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G.R. No.

135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,


vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI
KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU
EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,
TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY
DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA
GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES,
LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA
G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,
MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO
A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY,
HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY
SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR.,
JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS
MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

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In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the
IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors
of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the
leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for
Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition
be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to
Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are
private but community property of the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;

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"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners. 3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral
domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of
the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is
an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments,
Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the
jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous
peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of
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the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control
over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the
NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management
to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice
and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On
the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights
may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

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Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 155450 August 6, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Regional Executive


Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Regional
Office No. 2, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND VICTORIA
TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, and the COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN,respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the 21 May 20012 and 25 September


20023 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The

21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines’


(petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002
Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court)
issued Decree No. 3819284in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria
Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents
Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering
a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of
7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 115855 (OCT No. 11585) in
the name of spouses Carag.

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On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance
expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were
issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,6 issued in the name of the
Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square
meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,7 issued in the name of the
private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square
meters.

On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with
the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the
DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No.
381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber
land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.

The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team


to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.

The investigating team reported that:

A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for
spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of
the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag
and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and
disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of
the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.

B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have


possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-
interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of
LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.8

Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was
"only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982."

In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land


Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for
the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with
the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation.

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On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of
judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles9 on the ground that in
1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject
property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed
portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at
the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable
and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was
classified as alienable and disposable.

On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss.10 Private


respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of
jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could
have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added that
petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision
sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint
was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and by Section
38 of Act No. 496.11 Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of
spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective
resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party
in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to
grind against private respondents.12

On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion,


annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.13

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of


lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals
declared:

The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil
actions which this court may annul are those which the "ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available." The Amended Complaint contains no
such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances
be divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment
may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of

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jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint which
is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of
Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters
of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously
included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2,
1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication
and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab
initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as
those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed
out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land
Act.14 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002


Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the


ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other
appropriate remedies are no longer available;

2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of


jurisdiction;

3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the
amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss;

4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction


to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan;

5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original
proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to
the then Court of First Instance over the land;

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6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and

7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.

The Ruling of the Court

While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural


grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of
decree has no merit.

Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court

First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the
grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment
of decree.15

We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:

11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch
of the Government had the authority and power to declassify or
reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have
the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland,
portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the
Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and
such adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the
timberland area is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution.

xxxx

15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the
name of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the
derivative titles thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses,
specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by
the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the
Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the
reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did
not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the
said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same
are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect
whatsoever.16 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
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Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was
seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which
petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable and
disposable.

Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of
petitioner’s failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available."

In Ancheta v. Ancheta,17 we ruled:

In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the


RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the
nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the
petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the
final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available
through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or
final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and
may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by
resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding
whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.18

Since petitioner’s complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject


of the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of petitioner.

Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioner’s
complaint were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial
court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.19

Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be


observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may
be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial
Court.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the
complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case.
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However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits.

Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit

Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to


spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims
that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not
alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In
effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the
subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and
disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the
Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to
declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.

Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either


lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim.20 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.21

Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa
v. Insular Government,22 we ruled:

From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that,


with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber
zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are
public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not
destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the
Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any
private or juridical person x x x23 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by


the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands
were deemed alienable.

In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been
declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in
accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land
classification maps24 petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show
that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for
some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and

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Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement
that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.25

The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No.
2874,26 which provides:

SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the


Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
classify the lands of the public domain into -

(a) Alienable or disposable

(b) Timber and

(c) Mineral lands

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one
class to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition.

Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the
disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to
Section 6 of Act No. 2874.

It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands
which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:

SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or


concession which have been officially delimited and classified and,
when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for
public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private
right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law
may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have
ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of
public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition
before the same have had their boundaries established or been
surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or
disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature.
(Emphasis supplied)

However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as
well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not
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covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of
disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish
regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or
mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance
with law.

Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in


Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private
parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become
private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner
alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be
claimed under any existing law at that time.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,27 the Republic sought to


annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a
land registration court, because when the application for land registration was
filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic
also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the
land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify
lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos.
92628 and 2874. The Court ruled:

We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if


the authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and
disposable would apply to lands that have become private property or
lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized and
recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of
Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an
application with the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When
the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a
decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the
land, the court had already made a determination that the land was
agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open
and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed
number of years. It was the land registration court which had the
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jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was
agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or
evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)

As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of
Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was
agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land
was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the
decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the
original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the
decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the
trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision
rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review.

The finality of the trial court’s decision is further recognized in Section 1,


Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides:

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public


domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and
mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that
these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution."29 When the Commonwealth
Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag
had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed
portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the


Philippines’ complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and
declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,


THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF
DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their
behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY
SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to
secure titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-
claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second
is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest
and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

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Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm
crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to
12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped island’s three barangays.5

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the
National Reservation Survey of Boracay

Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. 7

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President
Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. 10

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not
place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, 11 as
amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD
No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these
parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut
trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years
ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes. 12

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The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation
No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They
decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their
respective memoranda.13

The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1
and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the
name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262
filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on

August 7, 1933.16

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with
a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title
to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed
therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director
of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It
ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay
were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. 18 The Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public
lands were declared as part of the forest reserve. 22

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. 23 The Republic then appealed to the
CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the
appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court. 24

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition
under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of

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reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a
fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way
and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other
landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior
vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective
lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their
lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. 31

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first
Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section
3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot
be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the
courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable
lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally
involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island. 33

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose
any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied
lands in Boracay Island.34

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF


OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT
THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL
LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.

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HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND


DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR
PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN
BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS
PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO


APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE
LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707
and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under
other pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; 37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then
President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the
public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other
classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for classification. 42 Then
the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
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22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of
these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.46

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.47Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. 48 Necessarily, it is up to the
State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may
be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. 49

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims.52

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and
the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession
of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section
393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly
inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of
twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the
date of its inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the
State.58

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or
special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by
purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was
embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). 62 It also provided the definition by
exclusion of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the
Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64

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x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis
Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes
absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system. 66

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the
first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted
corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or
purchase lands of the public domain. 67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904
was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. 68

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the
second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural
lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueño since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required. 69

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1,
1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands, 70 and
privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However,
this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, 72 which provided for a simple thirty-
year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended
by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.74

The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings. 76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants
should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity
of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be
governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. 78 It
governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including
chattel mortgages.79

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."82

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The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. 83 To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. 85 The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.86

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.87

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to
the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919) 88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." 90

Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the
effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be
stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which
land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be
classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power
to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts
were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. 91 This was the Court’s ruling
in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v.
Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of
the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v.
Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced.
These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926
enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision
vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding

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classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to
devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have
a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." 94

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all
lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable
agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public
domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have
automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral
land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse,
would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under
the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or
administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to
landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue
of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in
the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural
uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this
Court stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that
whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The
mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to
declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent
and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it
is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof
must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees
upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today,
and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow.
And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands
classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided
upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or
the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts
have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior
value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each
particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts
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to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the
other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No.
1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry
land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case,
whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests
have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself
what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land.
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95(Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each
case, except those that have already became private lands. 96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919
and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral
or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine
the classification of lands of the public domain. 97

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933, 98 did not
present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the property’s land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the
Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by
Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the
property’s land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to
classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v.
Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.103

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent
issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of
agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as
an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which
included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases
decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have
already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not
have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption
that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of
portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 106 ipso
facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of


Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 107-a ruled:

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"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon
public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as
public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination
of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to
be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of
its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for
local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest
land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the
island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of
Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as
public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying lands of the
public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry 114 is particularly
instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also
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be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. 116 At any
rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable
agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However,
private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other
islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of
private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an
agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an
agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared as
alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably,
Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested
lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas
in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the
island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In
fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s authority to
declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay
Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as
alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of
Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist
zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the
public and private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for
ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at
administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas’
alienability.119

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More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other
islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas,
Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto
Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis
Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be
declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the
intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable
and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is
only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority
to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. 121

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority
granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the
Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. 122 Absent such classification, the land
remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition. 123

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96
hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each
side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form
part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing
vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural
lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no
longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided
in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive
from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the
public domain despite PD No. 705.

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In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, 124 the Court
stated that unclassified lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until
released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had
never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice 126 on
this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
"reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we
repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not]
into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code,
there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest
lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and
cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised
Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code. 127

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There
are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.128

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert
portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the
public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902,
Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public
Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable.
This is clear from the wording of the law itself. 129Where the land is not alienable and disposable,
possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. 130

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No.
1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed
to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in
Boracay since June 12, 1945.

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We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private
claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were
issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court
that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the
island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist
spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot
be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically
give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land
they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the
evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants
are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even
with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island,
making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a
number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court
commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously.
This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote
their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified
as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied
alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They
can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes
of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead 131 or sales patent,132 subject to the
conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one
such bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will
become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the
island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view
the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer
overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to
strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.

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To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion and protection are
not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as
destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice
Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be
followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and
quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development
and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on
our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,
watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish
disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric
plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses,
and highways – not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be
written down in a lumberman’s decalogue. 135

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,


vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.

Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.


D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

From the record the following facts appear:

First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita
in the city of Manila.

Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots.
Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th
day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them
the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate
included the wall.

Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court
decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens
system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.

Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall
which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of
each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition
upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land,
they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.

Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

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Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot
of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all
parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had
not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even
though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory
to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the
same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured
the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to
watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion
of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme
and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to
quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the
registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep.,
482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world.
It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep.,
49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)

While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action.
All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and
there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all
the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of
giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and
they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity
of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under
the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have
a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate
of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of
the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows
exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered
title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by
a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles
under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties
relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the
owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.

The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of
land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all
the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be
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no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are
noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need
not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open,
and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by
prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons
must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.

The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has
been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been
settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page
823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly,
or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193;
Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R.,
152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can
be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that
the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be
rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the
"Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his
"Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said:
"Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that
person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived
directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates
for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of
the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).

Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To
all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or
other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration
a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest.

It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened,
for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If
then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct
proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by
including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not
believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.

We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of
land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of
the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to
two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry.
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This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the
land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now
decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even
though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they
should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration
under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and
the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date
shall prevail.

In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He
says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the
predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was
seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application.
Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to
Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the
validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would
be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".

As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is
defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been
gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose
a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose
within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or
sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are
bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the
duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to
avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real
owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the
name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in
question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such
registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably
bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not
be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which
the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in
the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There
is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than
to him.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of
the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule
be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other
of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent
purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his
vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the
earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.

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We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that
the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate
that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not.
Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale
of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land
wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an
"innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his
land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is
the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have
been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be
deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the
appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be
included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these
examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be
applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent
purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the
difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in
said sections.

May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original
certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public
registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are
charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any
portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with
notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record
discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support
(Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710,
710 [a]).

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents
and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286,
289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson,
27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have
disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the
very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot
be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must
take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute.
Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.

While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real
property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of
the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of
that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the
plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of
land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such
ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded
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mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May
there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public
record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that
no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule,
however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the
defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.

In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the
second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore
been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38,
55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent
purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent
purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule
should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the
original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion
of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record
contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent
purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor,
or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We
believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases
where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system.
When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all
subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded
as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We
think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens
system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very
strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip?
Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original
certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of
the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting
from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are
of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule
contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate,
and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like
the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no
negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest
secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and
complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate,
by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged
and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather
than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.

The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double
registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now
attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration
under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the
torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in
dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the
torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of
the title to the land.

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It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the
same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements
of the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the
premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original
certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate
certificates issued.

Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 86787 May 8, 1992

MILAGROS TUMULAK BISHOP, JUANA PANGILINAN, EMILIO MAXIMO, ANITA PANGILINAN,


MAGDALENA ROSETE, MANUEL DACUT, RECTO DIESTA, VIRGINIA NOVICIO, and LINDA
BONILLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MANUEL AND JESUSA
SALANG, respondents.

Saturnino Bactad for petitioners.

CRUZ, J.:

The question presented in this case is not novel. As in previous cases resolving the same issue, the
answer will not change.

In dispute are certain portions of a parcel of land situated in Calapacuan, Subic, Zambales, with a
total area of 1,652 square meters. These portions are in the possession of the petitioners. The entire
parcel is registered in the name of the private respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
29018.

On January 22, 1985, the private respondents sued the petitioners for recovery of possession of the
lots in question. The plaintiffs invoked their rights as registered owners of the land. In their answer,
the defendants claimed that the lots were part of the public domain and could not have been
registered under the Torrens system. All alleged long and continuous possession of the lots and
produced tax declarations in their names. Two of them maintained that they had acquired their
respective lots by virtue of valid contracts of sale. Another based her claim on inheritance.

After trial, Judge Nicias O. Mendoza of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs. 1 He held in part as follows:

The plaintiffs, being the registered owners in fee simple of the land in question,
necessarily have the lawful right to the physical possession of the land. The owner of
a land has a right to enjoy and possess it, and he has also the right to recover and
repossess the same from any person occupying it unlawfully.

Art. 428 –– New Civil Code

The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law.

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The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor
of the thing in order to recover it.

There is, therefore, no doubt in law, that the plaintiffs being the registered owners of
the land in question have also the corresponding right to the recovery and
possession of the same. The defendants who are in physical occupancy of the land
belonging to the plaintiffs have no right whatsoever to unjustly withhold the
possession of the said land from the plaintiffs. The defendants' occupancy of the land
in question is unlawful and in violation of plaintiffs right to the recovery and
possession of the land they owned. The evidence presented by the defendants
claiming as per certifications of the Bureau of Forestry that the land occupied by
them is within the alienable and disposable public land, deserves scant consideration
as the said certification are without basis in law. The moment the land in question
was titled in the name of the plaintiffs, it ceased to become a part of the public
domain as the same became the private property of the registered owner, the herein
plaintiffs. Tax declarations of the land made in the names of the defendants are not
evidence of title, it appearing that the land is already titled to the plaintiffs. The
registration of the land in the names of the defendants with the Assessor's Office for
taxation purposes and the payments of real property taxes by the defendants can not
and does not defeat the title of the plaintiffs to the land. The fact that the defendants
have been in occupancy of the land in question for quite a period of time is of no
moment as prescription will not ripen into ownership because the land is covered by
a torrens title. Acquisitive prescription will not be available to land titled under Art.
496.

PREMISED THEREFORE on the foregoing consideration, the Court finds and so


holds that the plaintiffs being the registered owners of the land in question are
entitled to the possession of the same, and that the defendants who are occupying
the land belonging to the plaintiffs in violation of the right of the latter, are duty-bound
to restore possession of the same to the titled owners, the herein plaintiffs.

On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the respondent court on August 22, 1988. 2 Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners then came to this Court, urging reversal of the courts
below.

They allege that:

1. The land in question is part of the public domain and could not have been validly
registered under the Torrens system.

2. The petitioners have acquired title to their respective lots by laches.

3. In the alternative, they should be considered builders in good faith entitled to the
rights granted by Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 of the Civil Code.

The petition has no merit.

On the first ground, the Court notes that the private respondents' title is traceable to an Original
Certificate of Title issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago. That certificate is now
incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world. The resumption of regularity applies to the

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“Rob-bery pretty”
issuance of that certificate. This presumption covers the finding that the land subject of the certificate
was private in nature and therefore registrable under the Torrens system.

To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it must be shown
that the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction over the case and that there was actual fraud
in securing the title. 3Neither of these requirements has been established by the petitioners. All they
submitted was the certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the land in question was alienable and
disposable public land. The trial court was correct in ruling that this deserved scant consideration for lack
of legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an administrative body cannot prevail against court decision
declaring the land to be registrable.

Significantly, it does not appear in the record that the Director of Forestry, or any other
representative of the Government for that matter, entered any opposition to the land registration
proceedings that led to the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title. No less importantly, an action
to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the expiration of one (1) year
from the entry of the decree of registration 4 and cannot now be resorted to by the petitioners at this late
hour. And collaterally at that.

The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of registered land must also possess
it does not merit serious attention. The non-presentation by the private respondents of their tax
declarations on the land is no indication that they have never acquired ownership thereof or have
lost it by such omission.

The second ground must also be rejected.

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession,
the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.

In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their long and continuous
occupancy of the lots in question, the petitioners are in effect contending that they have acquired the
said lots by acquisitive prescription. It is an elementary principle that the owner of a land registered
under the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription. 5

As the Court observed in the early case Legarda v. Saleeby: 6

The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quite title to land; to
put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were
noted at the time of registration in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his
land.

Applied consistently these many years, this doctrine has been burnished bright with use and has
long become a settled rule of law.

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In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot invoke the status of
builders in good faith to preserve their claimed rights to the constructions they have made on the lots
in dispute.

A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds
on it. 7 This definition cannot apply to the petitioners because they knew at the very outset that they had
no right at all to occupy the subject lots.

The petitioners have consistently insisted that the lots were part of the public domain and even
submitted a certification to that effect from the Bureau of Forestry. The land was in fact registered
under the Torrens system and such registration was constructive notice to the whole world, including
the petitioners. Apparently, the petitioners did not take the trouble of checking such registration. At
any rate, the point is that, whether the land be public or private, the petitioners knew they had no
right to occupy it and build on it. The Court of Appeals was correct in calling them squatters for
having entered, without permission or authority, land that did not belong to them.

In urging reversal of the trial court and the respondent court, the petitioners are asking us to overturn
long established doctrines guaranteeing the integrity of the Torrens system and the indefeasibility of
titles issued thereunder for the protection and peace of mind of the registered owner against illegal
encroachments upon his property. We are not disposed to take this drastic step on the basis alone
of their feeble arguments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68741 January 28, 1988

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MELECIO MAGCAMIT, NENA COSICO and EMELITA
MAGCAMIT, defendants-appellants.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * (now Court of
Appeals) dated January 31, 1984, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, 8th Judicial District,
Branch III, and of the resolution dated August 28, 1984 denying the motion for reconsideration filed thereof.

The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court
are as follows:

On December 2,1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, as owners of a parcel of
land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or less 105,710 square
meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico,
and Amelita Magcamit (herein private respondents) as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang
Mabiling Muli." This sale with right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Laguna on December 6,1971 under Act No. 3344. On January 31,1972 the sale was made
absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private respondents for the sum of
P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the execution of the instrument, entitled "Kasulatan
Ng Bilihan Tuluyan," after being credited with the P30,000.00 consideration of the "Kasulatan Ng
Mabibiling Muli," and the balance of P40,000.00 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title
is issued. From the execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in peaceful,
adverse and open possession of subject property.

On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the property in question
was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledge of the
private respondents and on April 30, 1975, said Spouses executed a Special Power of Attorney in
favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National
Grains Authority.

On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea Ramirez on May 18,
1975, covering, among others, the property involved in this case covered by OCT No. T-1728, for
unpaid indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.

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On May 31, 1974, the Provincial Sheriff caused the issuance of the notice of sale of the property in
question, scheduling the public auction sale on June 28, 1974. The petitioner was the highest and
successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date by the
Provincial Sheriff.

On July 10, 1974, the petitioner in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor sold the subject
real property in favor of itself. By virtue of the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. T-75171 of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was issued in the name of the petitioner on July 16,
1974. It was only in July 1974, that private respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas
spouses had been issued covering the property in question and that the same property had been
mortgaged in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay the petitioner
NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance of the amount due the Vivas spouses under the
terms of the absolute deed of sale but the petitioner refused to accept the payment. On July 31,
1974, counsel for private respondents made a formal demand on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo to
comply with their obligation under the terms of the absolute deed of sale; and soon after reiterated to
the NGA, the offer to pay the balance of P40,000.00 due under the absolute deed of sale. On August
13, 1974 petitioner in its reply informed counsel of private respondents that petitioner is now the
owner of the property in question and has no intention of disposing of the same.

The private respondents, who as previously stated, are in possession of subject property were asked
by petitioner to vacate it but the former refused. Petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against private
respondents in the Municipal Court of Victoria, Laguna, but the case was dismissed.

On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, San Pablo City, against the petitioner and the spouses Vivas
and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be declared the owners of the property in question
and entitled to continue in possession of the same, and if the petitioner is declared the owner of the
said property, then, to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under such terms and
conditions as the court may find just, fair and equitable under the premises. (Record on Appeal, pp.
2-11).

In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner (defendant therein) maintained that it was never a privy
to any transaction between the private respondents (plaintiffs therein) and the spouses Paulino
Vivas and Engracia Lizardo that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value of the property formerly
covered by OCT No. 1728; and that the title is now indefeasible, hence, private respondents' cause
of action has' already prescribed. (Record on Appeal, pp. 16-22).

After due hearing, the trial court ** rendered its decision on March 17, 1981, in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of
said judgment reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) declaring defendant National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property in
question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same;

(2) ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to defendant National Grains
Authority;

(3) ordering defendants-spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo to pay plaintiffs
the sum of P56,000.00 representing the amount paid pursuant to the Kasulatan Ng
Bilihang Tuluyan marked Exhibit "3", with legal interest thereon from January 31,
1972 until the amount is paid, to pay an additional amount of P5,000.00 for and as
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attorney's fees, an additional amount of Pl0,000.00 as moral damages, another
amount of P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this suit.
(Rollo, P. 35).

The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the trial court to the Intermediate
Appellate Court.

After proper proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 1984, reversing
and setting aside the decision of the trial court as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby reversed and set aside and
another one is rendered ordering the National Grains Authority to execute a deed of
reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration and cancellation of
transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75171 and the issuance of another title in the
names of plaintiff-appellants, and ordering defendants-appellees Paulino Vivas and
Engracia Lizardo to pay the National Grains Authority the sum of P78,375.00 (Exh. 3)
within thirty (30) days from the receipts of the writ of execution. No damages and
costs. (Rollo, p. 19).

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied.
(Rollo, p. 26).

Hence, this petition.

In the resolution of May 20, 1985, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to
submit simultaneous memoranda (Rollo, p. 128). The memorandum for the petitioner was filed on
July 3, 1985 (Rollo, p. 129) while the memorandum for the private respondents was filed on August
26, 1985 1 Rollo p. 192).

The main issue in this case is whether or not violation of the terms of the agreement between the
spouses Vivas and Lizardo, the sellers, and private respondents, the buyers, to deliver the certificate
of title to the latter, upon its issuance, constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and
right acquired by petitioner NGA, an innocent purchaser for value.

It is undisputed that: (1) there are two deeds of sale of the same land in favor of private respondents,
namely: (a) the conditional sale with right to repurchase or the 'Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabibiling
Muli" which was registered under Act 3344 and (b) the deed of absolute sale or "Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Tuluyan" which was not registered; (2) the condition that the Certificate of Title will be
delivered to the buyers upon its issuance and upon payment of the balance of P40,000.00 is
contained in the deed of absolute sale; and (3) the land in question at the time of the execution of
both sales was not yet covered by the Torrens System of registration.

It is axiomatic, that while the registration of the conditional sale with right of repurchase may be
binding on third persons, it is by provision of law "understood to be without prejudice to third party
who has better right" (Section 194 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344). In this
case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens System and
has obviously a better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale with the
suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and
Lizardo and private respondents.

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In their complaint at the Regional Trial Court, private respondents prayed among others, for two
alternative reliefs, such as: (a) to be declared the owners of the property in question or (b) to order
the declared owner to reconvey or transfer the ownership of the property in their favor.

Private respondents claim a better right to the property in question by virtue of the Conditional Sale,
later changed to a deed of Absolute Sale which although unregistered under the Torrens System
allegedly transferred to them the ownership and the possession of the property in question. In fact,
they argue that they have been and are still in possession of the same openly, continuously, publicly
under a claim of ownership adverse to all other claims since the purchase on December 2, 1971
(Rollo, p. 165). It is stressed that not until the month of July, 1974 did the plaintiff learn that a title
had been issued covering the property in question (Rollo, p. 15).

Time and time again, this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration of title to land
under the Torrens System is an action in rem not in personam, hence, personal notice to all
claimants of the res is not necessary in order that the court may have jurisdiction to deal with and
dispose of the res. Neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title
issued in a registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may
provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or one in the nature of or akin a to
proceeding in rem which shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown (Moscoso vs. Court
of appeals, 128 SCRA 719 [1984], citing: City of Manila vs. Lack, et al., 19 Phil. 324, 337; Roxas vs.
Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120;
Aguilar vs. Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661). It is thus evident that respondents' right over the property was
barred by res judicata when the decree of registration was issued to spouses Vivas and Lizards. It
does not matter that they may have had some right even the right of ownership, BEFORE the grant
of the Torrens Title.

Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except
those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and
enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those
mentioned by law as existing, against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off
by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world, including
the government (Aldecoa and Co. vs. Warner Barns & Co., 30 Phil. 209 [1915]; Snyder vs. Fiscal of
Cebu and Avila, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]). Under said ruling, if the purchaser is the only party who
appears in the deeds and the registration of titles in the property registry, no one except such
purchaser may be deemed by law to be the owner of the properties in question (Ibid). Moreover, no
title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession (Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 [1985]).

It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the exceptions provided for
under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which can be enforced against petitioner herein.

Thus, it has been invariably restated by this Court, that "The real purpose of the Torrens System is
to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. "Once a title is registered, the
owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the
"mirador su casato," avoid the possibility of losing his land." "An indirect or collateral attack on a
Torrens Title is not allowed (Dominga vs. Santos, 55 Phil. 361; Singian vs. Manila Railroad, 62 Phil.
467)."

The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to
another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is then considered as guilty of
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fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long as the
property has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Angeles vs. Sania, 66 Phil.
444 [1938], emphasis supplied).

It will be noted that the spouses Vivas and Lizardo never committed any fraud in procuring the
registration of the property in question. On the contrary, their application for registration which
resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 1728 was with complete knowledge and implied authority of
private respondents who retained a portion of the consideration until the issuance to said spouses of
a certificate of title applied for under the Torrens Act and the corresponding delivery of said title to
them. The question therefore, is not about the validity of OCT No. 1728 but in the breach of contract
between private respondents and the Vivas spouses. Petitioner NGA was never a privy to this
transaction. Neither was it shown that it had any knowledge at the time of the execution of the
mortgage, of the existence of the suspensive condition in the deed of absolute sale much less of its
violation. Nothing appeared to excite suspicion. The Special Power of Attorney was regular on its
face; the OCT was in the name of the mortgagor and the NGA was the highest bidder in the public
auction. Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an innocent purchaser for value, first as an innocent
mortgagee under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as innocent purchaser for value in the public
auction sale.

Private respondents claim that NGA did not even field any representative to the land which was not
even in the possession of the supposed mortgagors, nor present any witness to prove its allegations
in the ANSWER nor submit its DEED OF MORTGAGE to show its being a mortgages in good faith
and for value (Rollo, p. 110).

Such contention is, however, untenable. Well settled is the rule that all persons dealing with property
covered by a torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the
title. When there is nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of
the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what
the torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto (Centeno vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 545 [1985]).

More specifically, the Court has ruled that a bank is not required before accepting a mortgage to
make an investigation of the title of the property being given as security (Phil. National Cooperative
Bank vs. Carandang Villalon, 139 SCRA 570 [1985]), and where innocent third persons like
mortgagee relying on the certificate of title acquire rights over the property, their rights cannot be
disregarded (Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 489 [1985]).

Under the circumstances, the Regional Trial Court could not have erred in ruling that plaintiffs
(private respondents herein) complaint insofar as it prays that they be declared owners of the land in
question can not prosper in view of the doctrine of indefeasibility of title under the Torrens System,
because it is an established principle that a petition for review of the decree of registration will not
prosper even if filed within one year from the entry of the decree if the title has passed into the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value (Pres. Decree No. 1529, Sec. 32). The setting aside of the decree
of registration issued in land registration proceedings is operative only between the parties to the
fraud and the parties defrauded and their privies, but not against acquirers in good faith and for
value and the successors in interest of the latter; as to them the decree shall remain in full force and
effect forever (Domingo vs. The Mayon Realty Corp. et al., 102 Phil. 32 [19571). Assuming,
therefore, that there was fraud committed by the sellers against the buyers in the instant case,
petitioner NGA who was not privy therein cannot be made to suffer the consequences thereof As
correctly declared by the trial court, the National Grains Authority is the lawful owner of the property
in question by virtue of its indefeasible title.

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As to private respondents' alternative prayer that the declared owner be ordered to reconvey or
transfer the ownership of the property in their favor, it is clear that there is absolutely no reason why
petitioner, an innocent purchaser for value, should reconvey the land to the private respondents.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, now Regional Trial
Court, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988

EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,


vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO,
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, respondents.

Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.

Rico & Associates for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432 and the private
respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two (2) cases and the instant case is
the same — a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara,
Iloilo covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.

The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the filing of the earlier
petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No.
64432, as follows:

. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta.
Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of
Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia
and Eduardo S. Baranda The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio
Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they
also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after considering
the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired,
ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration
having been denied, a writ of demolition was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and
Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On
August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the
petition for review on certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme
Court. As earlier stated the petition was denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983.
The motion for reconsideration was denied in another resolution dated March 25,
1983, which also stated that the denial is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in
accordance with the entry of judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The
petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--contend that the writs of possession
and demolition issued in the respondent court should now be implemented; that Civil
Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the

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implementation of the writ; that counsel for the respondent should be held in
contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but futile effort to delay the execution
of the writs of possession and demolition and that petitioners are entitled to damages
because of prejudice caused by the filing of this petition before the Intermediate
Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order ' to maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant petition
for indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827
before the respondent court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and
(2) the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court was
only intended not to render the petition moot and academic pending the Court's
consideration of the issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of issues already resolved by
this Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate
implementation of the writs of possession and demolition is likewise ordered. (pp.
107-108, Rollo — G.R. No. 64432)

On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration of
the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this same date, another resolution was
issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion
of the private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions
dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court
issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which covered the
same subject matter as the Resolutions above cited pursuant to our Resolution dated December 29,
1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.

Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito
G. Gustilo issued the following order:

Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:

(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated January 7,


1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division)
in G.R. No. 62042;

(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29, 1983
Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;

(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496,
therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court and that of
Honorable Supreme Court.

Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto, the same
is hereby GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared null and
void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby declared valid and
subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia,
all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.

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The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the Subdivision
Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--
G.R. No. 64432)

The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for reconsideration and
manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground
that there was a pending case before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction
under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which remained
unresolved.

In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte
motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to
execute and implement the judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be issued:

1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon. Judge
Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to register the
Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;

2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to


issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;

Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p. 473, 64432 Rollo)

Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on another motion of the same nature filed by
the petitioners, we issued another Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court
Administrator for implementation by the judge below.

In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge
Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,1986 and January 6,1987 respectively, to
wit:

ORDER

This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants through


counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of
Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of deeds for the Province of
Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting
Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.

Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia
dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of the writ of possession was
granted by the Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its Resolution dated
September 17,1986, the present motion is hereby GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby ordered to


register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as prayed for.

xxx xxx xxx

ORDER
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This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia on December 2, 1986, in compliance with the order of this Court dated
November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria
Provido Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986 which was granted by the
Court pursuant to its order dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no
Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days period granted by the Court finding the
petition tenable, the same is hereby GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Transfer


Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from the date of this
order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared
annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new Certificate of
Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia, which certificate shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the
outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)

On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private respondent in
G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for explanation in relation to the
resolution dated September 17, 1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the following
points:

a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT T-25772,
should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in the Resolution
of November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted by implication (by virtue of
the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?

b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the
implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-25772
and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p. 536, Rollo — 4432)

Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a resolution dated May
25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:

xxx xxx xxx

Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983 and in
G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the implementation of our
resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the matters concerning the execution
of the decisions to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to
apply disciplinary sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation
of the resolutions of this Court. No further motions in these cases will be entertained
by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo-64432)

In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated November 6, 1986 and
January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of
titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of TItle No. T-106098.

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However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No.
15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new certificates of
titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order
dated February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.

This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 to order
the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to
cancel the notice of lis pendensin the new certificates of titles.

In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.

Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 denied the
petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in another order dated September 17,
1987, the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February l2, 1987 directing the
Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles
issued in the name of the petitioners.

The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of is pendens on the
new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the petitioners filed in the
reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated
thereon.

In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion and directed the
Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562.

Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for reconsideration of the
February 12, 1987 order stating therein:

That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order based on
the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:

"At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other
disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the
plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in
which a memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has been registered
as provided in the preceding section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall
be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk
of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the
manner of disposal thereof."

That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098, T-
111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Case No.
15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus
Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."

That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of subject
Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon the registration

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of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was pending,
stating the manner of disposal thereof.

Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens was
based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the Intermediate
Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can
order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)

Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
15871 were not privies to the case affected by the Supreme Court resolutions, respondent Judge
Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion
for reconsideration.

The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with the
Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of
titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to
annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.

Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara Cadastre
Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and
Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides'
counsel, a notice of is pendens was annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-106098
covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.

Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated October 24,
1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.

The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why respondent
Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel
the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.

This petition is impressed with merit.

Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although Calixta Provido,
Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were
not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the
Providos who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and the names of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues
raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent Judge


Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void the transfer certificate
of title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-owners. (p. 3,
Rollo; Emphasis supplied)

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It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No. 62042 contrary to
the trial court's findings that they were not.

G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the reconstitution
proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same
parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia valid and subsisting.

The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983 long before Civil
Case No. 15871 was filed.

Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents herein, in filing
Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No.
62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs
of possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre.

The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:

Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the
registration thereof With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he
would not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a
warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in
litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of course he
intends to gamble on the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of
Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415,
footnote 3, citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486)

The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this case
necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil.
1000), Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and
Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:

We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in
a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined,
the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar
circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff
does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances
of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the
determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v.
Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal, supra)

The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the Supreme Court
illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in
G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.

Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent
Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of

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Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of
Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first
paragraph thereof which provides:

Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the
rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the
Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration
thereof.

This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been misled by the
respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he was the same Judge who issued
the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal said order
dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court
below but based on the order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings filed by the
parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein) touched
on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over Lot Number 4571,
Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.

The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate
and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.

Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property
which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with
Section 117 of this Decree."

Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to
be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument
presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken
by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to
the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the
Register of Deeds. ... ."

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are
clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231;
Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The
statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens
certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought to, must,
...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to
express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent
Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper
step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should have
asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National
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Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529.

In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of this
Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendensannotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over
Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have
allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil
Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot No.
4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by the trial court which
annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969

AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,


vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.

Vicente Llanes for petitioners.


Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC Consulta No. 366.

On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy
of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of
Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of
the instrument sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land
described in OCT No. 548, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (²/³) portion
thereof in favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares.

The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not
sufficient in law." It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the
certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio
Balbin in favor of three different buyers. The pertinent entries read:

Entry No. 5658. Sales.

Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an
area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No.
548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu thereof, the
name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation in interest of the
vendor. ...

Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, ...

xxx xxx xxx

Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.

Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided portion of an
area of 16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is
hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee
... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...

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Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. ...

Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion.

Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an
undivided portion of an area of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this
Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion
... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to
all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...

Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. ...

The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains an additional
memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title No. 548 have been issued
(by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and
Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for
and in the name of the vendees, this 5th day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because
these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by
petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.

Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who
subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated April 10, 1962. With
respect to the principal point in controversy, the Commissioner observed:

(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property described in the
Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold undivided portions thereof on
three different occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside from the
owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's duplicates which
are presumably in the possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to the owner's
duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-owner's duplicates must
likewise be surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees that the issuance of the three
co-owner's duplicates was unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a court of
competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these titles are presumed to have been lawfully
issued.lawphi1.ñet

Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would want to compel
annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496,
which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any
voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered
owner to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such
instrument." Under this provision, according to petitioners, the presentation of the other copies of the
title is not required, first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or
interest in the property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three vendees-co-owners in this
case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor was illegal or
unauthorized.

We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes that there is only
one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its
production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for
the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the
three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As

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correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of
those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until
otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title
in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an
outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every
copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain
identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the
title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole
system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.

One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in upholding the action taken
by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property subject of the donation is presumed
conjugal, that is, property of the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife,
Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may
make such a conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its
implications, for without a previous settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse may dispose of
his aliquot share or interest therein — subject of course to the result of future liquidation.
Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character of the property is assumed, the
deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which
justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of said property
which he donated was more than his one-half share, not to say more than what remained of such
share after he had sold portions of the same land to three other parties.

It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC No. 2221),
wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the character of the land in question are in
issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration
of the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of
the interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur and that of the
Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant,


vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.

Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.


Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

CASTRO, J.:

On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in
the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237
in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went
to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to
secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds
upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:

1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo,
married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property;

2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it
is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but

3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving
husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law (LRC
Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).

To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is necessary that
the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of the surviving spouse and the
heirs of the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the
consent of such other heir or heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying
this sale executed by their father.

In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition
for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and
to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages
and P1,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a
ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent reiterated the grounds
stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has "other legal, plain, speedy and
adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision of the respondent to the Honorable
Commissioner of Land Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
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In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus does not lie . .
. because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the
petition, with costs against the petitioner.

Hence the present appeal by Almirol.

The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to compel the
respondent to register the deed of sale in question.

Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on his part to
maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not
constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is
not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent
jurisdiction.1

Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a
Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of
Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).

. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their


registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for
denying their registration. The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments
shall be registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity
before they become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their
provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding
the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before,
registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must first be
allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and
Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).

Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from
exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to
register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is
in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to
him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the
Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing
the step to be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:

Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. — When the


Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to
be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for
registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon
which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon
the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him,
and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases
shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a
party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue
involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty
days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
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The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus.
Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of
Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration," who
thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which
shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be
resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is affirmed, at
petitioner's cost.
1äwphï1.ñët

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