11 3 104 Negotiable Instrument

§ 11-3-104.
Negotiable instrument, GA ST § 11-3-104
West’s Code of Georgia Annotated

Title 11. Commercial Code (Refs & Annos)
Article 3. Negotiable Instruments (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions and Definitions
Ga. Code Ann., § 11-3-104

§ 11-3-104. Negotiable instrument
Currentness
(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this Code section, “negotiable instrument” means an unconditional
promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order,
if it:
(1) Is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;
(2) Is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) Does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in
addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain:
(i) An undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment;
(ii) An authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral; or
(iii) A waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.
(b) “Instrument” means a negotiable instrument.
(c) An order that meets all of the requirements of subsection (a) of this Code section, except paragraph (1) of subsection (a)
of this Code section, and otherwise falls within the definition of “check” in subsection (f) of this Code section is a negotiable
instrument and a check.
© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

§ 11-3-104. Negotiable instrument, GA ST § 11-3-104
(d) A promise or order other than a check is not an instrument if, at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a
holder, it contains a conspicuous statement, however expressed, to the effect that the promise or order is not negotiable or is
not an instrument governed by this article.
(e) An instrument is a “note” if it is a promise and is a “draft” if it is an order. If an instrument falls within the definition of
both “note” and “draft,” a person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as either.
(f) “Check” means (i) a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank; or (ii) a cashier’s
check or teller’s check. An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face by another term, such as
“money order.”
(g) “Cashier’s check” means a draft with respect to which the drawer and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same
bank.
(h) “Teller’s check” means a draft drawn by a bank (i) on another bank; or (ii) payable at or through a bank.
(i) “Traveler’s check” means an instrument that (i) is payable on demand; (ii) is drawn on or payable at or through a bank;
(iii) is designated by the term “traveler’s check” or by a substantially similar term; and (iv) requires, as a condition to
payment, a countersignature by a person whose specimen signature appears on the instrument.
(j) “Certificate of deposit” means an instrument containing an acknowledgment by a bank that a sum of money has been
received by the bank and a promise by the bank to repay the sum of money. A certificate of deposit is a note of the bank.
Credits
Laws 1996, p. 1306, § 3.
Editors’ Notes
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENT
1. The definition of “negotiable instrument” defines the scope of Article 3 since Section 3-102 states: “This Article applies
to negotiable instruments.” The definition in Section 3-104(a) incorporates other definitions in Article 3. An instrument is
either a “promise,” defined in Section 3-103(a)(9), or “order,” defined in Section 3-103(a)(6). A promise is a written
undertaking to pay money signed by the person undertaking to pay. An order is a written instruction to pay money signed by
the person giving the instruction. Thus, the term “negotiable instrument” is limited to a signed writing that orders or
promises payment of money. “Money” is defined in Section 1-201(24) and is not limited to United States dollars. It also
includes a medium of exchange established by a foreign government or monetary units of account established by an
intergovernmental organization or by agreement between two or more nations. Five other requirements are stated in Section
3-104(a): First, the promise or order must be “unconditional.” The quoted term is explained in Section 3-106. Second, the
amount of money must be “a fixed amount * * * with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order.”
Section 3-112(b) relates to “interest.” Third, the promise or order must be “payable to bearer or to order.” The quoted phrase
is explained in Section 3-109. An exception to this requirement is stated in subsection (c). Fourth, the promise or order must
be payable “on demand or at a definite time.” The quoted phrase is explained in Section 3-108. Fifth, the promise or order
may not state “any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to
the payment of money” with three exceptions. The quoted phrase is based on the first sentence of N.I.L. Section 5 which is
the precursor of “no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or drawer” appearing in former Section 3-
104(1)(b). The words “instruction” and “undertaking” are used instead of “order” and “promise” that are used in the N.I.L.
formulation because the latter words are defined terms that include only orders or promises to pay money. The three
exceptions stated in Section 3-104(a)(3) are based on and are intended to have the same meaning as former Section 3-112(1)
(b), (c), (d), and (e), as well as N.I.L. § 5(1), (2), and (3). Subsection (b) states that “ instrument” means a “negotiable
instrument.” This follows former Section 3-102(1)(e) which treated the two terms as synonymous.
2. Unless subsection (c) applies, the effect of subsection (a)(1) and Section 3-102(a) is to exclude from Article 3 any promise
or order that is not payable to bearer or to order. There is no provision in revised Article 3 that is comparable to former
Section 3-805. The comment to former Section 3-805 states that the typical example of a writing covered by that section is a
check reading “Pay John Doe.” Such a check was governed by former Article 3 but there could not be a holder in due course
of the check. Under Section 3-104(c) such a check is governed by revised Article 3 and there can be a holder in due course of
the check. But subsection (c) applies only to checks. The comment to former Section 3-805 does not state any example other
than the check to illustrate that section. Subsection (c) is based on the belief that it is good policy to treat checks, which are
payment instruments, as negotiable instruments whether or not they contain the words “to the order of”. These words are
almost always pre-printed on the check form. Occasionally the drawer of a check may strike out these words before issuing
the check. In the past some credit unions used check forms that did not contain the quoted words. Such check forms may still
be in use but they are no longer common. Absence of the quoted words can easily be overlooked and should not affect the
rights of holders who may pay money or give credit for a check without being aware that it is not in the conventional form.
Total exclusion from Article 3 of other promises or orders that are not payable to bearer or to order serves a useful purpose. It
provides a simple device to clearly exclude a writing that does not fit the pattern of typical negotiable instruments and
which is not intended to be a negotiable instrument. If a writing could be an instrument despite the absence of “to order” or
“to bearer” language and a dispute arises with respect to the writing, it might be argued that the writing is a negotiable
instrument because the other requirements of subsection (a) are somehow met. Even if the argument is eventually found to
be without merit it can be used as a litigation ploy. Words making a promise or order payable to bearer or to order are the
most distinguishing feature of a negotiable instrument and such words are frequently referred to as “words of
negotiability.” Article 3 is not meant to apply to contracts for the sale of goods or services or the sale or lease of real
property or similar writings that may contain a promise to pay money. The use of words of negotiability in such contracts
would be an aberration. Absence of the words precludes any argument that such contracts might be negotiable instruments.
An order or promise that is excluded from Article 3 because of the requirements of Section 3-104(a) may nevertheless be
similar to a negotiable instrument in many respects. Although such a writing cannot be made a negotiable instrument
within Article 3 by contract or conduct of its parties, nothing in Section 3-104 or in Section 3-102 is intended to mean that in
a particular case involving such a writing a court could not arrive at a result similar to the result that would follow if the
writing were a negotiable instrument. For example, a court might find that the obligor with respect to a promise that does
not fall within Section 3-104(a) is precluded from asserting a defense against a bona fide purchaser. The preclusion could be
based on estoppel or ordinary principles of contract. It does not depend upon the law of negotiable instruments. An example
is stated in the paragraph following Case # 2 in Comment 4 to Section 3-302.
Moreover, consistent with the principle stated in Section 1-102(2)(b), the immediate parties to an order or promise that is not
an instrument may provide by agreement that one or more of the provisions of Article 3 determine their rights and
obligations under the writing. Upholding the parties’ choice is not inconsistent with Article 3. Such an agreement may bind a
transferee of the writing if the transferee has notice of it or the agreement arises from usage of trade and the agreement does

not violate other law or public policy. An example of such an agreement is a provision that a transferee of the writing has the
rights of a holder in due course stated in Article 3 if the transferee took rights under the writing in good faith, for value, and
without notice of a claim or defense.
Even without an agreement of the parties to an order or promise that is not an instrument, it may be appropriate, consistent
with the principles stated in Section 1-102(2), for a court to apply one or more provisions of Article 3 to the writing by
analogy, taking into account the expectations of the parties and the differences between the writing and an instrument
governed by Article 3. Whether such application is appropriate depends upon the facts of each case.
3. Subsection (d) allows exclusion from Article 3 of a writing that would otherwise be an instrument under subsection (a) by
a statement to the effect that the writing is not negotiable or is not governed by Article 3. For example, a promissory note can
be stamped with the legend NOT NEGOTIABLE. The effect under subsection (d) is not only to negate the possibility of a
holder in due course, but to prevent the writing from being a negotiable instrument for any purpose. Subsection (d) does
not, however, apply to a check. If a writing is excluded from Article 3 by subsection (d), a court could, nevertheless, apply
Article 3 principles to it by analogy as stated in Comment 2.
4. Instruments are divided into two general categories: drafts and notes. A draft is an instrument that is an order. A note is
an instrument that is a promise. Section 3-104(e). The term “bill of exchange” is not used in Article 3. It is generally
understood to be a synonym for the term “draft.” Subsections (f) through (j) define particular instruments that fall within the
categories of draft and note. The term “draft,” defined in subsection (e), includes a “check” which is defined in subsection (f).
“Check” includes a share draft drawn on a credit union payable through a bank because the definition of bank (Section 4-105)
includes credit unions. However, a draft drawn on an insurance company payable through a bank is not a check because it is
not drawn on a bank. “Money orders” are sold both by banks and non-banks. They vary in form and their form determines
how they are treated in Article 3. The most common form of money order sold by banks is that of an ordinary check drawn by
the purchaser except that the amount is machine impressed. That kind of money order is a check under Article 3 and is
subject to a stop order by the purchaser-drawer as in the case of ordinary checks. The seller bank is the drawee and has no
obligation to a holder to pay the money order. If a money order falls within the definition of a teller’s check, the rules
applicable to teller’s checks apply. Postal money orders are subject to federal law. “Teller’s check” is separately defined in
subsection (h). A teller’s check is always drawn by a bank and is usually drawn on another bank. In some cases a teller’s
check is drawn on a nonbank but is made payable at or through a bank. Article 3 treats both types of teller’s check identically,
and both are included in the definition of “check.” A cashier’s check, defined in subsection (g), is also included in the
definition of “check.” Traveler’s checks are issued both by banks and non-banks and may be in the form of a note or draft.
Subsection (i) states the essential characteristics of a traveler’s check. The requirement that the instrument be “drawn on or
payable at or through a bank” may be satisfied without words on the instrument that identify a bank as drawee or paying
agent so long as the instrument bears an appropriate routing number that identifies a bank as paying agent.
The definitions in Regulation CC § 229.2 of the terms “check,” “cashier’s check,” “teller’s check,” and “traveler’s check” are
different from the definitions of those terms in Article 3.
Certificates of deposit are treated in former Article 3 as a separate type of instrument. In revised Article 3, Section 3-104(j)
treats them as notes.
Relevant Additional Resources

Additional Resources listed below contain your search terms.
RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:1, Nature and Definition of Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:3, Draft or Bill of Exchange as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:4, Check as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:6, Promissory Note as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:8, Certificate of Deposit as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:9, Cashier’s Check as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:10, Teller’s Check as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:11, Traveler’s Check as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:34, Requirement of Promise or Order to Pay in Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:35, Requirement of Unconditional Promise or Order in Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:37, Requirement for Payment on Demand or at Definite Time Under Negotiable
Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:41, Requirement Excluding Other Statements, Undertakings, or Instructions
Affecting Negotiability.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:42, Effect of Particular Omissions of Terms on Negotiability.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:45, Statutory Rules of Construction for Negotiable Instruments; Parol Evidence.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:115, Negotiable Instrument Payable at Fixed or Determinable Time.
Treatises and Practice Aids
UCC Local Code Variations § 3-104 [Rev], Negotiable Instrument.

West’s A.L.R. Digest 56K144, Negotiability in General.
West’s A.L.R. Digest 56K164, Conditions and Restrictions in Instrument.
Relevant Notes of Decisions (27)

View all 44
Notes of Decisions listed below contain your search terms.
Negotiable instruments
To be negotiable, as unconditional promise to pay sum certain in money with no other promise, order, obligation, or power,
note must be like a courier without luggage; it must move unencumbered. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104(1). Ameritrust Co., N.A. v.
White, 1996, 73 F.3d 1553, 75 A.L.R.5th 725. Bills And Notes 144; Bills And Notes 164
ERISA plan administrator’s creation of an account in beneficiary’s name and delivery of a blank draftbook for the account
did not satisfy requirement of group life insurance policy that benefits be paid in one sum, and thus, administrator did not
discharge its fiduciary status by creating the account and delivering the draftbook, and the assets backing the account, as
accrued yet unpaid benefits, were plan assets for which administrator acted as a fiduciary; policy required actual delivery of
the proceeds due to beneficiary, administrator maintained actual possession of the benefits in its general account and had
control over where the benefits in its general account would be invested, beneficiary did not have possession or control of the
benefits, she merely had the ability to request possession by writing a draft on the account, which were not negotiable
instruments under Georgia law. Owens v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 2016, 210 F.Supp.3d 1344, reconsideration
denied 2017 WL 106017. Labor and Employment 473; Labor and Employment 575
Financial guaranty bond was not a negotiable instrument within definition of Uniform Commercial Code, since, on its face,
the bond was not payable in a sum certain but payable in some indeterminate balance left unpaid by the principal, and since
the bond was not expressly “payable to order or to bearer.” Code Ga. § 109A-3-104(1), (1)(b, d). Cobb Bank & Trust Co. v.
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 1978, 459 F.Supp. 328, affirmed 624 F.2d 722. Bills And Notes 147; Bills And Notes
157

A document lacking the words “payable to order or to bearer” may not be considered negotiable instrument in
determination of transfer rights and holder status. Code Ga. § 109A-3-104(1), (1)(b, d). Cobb Bank & Trust Co. v. American
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 1978, 459 F.Supp. 328, affirmed 624 F.2d 722. Bills And Notes 147
Negotiability demands that an instrument bear a definite sum in order that subsequent holders can take and transfer the
instrument without plumbing the intricacies of individual relationships or payback schemes. Code Ga. § 109A-3-104(1), (1)
(b, d). Cobb Bank & Trust Co. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 1978, 459 F.Supp. 328, affirmed 624 F.2d 722. Bills And
Notes 157
No new consideration need be given for an instrument if the instrument is given in payment of, or as security for, an
antecedent obligation of any kind. Smith v. Thigpen, 2009, 298 Ga.App. 572, 680 S.E.2d 604. Bills and Notes 94(1)
A negotiable instrument is presumed to be based on a valid and sufficient consideration. Smith v. Thigpen, 2009, 298
Ga.App. 572, 680 S.E.2d 604. Bills and Notes 493(1)
Negotiable instruments are recognized by law as having an intrinsic value. Harper v. State, 2003, 259 Ga.App. 843, 578
S.E.2d 544. Bills And Notes 144
One of requirements of negotiable instrument is that it contained time honored “words of negotiability,” such as pay to
order of or pay to bearer. Code, § 109A-3-104(1) (d). Hall v. Westmoreland, Hall and Bryan, 1971, 123 Ga.App. 809, 182
S.E.2d 539. Bills And Notes 147
In action by payee against maker of note, whether conditions included in note, providing for change of amount in event of
subsequent discovery of errors in accounting would invalidate the instrument as negotiable paper was immaterial and note
should be enforced in accordance with its terms. Code, §§ 109A-3-104(b) to 109A-3-106. Daniels v. Allen, 1968, 118
Ga.App. 722, 165 S.E.2d 449. Bills And Notes 529
Because the promissory notes obtained by the Georgia Student Finance Authority to secure state funded student loans are
non-negotiable instruments under the Uniform Commercial Code, the Authority has the discretion to determine the extent to
which it will be legally bound by electronically-executed documents and promissory notes; furthermore, a secure electronic
signature of a notary will satisfy the requirement, if any, for an official witness. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 05-2, March 30, 2005,
2005 WL 949001.
Checks
Under Georgia law, check was negotiable instrument, and check was thus evidence of debt rather than statement of one’s
financial condition; accordingly, corporate officer had never issued written statement of financial condition to vehicle
supplier that was issued checks drawn on corporate account, by treasurer and then by corporate officer, although such checks
were dishonored, and debt to supplier was not nondischargeable in bankruptcy of corporate officer as debt for property
received by use of materially false written statement respecting financial condition. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(B);
O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104. Matter of Ethridge, 1987, 80 B.R. 581. Bankruptcy 3372.29
Debt which arose out of a course of commodity future trading in a margin account was not nondischargeable on basis that
check written by debtor to pay for margin call was a “false financial statement,” since a “check”, being a “negotiable
instrument,” a form of contract creating rights, and not a statement, supplying information, cannot be a “false financial
statement”. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(B); O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104. In re Paulk, 1982, 25 B.R. 913. Bankruptcy
3372.29
A “check” is a negotiable instrument, defined in relevant part as a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand
and drawn on a bank, and inherent in its definition, a check is a promise to pay which can be taken by the bearer or indorsee
and cashed or converted on demand into federal reserve notes equaling the value stated on the check. Harper v. State, 2003,
259 Ga.App. 843, 578 S.E.2d 544. Bills And Notes 15; Bills And Notes 149
Transaction in which check was drawn on bank made payable to third party who, in turn, deposited same in its bank account
for collection was governed by Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and thus, collecting bank was entitled to application of
UCC limitation on damages in drawer’s suit alleging that bank negligently discharged its duty as collecting bank in
presenting check for payment to drawer’s bank; having used negotiable instrument, drawer could be deemed to have done
so in contemplation of its presentment for payment upon action of collecting bank. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-1-201(29), 11-3-104(2)
(b), 11-4-101 et seq., 11-4-103(5). Farr v. Trust Co. Bank of Savannah, N.A., 1996, 220 Ga.App. 423, 469 S.E.2d 501. Banks
And Banking 175(5)
“Check” is a draft drawn on a bank, payable on demand, and is a negotiable instrument which can be transferred by
endorsement of payee to bank for purpose of collection, with transferee bank obtaining such rights as the transferor had and
becoming the agent of the depositor for the purpose of collection. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-104(2)(b), 11-3-201(1). Green v. State,
1987, 182 Ga.App. 695, 356 S.E.2d 673. Banks And Banking 156; Banks And Banking 165; Bills And Notes 15;
Bills And Notes 149
Negotiable instrument which was drawn on a bank and, payable to defendants in garnishment in attachment proceeding was
a check, and debt represented by the check was not subject to garnishment after the check had been properly mailed and
delivered to such payees by garnishee. Code, § 109A-3-104. Russ Togs, Inc. v. Gordon, 1972, 127 Ga.App. 520, 194 S.E.2d
280. Bills And Notes 15; Creditors’ Remedies 61
Promissory notes
Forfeiture clause in notes executed by limited partner at time he acquired interest in limited partnership, providing that if
partner did not timely make all payments owing under notes, then he would retroactively lose all interest in limited
partnership, qualified as impermissible “other promise, order, obligation, or power,” which prevented promissory notes from
qualifying as “negotiable instruments” under Georgia law. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104(1). Ameritrust Co., N.A. v. White, 1996, 73
F.3d 1553, 75 A.L.R.5th 725. Bills And Notes 165
“Agreement Between Parties” constituted clear and unambiguous promissory note, or at least an enforceable contract
between borrower and lender, even though it did not constitute negotiable instrument under Uniform Commercial Code, and
provided for different terms of repayment if venture for which money was borrowed was successful, where document
provided that within six months from the date of the document, the defendants would have sum of money together with
interest over the prime rate, paid back to plaintiff. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104. Johnston v. Almand, 1994, 213 Ga.App. 553, 445
S.E.2d 347. Bills And Notes 28; Bills And Notes 150(1); Contracts 194
Promissory notes farmer signed in settlement of action on account conformed to requirements set forth in O.C.G.A. § 11-3-
104(1), (2)(d), defining a negotiable instrument, and thus, creditor was entitled to judgment after farmer defaulted.
Anderson v. Hendrix, 1985, 175 Ga.App. 720, 334 S.E.2d 697. Bills And Notes 451(1)

Even if promissory notes signed by farmer, pursuant to agreement with creditor when farmer became past due on an open
account used to purchase items needed in farming business, failed to conform to requirements set forth in O.C.G.A. § 11-3-
104(1), (2)(d), defining a negotiable instrument, promissory notes would still be enforceable between maker and the payee,
and thus, creditor was entitled to recover on notes after farmer defaulted. Anderson v. Hendrix, 1985, 175 Ga.App. 720, 334
S.E.2d 697. Bills And Notes 452(1)
Contracts
Construction contract for paving work was not “negotiable instrument,” and therefore Article 3 of Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) was not applicable, where contract was payable when work was performed. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-104(1), (1)(c),
11-3-109(2), 11-3-403. Crolley v. Haygood Contracting, Inc., 1991, 201 Ga.App. 700, 411 S.E.2d 907. Bills And Notes
164
Retail instalment contract relating to spraying for roaches was not a “negotiable instrument,” so that finance company
which had acquired such contract was not a holder in due course, and the defense of failure of consideration could be raised,
where contract did not contain merely a simple promise to repay but included, inter alia, a grant to holder of the power to
waive particular defaults or remedies without waiving others, and a purported waiver by the buyer of any defense,
counterclaim or cross complaint he could have asserted against the seller. Code, §§ 109A-3-104 to 109A-3-112, 109A-3-
104(1), 109A-3-302(1) (c). Geiger Finance Co. v. Graham, 1971, 123 Ga.App. 771, 182 S.E.2d 521. Bills And Notes
148.1; Bills And Notes 327
Leases
Motor vehicle lease was not a “negotiable instrument” within meaning of Uniform Commercial Code and, hence, former
law of guaranty and suretyship rather than the Code was the controlling authority as regards liability of guarantor. O.C.G.A.
§§ 11-3-102(1)(e), 11-3-104, 11-3-416, 11-3-416(1, 3). Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sullivan, 1984, 170 Ga.App. 718, 318
S.E.2d 188. Bills And Notes 148.1; Guaranty 34
Guaranties
Guaranty of merchandise supplied on open account was governed by suretyship provisions of Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) rather than commercial paper provisions, as commercial paper provisions do not govern guaranties which are not
ancillary to notes or other actionable negotiable instruments since guaranties alone are not negotiable instruments.
O.C.G.A. §§ 10-7-20 et seq., 11-3-101 et seq. Panasonic Indus. Co. v. Hall, 1990, 197 Ga.App. 860, 399 S.E.2d 733.
Guaranty 28
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code was not applicable to determination of effectiveness of oral renunciation of
guaranty by bank’s loan officer, after first note had been fully satisfied by debtor and before subsequent notes were executed
which would otherwise have been covered by future advances clause in guaranty, because Article 3 does not cover guaranties
which are not ancillary to notes or other actionable negotiable instruments. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-101 et seq., 11-3-104(1)(b),
11-3-105(2)(a), 11-3-605. Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Reid, 1986, 180 Ga.App. 428, 348 S.E.2d 913, certiorari denied. Guaranty
64
Guaranties alone are not negotiable instruments, since they are conditional promises to pay sum certain. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-
104(1)(b), 11-3-105(2)(a). Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Reid, 1986, 180 Ga.App. 428, 348 S.E.2d 913, certiorari denied. Bills And

Notes 164
Ga. Code Ann., § 11-3-104, GA ST § 11-3-104

The statutes and Constitution are current with legislation passed during the 2017 Session of the Georgia General
Assembly. The statutes are subject to changes by the Georgia Code Commission.
End of Document © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

Notes Of Decisions (44)
Negotiable instruments
To be negotiable, as unconditional promise to pay sum certain in money with no other promise,
order, obligation, or power, note must be like a courier without luggage; it must move
unencumbered. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104(1) . Ameritrust Co., N.A. v. White, 1996, 73 F.3d 1553, 75
A.L.R.5th 725 . Bills And Notes 144 ; Bills And Notes 164
ERISA plan administrator’s creation of an account in beneficiary’s name and delivery of a blank
draftbook for the account did not satisfy requirement of group life insurance policy that benefits be
paid in one sum, and thus, administrator did not discharge its fiduciary status by creating the
account and delivering the draftbook, and the assets backing the account, as accrued yet unpaid
benefits, were plan assets for which administrator acted as a fiduciary; policy required actual
delivery of the proceeds due to beneficiary, administrator maintained actual possession of the
benefits in its general account and had control over where the benefits in its general account would
be invested, beneficiary did not have possession or control of the benefits, she merely had the
ability to request possession by writing a draft on the account, which were not negotiable
instruments under Georgia law. Owens v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 2016, 210
F.Supp.3d 1344 , reconsideration denied 2017 WL 106017 . Labor and Employment 473 ; Labor
and Employment 575
Financial guaranty bond was not a negotiable instrument within definition of Uniform Commercial
Code, since, on its face, the bond was not payable in a sum certain but payable in some
indeterminate balance left unpaid by the principal, and since the bond was not expressly “payable
to order or to bearer.” Code Ga. § 109A-3-104(1), (1)(b, d). Cobb Bank & Trust Co. v. American
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 1978, 459 F.Supp. 328 , affirmed 624 F.2d 722 . Bills And Notes 147 ; Bills
And Notes 157
A document lacking the words “payable to order or to bearer” may not be considered negotiable
instrument in determination of transfer rights and holder status. Code Ga. § 109A-3-104(1), (1)(b,
d). Cobb Bank & Trust Co. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 1978, 459 F.Supp. 328 , affirmed 624
F.2d 722 . Bills And Notes 147
Negotiability demands that an instrument bear a definite sum in order that subsequent holders can
take and transfer the instrument without plumbing the intricacies of individual relationships or
payback schemes. Code Ga. § 109A-3-104(1), (1)(b, d). Cobb Bank & Trust Co. v. American Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co., 1978, 459 F.Supp. 328 , affirmed 624 F.2d 722 . Bills And Notes 157
No new consideration need be given for an instrument if the instrument is given in payment of, or
as security for, an antecedent obligation of any kind. Smith v. Thigpen, 2009, 298 Ga.App. 572,
680 S.E.2d 604 . Bills and Notes 94(1)
A negotiable instrument is presumed to be based on a valid and sufficient consideration. Smith v.

Thigpen, 2009, 298 Ga.App. 572, 680 S.E.2d 604 . Bills and Notes 493(1)
Negotiable instruments are recognized by law as having an intrinsic value. Harper v. State, 2003,
259 Ga.App. 843, 578 S.E.2d 544 . Bills And Notes 144
One of requirements of negotiable instrument is that it contained time honored “words of

negotiability,” such as pay to order of or pay to bearer. Code, § 109A-3-104(1) (d). Hall v.
Westmoreland, Hall and Bryan, 1971, 123 Ga.App. 809, 182 S.E.2d 539 . Bills And Notes 147

Even if note given in settlement of account between special agent and general agent were
nonnegotiable because of provision for change of amount in event of subsequent discovery of error,
face amount of the note established prima facie the amount due, less recognized credits, and party
asserting error in accounting had burden of proof. Daniels v. Allen, 1968, 118 Ga.App. 722, 165
S.E.2d 449 . Bills And Notes 491 ; Bills And Notes 519 ; Insurance 1645(1)
In action by payee against maker of note, whether conditions included in note, providing for change
of amount in event of subsequent discovery of errors in accounting would invalidate the instrument
as negotiable paper was immaterial and note should be enforced in accordance with its terms.
Code, §§ 109A-3-104(b) to 109A-3-106. Daniels v. Allen, 1968, 118 Ga.App. 722, 165 S.E.2d 449 .
Bills And Notes 529
Because the promissory notes obtained by the Georgia Student Finance Authority to secure state
funded student loans are non-negotiable instruments under the Uniform Commercial Code, the
Authority has the discretion to determine the extent to which it will be legally bound by
electronically-executed documents and promissory notes; furthermore, a secure electronic
signature of a notary will satisfy the requirement, if any, for an official witness. Op.Atty.Gen. No.
05-2, March 30, 2005, 2005 WL 949001 .
Checks
In prosecution for interstate transportation of falsely made and forged payroll check, knowingly and
with intent to defraud, writing which had most of attributes of check, both as matter of local law
and in common understanding, and which was used by defendant in transaction as check would
ordinarily be used permitted jury to find that writing was “security” within statute defining
“security” as including “check.” 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2311 , 2314 ; Code Ga. § 109A-3-104(1) (a). U. S.
v. Webb, 1971, 443 F.2d 308 . Receiving Stolen Goods 2
Check used by mortgagee to fund mortgage loan to enable mortgagor to purchase residence did
not breach loan contract, constitute mail or wire fraud, or establish pattern of racketeering activity
or usury on ground that check was not legal tender, where check given to mortgagor was backed
by and redeemable in federal reserve notes, coins and lawful money of United States, and
mortgagor received benefit of her bargain because she successfully purchased residence with
check. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104(2)(b) ; U.C.C. § 3-104(f) ; 31 U.S.C.A. § 5103 ; U.S.C.A. Const. Art.
1, § 8, cl. 5 . In re Strickland, 1995, 179 B.R. 979 . Contracts 312(1) ; Postal Service 35(10) ;
Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10 ; Telecommunications 972
“Check” is promise to pay which can be taken by bearer or endorsee and cashed or converted on
demand into federal reserve notes equalling value stated on check. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104(2)(b) ;
U.C.C. § 3-104(f) . In re Strickland, 1995, 179 B.R. 979 . Bills And Notes 144
Under Georgia law, check was negotiable instrument, and check was thus evidence of debt rather
than statement of one’s financial condition; accordingly, corporate officer had never issued written
statement of financial condition to vehicle supplier that was issued checks drawn on corporate
account, by treasurer and then by corporate officer, although such checks were dishonored, and
debt to supplier was not nondischargeable in bankruptcy of corporate officer as debt for property
received by use of materially false written statement respecting financial condition. Bankr.Code,
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(B) ; O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104 . Matter of Ethridge, 1987, 80 B.R. 581 .
Bankruptcy 3372.29
Debt which arose out of a course of commodity future trading in a margin account was not
nondischargeable on basis that check written by debtor to pay for margin call was a “false financial

statement,” since a “check”, being a “negotiable instrument,” a form of contract creating rights,
and not a statement, supplying information, cannot be a “false financial statement”. Bankr.Code,
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(B) ; O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104 . In re Paulk, 1982, 25 B.R. 913 . Bankruptcy
3372.29
Maker of check, that brought action for conversion against bank after it paid check despite stop-
payment order, was not required to establish the existence of specific dollars or coins in order to
recover for the conversion of its specific check and the full value of intangible rights identified with
that check; overruling 103 Ga. 727, 30 S.E. 435 . Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
2003, 276 Ga. 817, 583 S.E.2d 6 , reconsideration denied, on remand 265 Ga.App. 609, 594 S.E.2d
785 . Banks And Banking 139 ; Banks And Banking 154(1)
A “check” is a negotiable instrument, defined in relevant part as a draft, other than a documentary
draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank, and inherent in its definition, a check is a promise
to pay which can be taken by the bearer or indorsee and cashed or converted on demand into
federal reserve notes equaling the value stated on the check. Harper v. State, 2003, 259 Ga.App.
843, 578 S.E.2d 544 . Bills And Notes 15 ; Bills And Notes 149
Transaction in which check was drawn on bank made payable to third party who, in turn, deposited
same in its bank account for collection was governed by Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and thus,
collecting bank was entitled to application of UCC limitation on damages in drawer’s suit alleging
that bank negligently discharged its duty as collecting bank in presenting check for payment to
drawer’s bank; having used negotiable instrument, drawer could be deemed to have done so in
contemplation of its presentment for payment upon action of collecting bank. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-1-
201(29) , 11-3-104(2)(b) , 11-4-101 et seq. , 11-4-103(5) . Farr v. Trust Co. Bank of Savannah,
N.A., 1996, 220 Ga.App. 423, 469 S.E.2d 501 . Banks And Banking 175(5)
A wrecker service employee’s refusal to accept a check drawn on a credit union as payment of
charges for towing and storage of impounded vehicle did not violate city ordinance prohibiting
wrecker service operating within the city from refusing to accept a check or major credit card in lieu
of cash, under statutory provisions defining check as a draft drawn on a bank and excluding a credit
union from definition of bank. O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-4(7) , 11-3-104(2)(b) . Upton v. City of Atlanta,
1990, 260 Ga. 250, 392 S.E.2d 244 . Automobiles 371
“Check” is a draft drawn on a bank, payable on demand, and is a negotiable instrument which can
be transferred by endorsement of payee to bank for purpose of collection, with transferee bank
obtaining such rights as the transferor had and becoming the agent of the depositor for the purpose
of collection. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-104(2)(b) , 11-3-201(1) . Green v. State, 1987, 182 Ga.App. 695,
356 S.E.2d 673 . Banks And Banking 156 ; Banks And Banking 165 ; Bills And Notes 15 ;
Bills And Notes 149
Defendant could be found guilty of criminal issuance of bad check notwithstanding his contention
that checks were “not checks” under theory that, until payee filled in amount due at defendant’s
request, checks did not contain “sum certain.” O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-104(1)(b) , 16-9-20, 16-9-20(a) .
Hutchens v. State, 1985, 174 Ga.App. 507, 330 S.E.2d 436 . False Pretenses 6
A check, executed and delivered, is a contract in writing by which the drawer contracts with payee
that bank will pay to payee therein amount designated on presentation. Code, § 109A-3-104.
Bailey v. Polote, 1979, 152 Ga.App. 255, 262 S.E.2d 551 . Bills And Notes 23
Check is merely an order on bank to pay from drawer’s account, and may be revoked at any time
by the drawer before it has been certified, accepted, or paid by the bank, and may be revoked by
operation of the law on the death of the drawer. Code, § 109A-4-405. Stewart v. Citizens and
Southern Nat. Bank, 1976, 138 Ga.App. 209, 225 S.E.2d 761 . Bills And Notes 15 ; Bills And

Notes 22
Where check was given by payee’s stepmother in consideration of payee’s relinquishment of his
share of his father’s estate, a contract was formed with stepmother which was binding on her
estate and which was not revoked by stepmother’s death, and in such case the check might be
used as evidence in support of payee’s claim of indebtedness against the stepmother but not as
evidence of the indebtedness itself. Code, § 113-1525. Holsomback v. Akins, 1975, 134 Ga.App.
543, 215 S.E.2d 306 . Bills And Notes 15 ; Executors And Administrators 221(4.1)
Negotiable instrument which was drawn on a bank and, payable to defendants in garnishment in
attachment proceeding was a check, and debt represented by the check was not subject to
garnishment after the check had been properly mailed and delivered to such payees by garnishee.
Code, § 109A-3-104. Russ Togs, Inc. v. Gordon, 1972, 127 Ga.App. 520, 194 S.E.2d 280 . Bills
And Notes 15 ; Creditors’ Remedies 61
Both check and demand note are acknowledgments of indebtedness and unconditional promises to
pay. Mason v. Blayton, 1969, 119 Ga.App. 203, 166 S.E.2d 601 . Bills And Notes 15 ; Bills And
Notes 48.1
Check is written contract to be performed at place where banking house is located or place of
business of person on whom it is drawn. Mason v. Blayton, 1969, 119 Ga.App. 203, 166 S.E.2d 601
. Bills And Notes 15
Check executed and delivered is contract in writing by which drawer contracts with payee that bank
will pay to payee or his order amount designated, on presentation. Code, §109A-3-104. Mason v.
Blayton, 1969, 119 Ga.App. 203, 166 S.E.2d 601 . Bills And Notes 15
A check is a mere order upon a bank to pay from the drawer’s account and is subject to revocation
by drawer at any time before it has been certified, accepted, or paid by the bank. Code, § 14-1707.
Aiken Bag Corp. v. McLeod, 1954, 89 Ga.App. 737, 81 S.E.2d 215 . Bills And Notes 15 ; Bills
And Notes 22
Promissory notes
Forfeiture clause in notes executed by limited partner at time he acquired interest in limited
partnership, providing that if partner did not timely make all payments owing under notes, then he
would retroactively lose all interest in limited partnership, qualified as impermissible “other
promise, order, obligation, or power,” which prevented promissory notes from qualifying as
“negotiable instruments” under Georgia law. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104(1) . Ameritrust Co., N.A. v.
White, 1996, 73 F.3d 1553, 75 A.L.R.5th 725 . Bills And Notes 165
Promissory note was supported by consideration, and thus valid and enforceable, since debtor had
given note in payment of an antecedent debt; note was issued and given to lender in payment of
debt owed by debtor’s manufacturing company. Smith v. Thigpen, 2009, 298 Ga.App. 572, 680
S.E.2d 604 . Bills and Notes 92(5) ; Bills and Notes 94(1)
“Agreement Between Parties” constituted clear and unambiguous promissory note, or at least an
enforceable contract between borrower and lender, even though it did not constitute negotiable
instrument under Uniform Commercial Code, and provided for different terms of repayment if
venture for which money was borrowed was successful, where document provided that within six
months from the date of the document, the defendants would have sum of money together with
interest over the prime rate, paid back to plaintiff. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104 . Johnston v. Almand,
1994, 213 Ga.App. 553, 445 S.E.2d 347 . Bills And Notes 28 ; Bills And Notes 150(1) ;
Contracts 194

Promissory notes farmer signed in settlement of action on account conformed to requirements set
forth in O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104(1), (2)(d) , defining a negotiable instrument, and thus, creditor was
entitled to judgment after farmer defaulted. Anderson v. Hendrix, 1985, 175 Ga.App. 720, 334
S.E.2d 697 . Bills And Notes 451(1)
Even if promissory notes signed by farmer, pursuant to agreement with creditor when farmer
became past due on an open account used to purchase items needed in farming business, failed to
conform to requirements set forth in O.C.G.A. § 11-3-104(1), (2)(d) , defining a negotiable
instrument, promissory notes would still be enforceable between maker and the payee, and thus,
creditor was entitled to recover on notes after farmer defaulted. Anderson v. Hendrix, 1985, 175
Ga.App. 720, 334 S.E.2d 697 . Bills And Notes 452(1)
Recitation of consideration in promissory note was not essential to recovery thereon. Code, §§
109A-3-104(1), 109A-3-307(2), 109A-3-408; § 14-301 (Repealed). Riddick v. Evans, 1980, 155
Ga.App. 868, 274 S.E.2d 40 . Bills And Notes 40
Contracts
Construction contract for paving work was not “negotiable instrument,” and therefore Article 3 of
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was not applicable, where contract was payable when work was
performed. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-104(1), (1)(c) , 11-3-109(2) , 11-3-403 . Crolley v. Haygood
Contracting, Inc., 1991, 201 Ga.App. 700, 411 S.E.2d 907 . Bills And Notes 164
Retail instalment contract relating to spraying for roaches was not a “negotiable instrument,” so
that finance company which had acquired such contract was not a holder in due course, and the
defense of failure of consideration could be raised, where contract did not contain merely a simple
promise to repay but included, inter alia, a grant to holder of the power to waive particular defaults
or remedies without waiving others, and a purported waiver by the buyer of any defense,
counterclaim or cross complaint he could have asserted against the seller. Code, §§ 109A-3-104 to
109A-3-112, 109A-3-104(1), 109A-3-302(1) (c). Geiger Finance Co. v. Graham, 1971, 123 Ga.App.
771, 182 S.E.2d 521 . Bills And Notes 148.1 ; Bills And Notes 327
Leases
Motor vehicle lease was not a “negotiable instrument” within meaning of Uniform Commercial Code
and, hence, former law of guaranty and suretyship rather than the Code was the controlling
authority as regards liability of guarantor. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-102(1)(e) , 11-3-104 , 11-3-416, 11-3-
416(1, 3) . Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sullivan, 1984, 170 Ga.App. 718, 318 S.E.2d 188 . Bills And
Notes 148.1 ; Guaranty 34
Guaranties
Guaranty of merchandise supplied on open account was governed by suretyship provisions of

Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) rather than commercial paper provisions, as commercial paper
provisions do not govern guaranties which are not ancillary to notes or other actionable negotiable
instruments since guaranties alone are not negotiable instruments. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-7-20 et seq. ,
11-3-101 et seq. Panasonic Indus. Co. v. Hall, 1990, 197 Ga.App. 860, 399 S.E.2d 733 . Guaranty
28
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code was not applicable to determination of effectiveness of
oral renunciation of guaranty by bank’s loan officer, after first note had been fully satisfied by
debtor and before subsequent notes were executed which would otherwise have been covered by

future advances clause in guaranty, because Article 3 does not cover guaranties which are not
ancillary to notes or other actionable negotiable instruments. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-101 et seq. , 11-3-
104(1)(b) , 11-3-105(2)(a) , 11-3-605 . Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Reid, 1986, 180 Ga.App. 428, 348
S.E.2d 913 , certiorari denied. Guaranty 64
During period between maker’s payment of initial note and execution of subsequent note, guaranty
was simply an inchoately enforceable contract subject to condition precedent with no rights arising
until creditor made another loan to maker, and thus, oral renunciation of guaranty by bank’s loan
officer to guarantor at such time had effect of rescinding guaranty, under contract law, which,
unlike Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code , allows one party to consent to rescission by other
party, even though written guaranty contained future advances clause and stated that it would
continue until guarantor gave written notice to bank of discontinuance. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-101 et
seq. , 11-3-104(1)(b) , 11-3-105(2)(a) , 11-3-605 . Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Reid, 1986, 180 Ga.App.
428, 348 S.E.2d 913 , certiorari denied. Guaranty 64
Guaranties alone are not negotiable instruments, since they are conditional promises to pay sum
certain. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-104(1)(b) , 11-3-105(2)(a) . Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Reid, 1986, 180
Ga.App. 428, 348 S.E.2d 913 , certiorari denied. Bills And Notes 164

Versions (1)
§ 11-3-104. Negotiable instrument
GA ST § 11-3-104
Effective [See Text Amendments]
Enacted Legislation Laws 1996, p. 1306, § 3

Editor’s and Revisor’s Notes (20)
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENT
1. The definition of “negotiable instrument” defines the scope of Article 3 since Section 3-102
states: “This Article applies to negotiable instruments.” The definition in Section 3-104(a)
incorporates other definitions in Article 3. An instrument is either a “promise,” defined in Section
3-103(a)(9), or “order,” defined in Section 3-103(a)(6). A promise is a written undertaking to pay
money signed by the person undertaking to pay. An order is a written instruction to pay money
signed by the person giving the instruction. Thus, the term “negotiable instrument” is limited to a
signed writing that orders or promises payment of money. “Money” is defined in Section 1-201(24)
and is not limited to United States dollars. It also includes a medium of exchange established by a
foreign government or monetary units of account established by an intergovernmental organization
or by agreement between two or more nations. Five other requirements are stated in Section 3-
104(a): First, the promise or order must be “unconditional.” The quoted term is explained in
Section 3-106. Second, the amount of money must be “a fixed amount * * * with or without
interest or other charges described in the promise or order.” Section 3-112(b) relates to “interest.”
Third, the promise or order must be “payable to bearer or to order.” The quoted phrase is
explained in Section 3-109. An exception to this requirement is stated in subsection (c). Fourth,
the promise or order must be payable “on demand or at a definite time.” The quoted phrase is
explained in Section 3-108. Fifth, the promise or order may not state “any other undertaking or
instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of
money” with three exceptions. The quoted phrase is based on the first sentence of N.I.L. Section 5
which is the precursor of “no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or
drawer” appearing in former Section 3-104(1)(b). The words “instruction” and “undertaking” are
used instead of “order” and “promise” that are used in the N.I.L. formulation because the latter
words are defined terms that include only orders or promises to pay money. The three exceptions
stated in Section 3-104(a)(3) are based on and are intended to have the same meaning as former
Section 3-112(1)(b), (c), (d), and (e), as well as N.I.L. § 5(1), (2), and (3). Subsection (b) states
that “instrument” means a “negotiable instrument.” This follows former Section 3-102(1)(e) which
treated the two terms as synonymous.
2. Unless subsection (c) applies, the effect of subsection (a)(1) and Section 3-102(a) is to exclude
from Article 3 any promise or order that is not payable to bearer or to order. There is no provision
in revised Article 3 that is comparable to former Section 3-805. The comment to former Section 3-
805 states that the typical example of a writing covered by that section is a check reading “Pay
John Doe.” Such a check was governed by former Article 3 but there could not be a holder in due
course of the check. Under Section 3-104(c) such a check is governed by revised Article 3 and
there can be a holder in due course of the check. But subsection (c) applies only to checks. The
comment to former Section 3-805 does not state any example other than the check to illustrate
that section. Subsection (c) is based on the belief that it is good policy to treat checks, which are
payment instruments, as negotiable instruments whether or not they contain the words “to the
order of”. These words are almost always pre-printed on the check form. Occasionally the
drawer of a check may strike out these words before issuing the check. In the past some credit
unions used check forms that did not contain the quoted words. Such check forms may still be in
use but they are no longer common. Absence of the quoted words can easily be overlooked and
should not affect the rights of holders who may pay money or give credit for a check without being
aware that it is not in the conventional form.
Total exclusion from Article 3 of other promises or orders that are not payable to bearer or to order
serves a useful purpose. It provides a simple device to clearly exclude a writing that does not fit
the pattern of typical negotiable instruments and which is not intended to be a negotiable
instrument. If a writing could be an instrument despite the absence of “to order” or “to bearer”
language and a dispute arises with respect to the writing, it might be argued that the writing is a
negotiable instrument because the other requirements of subsection (a) are somehow met. Even
if the argument is eventually found to be without merit it can be used as a litigation ploy. Words
making a promise or order payable to bearer or to order are the most distinguishing feature of a
negotiable instrument and such words are frequently referred to as “words of negotiability.” Article
3 is not meant to apply to contracts for the sale of goods or services or the sale or lease of real
property or similar writings that may contain a promise to pay money. The use of words of
negotiability in such contracts would be an aberration. Absence of the words precludes any
argument that such contracts might be negotiable instruments.
An order or promise that is excluded from Article 3 because of the requirements of Section 3-104(a)
may nevertheless be similar to a negotiable instrument in many respects. Although such a writing
cannot be made a negotiable instrument within Article 3 by contract or conduct of its parties,
nothing in Section 3-104 or in Section 3-102 is intended to mean that in a particular case involving
such a writing a court could not arrive at a result similar to the result that would follow if the writing
were a negotiable instrument. For example, a court might find that the obligor with respect to a
promise that does not fall within Section 3-104(a) is precluded from asserting a defense against a
bona fide purchaser. The preclusion could be based on estoppel or ordinary principles of contract.
It does not depend upon the law of negotiable instruments. An example is stated in the
paragraph following Case # 2 in Comment 4 to Section 3-302.
Moreover, consistent with the principle stated in Section 1-102(2)(b), the immediate parties to an
order or promise that is not an instrument may provide by agreement that one or more of the
provisions of Article 3 determine their rights and obligations under the writing. Upholding the
parties’ choice is not inconsistent with Article 3. Such an agreement may bind a transferee of the
writing if the transferee has notice of it or the agreement arises from usage of trade and the
agreement does not violate other law or public policy. An example of such an agreement is a
provision that a transferee of the writing has the rights of a holder in due course stated in Article 3
if the transferee took rights under the writing in good faith, for value, and without notice of a claim
or defense.
Even without an agreement of the parties to an order or promise that is not an instrument, it may
be appropriate, consistent with the principles stated in Section 1-102(2), for a court to apply one or
more provisions of Article 3 to the writing by analogy, taking into account the expectations of the
parties and the differences between the writing and an instrument governed by Article 3. Whether
such application is appropriate depends upon the facts of each case.
3. Subsection (d) allows exclusion from Article 3 of a writing that would otherwise be an
instrument under subsection (a) by a statement to the effect that the writing is not negotiable or is
not governed by Article 3. For example, a promissory note can be stamped with the legend NOT
NEGOTIABLE. The effect under subsection (d) is not only to negate the possibility of a holder in
due course, but to prevent the writing from being a negotiable instrument for any purpose.
Subsection (d) does not, however, apply to a check. If a writing is excluded from Article 3 by
subsection (d), a court could, nevertheless, apply Article 3 principles to it by analogy as stated in
Comment 2.
4. Instruments are divided into two general categories: drafts and notes. A draft is an instrument
that is an order. A note is an instrument that is a promise. Section 3-104(e). The term “bill of
exchange” is not used in Article 3. It is generally understood to be a synonym for the term “draft.”
Subsections (f) through (j) define particular instruments that fall within the categories of draft and
note. The term “draft,” defined in subsection (e), includes a “check” which is defined in
subsection (f). “Check” includes a share draft drawn on a credit union payable through a bank

because the definition of bank (Section 4-105) includes credit unions. However, a draft drawn on
an insurance company payable through a bank is not a check because it is not drawn on a bank.
“Money orders” are sold both by banks and non-banks. They vary in form and their form
determines how they are treated in Article 3. The most common form of money order sold by
banks is that of an ordinary check drawn by the purchaser except that the amount is machine
impressed. That kind of money order is a check under Article 3 and is subject to a stop order by
the purchaser-drawer as in the case of ordinary checks. The seller bank is the drawee and has no
obligation to a holder to pay the money order. If a money order falls within the definition of a
teller’s check, the rules applicable to teller’s checks apply. Postal money orders are subject to
federal law. “Teller’s check” is separately defined in subsection (h). A teller’s check is always
drawn by a bank and is usually drawn on another bank. In some cases a teller’s check is drawn on
a nonbank but is made payable at or through a bank. Article 3 treats both types of teller’s check
identically, and both are included in the definition of “check.” A cashier’s check, defined in
subsection (g), is also included in the definition of “check.” Traveler’s checks are issued both by
banks and non-banks and may be in the form of a note or draft. Subsection (i) states the essential
characteristics of a traveler’s check. The requirement that the instrument be “drawn on or
payable at or through a bank” may be satisfied without words on the instrument that identify a
bank as drawee or paying agent so long as the instrument bears an appropriate routing number
that identifies a bank as paying agent.
The definitions in Regulation CC § 229.2 of the terms “check,” “cashier’s check,” “teller’s check,”
and “traveler’s check” are different from the definitions of those terms in Article 3.
Certificates of deposit are treated in former Article 3 as a separate type of instrument. In revised
Article 3, Section 3-104(j) treats them as notes.

Citing References (118)
Title Date NOD Topics Type

1. Georgia Real Estate Finance and Foreclosure Law 2017 — Other Secondary
APP A, Appendix A. Statutory Materials Source
§ 7-4-1. Loans by insured financial institutions § 7-4-2. Legal
rate of interest § 7-4-4. Advertisement of rate of interest or
finance charge § 7-4-5. Failure to include federal...
2. 100 Lakeside Trail Trust v. Bank of America, N.A. Sep. 08, 2017 — Case
804 S.E.2d 719, 720+ , Ga.App.
REAL PROPERTY - Mortgages and Deeds of Trust. Grantors
did not make genuine unconditional tender to pay note when
conditioned upon immediate exchange of physical note.
3. West’s A.L.R. Digest 56K144,  144. Negotiability 2017 — Other Secondary

in general Source
West’s A.L.R. Digest
4. West’s A.L.R. Digest 56K164,  164. Conditions and 2017 — Other Secondary
restrictions in instrument Source
5. West’s A.L.R. Digest 56K165,  165. References to 2017 — Other Secondary

collateral agreements Source
6. UCC Local Code Variations s 3-104 [Rev], 2017 — Other Secondary

Negotiable Instrument Source
ALASKA, Alaska Stat. § 45.03.104(a): Replaces ‘’it’’ with ‘’the
unconditional promise or order’’. ALASKA, Alaska Stat. §
45.03.104(a)(3): Omits designators (i), (ii), and(iii),...
7. Ga. Jur. Business Torts & Trade Regulation s 5:12, 2017 — Other Secondary
Transfer of contracts Source
Ga. Jur. Business Torts & Trade Regulation
A retail seller may assign, pledge, hypothecate, or otherwise
transfer a retail installment contract to any person, firm, or
corporation on such terms and conditions and for such...
8. Ga. Jur. Corporations, etc. s 3:24, Priority of debt 2017 — Other Secondary
over equity Source
Ga. Jur. Corporations, etc.
Generally, unless the debt instrument at issue provides
otherwise, holders of debt instruments have a priority right
over shareholders to receive the assets of a corporation
upon...


9. Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code s 4:1, Nature 2017 — Other Secondary
and definition of negotiable instrument Source
Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code
A negotiable instrument is a written promise or order to pay
money which meets the formal requirements set forth for the
form of a negotiable instrument and is within the scope of...
10. Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code s 4:3, Draft or 2017 — Other Secondary
bill of exchange as negotiable instrument Source
Under Article 3 Uniform Commercial Code—Negotiable
Instruments, a ‘’draft’’ is an instrument that is an order, and,
by the general definition of a negotiable instrument, is a...
11. Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code s 4:4, Check as 2017 — Other Secondary
negotiable instrument Source
Under Article 3 Uniform Commercial Code—Negotiable
Instruments, a check is a draft, other than a documentary
draft, drawn on a bank and payable on demand, or a
cashier’s or...
12. Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code s 4:6, 2017 — Other Secondary
Promissory note as negotiable instrument Source
Under Article 3, Uniform Commercial Code—Negotiable
Instruments, an instrument means a negotiable instrument,
and an instrument is a note if it is a promise. Thus, a note is
an...
Certificate of deposit as negotiable instrument Source
Instruments, a ‘’certificate of deposit’’ as an instrument
containing an acknowledgment by a bank that a sum of
money has been...
14. Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code s 4:9, Cashier’s 2017 — Other Secondary
check as negotiable instrument Source
Instruments, a cashier’s check is a draft with respect to
which the drawer and drawee are the same bank or
branches of the same...


Definitions for banks and collections Source
Article 4 defines the terms and phrases used therein in the
definitions section, which incorporates certain of the
definitions of other articles, as well as in the various
sections...
16. Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code s 4:10, Teller’s 2017 — Other Secondary
check as negotiable instrument Source
Instruments, a teller’s check is a draft drawn by one bank on
another bank or payable at or through a bank. A teller’s
check is...
Traveler’s check as negotiable instrument Source
Instruments, a traveler’s check is an instrument that: is
payable on demand; is drawn on or payable at or through a
bank; is...
Permissible payees of order paper Source
Article 3, Uniform Commercial Code—Negotiable
Instruments, provides that a promise or order cannot be a
negotiable instrument unless it is payable to bearer or order
when it is...
Requirement of promise or order to pay in negotiable Source
instrument
Instruments, provides that an instrument, to be negotiable,
must contain an unconditional ‘’promise or order to pay’’ a
fixed amount...
Requirement of unconditional promise or order in Source
negotiable instrument
Instruments, a negotiable instrument, to be negotiable,
means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed
amount of money,...


Requirement for promise or order for payment of Source
money in fixed amount
A negotiable instrument under Article 3, Uniform Commercial
Code—Negotiable Instruments, must contain an
unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of
money. In the event...
Requirement for payment on demand or at definite Source
time under negotiable instrument
Negotiable instruments under Article 3, Uniform Commercial
Code—Negotiable Instruments, must be payable on demand
or at a definite time. Failing both of these tests, the
instrument...
Requirement excluding other statements, Source
undertakings, or instructions affecting negotiability
Apart from the required promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money, under Article 3, Uniform Commercial Code
—Negotiable Instruments, a negotiable instrument must not
state any...
24. Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code s 4:42, Effect of 2017 — Other Secondary
particular omissions of terms on negotiability Source
Nothing in the definition of a negotiable instrument under
Instruments, requires the inclusion of a statement of any
consideration in...
Statutory rules of construction for negotiable Source
instruments; parol evidence
If an instrument falls within the definition of both a ‘’draft’’ or
a ‘’note,’’ a person entitled to enforce the instrument may
treat it as either, under Article 3, Uniform...
Negotiable instrument payable at fixed or Source
determinable time
If not payable on demand, a negotiable instrument under
Instruments, must be payable at a definite time. A promise
or order is...


27. Georgia Real Estate Title Exam. and Closings s 2017 — Other Secondary
3:109, Disbursements; recordings Source
As soon as the closing ends, the closing attorney should
prepare and mail or wire all disbursements not made at the
closing itself. These could include such things as loan...
28. Burrowes v. Bank of America, N.A. Feb. 16, 2017 — Case

797 S.E.2d 493, 496 , Ga.App.
FINANCE AND BANKING - Attachment and Garnishment.
Garnishee bank was prohibited by law from honoring
cashier’s check issued by bank to judgment debtor.
29. Ga. Enforcement Security Interests Personal 2017 — Other Secondary

Property s 1:2, Collateral Source
The term ‘’collateral’’ as used in the Code and in this text
means the property subject to a security interest or
agricultural lien. Some of the common types of personal
property...
30. Corporate Counsel’s Guide to Uniform 2016 — Other Secondary

Commercial Code s 17:14.50, Promissory notes Source
In River Forest, Inc. v. Multibank 2009-1 RES-ADC Venture,
LLC, 331 Ga. App. 435, 771 S.E.2d 126, 86 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d 162 (2015), cert. denied, (July 6, 2015), appellee...
31. Owens v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Sep. 27, 2016 Negotiable Case
210 F.Supp.3d 1344, 1354+ , N.D.Ga. instruments
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT - Benefit Plans. ERISA plan
administrator’s creation of account in beneficiary’s name did
not satisfy plan requirement that life insurance benefits be
paid in...
32. FRT 2011-1 Trust v. eHealthscreen, LLC Apr. 19, 2016 — Case
2016 WL 1595392, *13 , S.D.Ga.
This matter comes before the Court on several fully briefed
dispositive motions: Defendant eHealthscreen, LLC’s
(“eHealthscreen”) Motion for Summary Judgment Against
Plaintiff FRT...
33. First Citizens Bank and Trust Co., Inc. v. River Aug. 18, 2015 — Case
Walk Farm, L.P.
620 Fed.Appx. 811, 815 , 11th Cir.(Ga.)
REAL PROPERTY - Mortgages and Deeds of Trust. Affidavit of
note holder’s senior vice president was sufficient to establish
amount of damages owed in deficiency action.


34. Akkan v. Nationstar Mortgage Apr. 28, 2015 — Case
2015 WL 11438554, *10 , N.D.Ga.
This action is Plaintiff’s second attempt to stop the
foreclosure sale of real property located at 486 Timberlea
Lake Drive SE, Marietta, Georgia 30067. See Akkan v. Bank
of Am.,...
35. River Forest, Inc. v. Multibank 2009-1 RES-ADC Mar. 20, 2015 — Case
Venture, LLC
771 S.E.2d 126, 129 , Ga.App.
COMMERCIAL LAW - Secured Transactions. Note modification
was a renewal rather than a novation, thus assignee of note
could enforce underlying debt if it was holder of original...
36. Khader v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. Nov. 17, 2014 — Case

2014 WL 12013420, *6 , N.D.Ga.
This case is presently before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to
Amend and Motions for Summary Judgment. For the reasons
outlined below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is DENIED....
37. First Citizens Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Aug. 25, 2014 — Case
River Walk Farm, L.P.
2014 WL 11279375, *5 , N.D.Ga.
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment [33]. Plaintiff First Citizens Bank and
Trust Company, Inc. filed suit against Defendants River
Walk...
38. McCrary v. Bank of America July 18, 2014 — Case

2014 WL 12069846, *9 , N.D.Ga.
There are four motions pending before the Court in this case:
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [3]; Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [8]; Plaintiff’s
Motion...
39. Fritz v. Satellink Paging, LLC Mar. 31, 2014 — Case

2014 WL 1327742, *4+ , M.D.La.
This lawsuit arises out of the sale of a business. Plaintiff
Philip Fritz (’’Fritz’’), individually and in his capacity as a
representative of Premier Paging, Inc., Premier Paging...
40. Cumberland Contractors, Inc. v. State Bank and Mar. 18, 2014 — Case
Trust Co.
755 S.E.2d 511, 516 , Ga.App.
COMMERCIAL LAW - Commercial Paper. Sufficient evidence
loans were validly assigned to bank established bank’s
entitlement to enforce promissory notes.


41. Metro Brokers, Inc. v. Transportation Ins. Co. Nov. 21, 2013 — Case
2013 WL 7117840, *5 , N.D.Ga.
This civil case, alleging breach of contract and bad faith
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33–4–6, is before the Court on
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 39]
and...
42. You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank May 20, 2013 — Case

743 S.E.2d 428, 432 , Ga.
REAL PROPERTY - Mortgages and Deeds of Trust. Foreclosing
party was not required to hold promissory note as well as
security deed in order to foreclose.
43. Hampton Island, LLC v. Asset Holding Co. 5, LLC Mar. 28, 2013 — Case
740 S.E.2d 859, 863 , Ga.App.
COMMERCIAL LAW - Parties. Lender’s assignee was the real
party in interest in action to enforce promissory notes and
associated guaranties.
44. Smith v. Bank of America N.A. Mar. 04, 2013 — Case

2013 WL 12109236, *6+ , N.D.Ga.
This matter is currently before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion
to Add Parties, [Doc. 9], and Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (’’TRO’’), [Doc. 10], and is also before
the...
45. Garrison v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co. July 23, 2012 — Case
908 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1301+ , N.D.Ga.
INSURANCE - Life. Allegations that life insurer failed to make
lump sum payment stated claim of breach of contract.
46. Walker v. CitiMortgage Feb. 08, 2012 — Case

2012 WL 12883523, *4+ , N.D.Ga.
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s ‘’Ex Parte Application for
Temporary Restraining Order, Order Shortening Time, and
Order to Show Cause Re Preliminary Injunction.’’ [Doc. 4]....
47. Thomas v. Bank of America, N.A. Nov. 30, 2011 — Case

2011 WL 13120644, *20+ , N.D.Ga.
Attached is the Report and Recommendation of the United
States Magistrate Judge made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), N.D. Ga. R. 72.1(B), (D), and...


48. In re Lewis Oct. 26, 2009 — Case
2009 WL 3614763, *3 , Bkrtcy.E.D.Tenn.
THE COURT: This contested matter is before me upon the
Motion for Relief From Automatic Stay and Abandonment
filed by U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for RFMSI
2005SA4 on...
49. Smith v. Thigpen June 26, 2009 Negotiable Case

680 S.E.2d 604, 604+ , Ga.App. instruments
COMMERCIAL LAW - Debt Collection. Promissory note given
in payment of antecedent debt was supported by sufficient
consideration.
50. Smith v. Thigpen June 26, 2009 Promissory notes Case

680 S.E.2d 604, 604+ , Ga.App.
COMMERCIAL LAW - Debt Collection. Promissory note given
in payment of antecedent debt was supported by sufficient
consideration.
51. Morales-Arcadio v. Shannon Produce Farms, July 18, 2007 — Case

Inc.
2007 WL 2106188, *25 , S.D.Ga.
This case concerns the alleged underpayment of so-called
‘’H-2A laborer’’ farmworkers (collectively ‘’Laborers’’) by
defendants Shannon Produce Farms, Inc., James Shannon,
Sr., and...
52. P 146,709 CLEMENTE MORALES-ARCADIO, ET AL., 2007 — Other Secondary

PLAINTIFFS, V. SHANNON PRODUCE FARMS, INC. AND Source
JAMES G. SHANNON, JR., DEFENDANTS.
Labor & Employment Law
Case 6:05-cv-00062-BAE-GRS Filed Jul. 18, 2007U.S. District
Court, S.D. Georgia CLEMENTE MORALES-ARCADIO, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. SHANNON PRODUCE FARMS, INC. and JAMES G.
SHANNON,...
53. Manhattan Const. Co. v. McArthur Elec., Inc. Jan. 30, 2007 — Case
2007 WL 295535, *11 , N.D.Ga.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Manhattan
Construction Company’s (’’Manhattan’’ or ‘’Plaintiff’’) Motion
to Dismiss Counterclaim of Defendant Great American
Insurance...
54. Scott v. State Mar. 03, 2006 — Case

627 S.E.2d 904, 904+ , Ga.App.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Larceny. Evidence was sufficient to
support conviction for theft by deception even though victim
did not suffer any pecuniary loss.


55. To: President Mar. 30, 2005 Negotiable Administrative
Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 05-2, 05-2+ instruments Decision
Re: Because the promissory notes obtained by the Georgia
Student Finance Authority to secure state funded student
loans are non-negotiable instruments under the Uniform
Commercial...
56. Provident Bank v. MorEquity, Inc. June 13, 2003 — Case

585 S.E.2d 625, 627 , Ga.App.
COMMERCIAL LAW - Commercial Paper. Purchaser of
promissory note was not holder in due course.
57. Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. June 09, 2003 Checks Case
583 S.E.2d 6, 8 , Ga.
TORTS - Conversion. Plaintiff in a conversion action did not
need to identify specific currency represented by value of
check.
58. Harper v. State Feb. 25, 2003 Negotiable Case

578 S.E.2d 544, 544+ , Ga.App. instruments
CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Embezzlement and Conversion. Checks
embezzled by defendant had monetary value necessary for
felony theft by taking conviction.
59. Harper v. State Feb. 25, 2003 Checks Case

578 S.E.2d 544, 544+ , Ga.App.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Embezzlement and Conversion. Checks
embezzled by defendant had monetary value necessary for
felony theft by taking conviction.
60. Brown v. McGriff June 20, 2002 — Case

567 S.E.2d 374, 376+ , Ga.App.
COMMERCIAL LAW - Contracts. Amended agreement was
supported by adequate consideration in form of mutual
exchange of promises.
61. South v. Bank of America May 15, 2001 — Case

551 S.E.2d 55, 56 , Ga.App.
FINANCE AND BANKING - Banks. Fact issue of bank’s
withdrawal rules precluded judgment on the pleadings.
62. Kline v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. Aug. 02, 2000 — Case
538 S.E.2d 93, 95 , Ga.App.
COMMERCIAL LAW - Commercial Paper. Payee that took
money order issued for wrong amount in good faith for value
was not liable for conversion.


63. Lowery v. Dallis Jan. 29, 1999 — Case
513 S.E.2d 740, 741 , Ga.App.
COMMERCIAL LAW - Guaranty. Guarantors could assert as
defense payee’s alleged breach of contract.
64. COMMERCIAL AND BANKING LAW 1997 — Law Review

49 Mercer L. Rev. 95 , 96+
Last year’s article limited its coverage to cases interpreting
provisions of Georgia’s Commercial Code. Although the
courts have provided ample material to again dedicate the...
65. Dal-Tile Corp. v. Cash N’ Go, Inc. June 12, 1997 — Case
487 S.E.2d 529, 532 , Ga.App.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS - Checks. In action by check’s
holder in due course against check’s maker, fraudulent
inducement on the part of check payee’s president did not
void...
66. Thogerson v. State Dec. 17, 1996 — Case

479 S.E.2d 463, 463+ , Ga.App.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Forgery. UCC definition of negotiable
instrument was inapplicable.
67. Womack v. Columbus Rentals, Inc. Oct. 30, 1996 — Case

478 S.E.2d 611, 612+ , Ga.App.
REAL ESTATE - Mortgages. Former owners’ answer in
foreclosure sale purchasers’ dispossessory proceeding that
foreclosure purchase was void was not germane to
dispossessory...
68. First Union Nat. Bank of Georgia v. Collins Apr. 11, 1996 — Case
471 S.E.2d 892, 894+ , Ga.App.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS - Checks. Service charges that
banks imposed on dormant bank checks were lawful
charges, and thus, banks properly withheld charges from
Department of...
69. Farr v. Trust Co. Bank of Savannah, N.A. Mar. 04, 1996 Checks Case
469 S.E.2d 501, 502+ , Ga.App.
Checks. Transaction whereby check was drawn on one bank
account made payable to third party who then deposited
check in his bank account for collection was transaction
governed by...


70. Ameritrust Co., N.A. v. White Feb. 06, 1996 Negotiable Case
73 F.3d 1553, 1553+ , 11th Cir.(Ga.) instruments
Bank filed suit to collect monies allegedly owing on
promissory notes executed by party subscribing in limited
partnership, and subscribing partner counterclaimed for
conspiracy to...
71. Ameritrust Co., N.A. v. White Feb. 06, 1996 Promissory notes Case
73 F.3d 1553, 1553+ , 11th Cir.(Ga.)
Bank filed suit to collect monies allegedly owing on
promissory notes executed by party subscribing in limited
partnership, and subscribing partner counterclaimed for
conspiracy to...
72. In re Strickland Mar. 22, 1995 Checks Case

179 B.R. 979, 979+ , Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga.
MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUST. check used by
mortgagee to pay mortgage loan proceeds was legal tender
because it was backed by and redeemable in federal reserve
notes, coins and...
73. Honorable Larry Walker Dec. 22, 1994 — Administrative

1994 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 103 Decision
RE: A professional bondsman may require as a condition of
his suretyship that, in addition to the fee allowed by O.C.G.A.
§ 17–6–30, he receive an indemnification from a third...
74. Johnston v. Almand June 15, 1994 Promissory notes Case

445 S.E.2d 347, 347+ , Ga.App.
Promissory Note. Real estate investor did not establish that
fraud was implicated with note, which was a valid and
binding contract between the parties.
75. Honorable Marcus E. Collins, Sr. May 27, 1994 — Administrative

This responds to your question concerning service charges
on dormant official and certified checks. You have asked if
funds held by banks to pay outstanding certified and
official...
76. Ameritrust Co., N.A. v. White Oct. 20, 1993 — Case

1993 WL 819124, *4+ , N.D.Ga.
This case is presently before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion to
Compel Production of Supplemental Discovery [57-1],
plaintiff’s Motion to Strike defendant’s counterclaim [70-1],...

77. Matter of Ascot Mortg., Inc. Apr. 09, 1993 — Case

153 B.R. 1002, 1013 , Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga.
PREFERENCES. loan repurchase payments made under
purchase agreement executed in the secondary mortgage
market came within the new value defense to trustee’s
power to avoid...
78. P 75,258 IN RE ASCOT MORTGAGE, INC. 1993 — Other Secondary

Bankruptcy Law Reporter Source
¶ 75,258. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia. No. A89-
04814-ADK.April 9, 1993. Opinion of KAHN, Bankruptcy
Judge: W. H. Willson, Jr., as Chapter 7 Trustee of the
Bankruptcy Estate...
79. Gunter v. True Feb. 19, 1992 — Case

416 S.E.2d 768, 769 , Ga.App.
Creditor brought action against guarantors to enforce
guaranty for promissory note. The Cobb State Court, Nix, J.,
denied guarantors’ motion for summary judgment.
Guarantors...
80. Crolley v. Haygood Contracting, Inc. Oct. 31, 1991 Contracts Case
411 S.E.2d 907, 907+ , Ga.App.
Paving company brought action against director of property
owner who signed contract and property owner to recover
amounts allegedly owed on construction contract. Property
owner...
81. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Universal Diamond July 15, 1991 — Case
Corp., Inc.
409 S.E.2d 558, 560 , Ga.App.
Consignor brought action against carrier to recover damages
for breach of agreements to collect cash only for C.O.D.
shipments. The State Court, Fulton County, Carnes, J.,...
82. Panasonic Indus. Co. v. Hall Dec. 04, 1990 Guaranties Case
399 S.E.2d 733 , Ga.App.
Secured party brought action against business and guarantor
alleging indebtedness under open account agreement. The
State Court, Gwinnett County, Cook, J., directed verdict for...
83. Upton v. City of Atlanta June 08, 1990 Checks Case

392 S.E.2d 244, 244+ , Ga.
Wrecker service employee was convicted in the Fuluton
County Municipal Court, Howard R. Johnson, J., of refusing to
accept a check drawn on a credit union as payment for
towing and...


84. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Lovett & Feb. 10, 1989 — Case
Tharpe, Inc.
379 S.E.2d 530, 532 , Ga.App.
Drawer and drawee under commercial instrument entitled
“trade acceptance” appealed from an order of the Laurens
Superior Court, Towson, J., which heard drawer’s action to
collect...
85. Matter of Fontana Nov. 01, 1988 — Case

92 B.R. 559, 562 , Bkrtcy.M.D.Ga.
Chapter 7 debtor’s landlord filed adversary proceeding to
determine whether rental debt was nondischargeable. The
Bankruptcy Court, Robert F. Hershner, Jr., Chief Judge, held...
86. Matter of Ethridge Dec. 15, 1987 Checks Case

80 B.R. 581, 582+ , Bkrtcy.M.D.Ga.
Supplier of vans to corporation filed complaint in Chapter 7
individual bankruptcy of corporate officer-shareholder,
objecting to discharge, or alternatively, requesting...
87. Bank South, N.A. v. Midstates Group, Inc. Nov. 20, 1987 — Case
364 S.E.2d 58, 60 , Ga.App.
Corporation sued bank for bank’s alleged conversion of
certificate of deposit belonging to corporation. Bank moved
for summary judgment, asserting that it was “holder in due...
88. Honorable Harry Johnson, Jr. Oct. 16, 1987 — Administrative

This is in response to your request for my opinion concerning
whether municipal bonds, stocks purchased by the decedent,
and certificates of deposit constitute ‘’money loaned’’...
89. Green v. State Apr. 08, 1987 Checks Case

356 S.E.2d 673, 673+ , Ga.App.
Defendant was convicted in the State Court, Gwinnett
County, Winegarden, J., of theft by taking and she appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Birdsong, C.J., held that: (1) venue
was...
90. Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Reid Sep. 12, 1986 Guaranties Case
348 S.E.2d 913, 914+ , Ga.App.
Bank sought to collect on guaranty. The State Court, Fulton
County, Lambros, J., entered summary judgment in favor of
guarantor, and bank appealed. The Court of Appeals,...


91. Nelson v. Nelson Sep. 04, 1985 — Case
335 S.E.2d 411, 413 , Ga.App.
Purported lender brought action seeking principal and
interest allegedly owed to her pursuant to loan agreement.
The State Court, DeKalb County, Seeliger, J., entered
judgment in...
92. Anderson v. Hendrix Sep. 03, 1985 Promissory notes Case

334 S.E.2d 697, 697+ , Ga.App.
Creditor brought action after debtor defaulted on promissory
notes executed pursuant to settlement of creditor’s previous
action on open account. The Superior Court, Screven...
93. Bentley v. National Bank of Walton County Sep. 03, 1985 — Case
334 S.E.2d 331, 332 , Ga.App.
Bank brought action on seven promissory notes with maker.
The Cobb State Court, Stoddard, J., entered judgment in
favor of bank, and maker appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Deen,...
94. Hutchens v. State Apr. 08, 1985 Checks Case

330 S.E.2d 436, 436+ , Ga.App.
Defendant was found guilty in the Superior Court, McDuffie
County, Davis, J., of criminal issuance of a bad check.
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Deen, P.J.,
held...
95. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sullivan Apr. 24, 1984 Leases Case
318 S.E.2d 188, 189+ , Ga.App.
Assignor of motor vehicle lease sued guarantor when
principal obligor defaulted. The DeKalb State Court,
Seeliger, J., granted guarantor’s motion for directed verdict,
and...
96. Bank of Danielsville v. Seagraves May 18, 1983 — Case

305 S.E.2d 790, 794 , Ga.App.
Appeal was taken from summary judgment of the Madison
Superior Court, Grant, J., in favor of insurer on fidelity bond
of payee on promissory notes in action against maker, an...
97. In re Paulk Dec. 22, 1982 Checks Case

25 B.R. 913, 914+ , Bkrtcy.M.D.Ga.
Creditor brought a complaint seeking the nondischargeability
of its debt which arose out of a course of commodity future
trading in a margin account. The Bankruptcy Court, Algie...


98. Riddick v. Evans Sep. 26, 1980 Promissory notes Case
274 S.E.2d 40 , Ga.App.
Action was brought on a promissory note. The Clayton State
Court, Arnold, J., dismissed and plaintiff appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Smith, J., held that a recitation of...
99. Bailey v. Polote Nov. 09, 1979 Checks Case

262 S.E.2d 551 , Ga.App.
Suit was instituted for sums due on check which had been
returned for insufficient funds. The Fulton Superior Court,
Tidwell, J., granted plaintiff summary judgment, and...
100. Cobb Bank & Trust Co. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Oct. 25, 1978 Negotiable Case
Ins. Co. instruments
459 F.Supp. 328 , N.D.Ga.
Lender brought action against surety to recover under
financial guaranty bond. The District Court, Richard C.
Freeman, J., held that: (1) where assignor of financial
guaranty bond...
101. Stewart v. Citizens and Southern Nat. Bank Mar. 19, 1976 Checks Case
225 S.E.2d 761 , Ga.App.
After bank refused to cash check though there were
sufficient funds in the account, holder sued bank and its
agent. The Superior Court, Fulton County, John S. Langford,
Jr., J.,...
102. Holsomback v. Akins Apr. 11, 1975 Checks Case

215 S.E.2d 306 , Ga.App.
The payee of a check brought an action against the drawer’s
executrix and beneficiaries of the drawer’s estate, wherein
the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, and the...
103. Russ Togs, Inc. v. Gordon Nov. 09, 1972 Checks Case
194 S.E.2d 280 , Ga.App.
Garnishment in attachment proceeding. The Civil Court of
Fulton County, Kermit C. Bradford, J., granted summary
judgment to granishee, and appeal was taken. The Court of
Appeals,...
104. Hall v. Westmoreland, Hall and Bryan May 21, 1971 Negotiable Case
182 S.E.2d 539 , Ga.App. instruments
Action by law partners against client on negotiable
instrument in which client agreed to pay $2,760 at rate of
$230 per month as attorney’s fees for representation in
obtaining...


105. U.S. v. Webb May 20, 1971 Checks Case
443 F.2d 308 , 5th Cir.(Ga.)
Prosecution for causing interstate transportation of a falsely
made and forged payroll check, knowingly and with intent to
defraud. Defendant was convicted in the United States...
106. Geiger Finance Co. v. Graham May 13, 1971 Contracts Case
182 S.E.2d 521 , Ga.App.
Suit by finance company on an alleged note. The State
Court, DeKalb County, Jack B. Smith, J., entered judgment for
defendant, and finance company appealed. The Court of
Appeals,...
107. Mason v. Blayton Jan. 29, 1969 Checks Case

166 S.E.2d 601 , Ga.App.
Action by lessor of equipment to trucking corporation to
recover from corporation’s president on president’s personal
check which president had stopped payment on. The Civil...
108. Daniels v. Allen Nov. 26, 1968 Negotiable Case

165 S.E.2d 449 , Ga.App. instruments
Action between general insurance agent and special
insurance agent to recover amount due on account of
transactions between them. The City Court of Savannah,
George E. Oliver, J.,...
109. Aiken Bag Corp. v. McLeod Feb. 05, 1954 Checks Case
81 S.E.2d 215 , Ga.App.
Action by payee of check against operators of private,
unincorporated bank upon which the check was drawn, to
recover amount of check which defendants failed to pay or
to collect...
110. Cooke v. Bryant Mar. 24, 1898 Checks Case

30 S.E. 435 , Ga.
Error from superior court, Bibb county; W.H. Felton, Jr., Judge.
Action by J.G. Cooke against Edward Bryant. A demurrer to
the petition was sustained, and plaintiff brings error. ...
111. GA ST § 7-1-4; § 7-1-4. Definitions — — Statute

GA ST § 7-1-4
112. GA ST § 11-2-103; § 11-2-103. Definitions and — — Statute

index of definitions
GA ST § 11-2-103
113. GA ST § 11-3-103; § 11-3-103. Definitions — — Statute

GA ST § 11-3-103


114. GA ST § 11-3-106; § 11-3-106. Unconditional — — Statute
promise or order
GA ST § 11-3-106
115. GA ST § 11-3-115; § 11-3-115. Incomplete — — Statute

instrument
GA ST § 11-3-115

GA ST § 11-4-104

GA ST § 11-9-102
118. GA ST § 44-14-13; § 44-14-13. Funding of loan — — Statute

proceeds and disbursement of funds held in escrow
accounts in connection with loans secured by real
property
GA ST § 44-14-13

Context and Analysis (34)
Cross References (2)

Financial institutions, “subject to check” defined, see § 7-1-4.
Mortgages, conveyances to secure debt, disbursement of settlement proceeds, see § 44-14-13.
Library References (4)

Bills and Notes 144 to 175.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 56k144 to 56k175.
C.J.S. Bills and Notes.
C.J.S. Letters of Credit §§ 3 to 4, 127 to 138, 143, 148, 155, 159.
Encyclopedias (20)
4 Ga. Jur. Business Torts & Trade Regulation § 5:12, Transfer of Contracts.
6 Ga. Jur. Corporations, etc. § 3:24, Priority of Debt Over Equity.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:1, Nature and Definition of Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:3, Draft or Bill of Exchange as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:4, Check as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:6, Promissory Note as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:8, Certificate of Deposit as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:9, Cashier’s Check as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:10, Teller’s Check as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:11, Traveler’s Check as Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:22, Permissible Payees of Order Paper.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:34, Requirement of Promise or Order to Pay in Negotiable
Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:35, Requirement of Unconditional Promise or Order in
Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:36, Requirement for Promise or Order for Payment of
Money in Fixed Amount.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:37, Requirement for Payment on Demand or at Definite
Time Under Negotiable Instrument.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:41, Requirement Excluding Other Statements,
Undertakings, or Instructions Affecting Negotiability.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:42, Effect of Particular Omissions of Terms on
Negotiability.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:45, Statutory Rules of Construction for Negotiable
Instruments; Parol Evidence.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 4:115, Negotiable Instrument Payable at Fixed or
Determinable Time.
5 Ga. Jur. Uniform Commercial Code § 5:4, Definitions for Banks and Collections.
Other References (1)

Labor & Employment Law ¶ 146709, Clemente Morales-Arcadio, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Shannon
Produce Farms, Inc. and James G. Shannon, Jr., Defendants.
Treatises and Practice Aids (7)

Dobb’s Georgia Enforcement of Security Interests in Personal Property § 1:2 (4th ed.), Collateral.
Georgia Real Estate Finance and Foreclosure Law Appendix A, Statutory Materials.
Georgia Real Estate Title Examinations and Closings with Forms § 3:109, Disbursements;

Recordings.
UCC Local Code Variations § 3-104 [Rev], Negotiable Instrument.
West’s A.L.R. Digest 56K144, Negotiability in General.
West’s A.L.R. Digest 56K164, Conditions and Restrictions in Instrument.
West’s A.L.R. Digest 56K165, References to Collateral Agreements.

11 3 104 Negotiable Instrument

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

11 3 104 Negotiable Instrument

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

§ 11-3-104.

Negotiable instrument, GA ST § 11-3-104

West’s Code of Georgia Annotated

Ga. Code Ann., § 11-3-104

(2) Is payable on demand or at a definite time; and

(i) An undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment;

(b) “Instrument” means a negotiable instrument.

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

Laws 1996, p. 1306, § 3.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENT

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3

Relevant Additional Resources

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4

Treatises and Practice Aids

UCC Local Code Variations § 3-104 [Rev], Negotiable Instrument.

Relevant Notes of Decisions (27)

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8

Ga. Code Ann., § 11-3-104, GA ST § 11-3-104

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 9

Notes Of Decisions (44)

A negotiable instrument is presumed to be based on a valid and sufficient consideration. Smith v.

One of requirements of negotiable instrument is that it contained time honored “words of

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 13

Guaranty of merchandise supplied on open account was governed by suretyship provisions of

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 14

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 15

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 16

Editor’s and Revisor’s Notes (20)

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENT

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 18

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 19

Citing References (118)

Title Date NOD Topics Type

3. West’s A.L.R. Digest 56K144,  144. Negotiability 2017 — Other Secondary

5. West’s A.L.R. Digest 56K165,  165. References to 2017 — Other Secondary

6. UCC Local Code Variations s 3-104 [Rev], 2017 — Other Secondary

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 20

Title Date NOD Topics Type

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 21

Title Date NOD Topics Type

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 22

Title Date NOD Topics Type

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 23

Title Date NOD Topics Type

28. Burrowes v. Bank of America, N.A. Feb. 16, 2017 — Case

29. Ga. Enforcement Security Interests Personal 2017 — Other Secondary

30. Corporate Counsel’s Guide to Uniform 2016 — Other Secondary

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 24

Title Date NOD Topics Type

36. Khader v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. Nov. 17, 2014 — Case

38. McCrary v. Bank of America July 18, 2014 — Case

39. Fritz v. Satellink Paging, LLC Mar. 31, 2014 — Case

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 25

Title Date NOD Topics Type

42. You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank May 20, 2013 — Case

44. Smith v. Bank of America N.A. Mar. 04, 2013 — Case

46. Walker v. CitiMortgage Feb. 08, 2012 — Case

47. Thomas v. Bank of America, N.A. Nov. 30, 2011 — Case

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 26