banks because it was unnecessary. The nature of the banks always
follows that of the bed and the running waters of the river. A river is a compound concept consisting
of three elements: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed and (3) the banks. 23 All these constitute the
river. American authorities are in accord with this view:
'River' consists of water, a bed and banks.24
A "river" consists of water, a bed and banks, these several parts constituting the river, the whole
river. It is a compound idea; it cannot exist without all its paints. Evaporate the water, and you have
a dry hollow. If you could sink the bed, instead of a river, you would have a fathomless gulf.
Remove the banks, and you have a boundless flood.25
Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it should either be totally
public or completely private. And since rivers are of public ownership, 26 it is implicit that all the three
component elements be of the same nature also. As Manresa commented:
Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al decir el Codigo Civil
que los rios son de dominio publico, parece que debe ir implicito el dominio publico de anquellos
tres elementos que integran el rio.27
However, to dispel all possible doubts, the law expressly makes all three elements public. Thus, riverbanks
and beds are public under Arts. 339 and 407, respectively, of the Code, while the flowing waters are
declared so under Art. 33, par. 2 of the Law of Waters of 1866.
Articles 70, 72 and 73 of the Law of Waters speak of natural beds and their banks. Plaintiff now equates the
term "natural" with the word "original" so that a change in the course of a river would render those articles
inapplicable. However, the premise is incorrect. Diccionario De La Real Academia Española defines the
word "natural" as follows:
NATURAL — perteneciente a la naturaleza o conforme a la calidad o propriedad de las cosas;
nativo, originario de un pueblo o nacion; hecho con verdad, ni artificio, mezcla ni composicion
alguna; ingenuo y sin doblez en su modo de proceder; diceze tambien de las cosas que imitar a la
naturaleza con propiedad; regular y que comunmente sucede, y por eso, facilmente creible; que se
produce por solas las fuerzas de la naturaleza, como contrapuesto a sobre natural y milagroso,
(Emphasis supplied)
"Natural" is not made synonymous to "original" or "prior condition". On the contrary, even if a river should
leave its original bed so long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course would still fall within the
scope of the definition provided above. Hence, the law must have used the word "natural" only because it is
in keeping with the ordinary nature and concept of a river always to have a bed and banks.
Plaintiff's third point is not lightly to be taken. Indeed, it would seem possible to acquire private ownership
of banks under Art. 553 of the old Civil Code which provides:
Las riberas de los rios, aun cuando sean de dominio privado, estan sujetas en toda su extension y
en sus margenes, en una zona de tres metros, a la servidumbre de uso publico en interes general
de la navegacion, la flotacion, la pesca y el salvamento. (Emphasis supplied) .
And plaintiff is not without jurisprudential backing for in Commonwealth vs. Gungun,28 it was said
that the private ownership of the banks was not prohibited. His point is then neatly brought home
with the proposition that it is precisely when a river changes its course and opens a new bed
through a private estate that there can be private ownership of the banks.
A study of the history of Art. 553 will however reveal that it was never intended to authorize the private
acquisition of riverbanks. That could not have been legally possible in view of the legislative policy clearly
enunciated in Art. 339 of the Code that all riverbanks were of public ownership. The article merely
recognized and preserved the vested rights of riparian owners who, because of prior law or custom, were
able to acquire ownership over the banks. This was possible under the Siete Partidas which was
promulgated in 1834 yet.29 Under Law 6, Title 28, Partidas 3, the banks of rivers belonged to the riparian
owners, following the Roman Law rule.30 In other words, they were privately owned then. But subsequent
legislation radically changed this rule. By the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, riverbanks became of public
ownership, albeit impliedly only because considered part of the bed — which was public — by statutory
definition.31 But this law, while expressly repealing all prior inconsistent laws, left undisturbed all vested
rights then existing.32 So privately owned banks then continued to be so under the new law, but they were
subjected by the latter to an easement for public use. As Art. 73 provides:
Se entienden por riberas de un rio las fajas o zonis laterales de sus alveos que solamente sor
bañadas por las aguas en las crecidas que no causan inundacion. El dominio privado de las riberas
esta suieto a la survidumbre de tres metros de zona para uso publico, en el interest general de la
navegacion, la flotacion, la pesca y el salvamento. ... (Emphasis supplied). 1äwphï1.ñët

This was perhaps the reconciliation effected between the private ownership of the banks, on the one hand,
and the policy of the law on the other hand, to devote all banks to public use. 33 The easement would
preserve the private ownership of the banks and still effectuate the policy of the law. So, the easement in
Art. 73 only recognized and preserved existing privately owned banks; it did not authorize future private
appropriation of riverbanks.
The foregoing observation is confirmed by the still subsequent Law of Waters of June 13, 1879, which was
principally based on the Law of August 3, 1865. 34 Art. 36 of the new law, which was a substantial
reenactment of Art. 73 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, reads:
Las riberas, aun cuando sean de dominio privado en virtud de antigue ley o de costumbre, estan
sujetas en toda su extension las margenes en una zona de tres metros, a la servidumbre de uso
publico en interes general de la navegacion, la flotacion la pesca y el salvamento. ... (Emphasis
supplied)
The new law also affirmed the public ownership of rivers and their beds, and the treatment of the banks as
part of the bed.35 But nowhere in the law was there any provision authorizing the private appropriation of
the banks. What it merely did was to recognize the fact that at that time there were privately owned banks
pursuant to the SietePartidas, and to encumber these with an easement for public use.
However, the public nature of riverbanks still obtained only by implication. But with the promulgation of the
Civil Code of 1889, this fact was finally made explicit in Art. 339 thereof. Riverbanks were declared as
public property since they were destined for public use. And the first paragraph of Art. 36 of the Law of
Waters of 1879 was substantially reenacted in Art. 553 of the Code. 36 Hence, this article must also be
understood not as authorizing the private acquisition of riverbanks but only as recognizing the vested titles
of riparian owners who already owned the banks.
The authority, then, for the private ownership of the banks is neither the old Civil Code nor the Law of
Waters of 1866 but the Siete Partidas. Unfortunately, plaintiff cannot invoke it. Law 6, Title 28, Partida 3,
which provides for private ownership of banks, ceased to be of force in this jurisdiction as of 1871 yet when
the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, took effect. 37 Since the change in the course of the River took place
in 1937, the new banks which were formed could not have been subjected to the provisions of the Siete
Partidas which had already been superseded by then.
Coming to the factual issues: both parties assail the conclusion made by the lower court that only the
northern two-fifths of the disputed area remained as plaintiff's private property. This conclusion was
apparently based on the findings that the portion where rice and corn were found 38 in the ocular inspection
of June 15, 1951, was on the northern two-fifths of the disputed area; that this cannot be a part of the bed
because of the existence of vegetation which could not have grown underwater, and that this portion is
man-made. However, there is no evidentiary basis for these findings. The area indicated by Nos. 1 and 2 in
Exh. D-1 where no excavations had been made, appears to be more on the south-western one-fourth of
the disputed area. The American cases39cited by the lower court cannot apply here. Our Law of Waters, in
defining "beds" and considers the latter is part of the former. Those cited cases did not involve a similar
statutory provision. That plants can and do grow on the banks which otherwise could not have grown in the
bed which is constantly subjected to the flow of the waters proves the distinction between "beds" and
"banks" in the physical order. However, We are dealing with the legal order where legal definitions prevail.
And apart from these considerations, We also note the considerable difficulty which would attend the
execution of the ruling of the lower court. The latter failed to indicate fixed markers from which an exact
delimitation of the boundaries of the portion could be made. This flaw is conducive to future litigations.
Plaintiff's theory is that the disputed area, although covered at times by flood waters, cannot be considered
as within the banks of the River because: (1) such floods are only accidental, and (2) even if they are
regular, the flooding of the area is due to the excavations and extractions made by defendants which have
caused the widening of the channel.40 Defendants claim, however, that the area is always covered by the
normal yearly floods and that the widening of the channel is due to natural causes.
There is a gravel pit41 located along the west side of the River. This is about 500 meters long. 42 A greater
part of this pit occupies a portion of the strip of land that was sliced by the River from the rest of the Hilario
estate. As shown in Exhs. D and D-1, this strip of land is that western segment of the Hilario estate
bounded on the west by the same lines connecting stakes 23 through 27, which form part of the western
boundary of the estate, and on the east, bounded by the western waterline of the River.
Now, the disputed area, generally speaking, 43 is only that part of the gravel pit which is within the strip of
land. Its northern tip is that point where the so-called "secondary bank" line intersects the west River
waterline up north; its southern boundary is along the line connecting stakes 23 and 24. From these two
ends, the disputed area measures approximately 250 meters long. The eastern boundary is the western
River waterline at low tide and the western boundary is the "secondary bank" line, a line passing near stake
24 and running almost parallel to the line connecting stakes 25 and 26. Around the later part of 1949, the
disputed area was about 150 to 160 meters wide.44 This increased to about 175 to 180 meters by the later
part of 1950. And by January, 1953, the distance from the "secondary bank" line to the west waterline was
about 230 meters.45
This increasing width of the disputed area could be attributed to the gradual movement of the River to the
east. Since it entered into the Hilario estate, the River has not stayed put. 46 Vicente Vicente, plaintiff's
witness declared47 that after the River changed its course in 1937, the distance between the old and the
new river sites was about 100 meters. Exh. D-2 shows that in 1943, the south end of the River was about 5
meters southeast of stake 24.48 Honorato Sta. Maria, another witness for plaintiff, indicated the flow of this
course with a blue line in Exh. D-1. 49 This blue line is about 100 meters from the line connecting stakes 25
and 26, which was also the east boundary of the old River. 50 Around 1945 to 1949, the River was about
193 meters51 east of this line. This measurement is based on the testimonies of two defense
witnesses52 and stated that during that period, the River passed along the Excavated Area and the New
Accretion Area53 sites, as shown in Exh. 54. By the later part of 1949 up to November 1950, the west
waterline was from 248 to 270 meters54 east of the aforesaid boundary line. And finally in January, 1953,
based on the scale in Exh. 3-Calalang, the west waterline was from 300 to 305 meters away already.
Hence, from 100 meters in 1937, the River had moved to 305 meters eastward in 1953.
There are two questions to be resolved here. First, where on the strip of land are the lateral borders of the
western riverbank? And second, where have defendants made their extractions?
Anent the first question, the key is supplied by Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the limits of
banks of rivers —
By the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which are
washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not cause in inundations. ... (Emphasis
supplied)
The farthest extremity of the bank on the west side would, therefore, be that lateral line or strip
which is reached by the waters during those high floods that do not cause inundations. In other
words, the extent reached by the waters when the River is at high tide.
However, there is a difference between the topography of the two sides immediately adjoining the River.
The line indicated as "primary bank"55 in Exh. 3-Calalang, which is on the east, is about 3 meters high and
has a steep grade right at the edge where it drops almost vertically to the watercourse level. The precipice
here, which is near the east waterline, is very easily detectible. But the opposite side has no such steep
activity. In fact, it is almost flat with the bed of the River, especially near the water edge, where it is about
30 to 50 cms. high only. But it gradually slopes up to a height of about 2 to 2-½ meters along the line
indicated as "secondary bank", which is quite far from the waterline. This "bank" line is about 1-½ meters
higher than the level of the gravel pit and there are erosions here. This is about 175 meters west from the
November 1950 waterline, and about 100 meters west from the camachile tree.56
During the dry season, the waterlevel of the River is quite low — about knee-deep only. However, during
the rainy season, the River generally becomes swollen, and the waterlevel rises, reaching up to the
neck.57 However, considering the peculiar characteristics of the two sides banking the river, the rise in the
waterlevel would not have the same effect on the two sides. Thus, on the east, the water would rise
vertically, until the top of the "primary bank" is reached, but on the west, there would be a low-angled
inclined rise, the water covering more ground until the "secondary bank" line is reached. In other words,
while the water expansion on the east is vertical, that on the west is more or less lateral, or horizontal.
The evidence also shows that there are two types of floods in the area during the rainy season. 58 One is
the so-called "ordinary" flood, when the river is swollen but the flowing water is kept within the confines, of
the "primary" and "secondary" banks. This occurs annually, about three to four times during the period.
Then there is the "extraordinary" flood, when the waters overflow beyond the said banks, and even
inundate the surrounding areas. However, this flood does not happen regularly. From 1947 to 1955, there
were only three such floods.59 Now, considering that the "ordinary" flood easily cover the west side —
since any vertical rise of the waterlevel on the east would necessarily be accompanied by a lateral water
expansion on the west — the "inundations" which the law mentions must be those caused by the
"extraordinary" floods which reach and overflow beyond both "primary" and "secondary" banks. And since
the "primary" bank is higher than the "secondary" bank, it is only when the former is reached and
overflowed that there can be an inundation of the banks — the two banks. The question therefore, may be
stated thus: up to what extent on the west side do the highest flood waters reach when the "primary" bank
is not overflowed?
Defendants have presented several witnesses who testified on the extent reached by the ordinary flood
waters. David Ross, a bulldozer operator at the plant since 1945, testified 60 that from 1945 to 1949, when
the River was still passing along the site where the camachile tree is located, the annual flood waters
reached up to the "secondary bank" line. These floods usually took from 3 to 5 days to recede, during
which time their work was suspended. Corroboration is supplied by Macario Suiza, a crane operator in the
plant since 1945, and by Fidel Villafuerte, a plant employee since 1946. Suiza stated 61 that from 1947 to
1949, the area enclosed within the blue lines and marked as Exh. 54-B — which includes the New
Accretion Area was always covered by water when it rained hard and they had to stop work temporarily.
The western extremity of this area reaches up to the "secondary bank" line. Villafuerte stated62 that in the
ordinary floods when the water was just 50 cm. below the top of the "primary bank", the waters would go
beyond the camachile tree by as much as 100 meters westward and just about reach the "secondary bank"
line. Further corroboration is supplied by plaintiff's own evidence. Exh. 1-Calalang states that from 1947 to
1949, based on the casual observations made by geologist David Cruz, the area between the "primary"
and "secondary" banks were always covered by the non-inundating ordinary floods.
From 1950 to 1952, We have the testimony of Ross who stated63 that there were still floods but they were
not as big anymore, except one flood in 1952, since the River had already moved to the east. Engr. Ricardo
Pacheco, who made a survey of the disputed area in November 1952, and who conducted actual
observations of the extent of the water reach when the river was swollen, testified 64 that the non-inundating
flood regularly reached up to the blue zigzag line along the disputed area, as shown in Exh. I-City Engineer
Manila. This blue line, at the point where it intersects line BB,65 is about 140 meters west of the waterline
and about 20 meters west of the camachile tree. His testimony was based on three floods 66 which he and
his men actually recorded. Corroboration is again supplied by Exh. 1-Calalang. According to Cruz' report,
the floods in 1950 and 1951 barely covered the disputed area. During the normal days of the rainy season,
the waters of the swollen river did not reach the higher portions of the gravel pit which used to be
submerged. One cause for this was the lesser amount of rainfall from 1949 to 1951. But two floods
occurred from October 16 to 28, 1952, which overflowed the whole area and inundated the banks. From
1953 to 1955, when the River was farther away to the east, the flood waters still covered the west
side.67 Testifying on the extent reached by the water during the rainy season in 1954, Ross stated 68 that it
reached up to the camachile tree only. The last and latest data comes from Engr. Magbayani Leaño, the
Engineer-in-charge of the plant from August 1954. He testified 69 that as of December 1955, when the
disputed area was underwater, the water reach was about 20 meters or less to the east from the camachile
tree.
From all the foregoing, it can be safely concluded: (1) that from 1945 to 1949, the west bank of the River
extended westward up to the "secondary bank" line; (2) that from 1950 to 1952, this bank had moved, with
the River, to the east its lateral borders running along a line just 20 meters west of the camachile tree; and
(3) that from 1953 to 1955, the extremities of the west bank further receded eastward beyond the
camachile tree, until they lay just about 20 meters east of said tree.
To counteract the testimonies of the defense witnesses, plaintiff presented two rebuttal witnesses 70 who
told a somewhat different story. However, their testimonies are not convincing enough to offset the
dovetailing testimonies of the defense witnesses who were much better qualified and acquainted with the
actual situs of the floods. And said defense witnesses were corroborated by plaintiffs' own evidence which
contradicts the aforesaid rebuttal witnesses.
However, plaintiff maintains that the floods which cover the area in question are merely accidental and
hence, under Art. 77 of the Law of Waters, 71 and following the ruling in Government vs. Colegio de San
Jose,72 he is deemed not to have lost the inundated area. This is untenable. Plaintiff's own
evidence73 shows that the river floods with annual regularity during the rainy season. These floods can
hardly be called "accidental." The Colegio de San Jose case is not exactly in point. What was mainly
considered there was Art. 74 of the Law of Waters relating to lakes, ponds and pools. In the case at bar,
none of these is involved.
Also untenable is plaintiff's contention that the regular flooding of the disputed area was due to the
continuous extraction of materials by defendants which had lowered the level of said area and caused the
consequent widening of the channel and the river itself. The excavations and extractions of materials, even
from the American period, have been made only on the strip of land west of the River. 74 Under the
"following-the-nature-of-things" argument advanced by plaintiff, the River should have moved westward,
where the level of the ground had been lowered. But the movement has been in the opposite direction
instead. Therefore, it cannot be attributed to defendants' operation. Moreover, plaintiff's own evidence
indicates that the movement eastward was all due to natural causes. Thus, Exh. 1-Calalang shows that the
movement eastward of the channel by as much as 31 meters, from 1950 to 1953, was due to two typhoons
which caused the erosion of the east bank and the depositing of materials on the west side which
increased its level from as much as .93 to 2 meters.
Plaintiff's assertion that the defendants also caused the unnatural widening of the River is unfounded.
Reliance is made on the finding by the lower court that in 1943, the River was only 60 meters wide as
shown in Exh. D-2, whereas in 1950, it was already 140 meters wide as shown in Exh. D. However, Exh. D-
2 only shows the width of the River near the southwestern boundary of the Hilario estate. It does not
indicate how wide it was in the other parts, especially up north. And Eligio Lorenzo, plaintiff's own witness,
admitted75 on cross-examination that the width of the new river was not uniform. This is confirmed by Exhs.
D and D-1 which show that the new river was wider by as much as 50% up north than it was down south.
The 140-meter distance in Exh. D was at the widest part up north whereas down south, near the mouth of
the Bulobok River, it was only 70 meters wide. Lastly, the scale in Exh. 3-Calalang will show that in January
1953, the River, near the same point also, was less than 50 meters wide.
The only remaining question now is to determine if the defendants have really confined their operations
within the banks of the River as alleged by them. To resolve this, We have to find out from what precise
portion in the disputed area the defendants have extracted gravel and sand since they did not extract
indiscriminately from within the entire area. None of the parties' briefs were very helpful but the evidence on
record discloses that defendants made their extractions only within specified areas during definite periods.
From 1947 to the early part of 1949, the defendants conducted their operations only in the New Accretion
Area along a narrow longitudinal zone contiguous to the watercourse then. This zone, marked as Exh. 2-
City Engineer Manila, is about one (1) km. long and extends northward up to pt. 50.35 in Exh. 54. However,
no extractions nor excavations were undertaken west of this zone, i.e., above the "temporary bank"
line.76 These facts are corroborated by plaintiff's witnesses. That the extractions were near the river then
finds support in Vicente's testimony77 while Leon Angeles and Mrs. Salud Hilario confirm the fact that
defendants have not gone westward beyond the "temporary bank" line.78 This line is located east of the
"secondary bank" line, the lateral extremity of the west bank then.
In the later part of 1949, plaintiff prohibited the defendants from extracting along the New Accretion Area
and constructed a fence across the same. This forced the defendants to go below southeast of — the
"Excavated Area" and the New Accretion Area sites in Exh. 54.79 Engr. Busuego, testifying80 in 1952,
indicated their are of extraction as that enclosed within the red dotted line in Exh. D-1 which lies on the
south end of the strip of land. Only a small portion of the southeastern boundary of the disputed area is
included. The ocular inspection conducted on June 15, 1951, confirms this.81 Exh. 4-Calalang shows the
total amount of materials taken from within the area from 1949 to 1951.82 Thus, from 1950 up to 1953,
although the defendants were able to continue their operations because of the agreement between the
plaintiff and the Director of Public Works,83 they were confined only to the southeastern portion of the
disputed area. On the other hand, the lateral extremities of the west bank then ran along a line about 20
meters west of the camachile tree in the New Accretion Area.
From 1954 to 1955, defendants' area of operation was still farther near of the New Accretion Area. They
were working within a confined area along the west waterline, the northern and western boundaries of
which were 20 meters away east from the camachile tree.84 Ross indicated85 this zone in Exh. 54 as that
portion on the southern end of the disputed area between the blue lines going through the words "Marikina
River Bed" and the red zigzag line indicating the watercourse then. Engr. Leaño even stated, 86 that they
got about 80% of the materials from the river itself and only 20% from the dry bed. The sand and gravel
covered by Exhs. LL to LL-55 were all taken from here. The foregoing facts are not only corroborated by
Mrs. Hilario87 but even admitted by the plaintiff in his opposition88 to defendants' petition to extend their
area of operation west of the camachile tree. And because their petition was denied, defendants could not,
and have not,89 gone beyond the lateral line about 20 meters east from said tree, which has already been
established as the lateral extremity of the west bank during the period.
It appears sufficiently established, therefore, that defendants have not gone beyond the receding western
extremities of the west riverbank. They have confined their extraction of gravel and sand only from within
the banks of the river which constitute part of the public domain — wherein they had the right to operate.
Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that defendants have gone beyond the limits of the west
bank, as previously established, and have invaded his private estate. He cannot, therefore, recover from
them.
As a parting argument, plaintiff contends that to declare the entire disputed area as part of the riverbanks
would be tantamount to converting about half of his estate to public ownership without just compensation.
He even adds that defendants have already exhausted the supply in that area and have unjustly profited at
his expense. These arguments, however, do not detract from the above conclusions.
First of all, We are not declaring that the entire channel, i.e., all that space between the "secondary bank"
line and the "primary bank" line, has permanently become part of the riverbed. What We are only holding is
that at the time the defendants made their extractions, the excavations were within the confines of the
riverbanks then. The "secondary bank" line was the western limit of the west bank around 1945 to 1949
only. By 1955, this had greatly receded to the line just 20 meters east of the camachile tree in the New
Accretion Area. All that space to the west of said receding line90 would still be part of plaintiff's property —
and also whatever portion adjoining the river is, at present, no longer reached by the non-inundating
ordinary floods.
Secondly, it is not correct to say that plaintiff would be deprived of his property without any compensation at
all. Under Art. 370 of the old Civil Code, the abandoned bed of the old river belongs to the riparian owners
either fully or in part with the other riparian owners. And had the change occurred under the Civil Code of
the Philippines, plaintiff would even be entitled to all of the old bed in proportion to the area he has lost.91
And, lastly, defendants cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at plaintiff's expense. They were not
responsible for the shifting of the River. It was due to natural causes for which no one can be blamed. And
defendants were extracting from public property then, under proper authorization. The government, through
the defendants, may have been enriched by chance, but not unjustly.
Considering the conclusions We have thus reached, the other questions involved in the remaining
assignments of errors — particularly those apropos the doctrine of state immunity from suit and the liability
of defendant City of Manila — are rendered moot.
Wherefore, the decision and orders appealed from are hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby
entered as follows:
(1) Defendants City of Manila and the Director of Public Works and his agents and employees are
hereby absolved from liability to plaintiff since they did not extract materials from plaintiff's property
but from the public domain.
(2) All that portion within the strip of land in question, starting from the line running parallel to the
western waterline of the river and twenty meters east from the camachile tree in the New Accretion
Area measured along line AA in Exhs. 3-Calalang, 13 and 54, and going to the west up to the
western boundaries of the Hilario estate, is hereby declared as not part of the public domain and
confirmed as part of plaintiff's private property. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1The b

G.R. No. L-31271 April 29, 1974

ROMEO MARTINEZ and LEONOR SUAREZ, spouses, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY and UNDERSECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS &
COMMUNICATIONS, respondents-appellees.
Flores Macapagal, Ocampo and Balbastro for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and
Solicitor Concepcion T. Agapinan for respondents-appellees.

ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated November 17, 1969 in its CA-G.R. 27655-R which reverses the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga in favor of petitioners-appellants against the Secretary and Undersecretary of Public Works & Communications in the case
instituted to annul the order of November 25, 1958 of respondent Secretary of Public Works & Communications directing the removal by the petitioners of the
dikes they had constructed on Lot No. 15856 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, which order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
2056. The dispositive portion of the judgment of reversal of the Court of Appeals reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is hereby

reversed, and another entered: [1] upholding the validity of the decision reached by the
respondent officials in the administrative case; [2] dissolving the injunction issued by the
Court below; and [3] cancelling the registration of Lot No. 2, the disputed area, and ordering
its reconveyance to the public domain. No costs in this instance.
The background facts are stated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez, now petitioners-appellees, are the
registered owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Lubao, Pampanga, covered by
transfer certificate of title No. 15856 of the Register of Deeds of the said province. Both
parcels of land are fishponds. The property involved in the instant case is the second parcel
mentioned in the above-named transfer certificate of title.
The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino Montemayor, who secured a
"titulo real" over it way back in 1883. After the death of Paulino Montemayor the said
property passed to his successors-in-interest, Maria Montemayor and Donata Montemayor,
who in turn, sold it, as well as the first parcel, to a certain Potenciano Garcia.
Because Potenciano Garcia was prevented by the then municipal president of Lubao, Pedro
Beltran, from restoring the dikes constructed on the contested property, the former, on June
22, 1914, filed Civil Case No. 1407 with the Court of First Instance against the said Pedro
Beltran to restrain the latter in his official capacity from molesting him in the possession of
said second parcel, and on even date, applied for a writ of preliminary injunction, which was
issued against said municipal president. The Court, by decision promulgated June 12, 1916,
declared permanent the preliminary injunction, which, decision, on appeal, was affirmed by
the Supreme Court on August 21, 1918. From June 22, 1914, the dikes around the property
in question remained closed until a portion thereof was again opened just before the
outbreak of the Pacific War.
On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of both parcels of land in
his name, and the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, sitting as land registration court,
granted the registration over and against the opposition of the Attorney-General and the
Director of Forestry. Pursuant to the Court's decision, original certificate of title No. 14318,
covering said parcels 1 and 2 was issued to the spouses Potenciano Garcia and Lorenza
Sioson.
These parcels of land were subsequently bought by Emilio Cruz de Dios in whose name
transfer certificate of title No. 1421 was first issued on November 9, 1925.
Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed hands until eventually they were
acquired by the herein appellee spouses who hold them by virtue of transfer certificate of
title No. 15856.
To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the Committee
on Rivers and Streams, by then composed of the Honorable Pedro Tuason, at that time
Secretary of Justice, as chairman, and the Honorable Salvador Araneta and Vicente Orosa,
Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources and Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, respectively, as members. This committee thereafter appointed a Sub-
Committee to investigate the case and to conduct an ocular inspection of the contested
property, and on March 11, 1954, said Sub-Committee submitted its report to the Committee
on Rivers and Streams to the effect that Parcel No. 2 of transfer certificate of title No. 15856
was not a public river but a private fishpond owned by the herein spouses.
On July 7, 1954, the Committee on Rivers and Streams rendered its decision the dispositive
part of which reads:
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the spouses Romeo Martinez and
Leonor Suarez should be restored to the exclusive possession, use and
enjoyment of the creek in question which forms part of their registered
property and the decision of the courts on the matter be given full force and
effect."
The municipal officials of Lubao, led by Acting Mayor Mariano Zagad, apparently refused to
recognize the above decision, because on September 1, 1954, the spouses Romeo
Martinez and Leonor Suarez instituted Civil Case No. 751 before the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga against said Mayor Zagad, praying that the latter be enjoined from molesting
them in their possession of their property and in the construction of the dikes therein. The
writ of preliminary injunction applied for was issued against the respondent municipal
Mayor, who immediately elevated the injunction suit for review to the Supreme Court, which
dismissed Mayor Zagad's petition on September 7, 1953. With this dismissal order herein
appellee spouses proceeded to construct the dikes in the disputed parcel of land.
Some four (4) years later, and while Civil Case No. 751 was still pending the Honorable
Florencio Moreno, then Secretary of Public Works and Communications, ordered another
 investigation of the said parcel of land, directing the appellees herein to remove the dikes
they had constructed, on the strength of the authority vested in him by Republic Act No.
2056, approved on June 13, 1958, entitled "An Act To Prohibit, Remove and/or Demolish
the Construction of Dams. Dikes, Or Any Other Walls In Public Navigable Waters, Or
Waterways and In Communal Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works in Such Waters or
Waterways And In Communal Fishing Grounds, And To Provide Penalties For Its Violation,
And For Other Purposes. 1 The said order which gave rise to the instant proceedings,
embodied a threat that the dikes would be demolished should the herein appellees fail to
comply therewith within thirty (30) days.
The spouses Martinez replied to the order by commencing on January 2, 1959 the present
case, which was decided in their favor by the lower Court in a decision dated August 10,
1959, the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby
declares the decision, Exhibit S, rendered by the Undersecretary of Public
Works and Communications null and void; declares the preliminary
injunction, hereto for issued, permanent, and forever enjoining both
respondents from molesting the spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor
Suarez in their possession, use and enjoyment of their property described in
Plan Psu-9992 and referred to in their petition."
"Without pronouncement as to costs."
"SO ORDERED."
As against this judgment respondent officials of the Department of Public Works and
Communications took the instant appeal, contending that the lower Court erred:
1. In holding that then Senator Rogelio de la Rosa, complainant in the administrative case,
is not an interested party and his letter-complaint dated August 15, 1958 did not confer
jurisdiction upon the respondent Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to
investigate the said administrative case;
2. In holding that the duty to investigate encroachments upon public rivers conferred upon
the respondent Secretary under Republic Act No. 7056 cannot be lawfully delegated by him
to his subordinates;
3. In holding that the investigation ordered by the respondent Secretary in this case is illegal
on the ground that the said respondent Secretary has arrogated unto himself the power,
which he does not possess, of reversing, making nugatory, and setting aside the two lawful
decisions of the Court Exhibits K and I, and even annulling thereby, the one rendered by the
highest Tribunal of the land;
4. In not sustaining respondent's claim that petitioners have no cause of action because the
property in dispute is a public river and in holding that the said claim has no basis in fact
and in law;
5. In not passing upon and disposing of respondent's counterclaim;
6. In not sustaining respondent's claim that the petition should not have been entertained on
the ground that the petitioners have not exhausted administrative remedies; and
7. In holding that the decision of the respondents is illegal on the ground that it violates the
principles that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and in
holding that the said Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional on the ground that
respondents' threat of prosecuting petitioners under Section 3 thereof for acts done four
years before its enactment renders the said lawex post facto.
The Court of Appeals sustained the above-mentioned assignment of errors committed by the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga and, as previously stated, reversed the judgment of the latter court. From this
reversal this appeal by certiorari was taken, and before this Court, petitioners-appellants assigned the
following errors allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING IN THE INSTANT CASE THAT
PARCEL NO. 2 OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856 IS A PUBLIC RIVER
AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF ITS REGISTRATION BECAUSE THIS
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS TITLE IN VIOLATION OF THE
LAW AND THE WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REOPENING AND RE-LITIGATING THE ISSUE
AS TO WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2 OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO.
15856 REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA, IS A PUBLIC RIVER NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN LONG RESOLVED AND SETTLED BY THE
LAND REGISTRATION COURT OF PAMPANGA IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING
NO. 692 AND IS NOW RES JUDICATA.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
REGISTRATION OF LOT NO. 2 OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE TORRENS TITLE COVERING IT HAS BEEN
VESTED IN THE PETITIONERS WHO ARE THE SEVENTH OF THE SUCCESSIVE
INNOCENT PURCHASERS THEREOF AND WHO IN PURCHASING THE SAME RELIED
ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE PERSONS DEALING WITH REGISTERED LAND NEED
NOT GO BEHIND THE REGISTER TO DETERMINE THE CONDITION OF THE
PROPERTY.
The 1st and 2nd assignment of errors, being closely related, will be taken up together.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that Lot No. 2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 of the
petitioners-appellants is a public stream and that said title should be cancelled and the river covered
reverted to public domain, is assailed by the petitioners-appellants as being a collateral attack on the
indefeasibility of the torrens title originally issued in 1925 in favor of the petitioners-appellants' predecessor-
in-interest, Potenciano Garcia, which is violative of the rule of res judicata. It is argued that as the decree of
registration issued by the Land Registration Court was not re-opened through a petition for review filed
within one (1) year from the entry of the decree of title, the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto in favor
of the appellants for the land covered thereby is no longer open to attack under Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act (Act 496) and the jurisprudence on the matter established by this Tribunal. Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act cited by appellants expressly makes a decree of registration, which ordinarily
makes the title absolute and indefeasible, subject to the exemption stated in Section 39 of the said Act
among which are: "liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United
States or of the Philippine Islands which the statute of the Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of
record in the registry."
At the time of the enactment of Section 496, one right recognized or existing under the law is that provided
for in Article 339 of the old Civil Code which reads as follows:
Property of public ownership is:
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges
constructed by the State, and banks shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
(Par. 1)
The above-mentioned properties are parts of the public domain intended for public use, are outside the
commerce of men and, therefore, not subject to private appropriation. ( 3 Manresa, 6th ed. 101-104.)
In Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769, this Court held:
A simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily
make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains
title under the Torrens system which includes by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot
be registered under the Torrens system, he does not by virtue of said certificate alone
become the owner of the land illegally included.
In Mercado v. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592, it was also said:
 It is useless for the appellant now to allege that she has obtained certificate of title No. 329
in her favor because the said certificate does not confer upon her any right to the creek in
question, inasmuch as the said creek, being of the public domain, is included among the
various exceptions enumerated in Section 39 of Act 496 to which the said certificate is
subject by express provision of the law.
The same ruling was laid down in Director of Lands v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga, 61 Phil. 644,
as regards public plaza.
In Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. L-20300-01 and G.R. No. L-20355-56, April 30, 1965, 20
SCRA 704, it was held that the incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens certificate of title does
not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable of registration.
It is, therefore, clear that the authorities cited by the appellants as to the conclusiveness and
incontestability of a Torrens certificate of title do not apply here. The Land Registration Court has no
jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public
domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private applicant. Hence, the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of Certificate of Title No.
15856 in the name of petitioners-appellants may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by
the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations (Article
1108, par. 4, new Civil Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties
fraudulently registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not
prescribe. (Republic v. Ramona Ruiz, et al., G.R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348; Republic v.
Ramos, G.R. No.
L-15484, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 47.)
When it comes to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works & Communications
under Republic Act 2056 to order the removal or obstruction to navigation along a public and navigable
creek or river included therein, has been definitely settled and is no longer open to question (Lovina v.
Moreno, G.R. No L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Taleon v. Secretary of Public Works &
Communications G.R. No. L-24281, May 16, 1961, 20 SCRA 69, 74).
The evidence submitted before the trial court which was passed upon by the respondent Court of Appeals
shows that Lot No. 2 (Plan Psu 992) of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856, is a river of the public
domain. The technical description of both Lots Nos. 1 and 2 appearing in Original Certificate of Title No.
14318 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, from which the present Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15856 was derived, confirms the fact that Lot No. 2 embraced in said title is bounded practically on all sides
by rivers. As held by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil Case No. 1247 for injunction filed by
the petitioners' predecessors-in-interest against the Municipal Mayor of Lubao and decided in 1916 (Exh.
"L"), Lot No. 2 is a branch of the main river that has been covered with water since time immemorial and,
therefore, part of the public domain. This finding having been affirmed by the Supreme Court, there is no
longer any doubt that Lot No. 2 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 of petitioners is a river which is not
capable of private appropriation or acquisition by prescription. (Palanca v. Com. of the Philippines, 69 Phil.
449; Meneses v. Com. of the Philippines, 69 Phil. 647). Consequently, appellants' title does not include said
river.
II
As regards the 3rd assignment of error, there is no weight in the appellants' argument that, being a
purchaser for value and in good faith of Lot No. 2, the nullification of its registration would be contrary to the
law and to the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court as it would destroy the stability of the title which
is the core of the system of registration. Appellants cannot be deemed purchasers for value and in good
faith as in the deed of absolute conveyance executed in their favor, the following appears:
6. Que la segunda parcela arriba descrita y mencionada esta actualmente abierta, sin
malecones y excluida de la primera parcela en virtud de la Orden Administrative No. 103,
tal como fue enmendada, del pasado regimen o Gobierno.
7. Que los citados compradores Romeo Martinez y Leonor Suarez se encargan de
gestionar de las autoridades correspondientes para que la citada segunda parcela pueda
 ser convertida de nuevo en pesqueria, corriendo a cuenta y cargo de los mismos todos los
gastos.
8. Que en el caso de que dichos compradores no pudiesen conseguir sus propositos de
convertir de nuevo en pesquera la citada segunda parcela, los aqui vendedores no
devolveran ninguna cantidad de dinero a los referidos compradores; este es, no se
disminuiriat el precio de esta venta. (Exh. 13-a, p. 52, respondents record of exhibits)
These stipulations were accepted by the petitioners-appellants in the same conveyance in the following
terms:
Romeo Martinez y Leonor Suarez, mayores de edad, filipinos y residentes en al Barrio de
Julo Municipio de Malabon, Provincia de Rizal, por la presente, declaran que estan
enterados del contenido de este documento y lo aceptan en los precisos terminos en que
arriba uedan consignados. (Exh. 13-a, ibid)
Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended that the appellants who were the vendees did
not know exactly the condition of the land that they were buying and the obstacles or restrictions thereon
that may be put up by the government in connection with their project of converting Lot No. 2 in question
into a fishpond. Nevertheless, they willfully and voluntarily assumed the risks attendant to the sale of said
lot. One who buys something with knowledge of defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he
acquired it in good faith (Leung Lee v. Strong Machinery Co., et al., 37 Phil. 664).
The ruling that a purchaser of a registered property cannot go beyond the record to make inquiries as to
the legality of the title of the registered owner, but may rely on the registry to determine if there is no lien or
encumbrances over the same, cannot be availed of as against the law and the accepted principle that
rivers are parts of the public domain for public use and not capable of private appropriation or acquisition
by prescription.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals appealed from is in accordance with
law, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the petitioners-appellants.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9069 March 31, 1915
THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HILARIA ROJAS and her husband TIUNG SIUKO, alias SIWA, defendants-appellees.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellant.
J. Y. Pinzon for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
Appeal filed through bill of exceptions by the Attorney-General, representing the plaintiff municipality of
Cavite, from the judgment of March 27, 1913, whereby the Honorable Herbert D. Gale, judge, dismissed
the complaint with costs against the plaintiff party, declaring that the said municipality had no right to
require that the defendants vacate the land in question.
By an instrument dated December 5, 1911, afterwards amended on March 14, 1912, the provincial fiscal of
Cavite, representing the municipality of that name, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of said
province alleging that the plaintiff municipal corporation, duly organized and constituted in accordance with
Act No. 82, and as the successor to the rights s aid entity had under the late Spanish government, and by
virtue of Act No. 1039, had exclusive right, control and administration over the streets, lanes, plazas, and
public places of the municipality of Cavite; that the defendants, by virtue of a lease secured from the
plaintiff municipality, occupy a parcel of land 93 square meters in area that forms part o the public plaza
known under the name of Soledad, belonging to the municipality of Cavite, the defendants having
constructed thereon a house, through payment to the plaintiff for occupation thereof of a rental of P5,58 a
quarter in advance, said defendants being furthermore obligated to vacate the leased land within sixty days
subsequent to plaintiff's demand to that effect; that the defendants have been required by the municipality
to vacate and deliver possession of the said land, but more than the sixty days within which they having
done so to date; that the lease secured from the municipality of Cavite, by virtue whereof the defendants
occupy the land that is the subject matter of the complaint, is ultra vires and therefore ipso factonull and
void and of no force or effect, for the said land is an integral portion of a public plaza of public domain and
use, and the municipal council of Cavite has never at any time had any power or authority to withdraw it
from public use, and to lease it to a private party for his own use, and so the defendants have never had
any right or occupy or to retain the said land under leasehold, or in any other way, their occupation of the
parcel being furthermore illegal; and therefore prayed that judgment be rendered declaring that possession
of the sad land lies with the plaintiff and ordering the defendants to vacate the land and deliver possession
thereof to said plaintiff, with the costs against the defendants.
The demurrer filed to the foregoing complaint having been overruled, with exception on the part of the
defendants, in their answer of April 10, 1912, they admitted some of the allegations contained in the
complaint but denied that the parcel of land which they occupy and to which the complaint refers forms and
integral part of Plaza Soledad, or that the lease secured by them from the municipality of Cavite was null
and void and ultra vires, stating if they refused to vacate said land it was because they had acquired the
right of possession thereof. As a special defense they alleged that, according to the lease, they could only
be ordered to vacate the land leased when the plaintiff municipality might need it for decoration or other
public use, which does not apply in the present case; and in a cross-complaint they alleged that on the land
which is the subject matter of the complaint the defendants have erected a house of strong materials,
assessed at P3,000, which was constructed under a license secured from the plaintiff municipality; that if
they should be ordered to vacate the said land they would suffer damages to the extent of P3,000,
wherefore they prayed that they be absolved from the complaint, or in the contrary case that the plaintiff be
sentenced to indemnify them in the sum of P3,000 as damages, and to pay the costs.
After hearing of the case, wherein both parties submitted parol and documentary evidence, the court
rendered the judgment that he been mentioned, whereto counsel for the municipality excepted and in
writing asked for a reopening of the case and the holding of a new trial. This motion was denied, with
exception on the part of the appellant, and the forwarded to the clerk of this court.
It is duly proven in the record that, upon presentation of an application by Hilaria Rojas, he municipal
council of Cavite by resolution No. 10, dated July 3, 107, Exhibit C, leased to the said Rojas some 70 or 80
square meters of Plaza Soledad, on condition that she pay rent quarterly in advance according to the
schedule fixed in Ordinance No. 43, land within sixty days subsequent to notification to that effect. The
record shows (receipts, Exhibit 1) that she has paid the land tax on the house erected on the lot.
The boundary line between the properties of the municipality of Cavite and the naval reservation, as fixed
in Act No. 1039 of the Philippine Commission, appears in the plan prepared by a naval engineer and
submitted as evidence by the plaintiff, Exhibit C of civil case No. 274 of the Cavite court and registered in
this court as No. 9071. According to said plan, defendant's house is erected on a plat of ground that forms
part of the promenade called Plaza Soledad, and this was also so proven by the testimony of the plaintiff's
witnesses.
By section 3 of the said Act No. 1039, passed January 12, 1904, the Philippine Commission granted to the
municipality of Cavite all the land included in the tract called Plaza Soledad. In the case of Nicolas vs. Jose
(6 Phil. Rep., 589), wherein the municipality of Cavite, represented by its president Catalino Nicolas, sought
inscription in its name of the land comprised in the said Palza Soledad, with objection on the part of Maria
Jose et al. who is sought that inscription be decreed in their name of the parcels of land in this plaza
occupied by them, this court decided that neither the municipality nor the objectors were entitled to
inscription, for with respect to the objectors said plaza belonged to the municipality of Cavite and with
respect to the latter the said Plaza Soledad was not transferable property of that municipality to be
 inscribed in its name, because he intention of Act No. 1039 was that the said plaza and other places therein
enumerated should be kept open for public transit; herefore there can be no doubt that the defendant has
no right to continue to occupy the land of the municipality leased by her, for it is an integral portion of Plaza
Soledad, which if for public use and is reserved for the common benefit.
According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the
provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public
works of general service supported by said towns or provinces."
The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not in
1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the
defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said plaza or public place to the defendant for private use
the plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a
thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.
The Civil Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside he commerce of man may be
the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce, as was decided by the
supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 195, which says: "Communal things that cannot be
soud because they are by their very nature outside of commerce are those for public use, such as the
plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc."
Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract, Exhibit C, whereby he municipality of Cavite leased to
Hilaria Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force or effect, because it is contrary
to the law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract. On the hyphotesis that the said lease is
null and void in accordance with the provisions of article 1303 of the Civil Code, the defendant must restore
and deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to the municipality of Cavite, which in its turn
must restore to the said defendant all the sums it may have received from her in the nature of rentals just
as soon as she restores the land improperly leased. For the same reasons as have been set forth, and as
said contract is null and void in its origin, it can produce no effect and consequently the defendant is not
entitled to claim that the plaintiff municipality indemnity her for the damages she may suffer by the removal
of her house from the said land.
For all the foregoing reasons we must reverse the judgment appealed from and declare, as we do declare,
that the land occupied by Hilaria Rojas forms part of the public plaza called Soledad, and as the lease of
said parcel of land is null and void, we order the defendant to vacate it and release the land in question
within thirty days, leaving it cleared as it was before hr occupation. There is no ground for the indemnity
sought in the nature of damages, but the municipality must in its turn to the defendant the rentals collected;
without finding as to the costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. L-17821 November 29, 1963

PRIMITIVO LOVINA, and NELLY MONTILLA, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and BENJAMIN
YONZON, defendants-appellants.

Gil R. Carlos and Associates for plaintiffs-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch X), in its Civil Case No. 41639,
enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and Communications from causing the removal of certain dams and dikes in
a fishpond owned by Primitivo and Nelly Lovina in the Municipality of Macabebe Province of Pampanga, covered by
T.C.T. No. 15905.

The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in Macabebe,
Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056.
After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance in
navigable waters, and, in his decision dated 11 August 1959, ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove
five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the expense of the
respondent. After receipt of the decision, the respondent filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent injunction,
which is now the subject of the present appeal.

The respondents-appellants, Florencio Moreno, Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and Benjamin
Yonzon, investigator, question the jurisdiction of the trial court, and attribute to it the following errors:

1. The trial court erred in holding in effect, that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional:

2. The trial court erred in receiving evidence de novo at the trial of the case;

3. The trial court erred in substituting its judgment for that of defendant Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and in reversing the latter's finding that the stream in question is a navigable river which
was illegally closed by plaintiffs;

4. The trial court erred in holding that the Sapang Bulati is a private stream; and

5. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiffs should first exhaust administrative remedy before filing
the instant petition.

The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court below was that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because
it invests the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable
authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches
upon such waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby
Constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act 2056 provides:

Section 1. Any provision or provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction or building of
dams, dikes or any other works which encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and
any other navigable public waters or waterways as well as the construction or building of dams, dikes or any
other works in areas declared as communal fishing grounds, shall be ordered removed as public nuisances
or a prohibited constructions as herein provided: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications may authorize the construction of any such work when public interest or safety so requires
or when it is absolutely necessary for the protection of private property.
 Section 2. When it is found by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, after due notice and
hearing, that any dam, dike or any other works now existing or may there after be constructed encroaches
into any public navigable waters, or that they are constructed in areas declared as communal fishing
grounds, he shall have the authority to order the removal of any such works and shall give the party
concerned a period not to exceed thirty days for the removal of the same: Provided, That fishpond
constructions or works on communal fishing grounds introduced in good faith before the areas we proclaimed
as fishing grounds shall be exempted from the provisions of this Act, provided such constructions or works do
not obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river, stream, or would not cause inundations of
agricultural areas: Provided, further, That should the party concerned fail to comply with the order of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications within the period so stated in the order, such removal shall
be effected by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications at the expense of the said party within ten
days following the expiration of the period given the party concerned:Provided, furthermore, That the
investigation and hearing to be conducted by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications under this
section shall be terminated and decided by him within a period which shall not exceed ninety days from the
time he shall have been notified in writing or a written complaint shall have been filed with him by any
interested party apprising him of the existence of a dam, dike or any other works that encroaches into any
other public navigable river, stream, coastal waters or any other public navigable waters or waterways and in
areas declared as communal fishing grounds: Provided, still furthermore, That the failure on the part of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications without justifiable or valid reason to terminate and decide a
case or effect the removal of any such works, as provided for in this section, shall constitute an offense
punishable under section three of this Act: And provided, finally, That the removal of any such works shall not
impair fishponds completed or about to be completed which do not encroach or obstruct any public navigable
river or stream and/or which would not cause inundations of agricultural areas and which have been
constructed in good faith before the area was declared communal fishing grounds.

The objections of the appellees to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an undue delegation of
judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for being unreasonable and arbitrary, are not tenable. It will
be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or
encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make, because the
bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession (Palanca
vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).

It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of some
questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these functions,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable
streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are, validly conferable
upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by
Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.

It thus appears that the delegation by Congress to executive or administrative agencies of functions of
judicial, or at least, quasi-judicial functions is incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their executive or
administrative powers, is not in violation of the Separation of Powers so far as that principle is recognized by
the Federal Constitution nor is it in violation of due process of law. (3 Willoughby on the Const. of the U.S.,
pp. 1654-1655)

The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of certain facts and to apply the law
thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private,
rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial officers
the power to declare the existence of facts which call into operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to
commissioners and other subordinate officer, power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a basis
for procedure in the enforcement of particular laws. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, p. 950, sec. 235)

s. 237. Powers to determine cases within Statute. — One important class of cases in which discretion may
properly be vested in administrative officers, which class is almost an operation of the general rule relating to
the ascertainment of facts, consists of those cases in which a general rule or prohibition is laid down and
 power is vested in an executive officer to determine when particular cases do or do not fall within such rule or
prohibition. Power exercised under such statutes, calling for the exercise of judgment in the execution of a
ministerial act, is never judicial in nature within the sense prohibited by the Constitution. (11 Am. Jur., Const.
Law, sec. 237, p. 952)

A direct precedent can be found in the "Bridge cases" upholding the constitutionality of the U.S. River and Harbor Act
of March 3, 1899, that empowered (sec. 18) the Secretary of War to take action, after hearing, for the removal or
alteration of bridges unreasonably obstructing navigation. On the issue of undue delegation of power, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled as follows:

Congress thereby declared that whenever the Secretary of War should find any bridge theretofore or
thereafter constructed over any of the navigable waterways of the United States to be an unreasonable
obstruction to the free navigation of such waters on account of insufficient height, width of span, or otherwise,
it should be the duty of the Secretary, after hearing the parties concerned, to take action looking to the
removal or alteration of the bridge, so as to render navigation through or under it reasonably free, easy, and
unobstructed. As this court repeatedly has held, this is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative or
judicial power to the Secretary. Union Bridge Co. vs. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385, 51 L. ed. 523, 533, 27
Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 192,54 L. ed. 435, 441, 30 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 356; Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 194. 205, 55 L. ed. 699, 703, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep.
603. The statute itself prescribes the general rule applicable to all navigable waters, and merely charged the
Secretary of War with the duty of ascertaining in each case, upon notice to the parties concerned, whether
the particular bridge came within the general rule. Of course, the Secretary's finding must be based upon the
conditions as they exist at the time he acts. But the law imposing this duty upon him speaks from the time of
its enactment. (Louisville Bridge Co. v. U.S., 61 L. ed. 395). (Emphasis supplied)

Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as nuisances of properties of great value can not be done except
through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary abatements without previous hearing, and are
inapplicable to the case before us where the law provides, and the investigator actually held, a hearing with notice to
the complainants and the, appellees, who appeared therein. It is noteworthy that Republic Act 2605 authorizes
removal of the unauthorized dikes either as "public nuisances or as prohibited constructions" on public navigable
streams, and those of appellees clearly are in the latter class.

It may not be amiss to state that the power of the Secretary of Public Works to investigate and clear public streams
free from unauthorized encroachments and obstructions was granted as far back as Act 3208 of the old Philippine
Legislature, and has been upheld by this Court (Palanca vs. Commonwealth, supra; Meneses vs. Commonwealth,
69 Phil. 647). We do not believe that the absence of an express appeal to the courts under the present Republic Act
2056 is a substantial difference, so far as the Constitution is concerned, for it is a well-known rule that due process
does not have to be judicial process; and moreover, the judicial review of the Secretary's decision would always
remain, even if not expressly granted, whenever his act violates the law or the Constitution, or imports abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

The argument that the action of the Secretary amounts to a confiscation of private property leads us directly to the
issue of fact whether a navigable portion of the Bulati creek had once traversed the registered lot of the appellees
Lovina and connected with Manampil creek that borders said lot on the northwest before it was closed by Jose de
Leon, Lovina's predecessor. The Secretary of Public Works has found from the evidence before him that, originally,
the sapang (creek) Bulati flowed across the property in question, and connected the Nasi river
withsapang Manampil; that in 1926 or thereabouts, the Bulati creek was 2 meters deep at high tide and 1/2 meter
deep at low tide, and the people used it as fishing grounds and as a communication way, navigating along its length
in bancas; that former registered owner, Jose de Jesus, closed about meters of the course of the sapangBulati that
lay within the lot in question by constructing dams or dikes at both sides and converting the lot into a fishpond.

The appellees, on the other hand, rely on the 1916 registration plan of the property (Exh. C), showing it to be merely
bounded by the Bulati creek on the southeast, as well as on the testimony introduced at the hearing of prohibition
case (over the objection of the Government counsel) that the Bulati creek did not enter the property.

The Court of First Instance found that "according to the location plan, Exhibit "C", the "Bulati creek, on which dikes
and dams in question were constructed was a mere estero and could not be considered a navigable stream then." It
is not explained how such fact could appear solely from the plan Exhibit "C" (no other proof being referred to), unless
indeed the court below so concluded from the fact that in said plan the Bulati creek does not appear to run within the
registered lot. The conclusion of lower court is not supported by its premises, because by law, the issuance of a
Torrens title does not confer title navigable streams (which are fluvial highways) within registered property, nor is it
conclusive on their non-existence, unless the boundaries of such streams had been expressly delimited in the
registration plan (Act 496, sec. 39 cf. Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449; Meneses Commonwealth, 69 Phil.
647), so that delimitation of their course may be made even after the decree of registration has become final. In the
present case, in truth the very plan of the appellees, Exhibit "C", shows parallel reentrant lines, around its point 65
and between points 44 and that indicate the existence of a stream connecting the sapang Bulati on the southeast
and the sapang Manampil on the northwest, and which the surveyor apparently failed delimit for some undisclosed
reason. That the stream was the prolongation of thesapang Bulati, that formerly flow across the registered lot, is also
shown by the fact that appellees' plan Exhibit "C", the westward continuation the Bulati creek (west of point 65),
which bounds the registered lot, is labelled "Etero Mabao". The plan thus corroborates the previously summarized
testimony laid before investigator Yonzon and relied upon by the Secretary in his administrative decision. Even more,
appellees' own caretaker, Yambao, showed investigator Yonzon the old course of the Bulati within the fishpond itself;
and this evidence is, likewise, confirmed by the cross-section profile of the ground near the dams in question (See
plan Annex "AA" of Yonzon's Report), where the old channel of the creek is clearly discernible. To be sure, appellees
contend that they were not shown this plan; but in their evidence before the court of first instance, they never
attempted, or offered, to prove that said plan is incorrect.

That the creek was navigable in fact before it was closed was also testified to by the government witnesses, whose
version is corroborated as we have seen.

Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in executive decisions in matters within their jurisdiction are
entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion (Com. of Customs
vs. Valencia, 54 O.G. 3505), none of which has been shown to exist in this case, we agree with appellant that the
court below erred in rejecting the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works.

The findings of the Secretary can not be enervated by new evidence not laid down before him, for that would be
tantamount to holding a new investigation, and to substitute for the discretion and judgment of the Secretary the
discretion and judgment of the court, to whom the statute had entrusted the case. It is immaterial that the present
action should be one for prohibition or injunction and not one for certiorari, in either event the case must be resolved
upon the evidence submitted to the Secretary, since a judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de
novo, but only an ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not in violation of the constitution or of the
laws, and are free from fraud or imposition, and whether they find reasonable support in the evidence. 1 Here, the
proof preponderates in favor of the Secretary's decision.

Nevertheless, we, agree with appellees that they can not be charged with failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
for the Secretary's decision is that of the President, in the absence of disapproval (Villena vs. Secretary of the
interior, 67 Phil. 451).

Finally, there being a possibility that when they purchased the property in question the appellees Lovina were not
informed of the illegal closure of the Bulati creek, their action, if any, against their vendor, should be, and is hereby,
reserved.

In resume, we rule:

(1) That Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public
Works;
(2) That absence of any mention of a navigable stream within a property covered by Torrens title does not confer title
to it nor preclude a subsequent investigation and determination of its existence;

(3) That the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works under Republic Act No. 2056 should be respected in the
absence of illegality, error of law, fraud, or imposition, so long as the said, findings are supported by substantial
evidence submitted to him.

(4) That ownership of a navigable stream or of its bed is not acquirable by prescription.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the writs of injunction issued therein are annulled and
set aside. Costs against appellees Lovina.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Cf. Manabat vs. Cruz, L-11228, Apr. 30, 1958; Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682; Ortua vs. Singson, 59
Phil. 440 Julian vs. Apostol, 52 Phil. 422.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

[G.R. No. L-3348. July 26, 1907. ]

JULIAN NAVAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HERMOGENES BENAVIDES, Defendant-Appellee.

Teodoro Gonzales, for Appellant.

W.L. Wright, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. — Where both the plaintiff and defendant except to the judgment of the lower court, they
must each present a bill of exceptions with assignments of error; assignments of errors without a bill of exceptions will
not be considered.

2. COMPLETION OF CONTRACT. — Under a contract for the construction of a dwelling, if the owner accepts the
completed house without objection, he is estopped from setting up that the material used in the construction of said
house was not in accordance with the plans and specifications.

DECISION

JOHNSON, J. :
This was an action commenced in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, by the plaintiff against the
defendant, for the purpose of recovering the sum of P1,663.70 for extra work done and material furnished in the
construction of a house situated in Calle Lemery, in the city of Manila.

From the evidence presented during the trial in the lower court, it appears that in the month of July, 1904, the plaintiff
entered into a written contract with the defendant, under the terms of which the plaintiff was to construct a dwelling
house for the sum of P5,730; that some time after the plaintiff had actually commenced the construction of the house
under the said contract, it become necessary, by reason of an order of the city engineer of the city of Manila, to make
certain changes in the form of said house; that at that time there was an agreement between the plaintiff and the
defendant that, if it was necessary for the plaintiff to expend additional labor and materials in the construction of the
modified plans of said house, the defendant should pay for the said additional labor and material.

The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the additional labor and material necessary for the construction of the house
as modified, amounted to P1,663.70. However, in the testimony given by the plaintiff during the trial of the cause in
the lower court, he fails to point out or to indicate in any way the items of the additional cost made necessary by the
modification of the original plans and specifications. He presented two witnesses, however, who attempt to state what
was the value of the additional material and labor. Eduardo Ramos, a mason, was one of them, and Sio Saco, a
carpenter, was the other. Ramos testified that he had the contract for doing the masonry work in the construction of
the house; that his original contract for doing said masonry work was P420, and that to build the house in accordance
with the modified plans it cost P550, or P130 more than the original contract price. Saco testified that he had a
contract with the plaintiff to perform all of the carpentry work upon the said house; that the original contract price was
P750, and that by reason of the modified plans, it cost him in labor and material P450 additional. The statement of
these two witnesses is the only specific showing of the additional cost in the construction of the building, by virtue of
the change made in the original plans.

The defendant admitted that the plans for the construction of the house had been changed and that at the time the
changes were made he, the defendant, had a talk with the plaintiff concerning the additional cost by reason of said
changes. The said defendant testified, concerning this conversation, as follows: jgc:cha nrobles.com .ph

"He [the plaintiff] then hold me that it was only a matter of two or three hundred pesos more of cost and that I [the
defendant] should not be afraid of that or bother about it. On that understanding we agreed that the construction
should be such as we talked about and that he [the plaintiff] would apply for a new license." cra la w virtua1a w libra ry

The lower court, after hearing the evidence, made the following findings of fact: jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"That the change of plans necessitated some additional material in the construction of the building, and some
additional work on the part of the plaintiff in its construction; that the plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable compensation
for the extra work and extra material furnished, arising from the change of plan from that contemplated in the
contract; that the value of all the extra work performed and the extra material furnished is greatly less than that
claimed by the plaintiff, and that the reasonable value of the extra work necessary to be performed and material
furnished on account of the change of plan of the building from that contemplated under the contract is the sum of
P270."cralaw virtua1a w libra ry

The court thereupon rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P270, with
interested at the rate of 6 per cent, from the date of the decision (February 19, 1906) and for the costs. Both plaintiff
and defendant presented an exception to the decision of the lower court, after presenting a motion for a new trial. The
plaintiff only presented a bill of exceptions. The defendant assigns certain errors in his brief presented in this court.
Inasmuch, however, as the defendant has not also presented a bill of exceptions, we can not consider his assignment
of errors.

The plaintiff and appellant made several assignments of error, and they may all be included under the general
statement that the lower court erred in finding that the reasonable value of the additional labor and material furnished,
by reason of the modifications made in the original contract, was only P270.

There was much conflict in the testimony of the witnesses concerning the real value of the additional labor and
material furnished. It is true that the witnesses Ramos and Saco do state the specific amount of the additional cost, by
reason of modifying the original contract, but they in no way specify in detail this additional cost. Their testimony was
simply the general statement, without giving any items of the additional cost.

In view of the conflict in the testimony adduced during the trial of said cause, and in view of the fact that the lower
court heard and saw the witnesses, we are not inclined to change the findings of fact. Therefore the judgment of the
lower court is hereby affirmed, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, from the date of said judgment and costs.

The defendant during the trial of said case attempted to show that the material used in the construction of said house
was not in accordance with the plans and specifications. The evidence shows, however, that after the house was
completed, he accepted the same without objection. This court has decided (Campbell, etc., v. Behn, Meyer &
Company, 2 Off. Gaz., 469; 3 Phil. Rep., 590) that the acceptance and occupation of a building by the owner amounts
to an acknowledgment that the work has been performed substantially as required by the contract. Inasmuch,
however, as the plaintiff does not make this an assignment of error in this court, it is unnecessary to consider that
question. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-30263-5 October 3, 1987

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. ANDRES REYES, Presiding Judge, Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
GODOFREDO R. EUSEBIO, URBANO C. LARA, GIL VENEZUELA, RODOLFO CENIDOZA, RAMON
OROSA, AND JOSEFINA OROSA (Spouses), THE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the Order of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District, Branch VI, Pasig, Rizal dated December 16, 1968 in Civil Case
No. 10047 entitled Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara vs. Director of Lands.
The dispositive portion of the questioned order reads:
Wherefore, the orders of this court dated May 8, 1968, June 29, 1968 and August 27, 968
are hereby set aside and the Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings is hereby
denied.
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
Sometime on April 17, 1956 respondents Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R. Eusebio filed with the Bureau
of Lands their Free Patent Applications for the parcels of land designated as Free Patent Applications Nos.
7-207 and 7-208 for Lot No. 1 (10.3629 hectares) and Lot No. 2 (15.2892 hectares), Psu-152606,
respectively, situated in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal. After the posting of notices and upon favorable
recommendation of a representative of the Bureau of Lands, said free patent applications were approved
on June 14, 1956 as shown by the order of approval of applications and issuance of patents. Thus, on June
16, 1956, Free Patent Nos. V-45853 and V45854 were issued to respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and
Urbano C. Lara, which patents were transcribed and registered on June 21, 1956 by the respondent
Register of Deeds of Rizal in the Registration Book for the Province of Rizal in accordance with Section
122 of Act No. 496, as amended, as Original Certificates of Title Nos. 140 and 139, respectively.
In a subsequent investigation conducted by the Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands, it
was discovered that the parcels of land patented and titled in the names of respondents Godofredo R.
Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara were actually under water and form part of the Laguna de Bay. Neither were
private respondents able to occupy or possess said lots. Evidence clearly showed that there were no signs
of cultivation or of any improvement thereon.
On March 16 and March 22, 1960, respondents Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R. Eusebio executed
separate affidavits, admitting that they have not complied with certain requirements of the Public Land Act
and expressly agreed to have their patents and certificates of title cancelled (Rollo, pp. 13-14).
By virtue of the findings of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands, the affidavits and
the surrender of the owner's copy of the certificate of title, the herein petitioner, represented by the Director
of Lands, as plaintiff, filed separate complaints against herein respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and
Urbano C. Lara and the respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal as defendants, before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 in said court, for the cancellation of Free
Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 and Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 140 and 139 (Rollo, pp. 15-20).
Accordingly, summons together with copies of the complaints were duly served upon all the defendants in
Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 as shown by the returns (Rollo, pp. 21-22) dated August 16, 1961
submitted by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. However, notwithstanding
their receipt of the summons and copies of the complaint, the defendants, herein respondents Godofredo
R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara, failed to file their answers to the complaint. As a result thereof and upon
proper motion of the plaintiff (herein petitioner) the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial Region,
Branch II, Pasig, Rizal, entered an order on November 25, 1961 (Rollo, p. 23) declaring defendants (herein
respondents) in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 in default. On October 6, 1962, on the basis of evidence
submitted by the plaintiff (herein petitioner) the Court of First Instance of Rizal, rendered separate
decisions * declaring null and void Free Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 and their corresponding Certificates of Title Nos. 140 and 139 and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel said patents and titles (Rollo, pp. 24-29) and for failure of defendants to move for reconsideration or appeal, said decisions
became final and executory (Rollo, p. 5).

On December 12, 1962, respondent Register of Deeds addressed separate and Identical letters to
respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara, informing them of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 and advising them to surrender their owner's duplicate
copy of Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 139 and 140 for cancellation pursuant to the directive of the
Court (Rollo, pp. 30-31). On December 27, 1962, said respondents wrote a letter to the Register of Deeds
stating that the owner's duplicate of title called for had long been surrendered to Atty. Eduardo Javier of the
Investigation Section of the Bureau of Lands (Rollo, p. 32).
On June 3, 1967, after the lapse of almost five (5) years, respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano
C. Lara, this time, as plaintiffs, instituted Civil Case No. 10047 against the Director of Lands, as defendant
(herein petitioner) for the annulment of the aforementioned decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch II in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, alleging as grounds therefor that the Court had not acquired
jurisdiction over their persons and that the decision was procured through fraud (Rollo, pp. 33-36).
Although, the records show that the Director of Lands had not been properly served with summons in Civil
Case No. 10047, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District, Branch VI, acting upon an Ex-
Parte Motion to Declare Defendant in Default filed by herein respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and
Urbano C. Lara declared defendant (herein petitioner) Director of Lands in default and allowed the plaintiffs
(respondents herein) to adduce their evidence before the Special Clerk of Court (Rollo, p. 38).
On July 6, 1967, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District, Branch VI, rendered a decision
declaring the decision dated October 6, 1962 of the Court of First Instance, 7th Judicial District, Branch II in
Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 null and void. The decretal portion of said decision reads as follows:
Wherefore, the decision rendered in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 is hereby declared
null and void and the Director of Lands is hereby ordered to reinstate Free Patents Nos. V
45853 and V-45854 issued in the names of Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R. Eusebio
respectively, and the Register of Deeds of Rizal is likewise ordered to reinstate OCT No.
139 and 140 issued in the names of the patentees pursuant to the aforesaid patents.
SO ORDERED.
On March 14, 1968, a Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings with Additional Parties was filed by
defendant (herein petitioner) Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, wherein it
alleged that the said court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (petitioner) among
other things (Rollo, pp. 43- 44). On the same day, the Director of Lands filed A Petition to Reopen
Proceedings in the amended court (Rollo, pp. 45-48). The aforestated petition averred that on July 3, 1967,
even before the promulgation of the aforementioned decision and notwithstanding the fact that their patents
and certificates of title had long been declared null and void in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748,
respondents Eusebio and Lara, in consideration of P10,000.00 for their respective parcels of land,
executed separate deeds of absolute sale involving the alleged lands in question in favor of respondents
Gil Venezuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza and Ramon Orosa (Rollo, p. 46). Subsequently, on August 9, 1967,
immediately upon securing the certification of the Clerk of Court that the decision in the instant case had
become final and executory, respondents caused the cancellation of Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 139
and 140 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 196349 and 196348,
respectively, in the names of respondents Gil Venezuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza and Ramon Orosa.
Accordingly, on August 22, 1967, in consideration of P25,000.00 for each alleged parcel, respondents Gil
Venezuela and Rodolfo Cenidoza executed separate deeds of transfer of rights in favor of respondents
spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
196348 and 196349 were cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-211957 add T-
211958 to respondents spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa. Respondents spouses, Ramon Orosa
and Josefina Orosa, in consideration of a loan in the amount of P800,000.00 executed a deed of mortgage
of the aforestated on December 27, 1967 in favor of respondent Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(Rollo, pp. 46-47).
On March 28, 1968, intervenors spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their motion for leave to
intervene in opposition to the Motion to Admit Petition to reopen proceedings with additional parties filed by
the Director of Lands on March 16, 1968 (Rollo, p. 178) and the Intervenors' Opposition on the aforesaid
petition to reopen proceedings of the petitioner (Rollo, p. 181). Respondent Gil, Venezuela filed his
opposition on April 17, 1968 (Rollo, p. 104) and his Supplemental Opposition while respondent Rodolfo
Cenidoza filed his separate opposition to the petition to reopen proceedings on June 3, 1968 (Rollo, p.
239).
The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, after consideration of the motion to admit petition to reopen
proceedings with additional parties as well as the oppositions interposed thereto granted the motion on
May 8, 1968 (Rollo, p. 49). Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order by the court was filed by the
intervenors spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa on May 27, 1968 (Rollo, p. 190) while respondent
Gil Venezuela filed his urgent manifestation and motion for reconsideration on June 6, 1968 (Rollo, p. 114).
On June 8, 1968, the Director of Lands (petitioner herein) filed his opposition to the intervenors' and Gil
Venezuela's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated May 8, 1968 (Rollo, p. 195). Consequently on
June 12, 1968 the intervenors spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their Intervenors' Reply to
the Defendants' Opposition (Rollo, p. 203).
On June 29, 1986, the Court of First Instance of Rizal denied, in an order, the motion for reconsideration
filed by the intervenors and set the hearing on July 29, 1968 (Rollo, p. 50). A motion for Clarification and/or
Reconsideration of the Order of June 29, 1968 and Motion for Second Reconsideration of the Order of May
8, 1960 was filed by the intervenors on July 22, 1968 (Rollo, p. 205). However this was denied by the court
in an order dated August 27, 1968 (Rollo, p. 51). Meanwhile, the intervenors filed their third motion for
reconsideration of the order of May 8, 1968 and/or Clarification and Reconsideration of the Order of August
27, 1968 on November 2, 1968 (Rollo, p. 217), which was opposed by herein petitioner in its Opposition to
Intervenors' Third Motion for Reconsideration on November 23, 1968 (Rollo, p. 228).
On December 16, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Rizal granting the said third motion for
reconsideration, set aside its Orders dated May 8, 1968, June 29, 1968 and August 27, 1968 and denied
the Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings. The court ruled that the petition is not the proper
course of action available to the Director of Lands, who has not availed of the remedies provided by the
Rules of Court or the land Registration Court such as relief from the order of default or appeal from
judgment or review thereof, and has consequently lost his personality when he was declared in default, and
the Court, its jurisdiction to entertain the aforementioned Petition to Reopen (Rollo, pp. 52-53).
Hence, this petition.
Notice of lis pendens was given to the Register of Deeds on March 10, 1969 (Rollo, p. 57). On March 11,
1969, in a resolution promulgated by this Court, the respondents were required to file their answers and a
writ of preliminary injunction was issued without bond (Rollo, p. 60). Respondents except the Register of
Deeds of Rizal were restrained from entering into any transaction in connection with Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-211957 and T-211958 and specifically prohibit the respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal to
accept, record, transcribe and register any transaction concerning the free patents and certificates of title
subject matter of Civil Cases Nos. 6747-48 (Rollo, pp. 60-61).
On March 26, 1969, respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa manifested that they be
furnished with a copy of the petition for certiorari so that they may file their answer thereto (Rollo, pp. 65-
66). Respondent Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank filed its answer on April 2, 1969 (Rollo, pp. 71-
73) while respondent Gil Venezuela and respondent spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their
answers on April 24, 1969 and April 16, 1969, respectively (Rollo, pp. 95-103; 120-137). Respondent
Rodolfo A. Cenidoza filed his answer on May 2, 1969 (Rollo, pp. 236-238), but respondents patentees
Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara did not file their answers.
In the Resolution of May 12,1969, the hearing of these cases was set for June 18, 1969 (Rollo, p. 235). At
said hearing, counsel for petitioner was given twenty (20) days within which to submit its memorandum in
lieu of oral argument while counsel for respondents was granted leave to submit a reply thereto and
petitioner was allowed to submit a rejoinder (Rollo, p. 242). The Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Director of Lands filed its memorandum on August 16, 1969 (Rollo, p. 253). Respondent spouses,
Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their reply memorandum on October 21, 1971 (Rollo, p. 315) while
a supplemental reply was filed by Gil Venezuela on October 30, 1971 (Rollo, p. 394). On June 26, 1987,
respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed an urgent motion to resolve (Rollo, p. 409).
In his memorandum the Director of Lands assails the following acts of respondent Judge as constituting
grave abuse of discretion:
A. Taking cognizance of and giving due course to the complaint of Godofredo R. Eusebio
and Urbano C. Lara against the Director of Lands instead of dismissing the complaint
outright.
B. Declaring the Director of Lands in default notwithstanding non-service of summons and a
copy of the complaint upon said defendant.
C. Setting aside and declaring null and void the two (2) previous, valid, final and fully
implemented decisions of the same Court in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748.
D. Granting, after two (2) previous denials thereof, the third pro forma motion for
reconsideration of respondents Orosa spouses.
E. Denying the Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings of the Director of Lands
after having previously granted said motion. (Rollo, p. 262).
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether or not a decision which has long become final and executed,
can be annulled on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant and that
the decision was procured through fraud.
The petition is impressed with merit.
There is no question that the Court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, respondents
herein, Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, respectively, as
clearly adduced from the evidence presented that personal service was made on them. As shown by the
Sheriff's returns, in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, respondent Godofredo R. Eusebio was duly served
with summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 6747, while Urbano C. Lara was personally
served with summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 6748. Both services were made on
August 16, 1961 upon the respondents at Bambang, Pasig, Rizal — their recorded address (Rollo, pp. 265-
266).
Apart from the fact that Deputy Sheriff Maximo de Silva enjoys the presumption that he had regularly
performed his duty, the records amply show that, contrary to respondents Eusebio's and Lara's claim that
they were completely unaware of the proceedings, they were duly summoned in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and
6748 on August 16, 1961; that copies of the decisions in these cases were furnished them by the Clerk of
Court of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that the Register of Deeds in separate letters informed them of
the decisions in these cases and in reply to the request of the Register of Deeds to surrender their owners'
duplicate certificates of OCT Nos. 140 and 139, they alleged in a joint letter that they had long surrendered
their owner's duplicates certificates to the Bureau of Lands (Rollo, p. 267). Jurisdiction over the person of a
defendant is acquired when he actually receives the summons (Fuentes vs. Bautista, 53 SCRA 420
[1979]).
Thus, it is beyond dispute that all the proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 are regular and that
the trial court rendered valid judgment on the aforestated cases which have become final and executory
and are res adjudicata. This Court ruled in the case of (Zansibarian Residents Association vs. Municipality
of Makati, 135 SCRA 235 [1985]), that once judgment has become final, the issue therein should be laid at
rest. Final judgment was promulgated and a writ of execution was issued. Respondents herein did not avail
of any remedies available to them until after five (5) long years when they filed Civil Case No. 10047 in
another court.
As held by this Court in Bayer Philippines, Inc. vs. Agana, 63 SCRA 355 [1975], "Once a court renders a
final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial
function as regards any matter related to the controversy litigated comes to an end. The execution of its
judgment is purely a ministerial phase of adjudication. Indeed the nature of its duty to see to it that the
claim of the prevailing party is fully satisfied from the properties of the loser is generally ministerial." A
judgment whether correct or not becomes final when the plaintiff did not appeal said judgment (Malia vs.
IAC, 138 SCRA 116 [1985]) and courts are without jurisdiction over the case once judgment has become
final (Vda. de Emmas vs. Emmas, 95 SCRA 470 [1979]). The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded
on Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgment of the courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. vs. Arciaga, 148 SCRA 433 [1987]).
Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. 10047 is improper and there can be no justification for respondent
Judge's taking cognizance of and giving due course to the complaint filed therein by respondents Eusebio
and Lara against the Director of Lands; much less his setting aside of final, executory and fully
implemented judgments resulting in the cancellation of original certificates of titles issued by respondent
Register of Deeds of Rizal. Where judgment had long become final and executory and absent a showing
that respondents were deprived of due process or that said judgment was procured by extrinsic or collateral
fraud, the judgment can no longer be set aside (Gaba vs. Castro, 120 SCRA 505 [1983]).
Moreover, the doctrine of non-interference has been regarded as an elementary principle of higher
importance in the administration of justice that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be
opened, modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction (30-A Am Jur 605). As this Court ruled
in the case of Mas vs. Dumara-og 12 SCRA 34 [1964], a Judge of a branch of one should not annul the
order of a judge of another branch of the same court. Any branch even if it be in the same judicial district
that attempts to annul a judgment of a branch of the CFI either exceeds its jurisdiction Cabigo vs. Del
Rosario, 44 Phil. 84 [1949]) or acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (PNB vs.
Javellana, 92 Phil. 525 [1952]). Thus, in the case ofParco vs. CA, 111 SCRA 262, this Court held that the
various branches of the Court of First Instance being co-equal cannot interfere with the respective cases of
each branch, much less a branch's order or judgment.
Pertinent thereto is Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appear as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
the inferior courts as herein provided. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa, Gil Venezuela and Rodolfo Cenidoza contend
that they are buyers in good faith. Besides the fact that such contention is belied by the records which show
that on July 3, 1967, even before the promulgation of the decision in Civil Case No. 10047, and while their
patents and titles remained cancelled, respondents Eusebio and Lara, in consideration of P10,000.00 paid
to them for their respective parcels, executed separate deeds of absolute sale over the lands in question in
favor of Gil Venezuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza and Ramon Orosa (Rollo, p. 259). The Court ruled in the case
of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480 [1987]). That it is well settled that any title issued on non-
disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. In the
case at bar, the free patents and certificates of title issued to Eusebio and Lara cover areas which form
parts of Laguna de Bay. These are neither agricultural nor disposable. Subject patents and titles were
erroneously issued due to misrepresentations and false reports and must therefore be cancelled. Any false
statement in an application for public land shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the title granted. This
rule applies even after the issuance of the certificate of title (Chacon Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 124
SCRA 784 [1983]). A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud, and the doctrine of
indefeasibility of torrens title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud (De Leon vs. Abanilla, 124
SCRA 358). Likewise, the Court ruled in Cuevas vs. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1986], that mere possession
of land does not itself divest the land of its public character.
Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of its ownership of the land nor operate to
change the public character of the land to private (Director of Lands vs. Gonzales, 120 SCRA 375 [1983]).
Under the same principle, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, although an innocent mortgagee
for value, acquires no protection under the Land Registration Law.
While it is true that a bank is not required, before accepting a mortgage, to make an investigation of the title
of the property being given as security (Philippine National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang-Villalon, 139
SCRA 570 [1985]), and that where the torrens title of the land was in the name of the mortgagor and later
given as security for a bank loan, the subsequent declaration of said Title as null and void is not a ground
for nullifying the mortgage rights of the bank which has acted in good faith (Philippine National Cooperative
Bank vs. Carandang-Villalon, supra; Penullar vs. PNB, 120 SCRA 171 [1983]), it is apparent that the law on
innocent purchasers for value does not apply insofar as non-disposable public lands are concerned.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby rule that: (1) the decision dated July 6, 1967 and order dated
December 16, 1968 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (2) the decisions in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748
dated October 6, 1962 are reinstated; (3) the Register of Deeds of Rizal is directed to cancel all Certificates
of Titles issued in connection with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 10047; and (4) the real estate
mortgage I gage executed by the respondent spouses Orosa in favor of the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank is SET ASIDE, but their indebtedness must be paid to the Bank.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Gangayco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS, in his capacity as Judge of CFI South Cotabato, Branch I, General
Santos City, ISAGANI DU TIMBOL and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL SANTOS
CITY, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan and
Solicitor Patricio M. Patajo for petitioner.
Quitain Law Office for private respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint in its
Civil Case No. 1253, entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Isagani Du Timbol and the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Defendants",
instituted by the plaintiff to declare null and void Free Patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 based thereon issued in the name
of defendant Isagani Du Timbol; to order the aforesaid defendant to surrender the owner's duplicate of O.C.T. No. P-2508 and the defendant Register of Deeds to
cancel the same; to decree the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public domain, and granting such further relief as may be just and equitable in the
premises.

The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila Soria, who on
February 23, 1966, transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol
who filed his application therefor on February 3, 1969, as a transferee from Precila Soria.
On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the President of the Philippines for the
land in question, and on July 20, 1970, after transmittal of the patent to the Register of Deeds of General
Santos City, Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 was issued in the name of defendant Isagani
Du Timbol.
On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City (Civil Case No. 1253),
to declare free patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2508 in the name of defendant
Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land in question to the mass of
public domain. The action is based on the ground that the land covered thereby is a forest or timber land
which is not disposable under the Public Land Act; that in a reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity
where the land in question is situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said land was
plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700 to be inside the area which was reverted to the category of
public forest, whereas the application for free patent by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on June 3, 1969, or
more than eleven years thereafter; that the said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private
respondent Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land applied for.
Invoking the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-28591, 30 SCRA 207-301), holding that a
certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in
misrepresenting that the land covered by the application is part of the public domain when it is not, the
respondent court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Certificate of Title based on the patent had
became indefeasible in view of the lapse of the one-year period prescribed under Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act for review of a decree of title on the ground of fraud. From this order of June 22, 1973,
dismissing the complaint, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines has appealed to this Court for review.
After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent
and title is not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and, hence the patent and title
thereto are null and void.
The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the
state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of
a forest reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either
the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973. Although the Director of Lands has jurisdiction over
public lands classified as agricultural under the constitution, or alienable or disposable under the Public
Land Act, and is charged with the administration of all laws relative thereto, mineral and timber lands are
beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation,
protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reservations and
over the granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816
of the Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber land is clearly
established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest Development that it is within the portion of the
area which was reverted to the category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958. When
the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for free patent over the land in question on June 3,
1969, the area in question was not a disposable or alienable public land but a public forest. Titles issued to
private parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land covered thereby is not disposable public land but
forest land are void ab initio. In Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA p. 508, 512,
this Court said:
And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue a patent because the
land involved was still inalienable forest land when granted, then it may be plausibly
contended that the patent title would be ab initio void, subject to attack at any time by any
party adversely affected. (Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, supra,
citing Civil Code Arts. 1409 and 1421; Vaño vs. Insular Gov't., 41 Phil. 161; Aderable vs.
Director of Forestry, L-13663, March 25, 1960).
A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no authority to do so (Knight vs. Land Ass.,
142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, 35L ED. 974; emphasis supplied). If a person obtains a title under the
Public Land Act which includes, by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the
Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a
public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land
illegally included. (See Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769)
The case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-28591, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 297, relied upon by
respondent Court in dismissing this case, is not controlling. In that case no forest land was involved but
agricultural public land which was first covered by a patent issued to one party and later registered under
the Torrens System by the other party. The litigation was between private parties where the party who
registered it under Act No. 496 sought the nullity of the title of the patentee under the Public Land Act. In
the case at bar the party seeking the nullity of the title and reversion of the land is the state itself which is
specifically authorized under Section 101 of the Public Land Act to initiate such proceedings as an attribute
of sovereignty, a remedy not available to a private individual.
The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that applicant Isagani Du Timbol was never in possession of the
property prior to his filing the application, contrary to the provisions of law that the applicant must have
been in possession or cultivation thereof for at least 30 years; that the applicant, after diligent search by the
Acting Chief of the Survey-Party, Francisco R. Alcones, in South Cotabato, could not be contacted because
he is a resident of Davao City; that there are no existing signs of improvements found in the area in
question as it is not under cultivation but covered with grasses, bushes and small trees; that it is being used
as ranch for grazing cows by the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot; that no monuments were placed on the area
surveyed which goes to show that there was no actual survey thereof; that the property in question is inside
the ranch of the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1244 and, therefore,
inside the forest zone; and that said ranch has a fence around it to show that other persons could not enter
and cultivate the same, and that the signature of then Acting District Land Officer Elias de Castro of South
Cotabato has been forged to facilitate the issuance of patent in favor of Isagani Du Timbol.
The above alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud in the filing of the application and obtaining title to
the land, and if proven would override respondent Judge's order dismissing the case without hearing. The
misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing
thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land
Law which provides as follows:
That statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions or parts
of any concession, title or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false
statement thereon or omission of facts, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts
set forth in such statement, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the
material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the
concession, title or permit granted. ...
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is procured
through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property
belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with
the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void (Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA, 71, 79-80; emphasis supplied). The lapse of
the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the
cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had
been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should
not be a shield of fraud in securing title. (J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog, L-15398, December 29,
1962, 6 SCRA 938, page 38).
Considering that it is the state is seeking the cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani Du Timbol, said
title has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the state. A title founded on
fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof, through a petition
filed in court by the Solicitor General, (Sumail vs. Court of First Instance of Cotabato, 51 O.G. p. 2414 Phil.
L-8278. 96 Phil. 946: Eugenio, et al., vs. Perdido, et al., G. R. No. L-7083, May 19, 1955; De los Santos vs.
Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap G.R. No. L-6088, Feb. 24, 1954, 94 Phil. 405).
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the state
in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Jugado et al., G.R. No. L-
14707, May 23, 1961). Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of
Limitations does not run against the state (Article 1108, paragraph 4 of the New Civil Code). The right of
reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred prescription (Republic of the Philippines vs. Ramona
Ruiz, et al., G.R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348. People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. L-15484, Jan.
31, 1963, 47 SCRA 12; Government of the Philippines vs. Monte de Piedad 35 Phil. 728; 751-753).
Even granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol can no longer be reopened under the
Land Registration Act, the land covered thereby may be reconveyed to the state in an action for
reconveyance under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act), for the remedy of
reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the complaint for the grant of such other relief as may
be just and equitable in the premises.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent court, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the
complaint, and that of September 29, 1973, denying the motion for its reconsideration, both issued in Civil
Case No. 1253 of the respondent court, are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent court shall
proceed to hear said Civil Case and render judgment thereon accordingly.
Costs against respondent Isagani Du Timbol.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur in the judgment setting aside respondent court's orders which erroneously dismissed petitioner's
complaint on the ground of purported indefeasibility of private respondent's torrens certificate of title under
section 38 of Act 496 and ordering the remand of the case for trial and disposition on the merits.
Petitioner's complaint is not barred by the cited Act since it duly alleges that respondent's torrens title was
issued pursuant to a free patent covering forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public
Land Act and if these factual allegations are duly established at the trial, petitioner would be entitled to a
judgment that the patent and title of respondent, being part of the forest zone, are null and void.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the judgment setting aside respondent court's orders which erroneously dismissed petitioner's
complaint on the ground of purported indefeasibility of private respondent's torrens certificate of title under
section 38 of Act 496 and ordering the remand of the case for trial and disposition on the merits.
Petitioner's complaint is not barred by the cited Act since it duly alleges that respondent's torrens title was
issued pursuant to a free patent covering forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public
Land Act and if these factual allegations are duly established at the trial, petitioner would be entitled to a
judgment that the patent and title of respondent, being part of the forest zone, are null and void.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. L-9865 December 24, 1915

VERGO D. TUFEXIS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO OLAGUERA and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF GUINOBATAN, represented by its
president, Agapito Paulate, defendants-appellees.
Rafael de la Sierra for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee Municipal Council of Guinobatan.
No appearance for the other appellee.

TORRES, J.:
Counsel for plaintiff, in his written petition of May 13, 1913, prayed the Court of First Instance of Albay to
declare that his client was entitled to the possession and use of the land referred to in the complaint in
conformity with the terms of the Government concession (Exhibit A), of which he claimed to be the sole and
lawful owner; that the defendants be ordered to remove from the said land all the stores, sheds, billiard
tables, and other obstructions thereon, so that plaintiff might reconstruct the public market building on the
said land in accordance with the provisions of the said concession, and that they be ordered to pay jointly
and severally to the plaintiff, as damages, the sum of P250 per month from March 1, 1912, until the date on
which the land be vacated, and to pay the legal costs and expenses of the suit.
After the complaint had been answered by counsel for the defendant Francisco Olaguera, who prayed that
his client be absolved therefrom, with the costs against the plaintiff, the provincial fiscal, in the name and
representation of the municipality of Guinobatan, demurred on the ground that plaintiff lacked the
personality to institute the action and further alleged that the complaint did not set forth sufficient facts to
constitute a cause of action.1awphil.net

By an order of August 25, 1913, the court sustained the demurrer filed by the defendant municipality of
Guinobatan, allowed plaintiff ten days in which to amend his complaint, and notified him that unless he did
so within that period the action would be dismissed.
Counsel for plaintiff, by a writing of the 27th of the said month, set forth: That he objected to the above
ruling as he believed it erroneous and contrary to law; that he did not desire to amend his complaint,
wherefore, in accordance with the provisions of section 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court
should render such judgment in the case as the law might warrant, and his exception to the said ruling
should be entered on the record. By an order of September 1, 1913, the court, overruling the motion made
by the defendant Olaguera, dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiff, Vergo D. Tufexis, against the
municipal council of Guinobatan on the ground that plaintiff had not amended his complaint. Plaintiff's
counsel, when notified of this ruling, excepted thereto and moved for a rehearing and a new trial. This
motion was overruled, whereupon the plaintiff excepted and filed the proper bill of exceptions.
In the complaint filed by counsel for Vergo D. Tufexis, it was alleged that on September 30, 1911, plaintiff
acquired at a public sale held in execution of a judgment rendered against Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, a piece
of property situated in the municipality of Guinobatan, consisting of a frame building of strong materials with
a galvanized-iron roof, erected on a parcel of land belonging to that municipality and intended for a public
market; that plaintiff also acquired at the sale all the right, interest, title, and participation in the said
property that appertained or might appertain to Pardo y Pujol; that the said building was constructed by
virtue of a concession granted by the former Spanish government to Ricardo Pardo y Cabañas, father of
the judgment debtor, who, by a public instrument of July 31, 1912, renounced his right to redeem the said
property and conveyed it to plaintiff, together with all his rights therein, the instrument of grant, Exhibit A,
being attached to the complaint as a part thereof; that on January 2, 1912, the said building was totally
destroyed by an accidental fire; that subsequent to the date just mentioned and for several months
thereafter the municipal council of Guinobatan carried on negotiations with plaintiff for the purchase of his
rights in the said concession; that these negotiations could not be brought to a conclusion because the
municipal council had acted therein deceitfully, fraudulently, and in bad faith and for the sole purpose of
beguiling, deceiving, and prejudicing plaintiff in order to prevent him from exercising his right to reconstruct
the burned market building and utilize it in accordance with the terms of the said concession; that the
defendant municipal council, without plaintiff's consent and in connivance with the other defendant,
Francisco Olaguera, had authorized the latter unlawfully to take possession of all the land from March 1,
1912, in violation of plaintiff's rights; that the said Olaguera occupied the same with booths or stores for the
sale of groceries and other merchandise, for billiard tables, and other analogous uses and derived unlawful
gain from the revenues and rents produced by the said buildings; that plaintiff was entitled to the
possession of the said land in accordance with the concession, which was in full force and effect and
belonged to plaintiff; that plaintiff proposed to construct another public market building on the same land,
but that the defendants had prevented him from using the land and reconstructing thereon the said public
market building, and refused to recognize plaintiff's right and to vacate the land that had been occupied by
the burned edifice.
The provincial fiscal alleged as a ground for the demurrer that in no part of the instrument of concession did
it appear that the privilege granted to Ricardo Pardo y Cabañas had likewise been granted to his
successors or assignees, and that therefore such rights and actions as might have appertained to the
assignee, Pardo y Cabañas, could not be conveyed to nor could they be acquired by any other person; that
it was alleged in the complaint that the building was completely destroyed by fire on January 2, 1912, and
that if plaintiff's right to the possession of the land was conditioned by the existence thereon of the said
market building, such right had terminated by the disappearance of the building, inasmuch as plaintiff's
right of action for the possession of the land was a corollary of the existence or nonexistence of the market
building, and upon the disappearance of the latter the eland had reverted to the control of its owner; that
pursuant to the terms of the said concession, the land belonging to the municipality was granted for the
purpose of constructing thereon a market, and as this market had disappeared plaintiff would need a new
concession, if it could be obtained, in order to be entitled to the possession of the land and to construct a
new building; that by plaintiff's acquiring the right, title and interest of Ricardo Pardo y Pujol in the land he
could not be understood to have also acquired such right and interest in the building intended for a public
market, for the purchase of the building refers only to the edifice itself and it never could be understood that
plaintiff acquired any right in the concession, which was never sold to him, as the complaint contains no
allegation whatever that he purchased or acquired such right; that a personal privilege like the said
concession is only temporary and is extinguished at the death of the grantee, unless otherwise provided in
the grant; and that, from the lack of an allegation in the complaint that plaintiff legally purchased or acquired
the right in the said concession, it was evident that the complaint did not allege sufficient facts to constitute
a cause of action and was fatally defective.
The question presented in the case at bar consists of whether a building of strong materials, erected by the
said debtor's father, Ricardo Pardo y Cabañas, on land belonging to the municipality of Guinobatan and
intended for a public market, by virtue of a concession granted on August 4, 1884, under the conditions
therein imposed upon the grantee, could be attached and sold for the payment of a certain debt owed by
Ricardo Pardo y Pujol to a third person who had obtained a final judgment.
In deciding this question it is indispensable to determine what rights were acquired by Pardo y Pujol's
father by virtue of the said concession granted to him by the Spanish Government, in the building erected
by him on a parcel of land belonging to the municipality of Guinobatan. The concession referred to
contains, among other provisions, the following: itc-a1f

ARTICLE 1. There is hereby granted to Mr. Ricardo Pardo y Cabañas the parcel of land in the
pueblo of Guinobatan, a prolongation of another parcel belonging to him, situated between the
store and house of the Chinaman Valentin Garcia and that of Mr. Roco, following the line of Calle
Real or Calzada de Albay and that of Calle del Carmen, up to and as far as the square that is to be
laid out in the said pueblo.
ART. 2. On the said land the petitioner shall construct a public market building, with a galvanized-
iron roof, in accordance with the plan submitted to this office on the 13th of last May and which was
approved by his Excellency the Governor-General in conformity with the changes recommended by
the advisory board of the consulting board of public works; and these changes are those hereinafter
specified.
ART. 3. The said Mr. Pardo is granted the right to enjoy the revenue derived from the floor space of
the market for the period of forty years, since the revenue from such floor space appertains to the
grantee of the said service. By floor space is meant the right to shelter or retail merchandise in the
market belonging to the grantee.
 ART. 4. On the expiration of the said period both the land aforementioned and the building thereon
constructed shall be the property of the Government and the building shall be delivered to it in good
condition.
ART. 5. It shall be obligatory for every vendor to sell his goods in the said market, which shall be the
only one in the said pueblo.
ART. 7. The said authority shall put Mr. Pardo in possession of the land affected by this concession,
and the proper proceedings in connection therewith shall be had in the presence of the chief
engineer of public works of the said district and the headmen of the pueblo.
ART. 8. Mr. Pardo shall inform this office of the date of the commencement of the work of
construction, and the work shall be inspected by the public works officials residing in Albay; the
building when completed shall be examined and accepted by the chief engineer of the district of
Nueva Caceres or by the deputy to whom the latter may delegate this duty: all with the knowledge
of the office of the inspector of public works.
The land on which the building was erected and which is referred to in the foregoing articles, contained in
the franchise granted by the Government of the former sovereignty, belongs to the municipality of
Guinobatan. Although the building was constructed at the expense and with the money of the grantee,
Ricardo Pardo y Cabañas, it is, nevertheless, the property of the state or of the said municipality, and was
temporarily transferred to the grantee, Pardo y Cabañas, in order that he might enjoy the usufruct of its
floor space for forty years, but on the termination of this period the said right of usufruct was to cease and
the building was to belong finally and absolutely to the state or the municipality in representation thereof.
For these reasons, then, there is no question that the building and the land on which it was erected, since
they did not belong to the grantee, Pardo y Cabañas, nor do they belong to his son and heir, Ricardo Pardo
y Pujol, could not be attached or sold for the payment of a debt contracted by the latter.
The concession granted by the former Spanish Government is personal and transferable only by
inheritance, and in no manner could it be conveyed as a special personal privilege to another and a third
person unless were an hereditary successor of the grantee, Pardo y Cabañas, without knowledge and
consent of the administrative authorities under whose control the special right of usufruct in the floor space
of the said market building was enjoyed and exercised.
Even though it is unquestionable that the creditor has a right to collect the money due him, out of his
debtor's property, yet when among such property is included the right of usufruct in a public-service
building and this right is closely related to a service of a public character, the right that lies in behalf of the
creditor for the collection of a debt from the person who enjoys the said special privilege of right of usufruct
in the floor space of a building intended for a public market is not absolute and may be exercised only
through the action of a court of justice with respect to the profits or revenues obtained under the special
right of usufruct granted to the debtor.
Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, as the successor and heir of the grantee, Pardo y Cabañas, is bound to pay his
debts and his property can be attached on petition of his creditors. However, his personal privilege of
usufruct in the floor space of the public market building of Guinobatan cannot be attached like any ordinary
right, because that would mean that a person who has contracted with the state or with the Governmental
authorities to furnish a service of a public character would be substituted, for another person who took no
part in the contract, and that the regular course of a public service would be disturbed by the more or less
legal action of the creditors of a grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the public interests.
It is indeed true that the building, which for many years served as a public market in the pueblo of
Guinobatan, was erected out of the private funds of the grantee, Pardo y Cabañas, and at first sight it
seems natural that the latter, who paid the cost of the construction of the building, should be its owner.
However, judging from the agreement between him and the Government authorities, he was granted the
right to usufruct in the floor space of the said building in order that, during the period of forty years, he
might reimburse himself for and collect the value of the building constructed by him; and it must be believed
that Pardo y Cabañas, before executing the contract with the Government for the purpose of obtaining the
right of usufruct granted to him and before accepting the contract, thought over its conditions deliberately
and maturely and felt sure that he would profit thereby, that is, that he would reimburse himself for the
value of the building he erected, and obtain interest on the investment and other advantages by enjoying
the usufruct for the space of forty long years, as in fact even after his death this right continued to be
enjoyed by his son, Ricardo Pardo y Pujol. Therefore, the said privilege conferred on the grantee by the
Spanish Government on August 4, 1884, was neither onerous nor prejudicial to him or his heir, but on the
contrary was beneficial to them.
So, if neither the land nor the building in question belongs to Pardo y Pujol, it is evident that they could not
be attached or sold at public auction to satisfy his debt and, consequently, the attachment and sale of the
said Government property executed on petition of the creditor of the said Pardo y Pujol are notoriously
illegal, null and void, and the acquisition of the property by plaintiff confers upon him no right whatever
based on the said concession.
In the decision in the case of Lopez vs. Alvarez (9 Phil. Rep., 28) the principle was asserted that:
In attachments of all kinds it is an essential condition that the thing which is attached shall be the property
of the debtor, and from no provision of the Mortgage Law can any conclusion be drawn which shall be
contrary to this principle.
This same principle was set up in the decision of the case of Alvaran vs. Marquez (11 Phil. Rep., 263).
It having been demonstrated by the foregoing reasons that the building constructed on land of the
municipality of Guinobatan for a public market could not be attached and sold as the result of a debt
contracted by Ricardo Pardo y Pujol in favor of a third person, we shall now proceed to examine whether
an attachment would lie of the special right, granted by the former Spanish Government to the said debtor's
father, of usufruct in the floor space of the said market and right to collect the revenues therefrom for the
period of forty years, counted from the date of the granting of the said right.
Without the consent of the proper administrative official, a grantee, or one charged with conducting a public
service such as a market of the municipality of Guinobatan, cannot be permitted to be substituted by any
other person, though this latter be a creditor of the usufructuary grantee. Hence, we hold that the
attachment of the right of usufruct in the said building and of collecting the revenue obtained from the floor
space of the said public market of Guinobatan, was illegal, because, were this right susceptible of
attachment, a third person, as a creditor or a purchaser, might exercise such right, notwithstanding his
personal status, instead of the grantee contractor. This theory does not bar the creditor from collecting the
money owed him by the grantee, inasmuch as he has the right to petition the courts to allow him through
proper legal proceedings to collect his money out of the revenues produced by the usufruct conferred by
the Government on the grantee of the said service.
The concession obtained by Ricardo Pardo y Pujol's father on August 4, 1884, is a true sovereignty and the
grantee, Pardo y Cabañas, and therefore the stipulations made by and between the contracting parties, the
obligation to which that contract may have given rise, and the consequences that may have been entailed
by the contract, all come within the scope of the civil law which guarantees the rights of the contracting
parties.
Although in our opinion the said concession is somewhat of the nature of a franchise, yet we do not think
that the provisions of sections 56 to 61 of Act No. 1459 are applicable to the case at bar, for these sections
refer to a franchise granted to a corporation, while the concession given by the former Spanish
Government was granted to a private party and not to a corporation or judicial entity. Therefore, though
under the said Act a franchise is subject to attachment, the Act contains no express provision whatever
which authorizes the attachment and sale of a right or franchise especially granted to a private party under
the conditions in which the concession in question was granted. The substitution of a third person instead
of the one who obtained such an administrative concession must be explicitly authorized by the proper
official of the administrative branch of the Government in order that the substitute may exercise the right so
granted.
In the case of Ricardo y Pujol, the grantee of the usufruct on the floor space in the said market building in
Guinobatan, his creditor, in order to obtain the payment of his credit, could have applied to the courts for an
attachment of the revenues or proceeds collected by his said debtor by virtue of the said concession; but it
was in no wise proper to attach and sell the right granted by the public administration to operate and enjoy
the usufruct of the floor space of the said public market.
Although there is no similarity between the management of a public market and that of a railroad company,
yet for the reason that the operation of the one as well as the other is of public interest, when a creditor of
such a company sues to collect a debt it would be improper to attach the stationary equipment and rolling
stock of the railroad — only the gross receipts of the business over and above the amount required for its
operation could be touched. This same legal principle holds in the case where the grantee of a market is a
debtor and his property is attached on petition of his creditor. The receipts of the market may be attached,
but not the right to operate and conduct the service, which is of a public character.
In fact, article 1448 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, cited in this decision, not as a law now in force, but
for the purpose of setting out a principle of law, prohibits the levy of attachments on railroads opened to
public service, and on the stations, stores, shops, lands, works and buildings necessary for their operation,
or on the locomotives, rails and other material intended for the operation of the line. When execution is
levied on such railroad companies, the proceedings are governed by the provisions of the Law of
November 12, 1869, extended by a royal order of August 3, 1886, to the overseas provinces. This law
prescribes among other things that attachments may be levied and executed only on the gross receipts
remaining after the necessary operating expenses have been deducted.
In harmony with this legal provision, the supreme court of the State of Nebraska, in which State there is no
law whatever that authorizes the attachment and sale of a bridge belonging to a corporation, in the case of
the Overton Bridge co. vs. Means (33 Neb., 857) laid down the principle that such a bridge and the rights of
the corporation therein could not be sold to satisfy a judgment against the corporation for the reason that:
The property of corporations which are closed as public agencies, such as railroad and bridge
companies, which is essential to the exercise of their corporate franchise, and the discharge of the
duties they have assumed toward the general public, cannot, without statutory authority, be sold to
satisfy a common law judgment.
It cites decisions of several states, and also, in the decision referred to, cited Morawetz on Private
Corporations, section 1125, and held that after attachment of the property not necessary to enable the
corporation to perform its duties to the public, the only remedy remaining to a judgment creditor was to
obtain the appointment of a receiver and a sequestration of the company's earnings.
The supreme court of Alabama, in deciding a similar case (Gardner vs. Mobile & Northwestern R.R. Co.,
102 Ala., 635, 645), affirmed the same principle and said:
The only remedy of a judgment creditor is to obtain the appointment of a receiver and the
sequestration of its income or earnings.
It is to be noted that section 56 of Act No. 1459, which permits the sale under execution of a corporation's
franchise, is in no wise applicable to the case at bar, for the reason that, since this Act was promulgated on
March 1, 1906, it could not and cannot affect the laws, decrees, and orders of the Spanish government in
conformity with which the administrative concession, Exhibit A, was granted to Pardo y Cabañas.
The operation of a railroad is of public interest, and concerns both the public and the state, even though the
superintendent and management thereof be conducted by a private company. Therefore, the property of a
railroad, either its rolling stock or permanent equipment, is not subject to attachment and sale, and the
rights of the creditors of the operating company may be exercised for the collection of their credit only of
the gross receipts after the operation of the railroad is insured from its own income.
This decision is based on the provisions of the aforecited law and the premise that the usufruct of the floor
space of the public market of Guinobatan, granted to Ricardo Pardo y Pujol's father was not subject to
attachment on account of its being of a public character, but still the latter's creditor could have applied for
a writ of execution and laid an attachment on the proceeds obtained from the operation of the market,
which proceeds or income could have been collected by a receiver and intervenor.
This, however, was not done, but on the creditor's petition the public market building, which was not his
debtor's property, together with all the right, interest, title and participation which the latter had or might
have had therein, was attached and sold; and as plaintiff was unable to acquire any right or title in such
property illegally sold and illegally acquired by him at public auction or in the usufruct of the floor space of
the building, it is unquestionable that he lacks the personality to claim possession of the land that belongs
to the municipality or the enjoyment and exercise of the right conferred by the aforesaid administrative
concession, which was and is inalienable on account of its being a personal right. For the same reason,
plaintiff has no right to reconstruct the burned building on the land where it formerly stood.
The only right to which the creditor was entitled was to petition for the attachment of the income and
proceeds obtained from the use of the floor space of the market; but he did not avail himself of this right,
nor were the receipts therefrom attached, nor were they adjudicated either to the creditor or to the plaintiff
Tufexis. Therefore, the order of dismissal appealed is in accordance with law and the merits of the case,
and likewise the errors assigned thereto have been duly refuted by the reasons set forth herein.
For the foregoing considerations, we hereby affirm the said order of dismissal, with the costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. L-6098 August 12, 1911

THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALDECOA AND COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Emilio Pineda for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On April 20, 1907, the Attorney-General filed a written complaint in the Court of First Instance of Surigao
against the firm of Aldecoa & Co., alleging that the defendant, a mercantile copartnership company
organized under the laws in force in these Islands and domiciled in this city of Manila with a branch office in
Surigao, continues to operate as such mercantile copartnership company under the name of Aldecoa &
Co.,; that the said defendant, knowing that it had no title or right whatever to two adjoining parcels of land,
which belong to the domain of the Government of the United States and were placed under the
administration and control of the Government of these Islands, has been occupying them illegally for the
past seventeen years, more or less, having constructed on the land a wharf, located along the railroad, and
built warehouses of light material for the storage of coal — all for its exclusive use and benefit; that of the
said two parcels of land, the parcel B has an area of 11 centares, approximately, and the parcel A, 84
centares, more or less, and their situation, metes and bounds, together with other details thereunto
pertaining, are set out in the judgment of the court; that these lands, situated in Bilang-bilang, in the pueblo
of Surigao and the province of the same name, belonged to the late Spanish Government in the Philippines
and are now the property of the Government of the United States and were placed under the control of the
Insular Government, which, by virtue of the treaty of Paris, has succeeded the former in all its rights; that,
since the year 1901, the defendant has been requested repeatedly by the Attorney-General, in
representation of the Insular Government, to recognize the latter's right of dominion over the same and to
deliver to it the said property, and that, by reason of such demands, Aldecoa & Co., on February 25, 1903,
recognizing the Insular Government's ownership, agreed to return the land, but that later, after several
delays, it concluded by persisting in its attempt illegally to continue occupying the said land and refused to
return it to the Insular Government; wherefore the Attorney-General asked the court to enter judgment
declaring the Insular Government to be the owner of the land claimed, and to order that the plaintiff be
placed in possession of the same, together with the fruits collected by the defendants since it took such
possession, and those awaiting collection, and to sentence the defendant to pay the costs.
Counsel for the defendant, Aldecoa & Co., in liquidation, answering the preceding complaint, set forth that it
denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint, with the exception of those which it expressly
admitted in its answer; and that it admitted paragraph 2 of the complaint, that is, the fact of the defendant's
being a mercantile copartnership company, organized under the laws in force in these Islands. As a special
defense, it alleged that it held and possessed, as owner, and had full and absolute dominion over, the lands
claimed by the plaintiff in paragraph 1 of the complaint. The defendant therefore prayed that judgment be
rendered in its favor, by absolving it from the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiff, together with the
other relief solicited.
The provincial fiscal of Surigao presented a motion on November 3, 1908, for the purpose of amending the
preceding complaint, with the permission of the court, by inserting, between paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
complaint, a separate paragraph, as follows: "that Aldecoa and Company's possession of the lands here in
question, was in fact interrupted during the years 1900, 1901, and 1902;" but, in view of the ruling of the
court by an order of November 5, 1908, directing the plaintiff, within three days to specify the facts that
constituted the alleged interruption of the defendant's possession of the lands in question, the provincial
fiscal presented, on the 6th of the same month, a new written motion whereby be requested permission to
amend the previous complaint by inserting between the said paragraphs 4 and 5 of the original complaint,
a separate paragraph, as follows. "That the municipality of Surigao, in the year 1900, and through the
mediation of Captain Kendrick, removed the posts and wire which enclosed the property here in question,
the sole sign of possession that the defendant then had to the said lands." Inasmuch as no objection
whatever was raised to the amendment requested, the court granted the same by an order of December 7,
1908.
The case came up for hearing on the 1st of December of that year and, after the presentation of testimony
by both parties, the documents exhibited being attached to the record, the court, on December 10, 1909,
rendered judgment and found that the land in question was public land and belonged to the State, and
ordered the defendant to return it to the plaintiff might have the crops and the buildings on the land, upon
the payment of an indemnity therefor, or might compel the defendant to pay him the value of the land, as
provided by article 361 of the Civil Code. Counsel for the defendant excepted to this judgment, and by a
written motion of the 4th of January asked for a rehearing of the case on the grounds that the said
judgment was unwarranted by the evidence and was contrary to law. This motion was disallowed,
exception thereto was taken by the appellant and, the required bill of exceptions being filed, in which was
set out, at the request of the provincial fiscal, the latter's exception to the order issued by the judge on
January 24, while in Cagayan, Province of Misamis, granting an extension of time for the presentation of
the bill of exceptions, it was certified and transmitted to the clerk of this court.
The demand of the representative of the Government is for the recovery of possession of two united
parcels of land, belonging to the public use and domain, which are at present occupied by the defendant
Aldecoa & Co. The latter claims to have the full and absolute ownership of the said land and to have held it
as owner since 1889, by virtue of a verbal permit from the politico-military governor of Surigao.
From the proceedings had and by the testimony of a large number of competent witnesses, one of whom
was introduced by the defendant party itself, it was clearly proved that, in 1889, the land in litigation, as well
as Bates Avenue, was, during the extraordinary high tides, usually covered by sea water that would extend
to the other side of the said avenue, as far as the warehouse of Aldecoa & Co. that was erected there, and,
at the ordinary low tides, as far as the wall built along the shore by the aforesaid firm and designated by the
numbers 5, 6, and 7 in the plan, Exhibit A. This plan, according to the agreement between the parties,
exactly represents the land in litigation.
It was likewise proved that nearly all the land in question was low land and swampy in certain places, with
aquatic bushes growing upon it; that it had been gradually raised by the action of the sea, which in its ebb
and flow left sand and other sediment on the low ground; that the retaining wall erected to prevent the sea
water from reaching the said warehouse, that is on the opposite side of Bates Avenue, contributed in a
large measure toward raising the level of the land; and that, furthermore, between the years 1889 and
1890, there were two piers on the said land, one named Carloto, alongside of which the vessels used to lie
that called at Surigao during their voyages.
It is, then, incontrovertible that the land in question is of the public domain and belongs to the State,
inasmuch as at the present time it is partly shore land and in part, was such formerly, and now is land
formed by the action of the sea.
Treating of the sea coasts and shores as property of the public use and domain, partida 3, title 28, law 3,
says:
The things which belong in common to all the living creatures of this world, are; The air, rain water,
the sea and its shores; for every living creature may use them, according to its needs, etc.
Law 4 of the same title and partida says, among other things:
And by the seashore is understood all that space of ground covered by the waters of the sea, in
their highest annual tides, whether in winter or summer.
The Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, extended to these Islands by the royal decree of the 8th of the same
month and year and, together with the decree ordering its enforcement, issued by the Gobierno General on
September 21, 1871, was published in the Official Gazette of the 24th of the same month, which law was
not substituted nor repealed by that of June 13, 1879, promulgated in Spain and not extended to these
Islands, provides, in article 1, that:
The following are part of the national domain open to public use:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The coast sea, that is, the maritime zone encircling the coasts, to the full width recognized by
international law. . . .
3. The shores. By the shore is understood that space alternately covered and uncovered by the
movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctial
tides. Where the tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by
the sea during ordinary storms or tempests.
ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvium deposits caused by the action of the
sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea, and
are not necessary for the purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or
for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of
the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos, pr private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the
party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.
ART. 17. The use of the shores also belongs to the public under the police supervision of the civil
authorities; all persons may fish thereon, wash, bathe, embark and disembark on pleasure trips,
spread and dry clothes and nets bathe cattle, remove sand, and collect stones, shells, plants,
shellfish, and other products of the sea, and do other things of a like nature. these rights may be
restricted by virtue of the regulations necessary for the coast defense or police supervision, or in
the interest of public utility or decency.
ART. 18. In no place on the coasts, shores, ports, or entrances of rivers, nor on the islands referred
to in article 3, shall new works of any kind whatever be constructed, nor any building be erected,
without proper permission, in accordance with the provisions of this law and with those of the law
regarding ports.
On the supposition that Aldecoa & Co. commenced to occupy the land and shore herein concerned, prior to
the enforcement of the Civil Code in these Islands, it is unquestionable that the issue pending decision
must be determined in accordance with the provisions of the said Law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
inasmuch as the shores, as well as the lands united thereto by the accretions and alluvium deposits
produced by the action of the sea, are of the public use and domain.
Excluding the space occupied by Bates Avenue, that lies between the defendant's buildings and the shore
and the lands added to the latter by the action of the sea in the sitio called Bilang-bilang, all this said land,
together with the adjacent shore, belongs to the public domain and is intended for public uses. So that the
defendant, in construction on the two aforementioned parcels of land a retaining wall, a pier or wharf, a
railway, and warehouses for the storage of coal, for its exclusive use and benefit, did all this without due
and competent authority and has been illegally occupying the land since 1901 by the representative of the
Insular Government, Aldecoa & Co., by a letter of February 25, 1903, acknowledged that the land belonged
to the Government and consented to vacate it, although it afterwards persisted in its claim that it was the
owner of the land and refused to vacate and place it at the disposal of the Insular Government, whose
representative, in view of the defendant's changed attitude in the matter, was forced to bring this action to
recover its possession.
Aldecoa & Co. endeavored to prove that the land, consisting of the two united parcels A and B, belonged to
them in fee simple, on account of their having begun to occupy it through a verbal permit from the then
politico-military governor of Surigao. Although the record does not show the nature of the permit obtained,
yet it is inferred from the document Exhibit C I that the said permit was a verbal authorization to occupy the
land on condition that the defendant should later on prepare title deeds thereto, and that this authorization
was granted for the purpose of furnishing facilities to, and benefiting the merchants of Surigao, in view of
the backward condition of things in those regions at the time. It is certain, however, that Aldecoa & Co. did
not obtain or solicit permission from the Government to establish themselves there and erect thereon their
buildings and works, nor did they endeavor to obtain any title of ownership to the said land, as one of their
witnesses, Juan Y. Aldecoa, testified. Furthermore, in the said letter or document Exhibit C I, the attorney
then representing the defendant prayed that in case of sale or total or partial lease thereof Aldecoa & Co.
should be given preference to any other party, on account of the important improvements they had made
on the land.
It is true that, notwithstanding the fact that the lands which become an adjacent part of the shores through
the accretions occasioned by the action of the sea, when they are no longer covered by such waters, or are
not necessary for the purposes of public utility, for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-
guard service, may be declared by the Government to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent
thereto; but the defendant has not proven that it obtained for itself, in conformity with the provisions of
article 4 of the said Law of Waters, such declaration of ownership, and competent authorization obtained
from the Insular Government is indispensible in order that private person may construct works on the
seashore and thereby secure lands for his profit and benefit, pursuant to article 5 of the same law,
inasmuch as article 18 strictly prohibits the construction of any works or the erection of any building at any
place on the coasts and shores, without proper authorization.
Aside from the verbal permission alleged, but not duly proven, and leaving aside the fact that the same is
not admissible in official and administrative proceedings, it has in no wise been proved that Aldecoa & Co.
obtained from the Insular Government any authorization whatever to erect a retaining wall, to construct a
pier and warehouses, and to lay a railway wall, to construct a pier and warehouses, and to lay a railway on
the land in question, which belonged to the state and was destined to public uses, as the defendant must
have very well known; nor could any right whatever be created in its favor, and to the prejudice of the State,
by its having filled in, without the proper permission, the aforementioned land for the purpose of raising the
level thereof.
The Civil Code, which went into effect in these Islands on December 7, 1889, the twentieth day of its
publication in the Gaceta de Manila of the 17th of November of the same year, confirms the provisions of
the said Law of Waters, since, in its article 339, it prescribes that:
Property of public ownership is —
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges
constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
Article 341 of the same code provides:
Property of public ownership, when no longer devoted to general uses or to the requirement of the
defense of the territory, shall become a part of the State property.
The shores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be devoted to public uses and no
grant whatever has been made of any portion of them to private persons, remain a part of the public
domain and are for public uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial property of the State, such
lands, thrown up by the action of the sea, and the shores adjacent thereto, are not susceptible of
prescription, inasmuch as, being dedicated to the public uses, they are not subject of commerce among
men, in accordance with the provision of article 1936 of the Civil Code.
The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretions and alluvium
deposits occasioned by the sea, where the occupant or possessor is a private person and holds without
previous permission or authorization from the Government, granted in due form, although he may have had
the intention to hold it for the purpose of making it his own, is illegal possession on his part and amounts to
nothing more than a mere detainer of the land, which is out of the sphere of the commerce of men, as
belonging to the public domain and being allotted to public uses and for the use of all persons who live at
the place where it is situated.
The record does not disclose that Aldecoa & Co. had obtained from the Spanish Government of the
Philippines the requisite authorization legally to occupy the said two parcels of land of which they now claim
to be the owners; wherefore, the occupation or possession which the allege they hold is a mere detainer
that can merit from the law no protection such as is afforded only to the person legally in possession.
The politico-military governor of Surigao having had no authority or power to grant the possession or
ownership of the said two parcels of land, could not have authorized their occupancy under a title of
ownership. At the most, he may have, as alleged, verbally authorized the defendant to construct a pier, to
fill in with earth the passageway necessary to enable the same to be reached from Bates Avenue, to erect
a retaining wall to prevent the sea water, which used to inundate the said avenue, from flowing inward as
far as the defendant's warehouses, and to build warehouses on the high land, raised by the action of the
water near the shore; but such verbal authorization, even admitting that it was actually given, and the
material occupation enjoyed by the defendant during more than ten years, have not created rights such as
could legitimize a detention to the prejudice of the public, and of the State which represents the community,
the sole entity entitled to the use and enjoyment of the land and shore usurped, for the very reason that
such shores and lands belong to the national domain, are intended for public uses and are not susceptible
of prescription, as they do not pertain to the commerce of men.
The subject of this suit, as has been seen, is a tract of land that is a continuation of the shore at the sitio of
Bilang-bilang and was formed on that shore by alluvium deposits occasioned by the action of the waters of
the sea, that is, was land reclaimed from the sea, as fully proven by the record in this case; therefore the
present issue is identical with that decided in the case of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden (6 Phil. Rep., 732) relative
to a tract of land formed by the action of the sea and which has become a part of the so-called Sangley
Point, in the Province of Cavite, and consequently the findings and doctrine established in that decision are
properly applicable to this action, as may be seen by a perusal of that case.
The land in question, together with the shore of which it forms a part, is not, considering its conditions,
comprised within the provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926, for the reason that it can not be deemed to be
agricultural public lands, nor mangrove-swamp land, inasmuch as it is unquestionable, as the record shows
it to have been proven, that the disputed property is land which was reclaimed from the sea through
accretions produced by the action of the water upon a high part of the shore, and is, therefore, land
intended for public uses. This classification loses none of its force from the fact that a part of the land is
swampy, because this circumstance does not divest it of its true character as land gained from the sea by
accretion.
Mangrove-swamp land, which is generally situated inland at a certain distance from the seashore, although
it is usually inundated by the waters of the sea, especially at high tide, can not be confounded with the land
formed by the action of the sea and which forms the shore line thereof; and for this reason, the decisions
rendered in the cases of Montano vs. Insular Government (12 Phil. Rep., 572), and Mapa vs. Insular
Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), wherein due consideration was given to the provisions of section 54 of
Act No. 926, have no application to the present action, which solely concerns land formed by the action of
the sea, and the shore that is a part of it, both intended for public uses, while the references made by the
appellant party apply to building lots, fisheries and nipa lands that were inundated by sea water and which,
though covered with a good deal of water, could not be said to be navigable ways. The land in question, on
the contrary, together with its adjacent shore, borders on water of great depth, the Pacific Ocean, for,
besides the pier constructed at the place by the defendant and appellant, there were two others, and all
intended for the service of the steamships that plied the high seas and were accustomed to enter the said
port and there anchor alongside of these piers.
Under no consideration could the land herein concerned, together with the shore upon which it is formed,
be classed as agricultural land susceptible of appropriation, and as such form the basis for the allegation of
the possession of an imperfect or prescriptive title thereto, because, as aforestated, so long as the land in
litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being
appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a
competent authority — a requisite which the defendant and appellant was unable to prove for the purpose
of legalizing his possession.
However, on the supposition that the defendant, Aldecoa & Co., began to occupy the said land and shore
after first obtaining verbal permission from a politico-military governor, constructing thereon a pier,
warehouse, and retaining wall, it is right to hold, as did the lower court in his judgment, that it acted in good
faith, and under such a supposition, the provisions of article 361 of the Civil Code must be complied with.
For the foregoing reasons, in the course of the explanation of which the errors attributed to the judgment
appealed from have been disposed of, it is our opinion that such judgment should be fully affirmed, as it is
in accordance with the law. The costs shall be assessed against the appellant. So ordered.
Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Moreland and Carson, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-28379 March 27, 1929

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, applicant-appellant,
vs.
CONSORCIA CABANGIS, ET AL., claimants-appellees.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.
Abad Santos, Camus & Delgado for appellees.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The Government of the Philippine Islands appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in cadastral proceeding No. 373 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, G. L. R. O.
Cadastral Record No. 373, adjudicating the title and decreeing the registration of lots Nos. 36, 39 and 40,
block 3055 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila in favor of Consuelo, Consorcia, Elvira and Tomas,
surnamed Cabangis, in equal parts, and dismissing the claims presented by the Government of the
Philippine Islands and the City of Manila.
In support of its appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court in
its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that the lots in question are of the public domain, the same
having been gained from the sea (Manila Bay) by accession, by fillings made by the Bureau of
Public Works and by the construction of the break-water (built by the Bureau of Navigation) near
the mouth of Vitas Estero.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the lots in question formed part of the big parcel of land
belonging to the spouses Maximo Cabangis and Tita Andres, and in holding that these spouses and
their successors in interest have been in continuous, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession
of said lots up to the time this case came up.
3. The lower court erred in holding that said lots existed before, but that due to the current of the
Pasig River and to the action of the big waves in Manila Bay during the south-west monsoons, the
 same disappeared.
4. The lower court erred in adjudicating the registration of the lands in question in the name of the
appellees, and in denying the appellant's motion for a new trial.
A preponderance of the evidence in the record which may properly be taken into consideration in deciding
the case, proves the following facts:
Lots 36, 39 and 40, block 3035 of cadastral proceeding No. 71 of the City of Manila, G. L. R. O. Record No.
373, were formerly a part of a large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of the herein claimants and
appellees. From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay,
until the year 1901 when the said lots became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides, and
remained in such a state until 1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in order
to facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the low lands
which were completely covered with water, surrounding that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing
Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of this proceeding.
Up to the month of February, 1927 nobody had declared lot 39 for the purposes of taxation, and it was only
in the year 1926 that Dr. Pedro Gil, in behalf of the claimants and appellees, declared lot No. 40 for such
purpose.
In view of the facts just stated, as proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the question arises: Who
owns lots 36, 39 and 40 in question?
The claimants-appellees contend that inasmuch as the said lots once formed a part of a large parcel of
land belonging to their predecessors, whom they succeeded, and their immediate predecessor in interest,
Tomas Cabangis, having taken possession thereof as soon as they were reclaimed, giving his permission
to some fishermen to dry their fishing nets and deposit their bancas thereon, said lots belong to them.
Article 339, subsection 1, of the Civil Code, reads:
Article 339. Property of public ownership is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, riverbanks, shorts, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 1, case 3, of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, provides as follows:
ARTICLE 1. The following are part of the national domain open to public use:
xxx xxx xxx
3. The Shores. By the shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the movement of
the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctial tides. Where the
tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during
ordinary storms or tempests.
In the case of Aragon vs. Insular Government (19 Phil., 223), with reference to article 339 of the Civil Code
just quoted, this court said:
We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that in a case of gradual encroachment or erosion
by the ebb and flow of the tide, private property may not become 'property of public ownership,' as defined
in article 339 of the code, where it appears that the owner has to all intents and purposes abandoned it and
permitted it to be totally destroyed, so as to become a part of the 'playa' (shore of the seas), 'rada'
(roadstead), or the like. . . .
In the Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola, volume XII, page 558, we read the following:
With relative frequency the opposite phenomenon occurs; that is, the sea advances and private
properties are permanently invaded by the waves, and in this case they become part of the shore or
beach. They then pass to the public domain, but the owner thus dispossessed does not retain any
right to the natural products resulting from their new nature; it is a de facto case of eminent domain,
and not subject to indemnity.
Now then , when said land was reclaimed, did the claimants-appellees or their predecessors recover it as
their original property?
As we have seen, the land belonging to the predecessors of the herein claimants-appellees began to wear
way in 1896, owing to the gradual erosion caused by the ebb and flow of the tide, until the year 1901, when
the waters of Manila Bay completely submerged a portion of it, included within lots 36, 39 and 40 here in
question, remaining thus under water until reclaimed as a result of certain work done by the Government in
1912. According to the above-cited authorities said portion of land, that is, lots 36, 39 and 40, which was
private property, became a part of the public domain. The predecessors of the herein claimants-appellees
could have protected their land by building a retaining wall, with the consent of competent authority, in 1896
when the waters of the sea began to wear it away, in accordance with the provisions of Article 29 of the
aforecited Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, and their failure to do so until 1901, when a portion of the
same became completely covered by said waters, remaining thus submerged until 1912, constitutes
abandonment.
Now then: The lots under discussion having been reclaimed from the seas as a result of certain work done
by the Government, to whom do they belong?
The answer to this question is found in article 5 of the aforementioned Law of Waters, which is as follows:

ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the
party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.
The fact that from 1912 some fishermen had been drying their fishing nets and depositing their bancas on
lots 36, 39 and 40, by permission of Tomas Cabangis, does not confer on the latter or his successors the
ownership of said lots, because, as they were converted into public land, no private person could acquire
title thereto except in the form and manner established by the law.
In the case of Buzon vs. Insular Government and City of Manila (13 Phil., 324), cited by the claimants-
appellees, this court, admitting the findings and holdings of the lower court, said the following:
If we heed the parol evidence, we find that the seashore was formerly about one
hundred brazas distant from the land in question; that, in the course of time, and by the removal of
a considerable quantity of sand from the shore at the back of the land for the use of the street car
company in filling in Calle Cervantes, the sea water in ordinary tides now covers part of the land
described in the petition.
The fact that certain land, not the bed of a river or of the sea, is covered by sea water during the
period of ordinary high tide, is not a reason established by any law to cause the loss thereof,
especially when, as in the present case, it becomes covered by water owing to circumstances
entirely independent of the will of the owner.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguilar (G.R. No. 22034),1 also cited by the claimants-appellees,
wherein the Government adduced no evidence in support of its contention, the lower court said in part:
The contention of the claimants Cabangis is to the effect that said lots are a part of the adjoining
land adjudicated to their deceased father, Don Tomas Cabangis, which, for over fifty years had
belonged to their deceased grandmother, Tita Andres, and that, due to certain improvements made
in Manila Bay, the waters of the sea covered a large part of the lots herein claimed.
The Government of the Philippine Islands also claims the ownership of said lots, because, at
ordinary high tide, they are covered by the sea.
Upon petition of the parties, the lower court made an ocular inspection of said lots on September
12, 1923, and on said inspection found some light material houses built thereon, and that on that
occasion the waters of the sea did not reach the aforesaid lots.
From the evidence adduced at the trial of this cause, it may be inferred that Tita Andres, during her
lifetime was the owner of a rather large parcel of land which was adjudicated by a decree to her son
Tomas Cabangis; the lots now in question are contiguous to that land and are covered by the
 waters of the sea at extraordinary high tide; some 50 years before the sea did not reach said strip
of land, and on it were constructed, for the most part, light material houses, occupied by the tenants
of Tita Andres, to whom they paid rent. Upon her death, her son Tomas Cabangis succeeded to the
possession, and his children succeeded him, they being the present claimants, Consuelo, Jesus,
Tomas, and Consorcia Cabangis.
The Government of the Philippine Islands did not adduce any evidence in support of its contention,
with the exception of registry record No. 8147, to show that the lots here in question were not
excluded from the application presented in said proceeding.
It will be seen that in the case of Buzon vs. Insular Government and City of Manila, cited above, the rise of
the waters of the sea that covered the lands there in dispute, was due not to the action of the tide but to the
fact that a large quantity of sand was taken from the sea at the side of said land in order to fill in Cervantes
Street, and this court properly held that because of this act, entirely independent of the will of the owner of
said land, the latter could not lose the ownership thereof, and the mere fact that the waters of the sea
covered it as a result of said act, is not sufficient to convert it into public land, especially, as the land was
high and appropriate for building purposes.
In the case of the Director of Lands vs. Aguilar also cited by the claimants-appellees, the Insular
Government did not present any evidence in support of its contention, thus leaving uncontradicted the
evidence adduced by the claimants Aguilar et al., as to the ownership, possession and occupation of said
lots.
In the instant case the evidence shows that from 1896, the waves of Manila Bay had been gradually and
constantly washing away the sand that formed the lots here in question, until 1901, when the sea water
completely covered them, and thus they remained until the year 1912. In the latter year they were
reclaimed from the sea by filling in with sand and silt extracted from the bed of Vitas Estuary when the
Government dredged said estuary in order to facilitate navigation. Neither the herein claimants-appellees
nor their predecessors did anything to prevent their destruction.
In conclusion, then, we hold that the lots in question having disappeared on account of the gradual erosion
due to the ebb and flow of the tide, and having remained in such a state until they were reclaimed from the
sea by the filling in done by the Government, they are public land. (Aragon vs. Insular Government, 19
Phil., 223; Francisco vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 28 Phil., 505).
By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from is reversed and lots Nos. 36, 39 and 40 of cadastral
proceeding No. 373 of the City of Manila are held to be public land belonging to the Government of the
United States under the administration and control of the Government of the Philippine Islands. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37986 March 1, 1934
EUFEMIA MERCADO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL PRESIDENT OF MACABEBE, PAMPANGA, and THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
AND COMMUNICATIONS, defendants-appellee.
Eusebio Orense and Nicolas Belmonte for appellant.
Provincial Fiscal Daza for appellees.
DIAZ, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Eufemia Mercado from a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga dismissing her appeal from an order of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications
wherein said official directed Romulo Mercado, the appellant's predecessor in interest, to remove the two
dikes which he had constructed at both ends of the creek named Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun,
which traverses part of the hacienda described in certificate of Title No. 329 of the registry of deeds of
Pampanga, and formerly belonging to said Romulo Mercado, but which now belongs to the appellant by
virtue of a formal donation made to her by said Romulo Mercado, after the institution of this action.
After due trial, the court a quo held that the creek in question is property of the public domain.
The contention of the appellant's predecessor in interest in the record of the investigation conducted by the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications, through his agents, and that of the appellant, both in the
court a quo and in this court, is that the said Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek is not a natural but
an artificial creek which had been developed on his hacienda by means of excavations made by his men
on two different occasions, the former before the revolution or during the Spanish regime, and the latter
after the revolution.
The appellees, in turn, contend that the creek in question is a natural navigable creek which already existed
on the said hacienda of the appellant not only long before the revolution but also from the time immemorial.
The evidence presented by the appellant shows that formerly when her so-called hacienda still belonged to
her grandfather Mariano Mercado, the portion of the said creek, indicated on the plan Exhibit 2 by two
parallel lines in black ink drawn from the point marked 3 towards the center until it turns northwards, was
but a recess or arm then called Buñgalun, of the Nasi River, which arm was lost in the hacienda. It
extended close to a small creek called Batasan-Limasan which derived its waters, particularly during high
tide, from the large creek called Limasan indicated on the aforesaid plan.
Mariano Mercado, the original owner of the hacienda, in order to facilitate the cutting and transportation of
firewood and other products, produced on the said hacienda, towards the Nasi River on the east or towards
Limasan creek on the west, connected the two recesses or bodies of water in question by means of
excavations and, after having so connected them, made other excavations at both ends towards the said
river and creek, thus constructing a sort of canal directly connecting both bodies of water, and which later
became known as the Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek.
The said Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek or canal already existed at the time of the institution of
the registration proceedings wherein judgment was rendered resulting in the issuance of certificate of title
No. 329 in favor of Romulo Mercado. On the plan of the land, which was presented in the said case, the
aforesaid creek appears; and at the time the case was tried as well as when the certificate of title was
issued in favor of the applicant Romulo Mercado, none of the herein defendants nor the Insular
Government filed opposition or objection thereto.
Once the said Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek or canal was opened from the Nasi River to
Limasan creek, not only the residents of the hacienda and those who visited it but also some of the
residents of the nearby barrios and municipalities began to use it as a means of communication in
attending to their needs, sometimes with the permission of the owners of the hacienda, and at other times
without even the latter's knowledge. It was then that Romulo Mercado, the appellant's predecessor in
interest, decided to convert the said creek into a fish pond and with that object in view, in 1928 he closed
the two opening thereof towards the Nasi River on one side and Limasan creek on the other side.
The appellant's witnesses, Romulo Mercado, Maximo dela Peña and Andres Limin testified that the creek
in question became navigable only from the time Mariano Mercado had excavated both ends and the
junction of the former two recesses from which said creek had been formed; that the former owners of the
hacienda had employed about 60 men for a period of two weeks in order to perform such task, and that
during the revolution and for about ten years, in view of the fact that many people entered the hacienda to
cut or carry away firewood without permission, Romulo Mercado ordered the creek closed in order to
prevent the entrance into and passage of strangers through it.
On the other hand, the appellee's tried to prove by means of their witnesses Castor Quiambao, Maximino
Guintu and Lorenzo Magat, that the creek in question has existed on the appellant's hacienda from time
immemorial, and that they had been passing through and fishing in it, as others had done, as often as they
wished, long before the revolution until it was closed by the appellant's predecessor in interest in 1928. To
that effect, they presented resolution No. 6 of the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, placing at
public auction the privilege of fishing in the Batasan-Limasan creek (Exhibit 6), among other rivers and
creeks. However, they failed to establish that anybody had ever obtained such privilege, for which reason
said evidence cannot be given any weight, there being no doubt, as there can be no doubt, that a mere
notice, as Exhibit 6, does not constitute sufficient evidence that the creek in question is the property of the
public domain. 1ªvvphi1.ne+

The testimony of the said witnesses for the appellees seems insufficient to overcome that of the witnesses
for the appellant on the ground that Castor Quiambao is relatively young and he himself admitted that in his
youth, as he remembered, he used to pass through the creek in question only once or twice a month. The
other witnesses, not being residents of the place, were in no better position to know what the appellant's
witnesses knew as to the true nature, conditions and changes which the said creek had undergone,
inasmuch as the latter witnesses had lived and worked in that same place for many years.
However, considering that the evidence of both parties is equiponderant, could not the question be decided
by taking into consideration only, or mainly, the undisputed fact that the creek in question, both during the
first years of its existence, when it was but a small creek formed by the channels or recesses called
Batasan-Limasan and Buñgalun by some witnesses, and after it had been converted into said creek,
whether naturally or artificially, that it, by means of man's labor, with openings toward the Nasi River and
toward the Limasan creek, derived its waters from the aforesaid river and creek, which unquestionably
belong to the public domain?
The lower court, invoking the provisions of articles 339, 407 and 408 of the Civil Code, decided the
question mainly by taking said fact into consideration.
The pertinent parts of the aforesaid three articles provide as follows:
Property of public ownership is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character. (Art. 339.)
The following are of public ownership:
1. Rivers and their natural channels;
2. Continuous or intermittent waters from springs or brooks running in their natural channels and
the channels themselves;
3. Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public ownership;
xxx xxx xxx
8. Waters which flow continuous or intermittently from lands belonging to private parties, to the
State, to provinces, or to towns, from the moment they leave such lands. (Art. 407.)
The following are of private ownership:
1. Waters, either continuous or intermittent rising on private estates, while they run through them;
2. Lakes and ponds and their beds when formed by nature on said estates;
3. Subterranean waters found on the same;
4. Rain waters falling thereon as long as they remain within their boundaries;
5. The channels of flowing streams, continuous or intermittent, formed by rain water, and those of
brooks crossing estates which are not of public ownership.
The water, bed, banks, and floodgates of a ditch or aqueduct are deemed to be an integral part of
the estate or building for which the waters are intended. The owners of estates through or along the
boundaries of which the aqueduct passes can assert no ownership over it, nor any right to make
use of its beds or banks, unless they base their claim on title deeds which specify the right or the
ownership claimed. (Art, 408.)
It will be noted that the appellant cannot invoke in her favor the article last quoted on the ground that
although it is true that the Batasan-Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek passes through her hacienda, it is
none the less true that it is not included in any of the kinds of private property therein enumerated. The
appellant and her predecessors in interest, in closing the two openings of the said creek and converting it
into a fish pond, not only appropriated for themselves the channel of the said creek but also the creek itself;
and a creek is not a brook because the latter is but a short, almost continuous stream of water (Diccionario
de la Real Academia Española), while the former is a recess or arm extending from a river, which
participates in the ebb and flow of the sea. (15 Enciclopedia Juridica Española, 216.)
On the other hand, the aforecited article 339 provides that canals, rivers,
torrents, . . . and those of a similar character are property of public ownership, and the similarity between
rivers, canals, and creeks is undoubtedly obvious on the ground that, as has been stated, a creek is no
other than an arm extending from a river. Furthermore, under article 407, the Batasan-Limasan or Pinac
Buñgalun creek may be considered as belonging to the class of property enumerated in paragraph 8
thereof. And, in addition to the foregoing, the Contentious Court of Spain (Tribunal Contencioso de España)
in a decision dated June 25, 1890, laid down the doctrine that creeks are property of the public domain
(15 Enciclopedia Juridica Española, 216).
And even granting that the Batasan-Limasan creek acquired the proportions which it had, before it was
closed, as a result of excavations made by laborers of the appellant's predecessor in interest, it being a fact
that, since the time it was opened as a water route between the Nasi River and Limasan creek, the owners
thereof as well as strangers, that is, both the residents of the hacienda and those of other nearby barrios
and municipalities, had been using it not only for their bancas to pass through but also for fishing purposes,
and it being also a fact that such was the condition of the creek at least since 1906 until it was closed in
1928, if the appellant and her predecessors in interest had acquired any right to the creek in question by
virtue of excavations which they had made thereon, they had lost such right through prescription inasmuch
as they failed to obtain, and in fact they have not obtained, the necessary authorization to devote it to their
own use to the exclusion of all others. The use and enjoyment of a creek, as any other property susceptible
of appropriation, may be acquired or lost through prescription, and the appellant and her predecessors in
interest certainly lost such right through the said cause, and they cannot now claim it exclusively for
themselves after the general public had been openly using the same from 1906 to 1928. When two
different interests, one being private and the other public, are in conflict with one another, the former should
yield to the latter.
It is useless for the appellant now to allege that she has obtained certificate of title No. 396 in her favor
because the said certificate does not confer upon her any right to the creek in question, inasmuch as the
creek, being of the public domain, is included among the various exceptions enumerated in section 39 of
Act No. 496 to which the said certificate is subject by express provision of the law, and furthermore,
because it so appears in the certificate itself.
The doctrine laid down in the case of the Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Santos (G. R. No.
27202, promulgated September 2, 1927, not reported), which the appellant invokes in her favor, is not
applicable herein because the subject matter in that case is not of the same nature as the Batasan-
Limasan or Pinac Buñgalun creek. The thing involved therein was simply a date or, in the words of the trial
court, a low depression on the defendant's land where there was a waterway passable by bancas at high
tide, but which completely dried up at low tide and during the dry season. From what has been
hereinbefore stated, it may be inferred that the Batasan-Limasan creek is perfectly navigable
by bancas throughout the year, inasmuch as at the time it was measured in November by employees and
agents of the Bureau of Lands, it was more than two meters deep at its mouth and around a meter and a
half deep at its shallow parts. Furthermore, in the case of Urbano Santos, the creek in question was closed
a few years after excavations had been made in the land under consideration.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

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