(Justyna Zając (Auth.) ) Poland's Security Policy (Zlibraryexau2g3p.onion)

Poland’s Security Policy
The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order
Justyna Zając
Poland’s Security Policy
Justyna Zaja ̨c
Poland’s Security
Policy
The West, Russia, and the Changing
International Order
Justyna Zaja ̨c
Institute of International Relations
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies
University of Warsaw
Warsaw, Poland
ISBN 978-1-137-59499-0 ISBN 978-1-137-59500-3 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59500-3
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016946985
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.
Cover image © TAR-TASS Photo Agency / Alamy Stock Photo
Printed on acid-free paper
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd. London
The registered company address is: The 236 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8HB,
United Kingdom
CONTENTS
1 Post-Cold War Determinants of Poland’s Security Policy 1

Geopolitical Location: Advantage or Curse? 2
Demographic, Social and Economic Potential 5
History and Identity in Poland’s Security Policy 11
Strategies and Concepts of Poland’s Security Policy 15
Notes 25
2 ‘Go West’: Poland’s Security Policy in Transition 31

The Emergence of Western Dominance 32
Poland’s Role in Dismantling the Eastern Bloc 34
Poland’s Reorientation Toward the West 38
From Favoring the CSCE to Rapprochement with the WEU
and NATO Membership 44
Poland’s Eastern Policy: Bridge or Bulwark? 48
Notes 55
3 Poland’s Security Policy in the Unipolar World Order 63

US Global Hegemony, the EU’s Rising Strength,
Russia’s Weakness 64
NATO as the Main Pillar of Poland’s Security 68
Strategic Partnership with the USA 74
Poland’s Caution with Regard to the ESDI and the ESDP 80
The Diminishing Importance of the OSCE in Poland’s
Security Policy 85
v
vi CONTENTS
Growing Tensions Between Poland and Russia 88

Notes 92
4 Poland’s Security Policy in the Emerging Multipolar

World Order 103
America Turns to Asia, the EU Stumbles, Russia Resurges 104
Poland’s Growing Fear of Russia 108
The Quest for NATO Consolidation and Closer
Polish–American Ties 112
Poland’s Growing Defense Capabilities 117
Poland and the CSDP 120
Support for Pro-Western Currents in Post-Soviet States 125
Notes 128
5 The Ukraine Crisis: Implications for Poland’s Security 137

The Ukraine Crisis as a Clash between the West and Russia 138
Polish–Ukrainian Strategic Partnership 140
Poland’s Engagement in the Ukraine Crisis 145
The Impact of the Ukraine Crisis on Poland’s Security 151
Poland and Other EU Member States with Regard
to the Ukraine Crisis 166
Notes 171
6 Conclusions 185
Notes 193
Bibliography 195
Subject Index 213
Name Index 219

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Poland’s security policy, which forms the subject of this book, is a topic
that has interested me as a scholar for many years. During my research
leading to this book, being a member of the presidential team of experts
working on Poland’s National Security Strategic Review—which provided
the basis for the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland
published in 2013—has proven to be an invaluable experience. My stay as
a visiting scholar at the Elliott School of International Affairs of George
Washington University in the spring of 2015 has given me a perspective
that was highly useful in placing Poland’s post-Cold War security policy
in the context of the changing international order. In this regard, I would
like to thank Peter Rollberg—Director of the European, Russian and
Eurasian Studies at GWU, for creating a congenial working atmosphere.
I am also grateful to the Kościuszko Foundation, whose grant made my
stay at GWU possible.
In preparing a book like this one, the author is indebted to many per-
sons. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Ryszard Zięba for his invalu-
able comments. I would also like to extend my thanks to many colleagues
for their insightful opinions during the preparation of this book: Stephen
F. Cohen, James Goldgeier, Henry Hale, Stephen Hedlund, Erik Jones,
Marlene Laruelle, Henry Nau, Robert Orttung, Magnus Petersson,
Angela Stent, Constanze Stelzenmüller, with a very special thanks to
Sharon L. Wolchik. I am also most grateful to Jean Jacques Granas for his
invaluable editorial help as well as my ‘Poland’s Foreign Policy’ students
at the University of Warsaw whose fresh discernment sheds new light on
stubborn questions.
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Last but not least, I am deeply grateful to my family and friends for
their patient and unfailing support and for cheering me on at all stages
leading to the publication of this book.
ABBREVIATIONS
ABW Internal Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego)

AGS Alliance Ground Surveillance
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
CBSS Council of the Baltic Sea States
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Agreement
CEI Central European Initiative
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSBM Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCE/OSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
ECAP European Capabilities Action Plan
EDA European Defense Agency
ENP European Neighborhood Policy
EPAA European Phased Adaptive Approach
ERI European Reassurance Initiative
ESDI European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
IPN Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci
Narodowej)
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NRF NATO Response Force
NSR National Reserve Forces (Narodowe Siły Rezerwowe)
PfP Partnership for Peace
PiS Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość)
ix
x ABBREVIATIONS
PKW Polish Military Contingent (Polski Kontyngent Wojskowy)

PO Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska)
PSL Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe)
RAP Readiness Action Plan
SAC Strategic Airlift Capability
SLD Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej)
UPA Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukraińska Powstańcza Armia)
VJTF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
WSI Military Information Services (Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne)
ŻW Military Gendarmerie (Żandarmeria Wojskowa)
INTRODUCTION
We are here, the leaders of five states: Poland, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania. We are here in order to take up a struggle. For the first time in a
long while, our neighbors from the north, in our case also from the north
and from the east, have shown a face we have known for centuries. Those
neighbors think that the nations around them should be subordinated to
them. We say no! That country is Russia. That country thinks that the old
times of an empire that collapsed 20 years ago are returning; that domina-
tion will once again be the chief trait of this region. It won’t! Those days are
over once and for ever. Not for twenty, thirty or fifty years. We all have, in
the same period or at different times, known this domination. It is a disaster
for […] all of Europe. It is the breaking of human characters, the imposi-
tion of a foreign regime and of a foreign language. […]We also know very
well that today it’s Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the
Baltic states, and after that it will perhaps be time for my country, Poland!
We were deeply convinced that membership in NATO and the European
Union would put an end to Russian appetites. It turned out not to be the
case, that it was a mistake. But we are able to stand up against it […].
Those words were spoken by President Lech Kaczyński to a cheering crowd

on 12 August 2008 during a rally in Tbilisi, in wake of the Georgian–Russian
War.1 It was a clear indication of Poland’s growing fears caused by the redis-
tribution of power in the world, in which the West’s position was growing
weaker, Russia had embarked on a revisionist policy and non-Western coun-
tries were playing a growing role in international politics.
Russia has traditionally been viewed in Poland as a potential threat,
and military security plays a key role in Polish policy. While Poland’s
xi
xii INTRODUCTION
strategic documents treat security in the wide sense, in practice challenges

and threats of a non-military nature, like illegal migration, environmen-
tal pollution, or terrorism are not leading causes for concern in the eyes
of Polish decision makers. Poland does not feel their consequences as
intensely as do many other European countries, as it is not a destination
of choice for large groups of illegal immigrants, its society remains highly
homogenous, and—most fortunately—it has not yet been the target of a
terrorist attack.2 While many European Union countries concentrate on
non-military security, Polish decision makers are mainly concerned with
Russia’s proximity and by the question of how to protect Poland effec-
tively from this powerful neighbor. This preoccupation did not disappear
with the changing international order after 1989. From the moment the
bipolar division of the world collapsed, the influence of non-state entities
and the quantity of issues affecting participants in international politics has
grown enormously. As a result, interactions between international actors
in the increasingly globalized world have been transformed into an unusu-
ally complex grid. The functions of states have changed and they have
lost a portion of their power on behalf of non-state entities. Despite those
changes, the dominant category of thought about security in Poland has
remained that of the neorealist paradigm, in which the main actors in
international politics are states which invariably—and above all else—seek
classical security, understood in terms of notions such as survival, inviola-
bility of borders, territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty. Such
thinking in Poland is predetermined by the country’s geopolitical situ-
ation and by its historical experiences. Since the 18th century, Poland’s
fate has been marked by its location between Germany and Russia and by
the Poles’ almost 200-year old struggle for independence. New geopoliti-
cal circumstances in the 1990s have in large measure allowed Poland to
overcome its apprehension of Germany, but fear of Russia has remained
unchanged. As a result, since the end of the Cold War, Warsaw’s efforts
have been directed at achieving security from Russia. The nature of those
efforts has to a large measure depended on a changing international order.
Thus, the question of how the changing international order after the
Cold War affected the security policy of Poland—a middle power located
in the region of Central and Eastern Europe—is the basic subject of this
work. In this book the author assumes that ‘order’ exists when a relatively
stable pattern of human relations characterizes the international stage and
that such stability is upheld by rules of international conduct. While dif-
ferent authors have different views about these rules, they tend to agree
INTRODUCTION xiii
on one thing: that the rules, whether they are formal or informal, are in
the main defined by the most powerful actors in the system.3 Thus, power
provides the structure for international order, as order is the structure for
power.4 In this work we assume that changes in the international system,
such as the redistribution of power (from a bipolar system to a unipolar
one, or from a unipolar to a multipolar one, for example), lead to a chang-
ing international order—the rules, norms and institutions that govern the
functioning of the society of states. The collapse of the USSR and of the
Eastern Bloc made it possible for the countries that were part of the West
during the Cold War to spread on a global scale the rules, norms and insti-
tutions on the basis of which they relate to one another. Those same rules,
norms and institutions were successfully implemented in many Central
and Eastern European states which had a vested interest in adopting them,
while countries in other regions of the world were, for various reasons, less
keen to do so. The weakening position of the West at the beginning of the
21st century and the redistribution of power in the international system
contributed to the dissemination by the emerging powers of rules, norms
and institutions that differed from those championed by the West.5
Three stages can be distinguished in this process by which a new inter-
national order has been taking shape since the end of the Cold War: the
transformation phase at the end the 1980s/early 1990s; the unipolar
order in the 1990s with the domination of the West and with the USA
as a hegemon; and the multipolar order that has been emerging since the
beginning of the 21st century. The last few years have brought particular
challenges for Poland’s security policy on account of the revisionist policy
of Russia, which is seeking to gain an equal position to that of western
countries (the USA and UE member states) and to play a key role in
international politics. These steps are seen in Poland as Russia’s return to
an imperial policy—one that endangers Poland’s security. The aim of this
book, therefore, is to examine the changes in Poland’s security policy in
connection with the redistribution of power in the international system
affecting the international order.
In this book, Poland is defined as a middle power.6 Despite the fact that
there is no general agreement in the literature about what constitutes a
middle power in international politics,7 the author has placed Poland in this
group on the basis of international hierarchy criteria,8 which refer to such
quantifiable attributes as area, population, strength of economy, military
capability and other comparable factors, as well as the state’s geographic loca-
tion. The latter criterion signifies that a ‘middle power’ is a state physically
xiv INTRODUCTION
located ‘in the middle’, between the system’s great powers.9 Middle powers
are able to influence the international order, but this influence is limited.
On the other hand, the international order has a great impact on their
policies. As Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski points out about middle pow-
ers, ‘if they did desire to make changes upsetting others, they would lack
the power to do so. […] Many of these nations have accepted the exist-
ing international order […] and found a place in it which assures them
certain benefits’.10 Joshua Spero notes that ‘middle powers exist in a great
power imposed self-help world, where great powers all too frequently try to
ignore, manipulate, or dominate middle powers. Unlike great powers and
their ability to change the international system of power distribution, analy-
sis of middle powers centers largely on their attempts to influence and avoid
dominance regionally by great powers’.11 Hedley Bull argues that ‘middle
and small powers […] are able to provide for their security for long periods
while dispensing with allies. But their ability to do so is conditional upon
the maintenance of a general balance of power in the international system
by states other than themselves. By contrast, the ability of the great powers
to dispense with allies is not conditional in this way’.12
Poland qualifies as a middle power under either criteria—international
hierarchy and the state’s geographic location. Its total area amounts
about 312,000 km2, which gives it the 9th place in Europe and the 69th
place in the world; it has 38.5 million inhabitants, which makes it the
8th most populous country in Europe (taking the entire population of
Russia and Turkey into account) and the 6th in the European Union;
Poland has the world’s 20th largest economy. It is also located ‘in the
middle’ between Germany and Russia—both of which rank as regional
powers—a geopolitical location that brought it much hardship in his-
tory. Hedley Bull points out that Poland’s partition between Austria,
Prussia and Russia in the 18th century was an application of the concept
of balance of power; as a weak state, Poland was sacrificed in order to
keep the balance of power in Europe.13
Polish people and institutions also generally see Poland as a middle
power. This is an important factor because, if one were to paraphrase
Robert Rothstein, a middle power is ‘a state which recognizes that it can
not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must
rely fundamentally on the aid of others’,14 or, as Robert Keohane puts it,
‘a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act effec-
tively by itself, but may have a systemic impact in a small group or through
international institutions’.15
INTRODUCTION xv
On the premise that Poland is a middle power, this work seeks to answer
the following questions: To what degree does the changing international
order influence Poland’s security policy? Do the aims of Poland’s security
policy change along with the changing international order? What instru-
ments, methods and strategies does Poland resort to in its security policy
as the distribution of power and dominant pattern of behavior of states in
the world change?
These questions are all the more significant as it is difficult to distinguish a
distinct pattern of behavior in international politics that would be common
to all middle powers. Adam Chapnick notes that in the literature relating to
middle powers, three notions—multilateralism, conflict management and
moral power—combine to form a behavioral model.16 In other words, it is
often assumed in the literature that seeking to preserve the existing interna-
tional order, a tendency towards collaboration and multilateralism, favoring
peaceful methods of conflict resolution, acting not only in the name of the
national interest but rather on behalf of the international community, and
supporting international law are typical aspects of middle power behavior.
However, it is very difficult to prove that the behavior of middle powers is
characterized by a tendency to seek multilateral solutions to international
problems, to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and
to base their diplomacy on “good international citizenship” notions.17 As
Dennis Stairs points out, ‘commentators on the roles played by “middle
powers” in world affairs […] assume, or they try artfully to demonstrate,
that patterns exist where in fact they do not, and that causes are simple
when they are actually complex’.18 In fact, middle powers do not always
take on responsibility for the creation and preservation of the international
order seriously, their behavior does not always strengthen international
institutions and processes in a way that favors the settlement of problems
and disputes through orderly political means within a rule-governed envi-
ronment, or contribute to the removal of the underlying causes of conflict,
whatever those causes may be.19
Thus, states with very similar attributes do not have similar foreign and
security policies. The behavioral trait that is common to all middle pow-
ers is their obvious inability to ‘do some of the things that great powers
can do. On the other hand, they can do things that a smaller power can-
not do’.20 The strategy of states derives from their individual choices, no
matter what group of states they belong to—great, middle or small pow-
ers. As Olav Knudsen says ‘certain patterns of conduct, as well as ways of
doing business, are common to all states’.21 Irrespective of size, each state
xvi INTRODUCTION
is an axiological project, which means that its foreign and security policies
are affected not only by objective factors, but also subjective ones, such as
history and identity.22 Olav Knudsen puts it in this way:
The collective historical experience of a nation tends to become embedded

in people’s minds and creates strong preconceptions that serve as constraints
for joint political action. Dramatic experiences lend themselves more easily
to clear-cut and simplified interpretations than the more mundane […]. The
history of relations between great powers and their smaller neighbors has a
tendency to be marked by dominance and violence […]. Historical experi-
ence is the strongest conditioner for a development of trust.23
The strategies of middle powers also change under the influence of external
factors. As Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal
point out, ‘middle power behavior has been far from static in nature. As the
international system has changed, we have seen a dramatic modification in
the behavior of these states’.24 There is no behavioral pattern for middle
powers depending on international system type, however. Carsten Holbraad
states that in a unipolar and a multipolar system: ‘Middle powers’ conduct
and role would depend on the way [a] great power exercised its preponder-
ance as well as on their own individual inclinations. […] The inclinations
of the middle powers would depend on a number of objective and subjec-
tive factors, such as geographical position and political traditions, and might
lead them in different directions. In responding to the preponderant power,
some might support its policy, while others would see it as threat’.25
As a result, a state that qualifies as a ‘middle power’ on the basis of
quantifiable measures and geographical location does not always play the
role that is held in the literature as being typical of middle powers—that
of conflict manager, multilateral moral power, stabilizer, mediator, peace-
keeper, community builder, ‘helpful-fixer’ and facilitator.26 Instead of
multilateralism, conflict management and moral power—often presented
in the literature as typical behaviors of middle powers—they can concen-
trate on such activities as strengthening their own power, deterrence,
containment, entering into alliances, balancing, bandwagoning, hiding,
transcending, specializing,27 buck-passing,28 and/or bridging.29
The influence of the changing international order on Poland’s post-Cold
War security policy is clearly visible. Joshua Spero rightly draws attention
to the fact that, after the Cold War, Poland adopted a bridging strategy,
understood as an alignment with all neighbors to lessen regional security
INTRODUCTION xvii
dilemmas, rather then to try playing countries against one another, hide
behind neutrality or distance itself through non-alignment.30 This was
undoubtedly Warsaw’s strategy when Krzysztof Skubiszewski was Poland’s
foreign minister (1989–1993). During this period, Poland chose the path
of developing bilateral cooperation with all its neighbors, of sub-regional
cooperation (the Weimar Triangle, the Visegrad Triangle, the Council of
the Baltic Sea States, the Central European Initiative) and of promoting
the model of cooperative security in Europe through the CSCE.
This strategy changed over the years, however. From the fall of 1992,
Poland’s security policy became focused on joining NATO—a political
and military alliance which Poland saw as the institution best able to
provide it with security and which it wished to join as rapidly as possible.
Successive Polish governments saw the casus foederis clause in the North-
Atlantic Treaty’s Art. 5 as the expression of the Alliance’s most important
function and consistently took steps to support NATO while opposing
any actions that could weaken it. This entailed a reluctant stance on
Poland’s part with regard to the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP), adopted by the EU in 1999. While Poland revised its stance
and took steps to further the EU security and defense policy in later
years, it consistently held the view that this policy is of a complementary
nature in relation to NATO. Poland also adopted a bandwagoning strat-
egy, understood as joining a stronger entity in order to obtain coveted
benefits.31 And so, when the George W. Bush administration announced
the ‘war on terror’, Poland took part in the military invasion of Iraq in
2003. Warsaw’s bandwagoning strategy was supposed to contribute to
strengthen Poland’s security. In fact, Poland was not facing any imme-
diate threat at that time, but wished to demonstrate its loyalty to the
USA—NATO’s most powerful member—and in this way it sought assur-
ances of American assistance in case of need. By supporting the USA,
Poland also wished to gain economic advantages in the form of lucra-
tive contracts during the reconstruction of Iraq and it also sought to
strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Franco-German tandem in the EU.32
Poland’s strategy with regard to the USA and the Bush administration’s
‘war on terror’ can also be explained through the concept of asymmetri-
cal alliance, which takes place when there is a great difference in power
between two allies. The weaker ally is dependent on the stronger one
and, for this reason, finds itself under pressure to become involved in the
realization of the stronger ally’s interests in exchange for guarantees of
support in situations of danger, should any arise.33
xviii INTRODUCTION
In addition to strengthening its own security through membership in

NATO and maintaining close relations with its member states, including
a strategic partnership with the global hegemon—the USA—Poland also
took steps aimed to hamper the restoration of Russia’s former power. An
important element of these efforts was drawing post-Soviet states, notably
Ukraine and Georgia, into a relationship of closer cooperation with the
West. All these steps led to a worsening of relations between Warsaw and
Moscow. As a result, in the second half of 1990s, Poland moved away from
promoting a cooperative approach based on the OSCE as the principal
model of security in Europe out of fear that Russia would make use of this
organization to further its own interests and to undermine European unity.
This shift in Poland’s security strategy was determined by the redistri-
bution of power in world politics and by the changing international order.
In the early 1990s, the West, with which Poland was seeking a rapproche-
ment, and Russia collaborated closely, and this contributed to Poland’s
adoption of the bridging strategy. Russia was a relatively weak state at the
time, and this reduced the sense of threat Warsaw felt from this direction.
This made it easy for Poland to opt for the role of a bridge between East
and West, the more so as such a role was not an entirely new one, given
Poland’s historical experience. But this situation changed over the next
few years. When Poland and other countries of Central Europe announced
in 1992 that the aim of their security policy would be to join NATO, they
met with Russian opposition. As the West’s world dominance consolidated
and its influence extended to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
Russia relationship with the West began to worsen. Russia showed increas-
ing disapproval of the manner in which the West was behaving in world
politics and, in particular, opposed the USA’s hegemonic position.
Russian decision makers thought that the USA’s actions were leading to
an excessive weakening of Russia, which—as Robert H. Donaldson and
Joseph L. Nogee point out—has always pursued a balance of power policy
as a general rule of statecraft.34 The growing divergences between the
West and Russia strengthened Poland’s traditional sense of threat from its
Russian neighbor and reinforced the view that a different security strategy
was needed. Even though Poland adopted the aim of NATO accession as
part of its new security policy in 1992, its bridging strategy remained in
place. Yet, as the West’s influence expanded to include countries of the
former Eastern Bloc, Poland’s relations with Russia deteriorated. Under
these circumstances, Poland intensified its efforts to join NATO and to
deepen relations with its strongest member—the USA—in order to gain a
protective umbrella as quickly as possible.
INTRODUCTION xix
Russia was a relatively weak state throughout the 1990s, however, and
Moscow’s criticism of the West’s behavior––especially that of the USA––in
international politics was not followed by effective action. This began to
change in the first decade of the 21st century. After Vladimir Putin came
to power in 2000, Russia managed to regain its internal stability, and the
multifaceted crisis that the West ran into a few years later inclined Russia
to embark on a policy aimed at altering the status quo and to bring it
a stronger position in the international system. This was made plain in
President Putin’s speech delivered at the Munich Security Conference in
February 2007. The events which followed—the Georgian–Russian War
in August 2008, the escalation of the Ukraine crisis beginning late 2013
and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014—reinforced in Poland
the sense that Europe was reverting to the former ‘Hobbesian’ paradigm
based on rivalry, conflict, the primacy of national interests, power, and
the division of the world into spheres of influence. This led to a greater
emphasis in Poland’s security policy on actions aimed at reinforcing the
country’s military capabilities, strengthening the NATO alliance, and con-
taining and deterring Russia.
Thinking along lines that are typical of neorealism, which stress a
state-centric approach as well as political and military rivalry, this plays
a dominant role in Poland and this was the primary factor which deter-
mined the division of this work’s contents. In this book the post-Cold
War order is divided into unipolar and multipolar periods in keeping
with Kenneth Walz’s approach to the concentration of power.35 The
period at the end of the 1980s/beginning of the 1990s, when the
bipolar world order was disintegrating, and Poland’s security policy
in the face of the Ukraine crisis, which began to escalate in the fall of
2013, have been treated separately.
The first chapter describes Poland as a middle power in the post-Cold
War context, which formed the background to its security policy. Attention
is drawn to what the author considers as being the most important deter-
minants of Poland’s security policy—the country’s geopolitical location;
its economic and social potential, which determines its power and inter-
national position; and its history and identity, which have an unusually
important influence on the choice of strategy in Poland’s security policy.
The last part of the first chapter is devoted to the analysis of the changes
in documents relating to the strategy of the Polish security since 1989 to
the present day, and takes differences between the concepts of Poland’s
political parties into account.
xx INTRODUCTION
The second chapter covers the changes in Poland’s security policy stemming
from the Autumn of Nations in 1989. At the turn of the 1980s to the 1990s,
Poland not only carried through a number of internal transformations,
but also fundamentally changed its security policy. The Polish authorities
embarked on a search for a new security model. Different concepts were con-
sidered, including Poland’s neutrality and the concept of the Intermarium.
In practice, the cooperative approach prevailed, and this manifested itself in
Poland’s active efforts to strengthen the CSCE. The cooperation between
the West and Russia made it easier for Poland to adopt its bridging strategy.
This strategy soon encountered obstacles, however.
The third chapter addresses Poland’s security policy within a unipolar
international order in which the West was dominant and the USA enjoyed
global hegemony. This chapter shows how Poland’s efforts to join NATO
led to the worsening of its relations with Russia and how those rela-
tions deteriorated as did the relationship between the West and Russia.
Growing tensions and differences in this relationship impelled the changes
that took place in Poland’s security policy strategy. In the mid-1990s,
Poland intensified its efforts to join NATO and to establish closer relations
with its strongest member—the USA. Seeking to preserve the strength
of the North Atlantic Treaty and America’s military presence in Europe,
Poland adopted a cautious stance with regard to the EU’s initiative to set
up a European Security and Defence Policy in 1999. Poland’s interest in a
cooperative security system as part of the OCSE visibly declined, and this
is also discussed in Chap. 3. At the same time, in the middle of the 1990s,
Poland intensified its efforts aimed to bring Ukraine into a closer relation-
ship of cooperation with the West, treating this as an element serving to
preclude the rebuilding of Russia’s strength.
The fourth chapter is devoted to Poland’s security policy in the face
of an emerging multilateral world order and describes the gradual ascen-
dance within that policy of elements that are typical of neorealism. After
president Putin’s 2007 speech in Munich, and the 2008 Georgian–Russian
War, Poland took steps to support NATO consolidation, the strengthening
of the guarantees under Art. 5, and closer relations with the USA. Given
that Washington had by then already decided to reduce its political and
military presence in Europe, Warsaw was inclined to play a more active
role in the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP). The EU, however, was struggling with an economic and political
crisis and grappling with the negative consequences of the Arab Spring,
and was too weak and too divided to take up effective steps to strengthen
INTRODUCTION xxi
the CSDP. Under those circumstances, one of the ways by which Poland

chose to reinforce its national security was the expansion of its own military
capabilities. At the same time, Warsaw supported drawing the post-Soviet
states, especially Ukraine and Georgia, into the Western orbit by strongly
supporting their prospect for NATO membership, and by co-initiating the
EU’s Eastern Partnership program in 2009. This was meant to help reduce
Moscow’s influence in this region and to prevent Russia from reverting to
its former stature.
The fifth chapter examines the implications for Poland’s security of the
Ukraine crisis, which has been escalating since the fall of 2013. Russia’s
annexation of Crimea in March 2014 considerably increased fears in
Poland of a Russian threat of a military or paramilitary nature (potential
action by ‘little green men’). In consequence, Warsaw took steps to
enhance Poland’s military security by means of a further expansion of
its own military capabilities, to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank, and to
strengthen political and military relations with the USA. Poland invari-
ably supports Ukraine’s rapprochement with NATO and that country’s
eventual membership in the Alliance. The differing interests of various
EU member states do not favor the realization by Poland of the policies
it took up in the face of the Ukraine crisis. While the EU did introduce
sanctions against Russia, with the growing problem of refugees and ille-
gal immigration influx to Europe, many EU member states speak of the
necessity to rebuild relations with Moscow.
The sixth and concluding chapter addresses the question of how the
changing international world order in the post-Cold War period has affected
Poland’s security policy. Last but not least, a few words seem in order about
terminology used to define the region of Central and Eastern Europe. There
are different notions used in the literature referring to this region: ‘Central
Europe’, ‘Eastern Europe’, ‘Central and Eastern Europe’, ‘East-Central
Europe’. As Piotr Wandycz points out ‘the term “East-Central Europe” is
arbitrary. It arose out of a need to define a region that is neither wholly
Western nor Eastern, but represents “a middle zone” or “lands in between”,
as some authors have entitled their works on the subject. Neither geographers
nor politicians would agree on the exact contours of the region’.36 Polish his-
torian Oskar Halecki divided Europe in four parts: ‘Western’, ‘West-Central’,
‘East-Central’, and ‘Eastern’.37 Czech intellectualist Milan Kundera, who
propagated the term ‘Central Europe’, points out that ‘three fundamen-
tal situations developed in Europe after the [Second World] war: that of
Western Europe, that of Eastern Europe, and, most complicated, that of
xxii INTRODUCTION
the part of Europe situated geographically in the center, culturally in the

West, and politically in the East.’38 We do not intend to examine either the
identity of ‘Central Europe’ or ‘Central and Eastern Europe’, or the geo-
graphical borders of the region. In this book we use two terms: ‘Central and
Eastern Europe’ and ‘Central Europe’. The first refers to European countries
that formed part of the Soviet Bloc after the Second World War and which
turned toward liberal democracy after the Autumn of Nations.39 From this
group, the countries that are located in the middle of Europe and whose
political, social and economic transition toward liberal democracy is the most
advanced are referred to as being in ‘Central Europe’. The countries of the
latter group are now members of NATO and the European Union. The two
terms are also used in NATO and EU documents, which mention Poland as
lying in ‘Central Europe’ as well as in ‘Central and Eastern Europe’.
Poland’s Security Policy: the West, Russia

and the Changing International Order Justyna Zaja ̨c
NOTES
1. Excerpt from a speech delivered by Polish President Lech Kaczyński’s dur-
ing a rally in Georgia in August 2008, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Ojcme45iykc, accessed on 6 February 2016.
2. Poles were among the victims of terrorist attacks abroad—for example,
three Polish citizens were killed in the terrorist attack on the Brada museum
in Tunis on 18 March 2015—but no attacks took place on Polish
territory.
3. T. L. Knutsen (1999), The Rise and Fall of World Orders (Manchester:
Manchester University Press), pp. 1–2.
4. I. W. Zartman (2009), ‘The Quest for Order in World Politics’, in I. W.
Zartman, ed., Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p. 4. Zartman uses the term ‘world
order’.
5. As Henry Nau points out, ‘different worldviews exist in all countries. They
constitute a broad ideational variable affecting policy outcomes […]. If or
as American power accommodates more and more rising powers in that
sense relatively declines, the voices of today’s aspiring power become more
important. The voices will shape how future international structures may
change and evolve’. See H. R. Nau (2012), ‘Introduction: Domestic
Voices of Aspiring Powers’, in H. R. Nau, D.M. Ollapally, eds., Worldviews
INTRODUCTION xxiii
of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran,

Japan, and Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 5–6.
6. About this qualification of Poland, see for example R. Zięba (2011), ‘The
search for an international role for Poland: conceptualizing the role of a
“middle-ranking” state’, in S. Bieleń, ed., Poland’s foreign policy in the 21st
century (Warsaw: Difin), pp. 61–79; J. Spero (2004), Bridging the European
Divide: Middle Power Politics and Regional Dilemmas (Lanham: Rowman
& Littlefield), P. Grudziński (2008), Państwo inteligentne. Polska w poszuki-
waniu międzynarodowej roli (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek);
A. Włodkowska-Bagan (2015), ‘Środki i metody polityki zagranicznej
państw średniej rangi. Casus Polski po 1989 r.’, in J. Zaja ̨c, A. Włodkowska-
Bagan, M. Kaczmarski, eds. Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Polska-
Europa-Świat. Księga jubileuszowa na czterdziestolecie pracy naukowej prof.
dr. hab. Ryszarda Zięby (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo WDiNP UW),
pp. 295–309.
7. For more, see M. Handel (1981), Weak States in the International System
(London: Frank Cass), pp. 23–30; A. Patience (2014), ‘Imagining middle
powers’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2,
pp. 213–216; E. Jordaan (2003), ‘The Concept of a middle power in
international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional
middle powers’, Politikon, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 165–167.
8. A. F. Cooper, R. A. Higgott, K. R. Nossal (1993), Relocating Middle
Powers. Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver
BC: UBC Press), p. 17. Adam Chapnick calls it a ‘hierarchical model’.
A. Chapnick (1999), ‘The Middle Power’, Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol.
7, No. 2, pp. 76–79.
9. A. F. Cooper, R. A. Higgott, K. R. Nossal (1993), Relocating middle pow-
ers…, p. 17.
10. A.F.K. Organsky (1958), World politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf),
p. 329.
11. J. B. Spero (2009), ‘Great Power Security Dilemmas for Pivotal Middle
Power Bridging’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 148.
12. H. Bull (1977), The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics
(London: Macmillan Press), p. 202.
13. Ibid., p. 108.
14. R. Rothstein (1968), Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia
University Press), p. 29.
15. R. Keohane (1969), ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International
Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 2, p. 269.
16. A. Chapnick (1999), ‘The Middle Power…’, p. 75.
xxiv INTRODUCTION
ers…, p. 19; B. Wood (1988), The Middle Powers and the General Interest
(Ottawa: North–South Institute), p. 21.
18. D. Stairs (1998), ‘Of medium powers and middling roles’, in K. Booth, ed.,
Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond (Cambridge: University
Press Cambridge), p. 270.
19. Ibid., p. 278.
20. Ibid., p. 275.
21. O.F. Knudsen (1996), ‘Analyzing Small-State Security: Role of External
Factors’, in W. Bauwens, A. Clesse, O.F. Knudsen, eds., Small States and
the Security Challenge in the New Europe (London, Washington: Brassey’s),
p. 3.
22. P. Grudziński (2008), Państwo inteligentne. Polska w poszukiwaniu
międzynarodowej roli, (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek), pp. 36,
37–38, 52. For more on the background of states’ foreign policy, see
R. Zięba (2004), ‘Uwarunkowania polityki zagranicznej państwa’, in
R. Zięba, ed., Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa (Toruń:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek), pp. 17–35.
23. O. F. Knudsen (1996), ‘Analysing Small-State Security… ’, pp. 12–13.
ers…, p. 19.
25. Holbraad uses the terms ‘unifocal system’ and ‘multiple system’. See
C. Holbraad (1984), Middle Powers in International Politics (New York:
St. Martin’s Press), pp. 185–186.
26. B. Wood (1988), The Middle Powers…, pp. 19–20; C. Holbraad (1971),
‘The Role of Middle Powers’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 6, No. 2,
pp. 80; L. Pearson (1966). ‘Canada’s Role as a Middle Power’, in J. K.
Gordon, ed., Canada’s Role as a Middle Power (Toronto: Canadian
Institute for International Affairs), p. 204; P. V. Lyon, B. W. Tomlin
(1979), Canada as an International Actor (Toronto: Macmillan),
pp. 12–13; D. B. Dewitt, J. J. Kirton (1983), Canada as a Principal Power
(Toronto: John Wiley & Sons), p. 403; A. F. Cooper, R. A. Higgott, K. R.
Nossal (1993), Relocating middle powers…, pp. 24–25; R. Cox (1996),
Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
p. 243. See also E. Jordaan (2003), ‘The Concept of a middle power’…,
pp. 168–170.
27. P. Schroeder (1994), ‘Historical Realities vs. Neo-Realist Theory’,
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 116–117.
28. T. J. Christensen, J. Snyder (1990), ‘Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks:
Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity’, International Organization,
Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 137–168. On buck-passing, see also J. Mearsheimer
(2001), The Tragedy of Great Powers Politics (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company).
INTRODUCTION xxv
29. J. B. Spero (2009), ‘Great Power Security Dilemmas…’, pp. 147–171.

30. Ibid., p. 152.
31. In keeping with the understanding of ‘bandwagoning’ given by R. L.
Schweller (1994), ‘Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist
State Back’, International Security Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 74. There are also
different understandings of bandwagoning. For example, see K. Waltz,
(1979), Theory of International Politics, (Reading: Addison-Wesley);
A. Wolfers (1962), ‘The balance of power in theory and practice’, Discord
and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press); S. M. Walt (1987), The Origins of Alliances
(Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press); R. Jervis, J. Snyder (1991), eds.,
Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition
in the Euroasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press);
J. Mearsheimer (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York,
London: W.W. Norton & Company).
32. M. Rhodes (2004), ‘Central Europe and Iraq: Balance, Bandwagon, or
Bridge?’, Orbis, Vol. 48, Issue 3, pp. 423–436; J. Zaja ̨c (2009),
‘Bandwagoning w polskiej polityce zagranicznej’, Przegla ̨d Zachodni No.
3, pp. 168–178.
33. A. Dybczyński (2015), ‘Zarza ̨dzanie sojuszem asymetrycznym: Relacje
Polska-USA’, in B. Szklarski, ed., Niekonfrontacyjna asymetria w relacjach
polsko-amerykańskich (Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs), pp. 27–44.
34. R. H. Donaldson, J. L. Nogee (2009), The Foreign Policy of Russia:
Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, 4th Ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp),
p. 4.
35. K. Waltz (1979), Theory of International Politics….
36. P. Wandycz (1992), The Price of Freedom. A History of East Central Europe
from the Middle Ages to the Present (London: Routledge), p. 1.
37. O. Halecki (1952), Borderlands of Western Civilization: A History of East
Central Europe (New York: The Ronald Press Company), pp. 4–5.
38. M. Kundera (May 1983), ‘Un occident kidnappé ou la tragédie de l’Europe
centrale’, Le Débat, No. 27, pp. 3–23. For the text in English, see
M. Kundera (26 April 1984), ‘The Tragedy of Central Europe’, New York
Review of Books, Vol. 31, No. 7, pp. 33–38.
39. For a comparison, see S. L. Wolchik, J. Leftwich Curry, eds. (2015),
Central & East European Politics: From Communism to Democracy, 3rd
Ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield).
CHAPTER 1
Post-Cold War Determinants of Poland’s

Security Policy
Poland is situated in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. It is a

member of the European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and of many
other international organizations and institutions. During the Cold War,
Poland was part of the Eastern Bloc—a member of the Warsaw Pact and
COMECON—and its security policy depended on East-West relations, as
well as on Poland’s position of subjectivity with regard to the USSR. The
end of the Cold War had a great impact on Poland’s security policy and it
profoundly changed its internal and external determinants.
This chapter analyzes the post-Cold War determinants of Poland’s
security policy in the context of the theoretical concept of middle powers
in the international order. Poland is a middle power in terms of an interna-
tional hierarchy reflecting such quantifiable attributes as area, population,
economic strength, military capability and other similar factors. Poland
is also a middle power in terms of its geographic location, as the country
is located ‘in the middle’—between Germany and Russia and between
East and West. Since every state is an axiological project, this chapter also
examines the influence of history and identity on Poland’s contemporary
external security policy. It also addresses, in a comparative manner, various
strategies and concepts related to Poland’s security policy, as advocated by
the largest Polish political parties.
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 1

J. Zaja ̨c, Poland’s Security Policy,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59500-3_1
2 J. ZAJA ̨C
1 GEOPOLITICAL LOCATION: ADVANTAGE OR CURSE?

It is difficult to speak of Poland’s geopolitical location in unequivocal
terms. Some see it as ‘the heart of Europe’,1 some as a bridge between East
and West,2 while others consider it as a disadvantageous ‘cursed location’.3
‘Historical experience shows that Poland’s geopolitical location between
East and West was the factor that most strongly influenced the rise of
Polish statehood and the shaping of the Polish national identity. It also
defined the fundamental nature of Poland’s national interests and strategic
objectives related to security.’4 From the partitions in the late 18th century
(in 1772, 1793 and 1795), to the catastrophe of 1939, Poland’s fate was
to a high degree a function of Russo–German relations. After the Second
World War, Poland’s politics were determined by the East–West divide:
Like other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Poland found itself
within the orbit of the USSR. When the Cold War ended, Poland’s geo-
political circumstances became more favorable than ever in the country’s
history. There was talk of historical changes enabling Poland to overcome
its seemingly fatal location between Germany and Russia—of a ‘new qual-
ity’ in Polish security policy. Fears connected with Poland’s geopolitical
location did not disappear, but attempts were made to surmount them.
As Polish foreign affairs minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski pointed out in
November 1992:
Since the moment of the breakthrough in Poland, the government has been
guided by the imperative of reversing the former bad role and function of
our position between the powers of the East and the West – a position boil-
ing down mainly to domination from the East. As early as the second half
of the eighteenth century this position always had disastrous effects. For the
past three years we have been striving to ensure that this position is to our
advantage. [...] Poland has a geostrategic location that makes its position
militarily significant. That has a bearing on the whole region.5
Poland is a middle power located in the region of Central and Eastern

Europe. Its total area (including internal waters) amounts to 312,685
km², which makes it the ninth largest country in Europe. Poland has a
relatively long coastline on the Baltic Sea (440 km) and boundaries with
seven countries: The Czech Republic (796 km), Slovakia (541 km),
Ukraine (535 km), Germany (467 km), Belarus (418 km), Russia (210
km) and Lithuania (104 km). The longest section of Poland’s border is
with the Czech Republic (22%) and the shortest with Lithuania (3%).6
POST-COLD WAR DETERMINANTS OF POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY 3
Poland’s present territory is half the size it was in the past, however. Under
the Jagiellonian Dynasty—whose first representative, Władysław Jagiełło,
ascended the Polish throne in 1386—Poland grew in strength and became
a major European power whose golden age lasted through the 15th and
16th centuries. During this period, the Polish kings ruled over a realm
whose area ranged from about 700,000 to over 900,000 km².7 Growing
internal crises in conjunction with the rising power of Poland’s neighbors
ultimately led to the collapse of Polish statehood. Poland was carved up
between Russia, Austria and Prussia in three partitions and, in 1795, dis-
appeared from the political map of Europe for 123 years. Poland regained
its independence in 1918 and after its borders were finally delimitated in
1922, it occupied a territory of about 388,000 km². This was about half
of Poland’s territory before the partitions. The Second Polish Republic
(1918–1939) also had unfavorably shaped boundaries. Its Baltic Sea
coastline was only 140 km long. Its 1912 km border with Germany ran
through disputed territory and was devoid of any natural defensive attri-
butes like rivers and mountains, and its relations with Germany were tense.
Moreover, the German minority in Poland often sought protection for its
rights at the League of Nations on the basis of the so-called Little Treaty
of Versailles, and received support from the German state. Gdańsk, which
was a free city, was the object of many Polish–German disputes. The bor-
der with the USSR, Poland’s second-longest (1412 km), ran through ter-
ritories inhabited by Ukrainians and Byelorussians, whose attitude toward
Poles and the Polish state was hostile. This was particularly the case with
the Ukrainians, of which there were about 5 million—approximately 16%
of Poland’s population at the time.8 The Polish–Lithuanian border (507
km) was not a peaceful one because Poland and Lithuania were in dis-
pute over Vilnius and the Vilnius region. Although Poland’s border with
Czechoslovakia (the third longest, with 984 km), ran along the Carpathian
Mountain range and was largely an ethnic and natural one, Poland’s rela-
tions with its neighbor to the south were cool. Disputes over border areas
(Trans-Olza, Spis and Orava), which were settled in July 1920, left feel-
ings of injustice and mutual animosity on both sides of the border.9 Only
the border with Romania (349 km) and Latvia (109 km) were relatively
peaceful. These were the short borders, however.
After the Second World War, Polish territory was reduced by nearly 20%
(from 388,000 km² to 312,000 km²) and the number of countries with which it
shared a border fell to three: The USSR (a border of 1321 km), Czechoslovakia
(1292 km) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (467 km).
4 J. ZAJA ̨C
In contrast with the pre-war period, Poland now had largely natural bor-
ders, most of which followed rivers (the Oder, Western Neisse, and Bug) and
mountains (the Sudety and Carpathians). Poland’s population also became
homogenous, because Poland’s eastern boundary was based on ethnic fac-
tors (the Curzon line), and because the inhabitants of former German terri-
tories ceded to Poland were expelled by virtue of the Potsdam Agreement of
1945. Poland’s coastline also grew to 497 km, and this made it possible for
Poland to operate several seaports. Relations between the People’s Republic
of Poland and its neighbors were formally friendly, but in practice Poland’s
membership of the Eastern Bloc meant Warsaw’s freedom to shape its rela-
tions with other countries was limited.10
The Autumn of Nations, which began in 1989, did not affect Poland’s
borders, but transformed the countries which lay beyond them. Upon the
unification of the two German states (1990), the collapse of the Soviet
Union (1991) and the ‘velvet divorce’ in Czecholovakia (1993), the num-
ber of Poland’s neighbors grew from three to seven: Germany, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Russia. No territorial
claims were raised by Poland’s neighbors after these peaceful changes and
all of them recognized their border with Poland.11 Poland signed friendship
and cooperation agreements with each of its neighbors in the early 1990s.
Over the centuries, Poland’s changing international environment
determined the fate of the country in different ways. During the first
period of its history (10–14th centuries), the Polish state found itself
isolated from the great historical processes of Medieval Europe and this
was a time of consolidation and stabilization. In the 14th century, Poland
became the principal force driving integration processes in the region.
The Polish–Lithuanian dynastic union of 1385 brought a period of great-
ness and peaceful stability, which lasted until the death in 1572 of King
Zygmunt August—the last monarch of the Jagiellonian dynasty. Within a
few decades, however, the Polish Commonwealth began drifting toward
the periphery of European politics, a process that was hastened by the
country’s severance from the south-east due to the rise of Turkey and
by the rise of trans-Atlantic trade. These developments produced long-
lasting negative economic consequences as well as threats of a political
and military nature. The 17th and 18th centuries in Polish history were a
period of numerous wars and conflicts with Russia, Sweden and Turkey.12
By the second half of the 18th century, unfavorable external conditions
and ongoing internal crises had proved Poland unable to defend itself
against the encroachments of neighboring Austria, Prussia, and Russia.13
As a result of the three partitions, Polish identity became associated with

the view that the greatest threat to Poland’s independence lies in its unfor-
tunate geopolitical location between Germany and Russia.
It was only with the First World War that conditions favoring the re-
establishment of Polish independence arose. The collapse of the three par-
titioning powers as a result of the war allowed Poland to re-emerge on the
political map of Europe. Its independence, recovered in November 1918,
was short-lived, however, because in September 1939 it was again invaded
by Germany and the USSR. The Secret Protocol appended to the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 provided for the division of Central and
Eastern Europe between the two countries and its provisions as related to
Poland came to be known as the country’s fourth partition. The Second
World War also laid bare the weakness of Poland’s treaties of alliance with
France and the United Kingdom. The memory of the failure of those treaties
continues to exert a strong influence on Poland’s security policy today. The
post-war realignment of forces in the world thrust Poland into the Soviet
sphere of influence, where it remained until the end of the 1980s. During
the Cold War, Poland’s geopolitical situation was also highly unfavorable.
The end of the Cold War bipolar order created new opportunities
for Poland’s security policy. Polish–German relations were evolving in a
promising direction; united Germany became a member of the Western
community, and the West—whose ally and member Poland is today—rose
to global dominance; and Russia was internally weak at the time and its
international position was also at a low point. Geopolitical factors didn’t
disappear for these reasons, but began to play a lesser role in Poland’s
policy, just as they had in the distant past. But as the multipolar world
order began to emerge at the beginning of the 21st century, as the posi-
tion of the West weakened somewhat and that of Russia grew, Poland
reverted to thinking in geopolitical terms. In the second decade of the
21st century, however, Poland’s unfavorable geopolitical situation is no
longer defined in terms of the country’s location between Germany and
Russia, but rather of its location between the West and Russia—Poland’s
eastern border is also that of the EU and of NATO.
2 DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POTENTIAL

Poland has 38.5 million inhabitants, which makes it the eighth most
populous country in Europe (taking the entire population of Russia and
Turkey into account) and the sixth in the European Union. Just as in
6 J. ZAJA ̨C
many other European countries, the number of Poland’s inhabitants is

falling systematically and this trend carries negative economic and social
consequences for the country. For several years, Poland has had a nega-
tive rate of natural increase and the long-term demographic projection is
that Poland’s population will continue to decrease. According to forecasts,
Poland’s population will drop to about 37.1 million by 2030, and to 33.9
million by 2050.14 This unfavorable demographic trend entails a gradual
ageing of society and also the shrinking of the working-age segment of
the population. While in 2012 for every 100 persons of working age there
were 56.5 persons of non-working age (100:56), according to forecasts
this ratio will be 100:73 in 2030, and 100:105 in 2050.15
These trends point to growing difficulties ahead for the Polish economy,
and to the need to start thinking of importing labor. At present, Poland
is a country with a highly-homogenous population, where inhabitants of
Polish national identity are the dominant group (96.07%).16 The largest
national minorities are the Germans, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians.17
Polish society is also highly homogenous in terms of religious denomina-
tion. Roman Catholicism is strongly rooted and the role of the Catholic
Church in Polish political and social life remains strong. Polish society is
characterized by an almost universally declared belief in God. Such belief
has remained pretty constant in recent years. Over 90% of respondents
since 1990 have been saying they are believers (from 92% to 97% depend-
ing on the year), and about 10% describe themselves as strong believers.
The percentage of people who state that they believe only partially or not
at all is relatively small (3–8%). Since the death of Pope John Paul II in
2005, however, the percentage of this last group has doubled (from 4% to
8%). During the same period, the percentage of strong believers dropped
(from 12% to 8%). It is also worthwhile to note that, from May 2005
to October 2014, the percentage of people who are religious ‘in keep-
ing with the Church’s precepts’ has fallen (from 66% to 39%), while the
percentage of people who say they believe ‘in their own manner’ has risen
(from 32% to 52%).18 The above trends have not weakened the position
of the Catholic Church in Poland, however. Despite the fact that Poland
is seen as a religiously tolerant country, there are doubts about the degree
to which non-Christian minorities could integrate in Polish society. Those
doubts have been growing along with the arrival in Europe of waves of
illegal Muslim immigrants. Although Poland is not a destination of choice
for immigrants from the Middle East and Africa, in the second half of
2015 an increasing number of illegal migrants from those regions have
been apprehended in Poland. Moreover, in September 2015, EU foreign

ministers reached an agreement according to which Poland was expected
to admit approximately 7,000 refugees who arrived in Europe in the previ-
ous months from the EU’s southern neighborhood. While the new PiS-
led government formed in the fall of 2015 accepted the obligations taken
on by the previous cabinet, after the terrorist attacks which took place in
Brussels in March 2016, Polish prime minister Beata Szydło announced
that Poland was no longer prepared to take in any of the refugees it had
agreed to accept in its negotiations with the EU. Poland, along with other
Visegrad Group members, is also against the adoption of a mechanism of
automatic relocation of migrants entering the EU. Jarosław Kaczyński—
the PiS leader—has stated outright that he was against the admission
to Poland of immigrants from the Middle East and accused refugees of
carrying all kinds of diseases and parasites that would endanger existing
European populations.19 One of the justifications given for such a stance
is the fact that Poland has already admitted a large number of people from
the post-Soviet area. In the 1990s, Poland admitted 86,000 Chechens,20
and after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the number of Ukrainians in
Poland rose sharply. Even though the majority of the latter are economic
migrants, the number of Ukrainian refugee applications is also rising.
While in 2003–2013 the number of such applications was under 100 per
year, their number grew to 2318 in 2014 and 1882 in 2015. Ukrainians
applying in Poland for protection under international law come mostly
from the districts of Donetsk (about 54%), Luhansk (about 31%), and
Crimea (about 9%).21 The Polish authorities grant asylum status to very
few applicants, however.22 Another reason why the Polish government
resists accepting more refugees is the fear of excessive financial costs for
the Polish state.
The state of development of the Polish economy is advanced, albeit
there are some serious concerns about its future. The country’s rapid eco-
nomic growth began with the introduction of a free-market economy fol-
lowing the political transformations that began in 1989, and accelerated
with Poland’s admission to the EU. After a decade of EU membership,
the Polish economy has grown and has been catching up fast with those
of ‘old’ EU countries. Since 2004, Poland’s GDP grew by nearly half
(48.7%) and began to catch up with the EU’s average GDP per capita:
while in 2003 Poland’s GDP per capita (PPP) was 48.8% of the EU-27
average, by 2012 it had reached 66.9%, an increase of 18.1%.23 Poland’s
GDP in 2003 amounted to 192.2 billion EUR, by 2010 it had risen to
8 J. ZAJA ̨C
359.8 billion EUR, and in 2014 it reached 413.1 billion EUR.24 EU

funds have been an important element of Poland’s economic transforma-
tion. From the first year of EU membership, Poland was a net beneficiary
country; in ten years it obtained a net sum of 61.4 billion EUR overall,
after having paid its contribution. Poland remained the largest net ben-
eficiary country for the 7-year financial framework for 2014–2020. While
it received a total of 101.5 billion EUR from the 2007–2013 budget this
sum has grown to 105.8 billion EUR for the period 2014–2020. In fact,
the inflow of EU funds to Poland began before the country’s accession to
that organization, mainly through the PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA pro-
grams. But only with EU membership did the real impact of such funds
on development increase. The greatest share of EU funds is transferred to
Poland as part of the Cohesion Policy. Poland’s cohesion policy envelope
will increase from 69 billion EUR in 2007–2013 to 72.9 billion EUR in
2014–2020.25 Unquestionably, important factors contributing to Poland’s
economic development included the growth of exports and FDI inflow.
In 2004–2014 the aggregate value of foreign direct investments inflow
to Poland exceeded 100 billion EUR (405 billion PLN). EU member-
ship and joining the Schengen Area in 2007 also enabled Poles to travel
freely through countries, thus leading to greater mobility of human capi-
tal. Progressively easier access to the labor markets of other EU countries
inclined many Poles to earn their living there. In addition, over 120,000
Polish students studied or underwent internships in other EU countries
as part of the Erasmus program, while 37,000 lecturers taught in those
countries’ higher learning institutions or received training there.26 Despite
such impressive figures, there were some negative aspects, however. While
the inflow of foreign capital has spurred Poland’s economic and social
development, the activities of multinational corporations will threaten the
continued functioning of Polish small and medium-size enterprises if the
state does not come up with an appropriate policy in this regard. The afflu-
ence of Poles in the last decade has increased (net wages have risen by 51%,
which means that in 2012 the statistical Pole could buy 50% more prod-
ucts with his or her wage than in 2003), but creeping social stratification is
becoming a problem. Poland’s unemployment rate has fallen (from 20% in
December 2003 to 11.2% in April 2015),27 but this is in large measure due
to emigration. Although it is difficult to estimate how many Poles have
moved to ‘old’ EU countries after 2004 (various studies put their number
at 1.3–2 million), it is certain that it is most often people of the youngest
and most productive age group (18–44) who leave. This has a negative
impact on the future of the country’s labor force and developmental

potential. Anxiety voiced by farmers can also be heard increasingly often.
While this social group as a whole is rightly considered as a beneficiary of
Poland’s membership in the EU, there are fears that relatively small-scale
production farms may not be able to survive in the long run. Some farm-
ers also fear that land will be bought up by foreigners, especially as the
12-year protective moratorium on the free trade of agricultural land in
Poland is coming to an end in 2016. Another challenge facing Poland is
the need to create an efficient state administration. Growing bureaucracy,
the incompatibility of initiatives pursued by various state institutions, the
lack of cohesion between state strategic documents reduce the efficiency
of measures undertaken to reach specific goals.28 Another serious problem
for the Polish national budget is the state of the pension and retirement
system and of the health care service, both of which are quite ineffective in
their present form. Poland’s decreasing population, the ageing of society,
and large scale economic emigration (approximately 2 million Poles), have
brought serious social and economic challenges for Poland. While the PiS
government which took power in the fall of 2015 has been taking steps to
improve this situation, the lack of a cohesive action strategy and systemic
solutions, and the shortcomings of the ones that are being implemented
give rise to serious doubts as to their effectiveness. Moreover, the manner
in which they are implemented has led many Polish and foreign milieus to
justifiably accuse the ruling party of violating democratic principles.
Poland’s relatively weak scientific and technical potential is also a
problem. Expenditures for research and development (R&D) as a share
of GDP amounted to only 0.87% in 2013. While this was an increase
over previous years (0.67% of GDP in 2009, and 0.72% of GDP in
2011),29 it was still definitely too little, especially considering the
neglect during previous years. Although the Polish economy withstood
the global financial crisis well, it will not stand up to competition in the
future unless it is based on innovation. Failure to innovate will not only
have negative consequences for Poland’s economic and social devel-
opment, but also for the growth of its military potential. The Polish
Armed Forces is a force of 120,000 soldiers, of which 100,000 are on
active duty and 20,000 are in the National Reserve Forces (Narodowe
Siły Rezerwowe—NSR). The Polish Armed Forces have been subject
to in-depth transformations since 1989. At the outset, the Polish army
was a 400,000-strong conscription-based mass army. Large and costly
reserves were an inherent element of that system. The initial stage of the
10 J. ZAJA ̨C
transformations consisted of reducing the number of soldiers and the

quantity of military equipment and weapons. Just between 1989 and
1993 the Polish armed forces were reduced by 25%.30 As it strove to be
admitted to NATO, Poland began to adapt its armed forces to those
of the North Atlantic Alliance. A standardization process was launched
and steps were taken to ensure the compatibility and interoperability of
the Polish Armed Forces with the NATO forces. Following its admis-
sion to the Alliance, Poland adopted a law in May 2001, under which
the third stage of transformations of Poland’s armed forces began and
which brought a new systemic solution to the Polish legal system—that
each year at least 1.95% of the previous year’s GDP would be allo-
cated for defense purposes. Since then Poland adopted three large-scale
programs to transform its armed forces—for 2001–2006, 2008–2010,
and 2013–2022. The Polish defense industry is not able to provide the
entirety of the equipment and arms needed by the Polish army and,
therefore, much of it needs to be purchased abroad. In keeping with
the Ordinance of the Ministry of National Defense of December 2007,
the purchase of most types of military equipment and armaments is
made conditional on the signing of an offset agreement. Poland’s most
important supplier of military equipment is the USA. In July 2015
Poland adopted a law providing that no less than 2% of annual GDP
would be spent to finance Poland’s defense needs, beginning 2016.
Equipment and arms purchases are in line with the adopted vision
of the Polish armed forces. According to the forecast of the Ministry
of National Defense, by 2030 the Polish armed forces will be made
up of five basic component branches: Land Forces, the Air Force, the
Navy, Special Forces, and the Military Gendarmerie (Żandarmeria
Wojskowa). Information Forces are also to be set aside from the armed
forces in response to the increasing probability that the sphere of infor-
mation (electronic, psychological and media) will play a crucial role in
future conflicts.31 There will thus be a greater need for modern equip-
ment, weapons and technologies based on microelectronics and IT,
and for biology, nanotechnology and new energy technologies. This in
turn will lead to a greater need for costly purchases which may prove
difficult to finance for economic or social reasons. Warsaw’s relatively
high defense spending in comparison with other EU countries is due to
the importance of the military component in Poland’s security policy.
And this is in large measure a derivative of Poland’s geopolitical situa-
tion and of the country’s historical experiences.
3 HISTORY AND IDENTITY IN POLAND’S

SECURITY POLICY
Poland’s policy is driven by history and geography perhaps to a greater
degree than any other European state.32 The Polish nation is one of those
Karl Marx called a historical nation rooted in institutions of the past.33
Contrasting historical experiences—major power status for a few centu-
ries; decline in the 18th century; 123 years of partition; the short epi-
sode of the Second Republic (1918–1939); and the Second World War
(1939–1945), following which Poland found itself in the Soviet sphere of
influence (1945–1989), have left a major imprint on the Polish identity.
History has imbued the Polish national identity with notions such as
martyrdom and heroism connected with the ongoing struggle for inde-
pendence and, at the same time, with concepts like Messianism and
Prometheism. One the one hand, the sense of injustice at the hands of
neighboring countries (Germany and Russia) grew, as did the cult of the
heroic struggle against the oppressors and a specific type of martyrol-
ogy. On the other, the memory of the splendor and greatness of the old
Commonwealth was very much alive and was accompanied by a sense of
civilizational superiority over the East and of a particular sense of mission
that this implied. The view, already current in medieval times, holding that
Poles had originated in Sarmatia led them to the conviction that they, who
felt part of Western Europe, had an unusually important role to play—to
hold back the barbarian invasions advancing on Europe from Asia. The
Poles-Sarmatians thought they had not only the right, but the duty, to
make use of the territories lying to the east of their country’s borders, and
saw Poland as a model for others to follow. In this manner, Sarmatism
came to stand for the idea of a Poland whose mission it was to spread
the values of the West eastward and to promote liberty for the nations
enslaved by Russia.34 As a result, the Poles were for centuries admired by
their eastern neighbors, as well as resented for their sense of mission and
superiority. Poland, which had the opportunity to be a bridge between
East and West, both of which were part of Christendom, thus placed itself
in the role of the Bulwark of Christianity (Antemurale Christianitatis).35
Polish history has also shaped two different approaches to politics: roman-
ticism/idealism and pragmatism/realism. Those two conflicting programs
of foreign policy emerged as early as the 18th century. Political idealism
emphasizes the need for cultivating the high morale of the people, while
political realism stresses the necessity to develop the human and material
12 J. ZAJA ̨C
resources of the country.36 Romanticism and idealism exerted a much

greater influence on the shaping of Polish identity than did pragmatism
and realism, however.
History also has consequences for Poland’s politics, society and general
intellectual and political consciousness in the post-communist period. It
is a long established tradition that Poles debate and assess contemporary
problems through the prism of their recurring historical and geostrate-
gic dilemmas.37 In the post-Cold War geopolitical context, the historical
factor has in large measure been overcome in Polish–German relations.
Following the final closure of Second World War issues in the early 1990s,
Germany has gradually become a close partner for Poland. While some
issues from the time of the Second World War arise from time to time,38
both countries are members of NATO and the European Union, so the
consolidation of their mutual relations largely takes place through com-
munity mechanisms. History has also ceased to determine Poland’s pres-
ent relations with the Czech Republic and Slovakia. While Poland did have
some disputes with those countries in the past, these have not played any
significant role in Poland’s relations with its southern neighbors in the
post-Cold War period.
Poland’s relations with its formerly-Soviet eastern neighbors look quite
different. Since the end of the Cold War, the debate about whether Poland,
which lies in Central Europe, is a bulwark or a bridge between East and
West has been very animated.39 Russia continues to be seen as a potential
threat in Poland and the rivalry, conflicts and wars which began in the end
of the 15th century and continued in successive centuries, continue to cast
a shadow over Polish–Russian state relations. Both states vied, with greater
or lesser fortune, for power and influence over the Ruthenian lands (the
territory of today’s Ukraine, Belarus), but after the Truce of Andrusovo
(1667), which divided Ukraine in two, the Commonwealth lost its posi-
tion of supremacy in Eastern Europe on behalf of Russia. In the late 18th
century partitions, over 60% of the old Commonwealth’s territory found
itself under Russian control,40 and the two failed anti-Russian insurrec-
tions—the November Insurrection (1830) and the January Insurrection
(1863)—only deepened the animosity felt by Poles toward the Russian
state.41 Mutual relations were not normalized when Poland regained its
independence in 1918, while in September 1939 the USSR invaded Poland
in collusion with the Third Reich. In keeping with Joseph Stalin’s political
calculations, power in post-war Poland was seized by Polish communists
and the country remained in the Soviet sphere of influence until 1989.
Conflict became not only a lasting element but, indeed, the geopolitical
stigma of Polish–Russian history.42 As a result, history has stamped the
Polish national identity with an image of Russia as an imperial state seeking
to subjugate Poland and to anchor permanently its influence over Eastern
and Central Europe. The most obvious example of historical factors influ-
encing Polish–Russian relations today is the Katyn massacre—the murder
of about 22,000 soldiers, officers and other functionaries of the Polish
state carried out in the spring of 1940 by the Stalinist regime—which
remains a vivid scar in the Poles’ consciousness. While Russia acknowl-
edged responsibility for the murders, it chose not to disclose a portion of
the relevant documentation—a decision that caused much dissatisfaction
in Poland. Some Polish politicians feel it necessary to classify the crime
as a case of genocide, something that hasn’t happened so far. There are
also other non-resolved issues from the past in Polish–Russian relations.43
Despite the establishment of a Polish–Russian Group for Difficult Issues
in 2002, and a Center for Polish–Russian Dialogue and Understanding
in 2011 (in Poland and in Russia), history continues to affect relations
between the two countries.
Historical factors also affect Poland’s relations with Lithuania and
Ukraine. Frictions in Polish–Lithuanian relations over the issue of the
Polish minority in Lithuania appeared at the beginning of the 1990s. In
1989 the number of Poles living in Lithuania stood at 258,000 people,
about 7% of the country’s population.44 Over 90% of those Poles have
lived for centuries in south-eastern Lithuania—mainly in the capital city
of Vilnius and the regions of Šalčininkai, Švenčionys, Trakai and Vilnius.45
Those are areas which, before the Second World War, had been part of
Poland, to which they had been annexed following an armed operation by
the Polish army conducted in October 1920 (the so-called Żeligowski’s
Mutiny). Lithuania did not recognize this annexation and diplomatic rela-
tions were only established in 1938, following an ultimatum from Poland.
Thus, the establishment of formal diplomatic ties did not reflect any real
improvement in relations between the two countries.46 Mutual animosi-
ties, having lain dormant since the Second World War, resurfaced after
the end of the Cold War. At the beginning of the 1990s, during negotia-
tions leading to the signing of the Polish–Lithuanian Treaty on Friendly
Relations and Good Neighborly Cooperation, the Lithuanians proposed that
the preamble to the treaty include a condemnation of Żeligowski’s inva-
sion and Poland’s subsequent occupation of Vilnius and the Vilnius region
from 1920 to 1939, something the Poles refused to accept. During the
14 J. ZAJA ̨C
negotiations there were also differing views about the rights and privileges
of the Polish minority in Lithuania. In light of these difficulties negotia-
tions dragged on and while Poland signed similar treaties with its other
eastern neighbors in 1992, an understanding with Lithuania was only
reached two years later. The relevant treaty, signed in April 1994, made
it possible for the two countries to normalize relations, but the spirit of
the past continues to haunt Polish–Lithuanian relations. Questions having
to do with the rights of Lithuania’s Polish minority that live in compact
settlements on territory which used to be part of the Polish state before
the Second World War, continue to cause friction. One of the most impor-
tant problems is the legal inability for Poles in Lithuania to write their
surnames in the original form.47
Historical questions also loom over Polish–Ukrainian relations.
Nationalism and anti-Polish attitudes among Ukrainians had grown for
centuries and crystallized following the First World War. In November
1918, fighting broke out between Poles and Ukrainians over the city of
Lwów and rapidly transformed itself into a regular war for Eastern Galicia.
In April 1920, the Ukrainian People’s Republic headed by Semon Petlura
concluded an alliance with Poland directed against the Bolsheviks, but
this alliance was of a tactical nature and Ukrainian separatism in the
western part of Ukraine retained its distinctly anti-Polish character. In
October 1920, Poland and Soviet Russia, which had been at war since
1919, agreed on a ceasefire and, in March 1921, signed the Treaty of
Riga, which ended the collaboration between Poland and the Ukrainian
People’s Republic. The interwar period was a time of growing sense of
national identity among Ukrainians and of recurring violent action on the
part of Ukrainian nationalists directed against the Polish state. The Polish
authorities took no steps to defuse tensions. Quite the opposite—succes-
sive governments in Warsaw sought to Polonize and assimilate national
minorities, and their frequently brutal policy only compounded anti-Pol-
ish sentiment.48 This led to tragedy during the Second World War: In
1943 the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) carried out an extensive eth-
nic cleansing operation during which an estimated 100,000 Poles were
murdered,49 most of them (50–60 thousand) in Volhynia.50 This issue
resurfaced in Polish-Ukrainian relations after the Cold War. Since 2003,
commemorations of the anti-Polish UPA campaign in Volhynia have been
organized every year. Though important and momentous, they have
unfortunately not brought closure to the historical wounds affecting the
way Poles and Ukrainians perceive each other. For many years, Ukrainians
were unwilling to commemorate the Poles who died defending Lwów

against the Ukrainians in 1918, when it was an overwhelmingly Polish
city, and only in 2005 was the cemetery in which they were buried dur-
ing the interwar period reopened. The Polish–Ukrainian reconciliation
process is a difficult one. Many Ukrainians continue to see Poland as a
state seeking to dominate them and the Ukraine crisis highlighted many
Ukrainians’ anti-Polish nationalism. For political reasons, however, rela-
tions with Ukraine are a priority in Poland’s security policy.
In Polish–Byelorussian relations, the end of the Cold War did not
bring any serious historically motivated disturbances to the two countries’
collaboration, because their past relations were not fraught with nega-
tive events. One may rather draw many positive conclusions from the his-
tory of the two countries’ relations by pointing to the period of shared
statehood during the times of the Commonwealth and to close cultural
ties. The factor that sets Poles and Byelorussians apart more than any
other is religion. To this day in the border areas of each state the Polish
identity is associated with Roman Catholicism and Byelorussian identity
with Eastern Orthodoxy. In the first years of Byelorussian independence,
Poland’s relations with that country thus looked very promising. The elec-
tion of President Alexander Lukashenka in 1994, and the different aims
that Poland and Belarus took in their respective foreign and security poli-
cies, led to a worsening of relations between the two countries, however.
Poland’s strategy was based on the expectation that relations with Belarus
would grow closer and that the Minsk authorities would respect demo-
cratic principles and human rights. On many occasions there were disputes
between Warsaw and Minsk because of the chicaneries that the Union of
Poles in Belarus was subjected to by the Byelorussian authorities and of
the latter’s often justified charges that Catholic priests were engaged in the
Polonization of the Byelorussian population in their pastoral work. This
situation is not due to historical factors, however, but rather to contempo-
rary ones and to the foreign policy choices made by the two countries.51
4 STRATEGIES AND CONCEPTS OF POLAND’S

SECURITY POLICY
When it was a member of the Warsaw Pact (WP), Poland had no security
policy of its own and followed the WP doctrine in this regard. It is only
with the end of the Cold War and the transformations of the Polish politi-
cal system that Warsaw gained the possibility of shaping its own foreign and
16 J. ZAJA ̨C
security policy. It was not an easy transition, however, because it took time
to overcome entrenched patterns, habits and procedures. Furthermore,
for a long time there were no institutions dealing with strategic thought,
planning and management.52 Nevertheless, changes of strategies and con-
cepts pertaining to Poland’s security policy did take place and, since the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, several successive documents
defining Polish security strategy were adopted. These documents are from
1992, 2000, 2003, 2007, and 2014. In 2013, for the first time, a White
Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland was drawn up under
the auspices of President Bronisław Komorowski.
4.1 Poland’s National Security Strategies

The security strategies Poland adopted between 1989 and 2016 presented
the conditions, aims and means to ensure the country’s security, while
each successive document covered the subject in greater depth than the
previous one. The first two, entitled The Principles of Poland’s Security
Policy (Założenia polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa) and The Security Policy
and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland (Polityka bezpieczeństwa i
strategia obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) were adopted on 2 November
1992. In the face of a changing international order following the Cold
War, the documents stressed the uncertain nature of developments in
international politics and the consequences for Poland of its location
between an increasingly integrated Western Europe on the one hand and
the disintegrating post-Soviet area on the other. Although the two docu-
ments treat security in the wide sense by taking into consideration non-
military threats and challenges, given the uncertain conditions at the time
they stress the importance of international cooperation, including in the
military sphere. The strategy’s principal aim is defined as integration with
the Western European Union (WEU), seen as NATO’s European pillar
and an important factor in Europe’s collective security system. Relatively,
much space in those documents is also devoted to the CSCE process and
to regional agreements with neighboring states.
The strategies that followed in 2000, 2003, and 2007 were adopted
during the period when the USA enjoyed a hegemonic position. When
Poland joined NATO in 1999, this organization began to play a key role
in Poland’s security policy. The 2000 strategy states that NATO mem-
bership has changed Poland’s geopolitical and geostrategic position in an
important way by reducing the danger of aggression against Poland, and
that there is no threat to Poland’s continued existence as an independent

state or any danger of direct military aggression in the foreseeable future.53
The unlikelihood of a military conflict in Europe that would be a threat
to Poland is mentioned also in the strategies of 2003 and 2007. In those
documents, NATO is seen as the principal pillar of Poland’s external secu-
rity and as a factor of political and military stability in Europe, and sus-
taining the Alliance’s collective defense function (Art. 5) is presented as
a matter of high priority. These documents view the European Union as
the second pillar of Poland’s external security, and consistently stress the
need for NATO–EU cooperation. The EU military component is viewed
as an integral part of NATO. The documents also show the decreasing
importance of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) in Poland’s security policy.54 While the CSCE process takes up
the same amount of space as NATO in the 1992 document, these propor-
tions began to change in 2000. The document from 2007 only mentions
briefly that Poland will remain involved in the work of the OCSE. At the
same time, one can note the growing importance of Poland’s collabora-
tion with the USA. In the documents from 1992 the USA is mentioned
in only one sentence, which states that the military presence of the USA
in Europe is necessary as it exerts a positive influence on the process of
political transformations in the region and contributes to the stability of
the entire continent. The role of the USA in Poland's security policy grew
significantly with each successive document. In the strategy for 2007 the
USA is the subject of an entire paragraph, in which the strategic character
of the relationship between Poland and the USA is stressed.55
In the strategies adopted by Poland during the first years of the 21st
century, when the international order was relatively stable in terms of
Poland’s interests, the principal challenges and threats were those of a
non-military nature: international terrorism; the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; organized crime; and
cyber, economic, environmental and demographic threats. The strategy
for 2007 is the first in which certain passages point to concerns having
to do with Russia in the context of energy security. It draws attention to
the fact that the Russian Federation is taking advantage of the booming
market for energy resources, it is seeking actively to strengthen its inter-
national position, and that its efforts to establish closer contacts with
chosen Western countries is accompanied by restrictions and discrimina-
tion targeted at chosen NATO and EU members. Despite this, the strat-
egy adopted in 2007, like the previous ones, did not mention any Polish
18 J. ZAJA ̨C
fears of a military threat. This, however, changed with the redistribution

of power in world politics that had been taking place for a number of
years. A few months after Russia’s seizure of Crimea in March 2014,
Poland adopted another security strategy, replacing the one from 2007.
The emerging multipolar international order led Poland to include in
its range of challenges and potential threats those of a classic character.
In addition to concerns of a non-military nature mentioned in previous
strategies, the new one stated:
In the neighbourhood of Poland, there is a risk of regional and local conflicts

which could engage the country indirectly or directly. Moreover, Poland is
not free from forms of political pressure which uses military arguments. In
its closest vicinity, there is a large concentration of military potentials, also
in offensive posture. Threats for Poland may, in unfavourable conditions,
become non-military and military. As far as military threats are concerned,
they may take the form of crisis threats or war threats i.e. of military conflicts
of various scale – from military activities below the threshold of classical war
to a less probable large scale conflict.56
The 2014 strategy reflects a sense of threat from Russia that had been
growing for several years. The document further stated:
Russia’s relations with the West will remain an important factor influencing
the security of Poland, the region and Europe. The reassertion of Russia’s
position as a major power at the expense of its neighbourhood, as well as the
escalation of its confrontational policy, an example of which is the conflict
with Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, has a negative impact on
the security in the region.57
In light of NATO’s gradual weakening, the EU’s internal problems, and

the changing priorities of US policy (Asia pivot), Poland is paying greater
attention to the need to expand its own defense capabilities. To quote
the strategy presently in force, there is a need for ‘ensuring readiness and
demonstrating determination to act in the field of security and defence, as
well as strengthening national defence capabilities, with particular treat-
ment of those areas of national security in the case of which Allied (com-
mon) actions may be hindered (consensus-challenging situations)’.58 The
most important pillars of Poland’s external security remain NATO, the EU
and the USA. This document devotes more space than the previous ones
to the OSCE and stresses that in the regional dimension, there is a need to
reconstruct the importance of the OSCE, although, as it points out, this

process will require a constructive approach from all Member States.59
4.2 The Security Policy Concepts of Poland’s Political Parties

The external security policy concepts espoused by Poland’s biggest politi-
cal parties are largely concordant, but upon closer examination a number
of differences can be seen. In the 1990s there was a general consensus in
the Polish political establishment about Poland’s membership in NATO
and the EU. The adoption of both aims took place in keeping with the
view, overwhelmingly shared in Poland, that the country was part of
Western civilization and that ‘returning’ to it was natural.
The unipolar world order during the 1990s greatly favored under-
standing and concordance between Polish parliamentary parties about
the aims and steps to take in security policy. The West, which Poland
sought to join, was dominant in world politics and potential threats from
Russia that Poland had traditionally feared were practically non-existent.
After the break-up of the Soviet Union and its defeat in the Cold War
confrontation, Russia was grappling with a number of internal problems
that weakened its power further and affected its foreign and security pol-
icy. The unipolar world order thus created an unusually advantageous
geopolitical framework for Poland, making security policy choices rela-
tively straightforward. This situation began to change at the beginning
of the 21st century, however. When the unipolar world order began to
transform itself into a multipolar one, when the position of the West
began to weaken and that of Russia to rise, Poland’s sense of security
began to decrease. Russia and the West began to drift apart and Poland,
which, after the collapse of the East–West bloc system, had gained the
opportunity to become an integrating link, a bridge of sorts in this part
of the world, is once gain becoming a bulwark. After Poland’s accession
to NATO and the EU, Polish foreign and security policy became increas-
ingly present in the public debate. Poland’s largest political parties—
Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform, PO), Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
(Law and Justice, PiS), Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left
Alliance, SLD), Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party, PSL),
Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru, and Kukiz’15—are in agreement that the
principal aims of Poland’s foreign and security policy are active member-
ship in NATO and the EU, close ties with the USA, good relations with
all neighbors, building an influential position in the region of Central and
20 J. ZAJA ̨C
Eastern Europe, and sustained activeness in non-European matters. But

visible differences between Polish political parties as to the instruments
and methods used to pursue those aims have begun to appear.
In the last decade, the two parties that were the most influential in
shaping Poland’s policy were the liberal-conservative PO and the right-
wing nationalist PiS. Since the 2005 elections, those two parties have
occupied the bulk of the seats in the Parliament—the 460-seat Sejm and
the 100-seat Senate. In 2005, PiS won the parliamentary elections and
gained 155 seats in the Sejm and 49 in the Senate, while PO got 133 and
34, respectively. After the parliament was dissolved and new elections were
scheduled for 2007, PO obtained 209 seats in the Sejm and 60 in the
Senate, while PiS got 166 and 39, respectively. The two parties obtained a
similar number of seats in the 2011 elections: PO—207 and 63, PiS—157
and 31. These proportions were reversed in the parliamentary elections of
October 2015, when PiS won a decisive victory with 37.5% of the popular
vote (235 seats in the Sejm, and 61 seats in the Senate). PO came second,
with 24% of popular support (138 seats in the Sejm, and 34 in the Senate).
The presidents of the past decade also came from PO and PiS. After the
two terms of Aleksander Kwaśniewski (1995–2005)—a president from the
left-wing SLD who had succeeded Lech Wałęsa (1990–1995)—the presi-
dential elections of 2005 were won by Lech Kaczyński (PiS). A month after
his tragic death in the Smolensk plane crash in April 2010 early presiden-
tial elections were held. These were won by Bronisław Komorowski (PO),
who lost the May 2015 presidential elections to Andrzej Duda (PiS). Thus
it is PO and PiS that exerted the greatest influence over Poland’s foreign
and security policy in the past decade. Both parties agree that membership
of NATO and the EU, the maintenance of close ties with the USA, good
relations with all neighbors, and Polish activeness on the international
stage are in Poland’s national interest. They also agree about the necessity
to strengthen Poland’s military potential. A closer analysis reveals some
differences between the two parties’ approach, however. The fundamental
premise for PiS is the conviction that geopolitics forms the dominant
background for international politics in the 21st century. According to
the party program, international politics are reverting to rivalry in pursuit
of spheres of influence; a hierarchy of states; the rise of imperial ambitions
in some states; and the use of power to pressure weaker states.60 Seeing
in the reemergence of state rivalry a return to classical instruments, PiS’s
concept of security policy favors bilateral cooperation between states based
on shared interests over multilateral cooperation within the framework
of international organizations. It sees the first as having priority and the

second as accessory. PO’s view on this subject is different. Conscious of
Poland’s limited leverage as a medium-size state, it holds the view that
the effectiveness of Poland’s foreign and security policy depends in large
measure on multilateral cooperation. In this context it attaches great
importance to the European Union, and acknowledges the desirability of
reinforcing the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In
contrast, PiS sees laying the foundations for an ambitious security policy
within the EU as an important initiative but, at the same time, thinks that
the EU serves mainly the interests of its largest members and that integra-
tion processes entail an uncontrolled erosion of the national sovereignty
of European states. This view is not meant to be taken as a rejection of
the idea of European integration, but rather that such integration should
take place with respect for Poland’s sovereignty and independence. For
this reason the two parties have a different perception of the role Germany
and France play in the European Union. When it was the governing party,
PO sought to maintain the best possible relations with the EU’s two larg-
est members. In December 2007, Radosław Sikorski—then Minister of
Foreign Affairs in the PO-PSL government—formulated the idea of a
return to the ‘Polish–German community of interests’ that existed in the
1990s.61 In November 2011, on an official visit in Berlin, he called for
German leadership in reforming the EU, stating that he fears German
power less that German inactivity.62 President Bronisław Komorowski, a
PO politician, saw the reactivation of the Weimar Triangle as one of the
high-priority issues of his presidency.63 PiS in turn was critical of PO’s
policy with regard to the largest EU states, referring to it as servility,64
clientelism65, and a policy subordinated principally to Germany, but also
to France.66 As former president Kaczyński stated, in a sense the stakes for
Poland in the EU are its sovereignty vis-à-vis German policy.67 In contrast,
for the PiS government, Poland’s strategic partner in Europe is the United
Kingdom, and that is the way it was referred to during Prime Minister
David Cameron’s official visit to Warsaw in February 2016.
The two parties’ policy differences with regard to the European Union
entail somewhat different approaches to their views about the role that
NATO and the USA play in Polish policy. Both parties agree that this role
is crucial, but PiS, in contrast to PO, sought to conclude a bilateral treaty
of alliance with the USA.68 Krzysztof Szczerski—a PiS deputy and, since
August 2015, a Secretary of State in the Chancellery of President Andrzej
Duda—accused the PO-PSL government of negating the principle that
22 J. ZAJA ̨C
a hard alliance with the USA is more important than NATO alone, and
of decreasing interest in US political and military presence in Poland.69
There is also a difference between PO and PiS about the methods used
to shape Poland’s Eastern policy. Despite the fact that both parties rec-
ognize the existence of a potential threat from Russia, in the case of PiS
these fears are expressed more explicitly. President Lech Kaczyński was
deeply involved in state policy concerning the post-Soviet area and made
reference to the Jagiellonian idea in this regard. While he made use of this
term strictly as a slogan, the essence of his policy was to weaken Russia
and to strengthen Poland’s position by establishing ties of cooperation
with post-Soviet states which were geopolitically important for Poland.
Being convinced that Russia was seeking to rebuild its sphere of influ-
ence in Central and Eastern Europe, President Kaczyński stressed that it
was in Poland’s interest to seek a far-reaching weakening of Russia’s posi-
tion through a power distribution favorable to Poland. Thus he invariably
supported NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. As Kaczyński
argued, the disintegration of the post-Soviet geopolitical order was in
Poland’s interest.70 For this reason, during the NATO Bucharest Summit
in April 2008, Kaczyński personally lobbied on behalf of greater NATO
cooperation with Georgia and Ukraine. He thought the best strategy with
regard to the post-Soviet area would be a policy conducted independently
and/or in classic cooperation with chosen countries. This idea was based
on the premise that a stronger position for Poland in the East contributes
to a stronger position for Poland in the EU and this, in conjunction with
close relations with the USA, translated into a stronger position for Poland
with regard to Russia.71 In practice, this entailed efforts to establish ties
between Poland and the political elites of individual countries, for example
those of Azerbaijan or Georgia. Considering the prevalent patrimonialism
in most post-Soviet states,72 seeking an understanding on the level of the
elites had its justifications.
As declared, PO’s approach to Eastern policy was altogether different.
In the summer of 2009, Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski called
for the abandonment of the Jagiellonian idea in Polish foreign policy, argu-
ing that Poland’s collapse in 1939 represented a civilizational defeat of the
idea of ‘Jagiellonian statehood’, and Poland’s Jagiellonian power ambi-
tions did not provide it with any appropriate answers to the geostrategic
and identity dilemmas of the day.73 PO also places a much greater emphasis
on the necessity to conduct Poland’s foreign policy aims within the frame-
work of the European Union. One consequence of this approach was the
adoption by the European Union in May 2009 of the Eastern Partnership

program on the initiative of the Polish and Swedish foreign ministers—
Radosław Sikorski and Carl Bildt. PiS thought the program to be hollow
on account of the limited funds supporting it, and as a competing project
with respect to President Kaczyński’s design of creating strong interstate
ties with the elites of several countries in the region and of strengthening
Poland’s position in the process.74 PiS charged Donald Tusk’s government
with giving up on the Kiev-first-Moscow-second principle and with adopt-
ing a Russia-first approach.75 PO also places less importance than PiS on
historical factors in relations with Russia. Rejecting historical fatalism in
its 2007 electoral platform, the party declared that its policy with regard
to Russia would be based on pragmatic calculations, without unneces-
sary emotions and empty gestures.76 This drew criticism from PiS, which
accused the government of subjection to Russia, unilateral concessions
in the form of a withdrawal from a more ambitious policy with regard
to states of the post-Soviet area, and of capitulation in the matter of rec-
ognizing the Katyn massacre of 1940 as a crime of genocide.77 A great
discrepancy between the two parties also arose in connection with the
Smolensk catastrophe. The crash on 10 April, 2010, of a Polish TU-154M
aircraft carrying a delegation—including President Kaczyński, his wife and
94 other persons holding high state positions—to the ceremonies com-
memorating the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre, caused a rift
between the two parties in connection with the causes of the crash, and
with the way the official investigation was conducted. PiS criticized the
government for inefficiency and for turning over the matter of the investi-
gation to the Russians. In February 2016 the new defense minister Antoni
Macierewicz (PiS) signed an ordinance making it possible to reopen the
investigation into the Smolensk catastrophe, the causes of which PiS con-
siders as unexplained.
PO and PiS also differ in their assessment of the importance of Central
and Eastern Europe in Poland’s security policy. While both parties see
this region as important, for PiS it is of strategic importance. In this
context PiS makes reference to the concept of Intermarum, that is, the
construction of alliances and partnerships with countries of Central and
Eastern Europe—from the Baltic to the Adriatic. This entails closer rela-
tions within the Visegrad Group, in the Carpathian region, the basin of
the Baltic Sea and in the Balkans. Newly-elected Polish President Andrzej
Duda announced that he would continue the foreign and security policy
of President Kaczyński and made reference to him in his August 2015
24 J. ZAJA ̨C
address to parliament on the day he was sworn in. It was symbolic of

the new president’s foreign policy that he chose Estonia—and 23 August,
2015, the anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact by
Germany and the USSR in 1939—as his first foreign visit.
The parliamentary elections in October 2015 also brought the fol-
lowing parties to parliament: Kukiz’15 (42 seats), Nowoczesna Ryszarda
Petru (28), PSL (16) and the German minority (1). For the first time
since 1991, the parliament is without a left-wing party. The Zjednoczona
Lewica (United Left) made up by Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD),
Twój Ruch, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, Unia Pracy, and Zieloni was
established in the summer of 2015 and obtained 7.55% of votes, that
is, 0.45% short of the minimum needed to enter parliament. The Left’s
poor showing is the more surprising as SLD—the largest party mak-
ing up the Zjednoczona Lewica (United Left, ZL) coalition—governed
Poland in 1993–1997 and 2001–2005. It is under SLD’s governments
that Poland joined the European Union. In its foreign and security pol-
icy, SLD sought to deepen integration within the EU, including the
maintenance of partnership ties with the largest European states, coop-
eration as part of the Weimar Triangle, the adoption of the Euro in
Poland, supporting the CSDP, the maintenance of a close alliance and
comprehensive cooperation with the USA and to strengthen NATO as a
guarantor, along with the EU, of Polish security and the maintenance of
close relations with Poland’s neighbors and states of Central and Eastern
Europe.78 The ZL program stressed three foreign and security policy
elements: (1) favoring the emergence of a European federation as the
appropriate path to overcome the EU crisis, Poland’s accession to the
eurozone, and the building of European solidarity in the face of the
refugee crisis; (2) supporting Poland’s role as a bridge between East
and West; and (3) working towards the elimination of military force in
international politics.79
The coalition partner of both SLD and PO was the agrarian Polskie
Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party—PSL). Foreign policy and
security issues do not play a major part in that party’s platform. PSL stresses
the need to maintain good relations with all neighbors, the importance of
an effective economic diplomacy and, in face of the multipolar interna-
tional order emerging in 21st century, also the necessity to enlarge and
modernize the Polish army, and to modernize the Polish defense indus-
try on the premise that greater defense expenditures will incline NATO
toward greater involvement in Poland.80
NOTES
1. N. Davies (1984), Heart of Europe. A Short History of Poland (Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press); K. Dziewanowski (1995), Polityka w
sercu Europy (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm).
2. See K. Łastawski (2015), ‘Pozycja geopolityczna Polski w Europie po roz-
padzie bloku radzieckiego’, in J. Zaja ̨c, A. Włodkowska-Bagan,
M. Kaczmarski, eds., Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Polska-Europa-
Świat. Księga Jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Ryszardowi Ziębie z
okazji czterdziestolecia pracy naukowej (Warsaw: WDiNP UW), p. 285.
3. J. Kloczkowski, ed. (2009), Przeklęte miejsce Europy? Dylematy polskiej geo-
polityki (Cracow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej).
4. (2013), White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw:
The National Security Bureau), p. 9.
5. K. Skubiszewski (1993), ‘The Eastern Policies of Poland’. Address to five
Parliamentary Committees (Senate Committee for Emigration and Poles
Abroad, Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs, Diet Committee for
Communication with Poles Abroad, Diet Committee for Economic
Relations and Maritime Economy, Diet Committee for Foreign Affairs),
assembled at their joint session in Warsaw on 18 November 1992, Materials
and Documents, No. 1/1993 (Warsaw: Department of Information and
Promotion of Foreign Ministry of Poland), pp. 5–6.
6. (2014), Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw: Central
Statistical Office), pp. 82–83.
7. J. Topolski (1982), Zarys dziejów Polski (Warsaw: Interpress), p. 90. See
also A. Zamoyski (2009), Poland: A History (London: Harper Press);
P. Jasienica (2007), Polska Jagiellonów (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka).
8. Estimates as to the number of Ukrainians in interwar Poland differ accord-
ing to source, and run from 4.4 to 5.4 million.
9. Most of the disputed territory of Spis and Orava was awarded to
Czechoslovakia.
10. J. Zaja ̨c, R. Zięba (2005), Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1945–1989
(Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek).
11. Only Belarus raised territorial claims. In October 1990 Minsk demanded
that Warsaw recognize the region of Białystok as ethnically Byelorussian
and that an autonomous area be established there. Minsk withdrew those
demands quite rapidly, however.
12. For more, see L. Moczulski (1999), Geopolityka. Potęga w czasie i
przestrzeni (Warsaw: Dom Wydawniczy Bellona), pp. 568–569.
13. For more, see P. Jasienica (2007), Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów. Dzieje
agonii (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka); J. Sowa (2011), Fantomowe ciało króla.
Peryferyjne zmagania z nowoczesna ̨ forma ̨ (Cracow: Univeristas).
26 J. ZAJA ̨C
14. (2014), Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw: Central

Statistical Office), p. 222.
15. These working age and retirement age figures are given for two case sce-
narios, because of the change in the retirement age. 100:53 in 2030 and
100:105 in 2050 this is the first case scenario. The respective figures for
the second case scenario are 100:52 in 2030 and 100:78 in 2050. (2014),
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw: Central Statistical
Office), p. 223.
16. (2012), Raport z wyników Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań
2011 (Warsaw: Central Statistical Office), p. 105.
17. Poland’s largest national/ethnic groups (those which do not have their
own states) are the Silesians and the Kashubians. See: (2012), Raport z
wyników Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011 (Warsaw:
Central Statistical Office, pp. 105–106.
18. (February 2015), Changing Religiosity (CBOS Public Opinion Research
Center), p. 2.
19. (2015), Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 100 posiedzenia Sejmu
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 16 września 2015 (Warsaw: Sejm Chancellery),
pp. 13–15.
20. This information was provided by Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz during a
parliamentary debate held on 16 September 2015. See (2015),
Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 100. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej, 16 września 2015 (Warsaw: Sejm Chancellery), p. 4.
21. Office for Foreigners, http://udsc.gov.pl/category/ukraina/, accessed
on 2 October 2015.
22. As Ukraine’s ambassador to Poland, Mr Andrii Deshchytsia, stated in
January 2016, only two persons applying for refugee status in Poland
received it. Deszczyca: Ukraińcy w Polsce to nie uchodźcy, http://www.rp.
pl/Dyplomacja/160129897-Deszczyca- Ukraincy-w-Polsce-to-nie-
uchodzcy.html, accessed on 14 January 2016.
23. (2014), Poland’s 10 years in the European Union (Warsaw: Ministry of
Foreign Affairs).
24. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&pl
ugin=1&pcode=tec00001& language=en accessed on 14 January 2016.
25. All figures in the first part of this article come from: (2014), Poland’s Ten
Years in the European Union (Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This is
a report prepared by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the occasion
of the first decade of Poland’s membership in the European Union.
26. (2014), Poland’s Ten Years in the European Union…
27. Stopa bezrobocia w latach 1990-2015 (Central Statistical Office), http://stat.
gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/rynek-pracy/bezrobocie-rejestrowane/stopa-
bezrobocia-w-latach-1990-2015,4,1.html, accessed on 26 May 2015.
28. J. Zaja ̨c, (2014), ‘Polen: Zehn Jahre Mitgliedschaft in der EU’, Religion
und Gesellschaft in Ost und West, RGOW, No. 10 (Zürich: Institut G2W),
pp. 16–17.
29. (2014), Działalność badawcza i rozwojowa w Polsce w 2013 r. (Warsaw:
Central Statistical Office).
30. (2013) White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw:
The National Security Bureau), p. 44. See also A. A. Michta (2003),
‘Modernizing the Polish Military’, in M. Zaborowski, D. H. Dunn, eds.,
Poland: A New Power in Transatlantic Security (London, Portland OR:
Frank Cass), pp. 40–49.
31. (2010), Wizja Sił Zbrojnych RP-2030 (Warsaw: Ministry of National
Defense).
32. R. L. Buell (1939), Poland. Key to Europe (New York, London: Alfred
A. Knopf).
33. J. Pawelec, P. Szeliga (2014), Nadgonić czas. Wywiad rzeka ze Zdzisławem
Najderem (Warsaw: Świat Ksia ̨żki), p. 415.
34. W. Bernacki (2009), ‘Wizje ładu międzynarodowego w polskiej myśli poli-
tycznej XV–XVIII wieku’, in J. Kloczkowski (ed.), Przeklęte miejsce Europy
…, pp. 59–60 (47–66). Compare with A. Walicki (2002), Rosja, katoli-
cyzm i sprawa polska (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka), pp. 366–367.
35. All sources indicate that Poland began to be referred to as the ‘Bulwark of
Christianity’ in the middle of the 15th century. It was Papal diplomats,
wishing to draw Poland into another coalition against the Sublime Porte,
who first coined this phrase in connection with the Polish state. See
J. Tazbir (1989), Poland as the Rampart of Christian Europe. Myths and
Historical Reality (Warsaw: Interpress), p. 17.
36. As Adam Bromke notes, from political idealism developed the program of
independence and insurrection, directed primarily toward shaking off the
yoke from the East. The method advocated was military action supported
by assistance from France. From political realism emerged the program of
seeking Russian support, which in the first place was directed toward
defense of the territorial integrity of the Commonwealth against the two
German courts and was expected to accomplish the most urgent reforms
under Russian protection. A. Bromke (1967), Poland's Politics: Idealism
vs. Realism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), pp. 3, 253.
37. G. Stanford (1999), Poland. The Conquest of History (Amsterdam:
Harwood Academic Publisher), p. 1.
38. Historical factors contributed to a serious deterioration in Polish–German
relations in 2005–2007, under the governments led by Law and Justice
(PiS). This party raised the issue of the Second World War and accused
Germany of not having sufficiently compensated for the material and
moral damage Poland sustained during the war. This took place against the
28 J. ZAJA ̨C
background of the activeness of the German Federation of Expellees (Bund

der Vertriebenen) and of its leader Erika Steinbach, who attempted to ‘rela-
tivize’ Germany’s responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War.
Another factor that harmed Polish-German relations was the agreement
between Germany and Russia to build the northern gas pipeline. Under
the PO governments (2007–2015), relations between the two countries
were stable and despite the existence of unresolved issues from the past,
history played a much lesser role in two countries mutual relations.
However, after PiS took power in the fall of 2015, Polish–German rela-
tions deteriorated. On the influence of history on today’s Polish–German
relations, see M. Stolarczyk (2015), ‘Dylematy polityki niemieckiej Polski
zwia ̨zane z zakresem wpływy obcia ̨żeń historycznych na międzypaństwowe
stosunki polsko-niemieckie’, in J. Zaja ̨c, A. Włodkowska-Bagan,
M. Kaczmarski, eds., Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe…, pp. 349–367.
39. See, for example, S.W. Garnett (1996), ‘Poland: Bulwark or Bridge?’,
Foreign Policy, No. 102, pp. 66–82; J. Karski (1997), Polska powinna stać
się pomostem między narodami Europy Zachodniej a jej wschodnimi
sa ̨siadami (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego).
40. A. Ma ̨czak, ed. (1997), Historia Europy (Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow: Zakład
Narodowy im. Ossolińskich), p. 485.
41. For more, see A. Nowak (2007), ‘Polish Foreign Policy during the
Partitions: Concepts and Limitations’, in J. S. Micgiel, P. Wandycz, eds.,
Reflections on Polish Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University, East
Central European Center: Józef Piłsudski Institute for Research in the
Modern History of Poland), pp. 1–21.
42. A. Włodkowska-Bagan (2012), ‘Konfliktowość w stosunkach polsko-
rosyjskich jako stygmat geopolityczny’, in S. Bieleń, A. Skrzypek, eds.,
Geopolityka w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ASPRA),
pp. 45–64. See also articles in the same book written by: A. Bryc, ‘Wpływ
geopolityki na tożsamość międzynarodowa ̨ Rosji’, A. Curanović,
‘Geopolityka religii w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich’.
43. A. D. Rotfeld, A. W. Torkunow, eds. (2015), White Spots—Black Spots: dif-
ficult matters in Polish–Russian relations 1918–2008 (Pittsburgh: University
of Pittsburgh Press).
44. See: Liczebność i rozmieszczenie ludności polskiej na Litwie, http://wspol-
nota-polska.org.pl/polonia_w_opracowaniach/13.html, accessed on 28
January 2016.
45. http://www.is.lt/tmid/mazumos.htm, accessed on 28 January 2016.
46. For more, see P. Łossowski (1985), Po tej i tamtej stronie Niemna. Stosunki
polsko-litewskie 1883–1939 (Warsaw: Czytelnik).
47. While the Lithuanian government did draw up a bill addressing the Polish
concerns, it failed to pass the Lithuanian parliament. The relevant vote
took place on 8 April 2010, during the official visit in Vilnius of Polish
President Lech Kaczyński, who did not hide his surprise and irritation with
the result of the vote. Despite the fact that the European Court of Human
Rights looked into the matter of Lithuania’s treatment of its Polish minor-
ity and that the Polish government expressed its dissatisfaction to the
Lithuanian authorities with the lack of progress on repeated occasions, the
matter remains unresolved. More on Poland’s policy towards the Polish
Minority in Lithuania see: A. Bieńczyk-Missala (2006), Human Rights in
Polish Foreign Policy after 1989 (Warsaw: PISM), pp. 170–181. See also:
S. Bieleń S. (2012), ‘The possibility of reconciliation in Polish-Russian
relations’, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 27, pp. 11–34.
48. K. Grünberg, B. Sprengler (2005), Trudne sa ̨siedztwo. Stosunki polsko-
ukraińskie w X–XX wieku (Warsaw: Ksia ̨żka i Wiedza), pp. 320, 383 et seq.
49. Polish operations cost the lives of 10,000 to 15,000 Ukrainians. See
G. Motyka (2011), Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji “Wisła”. Konflikt polsko-
ukraiński 1943–1947 (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie), pp. 447–448.
50. These numbers are given in W. Siemaszko, E. Siemaszko (2008),
Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów na ludności polskiej Wołynia
1939–1945, vol. I (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo von Borowiecky), p. 39.
51. R. Zięba (2013), Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego), p. 240 et seq.
52. S. Koziej (2012), ‘Obronność Polski w warunkach samodzielności strate-
gicznej lat 90. XX wieku’, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, No. 2, p. 20.
53. (2000) Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, (Warsaw),
Introduction, point. 2.1.
54. The CSCE was renamed the OSCE on 1 January 1995.
55. (2007), Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,
(Warsaw), point 48.
56. (2014), National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, (Warsaw),
point 36.
57. Ibid., point 41.
58. Ibid, point 65.
59. Ibid., point 68.
60. (2014), Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014, p. 153.
61. B. Koszel (2012), ‘A New Opening? Polish–German Relations during the
Rule of the PO-PSL Coalition (2007–2009)’, Przegla ̨d Zachodni, No. 4,
pp. 201–227.
62. R. Sikorski, ‘Polska a przyszłość Unii Europejskiej’, speech given in Berlin
on 28 November 2011 by the Polish foreign minister, http://www.msz.
gov.pl/resource/c2a33d88-7b8d-4fa5-8680-a67a4b2b38af:JCR ,
accessed on 28 January 2016.
63. (2012), ‘Orędzie po złożeniu przysięgi przed Zgromadzeniem Narodowym
i objęciu urzędu Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warszawa, 6 sier-
pnia 2010 roku’, Prezydent Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Bronisław Komorowski.
30 J. ZAJA ̨C
Wysta ̨pienia, listy, wywiady 2010–2011 (Warsaw: Presidential Chancellery),

pp. 23–24.
64. Ł. Warzecha (2011), Lech Kaczyński. Ostatni wywiad (Warsaw: Prószyński
i S-ka), p. 242.
65. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014, p. 154.
66. Ł. Warzecha (2011), Lech Kaczyński…, p. 246.
67. Ibid., p. 248.
68. Although PiS did not explicitly express the aim of concluding a bilateral
treaty with the USA in its 2014 program, it nevertheless stressed the need
to take steps leading to a rapid revitalization of bilateral Polish-American
relations. See: Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014, p. 154. See also:
Program Platformy Obywatelskiej. Polska zasługuje na cud gospodarczy—By
żyło się lepiej. Wszystkim. Warszawa 2007’ [fragments], A. Lewandowski,
G. Radomski, P. Tomaszewski, eds. (2012), Bezpieczeństwo zewnętrzne
państwa w polskiej myśli politycznej po 1989 roku. Wybór źródeł (Toruń:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika), pp. 174–186.
69. (2013), An interview with Krzysztof Szczerski, ‘Widziałem ministrów,
którzy płakali’, Między Unia ̨ a Rosja ̨. O polskiej racji stanu, polityce
zagranicznej i miejscu Polski w Unii Europejskiej z ekspertami rozmawia
Artur Dmochowski (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Słowa i Myśli), p. 23.
70. President Kaczyński believed the Ukrainians and Georgians deserved a
concrete commitment from the West. See Ł. Warzecha (2011), Lech
Kaczyński…, p. 257.
71. Ibid., p. 242.
72. H. Hale (2015), Patronal Politics. Eurasian Regime Dynamics in
Comparative Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
73. R. Sikorski (29 August 2009), ‘1 września—lekcja historii’, Gazeta
Wyborcza (Warsaw: Agora).
74. This concerned above all Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan. See Ł.
Warzecha (2011), Lech Kaczyński…, p. 247.
75. An interview with Krzysztof Szczerski, ‘Widziałem ministrów... ’, p. 23
76. (2012), Program Platformy Obywatelskiej. Polska zasługuje..., pp. 179–180.
77. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014, p. 42.
78. Jutro bez obaw. Program dla Polski, Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej,
pp. 75–85. http://www.sld.org.pl/public/ckfinder/userfiles/files/pro-
gram_sld.pdf, accessed on 28 January 2016.
79. Program wyborczy. Zjednoczona Lewica, SLD+TR+PPS+UP+Zieloni,
http://lewicarazem.org/public/common/js/ckeditor/ckfinder/user-
files/files/program_wyborczy_ZL(1).pdf, accessed on 28 January 2016.
80. Blisko ludzkich spraw. Deklaracja wyborcza PSL. Wybory parlamentarne
2015, pp. 30–31. http://prasowka.psl.pl/deklaracja_2015.indd.pdf,
CHAPTER 2
‘Go West’: Poland’s Security Policy

in Transition
The West emerged victorious from the Cold War, but its global dominance
only became apparent a few months after the beginning of the Autumn of
Nations. The changes that began in 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe
were so swift that it was not possible to predict in what direction they
would evolve.1 In 1991 the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact were dissolved, and the USSR dis-
integrated into 15 separate states that had to face a number of domes-
tic problems. Long-dormant conflicts broke out between some of them.
The situation in the Balkans also became complicated. The Slovenian and
Croatian declarations of independence in 1991 marked the disintegra-
tion of Yugoslavia and the breakout of bloody conflicts in the area. The
appropriateness of NATO’s future existence was discussed, the Western
European Union was revived, the integration process within the European
Communities progressed apace, and the CSCE became increasingly active.
A new international order was emerging—one in which member states of
formerly opposite blocs had to redefine their international roles.
In the new circumstances, Poland, a middle Central European power,
faced the necessity of transforming its internal as well as its foreign and
security policy. It wanted to leave the Warsaw Pact and COMECON as
soon as possible but, at the same time, it did not know in which direc-
tion the international politics would evolve. Even though events were
unpredictable, the international situation favored Poland like it hadn’t for
several centuries.

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59500-3_2
32 J. ZAJA ̨C
Poland undertook to transform its security policy in the late 1980s and
early 1990s in the context of a changing international order. It played an
important role in the dismantling of the Eastern Bloc, and it choose rap-
prochement with Western Europe and the USA as a security policy prior-
ity. Warsaw was also seeking to strengthen the CSCE and decided to seek
NATO membership and to pursue collaboration with the Western European
Union (WEU). At the same time, Poland’s policy was characterized by a
lack of cohesion in its Eastern policy—something that brought negative
consequences for Poland at a later period. Poland nevertheless adopted a
bridging strategy in its security policy at the turn of the 1980s to the 1990s.
1 THE EMERGENCE OF WESTERN DOMINANCE

The events which took place in Europe at the end of the 1980s set off
an avalanche whose force and consequences were hard to foresee. The
swiftness with which events unfolded in Central and Eastern Europe took
the international community by surprise. Even the USA—the Cold War’s
principal victor—had no detailed plan of action and the steps taken by
President George H. W. Bush’s administration were initially marked by
considerable improvisation. It is only in August 1990 that President Bush
declares that ‘there is no substitute for American leadership’,2 a statement
reiterated in the strategy adopted by the USA in August of the follow-
ing year.3 The New World Order—and the USA was to play a key role
in it—was to be based on liberty, justice, and the peaceful coexistence
of nations. In the name of those principles, in January 1991 an interna-
tional coalition led by the USA resorted to military force to compel Iraq
to withdraw from Kuwait, which Iraqi troops had invaded a few months
earlier. In October 1991, the USA arranged for the organization of the
Madrid conference, which inaugurated the Arab-Israeli peace process and
was an initiative that reflected American power and international influ-
ence. Despite the White House’s proclamation of US world leadership,
the appropriateness of such a role was under discussion in that coun-
try.4 Calls were made during the 1992 presidential electoral campaign
in support of isolationism, of reducing the role of the USA in world
politics or even of withdrawing from world affairs altogether. Those calls
were soon rejected, however, and proponents of internationalism—the
opposite current—gained the upper hand. The fundamental question,
therefore, was not ‘if’ but ‘how’ the USA should participate in world
affairs. Two groups emerged as this issue was debated: the unilateralists
‘GO WEST’: POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN TRANSITION 33
and the multilateralists.5 As this debate unfolded, the USA, which had
no definite security policy vision, adopted a passive stance with regard to
international developments toward the end of 1991. Neither the conflicts
in the post-Soviet area nor the escalating violence in the Balkans inclined
the Bush administration to take decisive steps. This situation continued
in the early stages of Bill Clinton’s presidency. It took the new president’s
administration, which took office in January 1993, several months to for-
mulate a comprehensive strategy in world politics. It was a period during
which Clinton, whose campaign slogan was ‘the economy, stupid’, con-
centrated on domestic affairs.
While Americans debated the USA’s future role in world politics, in
Western Europe the process of integration was progressing rapidly. The
Maastricht Treaty signed in February 1992 established the European
Union, which rested on three pillars: (1) the European Community, (2)
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and (3) cooperation
in the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA). The European Union
was going through a period of prosperity; it was becoming a model of
successful integration for many former Eastern Bloc countries that were
aiming for membership of this elite group. A discussion about the Euro-
Atlantic security structure was also under way during this time.6 At issue
was the role of the North Atlantic Alliance in the new geopolitical reality,
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the
long-dormant WEU. Many experts representing the neoliberal approach
favored the establishment of a regional system of cooperative security in
Europe based on the CSCE, the WEU, or even on both those organiza-
tions. As the West did not articulate a clear concept for Europe’s security
architecture and as a number of institutions—NATO, the WEU and the
CSCE—were vying for primacy in this respect, Poland and other Central
and East European countries were cautious with security policy decisions.
In the end, however, the neorealist view about the necessity of retain-
ing NATO prevailed out of concern that a post-Cold War Europe could
see a return to past rivalries between the powers for spheres of influence.
Thus, after a short period of renewed vitality for the CSCE and the WEU,
it is NATO that came to the foreground, and accession to its structures
became the goal of many former Eastern Bloc states, which saw NATO
as a guarantor of their security. The ongoing disintegration of the Soviet
Union and of Eastern Bloc institutions, in conjunction with the relative
weakness of other non-European states, gradually but rapidly led the West
to assume a dominant global position.
34 J. ZAJA ̨C
The shift from the bipolar international order that characterized the
Cold War period to an emerging unipolar order dominated by the West
and characterized by the hegemonic role of the USA presented serious
challenges for Poland, which found itself at the heart of the international
changes taking place in the early 1990s. The Polish government had not
only to guide the process of the country’s internal transformations, but
also to manage the transformation of Poland’s security policy—terminate
former obligations issuing from the country’s membership in the Eastern
Bloc and consider new priorities. The authorities, which originated from
Solidarity (Solidarność), were in agreement about the need to dissolve the
structures of the Eastern Bloc as soon as possible. The choice of a future
course of action was already visible, albeit not clearly marked out.
2 POLAND’S ROLE IN DISMANTLING THE EASTERN BLOC

During the Cold War Poland was an ally of all Eastern Bloc states, at the
bilateral and the multilateral level. Before the Second World War had for-
mally ended, Poland had concluded an alliance with the USSR (21 April
1945) and this was followed by similar treaties with successive Central
European countries—with Yugoslavia (18 March 1946), Czechoslovakia
(10 March 1947), Bulgaria (29 May 1948), Hungary (18 June 1948)
and Romania (26 January 1949). Poland’s principal aim in concluding
those treaties was to gain security from German revisionism, which Poland
feared. Those fears were reinforced after the Big Three conference held
at Potsdam in the summer 1945, when the Allies resolved to transfer to
Poland territories lying to the east of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers
that had been part of the Third Reich before the war, and to transfer their
German population. The relevant provisions of the Potsdam Agreement
gave rise to differing interpretations in Poland and in Germany, and became
a source of mutual tensions for many years. The Agreement stated that the
territories to the east of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse River would remain
‘under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should
not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany’,
while ‘the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await
the peace settlement’.7 Given the ever-growing discrepancies which arose
between the Allied Powers and which led to the Cold War, the ‘peace
settlement’ never took place. According to Polish officials, however, the
reservation included in the Potsdam document did not undermine the
finality of the decision to transfer the territories lying east of the Oder and
Lusatian Neisse rivers to Poland; the ultimate character of those territories

was sealed by the Allies’ decision to transfer the German population living
there.8 Germany’s interpretation was entirely different. While, following
the establishment of the GDR and the FRG in 1949, Poland succeeded in
settling the border question with the GDR relatively quickly through an
accord signed in July 1950 (the Agreement Concerning the Demarcation of
the Established and the Existing Polish–German State Frontier), in its rela-
tions with the FRG the border question remained problematic until 1990,
for Bonn considered that the border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse
rivers was not final. Even after the FRG and Poland signed a normaliza-
tion treaty in December 1970 (the Treaty between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the People’s Republic of Poland Concerning the Basis for
Normalizing Their Mutual Relations), the FRG’s position was that it
would be necessary to determine this border anew upon the unification
of the two German states.9 As a result, fear of Germany shaped the secu-
rity policy of the People’s Republic of Poland to a great extent. The July
Manifesto proclaimed by the Polish Committee of National Liberation on
22 July 1944 already stated that one of Poland’s aims would be the estab-
lishment of a broad system of alliances between states historically most
threatened by Germany. Thus the alliances concluded by Poland in the
1940s were applicable in case of armed aggression from Germany and/or
states that were to be allied with Germany directly or in any other form
during such a conflict. Only the alliance with Yugoslavia contained a wider
casus foederis, due to the territorial disputes between Yugoslavia and Italy
concerning Trieste and the region of Friuli. This alliance bound Poland
and Yugoslavia to assist each other in case of aggression from Germany,
or states being German allies during the Second World War or any other
state allied with Germany or with its former allies in such an aggression.
This alliance only lasted until 1949, however. As a result of the dispute
between Stalin and Tito, the ensuing Yugoslav-Soviet rift, and the ousting
from power in Poland of Władysław Gomułka for so-called ‘right-wing
nationalist deviations’, the new Warsaw authorities headed by Bolesław
Bierut denounced the alliance with Yugoslavia and never renewed it.10
Poland renewed its other bilateral alliance treaties, however—with the
USSR (8 April 1965), Czechoslovakia (1 March 1967), Bulgaria (6 June
1967), Hungary (16 May 1968), Romania (12 November 1970), and
signed the first such treaty with the GDR (15 March 1967).11 In the new
series of alliance treaties, the casus foederis clauses changed. Three of the
treaties (USSR, Czechoslovakia and the GDR) restricted the obligation
36 J. ZAJA ̨C
to provide assistance in cases of armed aggression on the part of ‘West

German forces of militarism and revanchism or by any other country or
group of countries who might enter into an alliance with West Germany’,
while in the three other treaties (Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary) such an
obligation was applicable in case of aggression from any state or group of
states.12 Fissures in the Eastern Bloc also led Poland to insist on clauses to
be inserted in all alliance treaties of the second series calling for consulta-
tions in international matters, while in the treaties concluded in the 1940s
such clauses were present only in the treaties with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
Romania and Hungary.
The above bilateral alliances were complemented by the Warsaw Pact,
which was established in May 1955 and of which Poland was a founding
member (along with the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the
GDR, Romania and Hungary). This pact treated the casus foederis in a
wide sense, and provided for members to assist one another in case of
armed aggression in Europe by any state or group of states (art. 4). Signing
the Warsaw Pact provided an additional guarantee of the inviolability of
the border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers. At the same time, it
made Poland that much more dependent on Moscow and, as events of the
Prague Spring in 1968 made clear, the USSR was to use the Warsaw Pact
as a tool to control other member states.
Poland’s bilateral alliances and its membership in the Eastern Bloc (the
Warsaw Pact and the COMECON13) were to a great extent forced upon
Warsaw by international circumstances. Thus, when the existing inter-
national order began to crumble in the late 1980s, Poland took steps to
dismantle the structures it was a part of. Such steps were taken by the gov-
ernment formed in September 1989 under Tadeusz Mazowiecki—Poland’s
first non-communist prime minister. That government proceeded very care-
fully, however, given the unpredictability of the international situation. In
his exposé of 12 September 1989, Prime Minister Mazowiecki stated:
Poland desires to participate in the creation of a new Europe and overcom-

ing the world’s postwar divisions, which are now totally anachronistic. [...]
Our openness to the whole of Europe does not mean repudiation of our
previous ties and obligations. Our reiteration that the new government will
honor Poland’s alliance obligations, is not tactical placatory expedient. This
stems from our understanding of Poland's raison d’etat and our analysis of
the international situation. If the day comes when European security will no
longer require military blocs, we will say goodbye to them without regret.14
Poland’s strategy consisted of the gradual dismantling of existing mul-

tilateral and bilateral structures and ties while, at the same time, estab-
lishing new ones so as to preclude the emergence in Central Europe
of a security grey area and so that the region wouldn’t become a buf-
fer zone. First and foremost for this purpose was collaboration with
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The three countries worked together to
dismantle the Warsaw Pact. Poland, however—like Czechoslovakia, but
in contrast to Hungary—wished for the Warsaw Pact to be dismantled
gradually, not dissolved through a single act. On 21 January 1991 the
ministers of foreign affairs of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary
postulated the complete dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty by virtue of
a joint decision of the Parties to it, by the end of 1991.15 Not quite a
month later (15 February), during a meeting of the Visegrad Triangle,
the three countries signed a Declaration on cooperation in pursuit of
European integration. The changing background for cooperation in
Central Europe led to the building of new regional ties in Poland’s
immediate vicinity. Within this ‘new regionalism’, as it became known,
Poland sought cooperation not only within the framework of the
Visegrad Triangle. It also joined the Pentagonale, thus turning it into
the Hexagonale (presently known as the Central European Initiative—
CEI) in July 1991, and became a founding member of the Baltic Sea
States Council (BSSC) in March 1992.16
The transformations taking place in the states of Central and Eastern
Europe, the disintegration of the USSR, and the establishment of new
cooperation ties led to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. On 1 April 1991,
the military structures of the Warsaw Treaty Organization were dissolved,
and during a meeting held in Prague on 1 July, the leaders of 6 member
states decided to dissolve the Warsaw Pact altogether. Two days earlier, on
28 June 1991, it had been decided that the structures of the COMECON
would be dissolved. Poland replaced the bilateral treaties of alliance it had
concluded during the Cold War period with treaties of friendship and coop-
eration, in keeping with the premise that a network of such treaties and the
growing cooperation they would give rise to would become one of the
elements of the new European security system. Poland signed such treaties
with Czechoslovakia and Hungary on 6 October 1991, with Germany on
17 June 1991, and with Russia on 22 May 1992. Poland also signed such
treaties with two other allies of the Cold War period: Romania (26 January
1993) and Bulgaria (25 February 1993).17 Neither of those two countries
played a significant role in Poland’s security policy in the 1990s, however.
38 J. ZAJA ̨C
3 POLAND’S REORIENTATION TOWARD THE WEST

In September 1989, as he awaited international developments, Tadeusz
Mazowiecki declared in his Sejm exposé that Poland would remain a loyal
ally of the USSR and Eastern Bloc countries. At the same time, the prime
minister clearly stated that Poland’s aim would be to ‘open up to the West’;
that it felt itself to be part of Western civilization; and that it wished to be
part of it in an institutional form as well.18 Despite the fact that Poland also
has strong ties with the East,19 the public debate was dominated by claims
that since the dawn of Polish statehood the country’s rulers had sought to
bring the country closer to Western Europe.20 Poland began to look for
a new security model, since it feared it would find itself in a security ‘gray
area’ or a ‘buffer zone’. As a result, Western Europe and the United States
rapidly became the most important focus point in Polish foreign and secu-
rity policy. When in the spring of 1991 Piotr Kołodziejczyk, Poland’s min-
ister of defense, made vague allusions to the idea of neutrality,21 it was
quickly rejected by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the minister of foreign affairs,
who believed that such a situation would unavoidably lead the stronger
powers to compete for influence on Polish territory.22 One party on the
right—the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN)—champi-
oned the concept of Intermarium (Międzymorze), but this idea also failed
to draw any wider interest.
The goal of a ‘return to Europe’ was paramount and pursued at two lev-
els: bilaterally, through the expansion of contacts with Western European
countries and the USA; and multilaterally, through efforts to join the
Council of Europe, the European Communities, NATO and to develop
relations with the Western European Union. One of the first tasks of the
Tadeusz Mazowiecki government was to rebuild relations with coun-
tries of the former Western Bloc. The most pressing matter was to settle
relations with Germany. The changes under way in Central and Eastern
Europe logically implied a reunification of Germany, a development of
particular interest to the Polish government in the context of the border
on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers. The People’s Republic of Poland
had signed three agreements concerning this border: with the GDR on 6
July 1950 and 22 May 1989,23 and with the FRG on 7 December 1970.
The position of the FRG was a problem for the Polish government, how-
ever. Despite the fact that Poland and the FRG recognized the existing
border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers as the western border of
the PRP by treaty in 1970; that they confirmed the inviolability of existing
borders; that they undertook to respect unconditionally each other’s ter-

ritorial integrity; and that they declared that they neither harbored any
territorial claims against each other nor would raise any in the future,
the two countries interpreted the treaty differently. Poland held the view
that the 1970 treaty represented the final recognition by the FRG of the
border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers, the more so as the treaty
referred to the Potsdam Agreement. In contrast, the FRG claimed that
the treaty merely constituted a modus vivendi and that by signing it, the
Bonn government had acted solely in its own name (hence the term ‘the
western border of the PRP’) and that the final settlement of the border
issue should, therefore, take place upon German reunification.24 The fall
of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was a sign for the Warsaw govern-
ment that the process of German reunification was under way. As in other
European capitals, no one in Warsaw expected that the pace of events
would be so quick. When, during the Open Skies Conference held in
Ottawa (13–17 February 1990), a special ‘2+4’ foreign ministers group
was called into being by the GDR and FRG on the one hand, and the
USA, United Kingdom, France, and USSR on the other, it became clear
that German unification was imminent. Prime Minister Mazowiecki and
foreign minister Skubiszewski took urgent steps to bring about a final
settlement of the Polish–German border issue. The matter was becom-
ing especially pressing in light of the attitude of certain German politi-
cians and Polish German-minority activists, some of whom claimed that
the ‘German question’ was not limited to the territories of the FRG, the
GDR, and West Berlin.25 The attitude of the German government also
caused serious concern in Poland. In a 10-point FRG and GDR unifica-
tion plan presented by German chancellor Helmut Kohl on 28 November
1989, there was no mention of the border issue. During the months that
followed, Kohl avoided unequivocal pronouncements on this question,
citing the realities of German internal politics as a justification. Instead, he
pointed to the Final Act of the CSCE of 1975 and relegated the matter of
the final settlement of the border question till after German unification.26
This caused much anxiety in Warsaw, especially as the Poles remembered
that in the fall of 1982, the CDU/CSU/FDP government led by Helmut
Kohl attempted to question the provisions of the 1970 treaty.
In light of those fears, the Polish government looked for support from
the Four Powers: the USA, France, United Kingdom and USSR. President
George H. W. Bush had agreed to the unification of the GDR and the
FRG as early as December 1989, but made US support conditional upon
40 J. ZAJA ̨C
the maintenance of Germany’s commitments to NATO, upon the peaceful

and evolutionary character of the unification process, and upon the main-
tenance in force of the 1975 Helsinki provisions concerning borders in
Europe. President Bush rejected Prime Minister Mazowiecki’s proposal,
made in February 1990, that the Polish–German border treaty should
be signed prior to German unification. Washington thought it impor-
tant that this border remain inviolable, but it didn’t insist on the quick-
est possible signing of the international treaty in this matter. France saw
the matter differently. In a speech delivered in Berlin on 1 March 1990,
French foreign minister Roland Dumas described Chancellor Kohl’s posi-
tion that the postponement of the border’s confirmation should await the
time of unification as ‘unreasonable’.27 This position was a consistent one,
as Paris had recognized the border settlement adopted at the Potsdam
Conference under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle.28 The inviolability
of the Polish–German border was also clear in London—something the
UK Government under Margaret Thatcher reiterated many times; and
for Moscow, which supported it during the entire post-War period. As a
result of the concordant position of the Four Powers, it was declared dur-
ing the Paris round of the ‘2+4’ group meeting in July 1990 that unified
Germany and Poland would confirm the border existing between them
in a treaty that would be binding under international law. This treaty was
signed on 14 November 1990, that is, after the formal unification of the
two German states, and came into force in January 1992, on the same
day as the Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic
of Germany on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation of 17 June
1991. The settlement of the Polish–German border issue under interna-
tional law greatly improved relations between the two countries. Germany
became Poland’s advocate in the European Communities and, in time, one
of its most important partners, even if some historical problems remained
to be resolved.29
Poland also sought to develop close ties with France. The historical
ties between the two countries and their ‘model’ relations in the 1970s
led Warsaw to accord prime importance to relations with France. In
March 1990 Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and President Wojciech
Jaruzelski made an official visit to Paris. The joint visit made by Poland’s
leading politicians coming from opposite camps reflected the strategic sig-
nificance that Warsaw accorded to relations with Paris. A treaty of friendship
and solidarity was signed then, but the visit did not lead to any intensifica-
tion of mutual relations. Fearing considerable economic costs, as well as
increased US influence in Europe due to the pro-American stance of the

Central European countries, Paris became disinclined relatively quickly
towards the idea of opening the EU eastwards. In Warsaw this stance was
greeted with incomprehension.30 Nor did the United Kingdom come to
play an important role in Poland’s security policy, despite the importance
of its stance on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse border question. Its position
was definitely lower than that of Germany, or even that of France.31
In contrast, the USA took up a very important place in Poland’s secu-
rity policy. The USA was seen in Warsaw as a force stabilizing security in
Europe and guaranteeing a balance of power on the continent. It was
thought in Warsaw that the United States would temper any potential
great-power ambitions of a reunited Germany while providing security
against the USSR/Russia. Several years later, in an interview, foreign min-
ister Krzysztof Skubiszewski said:
When at the turn of 1989/90 an opportunity arose to restore German unity

I initially feared that the price of German unification would be a partial
restoration of Soviet influence in Central and Eastern Europe, because the
West was repeatedly reaffirming its understanding for Soviet interests. At
one point, not on 12 September or 9 November [1989] but later, it became
clear to me that US president George Bush [senior] had decided to attain
two things: German reunification and the emancipation of the countries of
the former Soviet Bloc.32
The choice of the United States as the guarantor of Polish security thus
seemed natural. The USA was unquestionably the victor in the Cold War
and was viewed in Warsaw as the country thanks to which Poland and
other states in the region had recovered their liberty and sovereignty. The
history of Polish–American relations only served to amplify the apprecia-
tion and friendliness felt in Poland toward the USA. Only sporadically were
questions raised that could cast a shadow on the image of ideal Polish–
American relations.33 In the minds of people at large, the USA was asso-
ciated with success, prosperity and as a champion of values that are dear
to Poles, like liberty and democracy. Polish commanders in the American
War of Independence—Tadeusz Kościuszko and Kazimierz Pułaski—are
often recalled in Poland, as is President Woodrow Wilson’s 14-point plan
of 1918, the 13th of which called for the restoration of Polish indepen-
dence that had been lost in the 18th century.34 The United States contrib-
uted to Allied victory over the fascist Axis Powers in the Second World
42 J. ZAJA ̨C
War, and supported Polish dissidents during the Cold War period. When,
in 1980, Solidarity (Solidarność) was born, the United States was one
of its leading supporters. Washington also financed Radio Free Europe,
which broadcast uncensored information to Poland. These elements had
an impact on post-Cold War Polish–American relations, as many Solidarity
oppositionists came to occupy leading positions in the state administration
after Poland became independent from the USSR. Also of significance
was the large number of Polish–Americans (about 10 million). Moreover,
decision makers in Warsaw strongly believed in the convergence of Polish
and American interests.
The choice of the USA was made more obvious, as Polish decision mak-
ers placed great importance on integrating Poland with NATO’s system of
‘hard’ security, while the European Communities—membership of which
Poland also aspired to—were lacking a military component. Admittedly,
the EC sought to revive and strengthen the WEU, but this process was
slow and failed to bring tangible results. Poland was also cautious in its
politico-military cooperation with other European states and mindful that
France and the United Kingdom had failed to come to Poland’s aid in the
face of German aggression in 1939 despite the treaties of alliance those
powers had signed with Poland.
The United States thus came to occupy a key position in Poland’s secu-
rity policy, even if this position was not as obvious in the early 1990s as it
would become in later years. Polish–American military cooperation began
to grow relatively quickly, however. In June 1990, at Poland’s initiative a
group of American and Polish generals met in Warsaw; in December of the
same year US Deputy-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney came on a visit to
Warsaw and the arrangements made then enabled Polish officers to study
at prestigious American institutions as part of the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program. During President George
H. W. Bush’s visit to Poland in July 1992, discussions included Poland’s
possible purchase or lease of American F-16 or F-18 aircraft.35 The col-
laboration between the two countries’ intelligence services also proceeded
successfully, as could be seen during the first Persian Gulf War in 1991.
The extensive and effective Polish intelligence network in the Middle
East provided the Americans (and the British) with extensive informa-
tion about Iraq’s military potential and about the quantity and types of
weapons and other equipment (such as radars) used by the Iraqi military.
Significantly, Warsaw had provided military assistance in the form of two
Polish warships and a unit of engineers who were to go into action should
Saddam Hussein have used chemical weapons.36 The professionalism and
the contacts of Polish intelligence and Warsaw’s commitment to help the

Americans led Washington to ask Poland to represent its interests in Iraq
after US–Iraqi diplomatic relations were severed. Warsaw agreed, despite
the fact that this entailed financial losses of about 2.5–3 billion USD due
to the embargo on exports to Iraq and the suspension of the repayment
of Iraq’s debt to Poland following the imposition of sanctions on Iraq.37
Following the 1992 visit to Poland by Robert Gates, the first such visit
by a CIA Director, regular contacts between the CIA and the WSI—
Poland’s military intelligence service—were officially inaugurated. Poland
also acquiesced to President Bill Clinton’s September 1994 request that
special forces be sent to Haiti to help rebuild that country.38 Poland’s elite
Special Forces unit GROM landed in Haiti in mid-November 1994—the
third to do so after the American and Israeli units—and remained in Haiti
until January 1995.39
The United States also strongly supported Poland in its political and
economic transformations. The Support East European Democracy Act
1989 (SEED) voted by Congress in November 1989 called for financial
support for the transformations in Poland (and Hungary). This made pos-
sible the creation of a fund for the stabilization of the Polish currency, to
which the USA contributed 200 million USD. Given the runaway inflation
that Poland was facing at the time, this was unusually important. As part
of this program, the United States transferred additional funds to Poland,
including 240 million USD to support the Polish–American Enterprise
Fund and 4 million USD for technical assistance.40 The document also
provided for US support for Poland’s efforts to have its international debt
remitted. In effect, in 1991 Washington cancelled 70% of Poland’s debt
towards the USA, and this also contributed to the reduction by 50% of
Poland’s debt towards the Paris Club. In the early 1990s, Washington
also supported Warsaw in two matters that were unusually important
for Poland: The final recognition by united Germany of the Oder and
Lusatian Neisse border and for Poland’s efforts to remove Soviet troops
from its territory. Poland did not succeed in securing US assistance in the
restructuring of its armaments industry, which, deprived of its traditional
markets, found itself in a difficult situation. One issue that cast a shadow
on Polish–American relations in the early 1990s was the so-called Carbine
Affair. In March 1992 five Polish citizens were detained in Germany, tem-
porarily arrested and extradited to the USA to be charged with illegally
attempting to sell arms to Iraq in violation of the sanctions regime. Several
months later an American court found the men innocent on all counts.41
44 J. ZAJA ̨C
The growth of Polish–American relations, whose guidelines had been

defined in a declaration signed in March 1991, was quite rapid under
President George H. W. Bush, but slowed down for a few months follow-
ing the election as president of Democrat Bill Clinton. The newly elected
American president concentrated on domestic issues and was initially
mostly concerned with Asia in US foreign policy. In the former Eastern
Bloc his attention was drawn mostly by Russia, in keeping with the ‘Russia
first’ principle. Poland actively sought to ensure that Polish–American
relations would not be a function or an offshoot of US relations with
Russia, as they had been in the Cold War period.42
4 FROM FAVORING THE CSCE TO RAPPROCHEMENT

WITH THE WEU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP
During the first months of Poland’s systemic transformations, the

Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe began to
occupy an important place in Polish security policy, even if the CSCE
was based on soft security instruments, a fact that was not satisfactory
for Poland, which was interested in obtaining hard security guarantees.
Nonetheless, the CSCE had a few advantages: It was the broadest Euro-
Atlantic security organization in terms of membership and agenda. It was
also the least controversial. Insofar as there was a debate about the desir-
ability of the continued existence of NATO, the necessity of maintaining
the CSCE was agreed upon years earlier by the then Cold War rivals. It was
an important instrument serving to preserve the highly desirable military
cooperation in Europe; to resolve crises and conflicts arising in the post-
Soviet area and in the Balkans in the new geopolitical situation; and to
support democratic change in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Admittedly, Warsaw had played an important role in the establishment of
CSCE in 1975, so it had extensive experience in shaping that forum.43
In contrast to their stance in the days of the bipolar international order,
after the Cold War, Western states began to overplay the importance of
the CSCE. From the 1991 NATO summit in Rome, the alliance’s mem-
bers began to champion the concept of ‘interlocking institutions’, entail-
ing the maintenance and strengthening of a system of complementary and
closely collaborating institutions—a cooperative security system—in which
an important role was reserved for the CSCE. Poland and other Central
European countries adopted a similar position.44 One of the first propos-
als advanced in January 1990 by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki was
the establishment of a pan-European political structure; a kind of standing

European Cooperation Council, an institution aimed at maintaining perma-
nent political dialogue between all member states and, first and foremost—
paving the way for all pan-European forms of integration.45 This proposal
fitted nicely with the ideas current at the time, calling for the institutional-
ization of the CSCE. As a result, the Paris CSCE summit of November 1990
decided to set up new institutions. Admittedly, the European Cooperation
Council proposed by Poland was not among them. Nonetheless, it was
decided to institute Summits of Heads of State or Government, the CSCE
Council, the Committee of Senior Officials, the Secretariat, the Conflict
Prevention Center, and the Office for Free Elections. The establishment
of a Parliamentary Assembly was also announced. The Office for Free
Elections was set up in Warsaw and, in 1992, transformed into the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The decisions
taken at the Paris summit were not satisfactory for the Polish government,
however, for Poland lost the silent rivalry with Prague for the location of
the CSCE Secretariat, and with Vienna, which became the headquarters of
the Conflict Prevention Center.
Even if by mid-1991 the initial optimistic hopes for a cooperative secu-
rity system based on the CSCE had largely dissipated, and Poland—like
other Central European countries—came to believe that only a defense
alliance like NATO could provide it with the security guarantees it so ear-
nestly desired,46 it remained very active in the CSCE in 1991–1992. In the
face of the escalation of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, Poland proposed
during a meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials in October 1991
that CSCE peacekeeping forces be formed. This idea did not gain the sup-
port of other countries and was rapidly dropped by Polish diplomats. In
November of the following year, Warsaw submitted a project of a CSCE
Code of Conduct in the Field of Security, containing 12 proposed principles
intended to promote stability and peace throughout the CSCE area. This
idea was well received by other CSCE participants and, in effect, became
the basis for the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security
approved during the Budapest Summit in December 1994. Poland
was also actively involved in implementing the Coordinated Assistance
Program, initiated by the CSCE in 1992 for newly admitted members
and carried out by the Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights. In September 1994, Poland submitted at the CSCE
forum a project referring to the CFE Treaty, the accords on Confidence
and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and the Open Skies accords.
46 J. ZAJA ̨C
Warsaw was interested in setting limitations on the structure and degree

of battle readiness of the forces of its eastern neighbors and the possibility
of regional arms control.47
Gradually, however, Poland’s activeness in strengthening the CSCE
decreased. While in 1990 Poland’s foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski
would often speak, with the CSCE in mind, of Poland’s participation in
shaping Europe’s security system and of working for European unity, in
1991 Warsaw began to attach greater importance to the North Atlantic
Alliance. The Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe
adopted by North Atlantic Council in June 1991 created a clear incentive
for the pro-Atlantic orientation of Poland and other Central and Eastern
European countries. Poland, which had had official relations with NATO
since August 1990, rapidly joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC) established during the 1991 NATO Summit in Rome.
Polish politicians gradually began to express the view that NATO
should extend its security guarantees to Poland and to other Central
European countries. Such an arrangement was not yet possible, how-
ever. The Warsaw Pact was formally in existence until July 1991, Soviet/
Russian troops were stationed in Poland until 1993 and many NATO
members, while willing to engage in training and information sharing with
Poland and other countries of the region, were not inclined to accept
them as allies. One obstacle was Washington’s caution about the idea of
NATO enlargement. In the first months of 1991, the US Department
of State, which had characterized Poland’s foreign and security policy as
reasonable and which also thought that Central Europe should not remain
a ‘gray zone’, nonetheless stated that NATO membership for Poland was
not a feasible response to this problem. During his trip to Washington in
September 1991, Polish Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki was also
told that there could be no talk of NATO membership for Poland or any
other country for the time being.48 Some NATO members did not share
the desire of Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries
for NATO enlargement and doubted whether such enlargement lay in the
interests of the Alliance itself. One problem was the consistent opposition
of Russia, the insufficient level of Poland’s armament, Poland’s ill-adapted
military procedures and strategic culture, and enlargement costs. The
Polish government argued, however, that Poland would be able to deal
with a limited threat on its own, while a large-scale threat would not be
limited to Poland and would in any case extend to the border of Germany
and, hence, the entire West. Warsaw also stressed that the civilian and
military adaptation of other member countries, such as Greece, Turkey or

Spain, lasted several years, while the international situation in the 1990s
did not call for a state of high vigilance. It further argued that admitting
new members would not lead to increased defense costs, but merely to the
need to reallocate them.49
Despite the caution of NATO members about the Alliance’s enlarge-
ment, in the spring of 1992 the Polish government of Jan Olszewski
began talking of Poland’s desire to join NATO, and in May of that year,
the final declaration of the Visegrad Triangle Summit stated that its mem-
ber states were seeking to gain membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.
Poland reiterated this aim in November 1992, in the strategic documents
entitled The Principles of Poland’s Security Policy (Założenia polskiej polityki
bezpieczeństwa) and The Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic
of Poland (Polityka bezpieczeństwa i strategia obronna Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej). The choice of the North Atlantic Alliance was natural and obvi-
ous for Polish decision makers, who wished to join a ‘hard security’ sys-
tem, and NATO was seen as the only credible alliance in the Euro-Atlantic
area.50 In fact, for Poland, NATO’s political and military attractiveness
stemmed from the fact that it was led by the USA.
Poland’s search for an optimal model of security at the turn of the
1980s and 1990s also involved the Western European Union. This orga-
nization established in 1954 had lain dormant for several decades and only
in the mid-1980s did the process of reviving it begin. It proceeded slowly,
however. Although this organization intensified its activities following the
adoption of the Petersberg Tasks by the WEU Ministerial Council in May
1992, it was not autonomous in its operations, given its lack of defense
and operational capabilities. In June 1992, Poland and seven other Central
European countries joined the WEU Consultative Forum, which served
to exchange information on European security. In June 1994, Poland and
other Central European countries gained the status of WEU Associate
Partner and, following NATO accession, in March 1999, the status of
WEU Associate Member.
The Western European Union never came to occupy a major place in
Poland’s security policy, however, as Poland had no confidence in Western
Europe’s ability to build an autonomous security system without US par-
ticipation. An additional factor that discouraged Warsaw’s rapprochement
with the WEU was the ongoing dispute between the WEU and the USA
about the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the place
of the WEU in the European security system. Poland stood for a general
48 J. ZAJA ̨C
concept of integration with the West as a homogenous system in which

there was no transatlantic rivalry.51 Another reason was that from the out-
set, while the WEU sent signaled its interest in collaborating with Central
and Eastern European countries, it was interested in loose cooperation.
Therefore Polish decision makers used the forum to present Warsaw’s
viewpoint and to press Western countries to agree to NATO enlarge-
ment. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Polish defense minister at the time, recalls
that Poland’s strategy consisted in working for NATO enlargement to
the countries of Central Europe by means of security guarantees from
the USA’s principal military partners—France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and Italy. Warsaw’s thinking was that if those countries were
bound by treaty to defend Poland in case of conflict, it would be politi-
cally unthinkable for the USA to remain indifferent. Therefore, as Poland
would de facto be gaining US security guarantees in such a situation, there
was no reason why this could not be formalized though NATO enlarge-
ment. Warsaw quickly abandoned this strategy, however, as this line of
argumentation failed to gain acceptance in Washington.52
It also became clear relatively quickly that any WEU membership for
Poland would require prior accession to the EU because, in keeping with
the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the WEU constituted an
integral part of the European Union. Moreover, EU enlargement east-
wards was turning out to be a slow process and not all EU members sup-
ported it. In consequence, Poland did not take part in the Petersberg Tasks
the WEU conducted, even though Poland had been a WEU Associated
Partner since the Ministerial Council’s meeting in Kirchberg in May 1994,
and it did not make any military contribution to the cooperation between
European defense industries intended to strengthen the WEU’s opera-
tional capabilities despite earlier statements to that effect.
5 POLAND’S EASTERN POLICY: BRIDGE OR BULWARK?

During the period of its political transformations Poland did not formulate
a cohesive Eastern policy. In a changing geopolitical situation, Polish deci-
sion makers sought inspiration for such a policy in the ideals formulated
by Polish émigré circles in Paris centered on the journal Kultura, edited
by Jerzy Giedroyc. Articles published in this journal shaped the political
thinking not only of Poles abroad, but also those in Poland. Kultura,
which often carried articles by Juliusz Mieroszewski, the journal’s London-
based commentator on Polish and East-European affairs, contributed to
the rise of the so-called ULB doctrine (for Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus),
also referred to as the ‘Giedroyc doctrine’ or the ‘Giedroyc-Mieroszewski
doctrine’. The main premise of this doctrine was the belief that it was pos-
sible to overcome the fatalism that Poland’s geopolitical situation entailed.
Mieroszewski thought that the Poles are a nation entrapped in their past,
but he believed in the possibility of far-reaching geopolitical transforma-
tions and tried to promote them along with Giedroyc. Both men believed
that the best guarantee of Poland’s security is the emancipation of the
Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Byelorussian nations from Soviet domination
in cooperation with the Polish nation, wherein this emancipation should
take place in conjunction with international transformations and in coop-
eration with all European nations, because the struggle of captive nations
individually was not a realistic option. They thought that the maintenance
of the independence and self-determination of the three nations was of
the highest importance, in keeping with the premise that for as long as
Poland and Russia remain in dispute over ULB—Ukraine, Lithuania and
Byelorussia—there can be no security for Poland.53 In fact, Jerzy Giedroyc
and Juliusz Mieroszewski were the heirs of three pre-War Polish political
projects: Federalism, Intermarium (Międzymorze) and Prometheism. In
consideration of the fact that the ideas behind those projects continue
to exert an important influence on Poland’s foreign and security policy,
it is worthwhile to devote some attention to them, especially as they are
related to Józef Piłsudski, a figure of unusual importance in Polish his-
tory.54 Piłsudski thought that the greatest challenge facing Poland was its
location between Christian Europe and the ‘Asian’ East. In Piłsudski’s
mind, Poland belonged to Western civilization and its role was to defend
it. The foreign and security policy concept he championed was based on
the premise that a large and strong Poland would emerge; therefore, in the
first years after Poland regained its independence on 11 November 1918,
Piłsudski concentrated on acquiring as large a territory as possible. While
he thought that possibilities of territorial expansion to the west were lim-
ited by the decisions of the Entente, such possibilities existed to the east
and it is in this direction that he focused his attentions.55 Two compatible
concepts emerged in this context: that of Federation and Prometheism.
The federal concept entailed the weakening of Russia through the eman-
cipation of the nations that were a part of it and their voluntary association
with Poland. In essence, this was a return to the Jagiellonian concept based
on the idea of a federation of nations making up the Commonwealth.56 In
order to weaken Russian imperialism and to make the realization of the
50 J. ZAJA ̨C
federation concept more likely, Piłsudski thought it was necessary to gain

the support of all the nations wishing to free themselves of Russia and for
them to form their own states (Prometheism).57 The actions initiated by
Poland reflected both concepts. In the end, the war with Soviet Russia and
the Riga Treaty signed in March 1921 put an end to Piłsudski’s federal
plans. For this reason, the idea of resurrecting a Jagiellonian Poland was
later transformed into the concept of Intermarium, which entailed the
integration of countries lying between the Baltic and Black seas.58 The
concepts of Federation, Prometheism and Intermarium that underpinned
the thinking of the Polish émigré circles in Paris after the Second World
War were adapted to existing geopolitical realities of the day. If Giedroyc
and Mieroszewski made reference to Polish historical experience and the
traditions of old Jagiellonian Poland, they did not do so uncritically, how-
ever.59 They both thought that Poland’s aims and mission in the East had
to change, because ideas of federation popularized during the interwar
period by the Piłsudski camp presupposed Polish supremacy. Mieroszewski
even referred to the Jagiellonian idea as imperialism. In 1973, he wrote
in Kultura:
[...] we can’t hold the position that every Great-Russian program is impe-
rialist […] but that the Polish eastern program is not imperialist but
is some lofty “Jagiellonian idea” […]. Only for us does the Jagiellonian
Idea have nothing in common with imperialism. But for the Lithuanians,
Ukrainians and Byelorussians it is Polish imperialism in its purest form. The
Commonwealth of Both Nations ended with the wholesale Polonization
of the entire Lithuanian gentry [...] We sought to have the upper hand
on the ULB territories – be it through military means, or by advancing
federation plans – because history teaches us that when Russia rules over
those territories it is an insurmountable rival. [...] It is impossible to discuss
Polish-Russian relations in isolation from the ULB territories, because
Polish-Russian relations were always a function of the situation that pre-
vailed on those territories in a given historical period.60
The Giedroyc-Mieroszewski doctrine was thus rooted in the ideas of

Piłsudski and of those who wished to restore the old Commonwealth. In
contrast to those ideas, however, the proposals formulated by the Kultura
milieu were based on equality and partnership, not domination. Only in
such form could they be acceptable to the Lithuanians, Ukrainians and
Byelorussians. Indeed, during the interwar period, the Lithuanians and
the Ukrainians showed no interest in forming a federation with the Poles,
and attempts to bring it about brought negative consequences for Polish–

Lithuanian and Polish–Ukrainian relations.
When the disintegration of the Soviet Union began in the late 1980s,
Poland’s eastern policy was thus in line with the ULB (‘Giedroyc-
Mieroszewski’) idea. The Tadeusz Mazowiecki government took steps
to support and promote the independence of Ukraine, Lithuania and
Belarus. In the spring of 1990, Poland’s minister of foreign affairs,
Krzysztof Skubiszewski, formulated the ‘dual-track’ concept favoring the
maintenance by Warsaw of parallel relations with Moscow and with chosen
Soviet republics. This was meant to encourage the efforts of the latter to
become independent from Moscow. As part of this concept, Skubiszewski
visited Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk in October 1990, and the effect of those
visits was the signing of declarations about Poland’s relations with the
Russian Federation and with Ukraine.61 Poland’s policy was supposed to
strengthen pro-independence currents in the Soviet republics as well as
reduce Russian influence in this area. Those steps were rather slow, how-
ever.62 A clear change in Poland’s position only took place in August 1991
with the collapse in Moscow of Yanayev’s putsch,63 which made the immi-
nence of the Soviet Union’s disintegration evident. This also coincided
with the final stage of German unification, during which Poland was feel-
ing more confident about the final confirmation under international law
of the Polish–German border.64 During this time, the West also changed
its attitude with regard to the USSR. The West’s initially cautious stance
in the face of the events which were unfolding in Eastern and Central
Europe began to take on distinct features, and this also contributed to the
emergence of a more decisive Polish policy.
The actions of the Polish government were inconsistent, however. Even
though Poland was the first country to recognize Ukrainian independence
(2 December 1991), and did so just a few hours after the results of
Ukraine’s independence referendum were announced, Warsaw’s policies
toward Kiev in the following years were not consistent. Although Warsaw
was attached to the slogan ‘there is no independent Poland without an
independent Ukraine’ and signing of a number of agreements on coopera-
tion between the two countries, Poland was reluctant to support Ukraine
when it thought that doing so could be detrimental to its interests. And
so, Warsaw did not support the efforts undertaken by Ukraine’s diplo-
mats toward the end of 1991 to secure their country’s admission to the
Visegrad Triangle, fearing that this would delay Poland’s own admission
to Western European structures. It looked unfavorably on Ukrainian pres-
52 J. ZAJA ̨C
ident Leonid Kravchuk’s February 1993 plan of a Central and Eastern

European Security Area (the Kravchuk Plan) as an idea that collided with
Poland’s efforts to join NATO. As a result, Polish–Ukrainian relations
reached an impasse that lasted several years, despite the announcement
that those relations were of a strategic nature and the signing of the Treaty
of Good Neighbourship, Friendly Relations and Cooperation.65 The West
also failed to support this partnership. In the words of Ian J. Brzeziński,
‘Polish–Ukrainian relations will inevitably play a pivotal role in defining
the geopolitical architecture of post-Cold War Europe. The West must not
underestimate the consequences of success and failure in this “strategic
partnership”’.66
Polish–Byelorussian relations found themselves at an impasse relatively
quickly as well. In keeping with his ‘dual-track’ concept, Skubiszewski vis-
ited Minsk in October 1990, and a year later (10 October 1991) Warsaw
and Minsk signed the Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations, Mutual
Understanding and Cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the
Republic of Belarus. Poland was one of the first states to recognize Belarus’
independence (27 December 1991), and the Treaty between the Republic
of Poland and the Republic of Belarus on Good Neighbourhood and Friendly
Cooperation (23 June 1992) created the bases for the growth of mutual
cooperation. Belarus’ ever-closer collaboration with Russia was causing
increased anxiety in Poland, however. Warsaw feared excessive Russian
influence in Poland’s immediate vicinity, and this had a negative impact on
Polish–Byelorussian relations. During a visit in Minsk in November 1992,
worried Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka reproached Byelorussian
Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich about the rapprochement under way
between Belarus and Russia. In doing so, she expressed the desire that
Belarus remain an entirely independent state. This was taken negatively
by Belarus, which was opposed to gauging the degree of Byelorussian
sovereignty by the state of its relations with Russia.67 In effect, and despite
the many agreements that the two countries signed in the early 1990s, it
quickly became apparent that Poland and Belarus had differing visions of
their security and were heading in different directions. Whereas Poland
had been seeking NATO membership since 1992, Belarus, a founding
member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, became in January
1994 a signatory of that organization’s collective security system—the
Tashkent Treaty. The election of Alexander Lukashenka as president
of Belarus in July 1994 led to a lasting worsening of relations between
Warsaw and Minsk. The newly elected president chose close collaboration
with Russia, a prospect that Poland viewed with some apprehension. Soon
after, relations worsened further due to the violation of Polish minority
rights in Belarus.
Most difficult to understand, however, was Poland’s policy toward
Lithuania—the third country concerned by the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski
doctrine. Lithuania was the first Soviet republic to proclaim its indepen-
dence (11 March 1990) and sought backing for this process in Warsaw.
Yet the Polish authorities limited themselves to mere gestures of support.68
When the Soviet authorities attempted to pacify Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia by force in January 1991, Poland merely stated that the authori-
ties of those three states were legal and called for a peaceful resolution
to the crisis. When Poland officially recognized Lithuanian independence
several months later (26 August 1991), it was the 23rd country to do so.
Warsaw’s dilatory stance and, especially, the stance of Lithuania’s con-
siderable Polish minority, which, fearing Lithuanian nationalism, favored,
keeping Lithuania within the Soviet Union, had a detrimental impact on
Polish–Lithuanian relations. These factors could not remain without influ-
ence on the negotiations leading to the friendship and cooperation treaty,
which was signed by the two countries only in April 1994.
Poland also failed to achieve lasting stabilization in its relations with
Russia—the largest of Poland’s neighbors to the east. From the outset,
security concerns were a key issue in relations between the two countries.
Despite the disintegration of the USSR and the transformations taking
place there, Poland invariably feared Russia’s potential as a great power.69
Though entirely justified by historical experience, such fears introduced
an additional element of distrust in the two countries’ mutual relations,
which were already burdened by negative experiences and unresolved
issues from the past. The most pressing problem in mutual relations was
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. In February 1990 the Soviet
government declared that it was ready to hold talks concerning Soviet
troops stationed in Poland. Only in September 1990, however, did the
Polish government respond. This period of delay was caused by Warsaw’s
uncertainty about the final resolution of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse
border issue with Germany. When talks about the withdrawal of Soviet
forces from Poland began in November 1990, the Soviet negotiators put
forward the concept of a so-called anti-coalition clause based the ‘Falin-
Kvitsinsky doctrine’. This was unacceptable for Poland, as it entailed that
the USSR and Poland could not take part in any military and political
alliance targeted against the other and could not conclude agreements
54 J. ZAJA ̨C
contrary to the purposes of the Treaty; that the parties would undertake
not to allow any foreign armed forces to make use of any bases, deploy-
ment installations and other infrastructure, including objects transferred
to Poland in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish
territory. Moscow abandoned this idea following the collapse of the
Yanaev putsch in August 1991. A packet of agreements concerning the
withdrawal of Russian troops from Polish territory and the transit through
Polish territory of Russian troops withdrawn from Germany was signed on
22 May 1992.70 On the same day Poland and Russia also signed a Treaty
on Friendly and Good-Neighbourly Cooperation, but this treaty failed
to address issues of importance for Poland, like damages for victims of
Stalinist crimes, a common assessment of the Katyn massacre, and regulat-
ing navigation in the Vistula Lagoon and through the Strait of Baltiysk.71
It nevertheless created the bases for extensive bilateral collaboration and
was shortly followed by other agreements—on border crossings; on the
avoidance of double taxation, on transborder cooperation, on cooperation
between Polish regions and the district of Sankt-Petersburg; a consular
convention on the promotion and mutual protection of investments; a
declaration on cultural, scientific and educational collaboration (1992); a
treaty on trade and economic cooperation; an understanding on the con-
struction of a system of gas pipelines for the transit or Russian gas through
Polish territory and for supplies of Russian gas to Poland (1993); and an
understanding on basic principles for regulating mutual debt related to
trade between Poland and the former USSR (1996).72
Relatively quickly, Polish–Russian relations became dominated by the
question of NATO enlargement eastward. Poland wished to become a
member of this organization, while Russia consistently opposed NATO
enlargement. Polish and Russian security interests turned out to be
contradictory. In addition, relations between Poland and the USSR/
Russian Federation were fraught with many difficult problems which were
due to a complicated history and which arose from Poland’s inclusion in
a common bloc with the USSR, among other reasons. During the ini-
tial stages of its transformations, Poland concentrated on settling difficult
issues, demanded that the Kremlin admit its responsibility for the Katyn
massacre, and when the USSR did so (in April 1990), it demanded further
acts of expiation from Moscow. This hampered the formation of a climate
favoring political cooperation with first the USSR, and later with Russia.73
Polish post-Cold War decision makers who wanted to rest Poland’s
Eastern policy on the ‘Giedroyc-Mieroszewski doctrine’ were not entirely
successful. ‘General guidelines and slogans were given the function of

practical instructions without confronting them with the facts on the
ground.’74 In consequence, the bridging strategy that Poland adopted
in its foreign and security policy at the turn of 1980s to the 1990s ran
into serious obstacles. Problems that arose in Poland’s relations with its
Eastern neighbors made it very difficult for Warsaw to play the role of
a bridge between East and West. In addition, since the transformations,
which began in 1989, Polish decision makers sought to tie Poland with
the West, including with organizations that are exclusively Western. This
was a strategic aim. This concentration on the westerly direction meant
that Poland’s policy toward the West was not correlated with that toward
the East. The changing international order also contributed to changes in
the strategy guiding Poland’s security policy.
NOTES
1. On the Autumn of Nations see more P. Kenney (2002), A Carnival of
Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University
Press).
2. G. Bush (September 17, 1991), Toward a New World Order, Address before
a Joint Session of Congress, Washington D.C., September 11, 1990
(Washington: US Department of State), Vol. 1, No. 3.
3. (1991), National Security of the United States, August 1991 (Washington
DC: The White House), http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1991.pdf.
4. B. R. Posen, A. L. Ross (Winter 1996/97), ‘Competing Visions of US
Grand Strategy’, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 5–53.
5. See more M. Cox (1995), US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower
without a Mission? (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs).
6. On the subject of changes to the security system in Europe, see G. Flynn,
D. J. Scheffer (1990), ‘Limited Collective Security’, Foreign Policy, No.
80, pp. 77–101; R. H. Ullman (1991), Securing Europe (Princeton:
Princeton University Press), pp. 63–79; Ch. A. Kupchan, (1991),
‘Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe’, International
Security, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 114–161; J. Joffe (1992), ‘Collective Security
and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends’, Survival, Vol.
34, No. 1, pp. 36–50; A. Hyde-Price (1991), European Security beyond the
Cold War: Four Scenarios for the 2010 (London: SAGE Publications for
RIIA); A. M. Rusi (1991), After the Cold War: Europe’s New Political
Architecture (New York: St. Martin’s Press); A. Clesse, L. Rühl, eds.
(1990), Beyond East-West Confrontation: Searching for a new Security in
Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsesellschaft).
56 J. ZAJA ̨C
7. (January 1946), ‘Uchwały poczdamskie, Berlin, dnia 2 sierpnia 1945 r.’,

Zbiór Dokumentów, No. 1 (4) (Warsaw: PISM), pp. 27–28.
8. A. Klafkowski (1957), Podstawy prawne granicy na Odra Nisa na tle umów
jałtańskiej i poczdamskiej (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni); K. Skubiszewski
(1975), Zachodnia granica Polski w świetle traktatów (Poznań: Instytut
Zachodni); J. Kokot (1959), The Logic of the Oder-Neisse Frontier (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Zachodnie); W. Drzewieniecki (1959), The German-Polish
frontier (Chicago: Polish Western Association of America).
9. W. M. Góralski (2007), ‘Polska racja stanu a odprężenie w Europie.
Normalizacja stosunków między Polska ̨ a RFN w latach 1970–1977’, in
W. M. Góralski, ed., Polska-Niemcy 1945–2007. Od konfrontacji i part-
nerstwa w Europie (Warsaw: PISM), pp. 77–111.
10. J. Zaja ̨c, R. Zięba (2005), Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1945–1989
(Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek), pp. 88–113.
11. As the treaties of the first series were concluded for a period of 20 years,
Warsaw was interested in renewing and strengthening them, especially
given the existing internal fissures in the Eastern Bloc countries and the
FRG’s consistent questioning of the final nature of the Potsdam
Agreement’s provisions.
12. J. Zaja ̨c (2005), Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1945–1989. Wybór
dokumentów (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego).
13. The COMECON was an economic organization established in 1949. It
comprised the countries of the Eastern Bloc, along with a number of other
communist countries elsewhere in the world.
14. (1990) ‘Sejm Exposé by the Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki /
Excerpts Concerning Foreign Aid and International Relations, Warsaw,
September 12, 1989’, Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de Documents, juillet-
septembre 1989, No. 3 (Warsaw: PISM), pp. 28–29.
15. (1992) ‘Address by the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski at
the Session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty,
Budapest, 25 February, 1991’, Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de Documents,
janvier-juin 1991, No. 1 (Warsaw: PISM), pp. 215–220.
16. For more, see R. Zięba, ’»Nowy regionalizm« w Europie a Polska’, Sprawy
Międzynarodowe, (Warsaw: PISM), 1992, No. 1–2, pp. 25–44; A. Hyde-
Price (1996), The international politics of East Central Europe (Manchester /
New York: Manchester University Press), pp. 108–139.
17. K. Szczepanik, A. Herman-Łukasik, B. Janicka, eds. (2007), Stosunki dyp-
lomatyczne Polski. Informator, Tom I: Europa 1918–2006 (Warsaw:
Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych).
18. For more, see M. Mälksoo (2010), The Politics of Becoming European. A
Study of Polish and Baltics post-Cold War security imaginaries (London,
New York: Routledge).
19. For example, Andrzej Walicki suggests that defining Poland solely in cate-
gories of ‘Latin civilization’ seems attractive to those who would wish to
free Poland of communism and who identify communism with Russian
domination. Since the 15th century, Poland did indeed consider itself as
the Antemurale, but at the same time, it was willing to accept the oriental-
ization of its culture while, in political terms, fearing nothing more than
Western-type absolutum dominium. See A. Walicki (2002), Rosja, katoli-
cyzm i sprawa polska (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka), pp. 366–367.
20. K. Łastawski (2009), Polska racja stanu po wsta ̨pieniu do Unii Europejskiej
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne), p. 156 et seq.
21. The idea of eternal neutrality, championed primarily by defense minister
Piotr Kołodziejczyk, was consistent with the debate under way, especially
on the pages of the periodical Foreign Affairs about the idea of neutraliz-
ing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, so that they would form
a buffer of sorts, or a ‘gray zone’ separating NATO from USSR (which still
existed in the spring of 1991). This idea was quickly abandoned in Poland,
however.
22. K. Skubiszewski (1999), ‘Polska i Sojusz Północnoatlantycki w latach
1989–1991, Sprawy Międzynarodowe, No. 1, (Warsaw: PISM), p. 17.
23. (1990), ‘Treaty between the Polish People’s Republic and the German
Democratic on the Demarcation of the Territorial Waters in the Bay of
Pomerania, Berlin, May 22, 1989’ Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de
Documents avril- juin 1989 (Warsaw: PISM), No. 2 (520), pp. 13–21.
24. For more, see A. Czubiński, ed. (1988), PRL–RFN. Blaski i cienie procesu
normalizacji wzajemnych stosunków 1972–1987 (Poznań: Instytut
Zachodni); D. Bingen (1997), Polityka Republiki Bońskiej wobec Polski. Od
Adenauera do Kohla 1949–1991 (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Kwadrat).
25. M. Stolarczyk (2010), Zbieżność i rozbieżność interesów w stosunkach polsko-
niemieckich w latach 1989–2009 (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Śla ̨skiego), p. 94 et seq.
26. See the memoirs of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the min-
utes of his telephone conversation with German Chancellor Helmut
Kohl on 23 February 1990, T. Mazowiecki (2012), Rok 1989 i lata
następne. Teksty wybrane i nowe (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka), pp. 96–125.
The signed joint German–Polish declaration following the meeting
between Kohl and Mazowiecki in Krzyżowa in Lower Silesia on 9–14
November 1989 fails to define unequivocally the question of Poland’s
western border. In this situation, the Polish government took steps to
have united Germany and Poland sign a treaty settling in a final manner
the question of the German–Polish border. Further see A. Hajnicz
(1996), Ze soba ̨ czy przeciw sobie. Polska–Niemcy 1989–1992 (Warsaw:
Presspublica).
58 J. ZAJA ̨C
27. See ‘Wstęp do dokumentów’ and relevant documents, W. Borodziej, ed.

(2006), Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989–1991. Dokumenty dyplo-
matyczne (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar), pp. 29–30.
28. D. Jarosz, M. Pasztor (2015), Polish-French Relations 1944–1989
(Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang).
29. Further see M. Stolarczyk (1998), ‘Wokół formuły »polsko-niemiecka
wspólnota interesów«’, Przegla ̨d Zachodni, no 1, pp. 51–73; E. Stadtmüller
(1998), Granica lęku i nadziei. Polacy wobec Niemiec w latach
dziewięćdziesia ̨tych, (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Wrocławskiego); R. Zięba (2013), Polityka Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego), p. 133 et seq.
J. Spero (2004), Bridging the European Divide: Middle Power Politics and
Regional Dilemmas (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), pp. 101–145.
30. S. Parzymies (2002), ‘Stosunki dwustronne z wybranymi państwami
Europy Zachodniej. Francja’, in R. Kuźniar, K. Szczepanik, eds., Polityka
zagraniczna RP 1989–2002 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Askon, Fundacja
Studiów Międzynarodowych), pp. 163–174.
31. W. Sobków (2002), ‘Stosunki dwustronne z wybranymi państwami Europy
Zachodniej. Wielka Brytania’, in R. Kuźniar, K. Szczepanik, eds., Polityka
zagraniczna …, p. 176.
32. (11 September 2009) ‘Skubiszewski: Do niepodległości krok po kroku’,
Gazeta Wyborcza (interview given to M. Bos-Karczewska).
33. It is hardly remembered in Poland that during the Big Three Conference
in Teheran in December 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed to
the truncation of Polish territory in the east, asking only that this fact not
be disclosed for a time on account of the approaching presidential elections
in the USA. Poland’s boundaries were a secondary concern for the USA
(and for the United Kingdom). At the same time, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
and later his successor Harry Truman, were opposed to the idea of com-
pensating Poland for territory lost in the east by awarding it excessively
large areas in the west at Germany’s expense. Washington feared that
weakening Germany excessively could in the future have an unfavorable
impact on the balance of forces in Europe, while too generous territorial
acquisitions by Poland would mean increasing the Soviet sphere of influ-
ence in Europe. During the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945,
Poland nevertheless received part of Germany’s pre-war territory and, on
6 September 1946, US Secretary of State James Byrnes described the bor-
der on the Oder and western Neisse rivers as a temporary solution. He
recognized Poland’s right to territorial gains from Germany, but stated
that their extent would be decided at a future peace conference. For more
on the attitude of the Great Powers about Poland during the Big Three
Conference, see J. Karski, The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to
Yalta, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), pp. 357–384, 449–484.
34. In one of his 13 points, Wilson called for the establishment of an indepen-
dent Polish state on territories inhabited by a Polish population, with free
access to the sea, with political and economic independence, and with the
territorial integrity of such a state to be guaranteed under an international
convention. For more, see M. Fałkowski (2005), ‘Postawy Polaków wobec
Stanów Zjednoczonych, Amerykanów i stosunków transatlantyckich’, in
L. Kolarska-Bobińska, J. Kucharczyk, P. M. Kaczyński, eds., Mosty przez
Atlantyk? Postawy Polaków, Czechów, Słowaków wobec Stanów Zjednoczonych
(Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych), pp. 35–56. For more, see
P. Wandycz (1980), The United States and Poland (Cambridge MA and
London: Harvard University Press).
35. B. Winid (2001), ‘Zagadnienia bezpieczeństwa w stosunkach polsko-
amerykańskich w latach 1989–2000’, in R. Kuźniar, ed., Polska polityka
bezpieczeństwa 1989–2000 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar),
pp. 209, 214.
36. J. Onyszkiewicz (2014), ‘Na drodze do NATO-okruchy wspomnień’,
Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, No. 29, pp. 24–25.
37. R. Kuźniar (2009), Poland’s Foreign Policy after 1989 (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar), p. 105.
38. After the failure of the UN operation in Haiti (UNMIH), the Security
Council established the Multinational Forces—MNF, which were placed
under the command of the United States.
39. The greater part of the Polish contingent returned home in mid-December
1994. See D. S. Kozerawski (2012), Kontyngenty Wojska Polskiego w
międzynarodowych operacjach pokojowych w latach 1973–1999: konflikty-
interwencje-bezpieczeństwo (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek),
pp. 266–276.
40. Support East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, Public Law 101-
179-Nov. 28, 1989. See also M. Albright (1991), ‘The Role of the United
States in Central Europe’, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science,
Vol. 38, No. 1, (New York: Academy of Political Science) pp. 71–84.
41. See (3 June 1993) ‘Afera karabinowa. Czego boi się prokurator Hill’,
Rzeczypospolita; (13 October 1993) ‘Afera karabinowa. Oskarżeni złożyli
zeznania’, Rzeczypospolita.
42. J. Zaja ̨c (2015), ‘Asymetria w stosunkach polsko-amerykańskich w
zmieniaja ̨cym się ładzie międzynarodowym’, in B. Szklarski, ed.,
Niekonfrontacyjna asymetria w relacjach polsko-amerykańskich (Warsaw:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), pp. 45–60.
43. J. Zaja ̨c, R. Zięba (2005), Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych…,
pp. 224–239.
60 J. ZAJA ̨C
44. See (1992) ‘Problemy polityki zagranicznej u progu roku 1991—

Wysta ̨pienie ministra spraw zagranicznych RP Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego
w Sejmie, Warszawa, 14 lutego 1991 r.’, Zbiór Dokumentów Recueil de
Documents, No. 1, (Warsaw: PISM) pp. 28–29; (1992) ‘Polityka zagranic-
zna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w roku 1991—Exposé sejmowe ministra
spraw zagranicznych RP Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego, Warszawa 27 czer-
wca 1991’.
45. (1991) ‘Sejm Exposé by Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki (an
excerpt on Polish foreign policy, Warsaw, January 18, 1990’, Zbiór
Dokumentów-Recueil de Documents, janvier-mars 1990, p. 13.
46. A. Hyde-Price (1996), The international politics of East Central Europe
(Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press), p. 242.
47. R. Zięba (2012), ‘Polska w Organizacji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w
Europie’, in I. Popiuk-Rysińska, S. Parzymies, eds., Udział Polski w orga-
nizacjach międzynarodowych (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar),
pp. 190–193.
48. K. Skubiszewski (1999), ‘Polska i Sojusz Północnoatlantycki…, pp. 27, 38.
49. J. Onyszkiewicz (2014), ‘Na drodze do NATO…, pp. 30–32. See also
J. Machejek, S. Pia ̨stka, A. Machejek, Kwaśniewski: ‘pójdźmy dalej’. Wywiad
rzeka z prezydentem RP (Łodź: Hamal Books), pp. 71 et seq.
50. For more, see A. Rachwald (1995), ‘Looking West’, in Ilya Prizel,
A.A. Michta, eds., Polish Foreign Policy Reconsidered. Challenges of
Independence (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press),
pp. 129–155.
51. R. Zięba (2001), ‘European Security and Defense Identity: the Polish
Viewpoint’, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, No. 1, p. 191.
52. J. Onyszkiewicz (2014), ‘Na drodze do NATO…. p. 34.
53. For more, see J. Mieroszewski (1962), ‘Na ruinach przedmurza’, Kultura,
No. 11 (181), (Maisons-Lafitte: Institut Littéraire), pp. 99-108;
J. Mieroszewski (1968), ‘O emigracyjnym patriotyzmie’, Kultura, No. 12
(255), (Maisons-Lafitte: Institut Littéraire), pp. 70–73; J. Mieroszewski
(1973), ‘Polska “Ostpolitik”’, Kultura, No. 6 (309), (Maisons-Lafitte:
Institut Littéraire), p. 69; A. Nowak (31 August 2010), ‘Polska polityka
wschodnia: historyczne inspiracje i współczesne dylematy’, (Cracow:
Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej), http://www.omp.org.pl/artykul.
php?artykul=18, accessed on 28 January 2016; T. Snyder, ‘Jerzy Giedroyc
a polska polityka wschodnia’, in Ł. Jasina, J. Kłoczowski, A. Gil, eds.
(2007), Aktualność przesłania paryskiej ‘Kultury’ w dzisiejszej Europie.
Zbiór studiów (Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej),
pp. 327–331.
54. Piłsudski was Head of State in 1918–1922. Even though he held no offi-
cial position after this period, he retained the leading role in shaping Polish
policy, including foreign and security policy, until his death in 1935.
55. For more on the thinking of Józef Piłsudski, see A. Nowak (2009),
‘Geopolityczne koncepcje Józefa Piłsudskiego’, in J. Kloczkowski, ed.,
Przeklęte miejsce Europy? Dylematy polskiej geopolityki (Cracow: Ośrodek
Myśli Politycznej, Wyższa Szkoła Europejska im. ks. J. Tischnera).
56. About the Jagiellonian Idea, see O. Halecki (1937), Idea jagiellońska
(Lwów: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich); and P. Jasienica (2007),
Polska Jagiellonów (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka).
57. S. Mikulicz (1971), Prometeizm z polityce II Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw:
Ksia ̨żka i Wiedza).
58. In 1918–1920, both ideas—that of the Federation and that of
Intermarium—overlapped to some extent. In essence, they called for
Russia’s disintegration along its ‘ethnic seams’, assuming that the newly
emerging states would be fearful of Russia and would naturally seek to ally
themselves with Poland. This thinking gave way to the idea of building a
security system of sorts that would be strongly influenced by Poland. For
more on the concept of Intemrarium during the Interwar period, see
P. Okulewicz (2001), Koncepcja ‘międzymorza’ w myśli i praktyce polityc-
znej Józefa Piłsudskiego w latach 1918–1926 (Poznań; Wydawnictwa
Poznańskie).
59. A. Friszke (2007), Przystosowanie i opór. Studia z dziejów PRL (Warsaw:
Biblioteka Więzi), pp. 346–358.
60. J. Mieroszewski (1974), ‘Rosyjski “kompleks polski” i obszar ULB’,
Kultura, No. 9 (324), pp. 6–8.
61. No such document was signed at the time with Belarus, because the
authorities in Minsk did not want to confirm the existing boundary with
Poland, arguing that Belarus was not a party to the border treaty signed on
16 August 1945 by Poland and the USSR. Minsk even demanded that
Poland recognize the Białystok region as ethnically Byelorussian. Minsk
also voiced reservations about the treatment of the Byelorussian minority
in Poland and demanded the establishment of a Byelorussian ethnic district
in Poland. Foreign Minister Skubiszewski refused to discuss the question
about the border, holding that they were inviolable and immutable. In
effect, the political declaration on good-neighborliness was signed in
Warsaw on 10 October 1991. See K. Fedorowicz (2009), ‘Polityka Polski
wobec Białorusi’, in A. Gil, T. Kapuśniak, eds., Polityka wschodnia Polski.
Uwarunkowania. Koncepcje. Realizacja (Lublin: Instytut Europy
Środkowo-Wschodniej), p. 234.
62 J. ZAJA ̨C
62. S. R. Burant (1993), ‘International Relations in a Regional Context:

Poland and Its Eastern Neighbors—Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine’, Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 399–405.
63. Yanayev’s putsch, also known as the August putsch, was the unsuccessful
attempt by “hard-line” leaders of the CPSU to seize power in the USSR,
to put a stop to the transformations taking place in the country (Glasnost
and Perestroika) and to prevent the collapse of the USSR as a state.
64. I. Prizel (1995), ‘Warsaw’s Ostpolitik: A New Encounter with Positivism’,
in I. Prizel, A. A. Michta, eds., Polish Foreign Policy Reconsidered. Challenges
of Independence (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press),
pp. 93–128.
65. See Chap. 5 for more about Polish-Ukrainian relations.
66. I. J. Brzezinski (1993), ‘Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe’s Neglected
Strategic Axis’, Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 36.
67. R. Zięba (2014), Polityka Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej…, p. 240.
68. (Jan.–Mar. 1990) ‘Statement by the Government of the Republic of
Poland in Connection with “the Declaration of the Restoration of the
Lithuanian State” adopted by Supreme Council of Lithuania, Warsaw,
March 13, 1990’, Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de Documents (Warsaw:
PISM), pp. 47–48.
69. P. Grudziński (1997), Raport Polska-Rosja: niezgoda i współpraca (Warsaw:
Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych Instytutu Spraw Publicznych),
p. 10.
70. 17 September 1993 is recognized as the date on which the last Russian
soldier was withdrawn from Poland. It is a symbolic date that refers to the
USSR’s invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939. In fact the withdrawal
of Russian troops from Poland took place later. The deadline of their with-
drawal, set forth in the agreement as the end of 1993, was met.
71. J. Kukułka (1998), Traktaty sa ̨siedzkie Polski Odrodzonej (Wrocław: Zakład
Narodowy im. Ossolińskich), pp. 84–85.
72. Ibid., pp. 82–83.
73. R. Zięba (2013), Polityka Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej…, p. 174.
74. Z. Najder (2007), ‘Kontynuacja nieskuteczności. Polityka wschodnia RP
po roku 1989’, in J. Borkowicz, J. Cichocki, K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, eds.,
Okręt Koszykowa (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN), p. 72.
CHAPTER 3
Poland’s Security Policy in the Unipolar

World Order
The first half of the 1990s saw the emergence of a unipolar world order
marked by the dominance of the West and the hegemonic position of the
United States. The unipolar world order affected Poland’s security policy.
During the period of transformations that began in 1989, Poland’s high-
est priorities were to develop close relations with its neighbors, create new
forms of sub-regional cooperation (like the Visegrad Triangle, Council of
the Baltic Sea States, Central European Initiative, and Weimar Triangle),
strengthen the CSCE-based cooperative security system in Europe, join
west-European structures like NATO and the EU, and to establish closer
relations with the USA and Western European countries. As the unilat-
eral world order consolidated, the relative importance of those elements
changed. The bridging strategy, adopted by Poland during the transition
period, was beginning to give way to the aim of joining the NATO alliance
and establishing tight relations with its most powerful member. Thus the
importance of NATO and close relations with the USA, which became a
strategic partner for Poland, grew. The USA’s involvement in European
security was seen as crucial in Poland. Seeking to maintain a strong NATO
and American presence in Europe, Poland approached the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with caution and even disinclination.
The role of the CSCE/OCSE—an important component of Poland’s
security policy in the early 1990s—began to diminish relatively quickly.
As the priorities in Polish policy evolved and as differences between the

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59500-3_3
64 J. ZAJA ̨C
West, especially the USA, and Russia grew toward the end of the 1990s,
tensions between Poland and Russia became more pronounced. Poland’s
relations with its other Eastern neighbors in the 1990s were also not very
satisfactory. While a notable improvement in Polish–Lithuanian rela-
tions could be observed in the second half of the 1990s, the status of the
Polish minority in Lithuania remained a problem that cast a shadow over
the two countries’ relations. Cooperation with Belarus was reduced and
diplomatic tensions between Warsaw and Minsk were frequent. Polish–
Ukrainian relations were revitalized in 1996 but they were not without
problems and were changeable in nature.
1 US GLOBAL HEGEMONY, THE EU’S RISING

STRENGTH, RUSSIA’S WEAKNESS
The influence of the West spread to successive countries and the consolida-
tion and expansion of the Western worldview became one of the character-
istics of international politics throughout the 1990s. The European Union
and the USA promoted Western values like democracy, human rights and
a free-market economy. They used different instruments in doing so, how-
ever, and this was due to their differing potential and the different tradi-
tions that affected their foreign policy. The EU was a global player, but it
was a civilian power with a limited military component,1 while the USA was
a superpower with a leading position in each area of international politics.
The EU made attempts to strengthen its position with regard to the USA,
but it was not very successful. The European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) formulated in 1999 was ambitious but soon ran into a number of
serious obstacles. For Russia, the 1990s was a time of internal instability
and many economic and social problems. It was a tumultuous period dur-
ing which Russia had to grapple with issues left over from the collapse of
the USSR and when its international position was weak. No other state was
able to challenge the position of the United States.
In the 1990s the world entered a period of unipolarity, understood as
a system ‘in which one state’s capabilities are too great to be counterbal-
anced’,2 with the USA occupying a global hegemonic position.3 While Bill
Clinton’s administration initially concentrated on domestic issues and had
no clear overall strategy in foreign and security policy, it gradually assumed
the role of world leader for the USA. The National Security Strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement adopted in 1996 clearly states that ‘never
has American leadership been more essential—to navigate the shoals of
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE UNIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 65
the world’s new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities. [...] The
need for American leadership abroad remains as strong as ever’.4 The same
approach was adopted two years later.5 Both documents were based on
ideas originating in the early years of the Clinton presidency. Their under-
lying premise was the recognition of the need to ‘enhance US security,
bolster America's economic prosperity, and promote democracy abroad’.6
In pursuit of those goals, Washington intended to work with states and
international organizations and to encourage them to work with each
other. While pursuing cooperation with other actors as a priority, the USA
was willing to act unilaterally when it thought that its vital interests were at
stake, and this was made clear as early as September 1993 in a statement by
Anthony Lake, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.7
In practice, the friction between unilateralism and multilateralism
in US security policy became increasingly visible. While President
Bill Clinton’s first term (1992–1996) was marked by a multilateral
approach, during the second term one could observe the evolution of
American security policy toward unilateralism.8 As the UN’s weakness
was made plain in the first half of the 1990s in Somalia, in Haiti and in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Washington found it necessary to bolster its
own leadership, and the steps it took symbolized an ever-clearer shift
towards unilateralism.9 This trend manifested itself in US raids on ter-
rorist bases in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 following the terrorist
attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; the failure to send
the Kyoto Protocol, signed by president Clinton in 1998, for ratifica-
tion in the US Senate; and NATO’s armed intervention in Kosovo
in March 1999 without a mandate from the UN Security Council.
The trend toward unilateralism in US policy reached its apogee dur-
ing the presidency of George W. Bush (2001–2009). Very early dur-
ing his first term, President Bush decidedly rejected the idea of the
Kyoto Protocol, the statute of the International Criminal Court, the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996, and the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 1997. He also
announced the USA would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty of 1972, and it did so in June 2002. Unilateralist trends grew
more pronounced following the terrorist attacks of 11 September
2001. The White House’s adoption of the ‘war on terror’ as a top
priority led the USA to act in disregard of international organiza-
tions, and with the help of states forming a ‘coalition of the willing’.
66 J. ZAJA ̨C
The preemptive strike doctrine, whose essence was laid out in the
September 2002 US National Security Strategy, elicited serious reser-
vations from the international community.10 The document states:
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the
greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the
time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts
by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.11
This provision gave many countries good grounds to fear the possibility
that the USA might act in violation of international law in pursuit of its
own national interests.12 The anxiety of many such countries was com-
pounded by the Bush administration’s plans to build a strategic missile
defense system.
America’s military intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001 made
the Bush administration’s methods of operation plain. Despite the rec-
ognition by the Alliance that the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US territory
constituted grounds to apply Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the
Americans rejected the aid extended by its allies in the form of NATO
involvement, requested individual assistance from chosen countries, and
mounted a ‘coalition of the willing’. In effect, only in August 2003 did
NATO take over command of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF). In the years that followed, President Bush’s administration pro-
ceeded with no regard for international organizations and in breach or
international law and sought to reinforce US military potential and ensure
US supremacy in the world.
Washington’s unilateralism gave rise to much criticism and opposition
in many states, including some US allies in Western Europe. While transat-
lantic relations were relatively good during the Clinton presidency, the pol-
icies of the Bush administration placed them under considerable strain.13
This was most visible in the context of US’s Iraq policy, which divided
European countries sharply. On 30 January 2003, the so-called ‘letter of
the eight’ was signed by the prime ministers of the United Kingdom,
Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, and by the president
of the Czech Republic. The letter caused consternation in Brussels and
in those EU countries which were against the war. In effect, the letter
helped to deepen the rift among NATO allies, some of whom would not
accept American leadership based on unilateralism and militarism.14 Some
EU members were opposed to the use of force against Iraq—something

President George W. Bush had been urging since the summer of 2002.
Thus when the USA led the invasion of that country in March 2003, some
EU member states, notably Germany and France, condemned this step
sharply as being contrary to international law. As a result, during the war
in Iraq, American troops were joined by only British and Australian units
and by a small Polish unit of 200 men.
Russia was loath to accept US global hegemony. From September
1993, when President Yeltsin clearly expressed Russia’s opposition to
NATO enlargement to the east, Russian–American cooperation, which
had been good until then, gradually began to worsen.15 When Poland,
the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to join the North Atlantic
Alliance during the Madrid NATO Summit in July 1997, relations between
Washington and Moscow cooled markedly. Despite the establishment of
the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council in May 1997, Moscow had
the impression that the USA was not taking Russian interests seriously. As
Jack Matlock points out, however, the Clinton administration was deaf to
Russia’s warning that ‘enlarging NATO in the proposed manner would
be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War
era’.16 Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov was opposed to US
global hegemony and advocated a major role for Russia in world affairs.17
In effect, Russian–American relations were becoming increasingly sharp.
There was no agreement between the USA and Russia on the subject of
NATO enlargement, the deployment of the American Missile Defense sys-
tem (NMD/MD), and NATO’s intervention in the former Yugoslavia in
1999. Increasingly, Russia also feared America’s growing presence in the
post-Soviet states.18 Tensions in Russian–American relations were clearly
visible during the Istanbul OCSE Summit in November 1999.19
All in all, by the end of the 1990s Russian–American relations had grown
considerably cooler than they had been at the beginning of the decade. While
those relations warmed up following the terrorist attack on the USA on 11
September 2001,20 the warmth didn’t last. Differences between the two coun-
tries began to emerge relatively quickly over three issues: the Bush adminis-
tration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile/ABM Treaty
(December 2001); the implementation of the Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty/SORT (May 2002); and the November 2002 invitation of seven
other Central and Eastern European countries, including the Baltic States, to
join NATO.21 Moscow also took a critical view of America’s invasion of Iraq
in 2003.22 Russian criticism of US actions had limited effect, however. Russia
68 J. ZAJA ̨C
was struggling with many internal problems and its ability to influence events
on the world stage was limited.
Thus Poland—which had joined NATO in 1999, the EU in 2004, and
which had traditionally seen Russia as a potential threat—had to contend
with a climate of growing opposition to America’s leadership style from
many members of the international community, including some European
Union members and Russia. Poland adopted a firmly pro-American stance
in the face of the criticism directed at the USA by many countries; it rec-
ognized the United States as its strategic partner; it adopted a cautious
and reluctant stance with regard to the EU’s efforts to establish a military
component in the shape of the ESDP; and Warsaw’s pro-American stance
contributed to a rise of tensions in Polish–Russian relations.
2 NATO AS THE MAIN PILLAR OF POLAND’S SECURITY

In the fall of 1992, NATO accession officially became Poland’s most impor-
tant security policy aim. Although Poland’s security environment had
evolved in a favorable direction after the Cold War, obtaining hard security
guarantees was of key importance for Poland—a middle power where the
interests of the great powers had on many occasions collided and which was
mindful of the at times disastrous experiences history had brought. Accession
to NATO was accepted in Poland as a matter of national consensus and no
other option was seriously considered. While on a visit to Germany in March
1992, President Lech Wałęsa did propose that a new security system—
‘NATO-bis’—be built by Central European states but the idea, raised to
general surprise, was intended to galvanize NATO’s efforts to establish closer
cooperation with Central European countries, and not as a real alternative.
In September 1993, president Wałęsa sent a letter to the NATO secretary
general, expressing Poland’s desire to join the North Atlantic Alliance and
stressed that the admission of Poland to NATO ‘would remove that invis-
ible barrier which still keeps Europe divided into two parts—states which
enjoy fully ensured and guaranteed security, and states which do not’.23 The
new government formed in the fall of 1993 by parties with roots in the
People’s Republic of Poland—SLD and PSL—reiterated that joining NATO
was a priority of Poland’s policy. This reinforced the image that Poland’s
main political parties were in agreement about the fundamental aspects of
the country’s security policy. While during the initial post-Cold War period
the West was reluctant to consider the idea of admitting new members to
NATO, this gradually began to change. As James M. Goldgeier explains:
In the first few months of his administration, president Clinton had not
given much thought to the issue of NATO’s future. Then, in late April
1993, at the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, he met one-
on-one with a series of Central and Eastern European leaders, including the
highly regarded leaders of Poland and the Czech Republic, Lech Wałęsa and
Vaclav Havel. These two, having struggled so long to throw off the Soviet
yoke, carried a moral authority matched by few others around the world.
Each leader delivered the same message to Clinton: their top priority was
NATO membership. After the meetings, Clinton told Lake how impressed
he had been with the vehemence with which these leaders spoke, and Lake
was inclined to think positively toward expansion from that moment.24
In effect, on the initiative of the United States and Germany, in the

fall of 1993 the Alliance’s internal discussions produced the concept of
Partnership for Peace (PfP), which was then adopted during the Brussels
NATO Summit in January 1994.25 The program called for deepening the
partnership established in 1991 within the framework of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC) through bilateral military cooperation
between NATO and individual countries that were not NATO members.
An important aspect of the program was the declaration that NATO was
open ‘to the membership of other European states in a position to further
the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area’.26 The Partnership for Peace was not synonymous with
NATO enlargement to the east, however. This caused some displeasure in
Warsaw, where the program was at times referred to as the ‘partnership for
appeasement’ or ‘partnership for postponement’.27 While Poland signed
the partnership’s Framework Document as early as February 1994 (as the
third country to do so, after Lithuania and Romania), in the opinion of
president Lech Wałęsa ‘this was a step in the right direction, but too small
a step’.28 In the eyes of Andrzej Olechowski, Poland’s foreign affairs min-
ister, the program had two shortcomings:
1) It specified neither a date for the admission of new members nor the
criteria which they will have to meet, [and]
2) It made the admission of a new member contingent not only on the
degree of its preparation for membership but also on an assessment
of the overall situation of European security. This could arouse sus-
picions about the importance of the objection of one of the coun-
tries, although the statements make it clear that no third country
would have the right to veto NATO decisions on this issue.29
70 J. ZAJA ̨C
Poland thus expressed satisfaction with the growing cooperation between

NATO and countries of Central and Eastern Europe and got actively
involved in furthering this cooperation but, at the same time, it was disap-
pointed with its sluggish pace.
American advocates of NATO enlargement were an important source
of support for Polish politicians calling for a more rapid and far-reaching
expansion of ties between NATO and the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. Poland’s efforts to gain NATO membership were undertaken in
the face of Russia’s strong objections, however. Moscow had been clearly
opposed to NATO enlargement to the countries of Central Europe since
September 1993.30 Zbigniew Brzeziński, one of the leading American
proponents of NATO enlargement, criticized the Clinton administration’s
dilatoriness in this respect in an early-1995 issue of Foreign Affairs and
suggested that ‘Russia should be approached on a two-track basis: the
independent decision of the Alliance to take on Central European states
as members should be accompanied by a simultaneous invitation to Russia
to help create a new transcontinental system of collective security, one
that goes beyond the expansion of NATO proper’.31 The result of such
an approach would be twofold: it would give states of the former Eastern
Bloc a sense of security and, at the same time, it would dispel Russia’s fears
about the spread of Western influence. The role played by other propo-
nents of NATO enlargement to the east was also significant. They included
Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrooke, Henry Kissinger, Richard
Lugar,32 and RAND Corporation analysts such as Richard D. Asmus,
Richard L. Kugler, and Stephen Larrabee.33 In effect, Washington, which
had been cautious about the idea of NATO’s enlargement to the east,
began to view such a prospect with increasing favor.
In September 1995, NATO members approved the Study on NATO
Enlargement, a document that set forth the aims and principles of the
Alliance’s enlargement and the political and military criteria to be met by
candidate countries. In early December 1995, the North Atlantic Council
called on partner countries to establish national programs of coopera-
tion with NATO and to initiate individual consultations in the matter.
In response, in April 1996 Poland submitted to Brussels the Individual
Discussion Paper on NATO enlargement. This document contained a
number of arguments in favor of Poland’s admission to the Alliance as a
full-fledged member. Consultations between NATO and Poland began in
May 1996. Even though Poland argued—as did other countries seeking
admission to the Alliance—that NATO enlargement would expand the
zone of stability and predictability in Europe and stated that, as Russia’s

neighbor, it was anxious to establish good relations with it,34 some in the
Alliance’s decision-making circles feared that NATO enlargement could
lead to a deterioration of relations with Russia, to a return of Cold War
divisions, and would jeopardize democratization processes in that country.
In order to avoid this, the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation
and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed in
May 1997.35 Then, during the Madrid summit in July 1997, NATO offi-
cially invited Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary—the first coun-
tries of Central Europe—to join the Alliance. On 16 December 1997,
at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the accession protocols
concerning those three countries were signed. Following their ratification
by all NATO member states and candidate countries, on 12 March 1999
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary became full-fledged members
of the Alliance.36
Given the Polish elites’ classical approach to security, reinforcing the guar-
antees arising from the North Atlantic Treaty’s Art. 5, became Poland’s pri-
mary concern. As Polish foreign minister Bronisław Geremek stated in his
speech during the ceremony of deposition of the Protocols of Accession to
the North Atlantic Treaty on 12 March 1999, ‘we are convinced that NATO
must remain a defensive alliance, based on the principle of solidarity’.37 In his
speech, Geremek quoted President Harry S. Truman, who said that ‘none
of us alone can assure the continuance of freedom’.38 It was already becom-
ing clear, however, that the North Atlantic Alliance was increasingly often
engaged in ‘out of area’ operations—a concept ultimately adopted in 1992.
An increasing involvement in extra-Treaty operations—including the mili-
tary intervention in former Yugoslavia (in 1994/1995 and 1999), followed
by the large-scale intervention in Afghanistan in 2003—meant that NATO,
which had always been a defensive alliance, was beginning to acquire the
traits of a collective security organization.
Even though Warsaw’s prime concern was to maintain NATO as a
defensive alliance, Poland participated in ‘out of area’ operations in order
to show itself as a good and loyal ally. Already a participant in the PfP
program, in February 1996 Poland joined the Implementation Force
(IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These forces included a 670-strong
Polish contingent, which served as part of the Nordic–Polish Brigade.
Polish units also took part in the Stabilization Force (SFOR). At a later
stage, Poland also joined other operations of a rescue or humanitar-
ian character: The 1999 Albanian Force (AFOR) operation in Albania,
72 J. ZAJA ̨C
where it supported Kosovar refugees; and in 2005 in Pakistan, where

it gave assistance to victims of the Kashmir earthquake. In 2001–2003,
a Polish military contingent also took part in the ‘Amber Fox’ opera-
tion in Macedonia, patrolling designated zones and ensuring the secu-
rity for EU and CSCE observers.39 Polish soldiers also took part in the
NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) in 2004–2011, and in the
NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) in 2009–2014. In
2005–2011 the Polish Navy took part in the ‘Active Endeavor’ operation
which was meant to ensure navigation safety and prevent terrorist acts
on the Mediterranean Sea. On many occasions, Poland also contributed
to Air Policing operations over the Baltic States: each time, the Polish
military contingent was made up of 100 persons.40 During the presidency
of George W. Bush (2001–2009), the trend to use NATO for ‘out of
area’ operations became more pronounced. In keeping with this trend,
in May 2007, Polish foreign minister Anna Fotyga (PiS) proposed that
NATO conduct an ‘expeditionary policy’ and that Poland should build
expeditionary forces.41 Warsaw’s commitment was also due to its desire
to maintain close relations with the USA, whose importance in Poland’s
security policy was increasing.
The two most important NATO operations Poland participated
in were KFOR (in Kosovo) and ISAF (in Afghanistan). Poland has
been a member of the international KFOR force under NATO com-
mand since July 1999. In 2000–2010, Poland and Ukraine formed the
Polish–Ukrainian Battalion (POLUKRBAT) composed of 510 Polish
and about 320 Ukrainian soldiers. The unit also included a Lithuanian
platoon, which was withdrawn in 2009. The POLUKRBAT unit was
withdrawn in 2010 after the tasks of the multinational force were modi-
fied, and the Polish Military Contingent (PKW) in Kosovo was renamed
a Maneuver Company.
In the fall of 2001 Poland took part in the military operations in
Afghanistan and was one of the first states to do so. Initially, Polish
soldiers were placed under direct US command, and Poland’s greatest
contribution at this stage was to send its GROM special-forces unit.
In 2001–2006, Poland was also part of operation ‘Enduring Freedom’
(EF); in 2007–2014 the Polish contingent became part of the ISAF
forces. The first rotation of the Polish contingent for the EF mission
was sent in March 2002 and was 300-strong. Successive rotations were
about 100-strong each. From 2006 on, the number of Polish soldiers in
Afghanistan increased gradually. This had in large measure to do with
Poland’s diminishing contribution to the Iraq operation and, at the same

time, with the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. In 2010,
the Polish contingent in Afghanistan reached its peak—about 2,600 sol-
diers—after which this number successively decreased. The last PKW
rotation, in the fall of 2014, had only about 300 soldiers.42 The tasks
of the Polish contingent in the framework of the NATO operation also
changed. In the initial stages, the ISAF PKW mission was one of sta-
bilization and training. The emphasis gradually shifted toward training
and advising. The last rotation, from May 2013 to December 2014,
prepared for the withdrawal of the PKW. It also supported and advised
the Afghan Security Forces and Ghazni Province authorities in opera-
tions they conducted autonomously.43 After the ISAF operation ended
in late 2014, Poland joined the follow-up NATO-led mission, called
‘Resolute Support’ launched on 1 January 2015. It provided further
training, advice and assistance to Afghan institutions and security forces.
The number of Polish troops sent amounted to 113.44
Poland also invariably supports the idea of NATO enlargement,
which Polish decision makers see as one more stage in Poland’s emer-
gence from its geopolitical situation and as a means to escape the reach
of Russia’s political ambitions on the one hand, and as a way to anchor
the USA more firmly in Europe on the other. For these reasons, Poland
had a greater stake in NATO’s second enlargement round than per-
haps any other member of the Alliance. But even though Poland offi-
cially supported all countries wishing to join the Alliance, Lithuania
and Slovakia were the only countries whose membership was of any
direct impact on Poland’s security.45 After NATO’s 2004 enlargement,
Warsaw began to actively support Ukraine and Georgia in their coop-
eration with NATO. Poland’s position became especially clear during
the April 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit which was, in keeping with
the announcement made by member state leaders during the 2006
summit in Riga, mainly devoted to the issue of NATO enlargement.46
Much time was spent on the membership prospects of Ukraine and
Georgia. Poland’s president Lech Kaczyński was especially active in
supporting the two countries’ candidacy. The issue of extending the
Membership Action Plan (MAP) to those two countries proved divisive
and, in consequence the plan was not extended. On 3 April 2008 the
Bucharest Summit nevertheless issued a declaration stating that those
two countries would become NATO members and would begin sys-
tematic cooperation with the Alliance to reach this goal.47
74 J. ZAJA ̨C
3 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE USA

Maintaining America’s political and military presence in Europe has been
imperative from Poland’s point of view. In Warsaw, the United States
was seen as a security stabilizer and as a state whose presence in Europe
ensured a desirable balance of power. This presence provided a counter-
balance for Russian influence on the one hand, and reined in any potential
great-power ambitions of Germany on the other. Many Polish politicians
shared the view of Jan Nowak Jeziorański—a strong supporter of close
Polish–American relations and the long-time head of Radio Free Europe’s
Polish Section—that a weakening of US influence in Europe could lead
to German regional domination, which would be highly disadvantageous
for Poland.48 In their eyes, continued American presence in Europe thus
served to keep the power ambitions of Russia and Germany in check and
seemed to be the best guarantor of Poland’s security. This was a reflection
of the words once spoken by Lord Ismay, NATO’s first secretary gen-
eral: The purpose of the NATO alliance is ‘to keep the Russians out, the
Americans in and the Germans down’.49
The Polish–American relations that had taken shape in the first years
after the Autumn of Nations began to change in the mid-1990s. There
was a shift from an ‘open and sincere’ dialogue in the field of security,
which de facto stood for ‘differences’ (occasional irritants like the ‘Carbine
Affair’ in 1992, and US attempts to subordinate relations with Poland to
the ‘Russia First’ principle) to ties of alliance built on strategic partnership.
From Washington’s perspective, Poland was becoming its most impor-
tant and valuable ally in Central and Eastern Europe.50 Relatively quickly,
this led a number of Polish politicians to overestimate Poland’s place in
US security policy. In 2002, during a lecture given at the Jagiellonian
University in Cracow, Polish foreign minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz
(SLD) presented a comprehensive justification for maintaining close rela-
tions with the USA. Reflecting views that were commonplace within the
Polish political establishment, he described Polish–American relations
as being the most fruitful in history and presented the motives guiding
Poland in maintaining close ties with the USA. Cimoszewicz saw close
Polish-American relations as necessary to consolidate the Polish politi-
cal transformations, to ensure the country’s security and its stable and
sustained economic development, and also as a means to give Poland a
strong voice on the international stage.51 These convictions were reflected
in Poland’s actions. Towards the end of the 1990s, Warsaw began to
actively support American policies, even if they were controversial under

international law. In February 1998, during a visit to the USA, foreign
minister Bronisław Geremek (UW) expressed Poland’s support for a pos-
sible American military intervention in Iraq, should one occur.52 In March
1999, Poland supported the military operation against Serbia unreserv-
edly, even though this initiative was undertaken without a mandate from
the UN Security Council. During NATO’s 50th Anniversary Summit held
in Washington in April 1999, Poland also supported the position of the
United States, which sought to revise the Alliance’s strategic concept dat-
ing from 1991, to enable NATO to conduct ‘out of area’ operations with-
out the authorization of the UN Security Council and to transform NATO
into a global alliance. Poland argued that ‘in the current politico-military
situation characterized by the absence of risks of large-scale conflicts, and a
steadily growing NATO engagement in strengthening security and defus-
ing conflicts, it had to preserve the flexibility essential for effective action.
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept should not, for instance, make ‘out of
area’ operations by the Alliance conditional on the unqualified consent of
the UN Security Council’.53
Warsaw’s support for Washington grew stronger following the 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks against the USA. On 6 November 2001,
President Aleksander Kwaśniewski organized in Warsaw an antiterrorist
conference for Central, Eastern and Southeastern European leaders. The
conference drew 17 leaders of the region, including 13 heads of state, and
ended with the adoption of a declaration and a plan of action against ter-
rorism, both of which stressed the will to reinforce and combine efforts
aimed at combating international terrorism in the spirit of solidarity with
the United States, with other NATO members and with all others who see
terrorism as the most dangerous threat in the 21st century. Even though
the ‘war on terror’ and the methods adopted by the Bush administration
following the 9/11 attacks violated international law, Warsaw accepted
Washington’s policy uncritically. It actively assisted the United States in its
military operation against Iraq in March 2003, as one of three countries
to do so, alongside the United Kingdom and Australia. Poland’s participa-
tion in this intervention was an expression of Warsaw’s consistent position.
Polish politicians had on many occasions pointed to the Saddam Hussein
regime’s human rights violations, and to the danger arising from Iraq’s
alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction. Prior to their deci-
sion to send Polish troops to Iraq, the authorities in Warsaw did not raise
any conditions concerning either the size of the Polish contingent, the
76 J. ZAJA ̨C
duration of its deployment, or anything else. In the words of Jan Nowak

Jeziorański, Warsaw was right to support the USA politically in its conflict
with Saddam Hussein’s regime, but it was regrettable that Polish troops
had been sent to Iraq, because that country lies outside Poland’s sphere of
interests. He saw Poland’s eagerness to be at the forefront as a manifestation
of a chronic desire to please.54 Although, numerically speaking, Poland’s
participation was minute, it was symbolically important, because it helped
legitimize the Bush administration’s politically and legally controversial
operation based on the doctrine of preemptive strike.55 Poland’s active
support of the USA elicited sharp criticism from France and Germany in
the months leading up to the war against Iraq, however. President Jacques
Chirac famously stated at the time that Poland ‘had missed an opportunity
to remain silent’.56 Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder did not hide his disap-
pointment with Warsaw’s position either.
In May 2003, Poland took over command in one of four occupa-
tion (stabilization) zones in Iraq—the Multi-National Division Center
South (MND CS). Initially about 9000 persons from 24 countries
served under Polish command,57 but this number gradually decreased:
By July 2007 it had fallen to about 1200 persons from 10 countries.58
The number of Poles in the unit also changed. In June 2003 President
Kwaśniewski issued an order to send up to 2500 soldiers to Iraq.59 The
first three Polish Military Contingent (PKW) rotations in Iraq were about
2500-strong, the size of the fourth and fifth rotations was reduced—in
February 2005 to 1630 soldiers, in August to 1450.60 This diminishing
trend meant that in the ninth rotation, in July 2007, there were 897 sol-
diers and Polish Army employees. The Poles assumed command of the
South-Central zone, which included the 5 provinces of Babil, Karbala,
Najaf, Diwaniyah (formerly Qadisiyah) and Wasit. The zone occupied
about 65,000 km², or 15% of Iraq’s total area. The dislocation of the
PKW took place in three stages: The main forces were sent in August
2003; at the end of 2004 the Polish zone was reduced to the three prov-
inces of Babil, Wasit and Diwaniyah; and in January 2006 it was further
reduced to two—Wasit and Diwaniyah. The three first rotations carried
out stabilization tasks: Soldiers helped in reconstruction, they patrolled
the area, defended the headquarters of Iraqi local authorities, and fought
back rebels. Beginning with the fourth rotation, in February 2005, the
mission became a stabilization and training mission and, somewhat later,
an advisory and training one. The last PKW rotations dealt with advis-
ing and training Iraqi security services and supporting anti-terrorist
operations in the Iraqi provinces. The tasks of those rotations were also
civilian–military cooperation and assistance in the economic rebuild-
ing of the province. In November 2007, Polish Prime Minister Donald
Tusk announced that Polish troops would be withdrawn from Iraq. As a
result, in October 2008, Poland’s mission ended.
During America’s ‘war on terror’, Poland went further than most
countries in its support for the US policy. The high point was reached in
2002–2005, when Poland allowed the USA to establish a secret prison
on its territory, where persons suspected of terrorist activity were tor-
tured by CIA operatives. As early as November 2005, Human Rights
Watch revealed ‘that the United States has used secret detention facili-
ties in Eastern Europe, namely in Poland and Romania, to illegally hold
terrorist suspects without rights or access to counsel’.61 This informa-
tion was confirmed by the Council of Europe in its June 2006 and June
2007 reports, which stated that Poland hosted a secret CIA prison on
its territory (in Stare Kiejkuty), assisted with the transfer of secretly
detained individuals in and out of Poland, including to other secret
detention sites, and permitted the use of its airspace and airports for
such transfers. According to the Council of Europe ‘some individual
high office-holders knew about and authorized Poland’s role in the
CIA’s operation of secret detention facilities for High-Value Detainees
on Polish territory, from 2002 to 2005. The following persons could
therefore be held accountable for these activities: the President of
Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski; the chief of the National Security
Bureau, Marek Siwiec; the minister of national defense (Ministerial
Oversight of Military Intelligence), Jerzy Szmajdziński; and the head of
military intelligence, Marek Dukaczewski’.62
The matter ultimately found its dénouement at the European Court of
Human Rights. In December 2013, at the request of the Palestinian Abu
Zubaydah and the Saudi Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the European Court
of Human Rights conducted an oral hearing in Strasbourg in the cases of
al-Nashiri v. Poland and Abu Zubaydah v. Poland. In what proved to be
a landmark judgment, in July 2014 the court found Poland complicit in
‘CIA rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations on its ter-
ritory’,63 and that it had exposed the plaintiffs to serious risk of torture
by enabling the CIA to detain them. In conclusion, the court found that
Poland had violated Articles 2, 3, 5, 6§1, 8 and 13 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950,
and Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 to the Convention of 1983. The tribu-
78 J. ZAJA ̨C
nal found that the plaintiffs had been subjected to torture during their
detention by the CIA on Polish territory. The Polish authorities were
bound, pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention, to take steps in order
to ensure that persons finding themselves within their jurisdiction would
not be tortured or subjected to inhumane treatment or punishment. The
tribunal also examined the complaints in terms of possible violations of
the right to a fair trial and in this respect also found that Poland had
been in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. It fur-
ther found that Poland had violated the plaintiffs’ right to freedom and
personal safety, their right to respect for their private and family life, and
also their right to an effective remedy allowing them to seek redress for
the violations. It also found that the inquiry conducted in this matter in
Poland had fallen short of the standards of effectiveness required when
dealing with cases of suspected violation of the prohibition of torture.
For these reasons the European Court of Human Rights, in a unanimous
ruling, ordered Poland to pay 130,000 euros (100,000 euros in respect
of non-pecuniary damage, 30,000 euros in respect of costs and expenses)
to Husayn (Abu Zubayda) and 100,000 euros to Al Nashiri (in respect of
non-pecuniary damage).64 After an appeal by the Polish government was
turned down on February 2015, the rulings became final.
The Polish–American rapprochement at the beginning of 21st century
was also reflected in military cooperation. In April 2003 Poland signed a
contract for the purchase of American airplanes—36 single-seat F-16Cs and
12 two-seat F-16Ds. Three manufacturers vied for the contract: Lockheed
Martin—the American maker of the F-16; Dassault Aviation—the French
manufacturer of the Mirage 2000-5; and Saab-BAE Systems—the British–
Swedish consortium, maker of the JAS-39 Gripen. Polish decision makers
argued that the choice of the F-16s was due to the fact that Lockheed
Martin’s offer was the most advantageous—both in terms of price and of
the offset package. Many critical voices, however, alleged that the Polish
authorities’ decision was dictated by political considerations. As early as
November 2000, during a meeting of the SLD parliamentary caucus, it
was disclosed that in July 2000, Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek had informed
that party’s spokesperson, Danuta Waniek, of the fact that the government
had made attempts to purchase F-16 airplanes in the USA while bypass-
ing the tender procedure. In addition, prior to his visit to the USA in
December 2001 foreign minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz stated pub-
licly that the decision to purchase the airplanes is subject to additional
considerations besides technical or military ones.65
In November 2005, the then Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz

stated he was in favor of hosting elements of the American missile shield
on Polish territory. He was convinced that the presence of American bases
in Poland would tie the two countries in a lasting manner, and that the
USA would take particular care of the security of a country that hosted US
military infrastructure. Warsaw was so interested in bringing about such
a state of affairs that when the Americans appended to their 2006 missile
shield offer a ready positive reply form for the Polish government to sign,
the matter passed almost unnoticed.66 Negotiations in the matter were
officially initiated in May 2007 by the PiS government,67 and the agree-
ment was signed under the PO/PSL government on 20 August 2008, a
few days after the Georgian–Russian war. The two events’ proximity in
time was not coincidental. After the war broke out, Polish fears of possible
Russian aggressive designs with regard to Central Europe grew consider-
ably and Warsaw was interested in signing the agreement with the USA as
rapidly as possible. In addition to this agreement the two parties issued a
declaration on strategic cooperation which called for, among other things,
the establishment of a Strategic Cooperation Consultative Group made up
of high-ranking representatives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Ministry of National Defense, and of the American State Department
and Defense Department; and for US assistance in the modernization of
the Polish armed forces. In this declaration, the US also undertook to sup-
ply Poland with a battery of Patriot missiles.68
Poland’s 21st century policy with regard to the USA is at times seen
as submissive.69 Some see it as a manifestation of clientelism,70 satellit-
ism,71 bandwagoning,72 as ‘the Americanization of Polish foreign policy’73,
or Poland as a poputchik (a fellow traveler).74 While Poland supported
American policy unconditionally, it still expected economic benefits
in return. It received none, however, and the expectations that Polish
firms would win lucrative contracts during the rebuilding of Iraq proved
unfounded. There were also no political benefits. A question that sym-
bolizes this lack of reward is the issue of American visas for Poles and
the decade of unsuccessful efforts on Poland’s part to have them lifted.
Successive Polish governments, irrespective of their political background,
associated Polish interests with American interests, and this led to exces-
sive submissiveness on Warsaw’s part when dealing with the USA.75 For
example, in 2006, Victor Ashe, the US ambassador in Warsaw, in describ-
ing Poland’s policy toward the USA in a dispatch to the White House,
wrote that Polish prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński (PiS):
80 J. ZAJA ̨C
does not have any real foreign policy vision other than historical distrust of
Germany and Russia, but he instinctively identifies with the U.S., providing
an opportunity to influence his strategic vision and cement Poland's foreign
policy even more closely to U.S. interests. [...] Jarek is an extremely intel-
ligent and confident politician, but he has no experience in governance [...]
Well-informed arguments appealing to both his patriotism and his intellect
stand the best chance of success in helping keep Polish foreign policy vision
in line with U.S. interests.76
4 POLAND’S CAUTION WITH REGARD TO THE ESDI

AND THE ESDP
Poland’s interest in maintaining a strong US presence in Europe entailed a

cautious stance with regard to the European Security and Defence Identity
(ESDI) and, later, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). At
the beginning of the 1990s the Polish government observed the differ-
ences between the WEU and NATO over ESDI with some anxiety. Some
European states, France in particular, thought of the ESDI as the nucleus
of future European collaboration independent of the USA, while the lat-
ter held the view that this collaboration should be pursued within the
NATO framework.77 This transatlantic dispute put the Central European
states in an awkward situation. They wished to build a stable and effec-
tive European security system based on concordance between the USA
and Western European states. Poland, therefore, initially sought to avoid
taking a clear stand but when the rivalry between the USA and some
European countries began to grow, Poland’s position was articulated in
clear terms. According to Warsaw, NATO was the sole real and effec-
tive security organization in Europe and, for this reason it argued that
the WEU should be compatible with NATO. Poland wanted above all
to preserve NATO and US presence in Europe. Poland was interested in
defusing this transatlantic dispute as rapidly as possible but at the same
time, foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski expressed in April 1993 his
strong support for the US position in the dispute, by describing the WEU
as the ‘European pillar of NATO’.78
In the years that followed, Poland’s position with regard to European
integration in the field of security and defense remained consistent.
On Poland’s accession to NATO, on 12 March 1999, foreign minister
Bronisław Geremek emphasized that ‘Poland supports a strong transatlan-
tic link. The United States has given the Atlantic Community leadership,
stability and strength. Europe continuously needs a firm American anchor

for its security and growth. Conversely, American security and prosper-
ity depend on a reliable and flourishing Europe’.79 When, therefore, the
European Council, at a meeting in Cologne in June 1999, decided to
establish the European Security and Defence Policy, differences emerged
between Warsaw and Brussels. During the following European Council
meeting, in December 1999 in Helsinki, the Polish government presented
its position with regard to the ESDP. It stated that this initiative would
only make sense if it was to reinforce the ties between the EU and the
USA. It also proposed the establishment of a binding mechanism of coop-
eration between NATO and the EU. In keeping with this proposition,
European military planning would be subordinated to NATO’s Strategic
Concept, and the formation of military forces for EU operations would
take place in concordance with NATO’s defense planning system. Poland
also expressed the expectation that NATO members which are not mem-
bers of the EU would also take part, as equals, in the entire planning and
decision-making process concerning EU military operations.80 These pro-
posals caused considerable dissatisfaction in some EU member countries.
The most emphatic reaction was that of France, which described Poland
as ‘an American Trojan Horse in Europe’.81 Despite such critical reactions
from EU member states, Warsaw did not change its position. At the ses-
sion of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 15 December 1999,
Bronisław Geremek made three points which summed up Poland’s posi-
tion on the European Security and Defence Policy: (1) NATO has been
and remains the cornerstone of European security; (2) ESDP is a critical
factor strengthening NATO effectiveness; (3) setting clear mechanisms for
NATO-EU cooperation is of vital importance.82
Polish politicians repeated the reservations formulated by Madeleine
Albright, and whose sense came down to the famous 3Ds criteria, which
emerged after the Saint-Malo French–German agreement on European
defense in December 1998: ‘no decoupling, no duplication, no dis-
crimination’.83 This meant that the USA opposed an ESDP that might
‘decouple’ Europe from the United States, ‘duplicate’ NATO structures
and capabilities, or ‘discriminate’ against NATO members that are not
in the European Union or the WEU.84 This point of view was shared
in the speech given by Bronisław Geremek to the Sejm on May 2000.85
This approach was also reflected in the Security Strategy of the Republic
of Poland of 2000, which stressed that NATO was the basis for political
and military stability in Europe, as well as for Poland’s security, while the
82 J. ZAJA ̨C
system being built between the EU/WEU and NATO was seen as the
second pillar of Polish security. It also treated the ESDI as part of NATO
and stated that the development of the European defense policy didn’t
weaken lasting and strong Euro-Atlantic ties in the security sphere.86
It is worthwhile to note, that even after the Cologne European Council
decided to establish the ESDP, Polish officials tended to use the term
‘European Security and Defence Identity’ instead of ‘European Security
and Defence Policy’. This seemingly minor linguistic difference was sig-
nificant, however. It symbolized Poland’s approach, in keeping with which
Warsaw saw the new area of cooperation between EU states as an institu-
tion that should be subordinated to NATO, and not as an undertaking
aimed at reinforcing the capabilities of the European Union in the sphere
of security and defense. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of
Poland of 2003 assessed the EU’s security and defense cooperation in sim-
ilar terms. Poland adopted a concordant position with regard to the provi-
sions of the project of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(TCE). On 9 September 2003 the Polish government presented the opin-
ion that all EU member states should take part in the decision-making
process leading to the establishment of CFSP cooperation mechanisms (in
matters concerning ESDP). Poland also insisted on including in the proj-
ect provisions about NATO’s role in the Euro-Atlantic security system.87
The Polish position did not meet with the understanding of the countries
which favored greater EU autonomy from the USA in the field of security
and defense. Those countries, like France and Germany, accused Warsaw
of having an excessively pro-American stance.
Poland’s efforts to gain EU membership gradually led its position
about the European Security and Defence Policy to change from disincli-
nation to cautious engagement, in keeping with the premise that, since the
process of EU cooperation in this area is under way, Poland must ensure
for itself an appropriate place in it. In November 2000, during the first
Capabilities Commitment Conference, Poland declared that it would take
part in the rapid reaction forces being organized by the European Union,
but only if this doesn’t entail any additional costs in addition to the obli-
gations Poland had already assumed within NATO. During the third
planning conference, in May 2003, Poland declared it would make a total
of 1500 soldiers available for the EU to use in various Petersberg Task
(operations). Several months earlier, in February 2003, Poland had also
expressed interest in the planned project groups provided in the European
Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). As a result, in 2003–2007, Poland took
part in various degrees in the work of eight ECAP project groups in the
following capabilities: air refueling; strategic air and maritime transport;
defense against weapons of mass destruction; special forces; search and
rescue on the battlefield; medical backup; and operational command.88
In April 2004, Poland also declared it would take part in the creation of
EU Battlegroups, an initiative thought up two months earlier by France,
Germany and the United Kingdom. In November 2004, Poland and
Germany, along with Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia, signed a declaration
of intent in the matter of the formation of a common battle group that was
formalized in a memorandum of understanding two years later (November
2006). This unit was made available to the EU at the beginning of 2010,
and in the first half of the year, Poland played the role of a framework
country. Polish units are also part of a battle group that includes forces
from Germany and France. The so-called Weimar Battlegroup was formed
by the decision of the three countries in July 2006 and its tour of duty
began at the beginning of 2013. Discussions between the general staffs of
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have been under way
since January 2006 about the possibility of forming a so-called Visegrad
Battlegroup by 2016. Poland has also become active in the work of the
European Defence Agency (EDA), particularly in the sphere of reinforcing
Europe’s armaments market, the development of R&D programs, plan-
ning the development of European crisis reaction capabilities important
for the realization of Headline Goal 2010 and beyond that time frame.89
Since 2003, Poland has also been taking part in the Petersberg opera-
tions conducted under the auspices of the ESDP. Polish soldiers took part
in the following operations: EUFOR ‘Concordia’ in Macedonia (March–
December 2003—17 persons); EUFOR RD Congo (June–December
2006—130 persons); and EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (spring 2008–spring
2009—330–400 persons). It is also taking part in the EUTM Mali
operation (from 2013—20 soldiers withdrawn in May 2014) and in the
EUFOR ‘Althea’ operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the largest ever
conducted by the European Union (from December 2004—initially 275
Polish soldiers, 50 soldiers since December 2010). Poland’s involvement
in the EU’s civilian missions is relatively modest: EUPOL ‘Proxima’ in
Macedonia (December 2003–December 2005—6 police officers, later 3);
EUPOL Bosnia and Herzegovina (January 2003–June 2012—12 police
officers, later 7); EUJUST LEX Iraq (July 2005–December 2013—as part
of this mission, Poland conducted two training courses in 2006–2007,
two vocational internships in 2008, and one vocational internship in 2009
84 J. ZAJA ̨C
for the Iraqi prison service, and provided training to 48 persons in all);
EUPOL AFGHANISTAN (from June 2007—5 persons in 2016), EUAM
Ukraine (from July 2014—1 person), EUNAVFOR Med Sophia (from
July 2015—1 person), and EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories
(from January 2006—1 person from September 2016). More Poles took
part in EU civilian missions in Kosovo and in Georgia. The Special Polish
Police Unit (over 115 persons) and several experts from the Police, the
Customs Service and the Border Police are taking part in the EU mis-
sion deployed in Kosovo in December 2008 (EULEX Kosovo). About
20 Polish citizens are also on contract for the needs of the mission (as
of January 2015). In the aftermath of the 2008 Russian–Georgian war,
approximately 20 persons from Poland are taking part in the EU observa-
tion mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) launched in October 2008.
Poland is also taking part in the technical and advisory mission for the
monitoring of the Ukrainian–Moldovan border (EUBAM Moldova/
Ukraine), launched in November 2005. The Polish contingent is one
of the most numerous of all sent by EU member states (18 persons in
2016).90
Despite Poland’s involvement in the development of the ESDP, it
invariably gave priority to maintaining a strong NATO and US presence
in Europe. An important reason for Poland’s cautious stance with regard
to European autonomy in the field of security and defense was its distrust
in the EU’s ability to act effectively on their own. The military capabilities
of Western European countries are much smaller than that of the USA; the
WEU was not able to act without support from NATO resources and logis-
tics, and this is also a problem of the EU as a whole. Warsaw’s skepticism
about the military self-reliance of the European Union and its member
states is made the greater by Poland’s historical experiences. Both France
and the United Kingdom failed to came to Poland’s aid during Germany’s
invasion in September 1939, even though they were bound to do so under
the treaties of alliance they had signed with Poland (in 1921 and 1939,
respectively). Also, since the very inception of the ESDP, many in Warsaw
held the view that Western European states would not be inclined to
incur significant expenses in order to build a defense force independent of
NATO and that, in effect, the entire concept of a European Security and
Defence Policy would remain a dead letter in the military sense, and in
the political sense would only serve to limit American influence. Warsaw,
however, strove to avert a transatlantic rift on the issue, acting on the
assumption that, should Poland have to face armed aggression (although
this was seen as improbable), Poland could only count on American

forces for any immediate and tangible action.91 Thus the United States’
approach with regard to the ESDP was an important factor for Poland.
In 2000, Jerzy M. Nowak, Director of the Security Policy Department in
the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997–2000), admitted that, as far
as the ESDP was concerned, Poland had found itself in an awkward situ-
ation. Warsaw was being pressured by Washington to adopt a very critical
stance with regard to the rather preliminary concept of the ESDP on the
one hand, but on the other Western European countries began to talk of
Poland as ‘America’s Trojan horse’ in Europe.92 During George W. Bush’s
second term, he and his administration became more accepting of the
ESDP, however. A number of US experts called for American decision
makers to support EU integration in the sphere of security and defense,
with the simultaneous maintenance of NATO as ‘a key forum and the
institution of choice for acting militarily’.93 Warsaw’s position was similar
to the American one. Poland’s engagement in building up the ESDP was
consistently seen as being complementary to NATO. While the National
Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland adopted by the government in
2007 expresses Poland’s support for, and engagement in, the develop-
ment of the European Security and Defence Policy, it refers to NATO as
being the most important organization for Poland’s security, as a pillar of
stability in Europe, and also as the main forum for transatlantic relations.
The strategy also stresses that Poland will be seeking to increase the role
of NATO as a forum for transatlantic strategic dialogue and will support
the development of permanent and institutionalized cooperation between
the EU and NATO, so as to ensure the complementariness of actions
taken by those institutions and the most effective use of the resources at
their disposal.94 In Warsaw’s view, it was not in Poland’s interest for the
European Union to evolve into Europe’s principal defense guarantor, as
the only viable guarantor is NATO.
5 THE DIMINISHING IMPORTANCE OF THE OSCE

IN POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY
After few years of the Autumn of Nations, Poland gradually lost interest
in the further development and strengthening of the CSCE/OSCE. This
institution was not equipped in hard security guarantee instruments which
were very important for Poland and it became clear relatively quickly that
86 J. ZAJA ̨C
it did not have the means to respond effectively to conflict situations that
arose in the Balkans and in the post-Soviet area after the end of the Cold
War.95 Russia’s involvement in strengthening the CSCE was also a signifi-
cant factor leading to Poland’s diminishing interest in this institution. In
the summer of 1994, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev issued a
document suggesting that the Budapest Summit planned for December
1994 ‘is called upon to give a strong impetus to strengthening its lead-
ing role in the construction of the new Europe’, and that ‘the CSCE
should aim at coordinating the activities of NATO, the European Union,
the Council of Europe, the WEU and the CIS in the sphere of enhanc-
ing stability and security, promoting peacekeeping and protecting human
and national minority rights’. Even though, in the same document, he
stressed that his proposal did not entail turning the CSCE into ‘a hier-
archical leader or commander’,96 his words gave rise to fears in Poland
that Moscow was trying to subordinate NATO and other EU institutions
to the CSCE. Such suspicions had been raised earlier, when, during the
NACC ministerial meeting in January 1994, Kozyrev had suggested that
this structure should become the CSCE’s military arm. The Russian pro-
posals met with the favor of a number of politicians in France, Switzerland,
Germany and the Netherlands. This led to a dispute among CSCE mem-
bers, some of which, led by Russia, called for the further institutionaliza-
tion of the CSCE and a considerable strengthening of its position in the
Euro-Atlantic security system, while others, among whom the strongest
voice was that of the United States, were opposed to this idea and opted
for the maintenance of the CSCE’s loose character. Many in Washington
viewed the OSCE as a clear competitor to NATO for primacy in provid-
ing for Euro-Atlantic security and many pointed to the OSCE’s alleged
history of ‘failures’ to prevent or to resolve conflicts as evidence of its
unreliability.97 Poland shared this point of view. After the December 1994
CSCE Summit in Budapest, Bronisław Geremek, Chairman of the Sejm’s
Foreign Affairs Committee stated that the inability to determine the prin-
ciples for the CSCE’s future functioning only serves to reinforce the view
that the only effective European security structure is NATO.98 Poland
declared that, in its view, the OSCE could promote democratic values and
make use of so-called ‘soft security’ instruments, but that such initiatives
should not rest upon obligations of a legal nature. And so, in March 1996,
Poland, Slovakia and Hungary submitted a proposal to work out prin-
ciples of cooperation among security organizations—the OSCE, NATO,
EU, and WEU.99 It is while holding this position that Poland entered the
so-called OSCE chairmanship troika (1997–1999). During the December

1996 OSCE Summit in Lisbon, Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski
presented the tasks that Poland intended to pursue during its future chair-
manship. These included: (1) prevention and resolution of conflicts; (2)
the consolidation and development of a new politico-military order in
Europe, including arms control in the broad sense; (3) the strengthening
of democratic institutions and the protection of human rights.100 They
were confirmed by Polish foreign minister Bronisław Geremek in early
1998, when Poland took over Chairmanship. Geremek pointed out that
‘the overall objective of the Polish Chairmanship will be to implement
norms and principles jointly agreed within the OSCE and to promote the
implementation of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and interna-
tional relations based on law, moral principles and solidarity’.101
In his Sejm exposé on March 1998, however, foreign minister Bronisław
Geremek mentioned the OSCE in sixth place among Poland’s foreign
policy priorities. In fact, Poland’s chairmanship of the OSCE needs to be
viewed in a larger political context. In 1998 two processes took place that
were unusually important for Polish foreign and security policy and which
considerably reduced the significance of the Poland’s Chairmanship: the
ratification by most NATO members of the protocol of the admission
of Poland to the North Atlantic Alliance and the beginning of Poland’s
accession negotiations with the European Union. Warsaw’s attention was
concentrated on those matters. In addition, during this period, as part of
the European security in the 21st century debate which had been going
on since the Budapest Summit of 1994, Russia called for the adoption
by the OSCE of a Charter on European Security, giving rise to fears in
Warsaw that Moscow was attempting to give the OSCE an overriding
position with regard to other security organizations in Europe. Such
anxieties were plain within the right-wing AWS-Unia Wolności coalition
government, which had taken power in Poland following the parliamen-
tary elections of September 1997. The governing parties argued that such
OSCE Chairmanship would weaken Polish aspirations for membership in
the North Atlantic Alliance, and indirectly facilitate the designs of Russian
policy aimed at weakening NATO. Thus, the OSCE was seen by Polish
decision makers as Moscow’s tool even though the activeness of the OSCE
in the post-Soviet area was not looked upon favorably by the Russian
authorities.102 Although Poland held the chairmanship of the OSCE, it did
not organize the Ministerial Council meeting, which was held in Oslo in
December 1998. The premise followed by Polish decision makers was that
88 J. ZAJA ̨C
Poland’s 1998 chairmanship was to serve Poland’s accession to NATO by

demonstrating Poland’s leadership and organizational capabilities and by
presenting an image of Poland as a valuable and desirable partner for the
Euro-Atlantic security structures.
The OSCE never resumed the place it had occupied in Poland’s security
policy at the beginning of the 1990s. After Poland’s accession to NATO, and
to the European Union a few years later, the OSCE lost in importance in
this policy and is no longer seen as an important platform for the promotion
of Poland’s interests. Polish decision makers make declarations about the
significance of the OSCE for European security but they consciously gave up
treating it as an important organization for building closer cooperation and
reinforcing security in Europe.103 This approach to the OSCE reduced the
possibilities for Poland to conduct an effective diplomacy in various forums.
It also affected Polish–Russian relations and brought out the two countries’
divergent concepts of European security. While Poland considers NATO to
be the most important security organization in Europe, and seeks to main-
tain the presence of that alliance’s most important member—the USA—in
the region, Russia continues to see this arrangement as a threat to its own
security. Since the end of the Cold War this contradiction of interests and the
tensions between Warsaw and Russia have been increasing.
6 GROWING TENSIONS BETWEEN POLAND AND RUSSIA

Poland’s accession to NATO (1999) and the European Union (2004) led
to growing tensions in Polish–Russian relations. In 1992–1993 Poland and
Russia signed a number of agreements forming a solid basis for the devel-
opment of their mutual relations, but after President Yeltsin’s official visit
to Poland in August 1993, Polish–Russian relations began to worsen. Even
if President Yeltsin agreed during this visit that ‘a decision […] by sovereign
Poland aiming at all-European integration is not contrary to the interests
of other States, including Russia’,104 a few weeks later he sent a letter to the
leaders of the USA, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, in which
he openly expressed Russia’s opposition to the idea of NATO enlargement.
Moscow’s position has remained unchanged. Russian authorities argued
not only that NATO enlargement to the east threatens Russian security,
but also made reference to Mikhail Gorbachev, who claimed that during his
December 1989 meeting with George Bush in Malta, the US president had
promised him in exchange for the USSR’s agreement for German unifica-
tion that NATO boundaries would not be expanded.
Poland wished to join NATO and saw this institution as being the most
important in Europe’s security architecture, while Moscow saw it as a relic
of the Cold War and an organization serving as the instrument of America’s
expansionist policy. This fundamental difference in Russian and Polish
interests in security matters affected mutual relations, which abounded
with negative events and in which mere incidents took on the form of
diplomatic irritants. In October 1994, a number of Russian citizens were
assaulted in Warsaw (at Warszawa-Wschodnia rail station) and the incident
led to the cancellation of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin’s
planned visit to Poland. President Boris Yeltsin did not accept the invita-
tion to attend the 50th anniversary commemoration of the liberation of
the Auschwitz concentration camp in January 1995, and President Lech
Wałęsa did not attend the 50th anniversary commemoration of the end of
the Second World War in Moscow in May of that year. Several months later,
in February 1996 the Russians requested that a corridor from Belarus to the
Kaliningrad District be built. In Poland such an idea carried negative con-
notations with demands Germany had made on Poland on the eve of the
Second World War. These tensions were compounded in December 1995
by the so-called Oleksy affair, in which the then Minister of Internal Affairs
Andrzej Milczanowski accused Prime Minister Józef Oleksy of contacts with
a Russian intelligence agent. The accusation led to Oleksy’s resignation in
January 1996. Divergent interests in security matters also affected Polish–
Russian economic relations. While an agreement was signed between the
two countries in 1995 allowing Polish ships to fish in Russian economic
waters on the Sea of Okhotsk, and two important agreements were signed in
1996 concerning the cancellation of mutual debts, and long-term supplies
of Russian gas to Poland, Moscow was not interested in the ‘Partnership
for Transformation’ program proposed in 1994 by the Polish foreign affairs
minister Andrzej Olechowski, calling for the growth of economic, social,
scientific and cultural cooperation. In effect, Polish–Russian trade grew, but
at a lesser rate than made possible by the two countries’ potential. Other
unresolved issues also affected mutual relations negatively. These included
the question of free navigation for Polish ships through the Strait of Baltiysk,
the unresolved issue of the Katyn massacres (the murder of about 22,000
Polish officers by Soviet secret police agency, the NKVD in 1940), and the
unsettled matter of Polish goods of culture stolen and carted off to the
USSR during the Second World War. Polish–Russian antagonism was also
fuelled by Poland’s favorable attitude toward the Chechen insurgents, seen
in Warsaw as freedom fighters and in Moscow as terrorists.
90 J. ZAJA ̨C
After Poland’s accession to NATO in March 1999, Polish–Russian rela-

tions worsened sharply. In September 1999 the Russian foreign ministry
issued a declaration which questioned the fact of Soviet aggression against
Poland on 17 September 1939, leading to sharp protests from the Polish
foreign ministry. The apogee of tensions in Polish–Russian relations occurred
several months later: In January 2000 Poland expelled nine Russian diplomats
as personae non gratae, in response to which Russia did the same. In June
2000 the Polish government adopted the Premises of Polish Foreign Policy with
Regard to Russia (Założenia polskiej polityki zagranicznej wobec Rosji), but
this document, though extensive, concentrated on unresolved problems and
did not contain any wider action strategy.105 The second half of 2000 saw
several unsuccessful attempts to warm up Polish–Russian relations.106 Despite
the fact that in various official documents, including the National Security
Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 2000, Poland declared that it doesn’t feel
threatened by any state, parts of the Polish establishment perceived Russia as
a potential threat. Voices warning of Russia’s possible reversion to imperial
thinking and of Russian attempts to split the West into an Atlantic ‘evil’ half
and a European ‘good’ half could be heard in the public discourse.107
A noticeable warming up in Polish-Russian relations could be felt follow-
ing the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, when Russia joined the inter-
national anti-terrorist coalition and supported the USA in Afghanistan. In
January 2002, for the first time in nine years, Poland officially hosted a Russian
President—Vladimir Putin. Two months later, the two countries established
the Polish–Russian Group for Difficult Issues, which was supposed to help
improve mutual relations by clarifying complex aspects of Polish–Russian his-
tory. The good run in Polish–Russian relations came to an end, just as it
did in American–Russian ones. Barriers to a lasting improvement in mutual
relations included differences of opinion about the resolution of the Iraq
crisis in 2003, and the second wave of NATO enlargement which affected
seven Central European countries, including the Baltic States and Slovakia,
all strongly supported by Poland. Tensions in Polish–Russian relations in this
period were also compounded by Poland’s accession to the European Union.
The requirement that Russian citizens traveling to the Kaliningrad District
be in possession of Polish transit visas also gave rise to irritations between the
two countries.108 On account of Poland’s accession to the European Union
and the necessity to adapt Polish regulations to Community law, Poland also
terminated a number of bilateral agreements with Russia.
Tensions between the two countries were also aggravated by their
differing attitude about the 2003 Revolution of Roses in Georgia and
the 2004–2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Polish politicians and

the Polish public alike strongly supported the pro-Western course of
Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia and that of Victor Yushchenko and Yulia
Timoshenko in Ukraine. Russia, however, saw those actions as being aimed
at harming its interests by including Georgia and Ukraine in the Western
sphere of influence. Many in the Polish political elite believed that Poland
was seen by Russia as an agent charged with carrying out a strategy drawn
up by Washington to weaken Russia by drawing post-Soviet states into the
Western orbit.109 Even though Poles have on many occasions declared that
their initiatives (such as Poland’s engagement in Ukraine, especially dur-
ing the time of the Orange Revolution) were not directed against Russia,
there are grounds to doubt the sincerity of those declarations.110
In September 2005, Polish fears of Russian policy increased. These
stemmed from the German–Russian agreement on the construction of
the Nord-Stream pipeline to carry natural gas from Russia to Germany
directly and bypassing Poland. This agreement caused anxiety in Warsaw
about Poland’s energy security. In April 2006, Radosław Sikorski, who
was Poland’s defense minister at the time, went as far as to compare this
agreement to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.111
Polish–Russian tensions, which have been a derivative of international
politics, have also undoubtedly been stoked by the change of government
in Warsaw following the parliamentary elections in the fall of 2005. The
left-wing SLD-PSL government was replaced by a cabinet dominated by
right-wing PiS, a proponent of a hard stance toward Russia. The PiS-led
government—initially headed by Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz—expressed
interest in deploying elements of America’s anti-missile shield on Polish
territory. The subsequent PiS cabinet—now led by Jarosław Kaczyński—
began negotiations to that effect with the Americans in 2007.112 Russia
announced that the installation of the US anti-missile shield in Poland
would lead to Russian missiles being aimed at European targets. These dif-
ferences affected Polish–Russian economic relations in November 2005,
when Russia introduced an embargo on Polish animal and vegetable prod-
ucts. Tensions in Polish–Russian relations grew. After the world finan-
cial crisis, Russia clearly moved toward an assertive policy with regard to
the West, including Poland. This was reflected in Russia’s foreign policy
concept.113 Along with the relative weakening of the West’s position in
the world, including the loss by the USA of its hegemonic position, and
the emergence of a multipolar world order, Poland’s sense of threat from
Russia began to increase.
92 J. ZAJA ̨C
NOTES
1. See more K. E. Jørgensen, ed., (1997), European Approches to Crisis
Management (The Hague-London-Boston: Kluwer Law International);
F. Attinà, D. Irrera, eds. (2010), Multilateral Security and ESDP
Operations (Farnham: Ashgate).
2. W. C. Wohlforth (Summer 1998), ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’,
International Security, 24/1, p. 9. See also: C. Krauthammer
(1990/1992), ‘The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No.
23, pp. 23–33; J. Nye (1990), Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of
American Power (New York: Basic Books); E. B. Kapstein,
M. Mastanduno, eds. (1999), Unipolar Politics. Realism and State
Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press).
3. Z. Brzeziński (2004), The Choice, Global Domination or Global
Leadership (New York: Basic Books); J. Ikenberry (2011), Liberal
Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American
World Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press);
C. Norrlof (2010), America’s Global Advantage. US Hegemony and
International Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press);
I. W. Zartman, ed. (2009), Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and
International Order (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers);
E. B. Kapstein, M. Mastanduno (2010), ‘Realism and state strategies’, in
E. B. Kapstein , M. Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics. Realism…,
pp. 1–27; L. R. Lee (2010), US Hegemony and International Legitimacy.
Norms, power and followership in the wars on Iraq (London, New York:
Routledge).
4. (July 1994), A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement (Washington DC: The White House), pp. i, iv, http://
nssarchive.us/NSSR/1996.pdf, accessed on 28 January 2015.
5. (Oct. 1998), A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington
DC: The White House).
6. (30 Apr. 1999), ‘Presidential Decision Directive PDD 68 on International
Public Information (IPI)’. See M. Halliwell, C. Morley, eds (2008),
American Thought and Culture in the 21st Century (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press), p. 104.
7. (21 Sept. 1993), Remarks of Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, ‘From Containment to Enlargement’,
(Washington D.C.: John Hopkins University, School of Advanced
International Studies).
8. For more, see S. Patrick, S. Forman, eds. (2002), Multilateralism &
U.S. Foreign Policy. Ambivalent Engagement (Boulder, London: Lynne
Rienner Publisher).
9. See the critical opinions about the unilateral nature of US policy in S. P.
Huntington (Mar.-Apr. 1999), ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 35–49. In this article, Huntington argues
that ‘international politics in the nineties is a strange hybrid, a uni-mul-
tipolar system with one superpower and several major powers’ (p. 36).
See also G. Wills (Mar.-Apr. 1999), ‘Bully of the Free World’, Ibid.,
pp. 50–59.
10. D. Malone, Y. F. Khong, eds. (2003), Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign
Policy: International Perspectives (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner
Publisher).
11. (2002), National Security Strategy (Washington D.C.: The White
House), p. 15.
12. For more see I. H. Daalder, J. M. Lindsay (2003), America Unbound.
The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press); M. Buckley, R. Singh, eds. (2006), The Bush Doctrine
and the War on Terrorism. Global Response, Global Consequences (London,
New York: Routledge); R. Suskind (2006), The One Percent Doctrine:
Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York:
Simon & Schuster).
13. G. Lindstrom, ed. (2003), Shift or Rift. Assessing US–EU Relations after
Iraq (Paris: Institute for Security Studies); D. P. Houghton (2009),
‘Bush and Europe’ in A. Wroe, J. Herbert, Assessing the George W. Bush
Presidency. A Tale of Two Terms (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press), pp. 115–128; E. Jones (July 2004), ‘Debating the Transatlantic
Relationship: Rhetoric and Reality’, International Affairs, Vol. 80, No.
4, pp. 595–612; B. Huldt (2005), ‘The Iraq War and the transatlantic
relationship’, in J. Hallenberg, H. Karlsson, eds., The Iraq War: European
perspectives on politics, strategy and operations (London, New York:
Routledge), pp. 38–60.
14. See more H. Nau (2008), “Iraq and Previous Transatlantic Crisis:
Divided by Threat, Not Institutions or Values” in J. Anderson, G. J.
Ikenberry, T. Risse, eds. The End of the West?: Crisis and Change in the
Atlantic Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) pp. 82–110.
15. A. E. Stent (2014), The Limits of Partnership. U.S.-Russian relations in
the Twenty-First Century (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press), pp. 22–24; A. Bryc (2008), Rosja w XXI wieku. Gracz światowy
czy koniec gry? (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne),
pp. 134–162.
16. J. F. Matlock (2010), Superpower Illusions: How Myths and False
Ideologies Led America Astray—and How To Return To Reality (New
Heaven, London: Yale University Press), p. 171. See also S.F. Cohen
94 J. ZAJA ̨C
(2001), Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist

Russia (New York, London: W.W. Norton Company).
17. For more see S. Blank, A. Cohen, P. J. Dobriansky, M. Gage, R. O.
Freedman, S. Sestanovich, A. Stent (Apr. 6, 1998), ‘The State of Russian
Foreign Policy and U.S. Policy toward Russia’, Heritage Lectures
(Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation), No. 607.
18. On the subject of great power rivalry, including the USA and Russia, in
the post-Soviet area, see A. Włodkowska-Bagan (2013), Rywalizacja
mocarstw na obszarze poradzieckim (Warsaw: Difin), A. Bryc (2005),
‘Polityka [USA] wobec Rosji i innych państw poradzieckich’, in J. Zaja ̨c,
Polityka zagraniczna USA po zimnej wojnie (Toruń: Wydawnictwo
Adam Marszałek), pp. 67–93.
19. A. E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership…. pp. 45–46.
20. Russia, which was struggling with rising extremism on its territory, espe-
cially in the northern Caucasus, understood this threat very well and
showed far reaching readiness to collaborate with the USA in this
respect.
21. A. E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership…. pp. 49–81.
22. M. Bowker (2007), Russia, America and the Islamic World (Aldershot:
Ashgate), pp. 93–107, R. Allison (2013), Russia, the West, and Military
Intervention (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 99–119;
C. Wagnsson (2005), ‘Russia’s Choice. Preserve the status quo’, in
J. Hallenberg, H. Karlsson, eds., The Iraq War: European perspectives
on politics, strategy and operations (London, New York: Routledge),
pp. 61–76.
23. (Oct.-Dec. 1993), ‘Letter from the President of the Republic of Poland
Lech Walesa to Manfred Wörner, General Secretary of the North Atlantic
treaty Concerning Polish Membership of NATO, Warsaw, September 1,
1993’, Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de documents, No. 4, p. 10 (Warsaw:
PISM), pp. 9–12.
24. J. M. Goldgeier (1998), ‘NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of Decision’,
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 86–87. See also Idem. (1999),
Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington
DC: The Brookings Institution).
25. For more on the origins of the PfP, see C. A. Kupchan (1994), ‘Strategic
Vision’, World Policy Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 112–122.
26. (Jan. 10–11, 1994), Partnership for Peace: Invitation issued by the Heads
of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council (Brussels: NATO).
27. R. Kuźniar (2009), Poland’s Foreign Policy after 1989 (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar), p. 127.
28. (Jan.-Mar. 1994), ‘Address by the President of the Republic of Poland

Lech Wałęsa at the Official Luncheon of the Presidents of the Visegrad
Group Countries and the President of the United States of America Bill
Clinton, Prague, January 12, 1994’ Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de docu-
ments, No. 1, (Warsaw: PISM), p. 13.
29. (Jan.-Mar. 1994), ‘Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Poland Andrzej Olechowski at the Sejm of RP on the
Current International Situation and the Possible Threats to Poland,
Warsaw, January 21, 1994’, Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de documents,
No. 1, (Warsaw: PISM), p. 22.
30. (1994), ‘Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s letter to US President Bill
Clinton, 15 September 1993’, SIPRI Yearbook 1994, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), pp. 249–250. About Russian opposition towards
NATO enlargement into the Baltic States see L. Karabeshkin, D. R.
Spechler (2007), ‘EU and NATO Enlargement: Russia’s Expectations,
Responses and Options for the Future’, European Security, Vol. 16, Nos.
3–4, pp. 307–328.
31. Z. Brzeziński (January-February 1995), ‘A Plan for Europe’, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, p. 35.
32. J. Onyszkiewicz (2014), ‘Na drodze do NATO—okruchy wspomnień’,
Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, No. 29, p. 27.
33. R. D. Asmus, R. L. Kugler, F. S. Larrabee (1993), ‘Building a New
NATO’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 28–40; R. D. Asmus, R. L.
Kugler, F. S. Larrabee (1995), ‘NATO Expansion: The Next Steps’,
Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 7–33.
34. J. Onyszkiewicz (2014), ‘Na drodze do NATO…., pp. 29–30.
35. (27 May 1997), ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and
Security between NATO and the Russian Federation’, Paris, 27 May
1997 (Paris: NATO-Russia Summit).
36. About the NATO enlargement process see, for example, R. D. Asmus
(2004), Opening NATO’s Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself For a
New Era (New York: Columbia University Press).
37. (Jan.-June 1999), ‘Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Poland Bronisław Geremek at the Ceremony of Deposition of
Protocols of Accession of the Republic of Poland to the North Atlantic
Treaty, Independence, Missouri, 12 March 1999’, Zbiór Dokumentów-
Recueil de documents’, Vol. 55, No. 1–2, (Warsaw: PISM), p. 33 (32–35).
See also: J. Zaja ̨c (2014) „NATO w polskiej polityce bezpieczeństwa”,
in K. Czornik M. Lakomy, eds., Dylematy polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski
na pocza ̨tku drugiej dekady XXI wieku (Katowice: Wydawnictwo
Uniwersytetu Śla ̨skiego), pp. 191–205.
96 J. ZAJA ̨C
38. ‘See Special Message to the Senate Transmitting the North Atlantic
Treaty, 12 April, 1949’ Public Papers of President Harry S. Truman,
1943–1953, http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.
php?pid=1092&st=&st1=, accessed on 28 January 2016.
39. J. Zaja ̨c (2007), ‘Udział Polski w misjach pokojowych i stabilizacyjnych
na pocza ̨tku XXI wieku’, Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe, No. 4,
pp. 191–207.
40. See https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/polityka_bez-
pieczenstwa/operacje_nato_i_ue/operacje_nato/#oae, accessed on 28
January 2016.
41. ‘41. posiedzenie Sejmu w dniu 11 maja 2007 r. Informacja Ministra
Spraw Zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2007
r.’, p. 397, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter5.nsf/0/F46789E275E
31E43C12572D8006E1D11/$file/41_d_ksiazka.pdf, accessed on 28
January 2016.
42. http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.
php, accessed on 28 January 2016.
43. http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/pl/misje-zagraniczne/polskie-
kontyngenty- wojskowe/misja-pokojowa-w-afganistanie/pkw-
afganistan- 2007-2014/28672,pkw-afganistan-2007-2014.html ,
44. h t t p : / / w w w. n a t o . i n t / n a t o _ s t a t i c _ f l 2 0 1 4 / a s s e t s / p d f /
pdf_2015_10/20151007_2015-10-rsm-placemat.pdf, accessed on 28
January 2016.
45. O. Osica (2003), ‘In Search of a New Role: Poland in Euro-Atlantic
Relations’, in M. Zaborowski, D. H. Dunn, eds., Poland: A New Power
in Transatlantic Security (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass),
pp. 31–32.
46. In the end, the Alliance only invited Albania and Croatia, rejecting the
candidacy of Macedonia over Greek objections.
47. ‘Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council
in Bucharest on 3 April 2008’, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natol-
ive/official_texts_8443.htm), accessed on 25 January 2016.
48. J. Nowak-Jeziorański (29 Apr. 2000), ‘Pułapka z wyboru’, Polityka, No.
18, pp. 36–37.
49. D. M. Andrews (2005), ‘The United States and its Atlantic Partners’, in
D. M. Andrews, ed., The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US-European
Relations after Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 61.
50. R. Kuźniar (2012), Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar), p. 134; D. H. Dunn (2003), ‘Poland:
America’s New Model Ally’, in M. Zaborowski, D. H. Dunn, eds.,

Poland: A New Power…, pp. 61–86.
51. (2002) ‘Stosunki polsko-amerykańskie u progu XXI wieku. Fragmenty
wykładu ministra spraw zagranicznych Włodzimierza Cimoszewicza’,
Alma Mater—Miesięcznik Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, No. 42; J. Zaja ̨c
(2006), ‘El desarrollo de las relaciones polaco-americanas después de la
guerra fria’, Lamusa, No. 5, pp. 59–70.
52. See (10 Feb. 1998), ‘Gotowi wesprzeć...’, Correspondence from the
USA, Dziennik Polski.
53. B. Świetlicki (1999), ‘Polish-NATO Relations on the Eve of Admission
to the Alliance’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 1999 (Warsaw: PISM),
p. 20.
54. (31 Dec. 2003), ‘An Interview with Jan Nowak-Jeziorański’, Salon
Polityczny Trójki. For other assessments by J. Nowak-Jeziorański of
Poland’s foreign policy see, for example J. Nowak-Jeziorański (2003),
Polska z bliska (Cracow: Znak).
55. M. Stolarczyk (2005), ‘Kontrowersje wokół militarnego zaangażowania
Polski w Iraku’, Przegla ̨d Zachodni, No. 1, pp. 51–73; J. Zaja ̨c (2010),
‘Doktryna uderzenia prewencyjnego w polityce bezpieczeństwa USA’,
in J. Symonides, ed., Świat wobec nowych, zmieniaja ̨cych się wyzwań i
zagrożeń (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar), pp. 362–374.
56. J. Quatremer, N. Dubois (19 Feb. 2003), ‘Jacques Chirac jette un froid
à l’est’, Libération.
57. (Jan. 2006), ‘Bilans dotychczasowego udziału Polski w misji stabili-
zacyjnej w Iraku’, (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defense), http://
www.mon.gov.pl, accessed on 25 April 2008.
58. (8 July 2007), ‘Pożegnanie IX zmiany PKW Irak’, (Warsaw: Ministry of
National Defense), http://www.mon.gov.pl, accessed on 25 April 2008.
59. (9 June 2003), ‘Postanowienie o użyciu Polskiego Kontyngentu
Wojskowego (PKW) w składzie międzynarodowych sił stabilizacyjnych
w Republice Iraku’, Monitor Polski, No. 30, item 410. The stay of the
Polish Military Contingent was subject to a yearly decision by the Polish
president.
60. See ‘Bilans dotychczasowego udziału Polski…’
61. (6 Nov. 2005), ‘Human Rights Watch Statement on U.S. Secret
Detention Facilities in Europe’, Human Rights Watch, https://www.
hrw.org/news/2005/11/06/human-rights-watch- statement-us-
secret-detention-facilities-europe, accessed on 28 January 2016.
62. D. Marty (12 June 2006), Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-
state transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states:
Report, Doc. 10957, Strasbourg: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe—PACE; D. Marty (7 June 2007), Secret detentions and illegal
98 J. ZAJA ̨C
transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: Second

report, Strasbourg: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe—
PACE. See also: (2013), Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and
Extraordinary Rendition, Open Society Justice Initiative.
63. See European Court of Human Rights, ‘Case of Husayn (Abu Zubaydah)
v. Poland’, paragraph 444 (a), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
146047, accessed on 28 January 2016; and European Court of Human
Rights, ‘Case of Al-Nashiri v. Poland’, paragraph 442 (a), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-146044, accessed on 28 January 2016.
64. (24 July 2014), Case of Al Nashiri v. Poland (Application no. 28761/11),
Judgment, European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 24 July 2014;
Case of Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland (Application no. 7511/13),
Judgment, European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg.
65. R. Zięba (2013), Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego), p. 119.
66. J. Kiwerska (2014), ‘Kwestie bezpieczeństwa w stosunkach polsko-
amerykańskich. Trendy i perspektywy’, in S. Wojciechowski, A. Potyrała,
eds., Bezpieczeństwo Polski. Współczesne wyzwania (Warsaw: Difin), p. 68.
67. A serious governmental crisis took place in August 2007, when friction
between the three coalition parties—PiS, Samoobrona (Self-Defense)
and Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)—led to the
breakup of the coalition and to early elections.
68. (20 Aug. 2008) ‘Deklaracja w sprawie współpracy strategicznej między
Rzecza ̨pospolita ̨ Polska ̨ a Stanami Zjednoczonymi Ameryki’, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, http://www.msz.gov.pl, accessed on 28 January 2016.
69. See (2014), ‘Byliśmy cholernymi optymistami. Rozmowa Marcina
Zaborowskiego z profesorem Henrykiem Szlajferem’, Sprawy
Międzynarodowe, No. 4, p. 29.
70. R. Zięba, Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie …., p. 118.
71. Ibid., p. 124; R. Kuźniar (2006), ‘Bezpieczeństwo—po pierwsze nie
szkodzić’, Polski Przegla ̨d Dyplomatyczny, No. 5 (33), p. 11.
72. M. Kramer (Summer 2004), ‘East-Central European Strategies,
Neorealism, Nuclear Proliferation, and East-Central European
Strategies’, in E. B. Kapstein, M. Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics.
Realism…, pp. 383–463; M. Rhodes (2004), ‘Central Europe and Iraq:
Balance, Bandwagon, or Bridge?’, Orbis, Vol. 48, issue 3, pp. 423–436;
J. Zaja ̨c (2009), ‘Bandwagoning w polskiej polityce zagranicznej’,
Przegla ̨d Zachodni No. 3, pp. 168–178; R. Zięba, Polityka zagraniczna
Polski w strefie…, p. 118; R. Kuźniar (2009), Poland’s Foreign Policy
after 1989 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar), p. 330; S. Bieleń
(2014), ‘Rozważania o polskim interesie narodowym’, Stosunki
Międzynarodowe-International Relations, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 70 et seq.
73. R. Kuźniar, Poland’s Foreign Policy…, p. 324.

74. R. Kuźniar (1 Mar. 2015), ‘Ja ̨dro ciemności’, Gazeta Wyborcza. http://
wyborcza.pl/magazyn/1,142467,17205434.Jadro_ciemnosci.html,
75. ‘Byliśmy cholernymi optymistami…, p. 29.
76. (17 Aug. 2006), ‘Working with the Kaczynski Brothers—go straight to
the source’, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06WARSAW1721_a.
html, accessed on 28 January 2016.
77. For more, see S. Duke (2000), The Elusive Quest for European Security:
From EDC to CFSP (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan
Press); G. W. Rees (1998), The Western European Union at the Crossroads:
Between Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration (Boulder
CO: Westview Press).
78. (Apr.-June 1993), ‘Poland’s Foreign Policy in 1993—Sejm Exposé by
the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Warsaw, 29 April,
1993’, Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de documents, No. 2 (Warsaw: PISM),
p. 15.
79. (Jan.-June 1999), ‘Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Poland Bronisław Geremek at the Ceremony of Deposition of
Protocols of Accession of the Republic of Poland to the North Atlantic
Treaty, Independence, Missouri, 12 March 1999’, Zbiór Dokumentów-
Recueil de documents, Vol. 55, No. 1–2, p. 34.
80. (7 Dec. 1999), ‘Polska krytykuje plany obronne UE’ Rzeczpospolita,
http://archiwum.rp.pl/artykul/253978-W-imie-sojuszu-z-USA.html,
81. R. Zięba (2001), ‘European Security and Defence Identity. The Polish
Viewpoint’, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 202; (8
May 2003) ‘Is Poland America’s donkey or could it become NATO’s
horse?’, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/1768634,
82. B. Geremek (15 Dec. 1999), On European Security and Defence Identity
(EDSI), Brussels: NAC.
83. J. Borawski, T. D. Young (2001), NATO After 2000: The Future of the
Euro-Atlantic Alliance (Westport CT: Praeger), p. 38.
84. K. Donfried, P. Gallis (25 Apr. 2000), ‘European Security: The Debate
in NATO and the European Union’, CRS Congressional Report.
85. (2000), ‘Exposé by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Poland, Bronisław Geremek, to the Diet of the Republic of Poland on
the Main Lines of Polish Foreign Policy in 2000, Warsaw, May 9, 2000’,
Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de documents, No. 2 (Warsaw: PISM), p. 23.
100 J. ZAJA ̨C
86. (2000), ‘Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, przyjęta na

posiedzeniu Rady Ministrów w dniu 4 stycznia 2000 r.’ (Warsaw) point
3.2.3.
87. For more see (9 Sept. 2003) ‘Komunikat po Radzie Ministrów’, http://
www.kprm.gov.pl, accessed on 8 November 2005.
88. R. Zięba, Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie…, p. 92. See also
K. Pomorska (2011), ‘Poland: Learning to Play the Brussels Game’, in
R. Wong, Ch. Hill, eds., National and European Foreign Policies—
Towards Europeanization (London, New York: Routledge), pp. 167–187.
89. R. Zięba (2008), ‘Rozwój Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i
Obrony: implikacje dla Polski’, Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe, No.
4, pp. 218–220.
90. https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/polityka_bezpiec-
zenstwa/operacje_nato_i_ue/operacje_ue, accessed on 20 November
2015.
91. J. Nowak-Jeziorański, ‘Pułapka z wyboru’….
92. B. Klich, J. M. Nowak (June 2000), ‘Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa.
Zapis dyskusji’, Polska w Europie, No. 32 (Warsaw: Ośrodek Studiów
Międzynarodowych i Fundacja ‘Polska w Europie’), pp. 55–56.
93. See R. D. Asmus, A. J. Blinken, P. H. Gordon (Jan.-Feb. 2005),
‘Washington Should Embrace the European Union’, Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 84, No. 1, pp. 174–177.
94. (2007), Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Warsaw),
pp. 41, 41, 46.
95. For more, see V.-Y. Ghebali (1996), L’OSCE dans l’Europe post-
communiste, 1990–1996. Vers une identité paneuropéenne de sécurité,
Chapter V, Brussels: Établissement Émile Bruylant; J. Cohen (1999),
Conflict Prevention in the OSCE: An Assessment of Capacities (The
Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’).
96. A. V. Kozyrev (Aug. 1994), ‘Russia and NATO: A Partnership for a
United and Peaceful Europe’, NATO Review, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 3–6.
97. T. Hopmann (Sept. 1999), Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia.
The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington DC: United States
Institute of Peace), p. 43.
98. (18 Dec. 1994), ‘Wrota Europy. Rozmowa z prof. Bronisławem
Geremkiem, przewodnicza ̨cym Sejmowej Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych’,
Wprost; B. Geremek (2015), Rozmowy polskie 1988–2008 (Warsaw:
Bibloteka Profesora Bronisława Geremka).
99. (1 Mar. 1996), ‘The OSCE Role in Conflict Prevention, Crisis
Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation’, Non-Paper by the
Delegations of Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic, Security
Model Committee—doc. REF.PC/169/96.
100. (Oct.-Dec. 1996), ‘Statement by President of the Republic of Poland

Aleksander Kwaśniewski at the OSCE Summit, Lisbon, 3rd December
1996’, Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de documents, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Warsaw:
PISM), p. 112.
101. (1998), ‘Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Poland, OSCE Chairman-in-Office Permanent Council, Bronisław
Geremek, Vienna, January 15, 1998’, Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de
documents, No. 1, (Warsaw: PISM), p. 112.
102. J. M. Nowak (2014), Dyplomata na salonach i w politycznej kuchni
(Warsaw: Bellona), p. 312.
103. R. Zięba (2013), ‘Bezpieczeństwo w polityce zagranicznej RP rza ̨du
koalicji Platformy Obywatelskiej i Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego’,
Stosunki Międzynarodowe–International Relations, vol. 47, No. 1–2,
pp. 9–33.
104. (July-Sept. 1993), ‘Joint Polish-Russian Declaration, Warsaw, August
25, 1993’, Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de documents, No. 3 (Warsaw:
PISM), p. 63.
105. M. Menkiszak, M. A. Piotrowski (2002), ‘Polska polityka wschodnia’, in
R. Kuźniar, K. Szczepanik, eds., Polityka zagraniczna RP 1989–2002
(Warsaw: Askon, Fundacja Studiów Międzynarodowych), pp. 237–238.
106. In July 2000, Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski traveled to
Moscow. Cemeteries containing the remains of Polish officers murdered
by the Stalinist regime during the Second World War were inaugurated
in Katyn and Mednoye. A joint Polish-Russian declaration about the
development of trans-border, economic, commercial, financial, scientific
and technical cooperation was signed in December 2001. For more, see
R. Zięba (2010), Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej
wojnie (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne),
pp. 175–180.
107. For more, follow the discussion on the pages of the magazine Polska w
Europie, (Warsaw: Ośrodek Studiów Międzynarodowych i Fundacja
‘Polska w Europie’).
108. Since 2000, Russia has been seeking special facilitations in the transit of
persons to this enclave. Its proposal to establish special transport corri-
dors through Polish (and Lithuanian) territory was rejected by Warsaw
and Brussels. Warsaw proposed free visas for Russians in exchange for
the abolition of visas for Polish citizens (that is, the same conditions as
in the case of Ukraine), but Russia rejected this offer as unequal. The
two sides did not come to an understanding and on 18 September the
two countries’ deputy foreign ministers signed an agreement on the
introduction of visas for persons traveling between Poland and Russia as
of 1 October 2003.
102 J. ZAJA ̨C
109. A. Łomanowski, B. Musiałowicz (2006), ‘Kierunki rosyjskiej polityki

zagranicznej’, Bezpieczeństwo Międzynarodowe, p. 38.
110. A. Szeptycki (2011), ‘Rosja w odbiorze państw unii Europejskiej’, in
S. Bieleń, ed., Wizerunki międzynarodowe Rosji (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo
ASPRA), p. 151.
111. For example, see J. Górska (2010), Dealing with a Juggernaut: Analyzing
Poland’s Policy toward Russia, 1989-2009 (Lanham MD: Lexington
Books), p. 131.
112. Actually negotiations started in October 2006.
113. For more, see S. V. Kortunov, ed. (2010), Mirovaya politika v usloviyakh
krizisa (Moscow: Aspekt Press).
CHAPTER 4
Poland’s Security Policy in the Emerging

Multipolar World Order
In the first years after the Cold War, the world order rested on the global
hegemony of the USA. Toward the end of the 1990s, things began to
change, however. As early as 1999, Samuel Huntington noted that the
‘unipolar moment’, which arrived with the end of the Cold War and the
collapse of the Soviet Union, had passed.1 At the beginning of the 21st
century, the emerging powers were beginning to play increasingly impor-
tant international roles and were challenging America’s hegemony.2 The
influence of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) is grow-
ing rapidly. At the beginning of 21st century, the world thus entered the
period of a multipolar international order, i.e., one ‘made up of three or
more significant powers’.3
This trend entails the decline of the existing world powers’ relative
position. While the USA continues to hold that title, the influence of the
European Union and of its member states is declining visibly, due not only
to the growing importance of other world centers, but also of the EU’s
own internal problems. From Poland’s standpoint, Russia’s return to the
global game is a very important factor. Although many observers claim
that Russia is not a power on the rise but one in decline, Moscow’s policy
over the past decade has given rise to considerable unease in many Central
and Eastern European countries. Ever since President Putin’s speech given
at the Munich security conference in February 2007 and the Georgian–
Russian war in August 2008,4 fears in Warsaw that Russia might revert to

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59500-3_4
104 J. ZAJA ̨C
an imperial policy have been rising steadily and have had a clear and direct
impact on Poland’s security policy. As a consequence of the emerging mul-
tipolar international order, Poland is concentrating on NATO consolidation
and on reinforcing the Alliance’s defensive capabilities; on closer political
and military relations with the USA. It has been advocating a stronger EU
defense policy and is also reinforcing its own military capabilities. In order
to contain Russian influence in Eastern Europe and to prevent its restora-
tion in Central Europe, Poland is also taking steps to strengthen pro-West-
ern currents in some post-Soviet states, above all in Ukraine and Georgia.
1 AMERICA TURNS TO ASIA, THE EU STUMBLES,

RUSSIA RESURGES
In 2001 Goldman Sachs analysts noted the rising potential of Brazil,
Russia, India, and China (BRIC),5 and stated that ‘over the next 10 years,
the weight of the BRICs and especially China in world GDP will grow,
raising important issues about the global economic impact of fiscal and
monetary policy in the BRICs’.6 According to projections, China and
India are the countries whose demographic, economic and technological
development will be the most dynamic in the near future. Even though
both countries are struggling with a number of internal problems and
have yet to settle relations with their neighbors—something that will
affect their international position and role—the Asia and Pacific region is
undoubtedly becoming the center of the globalized world.
The rising importance of Asia and the Pacific has led to changes in
American policy, whose main focus has shifted towards this region.7 The
‘Asia pivot’ in US policy has clearly led to a decline in Washington’s inter-
est in Europe.8 While the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP), negotiations on which began in 2013, is an important element
of US–EU relations, in matters of security and defense the United States
expects greater European self-reliance. This entails a shift in Washington’s
stance with regard to the ESDP/CSDP. Fearing real competition from the
European Union, the US initially viewed the idea of European autonomy
in security and defense with considerable reservations,9 but by the end
of the first decade of the 21st century, the development of the ESDP
had gained Washington’s acceptance.10 During the Munich security con-
ference in February 2008, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated
that ‘the EU and NATO need to find ways to work together better, to
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE EMERGING MULTIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 105
share certain roles—neither excluding NATO from civilian operations nor

barring the EU from military missions. [...] There must be a “comple-
mentarity” between the EU and NATO’.11 The need for NATO–EU col-
laboration was also stressed during the NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit
in April 2009. The summit’s final declaration states that:
NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European

defense and welcomes the EU’s efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its
capacity to address common security challenges that both NATO and the
EU face today. These developments have significant implications and rel-
evance for the Alliance as a whole, which is why NATO stands ready to sup-
port and work with the EU in such mutually reinforcing efforts, recognizing
the ongoing concerns of Allies.12
This wording implied the United States had accepted the development
of the European Security and Defence Policy and confirmed America’s
changing stance with regard to the this policy. At the same time, the
attitude of France, a country that had traditionally been opposed to US
domination in Europe, was also changing. While President Jacques Chirac
(1995–2007) had made no secret of the fact that the ESDP was to lead
to the formation of a structure independent of NATO, his successor
Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012) adopted a more conciliatory stance with
respect to NATO–UE collaboration. As a result, at the NATO Summit
in Strasbourg/Kehl France announced its return to the Alliance’s military
structures, which it had left in 1966.13
As the United States has been increasingly involved in Asia, it has
also been reducing its military presence in Europe. In 1953, the USA
had approximately 450,000 troops in Europe operating across 1200
sites. During the early 1990s US troop numbers in Europe were
slashed. Between 1990 and 1993, the number of US soldiers in Europe
decreased from 213,000 to 122,000. In 2013 only 64,000 US troops
remained permanently based in Europe, and the number of sites had
been reduced by 85% from Cold War times.14 In 2009, NATO went
through a serious internal crisis as, for the first time in its history, it
faced a budget deficit.15 This generated a public discussion concerning
the Alliance’s maintenance costs and about the financial contribution
of NATO members to the organization’s budget. As Robert Gates, US
Secretary of Defense, stated during a speech given in June 2011, the
USA’s share of NATO’s military budget had grown to 75% since the end
106 J. ZAJA ̨C
of the Cold War and it would no longer be inclined to pay to such a

degree for the security of European countries and called on NATO’s
European members to increase their defense spending.16 America’s
expectations of greater self-reliance on the EU’s part in matters of secu-
rity and defense were also accompanied by serious doubts as to the EU’s
ability to take the necessary steps. Although the EU remains the world’s
largest economic power, it is emerging from the financial and economic
crisis—which began in 2008 and which was compounded by political
and social problems—with great difficulty. The crisis exposed many
drawbacks in the free-market economic model based on the Washington
consensus, and weakened the West’s main economic powers in compari-
son with the most dynamic developing countries. It also made plain the
waning of the West’s dominant role in international politics. Having to
face numerous internal problems, most EU member states have reduced
their military expenditures. In 2008–2013 decreases of over 10% in real
terms were recorded in Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,
Spain, and the United Kingdom, as well as all the countries in Central
Europe, except Poland (where spending increased by 12%). The largest
drop among major European countries in 2013 was in Spain, by 13%.17
In 2012, only in a few EU member states did military expenditures
reach 2% GDP, a level of spending NATO countries had undertaken to
meet in 2006 at the request of the United States. This group included
France (2.3%), Estonia (2.0%), the United Kingdom (2.4%) and Greece
(2.3%).18 Falling military expenditures is not the only characteristic of
the European Union in the beginning of the 21st century. Another one
is the increasing lack of solidarity among its member states. The 2003
US armed intervention in Iraq revealed serious differences between EU
member states, as did the Arab Spring and one of its consequences—the
refugee crisis.19
The decrease in military spending in EU member states is even greater
relatively speaking when compared to that of many other countries,
including those of the BRIC group, where such expenditures rose over
the past decade. This can be most clearly seen in the case of China and
Russia. In both countries, such expenditures have been rising systemati-
cally. Between 2004 and 2013 the growth rate of China’s military spend-
ing has been extremely high and rose from 63.6 to 188 billion USD
(170%), while that of Russia grew from 40.8 to 87.8 billion USD (more
than twofold).20 During the same period military spending in Brazil grew
from 24 to 38 billion USD and in India from 33 to 49 billion USD. The
largest military expenditures are, invariably, those of the USA.21 From

2004 to 2013, US military spending ranged from 553 to 720 billion
USD annually (553.4 billion USD in 2004, 640.2 billion USD in 2013).
However, US military spending as a share of the world total continues to
decline—at 37% in 2013 it was lower than at any time since the collapse
of the Soviet Union. The lowest it has been was in the mid-1990s, with
38%, where it had fallen from 41% in 1994, and after which it rose to a
peak of 46% in 2003.22 This declining trend will most probably continue
in the forthcoming years, given that the Budget Control Act, which was
signed into law in August 2011, imposed a set of spending caps which,
over the period of 2012–2022, will result in total cuts of 917 billion USD
to previously planned expenditures, of which 450 billion USD are cuts to
military spending.23 To sum up, military spending increased in all regions
and sub-regions in 2004–2013, except in Western and Central Europe,
where it fell by 7.6%.24
In the midst of the global redistribution of power, Poland’s great-
est fears have had to do with Russia’s rising international position and
Moscow’s desire to play a more important international role.25 While
Russia had sought to base its relations with the West on the principle
of equality as early as the 1990s,26 it was not able to force the mat-
ter through given its relatively weak international position at the time.
Russia’s sense that the West was ignoring its interests grew along with
the process of NATO enlargement. As Zbigniew Brzeziński pointed
out, ‘many Russians feared that the expansion of NATO would mean
that Russia would be left outside of Europe, ostracized politically, and
considered unworthy of membership in the institutional framework of
European civilization. While in 1996 the USA decided to make NATO
enlargement a central aim in US policy, the Russians had locked them-
selves into rigid opposition’.27 Increasingly, Russia began to see the
United States as abusing its leadership position in the world. It is with
ever-growing reservations that Russia viewed the US-led armed inter-
vention in former Yugoslavia (in 1994–1995 and 1999), in Afghanistan
(in 2001), and in Iraq (in 2003); violations of international law in the
name of the struggle against international terrorism; and US preference
for unilateral action in international politics. Stephen F. Cohen notes
even that ‘Moscow’s perception [is] that U.S. policy has been based on
an unrelenting, triumphalist double standard, as it has been’.28 After
Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, Russia strove to redefine the
post-Cold War model of its relations with the West and to secure for
108 J. ZAJA ̨C
itself a better international position, and especially a position of equality

with respect to the powers of the West.29 This was reflected in the speech
delivered by President Putin during the 42nd Munich security confer-
ence in February 2007. On that occasion, the Russian president called
for the building of a multipolar international order. The main thrust of
the Russian leader’s criticism concerned the disregard of Russian inter-
ests by the West, and especially by the USA.30 Seeking to alter the model
of European security in June 2008, the Kremlin presented proposals for
its reformulation. The Medvedev Plan, called thus after the then Russian
president, entailed the creation of a security area from Vancouver to
Vladivostok. Since the spring of 2009, Russia had been proposing a
European Security Treaty.31 Russia saw the plan as an opportunity to
strengthen its position and to overcome the trauma that defeat in the
Cold War had brought and which fed Russia’s anti-Western complexes.
Some Western countries, in turn, saw in it the danger that it would
enable Russia to move toward a revisionist and neo-imperial policy and
to undermine NATO and the credibility of the ESDP. Poland’s position
with respect to the Medvedev Plan tended to concord with the latter
position. The 2008 Georgian–Russian war was a reminder that the West
and Russia have two differing visions of European security.
2 POLAND’S GROWING FEAR OF RUSSIA

Russian criticism of the West’s policies gave rise in Poland to increas-
ingly strong fears of Russia’s return to an imperial policy. Admittedly,
after the formation of the PO-PSL government in Poland in the fall
of 2007, there were hopes of animating Polish–Russian relations, but
questions of security continued to be a point of discord. Russia con-
tinued to disapprove of the deployment of elements of America’s anti-
missile system in Poland (and in the Czech Republic), while Poland
strove not only to host US military infrastructure on its territory, but
strongly championed NATO membership for the two post-Soviet states
of Georgia and Ukraine, giving rise to opposition from Moscow, which
saw Warsaw’s aims as an encroachment on Russia’s sphere of influ-
ence. Poland’s sense of threat from Russia grew more intense during
the 2008 Georgian–Russian war. On 9 August 2008, the presidents of
Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia issued a common declaration
condemning the actions of the Russian armed forces and calling on
NATO to oppose the rise of imperialist and revisionist policy in the
Eastern Europe.32 In the Polish public debate there soon was outright
talk of Russia’s aggressive policy, of its imperialist concept of forcing
spheres of influence upon small and medium-size countries, and of
treating the interests of major powers in a privileged manner. As the
dispatches disclosed by WikiLeaks make clear, Radosław Sikorski, the
Polish foreign minister, ‘used to think Russia would be a danger in
10–15 years, but after the Georgia crisis, it could be as little as 10–15
months’.33 In November 2008, during a visit in Washington, Sikorski
presented an idea, known as the ‘Sikorski Doctrine’, in keeping with
which ‘any further attempt to redraw borders in Europe by force or by
subversion should be regarded by Europe as a threat to its security and
should entail a proportional response by the whole Atlantic commu-
nity’.34 Poland’s view was not shared by all European Union member
states, and this was due to their different attitudes toward Russia. As
Marc Leonard and Nicu Popescu pointed out in 2007, there were five
distinct policy approaches to Russia among old and new members of
the European Union:
“Trojan Horses” (Cyprus and Greece) who often defend Russian interests
in the EU system, and are willing to veto common EU positions; “Strategic
Partners” (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) who enjoy a “special rela-
tionship” with Russia which occasionally undermines common EU poli-
cies; “Friendly Pragmatists” (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary,
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) who maintain a close
relationship with Russia and tend to put their business interests above politi-
cal goals; “Frosty Pragmatists” (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland,
Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom) who
also focus on business interests but are less afraid than others to speak out
against Russian behavior on human rights or other issues; and “New Cold
Warriors” (Lithuania and Poland) who have an overtly hostile relationship
with Moscow and are willing to use the veto to block EU negotiations with
Russia.35
While this breakdown changed somewhat following the Georgian–Russian

war in 2008, it has remained largely unchanged in essence. Poland was
named in it (with Lithuania) as the country that most fears Russian policy
because the predominant view in Poland is that under Vladimir Putin,
Russia is aiming to undermine the unity of the West by driving wedges
between the countries of the European Union, by weakening NATO, and
by driving the USA out of Europe, so as to revert to the European tradition
110 J. ZAJA ̨C
of a ‘concert of powers’ and spheres of influence in which Russia would

play a leading role. Many in Warsaw believed that, in keeping with this
policy, Russia is directing its main efforts against the USA and its strategic
allies in Europe—the United Kingdom and a few countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, including Poland, which are seen by Russia as being part
of the ‘American camp’ within NATO. Poland, which holds the view that
European security and great-power status for Russia are mutually exclusive
and that the success of Russia’s strategy would threaten Poland’s security,
is trying at all costs to prevent such a scenario.36
Polish decision makers’ distrust of Russia had been increasing during
the first decade of the 21st century and grew more intense following
the Smolensk catastrophe. On 10 April 2010, the Polish presidential
plane on its way to Smolensk crashed on approach. The presiden-
tial couple and 94 accompanying persons—most of whom occupied
senior government or state positions and were on their way to com-
memorate the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacres—perished in
the crash. PiS—which was in opposition at the time—criticized the
PO-PSL government for excessive passivity vis-à-vis Moscow, and the
Russian investigation into the air crash, which PiS felt was conducted
in a sloppy fashion. In time, PiS began to float the idea that the catas-
trophe had been due to sabotage instigated by Russia. In the shadow
of the Smolensk catastrophe and in the wake of the investigation that
followed it and divided Poland’s political class and society, Polish dip-
lomats prepared for the December 2010 meeting of OCSE Heads of
State or Governments in Astana. One of the topics for discussion there
would be Russia’s proposal to remodel the architecture of European
security—the Medvedev Plan—adopted at the OCSE under the name
of ‘the Corfu Process’, and renamed ‘the V to V Dialogue’ in 2011.
No key importance was accorded to this event in Warsaw, however.
Fearing that Moscow was seeking to marginalize the North Atlantic
Alliance and to gain a dominant voice in European politics, Poland had
from the very beginning been opposed to the Medvedev Plan. Foreign
Minister Sikorski had this to say about it:
Step by step, there is a constant attempt to undermine the corner-

stones of European security. Now the Russian president offers a new
security architecture that should replace the existing one. If it means
a good strategic discussion with Russia, then we should grab it, but I
hope it doesn’t mean replacing the Atlantic alliance. We heard President
Medvedev say that NATO had no longer the capacity to provide security
of the European continent. [The] Russian leadership does not hide from
the fact of its preference to push America out of Europe. We in Poland
would not be in favor.37
Similar views were held in the entourage of President Lech Kaczyński.

Polish decision makers and many experts feared that acceptance
for this plan would give Russia the full and unreciprocated right to
monitor NATO’s decision-making process, and to each signatory of
the European security treaty proposed by Russia the right to decide
what constitutes a threat. This would have made it impossible for any
other country to join NATO: If, say, Ukraine or Georgia wanted to
join NATO, under the Medvedev Plan, Russia or Belarus would have
been able to declare that this constitutes a threat to their security and
thus, to block those countries’ accession to the organization.38 This was
irreconcilable with Polish raison d’état. In consequence, in December
2010, Poland was represented in Astana not by its head of state or gov-
ernment, but by foreign minister Radosław Sikorski. Poland was also
critical of the results of the OCSE meeting itself because, in Warsaw’s
opinion, it had not produced any tangible results in view of the consid-
erable expectations it had given rise to, the leading one of which was
that it provide new impulse to the ongoing discussions about the secu-
rity of the Euro-Atlantic area.39 In the end, despite the adoption of the
2010 Astana Declaration, entitled Toward a Security Community, and
announcing a new collaboration between the Euro-Atlantic on the one
hand and the Eurasian security community on the other, the summit
didn’t lead to any real breakthrough in ‘uniting all OSCE participating
States across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region’.40
Poland’s sense of threat from Russia was compounded by Moscow’s
efforts to modernize its armed forces. Military expenditures in Russia
more than doubled between 2004 and 2013. Also, in December 2013,
the press carried information about the deployment in the Kaliningrad
District of 18,000 short range Iskander missiles.41 Although the Russian
government denied that any such deployment had taken place Warsaw
took steps to further NATO consolidation, to reinforce Art. 5 of North
Atlantic Treaty, and to maintain America’s political and military presence
in Europe. Poland also began to build up its own military capabilities
intensively.
112 J. ZAJA ̨C
3 THE QUEST FOR NATO CONSOLIDATION

AND CLOSER POLISH–AMERICAN TIES
In 1992 Poland had chosen to seek membership in an alliance focused on

collective defense. In the second half of the 1990s, however, NATO was
increasingly often being engaged beyond its treaty borders in keeping with
the concept of ‘out of area’ operations. A number of non-treaty opera-
tions, including military intervention in former Yugoslavia (in 1994/1995
and 1999), followed by large scale engagement in Afghanistan in 2003
and in Libya in 2011, have transformed NATO from an organization of
a strictly defensive character into one that also served a collective secu-
rity function. Crisis management operations have weakened NATO and
hurt its international prestige. While NATO’s first such operations in the
Balkans in the 1990s proved successful, its engagement in Afghanistan has
clearly weakened the Alliance. The 2011 operation in Libya also failed to
produce the expected results.
Even though Poland has been taking part in NATO’s non-treaty opera-
tions since 1996, it continues to see the North Atlantic Treaty’s Art. 5,
which contains the casus feoderis clause, as the Alliance’s most important
function. Warsaw intensified its efforts to strengthen NATO collective
defense (art. 5) after the 2008 Georgian–Russian war, and it justified those
efforts by referring to Poland’s geostrategic location and argued that dif-
ferent means were required to provide defense guarantees to a country
lying in the western part of the continent than were necessary in the case
of countries like Poland, which are NATO border states. Opinions could
be heard according to which, in the most pessimistic case scenario—pre-
supposing NATO’s decline, the withdrawal of US forces from Europe and
Russia’s undermining of EU cohesion—Poland could be facing a tempo-
rary or even a lasting period of domination at the hands of its collaborat-
ing eastern and western neighbors (Russia and Germany), which would be
guided solely by their national interests.42 Poland’s efforts to strengthen
NATO collective defense and to maintain a balance between the Alliance’s
capabilities in this area and its engagement in operations beyond the
treaty area came to the fore on the occasion of NATO’s Lisbon Summit
in November 2010. Polish representatives there were successful in getting
NATO to adopt Art. 5 as the foundation for the organization’s new stra-
tegic concept, which set out the Alliance’s aims for the following decade.
While the adopted concept did define three main tasks for the Alliance—
collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security—it was
clear that the highest priority was given to the first. During the Lisbon
summit, Poland’s efforts to strengthen the Alliance’s collective defense
function were also accompanied by demands for the modernization, and
even the deployment, of NATO’s defense infrastructure, and for guaran-
tees that contingency planning would be updated in case a threat or crisis
should emerge in Poland’s vicinity (Warsaw obtained the first such plan in
2001). Poland also proposed that the principle of automaticity be intro-
duced to the Alliance’s response process in case of aggression, but this was
not adopted, however. The questions of financial burden sharing and that
of the future presence of American troops in Europe remained unresolved.
Even though it concentrated on strengthening NATO’s traditional
collective defense function during the 2010 Lisbon Summit, Poland also
declared that it would continue to take part in all operations unrelated to
Art. 5 that serve the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Polish
decision makers stressed, however, that such operations should be con-
ducted in a rational manner because they take up considerable funds from
the NATO budget and the defense budget of member states. In addition,
Poland supported the development of constructive relations with Russia
while, at the same time, emphasizing that this can’t take place at the cost
of the security of other states. Warsaw also took the position that other
countries lying east of Poland, including Ukraine and Georgia, should be
able to develop closer relations with NATO if they so wish, and even be
given the right to join the Alliance if they meet the criteria set forth in
the Washington Treaty.43 Poland also supported cooperation with other
security organizations and states from other regions of the world. These
points proved concordant with the position of NATO as a whole, and this
was reflected in the wording of the strategic concept adopted by NATO
on 19 November 2010.44 As it announced it would participate in ‘out of
area’ operations, Poland reduced its engagement in Afghanistan, in what
was part of a NATO-wide trend to withdraw forces from that country.
During the NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012, leaders of member
states decided that in the middle of 2013, ISAF would hand over respon-
sibility for all combat missions to the Afghan command, which would
thus gain the leading role in assuring security over the country’s entire
territory.
Given its growing sense of threat from Russia, in addition to its efforts
to strengthen NATO’s collective security function and to consolidate the
Alliance, Warsaw stepped up its efforts to bring about closer political and
military ties with the USA. One of the effects of the 2008 Georgian–Russian
114 J. ZAJA ̨C
war was to speed up the signing of the agreement on the deployment

on Polish territory of elements of the American anti-missile shield. Given
Warsaw’s stance that the security of Europe, including Poland, can only
be assured through the lasting military presence of the United States on
the European continent, Warsaw had expressed its readiness to partici-
pate in this project as early as 2005. The agreement was signed by Polish
Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski and US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice on 20 August 2008. The agreement defined the loca-
tion, the functioning and the legal status of non-nuclear bases and of anti-
ballistic missile interceptors. The supervision of the base and responsibility
for its operation as well as the related financial costs were to be shared
by the two countries. The USA was to exercise a ‘heightened degree of
access control’ and, in some cases, exclusive supervision in certain areas
within the base where the so-called Anti-Missile Defense Complex and
its auxiliary infrastructure were to be located. The base was to be built in
Redzikowo near Słupsk (Słupsk-Redzikowo). As Polish decision makers
feared that US military presence on Polish soil would expose Poland to a
greater threat from Russia, they demanded additional security guarantees
from the USA, an issue raised on many occasions by minister Sikorski.45 In
effect, a declaration on strategic cooperation was added to the agreement.
It announced the establishment of a Strategic Cooperation Consultative
Group (SCCG) composed of senior representatives from the Department
of State and Department of Defense in the USA, and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense in Poland, as well as
American assistance in the modernization of the Polish armed forces and
US commitment to provide Poland with a Patriot air and missile battery.46
Warsaw’s offer gave the USA a measure of security against a possible attack
from Iran, in exchange for a commitment to give Poland access to modern
military technology and a small American military presence in Poland in
the form of a mobile Patriot missile launcher.47 Polish politicians, experts
and commentators were mostly of the opinion that such commitments
were a reflection of closer Polish-American relations and, by the same
token, signified greater security for Poland. President Kaczyński had this
to say:
I am very far from being fascinated by America. But the USA provided
us with a protective umbrella while, at the same time, being so far from
Poland that there can be no question of overly direct dependence. The
United States is strategically interested in Poland—also for its own secu-
rity—and this strengthens our position within NATO and the European
Union. This position could be additionally reinforced through a bilateral
treaty on missile defense concluded with Washington. I wish to stress the
term “bilateral”. This is why I was opposed to pressure to make this issue a
European agreement and to include it into the system of EU partners. The
effect would have been that decisions concerning our relations with the
United States would have been taken collectively. In general, there was pres-
sure on the part of the strongest EU member states to collectivize the mem-
bership of EU states in NATO. Of course, this is not in our interest. This
exactly is one of the problems of our raison d’état with NATO, and more
precisely with EU-NATO relations. [...] Above all, there is always Russia
in the background—Germany, France, and Russia behind them. Drawing
Russia into this system is not in our interest. The Russians are looking for
a sphere of influence in this region and this is beyond the slightest doubt.
Of course, this is taking place without excessive haste, by stages, and not in
the first instance, as there are others before us in this queue—yet it is taking
place. [...] One also shouldn’t forget that there is a great potential of anti-
Americanism in Europe. I can understand this anti-Americanism to some
degree, but to understand it does not mean to accept it, and even less to
see it as something advantageous for us. I am thinking in terms of my coun-
try’s interests, and Poland with close ties with the United States is stronger
within the EU, not weaker. Our position is made the stronger by convincing
others that we enjoy America’s support within NATO.48
There was no certainty, however, that the deployment on Polish terri-

tory of elements of the American missile defense system would lead to
guarantees under international law on the part of the USA to provide
security for Poland, because the agreement of August 2008 contained no
such guarantees. Supporters of the plan argued, however, that the USA
would guarantee the security of a country in which it has military installa-
tions. There was also an opposite point of view: Deploying elements of the
American missile defense system in Poland could also end up worsening
Poland’s security, because it would disturb the strategic balance of power
in the region. For Poland as a middle power, a frontline country, such a
scenario would be highly disadvantageous, as it would expose the country
to increased threat.49 As a matter of fact seeing in such plans a threat to its
vital interests, Moscow has on many occasions expressed anxiety concern-
ing those plans, and responded to them by militarizing the Kaliningrad
District. Moreover, carrying out the US administration’s plans, which
did not involve NATO structures, would have undermined the cohesion
116 J. ZAJA ̨C
of the Alliance, and a powerful and consolidated NATO is in Poland’s

interest. From a military standpoint, deploying elements of the American
missile shield would not have contributed to reinforcing Poland’s security,
because this shield was supposed to protect the USA from possible attacks
from the Middle East (Iran), but would have entailed many negative con-
sequences of a political and military nature for Poland.50
All these deliberations proved premature, however, because the USA’s
newly elected president, Barack Obama, decided not to go ahead with the
agreement, and informed Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk of this dur-
ing a one-on-one telephone conversation held on 17 September 2009—
the 70th anniversary of the USSR’s invasion of Poland. Warsaw was greatly
disappointed by Washington’s decision—and with the date on which it
was communicated. The manner in which the decision was taken—with-
out any consultations with the interested countries, i.e., Poland and the
Czech Republic—as well as America’s reset policy with Russia gave addi-
tional causes for worry. As a result, in July 2009 intellectuals and former
policymakers from Central and Eastern European countries, including
presidents Lech Wałęsa and Aleksander Kwaśniewski, wrote an open letter
to the Obama administration, in which they pointed out that ‘Central and
Eastern Europe is at a political crossroads and there is a growing sense
of nervousness in the region’. They warned against Russian revisionism
pursuing a 19th century agenda with 21st century tactics and methods
and called upon Washington to ‘reaffirm its vocation as a European power
and make clear that it plans to stay fully engaged on the continent’ to
contribute to the ‘renaissance of NATO as the most important security
link between the United States and Europe’ since ‘it is only credible hard
security guarantee that countries of Central and Eastern Europe have’,
to commit to building an anti-missile shield protecting US allies and
not one based on Russian proposals.51 In September 2009, the Obama
Administration replaced the Bush-era missile defense program with plans
for a new program, known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach
(EPAA), based initially around existing US Patriot, THAAD, and Aegis
interceptors. In October 2009, Poland said it would participate in the
Obama Administration’s new EPAA program by hosting SM-3 missiles.
This was confirmed in an agreement signed on 3 July 2010 and stating
that the ‘ballistic missile defense site in Poland [Słupsk- Redzikowo] is
scheduled to become operational in the 2018 timeframe and constitutes
a key element of Phase 3 of the EPAA’.52 In keeping with these premises,
the interceptor missiles would not only protect Polish territory but, in
conjunction with the other elements of the EPAA system located on the
Mediterranean Sea and in Romania, would be capable of protecting all
European NATO member states from incoming missiles from the Middle
East. In exchange, the USA undertook to station Patriot anti-aircraft bat-
teries intermittently in Poland in order to additionally protect Polish ter-
ritory from all possible external missile attacks.53 The EPAA project was
adopted by NATO countries at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010,
and later confirmed at the same forum in Chicago in May 2012.54
At the same time, on 13 June 2011 Poland and the USA signed a
Memorandum of Understanding concerning enhanced cooperation
between the two countries’ air forces. Pursuant to this agreement a USAF
Aviation Detachment (USAF AV-DET) was established. In 2012, USAF
AV-DET personnel were deployed on a continuous basis on Polish ter-
ritory and this was followed by deployments of US aircraft beginning in
2013 on a rotational basis. It was decided that the four-yearly rotational
deployments to Poland would consist of F-16 or C-130 aircraft.55 The
agreement provided for the first continuous presence of a US Armed
Forces unit on Polish territory and for greater interoperability of the
Polish Air Force with the US units. The USA is also extending financial
aid to Poland for military purposes. From FY1996 to FY2013, US for-
eign military (government-to-government) sales to Poland totaled over
4.7 billion USD, and were approximately 218 million USD in FY2013.
Poland has also received American support in a framework of Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education Training
(IMET). From FY2009 to FY2013 Poland received 152 million USD
in FMF,56 and 10.5 million USD in IMET.57 These sums are relatively
high in comparison with those received by other countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, but modest when compared to the aid received by coun-
tries outside the region and which are among the USA’s closest partners.
Taking into consideration the USA’s gradual reduction of its presence in
Europe, however, Poland is increasingly seeking to build up its own mili-
tary capabilities.
4 POLAND’S GROWING DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Poland’s growing sense of threat from Russia, the stagnation in which
the European Union found itself after the onset of the financial crisis,
and the gradual withdrawal of the USA from Europe combined to make
Poland take measures to boost its military capabilities. During the Cold
118 J. ZAJA ̨C
War, almost all of Poland’s operational forces were prepared for war tasks
as part of Warsaw Pact operations. In consequence, the Polish Army was
offensive by nature. The political transformations which began in 1989 led
to systemic and institutional problems, and this made it difficult to rebuild
and modernize the Polish Armed Forces, as well as to find the appropri-
ate place for them in the new state system. The infamous 1994 ‘Drawsko
dinner’—during which a vote of confidence in defense minister Piotr
Kołodziejczyk was held by the country’s most seniors officers—became
symbolic of the difficulties encountered during the process of transforma-
tion in the military sphere. Despite such problems, the gradual transfor-
mation of Poland’s Armed Forces did take place. The army was subjected
to a permanent process of modernization and adaptation to NATO norms
and requirements. In October 1998 the government adopted a program
of integration with NATO and of modernization of the Polish Armed
Forces for the years 1998–2012, and pointed to the need to equip the
Polish Army with modern weapons. Given the country’s financial prob-
lems, however, certain aspects of the program were ultimately abandoned,
and the program was replaced by the The Programme of Restructuring
and Technical Modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland
2001–2006. In May 2001, the Sejm passed a law mandating a level of
defense expenditure of 1.95% of the previous year’s GDP, which was a
high level in terms of the European average. For many years, however,
Poland did not increase the combat potential of its armed forces, and the
most serious problem in this sphere was waste of funds (large sums spent
on the maintenance of an excessively large officer corps, and on obsolete
weapons; and the inability to make full and proper use of funds set aside
for the purchase of new equipment).58
In the face of the emerging multipolar international order, Poland
stepped up the process of building up its military capabilities. The main
goal was to shift Poland’s priorities from external engagement to tasks con-
nected with the security (defense) of the country. Following the Obama
administration’s decision to withdraw from the anti-missile shield project
as envisioned by the Bush administration, Warsaw adopted plans to build
an missile defense system as a matter of high priority. In reference to the
Obama administration’s decision, President Komorowski admitted that
Poland had made the mistake of failing to appreciate the political implica-
tions of the changing US presidential administration and that this mistake
should not be repeated.59 A few months earlier, in November 2011, while
outlining the priorities of development of the Polish armed forces for the
years 2013–2022, President Komorowski noted the necessity to build an

air defense system, including an missile defense system. In August 2012,
he announced the idea of building a Polish missile defense system that
would complement the EPAA project being implemented by NATO. In
the months that followed, the concept by which Poland was to strengthen
its military resources and capabilities was developed and became known
as the ‘Komorowski Doctrine’. Its main theses were laid out in the White
Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland, published in 2013.60
The doctrine sees Poland’s own defensive potential as the core of Poland’s
national security system. While Poland’s membership in alliances, espe-
cially NATO and the EU, is an important external pillar supporting Polish
security, the most important are the country’s own defensive capabilities.
For this reason, outlays for the armed forces need to remain stable and be
optimally spent for the strengthening, first and foremost, of capabilities
needed for the defense of the state itself or the defense of Poland’s NATO
allies. This premise is consistent with the comprehensive military equip-
ment modernization and purchasing plan adopted in December 2012 for
the period 2013–2022. The purpose of this plan is to update the arma-
ment and equipment of the Polish armed forces by replacing outdated
weapons and military gear and by modernizing combat techniques. The
sum of 91.5 billion PLN was earmarked to accomplish this task by 2022.
The largest funds were earmarked for the building of air defense, combat
support helicopters and combating threats at sea.61
In connection with the changing priorities of Poland’s security pol-
icy, the ‘Komorowski Doctrine’ provides for shifting Poland’s strategic
priorities from participation in expeditionary missions to tasks related to
defense of the country (the nation as a whole, its citizens, territory and
resources). While the ‘Komorowski Doctrine’ does not rule out participat-
ing in foreign missions, it calls for giving participation in such missions its
proper place in the hierarchy of tasks to be performed by the state and its
armed forces because Poland’s engagement in foreign missions limited the
possibilities of preparing its armed forces optimally for the performance
of their most important constitutional tasks, i.e., defending the country.
Carrying out such tasks is connected with another point of the doctrine,
one stating that Poland’s specialty within NATO and the EU should be, in
addition to territorial defense, counter-surprise capabilities that are indis-
pensable, especially in situations when consensus among allies is difficult
to reach. Poland, as a NATO and EU border state, is particularly exposed
to limited-scale threats of an unexpected and selective nature, i.e., threats
120 J. ZAJA ̨C
whose activation does not require ongoing and observable preparations

but which can, at the same time, be an effective means of blackmail and
of exerting political and strategic pressure. Such threats need not neces-
sarily be related to the intent of controlling the territory of the country
(‘aterritorial’ threats). It is for this reason that they constitute ‘consensus-
challenging’ situations, in which ‘it would be difficult to reach agree-
ment among member countries on the manner and scope of response’.62
NATO as a whole could prove unable to respond and, for this reason,
Poland should be in possession of a full range of capabilities to respond to
precisely this type of threats (mainly such capabilities as intelligence and
reconnaissance; air defense, including missile defense; and troop mobil-
ity). Transformational and organizational aspects have also important sig-
nificance in the ‘Komorowski Doctrine’ is also played by its, mainly the
continuation of the strategic consolidation processes within the frame-
work of the state’s security system, including the consistent organizational
integration of the armed forces leading to a more effective and streamlined
defense system. The last point of the doctrine has to do with enhancing
Poland’s international subjectivity through active participation in interna-
tional organizations and shaping them in keeping with Poland’s strategic
interests. In relation to NATO, it is in Poland’s interest, following the end
of the operation in Afghanistan, for the Alliance to consolidate around
the realization of its fundamental task—collective defense. Practically, this
should be reflected particularly in the continual updating of contingency
plans.63
At the same time, Polish policy was aimed at strengthening the CSDP,
because the EU is the second external pillar of Poland’s security, after
NATO. Especially important is the adoption of a viable European security
strategy as an indispensable element leading to the subjectivization of the
EU in this sphere. Transatlantic relations, including NATO–EU collabo-
ration are also a priority issue for Poland.
5 POLAND AND THE CSDP
Poland’s cautious stance with regard to the Common Security and Defence
Policy began to evolve due to the changing international order. Voices
in Washington speaking in 2008 of the need for closer collaboration
between NATO and the EU in security matters; the 2009 North Atlantic
Alliance Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl, during which NATO recognized the
importance of a stronger and more capable European defense; and the

signing of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007, all contributed to shifting
Poland’s position with regard to the CSDP.64 During a July 2009 meeting
in Chobielin,65 Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski proposed to his
French counterpart Bernard Kouchner that the operability of the CSDP be
increased. As a first step, he proposed French–Polish collaboration in the
spheres of security and defense (the Chobielin Initiative). France, which has
always been in favor of strengthening the EU’s security and defense policy,
accepted this initiative without hesitation. As a result, on 5 November 2009,
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and French President Nicolas Sarkozy
signed a declaration, in which they announced that Poland and France
would collaborate closely in developing the CSDP and NATO as two com-
plementary institutions, bilaterally in the military sphere, and in resolving
European and global security problems.66 This document was interpreted
by many observers as the announcement of Poland’s active participation in
building the EU’s security and defense policy. It was even compared to the
French–British December 1998 Saint-Malo declaration, which paved the
way towards the proclamation of the ESDP. It was thought that Poland is
changing its course in security matters from a strongly pro-American stance
to a more pro-European one. Events in succeeding months bore out such
an interpretation: Within the framework of the Weimar Triangle, in April
2010 Poland, Germany and France proposed to strengthen the CSDP; and
on 6 December 2010, the foreign and defense ministers of the three coun-
tries made detailed proposals in the matter in a letter to HR/VP Catherine
Ashton. In it, they proposed renewed progress on EU–NATO cooperation,
permanent civil-military planning and conduct capabilities and European
capability development—primary areas that impact the operational effec-
tiveness of CSDP. In response to this initiative, HR/VP issued a report on
CSDP in July 2011 to the Foreign Affairs Council. The report identifies
a broad range of CSDP issues for future discussion: military capabilities
(pooling and sharing), permanent structured cooperation, civilian capa-
bilities, civil-military synergies in capability development, improving EU
crisis management performance (civil and military planning and conduct
capacity, EU Battlegroups; and cooperation with partners (NATO, UN,
third countries).67
The strengthening of the EU’s security and defense policy also became
one of the priorities of the Polish presidency of the EU Council (1
July—31 December 2011). In this capacity, Poland made a number of
122 J. ZAJA ̨C
proposals aimed at strengthening the CSDP: (1) joint procurement and

use of defense capabilities (pooling and sharing); (2) reform of EU battle-
groups), (3) the setting up of permanent, civil-military planning and com-
mand structures at the EU level (EU Headquarters); (4) cooperation with
the EU’s eastern neighbors.
One of the key concepts was that of pooling and sharing, namely, the
search for new methods of developing and optimizing the European
Union’s military capabilities through joint procurement and use as well
as the specialization of individual EU member states in specific areas. In
November 2011, during the Polish EU presidency, the EDA Steering
Board identified a range of eleven projects in this area, including ‘helicop-
ter training program, maritime surveillance networking, European Satellite
Communication Procurement Cell (ESCPC), medical field hospitals, air-
to-air refueling, future military satellite communications, intelligence sur-
veillance reconnaissance (ISR), pilot training, European transport hub,
smart munitions, and naval logistics and training’.68 These projects were
then accepted by the Foreign Affairs Council in December 2011, with the
reservation that their implementation had to be harmonized with NATO’s
smart defense initiative.
During its presidency at the EU Council, Poland also saw it as neces-
sary to turn EU battlegroups into a more effective instrument. Although
they are considered the standard EU military instrument, these groups
have never been used in any EU operations because most EU member
states remain reluctant to become involved in military operations, espe-
cially those—like operations involving battlegroups—that are connected
with a high risk of human casualties and with the financial and political
costs that they entail. In its attempt to launch the battlegroups, the Polish
presidency, by reference to the Swedish presidency,69 made the following
proposals: to include the financing of battlegroups in the so-called com-
mon costs (the Athena mechanism) as a solution that would give some
relief to exposed states and would be an expression of European solidarity
with regard to those countries which were forced to reduce their defense
budgets due to the financial crisis. Poland also proposed to include civilian
experts in the battlegroup staff, to extend the groups’ call of duty from 6
to 12 months, and to set their standby period to 30 days in the first half of
the year and 10 days in the second. As the calls of duty would overlap, the
EU would have four battlegroups at its disposal in each half-year period if
such an approach were to be adopted. Poland’s proposals also contained
calls to create the possibility of using the battlegroups as a strategic reserve
and as a so-called Initial Entry Force, that is, a rapid response force that
would be sent to crisis areas should such a need arise. As many EU mem-
ber states were opposed to those proposals, Warsaw gave up on them in
September 2011.70
The third priority of the Polish presidency of the EU Council con-
cerning the CSDP was the strengthening of the EU’s ability to plan and
conduct operations through the creation of a permanent civilian and
military planning and command structure that would eliminate the dual
approach to civilian and military missions. While EU civilian missions have
permanent planning and command structures, in the case of military mis-
sions commands are formed ad hoc on the basis of previously submitted
national commands. The idea of introducing a headquarters-like per-
manent structure for planning and conducting civilian and military mis-
sions proved controversial, however, and was very quickly blocked by the
United Kingdom.71
Another postulate of the Polish presidency was to establish closer rela-
tions with countries of Eastern Europe. Poland proposed that the European
Security and Defence College open its training offer to representatives of
Eastern Partnership states as a practical measure of such closer relations.
Training sessions for eastern partners were supposed to help familiarize
them with the CSDP political, institutional and operational framework—
something that would serve to make future cooperation more effective.
In the end, Poland only succeeded in having the Council include in its
Conclusion of 1 December 2011 a formulation about the need to enhance
cooperation with the EU’s eastern and southern neighbors in the sphere
of security and stability.72
All proposals concerning the strengthening of the CSDP were made part
of the context of developing the practical dimension of cooperation between
the EU and NATO—something that was clearly stressed in the program of
the Polish presidency. From Warsaw’s point of view, the most advantageous
of theses was the expansion of the scope of regular political consultations
between both organizations, including at the NATO Secretary General
and EU High Representative level. At the same time, Poland promoted all
initiatives aimed at the real expansion of the cooperation framework, i.e.,
closer cooperation between the European Defence Agency (EDA), acting
on behalf of improved defense capabilities for the EU, and the NATO Allied
Command for Transformation (ACT).73 Polish decision makers also began
to speak of the necessity to review the 2003 European Security Strategy, as
scholarly and expert milieus had been doing for several years.74
124 J. ZAJA ̨C
Warsaw also acted on behalf of greater CSDP effectiveness on the forum

of the Visegrad Group and the Weimar Triangle. In March 2013, during
the Polish presidency of the Visegrad Group (1 July 2012–30 June 2013),
members of the Group along with Germany and France adopted a joint
statement on cooperation in developing capabilities, solidarity in sharing
responsibly, declaring efforts aimed at improving competitiveness of the
European defense industry, making it more capable of delivering key mili-
tary capabilities through technologically advanced projects. Steps taken on
behalf of a stronger CSDP were taken in conjunction with simultaneous
strengthening of the North Atlantic Alliance. The statement stressed that
NATO and the EU should work together to ensure that their respective
initiatives are complementary, mutually reinforcing and focused on deliv-
ering the required capabilities, while avoiding unnecessary duplications.
They underlined their determination to turn NATO’s ‘Smart Defense’
and the EU’s ‘Pooling and Sharing’ initiative into an effective and effi-
cient response to the decreasing defense spending.75 Poland’s initiation
of common initiatives with other countries of the region fitted in with
US expectations that Poland would take on the role of a regional leader
in Central Europe.76 Such initiatives also had a practical aspect, as the
Visegrad Group battlegroup under Polish command began its half-year
call of duty on 1 January 2016. In the first half of 2013, Poland com-
manded the Weimar Group battlegroup and, three years earlier (January–
June 2010) it commanded a multinational group made up of German,
Slovak, Latvian, and Lithuanian forces.
Prospects for improving the CSDP’s effectiveness did not give cause
for optimism, however. Shrinking military budgets of EU countries and
the growing disparities between their respective national interests made
for serious difficulties in working out effective mechanisms for collabora-
tion and for sharing resources in those countries’ possession. The events
of the Arab Spring once again exposed a lack of cohesion and solidarity
within the European Union.77 Being aware of the different interests of
EU member states and of their tendency to renationalize their policies,
before the EU summit of December 2013 Poland promoted the idea
of drawing up a White Book on European Security. Such a document
was supposed to bring about a rapprochement between the positions of
EU member states. It was also supposed to form a point of departure
from which to amend the European Security Strategy of 2003.78 But in
November 2013, during an EU foreign and defense ministers meeting
prior to the summit, Poland blocked the EU armaments policy project.
Warsaw was concerned that the proposed program for the consolida-
tion of Europe’s armaments industry would be detrimental to Polish
small and medium-size firms of this sector. The proposed program speci-
fied that only countries with a strong and well-established defense sector
could participate, and this would have excluded smaller countries such as
Poland and Bulgaria from the consolidation process. As Poland’s defense
minister Tomasz Siemoniak pointed out, such an arrangement would in
practice have meant that most orders for armaments would go to firms
that already enjoyed a strong market position.79 In effect, the decisions
adopted during the European Council in December 2013—(1) increas-
ing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP; (2) enhancing the
development of capabilities and (3) strengthening Europe's defense
industry—failed to be a turning point in improving the effectiveness of
the EU’s foreign and security policy.
6 SUPPORT FOR PRO-WESTERN CURRENTS

IN POST-SOVIET STATES
Since the end of the Cold War, Poland has consistently supported pro-
Western currents in the foreign policy of post-Soviet states, and especially
in that of the Baltic States, Ukraine and Georgia. One of the ways in which
Poland did so was to draw those countries toward closer collaboration
with the European Union and NATO. During its EU accession negotia-
tions (1998–2002), Warsaw had already expressed its special interest in
the development of relations between the EU and Eastern Europe. This
interest was reflected in a document entitled Eastern Policy of the European
Union in the Context of its Enlargement by the Inclusion of East-Central
European Countries—the Polish View adopted by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in July 2001. Two years later the foreign ministry expanded this
concept in the form of a non-paper entitled Polish Proposals Concerning
the Future Shape of the Enlarged EU toward the New Eastern Neighbors.
In this document, Warsaw proposed developing further the EU’s rela-
tions with its Eastern neighbors: the inclusion of Russia in the European
Economic Space in the medium term and the signing of association agree-
ments with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, provided the latter countries
underwent democratization. That document also mentioned the pos-
sibility of Ukraine’s admission to the EU in the long term.80 After its
accession to the European Union in 2004, Poland stepped up its efforts
in this area, by collaborating with countries of the Visegrad Group and
126 J. ZAJA ̨C
with the Baltic States in order to strengthen the eastern dimension of

the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). As a consequence of these
efforts, in December 2007 the European Council adopted the Polish–
Lithuanian proposal to develop the southern and eastern dimension of
the ENP not only in a bilateral context but also a multilateral one. It is,
however, in Sweden that Poland found a partner with which it jointly
proposed the Eastern Partnership initiative. Taking advantage of France’s
push for the idea of a Union for the Mediterranean, in May 2008 Poland
and Sweden proposed the formation of an Eastern Partnership directed at
post-Soviet states during a meeting of EU foreign ministers. In order to
support this initiative, in November 2008 Poland organized in Warsaw a
meeting of Visegrad Countries and Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia,
Romania and Sweden. The meeting’s participants called for the estab-
lishment by the EU of ‘new forms of cooperation with Eastern partners
and far-reaching projects aimed at deepening their relations and coopera-
tion’.81 In May 2009 the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was formally inaugu-
rated at the EU summit in Prague. The stated objectives of the program
were to advance the political association and economic integration of the
EU with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
EaP resources were allocated as follows:
The EaP funds, totaling 600 million euro made available to Eastern
Partnership countries over the period 2010-13 (85 million euro in 2010,
110 million euro in 2011, 175 million euro in 2012 and 230 million euro
in 2013), aimed to support three main areas: (1) comprehensive Institution
Building programs to assist reforms (about 175 million euro); (2) regional
development programs to address regional economic and social disparities
(about 7 million euro); (3) the implementation of the EaP, focusing on
democracy, governance and stability, economic integration and convergence
with EU policies, energy security, and contacts between people with the aim
of bringing the partners closer to the EU (about 350 million euro).82
Although the Eastern Partnership enjoyed the support of all political

forces in Poland, certain reservations were expressed. Politicians of the
Polish People’s Party (PSL) were none too pleased with the planned estab-
lishment of an EU–Ukraine free trade zone and with the prospect that
Brussels might subsidize farmers outside the EU. Politicians from Law and
Justice (PiS), Poland’s largest opposition party, thought the plan was ‘safe’
and lacking in ambition.83 They also saw it as a project meant to compete
with President Kaczyński’s plan to establish ties between the elites of a

number of post-Soviet countries and, by doing so, to make Poland’s posi-
tion stronger.84 Even some Civic Platform (PO) politicians criticized the
EaP on account of the modest sums allocated to it.85 Although minister
Sikorski claimed that the Eastern Partnership was a modern and commu-
nitarian vision of Jerzy Giedroyc’s idea,86 this is a debatable claim. While
the ‘Giedroyc–Mieroszewski’ doctrine was based on the maintenance of
the independence of Ukraine (and Belarus and Lithuania) as a buffer belt
between Poland and Russia, the aim of the Eastern Partnership was to
draw Ukraine into a relationship of close collaboration with the European
Union—a situation that reduced the possibility of that country developing
a collaboration with Russia.
Of all the post-Soviet states, relations with Ukraine and Georgia are
the most important for Poland. In the early 1990s, Poland also attempted
to establish close relations with Belarus, but those efforts proved unsuc-
cessful on account of the seizure of power in that country by Alexander
Lukashenka. The policy of Lukashenka, who has been president of Belarus
since 1994, is one of close collaboration with Russia of the sort that pre-
cludes any rapprochement with the EU and NATO. The situation in
Ukraine and Georgia looks altogether different. Poland strongly sup-
ported pro-Western forces in both countries, especially during the time
of the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003) and the Orange Revolution
in Ukraine (2004/2005). The arrival in power of the camp of Micheil
Saakashvili in Georgia and of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Timoshenko
in Ukraine did not fulfill hopes for the introduction of a democratic sys-
tem and a free market economy, however. Both countries went through
serious internal problems which meant that opportunities for Poland to
influence democratic processes there turned out to be slight. Despite this,
Poland consistently champions the idea of those two countries’ accession
to the European Union, even if the Eastern Partnership program carries
no promise for the partner countries’ membership in the EU.
Poland has also been consistently supportive of the idea of NATO
enlargement to the east. Not wishing to remain a frontline state of the
Alliance, ever since it became a member in 1999 it has called for the accep-
tance into the NATO of other countries—especially the Baltic States and
Slovakia and, after this was done in 2004, for Ukraine and Georgia. This
was particularly visible during the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest.
President Kaczyński argued that the accession of Ukraine and Georgia
128 J. ZAJA ̨C
to NATO would mean a lasting breakup of the post-Soviet geopolitical

configuration in Eastern Europe and produce a geopolitical situation that
was favorable to Poland.87 Polish proponents of including Georgia and
Ukraine in NATO ignored the fact that the accession of such states would
weaken the Alliance’s cohesion—something Poland had always striven for.
Both the process of NATO enlargement and the establishment of the
Eastern Partnership were thus seen by Moscow as anti-Russian policy.
Although Polish decision makers staunchly deny this, in his December
2008 dispatch to Washington, US ambassador in Warsaw Victor Ashe
stated:
The Eastern Partnership and other Polish policies in the region aim to coun-
ter a resurgent Russia. [...] By offering former Soviet republics the prospect
of free trade and visa-free travel to the EU, the Eastern Partnership can
spur the reforms needed for eventual EU membership and stem growing
Russian influence. [...] On the economic front, Polish officials believe a
larger Western business presence in countries like Belarus and Ukraine will
provide an alternative to Russian state-controlled companies, and EU good
governance programs can fight the corruption that facilitates Russian politi-
cal and economic influence.88
The consequence of attempts to draw Georgia closer to the West con-

tributed to antagonize that country with Russia and to the outbreak of
the Georgian–Russian war in August 2008. Attempts to establish closer
cooperation between Ukraine and the West led to a clash between pro-
Western and pro-Russian forces in Ukraine, as well as to an escalation of
the internal conflict in that country in 2013 and to a crisis in relations
between the West and Russia.
NOTES
1. S. P. Huntington (Mar.-Apr. 1999), ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, p. 39. Other scholars also saw the unipolar order
as temporary. See C. Layne (1993), ‘Unipolar Illusion. Why New Great
Powers Will Rise’, International Security, vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 5–51;
C. Krauthammer (1990/1992), ‘The Unipolar Moment’, Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 70, No. 23, pp. 23–33; Ch. A. Kupchan (Fall 1998), ‘After Pax
Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable
Multipolarity’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 40–79;
M. Mastanduno (Spring 1997), ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist
Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War’, International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 44–98.
2. A. Acharya (2014), The End of the American World Order (Cambridge,
Malden: Polity Press).
3. M. A. Smith (2012), ‘Power in the Changing Global Order. The US, Russia
and China’ (Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press), p. 53. Smith uses the term
‘international system’, not ‘international order’.
4. On Georgian-Russian War see more C. Welt (2010) , “The Thawing of a
Frozen Conflict: The Internal Security Dilemma and the 2004 Prelude to
the Russo-Georgian War”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 63–97;
E. Karagiannis (2013), “The 2008 Russian-Georgian war via the lens of
Offensive Realism”, European Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 74–93; H. B.
L. Larsen (2012), “The Russo-Georgian war and beyond: towards a
European great power concert”, European Security, Vol. 21, No. 1,
pp. 102–121.
5. The foreign ministers of those four countries met for the first time in 2006
and, in the years that followed, such meetings were headed by heads of
state. In 2011 this group was joined by the Republic of South Africa, and
the group became also known as BRICS.
6. J. O’Neill (30 Nov. 2001), ‘Building Better Global Economic BRICs’,
Global Economic Paper, No. 66, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf.
7. For more on US foreign policy in the 21st century, see D. H. Allin,
E. Jones (2012), Weary Policeman: American Power in an Age of Austerity,
(New York: Routledge); G. J. Ikenberry, T. J. Knock, A.-M. Slaughter,
T. Smith (2009), The Crisis of American Foreign Policy. Wilsonianism in the
Twenty-first Century, (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press).
8. H. Clinton (11 Oct. 2011), ‘America's Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy,
No. 189, pp. 56–63.
9. K. Archick (29 Jan. 2008), ‘NATO and the European Union’, CRS Report
for Congress, RL 32342.
10. On transatlantic cooperation in face of emerging the multipolar order see
more Ch. A. Kupchan, “The Atlantic Order in Transition: The Nature of
Change in US–European Relations” in J. Anderson, G. J. Ikenberry, and
T. Risse, eds. The End of the West?: Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008) pp. 111–126; C. Monteleone
(2009), “The End of the Euro-Atlantic Pluralistic Security Community?
The New Agenda of Transatlantic Security relations in the Global Political
System”, in N. F. Sola, M. Smith, eds., Perceptions and Policy in
Transatlantic Relations. Prospective Visions form the US and Europe (New
York: Routledge), pp. 136–161.
130 J. ZAJA ̨C
11. Munich Conference on Security Policy (Munich, Germany). As Delivered by

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Munich, Germany, Sunday, February
10, 2008. See www.defense.gov, accessed on 8 December 2013.
12. (4 Apr. 2009), Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads
of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Strasbourg/Kehl.
13. For more, see H. Védrine (14 Dec. 2012), Rapport pour le Président de la
République Française sur les conséquences du retour de la France dans le
Commandement Intégré de l’OTAN sur l’avenir de la relation transatlan-
tique et les perspectives de l’Europe de la défense. http://www.ladocumenta-
tionfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/124000607/index.shtml, accessed on
14 December 2015.
14. Quoted in L. Coffey (July 2013), ‘The Future of US Bases in Europe: A
View from America’, lecture given at the Baltic Defense College in Tartu,
Estonia. See www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/the-future-
of-us-bases-in-europe-a-view-from-america, accessed on 9 December
2013.
15. For more, see F. S. Larrabee, et al. (2012), NATO and the Challenges of
Austerity (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation).
16. The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO). As Delivered by
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Brussels, Belgium, Friday, June 10,
2011. See www.defense.gov, accessed on 9 December 2013.
17. S. Perlo-Freeman, C. Solmirano, H. Wilandh (2014), ‘Global develop-
ments in military expenditure’, SIPRI Yearbook 2014 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), pp. 175–178.
18. Ibid., p. 241.
19. For more, see J. Zaja ̨c (2015), ‘The EU in the Mediterranean: Between its
International Identity and Member States’ Interests’, European Foreign
Affairs Review, Vol. 20, Issue 1, pp. 65–82.
20. S. Perlo-Freeman, N. Ferguson, N. Kelly, C. Solmirano, H. Wilandh,
‘Military expenditure data…’, pp. 232–233.
21. Ibid., p. 231.
22. Ibid., p. 182.
23. E. Sköns, S. Perlo-Freeman (2012), ‘The United States’ military spending
and the 2011 budget crisis’, SIPRI Yearbook 2012 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), pp. 162–166.
24. S. Perlo-Freeman, C. Solmirano, H. Wilandh, ‘Global developments in
military…’, p. 175.
25. M. A. Smith (2012), Power in the Changing Global Order…, pp. 111–147.
26. As early as 1994, Russia’s foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, observed that
‘the international order in the 21st century will not be a Pax Americana or
any other version of unipolar or bipolar dominance. The United States
does not have the capability to rule alone. Russia, while in a period of tran-
sitional difficulties, retains the inherent characteristics of a great power
(technology, resources, weaponry). And other rising centers of influence
strive for a greater role in world affairs. The nature of modern international
problems calls for solutions on a multilateral basis’. A. Kozyrev (May-June
1994), ‘The Lagging Partnership’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, pp. 63.
27. Z. Brzeziński (1997), The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its
Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books), pp. 101–102.
28. (2010), “U.S.-Russian Relations in an Age of American Triumphalism. An
Interview with Stephen F. Cohen”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.
63, No. 2, p. 199.
29. D. M. Spechler (2010), “Russian Foreign Policy during the Putin’s
Presidency: the Impact of Competing Approaches”, Problems of Post-
Communism, Vol. 57, No. 5, pp. 35–50; M. Kaczmarski (Dec. 2009),
‘Russia’s Revisionist Policy towards the West’, OSW Studies, No. 33, p. 8.
30. (10 Feb. 2007) ‘Vystuplenie i diskussiya na Myunkhenskoi konferentsii po
voprosam politiki bezopasnosti’, see http://kremlin.ru/events/presi-
dent/transcripts/24034, accessed on 28 January 2016.
31. (5 June 2008) Vystupleniye na vstreche s predstavitelyami politicheskikh,
parlamentskikh i obshchestvennykh krugov Germaniy’, see http://krem-
lin.ru/events/president/transcripts/320, accessed on 28 January 2016;
and P. Grudziński, J. Pietrusiewicz (Mar. 2011), ‘Building a modern secu-
rity community in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok’, Bezpieczeństwo
Narodowe, No. 19, pp. 51–62.
32. ‘Wspólna deklaracja w sprawie sytuacji w Gruzji uzgodniona z Prezydentami
Republiki Litewskiej, Republiki Łotewskiej i Republiki Estońskiej,
Warszawa, 9 sierpnia 2008 roku’, Prezydent Lech Kaczyński. Wysta ̨pienia,
listy, wywiady. Wybór 2008 (Warsaw: Kancelaria Prezydenta RP), pp. 80–81.
33. (12 Dec. 2008) Poland: a natural U.S. Ally on Eastern Policy, see https://
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08WARSAW1409_a.html, accessed on 28
January 2016.
34. See http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/en/news/transcripts/transcript-
polish-foreign-minister-radoslaw-sikorski-talks-to-council, accessed on 28
January 2016.
35. M. Leonard, N. Popescu (Nov. 2007), A Power Audit of EU-Russia
Relations (London: European Council on Foreign Relations), p. 2.
36. G. Kuczyński (Jan.-Feb. 2009), ‘Strategia Rosji wobec Zachodu’,
Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe 9/10, pp. 155–171.
37. (28 Dec. 2015), Transcript: Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski
Talks to the Council, November 19, 2008, http://www.atlanticcouncil.
org/en/news/transcripts/transcript-polish-foreign-minister-radoslaw-
sikorski-talks-to-council, accessed on 28 January 2016.
132 J. ZAJA ̨C
38. A. D. Rotfeld (2012), ‘Myśli o Rosji... i nie tylko. Eseje i wywiady’ (Warsaw:
Świat Ksia ̨żki), pp. 23–24. See also P. Kowal (2009), ‘Dwie strefy cienia.
Próby restauracji wpływów dawnego ZSRR w Europie a relacje Rosji z UE
i NATO’, in A. Orzelska, ed. (2009), Stosunki transatlantyckie z perspe-
ktywy polskiej polityki zagranicznej (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych
PAN, Collegium Civitas), pp. 85–119.
39. The CSCE Summit in Astana, see http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_
zagraniczna/polityka_bezpieczenstwa /szczyt_obwe_w_astanie_2010;jses
sionid=924AF65D1CECD0A934A36D4EBAE69D7D.cmsap2p ,
40. (2010), OSCE, Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security
Community, p. 3, http://www.osce.org/node/74985, accessed on 28
January 2016.
41. (18 Dec. 2013), ‘Rosjanie rozmieszczaja ̨ iskandery w Kaliningradzie?
Koziej: “To broń propagandowa”’, Gazeta Wyborcza; and (20 Dec. 2013),
‘Tusk: rakiet Iskander nie ma w Kaliningradzie’, http://www.polskieradio.
p l / 5 / 3 / A r t y k u l / 1 0 0 8 2 7 0 , Tu s k - r a k i e t - I s k a n d e r- n i e - m a - w -
Kaliningradzie, accessed on 28 January 2016.
42. G. Kuczyński, ‘Strategia Rosji wobec…’, p. 171.
43. (18 Nov. 2010), ‘Sojusz z przyszłościa ̨’, a statement by President Bronisław
Komorowski, Gazeta Wyborcza.
44. (19 Nov. 2010), Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for
the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon.
45. For more, see C. Ek (15 Feb. 2008), ‘Poland’s New Government:
Background and Issues for the United States’, CRS Report for Congress,
RS22811.
46. (20 Aug. 2008) ‘Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Poland
Concerning the Deployment of Ground-Based Ballistic Missile Defense
Interceptors in the Territory of the Republic of Poland’, see http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/180542.pdf, accessed 14 February
2016; (20 Aug. 2008), ‘Text of the declaration on Strategic Cooperation
between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland’,
http://2001- 2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/aug/108661.htm ,
accessed 14 February 2016.
47. A. Z. Kamiński, H. Szlajfer (2009), ‘Kierunek atlantycki w polskiej polityce
zagranicznej a projekt Wspólnej Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i
Obrony’, in A. Orzelska, ed., Stosunki transatlantyckie..., p. 45.
48. Ł. Warzecha (2010), Lech Kaczyński. Ostatni wywiad (Warsaw: Prószyński
i S-ka), pp. 241–242.
49. (30 Aug. 2008), Polska tanim sojusznikiem USA? An interview with Prof.
Ryszard Zięba conducted by Anna Jórasz, http://www.psz.pl.
50. R. Kuźniar (2006), ‘Bezpieczeństwo—po pierwsze nie szkodzić’, Polski
Przegla ̨d Dyplomatyczny, No. 5 (33), p. 12. See also B. Górka-Winter
(2006), “System obrony przeciwrakietowej Stanów Zjednoczonych—głos
w dyskusji” Polski Przegla ̨d Dyplomatyczny, No. 5 (33), pp. 53–69.
51. (15 July 2009), ‘An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from
Central and Eastern Europe’, Gazeta Wyborcza, see http://wyborcza.
pl/1,98817,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_
from_ Central.html, accessed on 15 February 2016.
52. (3 July 2010), ‘Protocol Amending the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland’, see
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/07/143945.htm, accessed
on 15 February 2016.
53. R. Zięba (2015), ‘Implikacje stosunków polsko-amerykańskich dla polityki
zagranicznej Polski’, Przegla ̨d Politologiczny, No. 2, pp. 7–20; K. Czornik,
M. Lakomy (2014), ‘Polityczny i wojskowy wymiar stosunków polsko-
amerykańskich w pierwszej i drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku’, in K. Czornik,
M. Lakomy, M. Stolarczyk, ed., Dylematy polityki zagranicznej na pocza ̨tku
XXI wieku (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śla ̨skiego),
pp. 435–436.
54. For more on Polish–American cooperation, see S. Domaradzki (2014),
‘Stosunki polsko-amerykańskie na pocza ̨tku XXI wieku - aspekty wojskowe
i polityczne’, in K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, eds., Dylematy polityki
bezpieczeństwa Polski na pocza ̨tku drugiej dekady XXI wieku (Katowice:
Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty Międzynarodowej), pp. 137–160; R. Grodzki
(2012), ‘Polsko-amerykańska współpraca wojskowa: stan i perspektywy’,
Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego, No. 114, pp. 1–5.
55. (13 June 2011) ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of
Defense of the United States of America and the Minister of national Defense
of the Republic of Poland on Cooperation of the Air Forces of the United
States of America and the Republic of Poland, on the Territory of the Republic
of Poland’, http://archiwalny.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/2011.06.13_-_MoU_
RP-USA_sily_powietrzne_EN.pdf, accessed on 28 January 2016.
56. http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm, accessed on 28
January 2016.
57. (17 Nov. 2015), http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm
accessed on 28 January 2016. See also D. E. Mix, ‘Poland and its Relations
with the United States: In Brief’, CRS Congressional Report, R44212.
58. See B. Balcerowicz (2001), ‘Siły zbrojne w polskiej polityce bezpieczeństwa’,
in R. Kuźniar, ed., Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa 1989–2000 (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar), pp. 493–495. J. Zaja ̨c, R. Zięba (2010),
134 J. ZAJA ̨C
Budowa zintegrowanego systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski (Warsaw:

Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego).
59. (2012) ‘Prezydent nie szemrze’, Wprost, No. 32.
60. See (2013), White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland
(Warsaw: The National Security Bureau), http://en.mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/
dokumenty/rozne/2014/02/WhiteBook_NationalSecurity_PL_2013.
pdf, accessed on 28 January 2016.
61. (4 Oct. 2013) ‘Uchwała Nr 164 Rady Ministrów z dnia 17 września 2013
r. w sprawie ustanowienia programu wieloletniego >>Priorytetowe Zadania
Modernizacji Technicznej Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w
ramach programów operacyjnych<<’, Monitor Polski, item 796.
62. (2013), White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw:
National Security Bureau), p. 13.
63. ‘“Doktryna Komorowskiego”—czyli priorytety dla obrony własnego tery-
torium’, http://www.bbn.gov.pl, accessed on 28 January 2016; M. Fryc
(Apr.-June 2014), ‘“Doktryna Komorowskiego”—Próba scharaktery-
zowania. Idea, zakres, priorytety, realizacja’, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe,
No. II–2014/30, pp. 41–72.
64. In keeping with the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force on 1 December
2009, the European Security and Defence Policy was renamed the
Common Security and Defence Policy.
65. Chobielin is a Polish locality situated near Bydgoszcz, where foreign min-
ister Radosław Sikorski has a country retreat and where he sometimes
hosted foreign guests.
66. (5 Nov. 2009), ‘Deklaracja Francusko-Polskiego Szczytu w sprawie
Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony’, Paris, see https://www.msz.gov.pl/
resource/193d3e4d-22e0-4af2-b382-4d6a2c0c7ba, accessed on 28
January 2016.
67. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/press-
data/EN/foraff/123936.pdf, accessed on 28 January 2015.
68. See (24 Nov. 2011) EDA’s Pooling & Sharing, European Defence Agency.
https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/factsheet_- _pooling_
sharing_-_301111, accessed 20 February 2016.
69. During its presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2009,
Sweden proposed greater flexibility in the use of the EU’s battle groups.
The Swedish proposal consisted, among other things, in making it possible
for groups, or chosen elements thereof, to be used, with the agreement of
the states making up a given group, in typical CSDP missions.
70. J. Węc (2012), Pierwsza polska prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej.
Uwarunkowania—procesy decyzyjne—osia ̨gnięcia i niepowodzenia (Cracow:
Księgarnia Akademicka), p. 113.
71. Ibid., p. 112.
72. Ibid., p. 115.

73. (2 June 2011) Zaangażowanie Polski w realizację Wspólnej Polityki
bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE—wymiar wojskowy, Ministry of National
Defense, minutes No. 2238 from the 97th meeting of the National
Defense Committee of the Senate of the Republic of Poland.
74. For example, see R. Zięba (2010), ‘Wspólna polityka zagraniczna i
bezpieczeństwa UE—strategie i wyzwania’. Pytania o Europę. Opinie
ekspertów (Warsaw: European Commission, Representation in Poland),
pp. 146–150; S. Koziej (2011), ‘Potrzeba nowelizacji strategii
bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej’, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, No. 20,
pp. 19–40.
75. (6 Mar. 2013) ‘Cooperation in Developing Capabilities, Solidarity in
Sharing Responsibly. Joint Statement of Ministers of Defense of the Czech
Republic, the Federal republic of Germany, the French Republic, Hungary,
the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic after their meeting in
Warsaw’, www.visegradgroup.eu.
76. See Ł. Kulesa, ed. (2012), The Future of NATO’s Deterrence and Defense
Posture: Views from Central Europe (Warsaw: PISM).
77. See more J. Zaja ̨c, ed. (2014) Unia Europejska w regionie śródziemnomorskim:
między polityka ̨ wspólna ̨ a interesami państw członkowskich (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo WDiNP UW).
78. (14 Nov. 2013) ‘O prawdziwa ̨ wspólna ̨ politykę bezpieczeństwa i obrony
Polskie oczekiwania przed grudniowym szczytem UE. Tezy warszawskie’,
http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wolnytekst/5071,Tezy-arszawskie.html ,
79. (19 Nov. 2013) ‘Polska delegacja mówi NIE w Brukseli’, http://www.
polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/10418?t=Polska-delegacja-mowi-
NIE-w-Brukseli, accessed on 28 January 2016.
80. B. Wojna, M. Gniazdowski, eds. (2009), Eastern Partnership: the Opening
Report (Warsaw: PISM), pp. 42–43. See also J.Kamińska (2014), Poland
and EU Enlargement: Foreign Policy in Transformation (New York,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 146–186; M. Klatt (2011), “Poland
and its Eastern Neighbours: Foreign Policy Principles”, Journal of
Contemporary European Research, Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp. 1–16.
81. (24 Nov. 2008) Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad
Group Countries and of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania
and Sweden, Warsaw, 24 November 2008, http://www.visegradgroup.
eu/2008/joint-statement-of-the-110412-4, accessed on 28 January
2016.
82. ‘EU Relations with Eastern Partnership’, http://www.enpi-info.eu/mai-
neast.php?id_type=2&id=743, accessed on 28 January 2016.
83. B. Wojna, M. Gniazdowski, eds., Eastern Partnership…, p. 44.
136 J. ZAJA ̨C
84. For several years, there was talk in Poland about the concept of building
the Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk (Płock) oil pipeline to carry Caspian Sea oil to
Western Europe, but the idea did not come to fruition. Polish fears of
excessive dependence on Russia for energy grew in 2005 following the
signing by Germany and Russia of an agreement to build the Northern Gas
Pipeline. In 2007 President Kaczynski initiated energy summits with
Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania and Azerbaijan. A year earlier, the Polish
energy corporation PKN Orlen purchased the Lithuanian oil refinery in
Mažeikiai, a move that was part of the concept of reducing Poland’s
dependence on Russian gas. The main premise of President Kaczyński was
to bring about a situation in which Azerbaijani oil would be carried by ship
to Ukraine, and from there through Ukrainian territory to Poland, and in
which access of Russian energy corporations to the European market
would be reduced. The energy summits did not bring any tangible results,
however, while the refinery in Mažeikiai is losing money and, as the com-
pany management announced in the fall of 2015, its closure is planned.
About President Lech Kaczyński’s Eastern policy concept, see P. Kowal,
‘Wielki powrót i wschodnia idea Lecha Kaczyńskiego’, in J. Kloczkowski,
ed. (2010), Polska w grze międzynarodowej. Geopolityka i sprawy wewnętrzne
(Cracow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej), pp. 39–68.
85. B. Wojna, M. Gniazdowski, eds., Eastern Partnership…, p. 44.
86. (2014), Record of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 7 May.
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?documentId=4294F34
913E51DD7C1257CDD004B5B6F, accessed on 28 January 2016.
87. Ł. Warzecha, Lech Kaczyński…, p. 257. On NATO and Ukraine see more
T. Bukkvoll (2011), ‘Political and Military Utility of NATO for Ukraine’,
in H. Edström, J. Matlary, M. Petersson, eds., NATO: The Power of
Partnership (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 83–111.
A. Legucka (2010), Perspektywy członkostwa Gruzji i Ukrainy w NATO
(Warsaw: Akademia Obrony Narodowej).
88. (12 Dec. 2008) ‘Poland: a natural U.S. Ally on Eastern Policy’, see
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08WARSAW1409_a.html, accessed
on 28 January 2016.
CHAPTER 5
The Ukraine Crisis: Implications

for Poland’s Security
The emerging of the multipolar world order in the early 21st century
has led to a clash between the West and Russia in Ukraine. At the end of
2013 the post-Cold War process by which the West’s influence extended
to Central and Eastern Europe—and Russia’s simultaneous opposition to
it—produced in Ukraine a crisis which escalated rapidly. Politically and
culturally, Ukraine is divided almost in half, with a pro-Western orien-
tation prevailing in the western part of the country, and a pro-Russian
outlook being predominant in its eastern part.1 In the post-Cold War
period, this cleavage made for a lack of clear priorities in Ukrainian foreign
policy. While Central European countries, including the Baltic States, set
a course for the West, thus depriving Russia of influence in this region,
the course of Kyiv’s foreign policy fluctuated depending on the party in
power. The changing priorities of Ukraine’s policy and a lack of internal
stability exposed this country to the influence of external actors. The crisis
in Ukraine has undoubtedly been caused by many factors,2 but from the
neorealist perspective, which forms the dominant approach in this book, it
is seen as a clash between the West and Russia.3
Ukraine’s fate is unusually important from Poland’s point of view.
One could say that Ukraine in the orbit of Western influences strength-
ens Poland’s security, while Ukraine under the influence of Russia weak-
ens that security considerably. This viewpoint determined Poland’s policy
towards Ukraine when the Ukraine crisis began. Warsaw adopted a clearly

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59500-3_5
138 J. ZAJA ̨C
pro-Ukrainian stance and demanded of its Western allies that decisive steps
be taken in response to Russia’s policy and its violations of international
law. This led to a considerable deterioration of the already ailing Polish–
Russian relations and to a growing sense of military threat in Poland. As
a consequence, Poland took steps to increase its defense capabilities, to
strengthen NATO’s eastern flank, and to reinforce political and military
ties with the USA.
Poland’s clear shift towards a traditional understanding of security is
not reflected in the policy of its Western allies, however. While Poland
and other Central European countries focus their efforts on military secu-
rity, western European countries—which are struggling with a growing
number of challenges related to the massive influx of immigrants—are
concentrating on non-military aspects of security. This gives rise to a clear
divergence of interests between Poland and many other EU member states
and to justified fears about the future of the EU and NATO.
1 THE UKRAINE CRISIS AS A CLASH BETWEEN THE WEST

AND RUSSIA
The Ukraine crisis that broke out at the end of 2013 has multiple causes,
but in a neorealist perspective it has been brought about by the rivalry
between the West (the USA and EU) and Russia. Since Ukraine gained
its independence in 1991 it has been a geopolitical pivot in Central and
Eastern Europe. As Zbigniew Brzeziński pointed out in 1997, ‘Ukraine,
a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical
pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to trans-
form Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.
Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would
then become a predominantly Asian imperial state [...]’.4 Russia thus
sought to maintain its influence in Ukraine using a wide range of instru-
ments—diplomatic, economic, military, cultural and social.5 At the same
time, Western influence progressively extended further east and succes-
sively came to encompass many Central European countries. This process
of NATO and EU extension eastward brought about rivalry between the
West and Russia in an area that Moscow used to know as its ‘near abroad’,
and which the EU refers to as ‘common neighborhood’. The resulting
situation has made Ukraine into a political battlefield between the West
and Russia, and has seriously destabilized Russian–European relations, as
THE UKRAINE CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLAND’S SECURITY 139
Dmitri Trenin predicted it would as early as 2008.6 Despite such forecasts,

in May 2009 the EU launched the Eastern Partnership program, which
was extended to six post-Soviet states—Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The EU and Ukraine announced that
during the third summit of this institution, to be held in Vilnius on 28–29
November 2013, they would sign the Association Agreement establishing
a deeper free trade area they had already initialed in March 2012.7 This
announcement intensified anxieties in Russia, in whose opinion the West
intended to ‘encircle’ it and that the signing of the Association Agreement
between the EU and Ukraine would have negative consequences for the
Eurasian Economic Union Russia was intending to establish.8 Ukraine
was supposed to form an important element of this organization. Its par-
ticipation would have entailed tight collaboration with Russia and other
post-Soviet states, and the de facto maintenance of Russian influence in
Ukraine. Fearful of this scenario, the EU intended to prevent this by sign-
ing the Association Agreement with Ukraine in November 2013. The
West’s strategy with regard to Ukraine was not a clear and consistent one,
however. The proposed agreement did not constitute a preliminary step
toward Ukraine’s future EU membership. The EU also failed to offer
Ukraine effective financial assistance, proposing instead economic aid
through the intermediary of the IMF, a path that entailed the necessity
for Ukraine to introduce costly reforms it could ill afford. In such cir-
cumstances, the signing of the Association Agreement with Ukraine did
not go according to plan. Several days prior to the Eastern Partnership
Summit in Vilnius, the Ukrainian government suspended preparations for
signing the agreement with the EU and, instead, accepted Putin’s offer
of a loan of 15 billion USD and of cheaper gas supplies. This led thou-
sands of Ukrainian supporters of a pro-Western foreign policy course and
opponents of President Victor Yanukovych to come out on the streets.
The crowd which assembled on Independence Square demanded politi-
cal and economic reforms that would bring Ukraine closer to the West.
Several weeks of demonstrations led to the overthrow in February 2014 of
President Yanukovych, and power in Ukraine was taken over by national-
ist forces of a pro-Western orientation. Even though the change of power
in Kyiv took place in violation of Ukrainian law, both the USA and the
EU supported the new authorities without reservation. While the West
saw in those events a victory for democracy, Russia saw them as the lat-
est in a string of operations aimed at undermining Moscow’s influence
in adjacent countries by means of regime change. Apparently, Moscow
140 J. ZAJA ̨C
concluded that Yanukovych had been, to a degree at least, the victim of a

Western plot to set up a government in Kyiv that would be pro-Western.
Russia also feared that the far-right members of such a government might
terminate the agreement by which Russia was allowed to keep a naval
base in Crimea (Sebastopol), put Ukraine on a fast track toward EU and
NATO membership, and sever economic ties that are crucial for Russia’s
power and defense industries.9 The Kremlin then acted swiftly to prevent
such a scenario. Russia rapidly took control of Crimea with the assistance
of local self-defense forces, and assembled a significant military presence
in the regions bordering on Ukraine. Moscow also inspired the decision
to bring forward the date for the referendum on the status of Crimea, and
the declaration of independence by the Crimean parliament.10 Then, on
18 March 2014, two days after a Crimean referendum on the issue of the
peninsula’s future ended positively from Russia’s viewpoint, the authorities
of the Russian Federation and of Crimea signed a treaty on the accession
of the Republic of Crimea and of Sebastopol to the Russian Federation.
President Putin justified these actions as the realization of the Crimeans’
right of self-determination. In fact it was also meant to prevent NATO’s
takeover of the Sebastopol naval base, which had spoken at one time of
including Ukraine in the Alliance. Russia’s annexation of the Crimea took
place in breach of international law, however, and was sharply condemned
by the West, which called it an act of aggression. Nevertheless, no effec-
tive steps to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity were taken by either the
USA or the EU. Despite the sanctions imposed on Russia, Moscow did
not change its policy and did not return the Crimea to Ukraine. These
events revealed the limits of the West’s influence. The case of Ukraine in
2014 (the secession of Crimea and its annexation to Russia) and that of
Georgia in 2008 (the secession of Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia with
Russian support) have shown that Russia is able to stand up effectively to
the West in the post-Soviet ‘near abroad’. The 2008 Georgian–Russian
War had already caused great anxiety in Poland—a country that is tra-
ditionally mindful of the Russian threat. The Ukraine crisis only made
Poland’s fears that much greater.11
2 POLISH–UKRAINIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Since the end of the Cold War, Poland’s Eastern policy has been based on the
premise that ‘there can be no independent Poland without an independent
Ukraine’. In recognition of the fact that ‘Ukraine’s loss of independence
would have immediate consequences for Central Europe, transform-

ing Poland into the geopolitical pivot on the eastern frontier of a united
Europe’,12 the long-term goal of all post-communist Polish administrations
has been to free the entire region from Russia's neo-imperial influence and
to help establish a cordon of democratic states along its eastern frontier’.13
This concept reflects the so-called Jagiellonian idea, the interwar concept
of Prometheism, and the ‘Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine’. In fact the
Polish political opposition—from which a great number of the Third Polish
Republic later decision makers originated—had called for Ukraine’s inde-
pendence as early as the 1970s.14 For these reasons even before Ukraine’s
independence referendum was held, Warsaw began working with Kyiv
on initiatives supporting the country’s independence. In the fall of 1991,
Poland and Ukraine signed a consular convention, a number of agreements
about economic cooperation, and a protocol on consultations between the
two countries’ foreign ministries. When Ukrainians opted for indepen-
dence by referendum on 1 December 1991, Poland formally recognized
the result a few hours after its announcement, and was the first country
to do so. It was also no coincidence that Ukraine was the first post-Soviet
state with which Poland signed a treaty on friendship and cooperation.
Negotiations began in January 1992 and were conducted intensively by
Poland, which wished to sign this treaty before signing a similar document
with Russia that had been ready for signing since December 1991. One can
find a confirmation of this order of priorities in the way the official schedule
for the interstate meeting was set. Ryszard Zięba notes that:
Within just one week in May 1992, the President of Poland, Lech Wałęsa¸
paid a visit to the Vatican, received the President of Ukraine, Leonid
Kravchuk, in Warsaw, and then paid a visit to Moscow. Quite surprising
was, in particular, the date of President Kravchuk’s visit to Poland which
was rescheduled for an earlier date (17–18 May, 1992), to take place three
days before Mr. Wałęsa’s departure to Russia where he would go to sign the
treaty between the two states.15
In effect, the Polish–Ukrainian Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendly

Relations and Cooperation was signed on 18 May 1992, and a similar
Polish–Russian document four days later—on 22 May. This was a clear sig-
nal that Ukraine enjoyed a position of higher priority in Polish foreign pol-
icy than Russia. However, despite the fact that Poland described Ukraine
as a strategic partner as early as 1992, during the months that followed this
142 J. ZAJA ̨C
partnership remained in stagnation. During this period, Ukraine sought

to join the Visegrad Triangle, and Poland viewed this idea with some res-
ervation as it feared that Ukraine’s membership in this group would delay
the admission of new countries, including Poland, into the EU.16 From
1993, Ukraine had also been seeking to join the Central European Free
Trade Agreement (CEFTA), and while those efforts met with goodwill on
Poland’s part, Ukraine’s chances of success in this regard were almost nil
given Kyiv’s negligent approach to economic reforms. Warsaw and Kyiv
also had different visions of European security. Poland had been seeking
to join NATO something that didn’t meet with Ukraine’s approval, while
Poland was unfavorably disposed towards the idea of creating a Central
and Eastern European zone of security and stability, a plan proposed by
Ukraine’s President Leonid Kravchuk and presented in February 1993.
In seeking to join the North Atlantic Alliance, for over a year Poland
suspended its rapprochement with Ukraine. But Warsaw altered its policy
with regard to its Eastern neighbor relatively quickly, for several reasons:
Kyiv accepted Poland’s aspirations to NATO membership; since 1994
Polish–Byelorussian relations had been worsening and this encouraged
Poland to intensify its support of pro-Western currents in Ukraine; and
Western countries also began to show greater interest in Ukraine. While
at the beginning of the 1990s, the USA followed a ‘Russia first’ policy,
in the middle of the decade American policy makers came to describe
the American–Ukrainian relationship as a strategic partnership.17 Such a
turn of events was unusually advantageous for Poland and led it to step
up its efforts to draw Ukraine closer to the West. In 1995 Poland became
Ukraine’s advocate in its efforts to join the Council of Europe and the
Central European Initiative (CEI). In the summer of 1995 meetings of the
Consulting Committee of the Polish and Ukrainian Presidents resumed.
This body was established in May 1993 but had ceased to meet following
the elections of Leonid Kuchma in July 1994.
President Kuchma’s visit in Warsaw in June 1996 became a symbolic
expression of improved Polish–Ukrainian relations. During the visit a num-
ber of agreements between the two countries were signed and, in effect,
1996 became known as ‘the year of Ukrainian renaissance in Poland’. The
Polish–Ukrainian strategic partnership was pursued mainly at the presiden-
tial level—the Presidential Consulting Committee met as many as four times
a year. Contacts at the governmental and parliamentary level and military
cooperation grew steadily as well. In November 1997 the joint battalion
POLUKRBAT was formed and was sent to take part in the Kosovo Force
(KFOR) peace mission in Kosovo in July 2000. In the sphere of economic
cooperation an important initiative was the establishment in October 1998
of the Poland–America-Ukraine Cooperation Initiative (PAUCI), for
the purpose of assisting small firms and local governments in supporting
macroeconomic reforms leading to a market economy.18 In 1992–1997,
Polish–Ukrainian trade grew sixfold and continued to grow despite the
temporary slump caused by the Eastern markets crisis of 1998. During the
first five years following Poland’s entry into the European Union, this trade
grew fivefold, and reached the record level of 8.79 billion USD in 2008.
In 2009 this figure fell markedly, to the level of 4.57 billion USD, only to
climb back gradually to the level of 7.47 billion USD in 2011.19
The proclaimed Polish–Ukrainian strategic partnership was not
reflected at the level of intersocial relations, however. Polish–Ukrainian
relations in this field continue to be disrupted by grievances rooted in his-
tory and the difficult coexistence of the two nations. Among the historic
events that cast a shadow on their relations are the mass crimes committed
during the Second World War on the Poles living in Volhynia and Eastern
Lesser Poland by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), as a result of
which about 100,000 Poles perished, and the Polish authorities’ decision
in 1947 to forcefully resettle Ukrainians living in the south-eastern regions
of Poland to other parts of the country—the so-called Wisła (Vistula)
operation. Events from earlier historical periods also fuelled mutual ani-
mosities, dislike and distrust. As a result, in 2001, Dariusz Rosati—Polish
foreign minister in 1995–1997—commented on this situation by saying
that while talk of the Polish–Ukrainian strategic partnership has been pres-
ent for years, this partnership hadn’t led to any real ties of interdepen-
dence between the two countries or to anything giving grounds to claim
that the policies of Poland and Ukraine are based on some jointly formu-
lated vision.20 Despite some difficulties, successive governments in Warsaw
all viewed the establishment of pro-Western government in Ukraine favor-
ably. With this in mind Polish politicians and society were actively involved
in supporting the Orange Revolution 2004/2005. In face of these
events many Polish politicians—including presidents Lech Wałęsa and
Aleksander Kwaśniewski, future presidents Lech Kaczyński and Bronisław
Komorowski, and a delegation of Polish deputies headed by the Speaker
of the Sejm Józef Oleksy—traveled to Kyiv to express their support for the
demonstrators. Polish artists appeared during a special concert organized
144 J. ZAJA ̨C
in Kyiv. Special happenings were organized in Poland and Ukraine as part

of the ‘Kijów-Warszawa—Wspólna Sprawa’ (Kyiv–Warsaw—A Common
Cause) campaign. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine helped to improve
the way in which Ukrainians are viewed in Poland. Given the tragic history
of Polish–Ukrainian relations, Ukrainians were intensely disliked in Poland
and were at the bottom of the list in every study of Poles’ attitudes toward
other nations. After the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians found themselves
closer to the middle of the list of nations liked by the Poles. The percent-
age of respondents who dislike Ukrainians fell from 51% in 2003 to 34%
in 2004.21 This change turned to be permanent in character. In 2008,
34% of respondents spoke of the Ukrainians with sympathy, 31% expressed
distaste, and 27% were indifferent.22 Strong Polish support for Ukraine’s
pro-Western course was dictated by the desire to draw that country closer
to the West. It was also thought in Warsaw that if democratization and
modernization processes proved successful in Ukraine, they could touch
off similar processes in Russia by serving as a source of inspiration for
Russia’s society and its elites.23 In the opinion commonly encountered
among Polish political circles, the emergence of a democratic system in
Russia would lead to a predictable and peaceful Russian foreign policy,
with a cooperative approach.
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine did not live up to expectations,
however. The pro-Western orange camp very rapidly split into two fac-
tions and a conflict broke out between their leaders—Victor Yushchenko
and Yulia Timoshenko, while the parliamentary elections in March 2006
gave a majority to the Party of Regions headed by Victor Yanukovych.
Under the Yanukovych governments, Ukraine was marked by instability in
foreign and internal affairs alike. Instead of introducing political and eco-
nomic reforms, Ukrainian politicians were absorbed with internal strug-
gles for influence, and sent contradictory signals in foreign policy. But this
situation did not change Warsaw’s approach. Poland invariably worked
for Ukraine’s admission to the EU and to NATO. Warsaw’s policy was
based on the assumption that the admission of Ukraine to the West would
change the alter the implications of Poland’s geopolitical location; that
Poland would cease to be a NATO front state, and that Ukraine’s inclu-
sion in the EU would preclude the restoration of Russia to its former great
power position. As a matter of fact Poland supported Ukraine’s mem-
bership in both NATO and the EU despite the fact that this would also
carry negative consequences for Poland: NATO membership for Ukraine
would weaken the Alliance’s cohesion and its accession to the EU would
turn Ukraine, a major agricultural producer, into a serious competitor for

EU funds. Some observers claim that Poland’s support of Ukraine is dic-
tated by its fear of Russia and that it treats Ukrainian affairs in a manner
so vague, superficial and simplistic as if Ukraine was not a real country,
but an abstraction.24 It isn’t easy to refute such a claim. When, in January
2016, Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski—a member of foreign minister
Witold Waszczykowski’s political cabinet—was asked in parliament about
whether the Polish government, in extending another loan of 4 billion
PLN (about 1 billion EUR) to Ukraine, had checked Ukraine’s ability to
pay it back, answered on Facebook: ‘Whether they pay it back or not, it’s
a worthy investment. Containing Russia must cost.25
Poland’s security is invariably viewed through the prism of Ukrainian
independence. This was confirmed by President Andrzej Duda during his
visit in Kyiv on 15 December 2015 when he said: ‘A struggle is under
way for our and your liberty’.26 These words suited the context of the
Ukraine crisis.
3 POLAND’S ENGAGEMENT IN THE UKRAINE CRISIS

In the face of the Ukraine crisis Poland clearly took the pro-Western side.
Its involvement was two-tracked: on the one hand, various social milieus
and the Polish media supported the demonstrators in Kyiv and, in time, the
Ukrainian government which was formed in February 2014 after President
Victor Yanukovych was ousted; on the other, the Polish authorities sought
to convince the West to take decisive steps to prevent Russia from interfer-
ing in Ukraine’s internal affairs. Polish politicians established contacts with
Ukrainian opposition groups as early as November 2013, when President
Yanukovych refused to sign the association agreement with the European
Union and Kyiv’s streets filled with opponents of the president’s policies.
Poland’s two largest parties—PO, in power at the time, and PiS, the larg-
est opposition party—were concordant about the necessity to support the
anti-Yanukovych opposition. PiS politicians, including its leader Jarosław
Kaczyński, visited pro-Western protesters (the Euromaidan), and so did
PO members of the European Parliament. The two parties differed on
support methods, however. PO politicians behaved more prudently, mind-
ful that Ukrainian opposition leaders had no need for foreign politicians
to appear at their rallies too frequently and to give credence to Moscow’s
claims that the protests are inspired by the West, whereas PiS thought that
Ukrainians need tangible proof of support.27
146 J. ZAJA ̨C
In the initial stages of the crisis, the Polish government was one of the
mediators. Foreign minister Radosław Sikorski, along with his French and
German counterparts—Laurent Fabius and Frank-Walter Steinmeier—and
with the participation of a Russian representative, negotiated an agreement
on 21 February 2014 between Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych
and opposition leaders—Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Vitali Klitschko and Oleh
Tyahnybok. The agreement, however, was rejected by the Right Sector,
a right-wing radical group which sought full victory. As protesters took
control of Kyiv, President Yanukovych left the country for Russia. On the
following day, 22 February 2014, the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna
Rada) voted to oust President Viktor Yanukovych and hold early presiden-
tial elections on 25 May. Five days later, the parliament established a new
government headed by one of the opposition leaders—Arseniy Yatsenyuk.
The new government turned to Western countries for help and announced
its readiness to conclude the association agreement with the EU rapidly.
The political part of the agreement between the European Union and the
new government in Kyiv was signed on 21 March 2014, while the trade
part, called the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), was
signed on 27 June 2014. DCFTA went into effect on 1 January 2016.
From the outset, Poland supported the Yatsenyuk government. Warsaw
gave it political support, acted to speed up Ukraine’s signing of the asso-
ciation agreement with the EU, and declared it would provide financial
assistance to reform the Ukrainian state; in January 2015, Polish Prime
Minister Ewa Kopacz, declared during a visit in Kyiv that Poland would
grant Ukraine a 100 million EUR loan to help rebuild the Donbass region,
which was being devastated by civil war, and to support reforms.28 Poland
was also one of the countries favoring arming Ukraine. Polish foreign
minister Grzegorz Schetyna made an official announcement to that effect
during the Munich Security Conference in February 2015, although such
voices had been heard among Polish politicians earlier. Poland’s policy
in this regard was not consistent, however: When, in the spring of 2015,
the United Kingdom, the USA and Canada sent instructors to Ukraine
to train Ukrainian soldiers fighting against the separatists in the east of
the country, Poland decided to only train 50 Ukrainian instructors in the
Polish cities of Toruń, Zegrze and Poznań.29
From the very beginning of the crisis, however, Poland was consistent
in its sharp condemnations of Russian interference in Ukrainian affairs,
and Polish politicians played a leading role in pointing out the danger that
Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine might escalate.30 Certain Polish
politicians and experts argued that there was a threat of a direct Russian
attack on Poland and the Baltic States, and also that Putin treats Poland as
his greatest foe, because it was a leading supporter of Ukraine.31 Former
Polish deputy defense minister Romuald Szeremietiew even stated that
Russia might use a tactical nuclear weapon against Poland.32 Rare were
the voices which stated that one shouldn’t scare Polish society with visions
of a Russian attack on Poland and NATO, and few commentators drew
attention to the Poles’ Russophobia and to the fact that such an attitude is
detrimental to the country—not only in image terms.33
Being aware that its capability to affect events in Ukraine is limited, the
Polish government sought to get NATO and the EU involved in trying
to find a solution to the Ukraine crisis. As early as March 2014, President
Bronisław Komorowski called for a meeting of the North Atlantic Council
to hold urgent consultations pursuant to Art. 4 of the North Atlantic
Treaty in connection with the threat to members’ security, arguing that
Poland may feel threatened by Russia’s potential use of its armed forces
on the territory of neighboring Ukraine.34 The NATO council met and,
in a declaration issued on 2 March, ‘condemned the Russian Federation’s
military escalation in Crimea and expressed its grave concern regarding
the authorization by the Russian Parliament to use the armed forces of the
Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine’. It stated that ‘Military
action against Ukraine by forces of the Russian Federation is a breach
of international law and contravenes the principles of the NATO-Russia
Council and the Partnership for Peace’, and called upon ‘the Russian
Federation to honor its international commitments, including those set
out in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, the Treaty on Friendship and
Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine of 1997, and the legal frame-
work regulating the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, to withdraw
its forces to its bases, and to refrain from any interference elsewhere in
Ukraine’.35
When it transpired during the same period that Russian special forces
soldiers without insignia (the so-called ‘little green men’) were supporting
Crimean separatists, Poland managed, during an extraordinary meeting of
EU foreign ministers, to force through a resolution calling the Russian
intervention in Crimea an act of aggression. It also called for a review of rela-
tions with Russia and for the introduction of visa and economic sanctions.36
Warsaw sought to achieve a consensus on the latter issues, something that
was initially a difficult task, but Polish diplomats were successful in the end.
148 J. ZAJA ̨C
In July 2014, the EU decided to impose economic sanctions on trade with

Russia in chosen sectors. In September those sanctions were made more
stringent. Even though the EU decided in June 2015 to extend them for
another six months, Moscow was not inclined to alter its policy with regard
to Ukraine. Russia did not return Crimea to Ukraine and continued to sup-
port separatists in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk districts. As the Minsk
Agreements of 5 September 2014 and 12 February 2015 on the cessation
of fire in the Donbass were not implemented by the end of 2015, the EU
Council extended the sanctions in force until 31 July 2016 and then for a
further six months, until 31 January 2017.
Warsaw’s actions with regard to the Ukraine crisis were sharply criti-
cized in Moscow and placed Poland in the role of a firm supporter of
the new Kyiv government. On 4 March 2014, President Putin accused
Poland (and Lithuania) of training armed Euromaidan groups in bases
in Lithuania and Poland located near the border and in Ukraine itself.
Poland did not answer those allegations by means of a diplomatic note.
Instead the spokesman of the Polish defense ministry issued a denial on
Twitter.37 A few weeks later, Poland was excluded from the group of coun-
tries seeking a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.38 Whereas Poland was
one of the mediators, with France and Germany, who worked out the
agreement of 21 February 2014, the next agreement, concluded on 17
April 2014 in Geneva, was reached without Poland’s participation.39 In
June 2014 a mediation group in the so-called Normandy format, made
up of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine, was established and Belarus
was chosen to host two successive agreements concerning Ukraine worked
out by this group (on 5 September 2014 and 12 February 2015). Poland’s
absence from the Normandy format was criticized very sharply by the
PiS opposition in Poland. The same party also proved unable to alter the
makeup of the Normandy format when it came to power, however. When,
on 24 August 2015, President Andrzej Duda (PiS) spoke of the necessity
to include Ukraine’s neighbors and the USA in the talks conducted as part
of the Normandy format, Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko emphati-
cally rejected the idea and stated that the existing makeup was up to the
task and that there was no need to change it. Thus, despite Poland’s active
support of the new authorities in Kyiv, they were not interested in Poland
playing any important role in the resolution of the crisis.
Poland’s exclusion from the group of countries with a say in how the
Ukraine crisis is resolved weakened somewhat Warsaw’s resolve in sup-
porting Ukraine, the more so as a number of serious problems appeared
in Polish–Ukrainian relations: In February 2014 Ukraine prohibited the

import of pork from Poland, and failed to take advantage of Warsaw’s
offer to buy Polish coal in October of the same year. Decision makers
in Warsaw were quite disappointed—as Minister of the Economy Janusz
Piechociński stated in October 2014, Ukraine is interested in Polish coal,
but would like to get it free.40 Ghosts from the past also re-emerged dur-
ing the Ukraine crisis. Polish society was alarmed by the fact that the
PO-PSL government seemed not to notice the glorification by Ukrainian
authorities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and of
its armed wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which was respon-
sible for mass murders committed on Poles during the Second World War.
Admittedly, on 17 December 2014, President Petro Poroszenko, speak-
ing before the Polish Parliament, referred to the two countries’ difficult
history using the words ‘we forgive and ask for forgiveness’,41 but on 9
April 2015, a few hours after Polish President Bronisław Komorowski’s
official visit in Kyiv, Ukraine’s Parliament adopted a resolution glorifying
UPA soldiers as Ukrainian national heroes. Despite this, the government
of Ewa Kopacz (PO-PSL) sought to avoid the subject, and when SLD
leader Leszek Miller submitted a motion for a resolution condemning the
glorification of the UPA, foreign minister Grzegorz Schetyna called it a
case of political extremism and falling for the Russian narrative.42 Minister
Schetyna’s opinion indicates that Poland’s dominant political elite consis-
tently show a pro-Ukrainian attitude while ignoring instances of Ukrainian
nationalism with a distinctly anti-Polish bent.
PiS, the party which came to power in Poland in 2015, attempted to
revitalize Polish–Ukrainian relations. On 15 December 2015, President
Duda flew on an official visit to Kyiv, having adopted as his aim to
move from ‘a heretofore declarative Polish–Ukrainian strategic partner-
ship to a concrete partnership’ and to ‘establish anew the vectors of
Polish–Ukrainian cooperation’.43 The agenda of the president’s visit was
bold and comprehensive, ranging from political and security issues to
economic cooperation and the improvement of relations between the
two societies. To a large degree, these arrangements were in essence a
continuation of those which Poland and Ukraine had agreed upon dur-
ing the visit in Kyiv of Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz in January 2015.
President Duda stressed that Ukraine is an ‘important strategic part-
ner’ for Poland. He made reference to the conflict in the eastern part
of Ukraine and stated that peace arrangements should be based on the
Minsk agreements and came out in support of the policy of sanctions
150 J. ZAJA ̨C
against Russia. He also suggested that Poland, as a state, could become

a source of important support for Ukraine, given that the war in Syria is
leading Western countries to seek a new relationship with Russia. Duda
and Poroszenko agreed on the reactivation of the Polish–Ukrainian
Presidential Consulting Committee, which has been in existence since
1993, on the assumption that Polish–Ukrainian dialogue should be inci-
dental by nature, but ongoing. Duda also announced that Poland would
extend a 4 billion PLN (1 billion EUR) line of credit to Ukraine, offered
Poland’s assistance in the process of decentralizing the Ukrainian state,
and declared Poland’s readiness to share its experience in this regard.
He spoke, among other things, of visits by Ukrainian local government
authorities for consultations with Polish self-government units and of
support on the part of Polish experts. Once again, Poland offered to be
Ukraine’s ambassador in the European Union by supporting Ukrainian
efforts to establish visa-free travel within the EU. President Duda also
emphasized his own efforts to ensure that Ukraine is present during
the Warsaw NATO Summit in July 2016. The question of the Polish–
Ukrainian gas interconnector project was also discussed in the context
of the opening of the LNG terminal in Świnoujście, in order to increase
the two countries’ independence from Russian energy.44
It is difficult to say, however, if the intent to revitalize Polish-
Ukrainian relations made by the two countries’ presidents in December
2015 will produce results. History continues to cast a shadow over the
two countries’ relations. For President Duda and for PiS, the govern-
ing party in Poland, history plays a very important role in contempo-
rary politics. As Duda stressed during his Kyiv visit, Polish–Ukrainian
relations have to be based on historical truth even if this truth is pain-
ful, and more effort is required to bring the historical dialogue with
Ukraine to such a level that would be consistent with the facts and the
sensibilities of Poles and Ukrainians.45 President Poroshenko expressed
his willingness to discuss painful historical events and pointed out that
history shows that whenever Poles and Ukrainians quarrel, both sides
lose out in the process. Similar declarations were made repeatedly dur-
ing the 25 years of Polish–Ukrainian post-Cold War relations, as were
announcements of the revival of the Polish–Ukrainian strategic part-
nership. Such declarations did not produce tangible results, however,
and in the second decade of the 21st century, conditions in both coun-
tries and developments in international politics are especially ill-suited
for the realization of such declarations.
4 THE IMPACT OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS

ON POLAND’S SECURITY
4.1 Deterioration of Polish–Russian Relations

In September 2015, Russia’s ambassador in Poland Sergei Andreev stated
that Polish–Russian relations are the worst they have been since 1945,
and added that it isn’t Russia’s fault, but Poland’s choice.46 While it is
difficult to agree with the second part of his statement, the Ukraine cri-
sis has clearly harmed Polish–Russian relations, which were not great to
begin with.47 Although for the entire post-Cold War period Russia has
been viewed in Warsaw with some wariness, during the 25 years since
the political transformations began, in no Polish official document was
Russia clearly identified as a threat to Poland’s security. This changed with
the Ukraine crisis. The National Security Strategy signed by President
Komorowski on 5 November 2014 states that ‘the reassertion of Russia’s
position as a major power at the expense of its neighborhood, as well as the
escalation of its confrontational policy, an example of which is the conflict
with Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, has a negative impact
on the security in the region’. It also notices that in the neighborhood of
Poland, ‘there is a risk of regional and local conflicts which could engage
the country indirectly or directly and that Poland is not free from forms
of political pressure which uses military arguments. Threats for Poland
may, in unfavorable conditions, become non-military and military’.48 Such
a statement was based on observations that a renaissance of great power
attitudes had taken place in some countries, along with thinking in terms
of geopolitical spheres of influence.49
Poland’s staunch support of Ukraine brought negative consequences
at all levels for Polish-Russian relations. High-level political cooperation
came to a virtual standstill.50 In 2014 meetings taking place as part of the
Committee for Polish–Russian Cooperation Strategy were suspended and
the ‘2020 Program in Polish–Russian Relations’, adopted a year earlier was
not implemented.51 The Polish–Russian Group for Difficult Matters also
stopped its meetings, and its chairman from the Polish side, Adam Daniel
Rotfeld, resigned in December 2015 from a position he had held since
2008. Increasingly often diplomatic irritations took place between the two
countries. In November 2014 the Polish foreign ministry expelled several
Russian diplomats, and the Russians responded in kind.52 Representatives
of the two countries didn’t meet on the occasion of the 70th anniversary
152 J. ZAJA ̨C
of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Nazi camp in January 2015.

What’s more, gibes were exchanged on that occasion. Polish foreign
minister Grzegorz Schetyna stated that it was the Ukrainians who had
supposedly liberated Auschwitz-Birkenau, a statement that met with an
official negative reaction from the Russian foreign ministry and media,
which called it a deliberate attempt to falsify history.53 Indeed, soldiers
from the 1st Ukrainian Front had taken part in liberating the camp, but
this was a formation where Soviet soldiers of many nationalities served.
Russia also reacted negatively to President Komorowski’s proposal to
hold the ceremonies of the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second
World War in Gdańsk. In mid-October 2015, the Polish Internal Security
Agency (ABW) and the Military Gendarmerie (ŻW), detained a colonel
working at the defense ministry and a lawyer with double, Polish–Russian,
citizenship on charges of working for Russian intelligence. Several days
later, the Polish foreign ministry cancelled the accreditation to a Russian
media correspondent—Leonid Sviridov. In December 2015, Russia recip-
rocated and cancelled the accreditation of Gazeta Wyborcza correspondent
in Russia—Wacław Radziwinowicz,54 something the Polish foreign min-
istry saw as a baseless decision of a solely retaliatory nature.55 The dispute
about Polish real estate in Russia and Russian real estate in Poland also
grew sharper. In July 2014 a suit against the Polish consulate was filed
with the Court of Arbitration of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region.
In it, the state enterprise Inpredservis demanded the payment of overdue
rent and that Polish personnel leave the building of the consulate. On 3
February 2015 the court ordered the Consulate General of the Republic
of Poland to vacate the premises and to pay 1.1 million USD. The Polish
foreign ministry pointed out that, ‘according to the Vienna Convention,
a diplomatic mission may not be a party to court proceedings and, there-
fore, that Poland does not recognize the judgment of the St. Petersburg
arbitration court or any [of the] successive decisions issued by the court
in connection with this case’, and that the eviction of a diplomatic mission
would be a ‘glaring violation of international law’. The ministry further
declared that although Russia has been using its diplomatic facilities free
of charge in Warsaw for over 40 years—and for over 60 in Gdańsk—it has
still not made any equivalent premises in the Russian Federation available
to Poland.56
Serious friction between the two countries also arose in connection with
acts of vandalism perpetrated on monuments to Soviet soldiers in Poland.
The diplomatic discussion concerning monuments commemorating Red
Army soldiers in Poland began with a ‘firm protest’ issued by the Russian
foreign ministry in connection with the dismantling in September 2015 by
the authorities of the town of Pieniężno of a bust commemorating fallen
Soviet General Ivan Chernyakhovsky, seen as a persecutor of the Home
Army—the Polish underground resistance movement—during the Second
World War. In the wake of this event, other cases of dismantling monu-
ments commemorating the role of the USSR in liberating Poland from
the German occupation, and acts of vandalism took place. The chairman
of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) Łukasz Kamiński called
the removal of Chernyakhovsky’s bust worthy of emulation, and Russian
pressure on the Polish authorities inappropriate. On 18 December 2015,
the Russian State Duma issued a declaration stating that insulting and
the destruction of Soviet military memorials and burial sites in Poland
was unacceptable. The declaration also expressed ‘deep indignation’ in
connection with the profanation of those memorial sites, with ‘persistent
attempts to write history anew’, ‘belittling the contribution of the Soviet
nation’ in defeating the Third Reich, and in ‘distorting the role of the Red
Army in liberating Poland’. In response, the Polish foreign ministry called
on Russia to ‘refrain from engaging in hysteria about the monuments, as
this doesn’t favor building mutual dialogue and understanding but only
serves to sharpen rhetoric and escalate emotions having to do with his-
torical issues and the monuments in Polish–Russian relations’.57 All those
diplomatic incidents were reminiscent of the similar methods used by both
sides to antagonize the other in 2005–2007, when Poland was ruled by
PiS, but their destructive influence in Polish–Russian relations was greater.
Polish–Russian economic relations have also clearly worsened, and this
brought tangible losses to Poland. In August 2014 Russia responded to
the Western sanctions by counter-sanctions in the form of an import ban of
Polish foodstuffs and agricultural products. While Polish exports to Russia
had increased over threefold in 2004–2013 (to over 8.1 billion EUR),
in 2014 it decreased by 14% (to about 7 billion EUR). The decrease in
agricultural and food products was 30% (that is almost 0.4 billion EUR)
and in electrical machinery by about 15% (that is almost 0.5 billion EUR).
This led to Russia’s fall on the list of Poland’s most important purchas-
ers of agricultural and food products. While in 2013 Russia was 3rd on
this list, (after Germany and the United Kingdom) with a share of 6.2%,
in 2014 it had fallen to 7th place with a share of 4%. It was possible to
redirect some of the food products subject to Russia’s ban to other mar-
kets, but in some groups of products, especially fruit and vegetables, for
154 J. ZAJA ̨C
many of which Russia was the leading importer, the Russian embargo was
a painful blow to Polish producers and exporters. Of the products that
did not find alternate markets, the most important are apples. In 2014,
exports of Polish apples to Russia dropped by as much as 46%. Despite the
fact that some could be redirected, among other destinations, to Belarus,
Kazakhstan or Romania, exports of Polish apples fell by about 22% over-
all.58 Poland lost an important share of the Russian market, a return to
which will be more difficult than was the case when Russia introduced
an import on Polish animal and vegetable products in November 2005.
The drop in trade volume with Russia also entailed considerable losses for
Polish carriers and these will also be unusually difficult, if at all possible,
to undo.
The worsening of Polish–Russian relations also affected cultural coop-
eration. The Polish government withdrew from the planned organization
of the Year of Polish Culture in Russia and the Russian Year in Poland in
2015. The Ukraine crisis also deepened the negative perception of Polish–
Russian relations. A study of Polish public opinion conducted in May 2014
showed that ‘the events in Ukraine and Russian activity towards main-
taining its influence in this region strongly deteriorated the perception of
Polish–Russian relations. Almost two-thirds of Poles (65%) believed the
relations were bad, while only 3% considered them as good. Moreover,
Poles found it more difficult than in 2011 to imagine friendly relations
based on partnership between both states. Less than half of respondents
(46%) thought that they were possible.59
4.2 Strengthening Polish Defense Capabilities

The Ukraine crisis strengthened Poland’s resolve to boost its national
defense capabilities—a process that had begun after the Georgian–Russian
War of 2008. In the face of the West’s weakening position and Russia’s
revisionist policy—Poland began work to adapt its security strategy to
those changing conditions. Work began, under the auspices of President
Bronisław Komorowski, with the drawing-up of the National Security
Strategic Review (2012). On the basis of its recommendations—which
were included in the White Book on National Security of the Republic of
Poland (2013)—the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland
(2014) was elaborated and replaced the one of 2007. Despite the fact
that the White Book adopted a holistic approach to security, efforts were
concentrated on the military dimensions. As early as 8 November 2011,
President Komorowski issued a decision defining the principal directions

of development for the Polish Armed Forces and for their preparation to
defend the country in 2013–2022. This decision instituted three high-
priority modernization areas, among which the most important were air
defense, including missile defense; increased mobility of the land forces,
especially in terms of helicopter transport; and investments in modern,
computerized combat, reconnaissance and command technology. The
presidential decision also contained indications concerning organizational
changes in the Polish Army, among which the most important was the
reform of the Polish Armed Forces’ command and control system that
came into force on 1 January 2014.
Feeling a sense of increasing threat from Russia, Poland began to
implement with ever greater determination the ‘Komorowski Doctrine’,
consisting in a shift in priorities from Poland’s engagement in foreign
military missions toward actions directly improving the security of
Poland’s territory. This idea entails a number of tasks: reducing Poland’s
participation in foreign missions, reinforcing territorial defense capabili-
ties, conducting organizational changes in the army command system
and the defense control system during time of war. In order to imple-
ment these tasks, in July 2015 the Polish parliament adopted a law in
keeping with which no less than 2% of GDP annually was earmarked for
the financing of Poland’s defense needs beginning with 2016, no less
that 20% of which would be spent on modernization. At the same time,
it was decided that no less than 20% of the modernization expenditures
would be spent on the development of air and missile defense systems.60
In August 2015, President Komorowski defined the main directions of
development for the Polish Armed Forces and their preparations for
the defense of the country in 2017–2026. As a priority, he indicated
strengthening of counter-surprise and military deterrence capabilities;
the development of the country’s strategic resistance to aggression,
especially to hybrid warfare falling under the threshold of war opera-
tions; increasing the security in cyber space and the development of
capabilities to provide assistance to state authorities in responding to
crisis threats.61 Increasingly, attention was focused on advanced tech-
nologies as the probable instrument of attack against the security of the
state. As early as January 2015, the National Security Bureau (BBN)
published the Cyber Security Doctrine of the Republic of Poland as a
guidepost and a common denominator for all steps taken to strengthen
the security of cyber space for both the state and its citizens.62
156 J. ZAJA ̨C
PiS, which has been in government since the fall of 2015, is a strong
proponent of strengthening Poland’s military security. Already during
its program convention in July 2015, this party announced that should
it come to power, it would increase defense spending to at least 2.3%
of GDP, and increase the size of Poland’s professional armed forces to
120,000 soldiers with the prospect of increasing this number by ‘several
tens of thousands’ more and to ‘rebuild’ the system of personnel reserves,
including the formation of a territorial defense system.63 The organiza-
tion of a national territorial defense system was named by new defense
minister Antoni Macierewicz as being among the defense ministry’s most
important tasks in the nearest future. He announced that in 2016, the
defense ministry intends to form and deploy along the country’s eastern
border of at least three brigades, and stressed that an important task is to
get the Warsaw NATO summit in July 2016 to decide on the stationing of
Allied units and bases on Polish territory.64 The strengthening of NATO’s
eastern flank became one of priorities of Poland’s security policy after the
escalation of the Ukraine crisis.
4.3 Reinforcing NATO’s Eastern Flank

As the Ukraine crisis unfolded, Poland intensified its efforts to reinforce
NATO’s eastern flank. Many Polish politicians expressed the fear of
Russian aggression against Poland and of Moscow’s use of soldiers with-
out ID markings, known as ‘little green men’—like it did in Crimea—or
of some other form of aterritorial conflict. The following passage from the
2013 White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland indicates
that such a possibility was considered in Poland before the Ukraine crisis
even began:
Considering the whole spectrum of strategic security conditions, Poland

must take into account the necessity to stand up to military threats. These
might be of twofold nature: threats related to political and military crises,
and war threats. [...] An actual armed conflict may be the consequence of an
uncontrolled escalation of a crisis situation. In the foreseeable future, two
types of such conflicts can be discerned: first, conflicts that can most generally
be referred to as aterritorial (where the adversary does not intend to occupy
the attacked territory), i.e. targeted strikes of purposefully moderate scale
and range (including covert strikes with “alleged responsibility”), aimed at
forcing the attacked state to take political action in the circumstances of
isolation from a larger international security system, e.g. without setting

in motion a NATO operation in consensus-challenging situations; second,
conflicts connected with a situation that is less likely nowadays, but at the
same time most dangerous, i.e. a large-scale war.65
Out of concern for this type of threat, on 1 April 2014 foreign minister
Radosław Sikorski expressed Poland’s desire to host two heavy brigades
from NATO countries on its territory.66 Even though this request was not
forwarded directly to NATO, Polish decision makers made clear their inter-
est in the deployment on Polish territory of the largest possible number
of NATO units, commands or command centers, considering their mod-
est number at the present time.67 Poland’s idea of deploying significant
Alliance forces in countries of Central Europe was greeted with caution by
its NATO partners. Many of them held the view that the NATO–Russia
agreement of May 1997, on the basis of which the North Atlantic Council
undertook not to deploy significant NATO forces on the territory of the
Alliance’s new, post-Cold War, members, should be respected.
In effect, on 16 April 2014, NATO settled on a compromise solution:
The Alliance decided to temporarily increase its presence in ‘border coun-
tries’ and increased the rotational presence of NATO forces in Poland,
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania in the summer of that year.
Further discussions on this topic were held during the NATO Summit in
Newport on 4–5 September 2014. There the Alliance
approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and decided to enhance
the responsiveness of NATO Response Force (NRF) by developing force
packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges
and threats. As part of it, NATO member states decided to create a “spear-
head force” within NRF, known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task
Force (VJTF) a new Allied joint force of about 4,000 soldiers that will be
able to deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, par-
ticularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory. They also agreed to estab-
lish an appropriate command and control presence and some in-place force
enablers on the territories of Eastern Allies at all times, with contributions
from Allies on a rotational basis, focusing on planning and exercising col-
lective defense scenarios. NATO members also decided to further enhance
NATO’s ability to quickly and effectively reinforce those Allies, including
through the preparation of infrastructure, pre-positioning of equipment
and supplies, and designation of specific bases. According to decisions, con-
tributing Allies will raise the readiness and capabilities of the Headquarters
158 J. ZAJA ̨C
Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin and will also enhance its role as
a hub for regional cooperation.68
In addition, allied leaders pledged to halt declining defense expendi-

tures and work toward spending 2% of national GDP on defense, a long-
standing Alliance goal, within a decade. The summit also resolved that the
next NATO summit would take place in Warsaw on 8–9 July 2016.
The decisions taken by the 2014 NATO Summit received mixed reactions
in Poland. From President Bronisław Komorowski’s viewpoint, the Newport
summit addressed two issues of importance for Poland. Firstly, NATO mem-
ber states agreed that Russia had to be treated as a potential adversary, some-
thing they had been reluctant to do until then. They thus recognized the
need to stress the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty’s Art. 5, that is, of
the defense of member states’ territories. Secondly, an unequivocal declara-
tion was adopted about reinforcing the Alliance’s eastern flank from Estonia
to the Black Sea. In doing so, NATO member states adopted the position
that Poland had been advocating for several years, that is that NATO’s
principal task is to defend the territory of its member states. This entails
the necessity for the existence of contingency plans, and for their continual
adaptation to changing conditions. The decisions taken at the Wales summit
were seen by president Komorowski and the ruling party (PO) as important
and beneficial for these reasons, and because they signaled the military rein-
forcement of NATO’s eastern flank. PiS, in opposition at that time, did not
agree however, and claimed that the decisions taken in Newport were of no
military significance. The smaller opposition parties—SLD, Twój Ruch, and
Polska Razem—adopted a moderate stance.69
In the months that followed, the practical realization of the prem-
ises adopted during the NATO Summit in Newport became a matter of
priority for the Polish government.70 The National Security Strategy of
2014 stressed that Poland would support NATO consolidation around
its defensive function, including the strengthening of its eastern flank.
In May 2015, Polish defense minister Tomasz Siemoniak presented the
Warsaw Strategic Adaptation Initiative (Warszawska Inicjatywa Adaptacji
Strategicznej), which entailed strengthening the entirety of NATO forces
and capabilities. Not just rapid response units, but changing the structure
profile of NATO forces in a way that would give the Alliance the capabil-
ity to respond not only at the brigade level, but also at the divisional and
corps level. It would include the development of capabilities that would
increase the Alliance’s conventional deterrence credibility, and increase
NATO joint funding for the development of defensive infrastructure

enabling, especially on the Alliance’s eastern flank, to host allied reinforce-
ments. Siemoniak emphasized that the practical realization of the premises
adopted by the NATO Summit in Newport in 2014 is a matter of priority
for Poland. These revolve around three issues:
(1) the full implementation of the reform of NATO’s Response Force,

including the reaching of operational readiness by the VJTF by the
Warsaw Summit;
(2) adapting command structures to new requirements;
(3) strengthening NATO advance planning in the framework of col-
lective defense—something that is one of key importance for the
practical ability of the Alliance to carry out the guarantees arising
from Art. 5, also with respect to hybrid threats.71
In order to meet these goals, Polish decision makers began to build a con-
sensus among NATO members, beginning with Central European coun-
tries. Even before the NATO Summit in Newport, President Komorowski
hosted the presidents of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in Warsaw on 22 July 2014.72
The aim of the meeting was to bring about a rapprochement between the
positions of those countries in matters of security, in the face of the Ukraine
crisis, they did not all share the idea of strengthening NATO’s eastern flank
to the same degree.73 While Poland, the Baltic States and Romania clearly
supported strengthening the Alliance’s infrastructure in Central Europe,
Hungary and Slovakia adopted a more restrained stance.74 The presidents of
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
and the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic then
met on 3 November 2015 in Bucharest, on the joint invitation of the presi-
dents Klaus Iohannis of Romania and Andrzej Duda of Poland, in order to
work out a common position (so-called NATO mini-summit). Participants
in the meeting underlined their commitment to renewed emphasized on
NATO's collective defense and they agreed, among other things, that they
will act to strengthen the Eastern flank of NATO; the full implementation
of the RAP and the long term strategic adaptation of the Alliance will be
crucial in this respect in order to strengthen Central European defense and
deterrence. Participants of NATO mini-summit in Bucharest also pointed
out that Russia’s military activities in the neighborhood were undermining
European security architecture, and stood firm on Russia’s need to abide
by international law and meet its international obligations, responsibilities
160 J. ZAJA ̨C
and commitments as a pre-condition for a NATO–Russia relationship

based on trust and confidence.75
Among Central European countries, the one that is closest to Poland’s
approach is Romania. Both countries see NATO as the principal external
pillar of their security, and they see the Alliance’s main function in the
Washington Treaty’s Art. 5. They also share proximity with Russia and
dependence on Russian energy resources.76 While during the 1990s, the
extent of Polish–Romanian cooperation was rather modest, the accession
of both countries to NATO (Poland in 1999 and Romania in 2004) and
to the EU (Poland in 2004 and Romania in 2007) had the effect of bring-
ing the two countries much closer, largely on account of the convergence
of their security interests. In October 2009, presidents Lech Kaczyński
and Traian Băsescu signed a declaration on Polish–Romanian strategic
partnership. The declaration stipulated that the aim of the two countries
would be to promote a strong North Atlantic Alliance, as well as to take
up coordinated action in support of a NATO ‘open door policy’, includ-
ing membership guarantees for Georgia and Ukraine in the Euro-Atlantic
security and stability area.77 Despite this, in May 2011, President Băsescu
did not take part in the Central European presidential summit organized
by President Komorowski, something that was blamed on the not entirely
congenial relations between the two politicians.78 However, in June 2013
a bilateral defense cooperation agreement was reached,79 and Romania
became Poland’s principal regional ally in the face of the Ukrainian crisis.
Seeking to get the Alliance to adapt to the new security situation in Eastern
Europe, during the 2014 NATO Newport Summit, Romania was success-
ful in convincing other allies to adopt its proposal to create a Multinational
Division Southeast—a structure analogous to the Multinational Corps
Northeast in Szczecin. The formal decision in this matter was made in
February 2015.80 In addition, Poland and Romania joined the Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS)—Poland in 2008 and Romania in
2011. They also take part, along with 13 other NATO members, in the
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), and the Strategic Airlift Capability
(SAC). Undoubtedly, one factor bringing Poland and Romania closer is
their tight cooperation with the USA and their perception of that coun-
try’s role in European security as indispensable. Both countries partici-
pate in the building of the European component of the American missile
defense system (EPAA) announced in 2009. Romania and the US signed
an agreement to that effect in 2011. The United States missile defence
system in Deveselu was declared operational in May 2016.81 The Polish
base in Słupsk-Redzikowo is scheduled to be operational in 2018. After

the launch of both bases, participation in the EPAA project will naturally
lead to closer Polish–Romanian cooperation.
Poland stepped up its efforts to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank after
PiS won the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015. During a
meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in January 2016,
President Duda expressed the hope that the results of the NATO Summit
in Warsaw would be threefold: (1) they would be universal—meaning
that decisions would be taken concerning the security of Central Europe
and of NATO’s southern flank; (2) they would be aimed at the future—
meaning that the decisions arrived at would constitute a certain vision of
potential courses of events against which NATO members would be pro-
tected; and (3) they would be decisive—meaning that specific decisions
would be reached about strengthening the Alliance’s defense and deter-
rence potential, because this is the most important issue today.82 Duda
argued that increasing NATO’s presence in Central and Eastern Europe
is necessary, both in terms of infrastructure and of the presence of troops,
because Russia has embarked on a number of actions that can’t be called
anything else but aggressive.83 Poland’s expectations were partially met.
At NATO’s Warsaw Summit in July 2016, the leaders of the Alliance’s
member states decided to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank by dislocating
four battalion-size combat groups of about 1000 soldiers each in Poland
and the Baltic States, on a rotational basis. Canada will be the framework
country in Latvia, Germany in Lithuania, the United Kingdom in Estonia,
and the United States in Poland. President Obama also announced that
the headquarters of the US armored brigade in Europe would be located
in Poland. Both decisions were received with great satisfaction by Polish
decision makers, as Poland was interested in strengthening long-term
military cooperation with the USA––the most powerful member of the
Alliance.84
4.4 Increasing Polish–American Cooperation

In the face of the Ukraine crisis Poland intensified its efforts to tighten
political and military relations with the USA. On 18 March 2014, the
day when Russia annexed Crimea, US Vice President Joe Biden was on a
visit to Warsaw where he confirmed that the United States would, if the
need arises, fulfill its obligation to give Poland assistance on the basis of
Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. President Barack Obama repeated
162 J. ZAJA ̨C
those assurances during his visit to Warsaw on the occasion of the 25th
anniversary of Poland’s regained sovereignty. During his speech, delivered
at Warsaw’s Castle Square on 4 June 2014, the American president stated:
Article 5 is clear—an attack on one is an attack on all. And as allies, we have a

solemn duty—a binding treaty obligation—to defend your territorial integ-
rity. And we will. We stand together—now and forever—for your freedom
is ours. Poland will never stand alone. But not just Poland—Estonia will
never stand alone. Latvia will never stand alone. Lithuania will never stand
alone. Romania will never stand alone. These are not just words. They’re
unbreakable commitments backed by the strongest alliance in the world
and the armed forces of the United States of America—the most powerful
military in history.85
The previous day, Obama announced the European Reassurance Initiative

(ERI)—an extension of the steps taken by the United States in order to
reassure its allies. This includes rotations of troops in Poland and the Baltic
states as well as the pre-positioning of armored vehicles and other equip-
ment on NATO’s eastern flank. Already in March 2014, the USA sent
additional multitask F-16 planes (up to 12) and, on a single mission, a
long distance reconnaissance AWACS plane, as well as personnel for the
airbase in Łask (up to 300 soldiers) and deployed 150 paratroopers. In
December 2014 the US Congress voted to appropriate 810 million USD
to fund the ERI.86
Poland is interested in the development of long-term military coopera-
tion with the United States. Warsaw considers the most important areas
of such cooperation to be air defense, the air force, special forces, cyber
defense and land forces.87 Such cooperation is presently taking shape. It
is planned that in 2018 the American missile defense base built as part of
NATO on Polish territory (in Słupsk-Redzikowo) will reach operational
readiness. At the same time, Poland is working on its own air and missile
defense system which is intended to protect Polish territory while being
part of NATO’s EPAA missile defense system. The Polish shield is to be
made of three sub-systems: very short-range—able to reach targets just a
few kilometers away (including drones, in addition to planes and helicop-
ters); short-range—to counter aircraft or rocket missiles at a maximum
distance of 25 km; and medium-range—intended to be used against tar-
gets located up to 100 km away, including ballistic missiles. The technical
modernization plan for 2013–2022, the medium-range sub-system is to
be purchased first. It will be composed of six Medium Range Air Defense

(MRAD) air and missile defense batteries which, in the Polish army, have
received the designation ‘Wisła’. The next stage of construction of the
Polish missile shield will be the purchase of eleven short-range rocket bat-
teries with the cryptonym ‘Narew’. As part of the first stage of the con-
struction of the Polish air and missile defense shield, in April 2015 Poland
signed a 2 billion USD contract with Raytheon for the provision of Patriot
missile batteries, eight of which are expected to incorporate the ‘Wisła’
medium-range surface-to-air element of Poland’s modernized air and mis-
sile defense system, which will then be integrated with NATO’s ballistic
missile defense project. Plans call for the first two batteries to be delivered
by 2018, with the remainder supplied by 2025. From all points of view,
the Polish government’s decision to choose the Patriot system is one of
strategic importance. Above all, Poland is counting on this acquisition to
strengthen American–Polish strategic cooperation resting on a strong US
presence in Central Europe and on long-term American interests in the
region. The military aspect of such cooperation would be greatly rein-
forced by an increased rotational presence of US forces and Patriot missiles
in Poland and would also serve to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank and
be a response to the fears in the region that were awakened by the events
in Eastern Ukraine and by Russia’s intimidation of NATO members.88
One should add that Poland is interested in the purchase of the newest
generation of Patriot missiles, something the USA has so far refused.
Poland is also purchasing other American equipment besides Patriot mis-
siles as part of its modernization of the Polish Armed Forces. In the second
half of 2016, Poland will be taking delivery of 40 Lockheed Martin AGM-
158A JASSM air-launched cruise missiles and related F-16 upgrades. The
relevant agreement, supposed to be worth approximately 250 million USD,
was finalized in December 2014. Critics of this agreement, however, claim
that Poland had been overcharged in this transaction, possibly even by 200
million USD. Doubts have also been voiced about whether Poland truly
needs JASSM rockets and whether they improve the country’s security.89
In January 2015, Poland also asked the US government about the possibil-
ity of purchasing, and the cost of, 24 Tomahawk-type guided missiles.90
Should a contract be signed with Poland’s decision to purchase Tomahawk
missiles was criticized by Moscow, which saw it as an unequivocally anti-
Russian action and noted that it would meet with an appropriate response.91
Poland’s intention, however, is to prepare for the increase of its defensive
capabilities, and these need to allow Poland to resist an adversary for the
164 J. ZAJA ̨C
longest possible time before its NATO allies can come to Poland’s rescue in
case of military attack.92
In this context Poland is also buying helicopters of the latest gen-
eration. In April 2015, the Polish defense ministry announced that it
would acquire Airbus H225M Caracal Helicopters manufactured by the
European consortium EADS, for an estimated 3.5 billion USD. The PiS
opposition criticized this decision sharply as being prejudicial to Polish
defense contractors and their equipment, while favoring foreign firms.93
As a result, Antoni Macierewicz, the defense minister in the new govern-
ment formed after the 2015 parliamentary elections, announced that the
main defense contracts prepared by the previous government, especially
those for the multitask helicopter tender as well as for the medium-
range air defense system (the ‘Wisła’ program), would be subject to
review. As far as the tender for the helicopters is concerned, he said the
government’s decision would depend on the offset terms. In connec-
tion with the purchase of the American Patriot system, defense minister
Macierewicz stated that Poland is interested in sincere, equitable and
effective discussions with its American partners as, upon closer analysis,
it turned out that the price proposed in the contract is much higher
than initially stated, the delivery period was far longer, and the changing
conditions of realization unknown to the party charged with meeting
them.94 A few months later, Poland and the USA came to an under-
standing. At the beginning of July 2016, prior to the NATO summit
in Warsaw, the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) and Raytheon signed
a letter of intent, by virtue of which the PGZ obtained a 50% share in
the execution of the Patriot system. It should be noted that close rela-
tions with the USA are extremely important for PiS. In April 2014, that
party’s leader Jarosław Kaczyński said that American, or at least mixed
Polish–American units should be stationed, as part of the North Atlantic
Alliance, on Polish territory and that under no circumstance should
Poland be a second class NATO member.95 In September 2015, Polish
diplomats successfully sought to arrange a bilateral meeting between
President Andrzej Duda and President Barack Obama on the occasion
of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly. During lunch, Duda
was seated next to Obama—something that Poland’s government circles
greeted with some satisfaction.96
Indeed, the great majority of Polish politicians, irrespective of politi-
cal affiliation, seek close cooperation with the USA, especially in politi-
cal and military matters, seeing in this the best way to ensure Poland’s
security. It is a debatable question, however, if American interests can

be permanently anchored in Central and Eastern Europe, considering
that the interests of the two countries are not by nature convergent.
And even though the USA helped Poland’s democratic opposition dur-
ing the Cold War period enormously, this took place as part of a larger
effort to undermine the strength and cohesion of the entire Eastern
Bloc. Most fortunately for Poland, US presidents in recent years have
been articulating American interests as more or less convergent with
Poland’s security needs, but this need not remain so for ever and not
with respect to all aspects of Poland’s security. From the American per-
spective, Poland is a small country, the average American’s interest in
things Polish is very small, and the influence of the Polish–American
community on domestic affairs is also slight. There are no grounds,
therefore, to think that Polish and American interests will stay conver-
gent in a lasting manner.97 Doug Bandow, a former assistant to President
Ronald Reagan and, later, an expert at the Cato Institute, has assessed
Polish expectations in this sphere critically. In June 2014, referring as it
were to the private pronouncements of Poland’s then foreign minister
Radosław Sikorski—who spoke of the Polish–American alliance as being
worthless and ‘complete bullshit’—wrote in The National Interest:
There is no security reason for the United States to risk war for Warsaw.
Poland never was strategically important for Washington. […] Americans
always felt sympathy for the plight of the Poles for centuries stuck among
avaricious empires. Although unfortunate, even tragic, Poland’s situation is
no cause for the United States to risk war (...) While it’s not certain what
America would do in the event of attempted Russian coercion of Warsaw,
most administrations would see that as a threat to core commitments that
could not be ignored. Being Germany’s neighbor also might galvanize
Berlin. At the very least, Moscow would recognize that threatening Poland
carries significant risks of confrontation with America. That’s far from
“worthless” for Poland.98
Such views—indicative of the divergent interests of the two countries—

are often expressed by American experts speaking in terms of realpolitik.
They are not formulated solely in connection with Poland, but also with
regard to America’s other European allies which fear Russia and which
are counting on security guarantees from the United States while doing
too little on their own. On this issue, Doug Bandow wrote quite frankly:
166 J. ZAJA ̨C
If countries like Poland feel threatened by Russia, they should do more

militarily. And they should try to convince their neighbors who would be
most affected by any conflict, to do more. After all, Europe has around eight
times the economic strength and three times the population of Russia. The
fact that the continent remains dependent on America militarily is frankly
scandalous. If there really is a threat from the east, so far not in evidence, the
European members of NATO should act.99
At the conference summing up NATO’s Warsaw Summit (11 July 2016)

Poland’s defense minister Antoni Macierewicz announced that Poland
would aim to spend at least 3% of its GDP on its armed forces. During
the few months preceding the summit, the PiS government’s flouting of
the principle of rule of law had become a problem in US–Polish rela-
tions. During his stay in Warsaw in connection with the NATO Summit,
President Barack Obama expressed his concern about Poland’s failure to
respect the values of democracy.
5 POLAND AND OTHER EU MEMBER STATES

WITH REGARD TO THE UKRAINE
CRISIS
At first glance, the policy of European Union member states with regard
to the Ukraine crisis is convergent. They share the opinion that the
administration of President Victor Yanukovych and the Russian authori-
ties, which sought to maintain Ukraine within its sphere of interests, were
responsible for the outbreak of the crisis. They also agree that Russia broke
international law by annexing the Crimea and are critical of Moscow for
its support of pro-Russian separatist groups in Eastern Ukraine. These
converging views have allowed the EU to take joint steps: it did not
recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea and condemned Moscow for
it in strong terms. Moscow failed to take steps to defuse the situation.
Consequently, on 17 March 2014, the EU took action: individuals found
to be associated with the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity were
banned from travelling to the EU and had their assets frozen. Russia’s
actions leading to the destabilization of the situation in Eastern Ukraine
led the EU to impose economic sanctions in July 2014 and to expand
them in September 2014. Those sanctions were extended several times
thereafter for successive six-month periods. Individual EU member states
also decided to suspend regular bilateral summits with Russia, notably
talks on the subject of visas. Talks about the new EU–Russia Agreement
were also suspended, as were negotiations about Russia’s membership in
the OECD and the International Energy Agency.100 At the same time,
starting in the spring of 2014, the EU has stepped up its support for
Ukraine’s economic and political reforms.101
Poland, Germany and France, acting within the framework of the
Weimar Triangle, were the EU member states that initially played the
greatest role in trying to resolve the Ukraine crisis. On 21 February 2014,
those three countries’ foreign ministers were successful in bringing about
an agreement between President Yanukovych and representatives of the
Euromaidan protestors. Poland, whose stance was decidedly one-sidedly
pro-Ukrainian, was excluded from the mediation efforts in Ukraine rela-
tively quickly, however. Despite repeated pronouncements by Polish for-
eign minister Grzegorz Schetyna to the effect that the best way to address
Ukraine’s problems is as part of the Weimar Triangle, Poland was not
invited to join the negotiating table.102 Poland officially continued to sup-
port the ongoing efforts of France and Germany, which then acted, along
with Ukraine and Russia, as part of the Normandy format, and sought to
hold systematic consultations with them. It is with skepticism, however,
that it observed their reactions, as well as those of other EU members, to
developments in Ukraine.
Upon closer inspection, clear divergences can be observed in the stance
and approach of various EU members with regard to Ukraine crisis. The
politicians of no other country engaged themselves in so direct a manner,
on such a scale and intensity, and as uncritically in supporting the Ukrainian
revolution and the new authorities in Kyiv as did Polish politicians. Among
EU member states, Poland became a hawk of sorts and found itself part
of a small group, with the Baltic states, calling for decisive actions with
regard to Russia. In this context, it consistently presented an irreconcil-
able stance and saw each compromise in negotiations aimed at resolving
the Ukrainian crisis as a setback for the West. In May 2015, President
Komorowski went so far as to compare the diplomatic attempts to resolve
the conflict in Ukraine to the policy of appeasement pursued in the 1930s
by the Western powers with regard to the Third Reich.103 Other EU coun-
tries, including France and Germany, adopted a more moderate position.
Insofar as Warsaw consistently demanded that Russia return Crimea to
Ukraine, Berlin and Paris seem to accept the existing state of affairs. The
Minsk I (5 September 2014) and Minsk II (12 February 2015) agree-
ments, negotiated with the help of Angela Merkel and François Hollande,
did not make the peace arrangements dependent on the return of the
Crimean peninsula to Ukraine. The German and French leaders also show
168 J. ZAJA ̨C
an understanding for certain postulates put forward by Russia and the

Eastern Ukrainian separatists, who are demanding autonomy for the area,
while the Polish government has opposed this idea, seeing it as a threat of
dismemberment of the Ukrainian state by Russia.
Poland was also one of the countries which demanded the imposi-
tion of the most severe sanctions against Russia. In 2014, Polish Prime
Minister Donald Tusk and foreign minister Radosław Sikorski went on
numerous foreign trips during which they argued with their interlocu-
tors for the imposition of sanctions on Russia and, as the crisis unfolded,
for their tightening. Sanctions were imposed by the European Union
and were successively extended, but voices could be heard in Berlin and
Paris to the effect that overly stringent sanctions that could destabilize
Russia were not desirable.104 Other EU member states, like Spain, Italy,
Cyprus and Greece, but also Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Hungary, also viewed positively the idea of lifting the sanctions against
Russia.105 At the same time, Poland called for the strengthening of
Ukraine on all areas. Poland was one of the few countries that favored
providing Ukraine with defensive weapons.106 Germany and France
decidedly rejected this idea, fearing that it would contribute to a further
escalation of the conflict. Both countries also rejected the idea of armed
intervention in Ukraine (by using NATO forces, for example), while in
Poland a number of prominent politicians entertained such a possibility.
In contrast to most of its Western partners, Poland is also in favor of the
admission of Ukraine to NATO in the foreseeable future. Polish par-
liamentarians greeted with applause Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s
announcement, in the Polish Sejm on 17 December 2014, that Ukraine
would seek to renounce its status of a state that is unaffiliated with any
military alliances, something that was interpreted as Ukraine’s first step
toward NATO membership. President Poroshenko represented Ukraine
at the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit.
Despite the political instability in Ukraine, the enormous corruption
in that country and its unusually difficult economic and social situation,
Poland has invariably taken the stance that Ukraine should have some
prospect of EU membership. Polish diplomats made efforts to get the
Eastern Partnership Riga Summit in May 2015 to adopt a declaration
stating that EU partner countries that have signed association agree-
ments (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) would have a chance to become
EU members in the foreseeable future. Those efforts were unsuccessful,
however, because the overwhelming majority of EU member states were
against it. An even greater number of EU member states are speaking of

the necessity to resume cooperation with Russia. Such voices had been
heard even earlier: in December 2014, the German weekly Die Zeit pub-
lished an appeal against the war with Russia and for a policy of détente. It
was signed by over 60 individuals from the German spheres of politics (of
various political orientations), science, culture, media and the economy,
and was addressed to the federal government, Bundestag deputies and
to the media. A few months earlier, in March 2014, when the Ukrainian
crisis was entering the armed conflict stage, former EU enlargement com-
missioner Günter Verheugen called for peaceful reactions with regard to
Russia and proposed that Moscow be offered: (1) an all-European security
structure which would include NATO and Russia, and (2) the creation of
an ‘economic area from Vladivostok to Lisbon’. In April 2015 this idea
of a free trade area ‘from Vladivostok to Lisbon’ gained the support of
Chancellor Angela Merkel.
In France also there were voices calling for coming to an understand-
ing with Russia. For a long time, France considered whether to sell two
French ‘Mistral’ class landing craft to Russia. Only in August 2015 did
France and Russia cancel the contract (the ships ultimately found their
way to Egypt).107 In July 2015 a group of French deputies visited the
Crimea, despite Ukrainian protests. Later, Russian television showed
their flattering comments about conditions prevailing on the annexed
peninsula. In August 2015, the French ambassador in Moscow, Jan
Morris Ripper, declared that Russia can count on France assisting it in
rebuilding its relations with the European Union.108 Voices in France
calling for a resumption of cooperation with Russia grew louder after ter-
rorist attacks that took place in Paris on 13 November 2015. A few days
after those tragic events, Presidents Hollande and Putin spoke in Crimea
of French–Russian cooperation in combating the so-called Islamic State.
The struggle against Islamic terrorism is undoubtedly one of the most
important levels at which the interests of Russia, the USA and of many
EU member states converge. This problem is less immediate for Poland,
in contrast to the countries of ‘Old Europe’. In September 2014, in
response to Washington’s call addressed to Allied states and calling for
greater engagement in the struggle against the Islamic State, President
Komorowski announced that Poland would support the international
anti-terrorist coalition, but would not send its troops. In doing so he
added that Poland’s engagement on a large scale in other regions of the
world will be easier and more understandable when Poles themselves
170 J. ZAJA ̨C
feel more secure on the eastern flank.109 In fact, with the escalation of
the Ukraine crisis, Poland demanded from its allies stronger guarantees
for its security, something that not all NATO members have greeted
with enthusiasm. After the 2014 NATO Newport Summit, the German
defense minister Ursula von der Leyen stated that should NATO allies
be facing armed aggression, Germany would not be able to meet its obli-
gations as an ally, given the outdated armaments of the Bundeswehr.110
Similar opinions appeared in the pages of Der Spiegel. Referring to senior
American and European generals, the daily wrote that the German author-
ities admitted that the Alliance’s defense plans exceed the Bundeswehr’s
present technical capabilities, and that the generals are doubtful the cre-
ation of the NATO response force—the so-called spearhead—would be
successful.111 Also in contrast to Poland, other countries of the Visegrad
Group—Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia—took a much less
unequivocally anti-Russian stance from Poland’s. In such circumstances
Poland has increasingly sought a rapprochement with Romania, the
Baltic states and with Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland—coun-
tries that are more directly affected by Russia’s policy.112 The United
Kingdom is also involved in strengthening NATO’s eastern flank.113
Reaching an understanding with its European partners in the mat-
ter of the Ukraine crisis is made the more difficult for Poland because
of its disinclination to accept immigrants arriving in massive numbers to
Europe. While the government of Ewa Kopacz (PO) agreed in September
2015 to host few thousand refugees as part of an EU agreement, the PiS
government remains averse to the idea. Like the other Visegrad coun-
tries, Poland refuses to accept a mechanism for the automatic allocation of
migrants entering the EU among its various member states.114 The stance
of Central European countries has been greeted critically by ‘Old Europe’
countries, which have to face an ever-growing illegal immigration prob-
lem. This situation widens the divergence between the interests of differ-
ent EU members and will make the maintenance of solidarity in the face
of the Ukraine crisis difficult.
Poland’s ability to act effectively in international politics is cur-
rently made difficult by the strong criticism that steps taken by the PiS
government have drawn from Poland’s EU partners. Germany has been
the source of particularly strong criticism aimed at the violation of core
democratic principles by the PiS government. Mutual Polish–German ani-
mosities are compounded by PiS’s traditional distrust of Germany and
its fear that Germany is seeking to dominate Europe.115 In April 2014,
PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński, in the context of strengthening NATO’s

presence in Central and Eastern Europe said ‘I do not want any German
troops here. At least seven generations must pass before this becomes
acceptable’.116
Germany plays a crucial role in the resolution of the Ukraine cri-
sis, however, and enjoys the support of the USA in this respect.117
The Barack Obama administration has left the issue of resolving the
Ukraine crisis in German hands. Moreover, the US administration and
many American politicians are expressing concern with the PiS govern-
ment’s violation of basic democratic principles and of the rule of law in
Poland.118 In this situation, a lack of understanding between Berlin and
Warsaw will make it difficult for Poland to act effectively with respect
to the Ukraine crisis, especially considering that very few EU countries
share Poland’s unconditional support for Ukraine, and Poland’s hard
stance with regard to Russia.
NOTES
1. For more, see S. L. Wolchik, V. Zviglyanich, eds. (1999), Ukraine: The
Search for a National Identity (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield).
2. For more on the causes of the Ukraine crisis, see R. Sakwa (2015), Frontline
Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands (London, New York: I. B. Tauris);
M. Rajan, E. Rumer (2015), Conflict in Ukraine: the Unwinding of the
post-Cold War Order (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press);
S. Yekelchyk (2015), The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to
Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
3. J. Mearsheimer (2014), ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The
Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93 No. 5;
pp. 77–89; S. F. Cohen (2015), ‘The Ukrainian Crisis: It’s Not All Putin’s
Fault’, The Nation, December 14; R. Zięba (2015), ‘Ukraina jako przed-
miot rywalizacji między Zachodem a Rosja ̨’, Środkowoeuropejskie Studia
Polityczne, No. 3, pp. 5–26.
4. Z. Brzeziński (1997), The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its
Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books), p. 46.
5. A. Szeptycki (2013), Ukraina wobec Rosji: studium zależności (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego).
6. D. Trenin (2008), ‘Russia and the European Union: redefining Strategic
Partnership’, in G. Grevi, A. de Vasconcelos, eds., Partnership for Effective
Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India, Russia (Paris:
UE Institute for Security Studies), pp. 133–134, 139. About rivalry on the
172 J. ZAJA ̨C
post-Soviet area, see also A. Włodkowska-Bagan (2013), Rywalizacja

mocarstw na obszarze poradzieckim (Warsaw: Difin).
7. On 14 June 1994 the EU and Ukraine had signed the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA). It came into force on 1 March 1998.
8. Since 1 January 2010 a formal customs union existed between the Republic
of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. In
February 2012, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia applied to join.
9. S. Charap, J. Shapiro (2014), ‘How to Avoid a New Cold War’, Current
History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, Vol. 113, p. 269.
10. T. Iwański et al. (2014), ‘Russian Policy towards Ukraine: not just Crimea’,
OSW Analysis, 12 March, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2014-03-12/russian-policy-towards-ukraine-not-just-crimea, accesed
on 16 February 2016.
11. As President Bronisław Komorowski said on the occasion of the 15th
anniversary of Poland’s accession to NATO ‘Poland is safe today. […]
but historical experience and observation of what is taking place beyond
our borders to the East forces us to be quick thinking and vigilant. It is
making us aware that we live in the vicinity of an area of instability.’ See
(2014), ‘Orędzie Prezydenta RP z okazji 15-lecia przysta ̨pienia do
NATO’, 12 March, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum-bronislawa-
komorowskiego/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta/inne/
art,605,oredzie-prezydenta-rp-z-okazji-15-lecia-przystapienia-do-nato.
html, accesssed on 28 January 2016.
12. Z. Brzeziński, The Grand Chessboard…, p. 46.
13. O. Osica (2002), ‘In Search of a New Role: Poland in Euro-Atlantic
Relations’, Defense Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 26. Polish defense minister
Janusz Onyszkiewicz (1992–1993 and 1997–2000) presented it thus: ‘I
held the view that it is necessary to establish contacts with the Ukrainians,
because for as long as Russia is with Ukraine, it is a superpower. If Ukraine
separates from Moscow then Russia will only be a very large country’. See
(1999), Onyszkiewicz ze szczytów NATO. Z Januszem Onyszkiewiczem
rozmawiaja ̨ Witold Bereś i Krzysztof Burnetko (Warsaw: Dom Wydawniczy
Bellona), pp. 136, 138. See also J. Bugajski (2009), America’s New
European Allies (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.), p. 18.
14. See a number of texts in (2002), ‘Nie ma wolnej Polski bez wolnej
Ukrainy’, in P. Kowal, J. Ołdakowski, M. Zuchniak, eds., Nie jesteśmy
ukrainofilami. Polska myśl polityczna wobec Ukraińców i Ukrainy. Antologia
tekstów (Warsaw: Kolegium Europy Wschodniej).
15. R. Zięba (2002), ‘The ‘Strategic Partnership’ between Poland and
Ukraine’, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, No. 3, p. 198.
16. S. Wolchik, R. Zięba (2000), ‘Ukraine’s Relations with the Visegrad
Countries’, in S. Wolchik, V. Zviglyanich, eds., Ukraine: The Search for a
National Identity (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), pp. 133–161.
17. Z. Brzeziński (1997), The Grand Chessboard…, pp. 113–114.
18. Its successor is the Polish–Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation (PAUCI),
which was established in April 2005, and whose mission is to develop
Ukraine’s ability to integrate closely with EU structures by taping into the
experience of Poland and other countries.
19. Yearbooks of Foreign Trade Statistics of Poland, Central Statistical Office,
Warsaw.
20. ‘Poland’s Eastern Policy’, Full record of the discussion organized by the
Stefan Batory Foundation and Tygodnik Powszechny on 1 March 2001,
p. 14.
21. ‘Reactions to the Events in Ukraine’, Public Opinion Poll, December
2004, p. 4.
22. (Dec. 2008), 8% of respondents held no opinion. ‘Stosunek Polaków do
innych narodów’, CBOS. Komunikat z badań, BS/193/2008, p. 2.
23. A. Balcer, K. Wóycicki (2014), Polska na globalnej szachownicy (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Poltext), p. 282.
24. See, for example B. Łagowski (2007). ‘Żartobliwa polityka zagraniczna’,
B. Łagowski, Duch i bezduszność III Rzeczypospolitej. Rozważania (Cracow:
Universitas), p. 269 (reprint from Przegla ̨d Tygodniowy, 6 March 2000).
25. B. Piętka (2016), ‘Szaleństwo czy zdrada?’, Myśl Polska, No. 3–4
(2069/70), 17–24 January, p. 8.
26. (2015), ‘Duda: chciałbym, by Ukraina była na szczycie NATO w
Warszawie’, 15 December http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-
swiata,2/duda-chcialbym-by-ukraina-byla-na-szczycie-nato- w-
warszawie,603166.html, accessed on 28 January 2016.
27. P. Majewski (2014), ‘Polscy politycy doradzaja ̨ protestuja ̨cym na Majdanie’,
Rzeczpospolita, 27 January.
28. (2015), Prime Minister Kopacz declared that Poland would institute a
program of stipends for students and establish a spokesperson for reforms
in Ukraine. ‘Premier Kopacz oferuje Ukrainie 100 milionów euro pożyczki.
Na Donbas i reform”, PAP, 19 January.
29. (2015), “Zachód wysyła instruktorów na Ukrainę. Polska nie’, TVN24, 16
April.
30. (2014), ‘Donald Tusk: zagrożenie interwencja ̨ Rosji na Ukrainie jest obec-
nie większe niż kilkanaście dni temu’, PAP, 6 August.
31. See (2014), ‘Gen. Waldemar Skrzypczak: retoryka straszenia społeczeństwa
polskiego wojna ̨ jest nie na miejscu’, TVP Info, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna,
WP.PL, 6 August.
174 J. ZAJA ̨C
32. (2015) ‘Możliwe użycie przez Rosję ładunku ja ̨drowego w uderzeniu na

Polskę’, 6 March, http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/
szeremietiew-rosja-moze-uzyc-ladunku-jadrowego-w-uderzeniu- na-
polske,521851.html, accessed on 28 January 2016. Romuald Szeremietiew
was Deputy-Minister of National Defense in the government of Jan
Olszewski in 1992.
33. (2014) ‘Prof. Bronisław Łagowski: rusofobia to jest obecnie ideologia
państwowa’, 7 October, http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/
pr of-br onislaw-lagowski-r usofobia-to-jest-obecnie-ideologia-
panstwowa/51vhw, accessed on 28 June 2015; (2015), ‘Prof. Stanisław
Bieleń: rusofobia jest zjawiskiem powszechnym w Polsce’, 15 March,
http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/prof-stanislaw-bielen-
rusofobia-jest-zjawiskiem-powszechnym-w-polsce/bwyzh, accessed on 28
June 2015; A. Romanowski (2014), ‘Polska, Ruś i racja stanu’, Gazeta
Wyborcza, 26 August, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75968,16529003,Polska__
Rus_i_racja_stanu.html, accessed on 28 January 2016.
34. (2014), ‘Możemy się czuć zagrożeni”. Polska chce zwołania Rady
Północnoatlantyckiej’, PAP, 1 March.
35. (2014), ‘North Atlantic Council statement on the situation in Ukraine’, 2
March. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_107681.
htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 28 June 2015.
36. (2014), ‘Sikorski apeluje do Rosji: Nie wchodźcie na Ukrainę. Będa ̨ kon-
sekwencje’, RMF, 3 March. http://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/news-sikorski-
apeluje-do-rosji-nie-wchodzcie-na-ukraine- beda-kons,nId,1158741 ,
accessed on 28 June 2015; (2014), ‘Polska chce planu sankcji gospodarc-
zych wobec Rosji’, Informacyjna Agencja Radiowa—IAR, 30 March,
http://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Polska-chce-planu-sankcji-
gospodarczych-wobec-Rosji-3086362.html, accessed on 28 June 2015.
37. See (2014), ‘Świat: Rosja oskarża Polskę o szkolenie euromajdanowców’,
IAR, 4 March.
38. M. A. Koprowski (2015), ‘Polska za burta ̨’, Najwyższy Czas, No. 8 (1292),
21 February.
39. This agreement was reached by the foreign ministers of Ukraine, Russia,
the USA and the EU.
40. (2014), ‘Piechociński: Ukraina chciałaby polski węgiel, ale za darmo.
Jestem zdegustowany’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 15 October, http://wyborcza.
biz/biznes/1,100896,16807375,Piechocinski__Ukraina_chcialaby_pol-
ski _wegiel__ale.html#ixzz3wHu11CkW, accessed on 28 January 2016.
41. ‘We forgive and ask for forgiveness’ is a sentence from a letter that Polish
bishops sent to German bishops on 18 November 1965, and which was a
prelude to Polish–German reconciliation. Poroshenko symbolically made
use of it in his speech. (2014), ‘Poroszenko w polskim Sejmie: Wybaczamy
i prosimy o wybaczenie’, Newsweek, 17 December, http://polska.news-

week.pl/petro-poroszenko- w-polskim-sejmie-wizyta-poroszenki-
newsweek-l,artykuly,353753,1.html, accessed in 28 January 2016.
42. (2015), ‘Schetyna: Absurd przesłania tragedię’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 April,
http://wyborcza.pl/politykaekstra/1,144844,17754786,Schetyna__
Absurd_przeslania_tragedie.html, accessed in 28 January 2016.
43. See (2015), ‘Minister Szczerski o głównych celach wizyty prezydenta w
Kijowie’, 14 December, http://www.prezydent.pl/kancelaria/aktywnosc-
ministrow/art,163,minister-szczerski-o- glownych-celach-wizyty-
prezydenta-w-kijowie.html, accesssed on 28 December 2015.
44. (2015), ‘Prezydent Duda w Kijowie. “Chcemy Ukrainy na szczycie NATO
w Warszawie”’, 15 December, http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/
Artykul/1558031,Prezydent-Duda-w-Kijowie-Chcemy- Ukrainy-na-
szczycie-NATO-w-Warszawie, accesssed on 28 December 2015.
45. (2015), ‘Minister Szczerski o głównych celach wizyty prezydenta w
Kijowie’, 14 December; (2015), ‘Gazoport może pomóc wzmocnić
niezależność energetyczna ̨ Ukrainy’, 15 December; (2015), ‘Ukraina jest
wielkim strategicznym partnerem Polski’, 15 December, http://www.
prezydent.pl, accessed on 28 January 2016.
46. (2015), ‘Ambasador Rosji dla TVN24: Polska współwinna II wojny
światowej, sprawy pomnika nie zapomnimy’, 25 September, http://www.
tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/ambasador-rosji- w-polsce-w-
rozmowie-z-reporterka-czarno-na-bialym,580483.html, accessed on 28
January 2016.
47. (2013), In April 2013, during a meeting of the Sejm Foreign Affairs
Commission, Ms Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Under-Secretary of State
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described “Polish–Russian relations as
not easy, emphasizing that for many years, there have been unresolved
problems which will cast a shadow on mutual relations’. See ‘Full record of
the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission (no. 73) from 4 April
2013’, Sejm Chancellery, Sejm Commissions Office, p. 12.
48. (2014), National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw),
pp. 20–21.
49. (2014), Address of the President during the 69th session of the UN
General Assembly, 25 September, http://www.prezydent.pl; (2014),
‘Adaptacja NATO do nowych warunków bezpieczeństwa. Wysta ̨pienie
szefa BBN ministra Stanisława Kozieja na posiedzeniu podkomisji ds.
potencjału obronnego i bezpieczeństwa Zgromadzenia Parlamentarnego
NATO, jakie odbyło się w Sejmie RP 16 października 2014 r.’ http://
www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/6020,quotAdaptacja-NATO-do-
nowych-warunkow-bezpieczenstwaquot-wystapienie-szefa-BBN.html;
176 J. ZAJA ̨C
(2014), ‘15 lat w NATO. Rozmowa z prezydentem RP—Bronisławem

Komorowskim, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe. 15 lat w NATO, 2014/I, p. 14.
50. One of the few meetings was a trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of
Poland, Germany, and Russia in St Petersburg as part of the so-called
Kaliningrad Triangle (on 10 June 2014). In Polish this trilateral forum is
referred to as the Królewiecki Triangle, from the Polish name for
Koenigsberg/Kaliningrad. See (2014), ‘Trójka ̨t Królewiecki o kryzysie na
Ukrainie’, 10 June, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadom-
osci/trojkat_krolewiecki_o_kryzysie_na_ukrainie, accessed on 14 January
2016; or (2014), ‘Kaliningrad Triangle on Ukraine’s crisis’, 10 June,
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/c/MOBILE/news/kaliningrad_triangle_
on_ukraine_s_crisis, accessed on 14 January 2016.
51. The ‘Program 2020 in Polish–Russian relations’ was signed on 19
December 2013, during the 8th meeting of the Committee for Polish–
Russian Cooperation Strategy chaired by foreign ministers Radosław
Sikorski and Sergiei Lavrov. This document is a list of priority issues and
areas of collaboration between the two countries for the following years.
For the text, see ‘Wspólna deklaracja Ministrów Spraw Zagranicznych
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Federacji Rosyjskiej Program 2020 w relacjach
polsko-rosyjskich’, http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/170dc6c7-2895-
4c3e-b22b-21191d64c869:JCR, accesssed on 28 January 2016.
52. (2014), ‘Polscy dyplomaci wydaleni z Rosji. Za “działalność niezgodna ̨ z
ich statusem”’, 17 November, http://www.tvp.info, accessed on 28
January 2016.
53. (2015), ‘Grzegorz Schetyna mówi o wyzwoleniu Auschwitz przez
Ukraińców. Rosyjskie media: to prowokacja’, 22. January, http://www.
polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1358757,Grzegorz-Schetyna- mowi-o-
wyzwoleniu-Auschwitz-przez-Ukraincow- Rosyjskie- media-to-
prowokacja, accessed on 28 January 2016.
54. (2015), ‘Korespondent “Gazety Wyborczej” wydalony z Rosji’, 18
December, http://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news,447445,korespondent-
gazety-wyborczej-wydalony-z-rosji.html, accessed on 28 January 2016.
55. (2015), ‘Oświadczenie Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych w zwia ̨zku z
wydaleniem polskiego korespondenta w Moskwie’, 18 December’, http://
www.msz.gov.pl, accesssed on 28 January 2016.
56. (2015), ‘Sa ̨d w Petersburgu nakazał eksmisję polskiego konsulatu’, 17
March, http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/bedzie-eksmisja-
polskiego-konsulatu-w-petersburgu,524960.html, accesssed on 28
January 2016.
57. (2015), ‘Rosyjska Duma o pomnikach w Polsce. MSZ: to nic nowego’, 18
December, http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1559488,Rosyjska-
Duma-o-pomnikach-w-Polsce-MSZ-to-nic-nowego, accessed on 28
January 2016.
58. (2015), Polska 2015. Raport o stanie handlu zagranicznego (Warsaw:
Ministerstwo Gospodarki).
59. (2014), ‘Opinions about Polish-Russian Relations and Poland's Eastern
Policy’, CBOS Public Opinion Research Center, May 2014.
60. (2015), ‘Ustawa z dnia 10 lipca 2015 r. o zmianie ustawy o przebudowie i
modernizacji technicznej oraz finansowaniu Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej oraz ustawy o finansach publicznych’, Dziennik Ustaw
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 7 August.
61. (2015), ‘Prezydent określił główne kierunki rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych
RP’, 3 August, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum-bronislawa-
komorowskiego/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/art,3316,prezydent-okre-
slil-glowne-kierunki-rozwoju-sil-zbrojnych-rp.html, accessed on 28
January 2016.
62. (2015), Sprawy bezpieczeństwa narodowego w czasie prezydentury Bronisława
Komorowskiego 2010–2015, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/
sprawy_bezpieczenstwa_narodowego_w_czasie_prezydentury_bronisl-
awa_komorowskiego.pdf, accessed on 10 January 2015.
63. (2016), ‘2,3% PKB na obronność i 120 000 żołnierzy w armii czynnej.
Konwencja PiS o Siłach Zbrojnych’, Defence24, 11 January, http://www.
defence24.pl/237834,23-pkb-na-obronnosc-i- 120-000-zolnierzy-w-
armii-czynnej-konwencja-pis-o-silach-zbrojnych, accessed on 28 January
2016.
64. (2015), ‘O najważniejszych zadaniach na posiedzeniu SKON’, 25
November, Ministry of National Defense, http://mon.gov.pl/aktual-
nosci/artykul/najnowsze/2015-11-25-o-najwazniejszych- zadaniach-
mon-na-posiedzeniu-skon, accessed on 11 January 2016.
65. (2013), White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw),
p. 128.
66. (2014), ‘Sikorski: Dwie brygady NATO w Polsce i byłbym szczęśliwy’,
1 April, http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/sikorski-dwie-
brygady-nato-w-polsce-i-bylbym-szczesliwy,413876.html, accessed on
11 January 2016.
67. In early 2014, approximately 500 persons out of a total of 8000 NATO
command and liaison officers and soldiers: (2014), ‘Full record of the
meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee (No. 126) from 2 April 2014 r.’
Sejm Chancellery, Sejm Commission Office, p. 8. On 1 January 2015,
Polish special forces took over annual command over NATO member spe-
cial forces on combat duty as part of NATO’s Response Forces. This was a
prestigious distinction, as the Poles were the first of the new NATO mem-
bers to be given the acquiescence of their allies to take over their elite units.
178 J. ZAJA ̨C
See R. Zięba (2015), ‘Implikacje stosunków polsko-amerykańskich dla

polityki zagranicznej Polski’, Przegla ̨d Politologiczny, No. 2, p. 19.
68. (2014), ‘Wales Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Wales’, 5 September, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
texts_112964.htm, accessed on 28 January 2016.
69. J. Zaja ̨c (2014), ‘The NATO Summit in Newport: Polish Perspective’,
Dossier stratégique: La Pologne, un acteur de la défense européenne, La
Lettre de L’IRSEM (Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École Militaire,
Paris), No. 8.
70. See also: M. Madej (2015), ‘Poland and NATO’s Future—Let’s Get
Serious About the Basics’, in R. Czulda, M. Madej, eds. Newcomers No
More? Contemporary NATO and the Future from the Perspective of ‘Post-
Cold War’ Member (Warsaw—Prague—Brussels: International Relations
Research Institute in Warsaw, Jagello 2000—NATO Information Center
in Prague, Latvian Institute of International Affairs in Riga in cooperation
with Atlantic Treaty Association in Brussels), pp. 131–135.
71. (2015), ‘Polish Defense Priorities in a Changed European Security
Environment’, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
19 May, http://csis.org/event/statesmens-forum-feat-he-tomasz-siemoniak-
polish-deputy-prime-minsiter-and-minister-defense, accessed on 11 January
2016; or http://mon.gov.pl/aktualnosci/artykul/najnowsze/2015-05-18-
wicepremier-tomasz-siemoniak-z-wizyta-w-usa, accessed on 11 January 2016.
72. (2014), ‘Dziewięciu prezydentów za wzmocnieniem wschodniej
flanki NATO’, 22 July, http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/
Ar tykul/1183986,Dziewieciu-prezydentow-za-wzmocnieniem-
wschodniej-flanki-NATO, accessed on 10 January 2016.
73. See more: R. Czulda, M. Madej, eds., (2015), Newcomers No More?…
74. A. Kacprzyk (2014), ‘Deterring Russia after Ukraine: CEE Divided on the
Future of NATO Policy’, Policy Paper, No. 13 (96), July (Warsaw: PISM).
75. (2015), ‘Joint Declaration on "Allied Solidarity and Shared Responsibility’,
Bucharest, November, https://www.lrp.lt/data/public/uploads/2015/11/
joint-declaration.pdf, accessed on 10 January 2016.
76. In the past, Poland and Romania shared a political and military alliance
that was anti-Soviet in nature. Signed in March 1921, the Convention on
Defensive Alliance was complemented with a secret military annex and
bound both parties to come to the other’s aid in case of unprovoked attack
from the east (i.e., on the part of Soviet Russia) and to coordinate their
eastern policies.
77. (2009), ‘Wspólna deklaracja J.E. Lecha Kaczyńskiego, Prezydenta
Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej oraz J.E. pana Traiana Băsescu, Prezydenta
Rumunii dotycza ̨ca polsko-rumuńskiego partnerstwa strategicznego’, 7
October, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum-lecha-kaczynskiego/aktu-
alnosci/rok-2009/art,12,695,wspolna-deklaracja-o-partnerstwie-strate-
gicznym.html, accessed on 10 January 2016.
78. P. Pacuła (2015), ‘Polsko-rumuńska współpraca obronna. Stan obecny i
perspektywy’, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, No. 3, p. 17.
79. (2013), ‘Agreement between the government of the Republic of Poland
and the government of Romania on bilateral defense cooperation’, 5 June,
http://archiwalny.mon.gov.pl/en/artykul/14394, accessed on 10
January 2016.
80. (2009), ‘Defence Ministers agree to strengthen NATO’s defences, estab-
lish Spearhead Force’, 5 February, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
news_117188.htm, accessed on 10 January 2016.
81. (2016), ‘Key missile defence site declared operational’, 12 May, http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_130721.htm, accessed on 5 July 2016.
82. (2016), ‘NATO musi reagować na zmieniając̨ą się sytuację i patrzeć w
przyszłośc’́ , 18 January, http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wizytyza-
graniczne/art,45,nato-musi-reagowac-na-zmieniajaca-sie-sytuacje-i-patrzec-
w-przyszlosc.html, accessed on 19 January 2016.
83. (2016), ‘Szef NATO: Rosja gotowa zmieniać granice siła ̨’, 18 January,
http://www.rp.pl/Polityka/160119290-Szef-NATO-Rosja-gotowa-zmieniac-
granice-sila.html, accessed on 19 January 2016.
84. On USA involvement in NATO see M. Petersson (2015), The US-NATO
Debate: from Libya to Ukraine, (New York: Bloomsbury), pp. 115–151.
85. (2014), ‘Remarks by President Obama at the 25th Anniversary of Freedom
Day, Castle Square, Warsaw, Poland’, June 4, https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2014/06/04/remarks-president- obama-25th-
anniversary-freedom-day, accessed on 11 January 2016.
86. D. E. Mix (2015), ‘The United States and Europe: Current Issues’, CRS
Report, RS22163, Congressional Research Service, 3 February, p. 7.
87. (2014), ‘Siemoniak o współpracy wojskowej z USA’, 16 April, Polska Zbrojna,
http://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/12295?t=Siemoniak-o-
wspolpracy-wojskowej-z-USA, accessed on 11 January 2016.
88. M. A. Piotrowski (2015), ‘Crossing at Vistula River: The Importance of
the Air and Missile Defence of Poland’, Bulletin (Warsaw: PISM), No. 44
(776), 28 April.
89. T. Bednarzak (2004), ‘Przepłacamy kilkakrotnie za amerykańskie pociski
JASSM? Cena odzwierciedla zawartość transakcji’, 6 December 2004,
http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,139078,title,Przeplacamy-kilkakrotnie-za-
amerykanskie-pociski-JASSM-Cena-odzwierciedla-zawartosc-transakcji,wi
d,17081683,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=11691d&_ticrsn=3, accessed on 11
February 2016.
180 J. ZAJA ̨C
90. (2015), ‘Polska kupi Tomahawki? Tomasz Siemoniak: pytaliśmy

Amerykanów o te pociski’, 12 March 2015, http://www.polskieradio.
pl/7/129/Ar tykul/1397272,Polska-kupi-Tomahawki- Tomasz-
Siemoniak-pytalismy-Amerykanow-o-te-pociski, accessed on 11 January
2016.
91. (2015), ‘USA: Polska zainteresowana kupnem 24 pocisków Tomahawk’,
PAP, 13 March, http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/usa-polska-zaintereso-
wana-kupnem-24-pociskow-tomahawk/j1gd0m, accessed on 17 January
2016; (2015), ‘Tomahawki dla polskiego wojska? “To jednoznacznie anty-
rosyjski akt”’, 13 March, http://www.tvn24.pl, accessed on 17 January
2016.
92. D. E. Mix (2015), ‘The United States and Europe..., p. 6.
93. Poland’s choice surprised many experts who expected that the Sikorsky
S-70i Black Hawk would be chosen on account of the fargoing ties of
cooperation between its maker and the Polish defense industry. The Polish
company PZL Mielec is a subsidiary of the American helicopter maker
Sikorsky. The Polish firm PZL-Świdnik, part of the Italian–British
AgustaWestland group, also submitted a tender.
94. (2015), ‘O najważniejszych zadaniach na posiedzeniu SKON’, 25
November, Ministry of National Defense, http://mon.gov.pl/aktual-
nosci/artykul/najnowsze/2015-11-25-o-najwazniejszych- zadaniach-
mon-na-posiedzeniu-skon, accessed on 17 January 2016.
95. (2014), ‘Jarosław Kaczyński: potrzebne pogłębione partnerstwo z USA’,
11 April, http://www.pis.org.pl/article.php?id=22921, accessed on 17
January 2016.
96. (2015), ‘Długa rozmowa z Obama ̨ i uścisk dłoni z Putinem. Prezydent
Andrzej Duda na szczycie ONZ’, 29 September, wPolityce.pl, http://
wpolityce.pl/swiat/266833-dluga-rozmowa-z-obama-i-uscisk-dloni-z-
putinem-prezydent-andrzej-duda-na-szczycie-onz, accessed on 17 January
2016.
97. See (2014), Nadgonić czas. Wywiad rzeka ze Zdzisławem Najderem
(Warsaw: Świat Ksia ̨żki), pp. 421–422, 426.
98. D. Bandow (2014), ‘Is Poland’s Alliance with America “Worthless”?’, The
National Interest, June 25. http://www.cato.org/publications/commen-
tary/polands-alliance-america-worthless, accessed on 17 January 2016.
99. D. Bandow (2016), ‘Poland Wants U.S. Troops as Part of EU Deal with
Britain: America the Big Loser’, Forbes, January 9, http://www.cato.org/
publications/commentary/poland-wants-us-troops-part-eu-deal-britain-
america-big-loser accessed on 17 January 2016.
100. (2014), ‘EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis’, http://europa.
eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm,
101. ‘EU—Ukraine Relations’, http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/about/

index_en.htm, accessed on 14 January 2016.
102. (2014), ‘Nie jest bezpiecznie. Wywiad z ministrem spraw zagranicznych
Grzegorzem Schetyna ̨’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 5 November; (2015), ‘Polska
jest bezpieczna. Nie była w ZSRR’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 March.
103. (2015), ‘Bronisław Komorowski: Lekcja historii’, Rzeczpospolita, 10
May.
104. On the German stance towards EU sanctions against Russia, see:
H. Kundnani (2015), ‘Leaving the West Behind’, Foreign Affairs, Jan./
Feb., Vo. 94, Issue 1, pp. 108–116.
105. See (2014), ‘Außenminister contra EU: Steinmeier warnt vor schärferen
Russland-Sanktionen’, Der Spigel, 19 Decmber, http://www.spiegel.
de/politik/deutschland/russland-steinmeier-warnt-vor-schaerferen-
sanktionen-a-1009491.html, accessed on 28 January 2016; (2015), ‘La
France et l’Allemagne envisagent la fin des sanctions imposées à la
Russie’, 7 January, http://www.euractiv.fr/sections/europe-de-lest/
la-france-et-lallemagne-envisagent-la-fin-des-sanctions-imposees-la-
russie, accessed on 28 January 2016; (2015), ‘Sanctions contre la Russie:
les Européens divisés’, Le Point, 7 Mars, http://www.lepoint.fr/
monde/sanctions-contre-la-russie-les-europeens-
divises-07-03-2015-1910996_24.php, accessed on 28 January 2016;
and http://zmieniacunie.money.pl/czechy;i;slowacja;przeciw;sankcjom
;wobec;rosji,250,0,1521914.html, accessed on 18 January 2016.
106. For example, during the last presidential campaign, in May 2015, the
PiS candidate, the present Polish President Andrzej Duda stated that
Poland could extend armed support to Ukraine and even considered
discussing whether to send Polish troops there. (2015), ‘Duda: Polscy
żołnierze w Doniecku? Polska mogłaby udzielić wsparcia’, 22 January,
http://www.rmf24.pl/tylko-w-rmf24/wywiady/kontrwywiad/news-
duda-polscy-zolnierze-w- doniecku-polska-moglaby-udzielic-
wsp,nId,1594144, accessed on 28 January 2016.
107. (2015), ‘Selon Hollande, la livraison des Mistral à l’Egypte se fera « sans
perte financière»’, LeMonde.fr, http://www.lemonde.fr/international/
article/2015/09/23/l-egypte-va-acquerir-les-deux-mistral-non-livres-
a-la-russie_4768390_3210.html#PkEML1oziKZ5D8kx.99, accessed
on 28 October 2015.
108. (2015), ‘Kryzys w Rosji. Paryż obiecuje Moskwie pomoc w odbudowie
kontaktów z Unia ̨ Europejska ̨’, Money.pl, 2 August, http://www.money.
pl/gospodarka/unia-europejska/wiadomosci/artykul/kryzys-w-rosji-
paryz-obiecuje-moskwie-pomoc,145,0,1871761.html, accessed on 28
January 2016.
182 J. ZAJA ̨C
109. (2014), ‘Polska pomoże w działaniach przeciw Państwu Islamskiemu,

ale wojsk nie wyślemy’, 5 September, http://www.tvp.info/16722854/
polska-pomoze-w-dzialaniach-przeciw-panstwu-islamskiemu-ale-wojsk-
nie-wyslemy, accessed on 15 September 2015.
110. (2015), ‘Ursula von der Leyen im Bild-Interview Wie Schrott ist die
Bundeswehr, Frau Ministerin?’, Bild, 28 September, http://www.bild.
de/politik/inland/ursula-von-der-leyen/wie-schrott- ist-die-
bundeswehr-37925584.bild.html, accessed on 28 December 2015.
111. (2014), ‘Marodes Material: Bundeswehr erfüllt Nato-Anforderungen
derzeit nicht,’ Der Spiegel, 27 September, http://www.spiegel.de/poli-
tik/ausland/bundeswehr-erfuellt-nato- anforderungen-laut-spiegel-
derzeit-nicht-a-994079.html, accessed on 28 December 2015.
112. (2015), ‘Polska zacieśnia współpracę wojskowa ̨ ze Szwecja ̨. Rosja
zmieniła układ sił’, 14 September, http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/
Artykul/1504962,Polska-zaciesnia-wspolprace-wojskowa-ze-Szwecja-
Rosja-zmienila-uklad-sil, accessed on 28 January 2016.
113. (2015), ‘Britain to station troops in Baltic region ‘to deter Russian
aggression’, 8 October, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/
oct/08/britain-station-troops-poland-latvia-lithuania-estonia-russian-
aggression, accessed on 28 January 2016; (2015), ‘Britain extends com-
mitment to NATO reassurance in Eastern Europe’, 21 June 2015,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-defence-nato-idUKKBN-
0P10EN20150621, accessed on 28 January 2016.
114. (2016), ‘Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Interior’, 19 January
2016, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-declara-
tion-of, accessed on 20 January 2016.
115. (2014), ‘Szczerski: Będziemy prowadzić politykę z podniesiona ̨ głowa ̨’,
Gazeta Polska, No. 35, 27 August, http://www.gazetapolska.pl/31458-
bedziemy-prowadzic-polityke-z-podniesiona-glowa, accessed on 28
January 2016; (2015), ‘Witold Waszczykowski dla Fronda.pl: Potrzeba
męzó̇ w stanu, a nie politycznych gierek’, Fronda.pl, 18 February, https://
www.fronda.pl/a/witold-waszczykowski-dla-frondapl-potrzeba-mezow-
stanu-a-nie-politycznych-gierek,47653.html, accessed on 28 January
2016; (2015), ‘Macierewicz: Obóz Kopacz i Tuska akceptował status
Polski jako państwa drugiej kategorii’, 13 August, http://telewizjarepub-
lika.pl/macierewicz-oboz-kopacz-i-tuska-akceptowal-status-polski-jako-
panstwa-drugiej-kategorii,22618.html, accessed on 28 January 2016.
116. (2014), ‘Kaczyński ucieka przed pytaniami o niemieckie wojska. Nie
pozwala pytać dziennikarzom’, 2 April, http://natemat.pl/97395,
kaczynski-ucieka-przed-pytaniami-o-niemieckie-wojska-nie-pozwala-pytac-
dziennikarzom, accessed on 28 January 2016.
117. The USA sees the EU through the prism of its member states, not as a
unit. From the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, Washington didn’t believe
in the effectiveness of the European Union, as is reflected by the words
‘F..k the EU’ spoken by Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland dur-
ing a telephone conversation with the US Ambassador to Ukraine,
Geoffrey Pyatt, in February 2014. See D. Chiacu, A. Mohammed (2014),
Leaked audio reveals embarrassing U.S. exchange on Ukraine, EU, 6
February, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ukraine-tape-idUS-
BREA1601G20140207, accessed on 28 January 2016.
118. On PiS government see: J. Zaja ̨c (2016), ‘100 Tage PiS-Regierung in
Polen’, Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West, RGOW 3/2016,
pp. 9–10. The European Parliament adopted two resolutions on the situ-
ation in Poland on 13 April 2016 and 14 September 2016. The European
Parliament expressed its concern that actions taken by the Polish govern-
ment and the President of the Republic of Poland have led to the effec-
tive paralysis of the Constitutional Tribunal which poses a danger to
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In the September resolu-
tion, besides the constitutional crisis, EP was also concerned about the
recent rapid legislative developments in other areas in relation, in particu-
lar, to independence and impartiality of public service media, right to
freedom of expression, right to privacy, procedural rights as well as the
fundamental right to a fair trial, political impartiality of the country’s
administration, and fundamental human rights, including women rights.
CHAPTER 6
Conclusions
Throughout the post-Cold War period, the main goal of Poland’s security
policy has been to provide protection against Russia. Despite the fact that
Poland’s successive National Security Strategies in the years 1989–2014
reflected a wide view of security and the absence of a military threat, the
fear that Russia might revert to an imperial policy was continually present.
The Polish Minister of National Defense Tomasz Siemoniak confirmed
this in September 2015 when he stated:
Since the end of the Cold War, our assessment of the security situation in
Europe was free of illusions about the absence of threats of a military nature.
The events in Ukraine only increased our perception of such threats. They
confirmed the unpredictability of Russian policy, aimed at regaining the sta-
tus of superpower and realization of arbitrarily defined political objectives,
also through the use of military means.1
Poland’s concerns undoubtedly have to do with its negative historical

experience and are pre-determined by its unfavorable ‘in the middle’ loca-
tion between Germany and Russia. Through the greater part of its history,
Poland has had to fight for its survival. As a result, this struggle became so
strongly rooted in the identity of the Poles that even when Poland found
itself in a very favorable position in security terms after the Cold War, it
was difficult to change their way of thinking.

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59500-3_6
186 J. ZAJA ̨C
In post-Cold War conditions, the Poles largely managed to overcome

their apprehensions with regard to Germany, but their fear of Russia
remained. This trend is noticeable both in the political elite and among
the public. The social perception of the development of Polish–German
relations after the Cold War is unequivocally positive. In a study con-
ducted on the anniversary of the signing of the Polish–German Treaty on
Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation (1991), 78% of respondents
felt that the last twenty years have been a period of significant improve-
ment in Polish–German relations.2 Their perception of Polish–Russian
relations, however, is characterized by a high degree of changeability and
a predominance of negative views. Since the collapse of the USSR, the
prevailing view in public opinion polls was that Russians are ‘neither good
nor bad’, but since 2000 Polish–Russian relations have never been seen as
good. After the 2008 Georgian–Russian War, there was increased fear of
neo-imperialist trends in Russian policy. In October 2008, 66% of respon-
dents were of the opinion that in the near future, Russia would try to
restore its influence over Central and Eastern Europe.3 Poles’ perception
of Polish–Russian relations was strongly affected by the Ukrainian crisis.
In May 2014 almost two-thirds of Poles (65%) believed that those rela-
tions were bad, while only 3% considered them good. However, just as in
previous years, the group of respondents viewing relations with Russia as a
priority (38%) was larger than the paramount importance to relations with
post-Soviet states, such as Georgia or Ukraine (34%).4
The decrease in Polish fears of Germany was undoubtedly influenced
by the fact that Germany is a member of western organizations like NATO
and the EU, of which Poland is also a member. Russia, however, remains
outside these structures, that along with its domestic constraints rein-
forces the Poles’ concern for their security.5 After the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russia has had to reestablish its place in the international system
and has been trying to achieve the strongest position possible. This has
given rise to concern in Poland about neo-imperialist trends in Russian
policy that could be a threat to Central and Eastern Europe.
The changing post-Cold War international order has inevitably had a
major impact on Polish security policy. While Poland has the ability, as a
middle power, to influence the international order, this ability is limited
and the impact of the international order on Poland’s own policies is far
greater. During the transition of the late 1980s and early 1990s—a period
when Eastern Bloc institutions were dissolved, and when Cold War pat-
terns of behavior in international politics disappeared while new ones had
CONCLUSIONS 187
not yet emerged—Poland adopted a bridging strategy. It was based on

cooperation with all neighbors, on taking part in shaping new forms of
sub-regional cooperation, and on promoting a model of cooperative secu-
rity in Europe centered on the CSCE. This strategy was perfectly summed
up by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who stated in his Sejm exposé
of 12 September 1989 that Poland’s opening up to Europe did not imply
the rejection of its existing commitments. This strategy was implemented
when Krzysztof Skubiszewski was Poland’s foreign minister (1989–1993).
As Joshua Spero points out:
Skubiszewski forged a long-term vision for Poland’s middle power position

in Europe’s rapidly changing security system by bridging to the East, based
on Poland’s solid Western foundation. […] For Skubiszewski the priority
remained to promulgate consistently a cooperative set of policies toward all
neighboring states and institutions. He always based this priority on Poland’s
European reintegration and outreach to Russia […]. Consequently, Poland
endeavored to promote a policy based on European democratization and inte-
gration, trying to support not only those of its neighbors who mattered for
regional security, but also those who implemented stability-enhancing policies.6
In the years 1991–1994, Poland signed friendship and cooperation agree-

ments with all its neighbors, took part in the dissolution of the Warsaw
Pact and COMECON, co-initiated new forms of sub-regional coopera-
tion (the Visegrad Triangle, the Weimar Triangle, the Council of the Baltic
Sea States), normalized relations with Russia on a partnership basis, and
settled the outstanding commitments from the Polish People’s Republic
period while, at the same time, pursuing the goal of a ‘return to Europe’.
The implementation of the bridging strategy was undoubtedly facil-
itated by the favorable international situation. At the beginning of the
1990s, while the relationship between the West and Russia was one of
close cooperation, Poland, which lay at the crossroads of the East and the
West, was seen as a bridge facilitating this cooperation, more so because
such a role had been present in Poland’s history. The fact that the West
had no clear vision of a European security structure during the first post-
Cold War years was a highly significant factor in Warsaw’s choice of a
bridging strategy. Security organizations—NATO, WEU and CSCE—
vied for supremacy at the time and this influenced the policies of Central
and Eastern European countries. The position of the USA was also one of
restraint: in the first months of 1991, Washington held the view that the
188 J. ZAJA ̨C
events unfolding in the USSR were of the highest importance, while the
issue of NATO or WEU membership for Central European countries was
a premature one. Therefore, if Poland adopted a bridging strategy that
promoted a system of cooperative security in Europe in the first years of
transformations, it was largely due to the West’s reluctance to make deci-
sions about the future shape of European security. Minister Skubiszewski
assumed that after German reunification, the West sought to strengthen
the role of the CSCE, which was supposed to offer some compensation
to the Soviet Union for the loss of control over eastern Germany. He also
believed that the West thought the price to pay for German reunification
was the maintenance of Soviet influence in Central and Eastern Europe
and this meant that NATO would not expand beyond Germany’s eastern
border. Skubiszewski stated this clearly:
As long as the Soviet Union existed and was led by Mikhail Gorbachev,
the accession of former Soviet satellites to NATO was out of the question,
because such was the position of the Alliance and its members. [...] In the
times of the Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki governments,
accession to the Alliance had to remain in the realm of possible (desirable)
scenarios or wishes; [...] The various guarantees granted to the USSR by the
West in connection with the resolution of the German problem, made the
admission of new members impossible [...] [Poland’s – JZ] actions had to be
gradual, without abrupt moves which would be seen as provocative by the
West and would not make Poland a desirable partner.7
Such were largely the circumstances in which Poland adopted its bridg-
ing strategy. The West’s thinking only changed in August 1991 with
Yanayev’s putsch (August Putsch), which foreshadowed the collapse of the
Soviet Union. As a result, after November 1991, institutional cooperation
between NATO and the Central and Eastern European countries—the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)—was established. It was
then that Poland began to move away from focusing on the CSCE and
began to pursue a rapprochement with NATO and the WEU, although
the latter was never a priority in Polish security policy. As western coun-
tries called for more interaction between organizations building Europe’s
cooperative security, Poland took a similar position in support of the
“interlocking institutions” concept. Thus, despite having adopted NATO
accession as a security policy priority in 1992, Poland continued to pursue
its bridging strategy. Normalization, followed by close cooperation with
CONCLUSIONS 189
Germany, close relations with Czecho-Slovakia, and the rapid normal-

ization of relations with its eastern neighbors, including Russia, showed
Poland as a stable and predictable country. In co-initiating sub-regional
cooperation and in its activeness in the CSCE, Poland indicated that it was
focused on cooperation and that it would contribute to European unity.
Poland’s positive image was also strengthened by Warsaw’s efforts to re-
establish traditionally close Polish–French collaboration and by the rap-
prochement with the USA. As Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski recalled
years later, ‘without all these actions, Poland’s association with the West—
including NATO membership, which was the most important Polish secu-
rity policy aim—would not have been possible.8
The bridging strategy soon ran into obstacles, however, and one of the
greatest was Poland’s eastern policy. The role of bridge between East and
West depended on Poland having very good relations with each, and such
was not the case.9 Poland’s official announcement of its aim to join NATO
in November 1992 met with formal opposition from Russia the follow-
ing September. This issue led to a sharp deterioration of Polish–Russian
relations, which worsened further over time. In addition, the encouraging
progress in Polish–Belarusian relations was halted. President Alexander
Lukashenka, elected in 1994, based Belarus’ policy on close collabora-
tion with Russia, and this ruled out any rapprochement between Belarus
and the West. Moreover, there were also problems with Polish–Ukrainian
relations. Ukrainian foreign policy aims were not firmly established and
its priorities swung, back and forth, from favoring the West, to Russia’s
advantage. Building true partnership between Poland and Ukraine was
also hindered by a complicated history. In 1996, the Polish–Ukrainian
strategic partnership, established in 1992, was reactivated, but experienced
many ups and downs in subsequent years. Polish–Lithuanian relations, in
turn, were continually disrupted by problems with Lithuania’s treatment
of its Polish minority, despite the signing of a bilateral treaty of friend-
ship and cooperation in April 1994. Nevertheless, relations with Lithuania
were settled satisfactorily, the unresolved issue of Lithuania’s Polish minor-
ity notwithstanding. Both countries pursued a common goal—accession
to the EU and NATO—and sought the best possible protection against
Russia. Relations with other neighbors also failed to develop as Warsaw
expected. The Visegrad Triangle, which was established in 1991 and was
to serve Poland’s rapprochement with Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, in
practice served to highlight its members’ disinclination to work together.
190 J. ZAJA ̨C
Problems in Poland’s eastern policy grew as the relations between the

West and Russia deteriorated. The West’s dominance, and US global
hegemony, which gradually emerged after the Cold War, led Russia to
feel increasingly resentful and convinced it was being treated unequally.
The West, in turn, grew progressively disappointed in Russia’s slow pace
of transformation. The Copenhagen criteria adopted by the EU in 1993
implied that the EU was considering admitting Central and Eastern
European countries in the near future. In January 1994, NATO adopted
the Partnership for Peace program and in September 1995 it announced
the conditions to be met by candidate states in the Study on NATO
Enlargement. Russia, which had always pursued balance of power poli-
tics as a general rule of statecraft, viewed this as the West’s attempt to
dominate Europe and was vehemently opposed. By the mid-1990s, the
diverging paths taken by the West and Russia became increasingly appar-
ent. At the same time, the West’s policy crystallized: the question now was
not if, but when to accept new members to NATO and the EU. These
developments influenced Polish policy. Seeing Russia’s increasingly critical
stance, Warsaw intensified its efforts to obtain hard security guarantees as
quickly as possible. It pursued NATO membership and the strengthening
of its political and military relations with the Alliance’s strongest mem-
ber—the USA. As it sought the earliest possible accession to NATO in the
mid-1990s, Poland also gradually became less active in the OSCE. This
organization did not provide hard security guarantees, something that was
of utmost importance for Poland, and Warsaw also feared that the OSCE
might be used by Russia to pursue its own national interests, to weaken
NATO and to break the unity of the West. Such an eventuality would have
been highly disadvantageous from Poland’s point of view.
In March 1999, Poland became a NATO member and, in subsequent
years, it strengthened the pro-American course in its security policy.
Bandwagoning with the USA (the global hegemon), whose relations with
Russia (the country representing a potential threat) were strained, was
seen in Warsaw as the best security strategy and as a path to other ben-
efits, like the ones Poland expected to gain through its participation in
the military operation against Iraq in March 2003. The choice of a band-
wagoning strategy by states which are not great powers is a frequent one
in international relations. Poland’s pro-American orientation was so pro-
nounced, however, that some researchers define it as submissive, as ‘the
Americanization of Polish foreign policy’, as clientelism or satellitism.10
Indeed, Warsaw supported US international actions unconditionally,
CONCLUSIONS 191
going as far as to allow the US to operate a secret CIA prison on Polish

territory where prisoners were tortured. In July 2014, the European
Court of Human Rights found that, in doing so, Poland had violated the
European Convention on Human Rights and ordered Poland to pay com-
pensation to two prisoners—Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri.
Poland’s pro-American stance also harmed its relations with Germany and
France, both of which were highly critical of US policy during the presi-
dency of G. W. Bush. Poland was described as ‘America’s Trojan horse in
Europe’. The term reflected the position Poland took with regard to the
EU’s attempts to build a European autonomous and cooperative security
and defense system. When the European Council launched the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999, Warsaw feared that this
could undermine NATO and reduce US military presence in Europe. For
this reason, Poland only reluctantly welcomed this initiative and consis-
tently treated the ESDP as being complementary to NATO.
The emergence of the multipolar order at the beginning of the 21st
century presents Poland’s security policy with new challenges. Under
Vladimir Putin, Russia adopted a policy seeking to change the status quo,
something that Polish decision makers see as a threat. As Central and
Eastern European intellectuals and former policymakers wrote in a letter
to Barack Obama in July 2009, ‘at a global level, Russia has become, on
most issues, a status-quo power. But at a regional level and vis-à-vis our
nations, it increasingly acts as a revisionist one’. This policy was made
plain in a speech given by President Putin at the Munich security confer-
ence in February 2007, and then after the 2008 Georgian–Russian War.
In the face of these developments, Poland increasingly began to work for
the consolidation of NATO and the strengthening its traditional func-
tion—collective defense (art. 5). At the same time, Warsaw took steps to
further strengthen its political and military relations with the USA. Poland
has been buying American military equipment and, in August 2008, the
two countries signed an agreement on the deployment of elements of the
American missile shield on Polish territory. This agreement, however, did
not enter into force and the Obama administration replaced the program
with the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). Poland is its mem-
ber and SM3 missiles are to be deployed in the north of Poland (Słupsk-
Redzikowo) by 2018. At the same time, since Washington’s policy has
shifted towards Asia (the Asia pivot), Poland has taken additional mea-
sures to assure its security. It is beefing up its own defense capabilities, and
attempting to increase the effectiveness of Common and Security Defence
192 J. ZAJA ̨C
Policy (CSDP). The European Union, however, is going through a seri-

ous crisis, and building the CSDP has been ineffective. Thus, although
Poland’s strategic documents, such as the White Book on National Security
of the Republic of Poland (2013) and the National Security Strategy of the
Republic of Poland (2014), mention that Poland’s security policy is based
on three pillars—national defense capabilities; NATO and cooperation
with its strongest member, the USA; and the EU—in practice, Poland
has been concentrating on the first two. The Ukrainian crisis has rein-
forced this trend because there are clear differences in opinion among the
EU member states over the policy to take with regard to Russia, even if
the European Union imposed sanctions on Russia. Poland’s security has
decreased seriously as a result of the Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s annexa-
tion of Crimea in March 2014. The National Security Strategy Poland
adopted in November 2014 is the first strategy since the end of the Cold
War that mentions the possibility of an attack of a military nature against
Poland, and the likelihood of an armed conflict with Russia is also dis-
cussed in Polish public debate.
As it grew increasingly concerned with Russia’s neo-imperial policy,
Poland did not follow the usual behavior associated in the literature with
middle powers.11 Instead, its security policy gradually became dominated
by actions coming out of the neorealist paradigm, such as strengthen-
ing its defense potential, bandwagoning, containment, and deterrence.
Through these actions, its concern for the consolidation of the North
Atlantic Alliance, for a close relationship with the United States and,
for the strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank, Poland sought to deter
and restrain Russia. At the same time, Poland supports the pro-Western
course in the foreign policy of post-Soviet states—mainly in Ukraine and
Georgia—hoping that this will rule out the rebuilding by Russia of its
influence in the post-Soviet area.
In terms of the three middle power concepts proposed by Australian social
scientist Allan Patience—the Concert of Europe, the regionalist, and the
neo-Kantian—, it is clear that Poland’s current security policy is dominated
by the first, which Patience describes as ‘reflecting the Concert of Europe’s
nineteenth-century role for “lesser states”, a state that is intent on imagining
a middle power role for itself will accrue influence—even reflected power—
through its alliance with a great power partner as it shelters beneath that
partner’s “security umbrella”’.12 Viewed from Warsaw, the 21st century saw
a return to the geopolitics of the 19th century—to the power of states, the
concert of powers, political and military rivalry, and the division of the world
CONCLUSIONS 193
into spheres of influence. The security dilemma that Poland has been trying
to resolve for centuries remains extant. A consolidated European Union
and smooth transatlantic cooperation allow Poland to overcome traditional
anxieties related to its geopolitical location ‘between Germany and Russia’,
and assume a location ‘between the West and Russia’—one that makes it an
integral part of the West and affords it greater security.
NOTES
1. (2015), Główne kierunki rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych RP wobec nowych
uwarunkowań bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego Wysta ̨pienie wicepre-
miera, ministra obrony narodowej Tomasza Siemoniaka z okazji 60-lecia
Zgromadzenia Parlamentarnego NATO, 22 September. http://mon.gov.
pl/z/pliki/rozne/2015/09/Warszawa_22.09.2015.pdf, accessed on 20
February 2016.
2. (June 2011), Polacy o relacjach między Polska ̨ a Niemcami. Komunikat z
badań, CBOS, BS/73/2011, p. 4.
3. (October 2008), Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie i sytuacja na Kaukazie. Komunikat
z badań, CBOS, BS/158/2008, pp. 8, 10.
4. (May 2014), Opinions about Polish-Russian Relations and Poland’s Eastern
Policy, CBOS, 77/2014.
5. Many Polish experts and politicians are of the opinion that the revisionist
Russian policy is determined by the authoritarian system. Many of them
consider President Vladimir Putin as the symbol of this policy.
6. J. Spero (2004), Bridging the European Divide: Middle Power Politics and
Regional Dilemmas (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), pp. 297–298, 300.
7. K. Skubiszewski (1999), ‘Polska i Sojusz Północnoatlantycki w latach
1989–1991’, Sprawy Międzynarodowe, No. 1, p. 11, 18.
8. Ibid., p. 47 et seq.
9. S. W. Garnett (1996), ‘Poland: Bulwark or Bridge’, Foreign Policy, No.
102, pp. 66–82.
10. For more, see Chap. 4.
11. A.Włodkowska-Bagan (2015), Środki i metody polityki zagranicznej państw
średniej rangi. Casus Polski po 1989 r., in J. Zaja ̨c, A. Włodkowska-Bagan,
M. Kaczmarski, eds. Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Polska-Europa-Świat.
Księga jubileuszowa na czterdziestolecie pracy naukowej prof. dr. hab.
Ryszarda Zięby (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo WDiNP UW), pp. 295–309.
12. A. Patience (2014), ‘Imagining middle powers’, Australian Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2, p. 218.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acharya, A. 2014. The end of the American world order. Cambridge, Malden:
Polity Press.
Albright, M. 1991. The role of the United States in Central Europe. Proceedings
of the Academy of Political Science 38(1): 71–84.
Allin, D.H., and E. Jones. 2012. Weary policeman: American power in an age of
austerity. New York: Routledge.
Allison, R. 2013. Russia, the West, and military intervention. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Anderson, J., G.J. Ikenberry, and T. Risse (eds.). 2008. The end of the West? Crisis
and change in the Atlantic order. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Andrews, D.M. (ed.). 2005. The Atlantic alliance under stress: US-European rela-
tions after Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Archick, K. 2008. NATO and the European Union. CRS Report for Congress, RL
32342.
Asmus, R.D. 2004. Opening NATO’s door. How the alliance remade itself for a new
era. New York: Columbia University Press.
Asmus, R.D., R.L. Kugler, and F.S. Larrabee. 1993. Building a new NATO.
Foreign Affairs 72(4): 28–40.
Asmus, R.D., R.L. Kugler, and F.S. Larrabee. 1995. NATO expansion: The next
steps. Survival 37(1): 7–33.
Asmus, R.D., A.J. Blinken, and P.H. Gordon. 2005. Washington should embrace
the European Union. Foreign Affairs 84(1): 174–177.
Attinà, F., and D. Irrera (eds.). 2010. Multilateral security and ESDP operations.
Farnham: Ashgate.
Balcer, A., and K. Wóycicki. 2014. Polska na globalnej szachownicy. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Poltext.
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59500-3
196 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bauwens, W., A. Clesse, and O.F. Knudsen (eds.). 1996. Small states and the
security challenge in the new Europe. London/Washington: Brassey’s.
Bereś, W., and K. Burnetko. 1999. Onyszkiewicz ze szczytów NATO. Warsaw: Dom
Wydawniczy Bellona.
Bieleń, S. (ed.). 2011a. Poland’s foreign policy in the 21st century. Warsaw: Difin.
Bieleń, S. (ed.). 2011b. Wizerunki międzynarodowe Rosji. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo
ASPRA.
Bieleń, S. 2012. The possibility of reconciliation in Polish-Russian relations.
Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 27: 11–34.
Bieleń, S. 2014. Rozważania o polskim interesie narodowym. Stosunki
Międzynarodowe-International Relations 50(2): 57–73.
Bieleń, S., and A. Skrzypek (eds.). 2012. Geopolityka w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich.
Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ASPRA.
Bieńczyk-Missala, A. 2006. Human rights in Polish foreign policy after 1989.
Warsaw: PISM.
Bingen, D. 1997. Polityka Republiki Bońskiej wobec Polski. Od Adenauera do Kohla
1949–1991. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Kwadrat.
Blank, S., A. Cohen, P.J. Dobriansky, M. Gage, R.O. Freedman, S. Sestanovich, and
A. Stent. 1998. The state of Russian foreign policy and U.S. policy toward Russia.
Heritage lectures, No. 607. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation.
Boesen, H., and L. Larsen. 2012. The Russo-Georgian war and beyond: Towards
a European great power concert. European Security 21(1): 102–121.
Booth, K. (ed.). 1998. Statecraft and security: The cold war and beyond. Cambridge:
University Press Cambridge.
Borawski, J., and T.D. Young. 2001. NATO after 2000: The future of the Euro-
Atlantic alliance. Westport: Praeger.
Borkowicz, J., J. Cichocki, and K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz (eds.). 2007. Okręt
Koszykowa. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Borodziej, W. (ed.). 2006. Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989–1991.
Dokumenty dyplomatyczne. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
Bowker, M. 2007. Russia, America and the Islamic world. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Bromke, A. 1967. Poland’s politics: Idealism vs. realism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Bryc, A. 2008. Rosja w XXI wieku. Gracz światowy czy koniec gry? Warsaw:
Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne.
Brzezinski, I.J. 1993. Polish-Ukrainian relations: Europe’s neglected strategic
axis. Survival 35(3): 26–37.
Brzeziński, Z. 1995. A plan for Europe. Foreign Affairs 74(1): 26–42.
Brzeziński, Z. 1997. The grand chessboard. American primacy and its geostrategic
imperatives. New York: Basic Books.
Brzeziński, Z. 2004. The choice, global domination or global leadership. New York:
Basic Books.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 197
Buckley, M., and R. Singh (eds.). 2006. The Bush doctrine and the war on terror-
ism. Global response, global consequences. London/New York: Routledge.
Buell, R.L. 1939. Poland. Key to Europe. New York/London: Alfred A. Knopf.
Bugajski, J. 2009. America’s new European allies. New York: Nova Science
Publishers.
Bull, H. 1977. The Anarchical Society. A study of order in world politics. London:
Macmillam Press.
Burant, S.R. 1993. International relations in a regional context: Poland and its
Eastern neighbors – Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine. Europe-Asia Studies 45(3):
399–405.
Bush, G. 1991. Toward a new world order, address before a joint session of congress,
Washington D.C., September 11, 1990, vol. 1, no. 3. Washington: US Department
of State.
Chapnick, A. 1999. The middle power. Canadian Foreign Policy 7(2): 73–82.
Charap, S., and J. Shapiro. 2014. How to avoid a new cold war. Current History:
A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs 113: 265–271.
Christensen, T.J., and J. Snyder. 1990. Chain Gangs and passed bucks: Predicting
alliance patterns in multipolarity. International Organization 44(2): 137–168.
Clesse, A., and L. Rühl (eds.). 1990. Beyond east–west confrontation: Searching for
a new security in Europe. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsesellschaft.
Clinton, H. 2011. America’s Pacific century. Foreign Policy 189: 56–63.
Cohen, J. 1999. Conflict prevention in the OSCE: An assessment of capacities. The
Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’.
Cohen, S.F. 2001. Failed crusade: America and the tragedy of post-Communist
Russia. New York/London: W.W. Norton Company.
Cohen, S.F. 2015. The Ukrainian crisis: It’s not all Putin’s Fault. The Nation,
December 14.
Cooper, A.F., R.A. Higgott, and K.R. Nossal. 1993. Relocating middle powers.
Australia and Canada in a changing world order. Vancouver: UBC Press.
Cox, M. 1995. US foreign policy after the Cold War: Superpower without a mission?
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Cox, R. 1996. Approaches to world order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Czornik, K., and M. Lakomy (eds.). 2014. Dylematy polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski
na pocza ̨tku drugiej dekady XXI wieku. Katowice: Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty
Międzynarodowej.
Czornik, K., M. Lakomy, and M. Stolarczyk (eds.). 2014. Dylematy polityki
zagranicznej na pocza ̨tku XXI wieku. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Śla ̨skiego.
Czornik, K., M. Lakomy, and M. Stolarczyk (eds.). 2015. Implikacje konfliktu
ukraińskiego dla polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa polski. Aspekty polityczne,
wojskowe, gospodarcze i społeczne. Katowice: Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty
Międzynarodowej w Katowicach.
198 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Czubiński, A. (ed.). 1988. PRL–RFN. Blaski i cienie procesu normalizacji wzajem-

nych stosunków 1972–1987. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
Czulda, R., and M. Madej (eds.). 2015. Newcomers no more? Contemporary NATO
and the future from the perspective of ‘Post-Cold War’ member. Warsaw/Prague/
Brussels: International Relations Research Institute in Warsaw, Jagello 2000 –
NATO Information Center in Prague, Latvian Institute of International Affairs
in Riga in cooperation with Atlantic Treaty Association in Brussels.
Daalder, I.H., and J.M. Lindsay. 2003. America unbound. The Bush revolution in
foreign policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Davies, N. 1984. Heart of Europe. A short history of Poland. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Dewitt, D.B., and J.J. Kirton. 1983. Canada as a principal power. Toronto: Wiley.
Dmochowski, A. 2013. Między Unia ̨ a Rosja ̨. O polskiej racji stanu, polityce
zagranicznej i miejscu Polski w Unii Europejskiej z ekspertami rozmawia Artur
Dmochowski. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Słowa i Myśli.
Donaldson, R.H., and J.L. Nogee. 2009. The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing
Systems, Enduring Interests. Armonk: M.E. Sharp.
Drzewieniecki, W. 1959. The German-Polish frontier. Chicago: Polish Western
Association of America.
Duke, S. 2000. The elusive quest for European security: From EDC to CFSP.
Houndmills/Basingstoke/Hampshire: Macmillan Press.
Dziewanowski, K. 1995. Polityka w sercu Europy. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza
Rytm.
Edström, H., J. Matlary, and M. Petersson (eds.). 2011. NATO: The power of
partnership. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Flynn, G., and D.J. Scheffer. 1990. Limited collective security. Foreign Policy 80:
77–101.
Friszke, A. 2007. Przystosowanie i opór. Studia z dziejów PRL. Warsaw: Biblioteka
Więzi.
Fryc, M. 2014. Doktryna Komorowskiego – próba scharakteryzowania. Idea,
zakres, priorytety, realizacja. Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe II–2014/30: 41–72.
Garnett, S.W. 1996. Poland: Bulwark or Bridge. Foreign Policy 102: 66–82.
Geremek, B. 2015. Rozmowy polskie 1988–2008. Warsaw: Biblioteka Profesora
Bronisława Geremka.
Ghebali, V.-Y. 1996. L’OSCE dans l’Europe post-communiste, 1990–1996. Vers une
identité paneuropéenne de sécurité. Brussels: Établissement Émile Bruylant.
Gil, A., and T. Kapuśniak (eds.). 2009. Polityka wschodnia Polski. Uwarunkowania.
Koncepcje. Realizacja. Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej.
Goldgeier, J.M. 1998. NATO expansion: The anatomy of decision. Washington
Quarterly 21(1): 85–102.
Goldgeier, J.M. 1999. Not whether but when: The U.S. decision to enlarge NATO.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 199
Góralski, W.M. (ed.). 2007. Polska–Niemcy 1945–2007. Od konfrontacji i part-

nerstwa w Europie. Warsaw: PISM.
Gordon, J.K. (ed.). 1966. Canada’s role as a middle power. Toronto: Canadian
Institute for International Affairs.
Górka-Winter, B. 2006. System obrony przeciwrakietowej Stanów Zjednoczonych –
głos w dyskusji. Polski Przegla ̨d Dyplomatyczny 5(33): 53–69.
Górska, J. 2010. Dealing with a Juggernaut: Analyzing Poland’s policy toward
Russia, 1989–2009. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Grevi, G., and A. de Vasconcelos (eds.). 2008. Partnership for effective multilater-
alism: EU relations with Brazil, China, India, Russia. Paris: UE Institute for
Security Studies.
Grodzki, R. 2012. Polsko-amerykańska współpraca wojskowa: stan i perspektywy.
Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego 114: 1–5.
Grudziński, P. 1997. Raport Polska-Rosja: niezgoda i współpraca. Warsaw: Centrum
Stosunków Międzynarodowych Instytutu Spraw Publicznych.
Grudziński, P. 2008. Państwo inteligentne. Polska w poszukiwaniu międzynarodowej
roli. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
Grudziński, P., and J. Pietrusiewicz. 2011. Building a modern security community
in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe 19: 51–62.
Grünberg, K., and B. Sprengler. 2005. Trudne sa ̨siedztwo. Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie
w X–XX wieku. Warsaw: Ksia ̨żka i Wiedza.
Hajnicz, A. 1996. Ze soba ̨ czy przeciw sobie. Polska–Niemcy 1989–1992. Warsaw:
Presspublica.
Hale, H. 2015. Patronal politics. Eurasian regime dynamics in comparative perspec-
tive. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Halecki, O. 1937. Idea jagiellońska. Lwów: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.
Halecki, O. 1952. Borderlands of western civilization: A history of East Central
Europe. New York: The Ronald Press Company.
Hallenberg, J., and H. Karlsson (eds.). 2005. The Iraq War: European perspectives
on politics, strategy and operations. London/New York: Routledge.
Halliwell, M., and C. Morley (eds.). 2008. American thought and culture in the
21st century. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Handel, M. 1981. Weak states in the international system. London: Frank Cass.
Holbraad, C. 1971. The role of middle powers. Cooperation and Conflict 6(2):
77–90.
Holbraad, C. 1984. Middle powers in international politics. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Hopmann, P.T. 1999. Building security in post-Cold War Eurasia. The OSCE and
U.S. foreign policy. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
Houghton, D.P. 2009. Bush and Europe. In Assessing the George W. Bush Presidency.
A tale of two terms, ed. A. Wroe and J. Herbert, 115–128. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
200 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Huntington, S.P. 1999. The lonely superpower. Foreign Affairs 78(2): 35–49.
Hyde-Price, A. 1991. European security beyond the Cold War: Four scenarios for the
2010. London: SAGE Publications for RIIA.
Hyde-Price, A. 1996. The international politics of East Central Europe. Manchester/
New York: Manchester University Press.
Ikenberry, G.J. 2011. Liberal leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of
the American world order. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Ikenberry, G.J., et al. 2009. The crisis of American foreign policy. Wilsonianism in
the twenty-first century. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Jarosz, D., and M. Pasztor. 2015. Polish-French relations 1944–1989. Frankfurt-
am-Main: Peter Lang.
Jasienica, P. 2007a. Polska Jagiellonów. Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka.
Jasienica, P. 2007b. Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów. Dzieje agonii. Warsaw:
Prószyński i S-ka.
Jasina, Ł., J. Kłoczowski, and A. Gil (eds.). 2007. Aktualność przesłania paryskiej
‘Kultury’ w dzisiejszej Europie. Zbiór studiów. Lublin: Instytut Europy
Środkowo-Wschodniej.
Jervis, R., and J. Snyder (eds.). 1991. Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic beliefs
and great power competition in the Euroasian Rimland. Oxford/New York:
Oxford University Press).
Joffe, J. 1992. Collective security and the future of Europe: Failed dreams and
dead ends. Survival 34(1): 36–50.
Jones, E. 2004. Debating the transatlantic relationship: Rhetoric and reality.
International Affairs 80(4): 595–612.
Jordaan, E. 2003. The concept of a middle power in international relations:
Distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers. Politikon
30(2): 165–181.
Jørgensen, K.E. (ed.). 1997. European approaches to crisis management. The
Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International.
Kacprzyk, A. 2014. Deterring Russia after Ukraine: CEE divided on the future of
NATO policy. Policy Paper 13(96), July.
Kaczmarski, M. 2009, Russia’s Revisionist Policy towards the West. OSW Studies,
no. 33.
Kamińska, J. 2014. Poland and EU enlargement: Foreign policy in transformation.
New York/Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kapstein, E.B., and M. Mastanduno (eds.). 1999. Unipolar politics. Realism and
state strategies after the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press.
Kapstein, E.B., and M. Mastanduno (eds.). 2004. Unipolar politics. Realism and
state strategies after the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press.
Karabeshkin, L., and D.R. Spechler. 2007. EU and NATO enlargement: Russia’s
expectations, responses and options for the future. European Security 16(3–4):
307–328.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 201
Karagiannis, E. 2013. The 2008 Russian-Georgian war via the lens of Offensive
Realism. European Security 22(1): 74–93.
Karski, J. 1997. Polska powinna stać się pomostem między narodami Europy
Zachodniej a jej wschodnimi sa ̨siadami. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Łódzkiego.
Karski, J. 2014. The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to Yalta. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Kenney, P. 2002. A carnival of revolution: Central Europe 1989. Princeton/
Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, R. 1969. Lilliputians’ dilemmas: Small states in international politics.
International Organization 23(2): 291–310.
Klafkowski, A. 1957. Podstawy prawne granicy na Odra Nysa na tle umów
jałtańskiej i poczdamskiej. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
Klatt, M. 2011. Poland and its eastern neighbours: Foreign policy principles.
Journal of Contemporary European Research 7(1): 1–16.
Klich, B., and J.M. Nowak. 2000. Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa. Zapis dyskusji.
Polska w Europie 32: 35–71.
Kloczkowski, J. (ed.). 2009. Przeklęte miejsce Europy? Dylematy polskiej geopolityki.
Cracow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej.
Kloczkowski, J. (ed.). 2010. Polska w grze międzynarodowej. Geopolityka i sprawy
wewnętrzne. Cracow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej.
Knutsen, T.L. 1999. The rise and fall of world orders. Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Kokot, J. 1959. The logic of the Oder-Neisse frontier. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo
Zachodnie.
Kolarska-Bobińska, L., J. Kucharczyk, and P.M. Kaczyński (eds.). 2005. Mosty
przez Atlantyk? Postawy Polaków, Czechów, Słowaków wobec Stanów Zjednoczonych.
Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych.
Kortunov, V. 2010. Mirovaya politika v usloviyakh krizisa. Moscow: Aspekt Press.
Koszel, B. 2008. Polska i Niemcy w Unii Europejskiej. Pola konfliktów i płaszczyzny
współpracy. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
Koszel, B. 2012. A new opening? Polish-German relations during the rule of the
PO-PSL coalition (2007–2009). Przegla ̨d Zachodni 4: 201–227.
Kowal, P. 2011. Krajobrazy z Mistralami w tle. Cracow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej.
Kowal, P., J. Ołdakowski, and M. Zuchniak (eds.). 2003. Nie jesteśmy ukrainofil-
ami. Polska myśl polityczna wobec Ukraińców i Ukrainy. Antologia tekstów.
Wrocław: Kolegium Europy Wschodniej.
Kozerawski, D.S. 2012. Kontyngenty Wojska Polskiego w międzynarodowych operac-
jach pokojowych w latach 1973–1999: konflikty-interwencje-bezpieczeństwo.
Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
Koziej, S. 2011. Potrzeba nowelizacji strategii bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej.
Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe 20: 19–40.
202 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Koziej, S. 2012. Obronność Polski w warunkach samodzielności strategicznej lat

90. XX wieku. Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, No. 21, 19–30.
Kozyrev, A.V. 1994a. The lagging partnership. Foreign Affairs 73(3): 59–71.
Kozyrev, A.V. 1994b. Russia and NATO: A partnership for a United and peaceful
Europe. NATO Review 42(4): 3–6.
Krauthammer C. 1990/1992. The unipolar moment. Foreign Affairs 70(23):
23–33.
Kuczyński, G. 2009. Strategia Rosji wobec Zachodu. Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe
9/10: 155–171.
Kukułka, J. 1998. Traktaty sa ̨siedzkie Polski Odrodzonej. Wrocław: Zakład
Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.
Kulesa, Ł. (ed.). 2012. The future of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture: Views
from Central Europe. Warsaw: PISM.
Kulesa, Ł., A. Nicolescu, S. Secrieru, and A. Sobják. 2013. Pushing the turbo but-
ton: What next for the Polish-Romanian strategic partnership?. Policy Paper
30(78), November (Warsaw: PISM/ Bucharest: EIR).
Kundera, M. 1983. Un occident kidnappé ou la tragédie de l’Europe centrale. Le
Débat 27: 3–23.
Kundera, M. 1984. The tragedy of Central Europe. New York Review of Books
31(7): 33–38.
Kundnani, H. 2015. Leaving the west behind. Foreign Affairs 94(1): 108–116.
Kupchan, Ch A. 1991. Concerts, collective security, and the future of Europe.
International Security 16(1): 114–161.
Kupchan, Ch A. 1994. Strategic vision. World Policy Journal 11(3): 112–122.
Kupchan, Ch A. 1998. After Pax Americana: Benign power, regional integration,
and the sources of stable multipolarity. International Security 23(3): 40–79.
Kuźniar, R. (ed.). 2001. Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa 1989–2000. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
Kuźniar, R. 2006. Bezpieczeństwo – po pierwsze nie szkodzić. Polski Przegla ̨d
Dyplomatyczny 5(33): 5–17.
Kuźniar, R. 2009. Poland’s foreign policy after 1989. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo
Naukowe Scholar.
Kuźniar, R. 2011. Pozimnowojenne dwudziestolecie 1989–2010. Stosunki międzynarodowe
na przełomie XX i XXI wieku. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
Kuźniar, R. 2012. Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo
Naukowe Scholar.
Kuźniar, R., and K. Szczepanik (eds.). 2002. Polityka zagraniczna RP 1989–2002.
Warsaw: Askon, Fundacja Studiów Międzynarodowych.
Łagowski, B. 2007. Duch i bezduszność III Rzeczypospolitej. Rozważania. Cracow:
Universitas.
Larrabee, F.S., et al. 2012. NATO and the challenges of austerity. Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 203
Łastawski, K. 2009. Polska racja stanu po wsta ̨pieniu do Unii Europejskiej. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne.
Layne, C. 1993. Unipolar illusion. Why new great powers will rise. International
Security 17(4): 5–51.
Lee, L.R. 2010. US hegemony and international legitimacy. Norms, power and fol-
lowership in the wars on Iraq. London/New York: Routledge.
Legucka, A. 2010. Perspektywy członkostwa Gruzji i Ukrainy w NATO. Warsaw:
Akademia Obrony Narodowej.
Leonard, M., and N. Popescu. 2007. A power audit of EU-Russia relations.
London: European Council on Foreign Relations.
Lewandowski, A., G. Radomski, and P. Tomaszewski (eds.). 2012. Bezpieczeństwo
zewnętrzne państwa w polskiej myśli politycznej po 1989 roku. Wybór źródeł.
Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika.
Lindstrom, G. (ed.). 2003. Shift or rift. Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq. Paris:
Institute for Security Studies.
Łomanowski, A., and B. Musiałowicz. 2006. Kierunki rosyjskiej polityki zagranic-
znej. Bezpieczeństwo Międzynarodowe, 17–40.
Łossowski, P. 1985. Po tej i tamtej stronie Niemna. Stosunki polsko-litewskie
1883–1939. Warsaw: Czytelnik.
Lyon, P.V., and B.W. Tomlin. 1979. Canada as an international actor. Toronto:
Macmillan.
Machejek, J., S. Pia ̨stka, and A. Machejek. 2000. Kwaśniewski: ‘pójdźmy dalej’.
Wywiad rzeka z prezydentem RP. Łodź: Hamal Books.
Ma ̨czak, A. (ed.). 1997. Historia Europy. Wrocław/Warsaw/Cracow: Zakład
Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.
Mälksoo, M. 2010. The politics of becoming European. A study of Polish and Baltics
post-Cold War security imaginaries. London/New York: Routledge.
Malone, D., and Y.F. Khong (eds.). 2003. Unilateralism and U.S. foreign policy:
International perspectives. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publisher.
Mastanduno, M. 1997. Preserving the unipolar moment: Realist theories and U.S.
grand strategy after the Cold War. International Security 21(4): 44–98.
Matlock, J.F. 2010. Superpower illusions. How myths and false ideologies led America
astray – and how to return to reality. New Heaven/London: Yale University
Press.
Mearsheimer, J. 2001. The tragedy of great powers politics. New York: W. W. Norton
& Company.
Mearsheimer, J. 2014. Why the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault: The liberal delu-
sions that provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs 93(5): 77–89.
Micgiel, J.S., and P. Wandycz (eds.). 2007. Reflections on Polish foreign policy.
New York: Columbia University, East Central European Center: Józef Piłsudski
Institute for Research in the Modern History of Poland.
Mieroszewski, J. 1962. Na ruinach przedmurza. Kultura 11(181): 99–108.
204 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Mieroszewski, J. 1968. O emigracyjnym patriotyzmie. Kultura 12(255): 70–73.

Mieroszewski, J. 1973. Polska ‘Ostpolitik’. Kultura 6(309): 68–79.
Mieroszewski, J. 1974. Rosyjski ‘kompleks polski’ i obszar ULB. Kultura 9(324):
3–14.
Mikulicz, S. 1971. Prometeizm z polityce II Rzeczypospolitej. Warsaw: Ksia ̨żka i
Wiedza.
Mix, D.E. 2015. The United States and Europe: Current issues. CRS Report,
RS22163, Congressional Research Service, 3 February.
Moczulski, L. 1999. Geopolityka. Potęga w czasie i przestrzeni. Warsaw: Dom
Wydawniczy Bellona.
Motyka, G. 2011. Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji “Wisła”. Konflikt polsko-ukraiński
1943–1947. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie.
Nau, H.R., and D.M. Ollapally (eds.). 2008. Worldviews of aspiring powers:
Domestic foreign policy debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Norrlof, C. 2010. America’s global advantage. US hegemony and international
cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nowak, J.M. 2014. Dyplomata na salonach i w politycznej kuchni. Warsaw: Bellona.
Nowak-Jeziorański, J. 2000. Pułapka z wyboru. Polityka 18: 36–37.
Nowak-Jeziorański, J. 2003. Polska z bliska. Cracow: Znak.
Nye, J. 1990. Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power. New York:
Basic Books.
O’Neill, J. 2001. Building better global economic BRICs. Global Economic Paper,
no. 66.
Okulewicz, P. 2001. Koncepcja ‘międzymorza’ w myśli i praktyce politycznej Józefa
Piłsudskiego w latach 1918–1926. Poznań: Wydawnictwa Poznańskie.
Onyszkiewicz, J. 2014. Na drodze do NATO – okruchy wspomnień. Bezpieczeństwo
Narodowe 29: 21–39.
Organsky, A.F.K. 1958. World politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Orzelska, A. (ed.). 2009. Stosunki transatlantyckie z perspektywy polskiej polityki
zagranicznej. Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Collegium Civitas.
Osica, O. 2002. In search of a new role: Poland in Euro-Atlantic relations. Defense
Studies 2(2): 21–39.
Pacuła, P. 2015. Polsko-rumuńska współpraca obronna. Stan obecny i perspe-
ktywy. Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe 3: 11–27.
Patience, A. 2014. Imagining middle powers. Australian Journal of International
Affairs 68(2): 210–224.
Patrick, S., and S. Forman (eds.). 2002. Multilateralism & U.S. foreign policy.
Ambivalent engagement. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publisher.
Pawelec, J., and P. Szeliga. 2014. Nadgonić czas. Wywiad rzeka ze Zdzisławem
Najderem. Warsaw: Świat Ksia ̨żki.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 205
Pawłuszko, T. 2014. Kategoria systemu międzynarodowego w nauce o stosunkach

międzynarodowych. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
Perlo-Freeman, S., C. Solmirano, and H. Wilandh. 2014. Global developments in
military expenditure. In SIPRI yearbook 2014, 175–178. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Petersson, M. 2015. The US-NATO debate: from Libya to Ukraine. New York:
Bloomsbury.
Piętka, B. 2016. Szaleństwo czy zdrada? Myśl Polska 3–4(2069/70): 17–24
January.
Piotrowski, M.A. 2015. Crossing at Vistula river: The importance of the air and
missile defence of Poland. Bulletin (Warsaw: PISM), No. 44 (776), 28 April.
Popiuk-Rysińska, I., and S. Parzymies (eds.). 2012. Udział Polski w organizacjach
międzynarodowych. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
Posen, B.R., and A.L. Ross. 1996/97. Competing visions of US grand strategy.
International Security 21(3): 5–53.
Prizel, I., and A.A. Michta (eds.). 1995. Polish foreign policy reconsidered. Challenges
of independence. Houndmills/Basingstoke/Hampshire: Macmillan Press.
Rajan, M., and E. Rumer. 2015. Conflict in Ukraine: the unwinding of the post-
Cold War order. Cambridge/London: The MIT Press.
Rees, G.W. 1998. The Western European union at the crossroads: Between Trans-
Atlantic solidarity and European integration. Boulder: Westview Press.
Rhodes, M. 2004. Central Europe and Iraq: Balance, Bandwagon, or Bridge?
Orbis 48(3): 423–436.
Rotfeld, A.D. 2012. Myśli o Rosji… i nie tylko. Eseje i wywiady. Warsaw: Świat
Ksia ̨żki.
Rotfeld, A.D., and A.W. Torkunow (eds.). 2015. White spots – Black spots: Difficult
matters in Polish-Russian relations 1918–2008. Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press.
Rothstein, R. 1968. Alliances and small powers. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Rusi, A.M. 1991. After the Cold War: Europe’s new political architecture. New York:
St. Martin’s Press.
Sakwa, R. 2015. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London/New York:
I. B. Tauris.
Schroeder, P. 1994. Historical realities vs. Neo-realist theory. International
Security 19(1): 108–148.
Schweller, R.L. 1994. Bandwagoning for profit: Bringing the revisionist state back
in. International Security 19(1): 72–107.
Siemaszko, W., and E. Siemaszko. 2008. Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów
na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939–1945, vol. I. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo von
Borowiecky.
206 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sikorski, R. 2009. Lekcje historii, modernizacja i integracja. Gazeta Wyborcza,

29–30 August.
Sköns, E., and S. Perlo-Freeman. 2012. The United States’ military spending and
the 2011 budget crisis. In SIPRI yearbook 2012, 162–166. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Skrzyp, J. 1998. Geostrategiczne położenie Polski. Warsaw: Akademia Obrony
Narodowej.
Skubiszewski, K. 1975. Zachodnia granica Polski w świetle traktatów. Poznań:
Instytut Zachodni.
Skubiszewski, K. 1999. Polska i Sojusz Północnoatlantycki w latach 1989–1991.
Sprawy Międzynarodowe, No. 1 (Warsaw: PISM), pp. 9–50.
Smith, M.A. 2012. Power in the changing global order. The US, Russia and China.
Cambridge/Malden: Polity Press.
Sola, N.F., and M. Smith (eds.). 2009. Perceptions and policy in transatlantic rela-
tions. Prospective visions form the US and Europe. New York: Routledge.
Sowa, J. 2011. Fantomowe ciało króla. Peryferyjne zmagania z nowoczesna ̨ forma.̨
Cracow: Univeristas.
Spechler, D.M. 2010. Russian foreign policy during the Putin’s Presidency: The
impact of competing approaches. Problems of Post-Communism 57(5): 35–50.
Spero, J. 2004. Bridging the European divide: Middle power politics and regional
dilemmas. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Spero, J. 2009. Great power security Dilemmas for pivotal middle power bridging.
Contemporary Security Policy 30(1): 147–171.
Stadtmüller, E. 1998. Granica lęku i nadziei. Polacy wobec Niemiec w latach
dziewięćdziesia ̨tych. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
Stanford, G. 1999. Poland. The conquest of history. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic
Publisher.
Stent, A.E. 2014. The limits of partnership. U.S. – Russian relations in the twenty-
first century. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Stolarczyk, M. 1998. Wokół formuły »polsko-niemiecka wspólnota interesów«.
Przegla ̨d Zachodni 1: 51–73.
Stolarczyk, M. 2005. Kontrowersje wokół militarnego zaangażowania Polski w
Iraku. Przegla ̨d Zachodni 1: 51–73.
Stolarczyk, M. 2010. Zbieżność i rozbieżność interesów w stosunkach polsko-
niemieckich w latach 1989–2009. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Śla ̨skiego.
Stolarczyk, M. (ed.). 2011. Stosunki Polski z sa ̨siadami w pierwszej dekadzie XXI
wieku, 113–159. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śla ̨skiego.
Suskind, R. 2006. The one percent doctrine: Deep inside America’s pursuit of its
enemies since 9/11. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Świetlicki, B. 1999. Polish-NATO relations on the eve of admission to the alliance.
In Yearbook of Polish foreign policy 1999, 15–20. Warsaw: PISM.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 207
Symonides, J. (ed.). 2010. Świat wobec nowych, zmieniaja ̨cych się wyzwań i
zagrożeń. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
Szczepanik, K., A. Herman-Łukasik, and B. Janicka (eds.). 2007. Stosunki dyplo-
matyczne Polski. Informator, Tom I: Europa 1918–2006. Warsaw: Ministerstwo
Spraw Zagranicznych.
Szeptycki, A. 2013. Ukraina wobec Rosji: studium zależności. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa
Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
Szklarski, B. (ed.). 2015. Niekonfrontacyjna asymetria w relacjach polsko-
amerykańskich. Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Tazbir, J. 1989. Poland as the Rampart of Christian Europe. Myths and historical
reality. Warsaw: Interpress.
Topolski, J. 1982. Zarys dziejów Polski. Warsaw: Interpress.
Ullman, R.H. 1991. Securing Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Walicki, A. 2002. Rosja, katolicyzm i sprawa polska. Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka.
Walt, S.M. 1987. The origins of alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of international politics. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Wandycz, P. 1980. The United States and Poland. Cambridge, MA/London:
Harvard University Press.
Wandycz, P. 1992. The price of freedom. A history of East Central Europe from the
Middle Ages to the present. London: Routledge.
Warzecha, Ł. 2011. Lech Kaczyński. Ostatni wywiad. Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka.
Węc, J. 2012. Pierwsza polska prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej. Uwarunkowania –
procesy decyzyjne – osia ̨gnięcia i niepowodzenia. Cracow: Księgarnia Akademicka.
Welt, C. 2010. The thawing of a Frozen conflict: The internal security dilemma
and the 2004 prelude to the Russo-Georgian War. Europe-Asia Studies 62(1):
63–97.
Włodkowska-Bagan, A. 2013. Rywalizacja mocarstw na obszarze poradzieckim.
Warsaw: Difin.
Wohlforth, W.C. 1998. The stability of a unipolar world. International Security
24(1): 9.
Wojciechowski, S., and A. Potyrała (eds.). 2014. Bezpieczeństwo Polski. Współczesne
wyzwania, 60–80. Warsaw: Difin.
Wojna, B., and M. Gniazdowski (eds.). 2009. Eastern partnership: The opening
report. Warsaw: PISM.
Wolchik, S.L., and J. Leftwich Curry (eds.). 2015. Central & East European poli-
tics: From communism to democracy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Wolchik, S.L., and V. Zviglyanich (eds.). 1999. Ukraine: The search for a national
identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Wolfers, A. 1962. The balance of power in theory and practice. In Discord and
collaboration: Essays on international politics. Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press.
208 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Wong, R., and C. Hill (eds.). 2011. National and European foreign policies –
Towards Europeanization. London/New York: Routledge.
Wood, B. 1988. The middle powers and the general interest. Ottawa: North–South
Institute.
Yekelchyk, S. 2015. The conflict in Ukraine: What everyone needs to know. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Zaborowski, M., and D.H. Dunn (eds.). 2003. Poland: A new power in transat-
lantic security. London/Portland: Frank Cass.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2005a. Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1945–1989. Wybór doku-
mentów. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
Zaja ̨c, J. (ed.). 2005b. Polityka zagraniczna USA po zimnej wojnie. Toruń:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2006. El desarrollo de las relaciones polaco-americanas después de la
guerra fria. Lamusa 5: 59–70.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2007. Udział Polski w misjach pokojowych i stabilizacyjnych na pocza ̨tku
XXI wieku. Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe 4: 191–207.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2009. Bandwagoning w polskiej polityce zagranicznej. Przegla ̨d Zachodni
3: 168–178.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2014a. The NATO summit in Newport: Polish perspective, Dossier stra-
tégique: La Pologne, un acteur de la défense européenne, La Lettre de L’IRSEM,
no. 8. Paris: Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École Militaire.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2014b. Poland’s position towards the transatlantic link, Dossier straté-
gique: La Pologne, un acteur de la défense européenne, La Lettre de L’IRSEM,
no. 3. Paris: Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École Militaire.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2014c. Polen: Zehn Jahre Mitgliedschaft in der EU. Religion und
Gesellschaft in Ost und West, RGOW, No. 10 (Zürich: Institut G2W), pp. 16–17.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2015. The EU in the Mediterranean: Between its international identity
and member states’ interests. European Foreign Affairs Review 20(1): 65–82.
Zaja ̨c, J., A. Włodkowska-Bagan, and M. Kaczmarski, eds. 2015. Bezpieczeństwo
międzynarodowe. Polska-Europa-Świat. Księga Jubileuszowa dedykowana
Profesorowi Ryszardowi Ziębie z okazji czterdziestolecia pracy naukowej. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo WDiNP UW.
Zaja ̨c, J. 100 Tage PiS-Regierung in Polen, Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und
West, RGOW 3/2016, pp. 9–10.
Zaja ̨c, J., and R. Zięba. 2005. Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1945–1989.
Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
Zaja ̨c, J., and R. Zięba. 2010. Budowa zintegrowanego systemu bezpieczeństwa nar-
odowego Polski. Warsaw: Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego.
Zamoyski, A. 2009. Poland: A history. London: Harper Press.
Zartman, I.W. (ed.). 2009. Imbalance of power: US hegemony and international
order. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 209
Zięba, R. 1992. »Nowy regionalizm« w Europie a Polska. Sprawy Międzynarodowe,

no. 1–2, 25–44.
Zięba, R. 1997. Why Poland aims at becoming a member of NATO. In Stability
and security of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 143–155. Ljubljana: Ministry
of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, Center for Strategic Studies.
Zięba, R. 2001. European security and defense identity. The Polish viewpoint. The
Polish Foreign Affairs Digest 1(1): 183–212.
Zięba, R. 2002. The ‘Strategic Partnership’ between Poland and Ukraine. The
Polish Foreign Affairs Digest 3: 195–226.
Zięba, R. 2004a. Transformation of Polish foreign policy. The Polish Foreign
Affairs Digest 4(4): 13–45.
Zięba, R. (ed.). 2004b. Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa. Toruń:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
Zięba, R. 2009. Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie.
Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne.
Zięba, R. 2013a. Bezpieczeństwo w polityce zagranicznej RP rza ̨du koalicji
Platformy Obywatelskiej i Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego. Stosunki
Międzynarodowe–International Relations 47(1–2): 9–33.
Zięba, R. 2013b. Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
Zięba, R. 2014. Poland’s relationship with Russia, Dossier stratégique: La Pologne,
un acteur de la défense européenne, La Lettre de L’IRSEM, no 3–2014. Paris:
Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École Militaire.
Zięba, R. 2015a. Implikacje stosunków polsko-amerykańskich dla polityki
zagranicznej Polski. Przegla ̨d Politologiczny 2: 7–20.
Zięba, R. 2015b. Ukraina jako przedmiot rywalizacji między Zachodem a Rosja ̨.
Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne 3: 5–26.
WEBSITES
The Atlantic Council: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
Bild: http://www.bild.de/
Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego: http://www.bbn.gov.pl/
Cato Institute: http://www.cato.org/
Central Statistical Office of Poland: http://stat.gov.pl/
The Economist: http://www.economist.com/
The European Council: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
The European Court of Human Rights: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
The European Defence Agency: https://www.eda.europa.eu/
European Union: http://europa.eu/
European Union External Action Service: http://eeas.europa.eu/
210 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
EU Neighbourhood Info Centre: http://www.enpi-info.eu/
Gazeta Polska: http://www.gazetapolska.pl/
Gazeta Wyborcza: http://wyborcza.pl/
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.: http://www.goldmansachs.com/
The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/
Harry S. Truman Library & Museum: http://trumanlibrary.org/
The Heritage Foundation: http://www.heritage.org/
Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/
International Security Assistance Force NATO: http://www.isaf.nato.int/
Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów: http://www.kprm.gov.pl
Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/international/
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland: http://www.msz.gov.pl/
Ministry of National Defense Republic of Poland: http://mon.gov.pl/
National Security Strategy Archive: http://nssarchive.us/
Newsweek: http://newsweek.pl/
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: http://www.nato.int/
Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, Cracow: http://www.omp.org.pl/
Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich: http://www.osw.waw.pl/
Le Point: http://www.lepoint.fr/
Polish Armed Forces: http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/
Polish Press Agency: http://www.pap.pl/
Polskie Radio: http://www.polskieradio.pl/
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe: http://psl.pl/
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: http://www.pis .org.pl/
The President of the Republic of Lithuania: https://www.lrp.lt/
The President of the Republic of Poland: http://www.prezydent.pl/
The President of Russia: http://kremlin.ru/
Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/
RMF 24: http://www.rmf24.pl/
Rzeczpospolita: http://www.rp.pl/
Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej: http://www.sld.org.pl/
Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/
Stowarzyszenie Wspólnota Polska: http://www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/
Telewizja Polska: http://www.tvp.info/
Telewizja Republika: http://telewizjarepublika.pl/
TVN 24: http://www.tvn24.pl
United States Department of Defense: http://www.defense.gov/
United States Department of State: http://www.state.gov/
Urza ̨d ds. Cudzoziemców: http://udsc.gov.pl/
Visegrad Group: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/
BIBLIOGRAPHY 211
The White House:https://www.whitehouse.gov/

WikiLeaks: https://wikileaks.org/
Zjednoczona Lewica, SLD+TR+PPS+UP+Zieloni: http://lewicarazem.org/
http://natemat.pl/
http://www.bankier.pl/
http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/
http://wpolityce.pl/
http://www.defence24.pl/
http://www.euractiv.fr/
https://www.fronda.pl/
http://www.money.pl/
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/
http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/
http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/
SUBJECT INDEX1
A B
Airborne Warning and Control System balance of power, xiv i, xviii, 41, 74,
(AWACS), 160, 162 115, 190
alliance, xvii, xix, xxi, 5, 10, 14, 17, balancing, xvi
22, 24, 35, 36, 37,42, 44, 45, 46, Baltic Sea States Council, 37
47, 53, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, bandwagoning, xvi, xvii,xxvn31,79,
71, 72–3, 74, 75, 84, 87, 88, 190, 192
104, 105, 110, 112, 113, 116, battlegroup, 83, 121, 122 124
119, 120, 124, 127, 128, 140, bipolar order, 5
142, 144, 157, 162 164, 165, BRIC, 103, 104, 106, 129n5
168, 170, 178n76, 188, 190 bridging/bridging strategy, xvi, xviii,
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), xx, 32, 55, 63, 187–9
160 bulwark, 11, 12, 19, 48–55
American Missile Defense system, 67,
115, 160, 162
annexation of Crimea, xix, xxi, 18, C
140, 151, 166, 192 Caracal Helicopters, 164
Asia pivot, 18, 104, 191 casus foederis, xvii, 35, 36
Association Agreement, 125, 139, 145 Central and Eastern Europe, xii, xviii,
146, 168 xxi, xxii, 1, 2, 5, 20, 22, 23–4,
‘aterritorial’ threats/‘aterritorial’ 31, 32, 37, 38 41, 44, 46,
conflict, 120, 156 57n21,70, 74, 110, 116, 117,
Autumn of Nations, xx, xxii, 4, 31, 74, 137, 138, 161, 165, 171, 186,
85 187, 188, 190, 191
1
Note: Page numbers with “n” denote notes.

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59500-3
214 SUBJECT INDEX
Central Europe, xviii, xxi–xxii, 12, 13, Euro-Maidan, 139, 145, 148, 167
37, 46,48, 51 70, 71, 79, 104, European Capabilities Action Plan
106, 107, 124, 141, 157, 161 (ECAP), 82–3
Central European Initiative (CEI), European Court of Human Rights,
xvii, 37, 63, 142 29n47, 77, 78, 191
Chobielin Initiative, 121 European Defence Agency (EDA), 83,
CIA prison, 77, 191 122, 123
COMECON, 1, 31, 37, 56n13, 187 European Neighborhood Policy
Committee for Polish-Russian (ENP), 126
Cooperation Strategy, 151, European Phased Adaptive Approach
176n51 (EPAA), 116, 160, 191
Common Security and Defence Policy European Reassurance Initiative
(CSDP), xx, 21, 24, 104, 120–3, (ERI), 162
124, 125, 134n69, 192 European Security and Defence Policy
Concert of Europe, 192 (ESDP), xvii, xx, 63, 64, 80, 81,
Conference for Security and 82, 84, 85, 105, 134n64, 191
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), European Security Strategy, 120, 123,
xvii, xx, 16, 17, 29n54, 31, 32, 124
33, 39, 44–6, 63, 72, 85–6, 187,
188, 189
Confidence and Security Building F
Measures (CSBMs), 45 F-16, 42, 78, 117, 162, 163
Council of the Baltic Sea States
(CBSS), xvii, 63, 187
G
Georgian-Russian War, xi, xix, xx, 79,
D 103, 108, 109, 112, 113, 128,
defense capabilities, 18, 47, 104, 122, 140, 154, 186, 191
123, 138, 154–6, 166, 191–2 Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine, 49,
deterrence, xvi, 155, 159, 161, 192 50, 51, 53–4, 127, 141
‘dual-track’ concept, 51, 52 global hegemon/global hegemony, xx,
xviii, 64–68, 103, 189, 190
great powers, xiv, xv, xvi, 41, 53, 68,
E 74, 94n18, 110, 131n26, 144,
Eastern Bloc, xiii, xviii, 1, 4, 32, 33, 151, 190, 192
34–7, 38, 44, 56n11, 56n13, 70, GROM, 43, 72
165, 186
Eastern Partnership (EaP), xxi, 23,
123, 126–8, 139, 168 H
Eastern Partnership Summit, 139, 168 hegemonic position, xviii, 16, 34, 63,
Eastern Ukraine, 163, 166 64, 91
SUBJECT INDEX 215
I N
imperialism, 49, 50, 108, 109, 186 National Security Strategic Review,
imperial policy, xiii, 104, 108, 185, 154
192 NATO Bucharest Summit, 22, 73,
Intermarium, xx, 38, 49, 50, 61n58 127, 1159
international hierarchy, xiii, xiv, 1 NATO Chicago Summit, 113, 117
international order, xii–xvi, xviii, xx, NATO enlargement, 46, 47, 48, 54,
xxii, 1, 16, 17–18, 24, 31, 32, 34, 67, 69, 70–71, –73, 88, 90, 107,
36, 44, 55, 103–4, 108, 118, 127, 128
120, 129n3, 130n26, 186 NATO Lisbon Summit, 112, 113, 117
international system, xiii, xiv, xvi, xix, NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP),
129n3, 186 157, 159
NATO Response Force (NRF), 157,
159, 170, 177n67
J NATO’s eastern flank, xxi, 138,
Jagiellonian concept/Jagiellonian 156–61, 162, 163, 170–1, 192
idea/Jagiellonian Poland, 22–3, NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, 105,
49–50, 141 120
NATO Summit in Newport, 157, 158,
159, 160, 170
K NATO Warsaw Summit, 150, 156,
Kaliningrad District, 89, 90, 111, 115 158, 159, 161–2, 166, 168
Katyn massacre, 13, 23, 54, 89, 110 neo-imperial/neo-imperialist, 108,
‘Komorowski Doctrine’, 119–120, 155 141, 186, 192
neorealism, xii, xix, xx, 33, 137, 138,
192
L Normandy format, 148, 167
little green men, xxi, 147, 156 North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC), 46, 69, 86, 188
M
Medvedev Plan, 108, 110, 111 O
middle power, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xix, Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers, 34–5,
1, 2, 68, 115, 186–7, 192 36, 38–39, 41, 43, 53
military capabilities, xix, xxi, 1, 84, 104, Orange Revolution, 91, 127, 143–4
111, 117, 118, 121, 122, 124 Organization for Security and
multipolar world order, xiii, 5, 18, 19, Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
25, 91, 103–36, 137, 191 xvii, 1, 17, 19, 85–88, 111, 190
Munich Security Conference, xix, 103, ‘out of area’ operations, 71, 72, 75,
104, 108, 146, 191 112, 113
216 SUBJECT INDEX
P S
Partnership for Peace (PfP), 69, 71, Security Strategy of the Republic of
147, 190 Poland, 81, 82, 85, 90, 154,
Patriot missiles, 79, 114, 116, 117, 163 158, 192
PiS, 7, 9, 19–23, 24, 27n38, 30n68, ‘Sikorski Doctrine’, 109
72, 79, 91, 110, 126, 145, 148, SLD, 19–20, 24, 68, 74, 78, 91,
149, 150, 153, 156, 158, 161, 149, 158
164, 166, 170–2 Słupsk-Redzikowo, 114, 116, 161,
PO, 19, 20–4, 28n38, 79, 108, 110, 162, 191
127, 145, 149, 158, 170 Smolensk catastrophe, 20, 23, 110
Poland-America-Ukraine Cooperation spheres of influence, xix, 5, 11, 12,
Initiative (PAUCI), 143, 173n18 20, 33, 58n33, 93, 109, 110,
Poland’s eastern policy, 22, 32, 48–55, 117, 151, 193
140, 189, 190 state’s geographic location, xiii, xiv, 1
Polish Armed Forces, 9–10, 79, 114, Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC),
118, 119–21, 155–6, 163 160
Polish Military Contingent (PKW), Strategic Cooperation Consultative
72, 73, 76, 97n59 Group, 79, 114
Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Study on NATO Enlargement, 70,
Matters, 151 190
Polish-Ukrainian Presidential
Consulting Committee, 142, 150
POLUKRBAT, 72, 143 T
pooling & sharing, 121, 122, 124 Trojan horse, 81, 85, 109, 191
power, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii,
xviii, xix, 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 31, 32, 33, U
34, 35, 3841, 53, 64, 68, 74, 87, Ukraine crisis, xix, xxi, 7, 15, 137–83,
103, 106, 107, 108, 109 110, 186, 192
115, 116 127, 137, 139, 140, ULB doctrine, 49–50
144, 145, 148, 149, 151, 156, unipolar world order, xix, xx, 19, 34,
167, 186, 187, 190, 191, 192 63–102
Principles of Poland’s Security Policy,
16, 47
Prometheism, 11, 49, 50, 141 V
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
(VJTF), 157, 159
R Visegrad Triangle/Visegrad Group,
redistribution of power, xi, xiii, xviii, xvii, 7, 23, 37, 47, 51, 63,
18, 107 124, 125, 127, 142, 170,
revisionism/ revisionist, xi, xiii, 34, 187, 189
108, 116, 154, 191, 193n5 Volhynia, 14–15, 143
SUBJECT INDEX 217
W 138–40, 142, 144, 145, 167,

Warsaw Pact, 1, 15, 16, 31, 36, 37, 187–8, 189–90, 193
46, 118, 187 Western European Union (WEU),
Weimar Triangle, xvii, 21, 24, 63, 121, 16, 31, 32, 33, 37, 42, 47,
124, 167, 187 44–48, 80, 81, 82, 84, 86,
the West, xiii, xviii, xix, xx, xxi, xxii, 187, 188
1, 2, 5, 11, 12, 18, 19, 24, White Book on National Security of the
31–62, 63, 64, 68, 90, 91, Republic of Poland, 16, 119, 154,
107, 108, 109, 128, 137, 156, 192
NAME INDEX1
A Biden, Joe, 161

Acharya, Amitav, 129n2 Bielecki, Jan Krzysztof, 46, 188
Albright, Madeleine, 59n40, 70, 81 Bieleń, Stanisław, xxiiin6, 28n42,
Allin, Dana H., 129n7 29n47, 98n72, 102n110
Allison, Roy, 94n22 Bieńczyk-Missala, Agnieszka, 29n47
al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abd, 77, 191 Bingen, Dieter, 57n24
Anderson, Jeffrey, 93n14, 129n10 Blank, Stephen, 94n17
Andreev, Sergei, 151 Blinken, Antony J., 100n93
Andrews, David M., 96n49 Booth, Kenneth, xxivn18
Archick, Kristin, 129n9 Borawski, John, 99n83
Ashe, Victor, 79, 128 Borkowicz, Jacek, 62n73
Asmus, Ronald D., 70, 95n33, 95n36, Borodziej, Włodzimierz, 58n27
100n93 Bowker, Mike, 94n22
Attinà, Fulvio, 92n1 Bromke, Adam, 27n36
Bryc, Agnieszka, 28n42, 93n15,
94n18
B Brzezinski, Ian J., 52, 62n65
Balcer, Adam, 173n23 Brzeziński, Zbigniew, 70, 92n3,
Balcerowicz, Bolesław, 133n58 95n31, 107, 131n27, 138,
Bandow, Doug, 165, 180n98, 180n99 171n4, 172n12, 173n17
Băsescu, Traian, 160 Buckley, Mary, 93n12
Bauwens, Werner, xxivn21 Buell, Raymond L., 27n32
Bernacki, Włodzimierz, 27n34 Bugajski, Janusz, 172n13
1
Note: Page numbers with “n” denote notes.

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59500-3
220 NAME INDEX
Bukkvoll, Tor, 136n87 D

Bull, Hedley, xiv, xxiiin12 Daalder, Ivo, 93n12
Burant, Stephen R., 62n62 Davies, Norman, 25n1
Bush, George, 32, 33, 39–40, 41, 42, Dobriansky, Paula J., 94n17
44, 55n2, 88 Domaradzki, Spasimir, 133n54
Bush, George W., xvii, 65, 66, 67, 72, Donaldson, Robert H., xviii, xxvn34
75, 85, 118, 191 Donfried, Karen, 99n84
Buzek, Jerzy, 78 Drzewieniecki, Włodzimierz, 56n8
Duda, Andrzej, 20, 21, 23, 145, 148,
149–50, 159, 161, 164, 168,
C 181n106
Cameron, David, 21 Duke, Simon, 99n77
Carl, Bildt, 23 Dunn, David H., 27n30, 96n45,
Chapnick, Adam, xv, xxiiin8, xxiiin16 96n50
Charap, Samuel, 172n9 Dybczyński, Andrzej, xxvn33
Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 89 Dziewanowski, Kazimierz, 25n1
Chernyakhovsky, Ivan, 153
Chirac, Jacques, 76, 105
Christensen, Thomas J., xxivn28 E
Cichocki, Jacek, 62n73 Edström, Håkan, 136n87
Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz, 74, 78 Ek, Carl, 132n45
Clesse, Armand, xxivn21, 55n6
Clinton, Bill, 33, 43, 44, 64, 65, 66,
67, 69, 70 F
Clinton, Hilary, 129n8 Fedorowicz, Krzysztof, 61n61
Coffey, Like, 130n14 Ferguson, Neil, 130n20
Cohen, Ariel, 94n17 Flynn, Gregory, 55n6
Cohen, Jonathan, 100n95 Forman, Shepard, 92n8
Cohen, Stephen F., xxi, 93n16, 107, Fotyga, Anna, 72
171n3 Freedman, Robert O., 94n17
Cooper, Andrew F., xvi, xxiiin8, Friszke, Andrzej, 61n59
xxiiin9, xxiiin17, xxivn24,
xxivn26
Cox, Michael, 55n5 G
Cox, Robert, xxivn26 Gage, Mark, 94n17
Curanović, Alicja, 28n42 Gallis, Paul, 99n84
Curry, Jane Leftwich, xxv39 Garnett, Sherman W., 28n39, 193n9
Czornik, Katarzyna, 95n37, 133n53, Gates, Robert, 43, 104–5
133n54 Geremek, Bronisław, 71, 75, 80–1, 86,
Czubiński, Antoni, 57n24 87, 99n82, 100n98
Czulda, Robert, 178n70, 178n73 Ghebali, Victor-Yves, 100n95
NAME INDEX 221
Giedroyc, Jerzy, 48–51, 53, 127 I

Gil, Andrzej, 60n53, 61n61 Ikenberry, John, 92n3, 93n14,
Gniazdowski, Mateusz, 135n80, 129n7, 129n10
135n83, 136n85 Iohannis, Klaus, 159
Goldgeier, James M., v, 68, 94n24 Irrera, Daniela, 92n1
Góralski, Witold M., 56n9 Iwański, Tadeusz, 172n10
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 88, 188
Gordon, J. King, xxivn26
Gordon, Philip H., 100n93 J
Górka-Winter, Beata, 133n50 Janicka, Barbara, 56n17
Górska, Joanna, 102n111 Jarosz, Dariusz, 58n28
Grevi, Giovanni, 171n6 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 40
Grodzki, Radosław, 133n54 Jasienica, Paweł, 25n7, 25n13, 61n56
Grudziński, Przemysław, xxiiin6, Jasina, Łukasz, 60n53
xxivn22, 62n68, 131n31 Jervis, Robert, xxvn31
Grünberg, Karol, 29n48 Joffe, Josef, 55n6
Jones, Erik, v, 93n13, 129n7
Jordaan, Eduard, xxiiin7, xxivn26
H Jørgensen, Knud Erik, 92n1
Hajnicz, Artur, 57n26
Hale, Henry, v, 30n72
Halecki, Oskar, xxi, xxvn37, 61n56 K
Hallenberg, Jan, 93n13, 94n22 Kacprzyk, Artur, 178n74
Halliwell, Martin, 92n6 Kaczmarski, Marcin, xxiiin6, 25n2,
Handel, Michael, xxiiin7 28n38, 131n29, 193n11
Hedlund, Stephen, v Kaczyński, Jarosław, 7, 79, 91, 145,
Herbert, John, 93n13 164, 171
Herman-Łukasik, Anna, 56n17 Kaczyński, Lech, xi, xxiin1, 20, 21,
Higgott, Richard A., xvi, xxiiin8, 22, 23, 29n47, 30n70, 73, 111,
xxiiin9, xxiiin17, xxivn24, xxivn26 114, 127, 136n84, 143, 160
Hill, Christopher, 100n88 Kaczyński, Piotr M., 59n34
Holbraad, Carlsten, xvi, xxivn25, Kamińska, Joanna, 135n80
xxivn26 Kamiński, Antoni Z., 132n47
Holbrooke, Richard, 70 Kamiński, Łukasz, 153
Hollande, François, 167, 169 Kapstein, Ethan B., 92n2, 92n3,
Hopmann, Terrence P., 100n97 98n72
Houghton, David Patrick, 93n13 Kapuśniak, Tomasz, 61n61
Huldt, Bo, 93n13 Karabeshkin, Leonid, 95n30
Huntington, Samuel P., 93n9, 103, Karagiannis, Emmanuel, 129n4
128n1 Karlsson, Hakan, 93n13, 94n22
Hyde-Price, Adrian, 55n6, 56n16, Karski, Jan, 28n39, 59n33
60n46 Kebich, Vyacheslav, 52
222 NAME INDEX
Kelly, Noel, 130n20 Kulesa, Łukasz, 135n76

Kenney, Padraick, 55n1 Kundera, Milan, xxi, xxvn38
Keohane, Robert, xiv, xxiiin15 Kupchan, Charles A., 55n6, 94n25,
Khong, Yuen Foong, 93n10 128n1, 129n10
Kissinger, Henry, 70 Kuźniar, Roman, 58n30, 58n31,
Kiwerska, Jadwiga, 98n66 59n35, 59n37, 94n27, 96n50,
Klafkowski, Alfons, 56n8 98n71, 98n72, 99n73, 99n74,
Klatt, Małgorzata, 135n80 101n105, 133n50, 133n58
Klich, Bogdan, 100n92 Kwaśniewski, Aleksander, 20, 75, 76,
Klitschko, Vitali, 146 77, 87, 100n106, 116, 143
Kloczkowski, Jacek, 25n3, 27n34,
61n55, 136n84
Kłoczowski, Jerzy, 60n53 L
Knock, Thomas J., 129n7 Łagowski, Bronisław, 173n24
Knudsen, Olav F., xv, xvi, xxivn21, Lake, Anthony, 65, 69, 92n7
xxivn23 Lakomy, Miron, 95n37, 133n53,
Knutsen, Torbjørn L., xxiin3 133n54
Kohl, Helmut, 39, 40, 57n26 Larrabee, F. Stephen, 70, 95n33,
Kokot, Józef, 56n8 130n15
Kolarska-Bobińska, Lena, 59n34 Larsen, Henrik Boesen Lindbo, 129n4
Kołodziejczyk, Piotr, 38, 57n21, 118 Laruelle, Marlene, v
Komorowski, Bronisław, 16, 20, 21, Łastawski, Kazimierz, 25n2, 57n20
118, 132n43, 143, 147, 149, Layne, Christopher, 128n1
151, 152, 154–5, 158, 159, 160, Lee, Lavina Rajendram, 92n3
167, 169, 172n11 Legucka, Agnieszka, 136n87
Kopacz, Ewa, 26n20, 146, 149, 170, Leonard, Marc, 109, 131n35
173n28 Lewandowski, Arkadiusz, 30n68
Kortunov, S. V., 102n113 Lindsay, James M., 93n12
Koszel, Bogdan, 29n61 Lindstrom, Gustav, 93n13
Kouchner, Bernard, 121 Łomanowski, Andrzej, 102n109
Kowal, Paweł, 132n38, 136n84, 172n14 Łossowski, Piotr, 28n46
Kozerawski, Dariusz S., 59n39 Lugar, Richard, 70
Koziej, Stanisław, 29n52, 135n74 Lukashenka, Alexander, 15, 52, 127,
Kozyrev, Andrei V., 86, 100n96, 189
130n26 Lyon, Peyton V., xxivn26
Kramer, Mark, 98n72
Krauthammer, Charles, 92n2, 128n1
Kravchuk, Leonid, 52, 141, 142 M
Kucharczyk, Jacek, 59n34 Machejek, Andrzej, 60n49
Kuchma, Leonid, 142 Machejek, Jerzy, 60n49
Kuczyński, Grzegorz, 131n36, 132n42 Macierewicz, Antoni, 23, 156, 166
Kugler, Richard L., 70, 95n33 Ma ̨czak, Antoni, 28n40
Kukułka, Józef62n70 Madej, Marek, 178n70, 178n73
NAME INDEX 223
Mälksoo, Maria, 56n18 O

Malone, David, 93n10 Obama, Barack, 116, 118, 161–2,
Marcinkiewicz, Kazimierz, 79, 91 166, 171, 191
Mastanduno, Michael, 92n2, 92n3, Okulewicz, Piotr, 61n58
98n72, 128n1 Ołdakowski, Jan, 172n14
Matlary, Janne Haaland, 136n87 Olechowski, Andrzej, 69, 89,
Matlock, Jack F., 67, 93n16 95n29
Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, 36, 38, 39, 40, Oleksy, Józef, 89, 143
44, 51, 57n26, 60n45, 187, 188 Ollapally, Deepa M., xxiin5
Mearsheimer, John, xxivn28, xxvn31, Olszewski, Jan, 47, 174n32
171n3 O’Neill, Jim, 129n6
Menkiszak, Marek, 101n105 Onyszkiewicz, Janusz, 48, 59n36,
Merkel, Angela, 167, 169 60n49, 60n52, 95n32, 95n34,
Micgiel, John S., 28n41 172n13
Michta, Andrew A., 27n30, 60n50, Organsky, Abramo Fimo Kenneth,
62n63 xxiiin10
Mieroszewski, Juliusz, 48–50, 54, Orttung, Robert, v
60n53, 61n60 Orzelska, Agnieszka, 132n38,
Mikulicz, Sergiusz, 61n57 132n47
Milczanowski, Andrzej, 89 Osica, Olaf, 96n45, 172n13
Miller, Leszek, 149
Mix, Derek. E., 133n57, 179n86,
180n92 P
Moczulski, Leszek, 25n12 Parzymies, Stanisław, 58n30,
Monteleone, Carla, 129n10 60n47
Morley, Catherine, 92n6 Pasztor, Maria, 58n28
Motyka, Grzegorz, 29n49 Patience, Allan, xxiiin7, 192,
Musiałowicz, Bartosz, 102n109 193n12
Patrick, Stewart, 92n8
Pawelec, Jan, 27n33
N Pearson, Lester, xxivn26
Najder, Zdzisław, 62n73 Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Katarzyna,
Nau, Henry, v, xxiin5, 93n14 62n73, 175n47
Nogee, Joseph L., xviii, xxvn34 Perlo-Freeman, Sam, 130n17,
Norrlof, Carla, 92n3 130n20, 130n23, 130n24
Nossal, Kim Richard, xvi, xxiiin8, Petersson, Magnus, v, 136n87,
xxiiin9, xxiiin17, xxivn24, xxivn26 179n84
Nowak, Andrzej, 28n41, 60n53, 61n55 Pia ̨stka, Sławomir, 60n49
Nowak, Jerzy M., 85, 100n92, 101n102 Piechociński, Janusz, 149
Nowak-Jeziorański, Jan, 74, 76, Pietrusiewicz, Jarosław, 131n31
96n48, 97n54, 100n91 Piłsudski, Józef, 49–50, 61n55
Nuland, Victoria, 183n117 Piotrowski, Marcin A., 101n105,
Nye, Joseph, 92n2 179n88
224 NAME INDEX
Pomorska, Karolina, 100n88 Schroeder, Gerhard, 76

Popescu, Nicu, 109, 131n35 Schroeder, Paul, xxivn27
Popiuk-Rysińska, Irena, 60n47 Schweller, Randwall L., xxvn31
Poroshenko, Petro, 148, 150, 168, Sestanovich, Stephen, 94n17
174n41 Shapiro, Jeremy, 172n9
Posen, Barry R., 55n4 Siemaszko, Ewa, 29n50
Potyrała, Anna, 98n66 Siemaszko, Władysław, 29n50
Primakov, Yevgeny, 67 Siemoniak, Tomasz, 125, 158–9, 163,
Prizel, Ilya, 60n50, 62n63 185
Putin, Vladimir, xix, xx, 90, 103, Sikorski, Radosław, 21, 22–3, 29n62,
107–8, 109, 139, 140, 147, 148, 30n73, 91, 109, 110, 111, 114,
169, 191, 193n5 121, 127, 134n65, 146, 157,
Pyatt, Geoffrey, 183n117 165, 168, 176n51
Singh, Robert, 93n12
Sköns, Elisabeth, 130n23
R Skrzypczak, Waldemar, 173n31
Rachwald, Artur, 60n49 Skrzypek, Andrzej, 28n42
Radomski, Grzegorz, 30n68 Skubiszewski, Krzysztof, xvii, 2, 25n5,
Radziwinowicz, Wacław, 152 38, 39, 41, 46, 51, 52, 56n8,
Rajan, Menon, 171n2 57n22, 60n48, 61n61, 80, 187,
Rees, G. Wyn, 99n77 188, 189, 193n7
Rhodes, Matthew, xxvn32, 98n72 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 129n7
Rice, Condoleezza, 114 Smith, Martin A., 129n3, 130n25
Ripper, Jan Morris, 169 Smith, Michael, 129n10
Risse, Thomas, 93n14, 129n10 Smith, Tony, 129n7
Rollberg, Peter, v Snyder, Jack, xxivn28, xxvn31
Romanowski, Andrzej, 174n33 Sobków, Witold, 58n31
Rosati, Dariusz, 143 Sola, Natividad Fernández, 129n10
Ross, Andrew L., 55n4 Solmirano, Carina, 130n17, 130n20,
Rotfeld, Adam Daniel, 28n43, 130n24
132n38, 151 Sowa, Jan25n13
Rothstein, Robert, xiv, xxiiin14 Spechler, Dina R., 95n30
Rühl, Lothar, 55n6 Spero, Joshua, xiv, xvi, xxiiin6, xxiiin11,
Rumer, Eugene B., 171n2 xxivn29, 58n29, 187, 193n6
Rusi, Alpo M., 55n6 Sprengler, Bolesław, 29n48
Stadtmüller, Elżbieta, 58n29
Stairs, Denis, xv, xxivn18
S Stanford, George, 27n37
Saakashvili, Mikheil, 91, 127 Stelzenmüller, Constanze, v
Sakwa, Richard, 171n2 Stent, Angela, v, 93n15, 94n17,
Sarkozy, Nicolas, 105, 121 94n19, 94n21
Scheffer, David J., 55n6 Stolarczyk, Mieczysław, 28n38,
Schetyna, Grzegorz, 146, 149, 152, 167 57n25, 58n29, 97n55, 133n53
NAME INDEX 225
Stoltenberg, Jens, 161 Walicki, Andrzej, 27n34, 57n19

Suchocka, Hanna, 52 Walt, Stephen M., xxvn31
Suskind, Ron, 93n12 Waltz, Kenneth, xix, xxvn31,
Sviridov, Leonid, 152 xxvn35
Świetlicki, Bogusław, 97n53 Wandycz, Piotr S., xxi, xxvn36,
Szczepanik, Krzysztof, 56n17, 58n30, 28n41, 59n34
58n31, 101n105 Waniek, Danuta, 78
Szczerski, Krzysztof, 21, 30n69, Warzecha, Łukasz, 30n64, 30n66,
30n75 30n70, 30n74, 132n48,
Szeliga, Paweł, 27n33 136n87
Szeptycki, Andrzej, 102n110, 171n5 Waszczykowski, Witold, 145
Szeremietiew, Romuald, 147, 174n32 Węc, Janusz, 134n70
Szklarski, Bohdan, xxvn33, 59n42 Welt, Cory, 129n4
Szlajfer, Henryk, 132n47 Wilandh, Helen, 130n17, 130n20,
Szydło, Beata, 7 130n24
Wills, Garry, 93n9
Winid, Bogusław, 59n35
T Włodkowska-Bagan, Agata, xxiiin6,
Tazbir, Jerzy, 27n35 25n2, 28n38, 28n42, 94n18,
Timoshenko, Yulia, 91, 127, 144 172n6, 193n11
Tomaszewski, Patryk, 30n68 Wohlforth, William C., 92n2
Tomlin, Brian W., xxivn26 Wojciechowski, Sebastian,
Topolski, Jerzy, 25n7 98n66
Torkunow, Anatolij W., 28n43 Wojna, Beata, 135n80, 135n83,
Trenin, Dmitri, 139, 171n6 136n85
Tusk, Donald, 23, 77, 116, 121, 168 Wolchik, Sharon L., v, xxvn39,
Tyahnybok, Oleh, 146 171n1, 173n16
Wolfers, Arnold, xxvn31
Wong, Reuben, 100n88
U Wood, Bernard, xxiiin17, xxivn26
Ullman, Richard H., 55n6 Wóycicki, Kazimierz, 173n23
Wroe, Andrew, 93n13
V
Vasconcelos, Alvaro de, 171n6 Y
Verheugen, Günter, 169 Yanukovych, Victor, 139, 140, 144,
von der Leyen Ursula, 170 145, 146, 1668, 167
Yatsenyuk, Arseniy, 146
Yekelchyk, Serhy, 171n2
W Yeltsin, Boris, 67, 88, 89
Wagnsson, Charlotte, 94n22 Young, Thomas-Durell, 99n83
Wałęsa, Lech, 20, 68, 69, 89, 116, Yushchenko, Victor, 91, 127,
141, 143 144
226 NAME INDEX
Z 58n29, 59n43, 60n47, 60n51,

Zaborowski, Marcin, 27n30, 96n45, 62n66, 62n72, 98n65, 98n70,
97n50, 98n69 98n72, 99n81, 100n88, 100n89,
Zaja ̨c, Justyna, xxiiin6, xxvn32, 25n2, 101n103, 101n106, 133n49,
25n10, 27n28, 28n38, 56n10, 133n53, 133n58, 135n74,
56n12, 59n42, 59n43, 94n18, 141, 171n3, 172n15, 173n16,
95n37, 96n39, 97n51, 97n55, 178n67
98n72, 130n19, 133n58, 135n77, Zubaydah, Abu, 77, 191
178n69, 183n118, 193n11 Zuchniak, Monika, 172n14
Zamoyski, Adam, 25n7 Żurawski vel Grajewski, Przemysław,
Zartman, William I., xxiin4, 92n3 145
Zięba, Ryszard, v, xxiiin6, xxivn22, Zviglyanich, Volodymyr, 171n1,
25n10, 29n51, 56n10, 56n16, 173n16

(Justyna Zając (Auth.) ) Poland's Security Policy (Zlibraryexau2g3p.onion)

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

(Justyna Zając (Auth.) ) Poland's Security Policy (Zlibraryexau2g3p.onion)

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Poland’s Security Policy

The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order

ISBN 978-1-137-59499-0 ISBN 978-1-137-59500-3 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016946985

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Cover image © TAR-TASS Photo Agency / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

1 Post-Cold War Determinants of Poland’s Security Policy 1

2 ‘Go West’: Poland’s Security Policy in Transition 31

3 Poland’s Security Policy in the Unipolar World Order 63

Growing Tensions Between Poland and Russia 88

4 Poland’s Security Policy in the Emerging Multipolar

5 The Ukraine Crisis: Implications for Poland’s Security 137

Subject Index 213

Name Index 219

ABW Internal Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego)

PKW Polish Military Contingent (Polski Kontyngent Wojskowy)

Those words were spoken by President Lech Kaczyński to a cheering crowd

strategic documents treat security in the wide sense, in practice challenges

The collective historical experience of a nation tends to become embedded

In addition to strengthening its own security through membership in

the CSDP. Under those circumstances, one of the ways by which Poland

the part of Europe situated geographically in the center, culturally in the

Poland’s Security Policy: the West, Russia

of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran,

29. J. B. Spero (2009), ‘Great Power Security Dilemmas…’, pp. 147–171.

Post-Cold War Determinants of Poland’s

Poland is situated in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. It is a

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 1

1 GEOPOLITICAL LOCATION: ADVANTAGE OR CURSE?

Poland is a middle power located in the region of Central and Eastern

As a result of the three partitions, Polish identity became associated with

2 DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POTENTIAL

many other European countries, the number of Poland’s inhabitants is

been apprehended in Poland. Moreover, in September 2015, EU foreign

359.8 billion EUR, and in 2014 it reached 413.1 billion EUR.24 EU

impact on the future of the country’s labor force and developmental

transformations consisted of reducing the number of soldiers and the

3 HISTORY AND IDENTITY IN POLAND’S

resources of the country.36 Romanticism and idealism exerted a much

were unwilling to commemorate the Poles who died defending Lwów

4 STRATEGIES AND CONCEPTS OF POLAND’S

4.1 Poland’s National Security Strategies

that there is no threat to Poland’s continued existence as an independent

fears of a military threat. This, however, changed with the redistribution

In the neighbourhood of Poland, there is a risk of regional and local conflicts

In light of NATO’s gradual weakening, the EU’s internal problems, and

reconstruct the importance of the OSCE, although, as it points out, this

4.2 The Security Policy Concepts of Poland’s Political Parties

Eastern Europe, and sustained activeness in non-European matters. But

of international organizations. It sees the first as having priority and the

adoption by the European Union in May 2009 of the Eastern Partnership

address to parliament on the day he was sworn in. It was symbolic of

14. (2014), Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw: Central

background of the activeness of the German Federation of Expellees (Bund

Wysta ̨pienia, listy, wywiady 2010–2011 (Warsaw: Presidential Chancellery),

‘Go West’: Poland’s Security Policy

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 31

1 THE EMERGENCE OF WESTERN DOMINANCE

2 POLAND’S ROLE IN DISMANTLING THE EASTERN BLOC

Lusatian Neisse rivers to Poland; the ultimate character of those territories

to provide assistance in cases of armed aggression on the part of ‘West