Fire Safety Journal, 2 ( 1 9 7 9 / 8 0 ) 223 - 2 3 6
© Elsevier Sequoia S.A., L a u s a n n e - - P r i n t e d in t h e N e t h e r l a n d s
Review of Explosion and Fire Hazard of Liquefied Petroleum Gas
D. J. R A S B A S H
Department of Fire Safety Engineering, School of Engineering, The King's BuiMings, University of Edinburgh,
Edinburgh EH9 3JL (Gt. Britain)
( R e c e i v e d S e p t e m b e r 13, 1 9 7 9 )
SUMMARY
The properties of LPG that contribute to
its fire and explosion hazards are outlined.
The hazards include those associated with
small vapour leaks from appliances and gas
cylinders as well as major hazards associated
with loss of containment and rapid vaporisa-
tion of tonnage quantities of the liquefied gas.
Estimates are given of the magnitude of effects
that might follow the latter t y p e of release. In
the UK the record of LPG is poor with regard
to general fire occurrence compared with that
of natural gas or town gas. This performance
will need to be improved if the q u a n t i t y of
LPG used is to be increased. These improve-
ments might be achieved by developing its use
as a piped fuel and in m o t o r vehicles, but both
these would require careful hazard analysis.
Although the record for major hazard with
LPG in the UK is good, quantitative studies
indicate t h a t handling and transportation of
tonnage quantities by road and sea are not
safe enough. Methods are suggested for reduc-
ing the risk.
INTRODUCTION
Liquefied petroleum gas is a fuel resource
which is going to become increasingly avail-
able in the next decade. It is important, be-
fore major expansion in the use and handling
of this fuel comes about, t h a t a critical assess-
ment is made of its fire and explosion risk.
This paper was prepared by the author at the
request of the Essex Branch of the Environ-
mental Health Officers Association in the UK,
and reviews these risks with particular refer-
ence to the UK. Large quantities of LPG are
handled at present at Canvey Island which is
situated in Essex, and there are proposals for
223
handling even more there in future. For this
reason, particular attention has been paid to
the features and probability of major disasters
that might follow loss of containment of the
fuel.
Liquefied petroleum gas contains two main
constituents, butane and propane. Commer-
cial butane and propane boil, respectively, at
about --2 and --45 °C. For the most part, the
material is transported and stored at room
temperature in the form of pressurised liquids,
the pressure at the highest expected ambient
temperature of 60 °C being about 7 bar for
butane and 22 bar for propane. However,
quantities in excess of one thousand tons tend
to be stored as a refrigerated liquid at, or near,
the boiling point. Ships' cargoes may be either
pressurised liquids or refrigerated liquids. In
addition, in parts of LPG installations the
liquid is vaporised and is transported as a gas
either by itself or, occasionally, as a mixture
with some air.
GENERAL FIRE AND EXPLOSION PROPERTIES
OF LPG
For the most part, the fire and explosion
properties of LPG do not become manifest
until the liquid is vaporised in the presence of
air. However, the possibility of pressure bursts
in the pressurised vessel is also a hazard, par-
ticularly in the presence of heating or fire, and
this will, of course, produce physical explosive
effects. In a manner similar to other flammable
gases or vapours, the gas will not propagate
flame outside certain limits of concentration,
which for propane is about 2.2 - 10 per cent.
and for butane 1.8 - 9 per cent. The m a x i m u m
explosive pressures occur when the concentra-
tion is about twice the lower limit value. Con-
centrations of flammable vapour and air with-
224
in these limits m a y be ignited by a small source
of ignition such as a small flame or a spark
with an energy as low as 0.3 mJ. Outside these
limits of concentration, n o t even a large flame
would be able to produce flame propagation
substantially beyond the driving influence of
the flame. At any interface with air on one
side and a flammable vapour above the upper
flammable limit on the other, including par-
ticularly the neat vapour, there will be a zone
within the limits which can be ignited and
produce a continuing fire until the vapour has
burned away. Refrigerated, liquefied petro-
leum gas in a vessel m a y be ignited in the
same way as petrol and will burn in a similar
manner, in that the flames above the liquid
surface will supply the latent heat of vaporisa-
tion of the vapour being fed into the flame.
Any spillage of liquid from a pressurised
container will result in almost instant total
dispersion and evaporation. In general, a small
spillage of refrigerated, liquefied gas will also
vaporise quickly. If large quantities of refri-
gerated LPG are spilled, then the surrounding
area will be rapidly cooled and vaporisation
rates will be greatly reduced. However, if
spillage takes place in, or on, an unlimited
area of deep water, the vaporisation rate will
be much higher and will tend to continue un-
abated. I am n o t aware of any measurement
of this rate; it is probably of the same order
for liquid propane as it is for LNG, which is
about 0.18 kg/m 2 s.
If a pocket of flammable vapour-air mix-
ture builds up, particularly in an enclosed
space, then the propagation o f flame through
the mixture can give rise to pressure effects.
For a mixture that is completely enclosed and
is approximately cubic in shape, the m a x i m u m
pressure t h a t m a y be developed is of the order
of 7 bar gauge. A flammable vapour-air mix-
ture established in a long duct m a y give rise to
a detonation which might give pressure effects
locally well in excess of 7 bar. Buildings m a y
be severely damaged at internal pressures in
excess of about 0.1 bar, and it should be re-
membered t h a t for a complete enclosure the
pressure t h a t builds up is approximately pro-
portional to the size o f the pocket occupied
by the flammable gas-air mixture in it. Thus,
for a volume of, say, 10 m × 10 m × 4 m (i.e.,
400 cubic metres) a pocket of flammable
vapour-air mixture only one-seventieth the
total volume, i.e., a volume of 6 cubic metres,
can, if ignited, give rise to major damaging
effects. To fill such a volume with the stoi-
chiometric mixture would require about 500 g
of either propane or butane vapour. Thus a
small leak can go quite far in producing dam-
aging effects. In practice, windows and doors
that may be present in most spaces could pro-
vide some relief. These would burst open,
limiting the damage. The violence of the ex-
plosion would depend on the configuration
of the items in the space through which flame
is propagating, since the flame is accelerated
by turbulence.
A major difference between petroleum gas
and natural gas or t o w n gas is that it is heavier
than air. This increases the risk in a number of
ways. Thus, there tends to be more ignition
sources in the lower parts of a room than in
the upper parts. Also LPG appliances tend to
be in the lower parts of working or living
areas, and leakage falling from the appliance
itself does not have much o p p o r t u n i t y to be-
come diluted to safe concentrations below the
lower limit. On the other hand, leakage rising
from natural gas appliances might entrain air
for a substantial distance prior to reaching a
ceiling. There also tend to be more pockets,
recesses, and inaccessible spaces near the floor
or the ground where flammable vapours might
accumulate. Finally, when ignition does take
place there are more obstacles in the path of
the flame near the ground than under a ceiling,
causing the flame to become accelerated and
the explosion more violent.
M A J O R FIRE A N D EXPLOSION H A Z A R D S ASSO-
CIATED WITH LPG
The above gives a summary of the normal
fire and explosion hazards associated with
LPG. However, experiences over recent years
have indicated that certain major and even
disastrous hazards may be associated with this
material due to the ability of large quantities
of the liquid gas to flash rapidly into the va-
pour form. There are two major types of haz-
ard according to whether ignition takes place
soon after spillage or there is a substantial
time gap. If the vapours are ignited soon after
the spillage has taken place, a fireball is pro-
duced which consumes the vapours very
quickly; far more quickly than if t h e y were
burning as a liquid over the initial surface.

Fig. 1. LPG b u r n i n g in 35 m m vessel.
Fig. 2. V a p o u r s f r o m 4 x 10 - 5 m 3 LPG b u r n i n g a f t e r
release u n d e r water.
225
This is illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2 which show
(a) 4 × 10 -5 m a of liquid propane gas burning
from a cylinder 35 m m diameter, and (b) the flame
t hat is form ed if vapours from a spillage of
the same a m o u n t of liquid propane under
water, are ignited. In t he f o r m e r case the fire
takes three minutes to burn out: in the latter
case the fuel is consumed in two seconds.
However, it can be even m ore dangerous if
the flammable gases evolved from the flashing
of spilled LPG are n o t ignited. T h e y may then
be carried by either their own flow or by out-
side wind t o an area where t h e y can produce
m uch damage when ignited.
Table 1 gives some information on these
hazards. There is a sum m ary of the m a x i m u m
size o f fireball t hat m ay be obtained from the
rapid spillage and vaporisation of different
quantities of LPG. Also given is the distance
at which a cellulosic material may b e c o m e
ignited spontaneously or by pilot flame when
under the influence of heat radiated by the
fireball, and also t he distance at which a per-
son with parts of the b o d y exposed to the
radiation of the fireball might feel unbearable
pain.
The fireball radius and duration were based
on i nform at i on with small quantities of fuel
by Hasegawa and Sato [ 1], although the NFPA
film on BLEVES appeared to indicate a dura-
tion of about 8 s for some 50 t o n n e of LPG,
which is in line with the predictions. The radii
for various effects of the fireball were based
on t he assumption that 20 per cent. of the
total energy in the fire is radiated during the
duration time of the fireball. I n f o r m a t i o n in
Hasegawa and Sato's paper implies a peak
radiation of about 22 per cent. of this energy
o u t p u t and a mean radiation of about 15 - 20
per cent. However, experiments with radiant
flames usually indicate a much higher mean
radiant o u t p u t . Thus Markstein [2] obtained
a mean radiant o u t p u t o f 24.4 per cent. for a
range of t u r b u l e n t diffusion flames. Relevant
threshold values are summarised in Table 2.
Criteria for pilot and spontaneous ignition
were obtained from Lawson and Simms [ 3]
and apply to fibreboard, whereas t hat for un-
bearable pain was obtained from Simms and
Hinkley [4]. All the criteria are time depen-
dent and the time taken was the calculated
durat i on o f the fireball.
T he calculated radii of effects in Table 1
are perhaps larger than m ay have been actually
TABLE 1 bO
bO
Major fire hazard following spillage and vaporisation of liquid flammable gas

Liquid Storage No rapid ignition Ignition soon after spillage and vaporisation
vapour quantity
Max. spread Max. area Spillage Maximum hazardous conditions
formed typical of:
of flamm, of flash time to
(tons) Properties of fireball Effects of fireball
vapour fire if produce
downwind ignited maximum Fireball Time of Radius for Radius for Radius for
(km) (km 2 ) effect radius duration spontaneous pilot unbearable
(<rain) (km) (s) ignition ignition pain
(km) (km) (km)

2 Central heating
storage
(pressurised) 0.3 0.01 1.5 0.029 4.2 0.08 0.10 0.19
20 Moderate size
tanker
(pressurised) 0.9 0.05 3.0 0.06 6.4 0.21 0.26 0.51
200 Small size
storage sphere
(pressurised) 2.6 0.3 6.5 0.12 9.8 0.58 0.74 1.55
2 000 Tank on ship's
cargo
(refrigerated) 8 2.0 13 0.25 14.8 1.6 2.1 4.4
20 000 Refrigerated
tank on land.
Refrigerated
ship's cargo in
a number of
tanks 24 12 26 0.52 22.5 4.3 5.8 13.2

TABLE 2
Threshold criteria used to calculate fireball effects
Fuel in Duration Radiant
fireball time (s) o u t p u t , F*
(tons) (W)
2 4.24 0.424 v 1010
20 6.43 2.8
200 9.76 18.4
2 000 14.8 121
20 000 22.5 796
*Radius of effect is given by r = 0.28 ~ where T is the relevant threshold value.
experienced in practice. There are a number
of reasons for this. Thus, people exposed will
tend to shelter bare skin and not experience
pain at the distances indicated. Moreover, the
ignition of materials inside domestic premises
will usually be at distances about 0.6 times
smaller than those shown in Table 1 since win-
dows will absorb two-thirds of the radiation.
Also, spontaneous ignition m a y be a more ap-
propriate criterion for fire than pilot ignition
in this situation. In addition, normal vegeta-
tion would contain too much moisture to be
ignited at the distances shown and thick, iso-
lated material, even if ignited, will tend to
self-extinguish once the fireball has burned
out. Humidity in the atmosphere and rain
would reduce considerably the e x t e n t of fire
spread. However, on a clear, dry day or night,
it would be expected t h a t dry vegetation and
thin, cellulosic materials would be subject to
pilot ignition up to the distance stated, the
ignition sources for the latter being fires
started by spontaneous ignition nearer to the
fireball.
Table 1 also gives estimates of the m a x i m u m
distance that flammable vapours may be
carried and still be dangerous at points down-
stream of spillages, and the m a x i m u m area of
a flashing fire that might occur when such
spillage vapours are ignited when carried down-
wind. The distances were based on informa-
tion provided by Kaiser [5] for travel o f va-
pour from d u m p e d quantities of LNG. Areas
were based on information on plume widths
also from experiments with LNG [6, 7].
It should be emphasised t h a t the figures
given are based on very meagre experimental
work and an incomplete understanding of the
processes involved. However, the Table does
227
Pilot Spontaneous Unbearable
ignition ignition pain
threshold threshold threshold
(W/m 2 ) (W/m 2 ) (W/m 2 )
3.47 × 104 5.56 × 104 0.94 × 104
3.26 5.10 0.84
2.63 4.18 0.60
2.22 3.68 0.50
1.88 3.34 0.36
give an indication of the dimension of disaster
that might result from a spillage of even mo-
derate quantities of these liquid gases. Thus a
20-ton spillage from a road tanker could pro-
duce a flash fire over 5 hectares (about 10
acres) with transient flashes up to about 0.9
km, and a 2 000 ton spillage and vaporisation
might produce a fire of 2 square kilometres
with transient flames reaching a distance down-
wind of 8 kilometres from the point of spil-
lage. These areas would contain a substantial
fraction above the stoichiometric or even the
upper limit concentration and could burn for
tens of seconds in a given locality.
In order to produce the effects outlined in
Table 1, not only does the spillage of the liquid
have to take place but also it must be vapor-
ised or dispersed in a relatively short time. An
estimate of this time for the condition of no
rapid ignition is given in the Table and is based
on the time when a lower travel distance
would be expected from the mean rate of spil-
lage than from the dumped spillage; it will be
seen that it varies from 1.5 min for 2 tons to
13 min for 2 000 tons. To produce the max-
imum diameter fireball under conditions of
rapid ignition, the time of release and disper-
sion need to be less than about twice the time
of burning of the fireball. The latter is shown
as varying from 4 to 22.5 s over the range of
spillage sizes in Table 1.
The question which arises is, how possible
is it for spillage with these characteristics to
occur? Experience has shown that for LPG
kept under pressure in a storage vessel it is
possible for the vessel to become ruptured
and to disgorge all its contents in a very short
time. Moreover, the bulk of its contents when
disgorged will almost immediately be either
228
flashed into vapour in the atmosphere or dis-
persed as a fine mist which is just as dan-
gerous. The most c o m m o n way for this to
occur is as a result of a fire, possibly due to a
leak, which surrounds the storage vessel and
heats it, thus weakening the steel. Occasion-
ally, however, pressure bursts have occurred,
either because of local damage to the storage
vessel or expansion of the liquid following
over-filling.
The mechanisms of spillage with pressure
vessels are also likely with semi-refrigerated
liquids, but are much less likely with fully
refrigerated liquids. The latter are stored in
insulated vessels which are much weaker than
pressure vessels, in fact n o t very dissimilar to
ordinary tanks for large scale storage o f flam-
mable liquid. It is rare, but certainly conceiv-
able, t h a t a simple metallurgical failure condi-
tion might occur in a tank, causing it to jetti-
son its contents. It is possible also under cer-
tain process or accidental conditions for sub-
stantial pressures to build up within a refri-
gerated tank. The main process condition is
known as "roll over" and is due to the varia-
tion in product present in a tank. Thus a
heavier, less volatile product m a y be allowed
to flow above a lighter, more volatile product.
A sinking of the upper layer into the lower
one can cause a rapid evolution of vapour
from the lower layers which might overcome
the relief and burst the vessel. An accidental
condition which might give rise to a similar
sudden discharge of the bulk of the contents
of a tank, and which is liable to occur with
ships' cargoes, would follow the puncture of a
tank below the waterline, either through
stranding, collision or some other mechanism.
It is then possible for water to enter the cargo
space. Water being warmer than the cargo,
particularly if it is liquid propane, can cause a
rapid vaporisation which could split the tank.
As far as the author is aware, this has never
happened in practice, nor has any research
work been carried o u t to define the conditions
under which it might occur, but the possibil-
ity cannot be dismissed. Refrigerated gas
tankers might also experience roll-over and
metallurgical failure.
If a spillage occurs of a fully refrigerated
liquid it still needs to be vaporised with suffi-
cient rapidity. This is less likely on land for
the reasons given above. On the sea there is a
continuing supply of heat from the water to
the spreading vaporising fluid. There is also a
tendency for the cooling of the water below
the spreading vaporising liquid to cause the
water to sink and be replaced by warmer water
from underneath. Thus, the possibility of a
catastrophe of dimensions that are indicated
in Table 1 following an accident involving one
or possibly two liquid flammable gas tanks in
a ship, is a very real one. However, it is more
difficult to conceive of the production of a
fireball of the indicated size. A possible mech-
an.ism might occur if the tank concerned were
already surrounded by a substantial fire, which
would act as a dispersive and vaporising agent
to the contents if these were released with
sufficient rapidity by disruption of the tank.
A well known analogous situation is the "boil-
over" which may be caused when the hot zone
formed in a tank of burning heavy fuel oil
reaches a layer of water that may be present
at the floor of the tank.
For a 20 000 ton gas tanker the involve-
ment of all the tanks in one fireball situation
can probably be ruled out. Even the extended
spill hazard is very unlikely since there will
need to be a mechanism present which gives
rise to the disgorgement of the contents with-
in a number of different tanks in the limited
time available. With LNG a mechanism has
been suggested that local leakages and vapor-
isation of LNG within the cargo space, even
of LNG spilled at a terminal, might stress the
metal of the hull by cooling, which could then
fail to support all of the other tanks [ 8]. l am
n o t aware of any calculation which shows this
can happen in the necessary time to produce
effects as in Table 1. This mechanism however
would not apply to LPG since the hull should
be able to resist the low temperature for a suf-
ficient time. On the other hand, a single land-
based refrigerated tank could, if it collapsed,
give rise to the disaster condition approaching
those outlined in Table 1 if there were no
available mechanism of channelling or other-
wise controlling the released spillage.
Finally, there are two further factors which
might make the situation worse than is appar-
ent in Table 1. First, under some conditions,
explosion effects over a large area have been
experienced following a spillage greater than,
say, some tens of tons of liquefied flammable
gas in the open, even if the ignition source is a
small one. This p h e n o m e n o n is, perhaps, most
likely when ignition is delayed, but cannot be

ruled out for immediate ignition with release
from pressurised vessels [9]. We still know
very little about this p h e n o m e n o n but I be-
lieve that it is more likely where pockets o f
flammable vapour-air mixture m a y be allowed
to accumulate in enclosed spaces and where
obstacles, plant or buildings, are present within
the flammable vapour cloud which can increase
the rate of flame spread by turbulence and
possibly local detonation. There is much dis-
cussion and some work proceeding on this
topic but as far as I am aware, it has not been
possible to reproduce y e t the development of
substantial pressures in the open under exper-
imental conditions. If such pressure effects
were, for example, manifested over a 1- 2 km 2
area over which a flashover has taken place
following a 2 000 ton spillage, then certainly
windows within the flash fire area and sub-
stantially beyond it would break, and much
damage would be caused to buildings within
the area. This would allow the flames to ignite
easily combustible material within the build-
ings: thus, one might expect in a built up area
items such as curtains and foam furniture and
bedding would be universally ignited in most
rooms. The breakage of the windows beyond
the initial burning area would assist in devel-
oping fire in this area by radiation. For this
reason, the transport of a large volume of
flammable vapour over a built-up area is the
greatest of the hazards of LPG in that it is
liable to cause the largest number of deaths
and most damage if it does occur. One cannot
with confidence recommend to people that
t h e y close all doors and windows and stay in-
doors, as one can with toxic or even radio-
active release hazards, since damage caused by
a blast accompanying the flash fire can rup-
ture the houses and allow them to become ignit-
ed in m a n y places. It has been loosely stated that
there are many ignition sources in a built up
area and t h a t an incoming cloud of flammable
gas will be ignited before the flammable va-
pours can encroach extensively into the area.
It is difficult to accept this for a night time
situation in purely residential areas. However,
as will be indicated later, the controlled igni-
tion of such clouds before t h e y reach such
areas could be a major defence against the
hazard.
The second possible effect is the develop-
m e n t of a fire storm as was caused by the
bombing raids in World War II. In this type
229
of fire the flames coalesce to form a large
column of flame above the area of the fire.
Gale force winds are established towards
the fire and the upward b u o y a n t column of
flame may throw burning material to distances
at points b e y o n d the fire area. In general, to
obtain a fire storm it is necessary to have
a burning area of about 1 km 2 and for build-
ings to be high and distances between build-
ings comparatively small, i.e., a fairly dense
built up area [10]. On the other hand, the
furnishing at present in most dwellings, if
ignited, can burn very rapidly, and it may be
possible that under these conditions even a
mainly residential area of typical two storey
high dwellings could allow a fire storm to be
established.
LIKELIHOOD OF FIRE AND EXPLOSION
HAZARD
The fact that one can postulate catastrophic
happenings as indicated above does not mean
that storage and transport in the quantities
indicated should be eliminated. Thus, a pos-
sible catastrophic fire hazard exists for almost
every shopping complex in the country. There
are hazards of this kind also for hospitals, the-
atres, cinemas, etc. The question that arises is, is
it really necessary to expose people to possible
major hazards and, if this cannot be avoided
without great difficulty, can the hazard be
sufficiently reduced so t h a t it becomes at least
endurable ? It must be remembered here that
a major factor in the capacity to endure a
hazard is the extent to which those at risk
receive benefit from the hazardous activity.
Thus, in the above quoted examples of catas-
trophic hazard, those at risk are those using
the premises, not those outside.
Few would d e n y that the c o m m u n i t y as a
whole obtains great benefit from the availabil-
ity of LPG fuels; the use of them in the lique-
fied form is very convenient, particularly in
small quantities in places which piped fuels
cannot reach. Moreover, in these days of
energy scarcity, one must be mindful of the
value of these liquefied gases as a substantial
contributor to our energy resources. This is
particularly relevant in the U.K. since North
Sea resources have an unusually high con-
tent of these volatile gases. Indeed, for this
reason, there is a good case for the con-
230

TABLE 3
Fire statistics - - LPG, natural gas (NG) a n d t o w n gas (TG)
(Taken f r o m U K A n n u a l Fire Statistics for t h e y e a r c o n c e r n e d p u b l i s h e d b y Building Research E s t a b l i s h m e n t
1970 - 3 and H o m e Office 1974 - 7).

1977 1976 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970

Number o f fires, material

first ignited:
In buildings LPG 1 113 894 912 844 967 541 632
TG + NG 1 302 1 357 1 608 1 644 1 846 1 691 1 613
Not in buildings LPG n.a. $ n.a. p.a. 624 502 503 427
TG + NG n.a. n.a. n.a. 346* 560* 622* 558*

Number o f fires, source o f

ignition:
In buildings LPG 1 710 1 631 1 573 1 406 1 270 1 088 1 080
TG + NG 7 588 7 577 8 776 8 978 8 333 7 333 7 107
N o t in buildings LPG n.a. n.a. n.a. 910 746 650 675
TG + NG n.a. n.a. n.a. 26 14 19 23

Number o f fires, both source o f

ignition and material first ignited:
In buildings LPG 570 559 567 418 424 288 287
TG + NG 769 848 964 914 817 859 760
Not in buildings LPG n.a. n.a. n.a. 282 207 217 178
TG + NG n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 3** 2** 3**

Fire rate in buildings (material

first ignited)~109 therms
t N G and TG used in UK
(109 Th) 14.549 13.969 12.634 10.700 9.757 7.440 5.750
N u m b e r o f fires per 109 Th
for NG and TG 89.5 97.1 127 153 180 225 280
t L P G u~ed in UK (109 Th)
( o t h e r t h a n s u p p l i e d t o gas
works) 0.612 0.605 0.631 0.627 0.516 0.356 0.268
N u m b e r o f fires per 109 Th
for LPG 1 818 1 477 1 445 1 346 1 874 1 519 2 358

*TG o n l y - - nearly all in gas works.

**TG only.
t T a k e n f r o m A n n u a l A b s t r a c t s o f Statistics 1974 and 1979 p u b l i s h e d b y HMSO.
$ n o t available.

s u m p t io n o f liquid flammable gas to increase
by a facto r o f five or m or e over t he n e x t de-
cade o r so. For this reason also, it is very ap-
propriate th at one should take a very rigorous
l o o k at the hazard presented by LPG at t he
present time and particularly to l ook f or areas
where safety might be improved.
Table 3 gives in f o r m at i on on the oc c ur r e nc e
o f fire in th e UK in which LPG was a contri-
b u t o r y factor. F o r comparison, i nf or m a t i on is
also given on fires in which either natural gas
or t o w n gas was a c o n t r i b u t o r y factor. It con-
tains numbers o f fires in which t he fuel appli-
ance was the ignition source and also num-
bers in which the fuel itself was the material
first ignited. In addition, numbers are also
given where b o t h the fuel appliance was the
ignition source and the fuel itself was the first
ignited. In themselves, these figures are n o t
very meaningful. T h e y need to be com pared
in each case with t he a m o u n t o f fuel used in
t he UK. This i nform at i on m a y be obtained
from the annual abstract o f statistics [ 11]
and is also given in Table 3. It m a y be shown

that, in all categories, for all the years, lique-
fied petroleum gas produced m a n y more fires
per million therms of fuel used than did nat-
ural gas or town gas. Perhaps the most relevant
comparison is for fires in which the fuel gas
was the material first ignited. Table 3 shows
that t h r o u g h o u t the whole period, LPG was
about ten times more hazardous than the
other gases. Indeed, the figures in the Table
are for fires in buildings only; taking account
of o u t d o o r fires would increase the LPG haz-
ard by some 50 per cent. Another disturbing
feature is that there is little evidence that this
fire rate is decreasing as it u n d o u b t e d l y is for
natural gas. There are, of course, some good
reasons for this, particularly, increasing
amounts of natural gas, which has become
much more available, are being used for cen-
tral heating which is a comparatively safe way
of using fuel. Moreover, all natural gas is piped,
whereas the bulk of liquid fuel gases used are
conveyed in stored form to the appliances.
Also, as indicated above, liquefied petroleum
gases suffer from the disadvantage of being
heavier than air. The figures nevertheless point
to the need for a substantial improvement in
fire safety of liquefied fuel gases if their use is
going to increase.
Turning to the major hazards, fortunately
our experience in this c o u n t r y of such disasters
with LPG as is indicated is virtually non-exis-
tent although there have been a significant
number of near misses. The sort of thing which
could happen is exemplified by the Flix-
borough disaster, but this, of course, involved
cycl0hexane , not liquefied petroleum gas. A
major feature of this type of hazard is that,
unlike the individual LPG appliances relevant
to most of the statistics in Table 2 and, indeed,
also unlike the catastrophic fire hazard asso-
ciated with buildings, those exposed to the
hazard may be obtaining only marginal, or
even sometimes negative, benefit from the
activity. This applies particularly where large
quantities of flammable liquid gas are trans-
ported at terminal areas; a risk can be stated
to be almost focussed at those people living
near these places.
In order to make design and planning deci-
sions, we need quantitative information on
how safe we are from catastrophies of this
kind. Techniques are now becoming available
to allow this to be estimated through proce-
dures known as hazard analysis and fault tree
231
analysis. In the latter procedure, the projected
catastrophe is the final incident in a chain of
unlikely events which lead first to the spillage
then the evaporation, with then ignition and
either flaming or explosion, or both, taking
place in an area where great harm can be done.
Under the Health and Safety at Work Etc. Act,
it is being proposed that organisations which
store quantities of liquefied flammable gases
in excess of 300 tonnes shall carry out hazard
surveys and, in certain instances where com-
munities might be at risk, to follow this up
with a more detailed study which might in-
clude fault tree analysis [12]. A recent ex-
ample of a detailed survey has been carried
out by the Safety and Reliability Directorate
on the Canvey Island situation [5]. In m y
department at the University of Edinburgh,
for over the last four years we have carried
o u t fault tree analyses for three special situa-
tions; two of these are listed and summarised
in Table 4. The third is an a t t e m p t to obtain
fault trees for a major spillage in road and rail
transport, which is still in progress, this latter
study suggests that under present conditions
a major disaster will occur about once in 10 -
20 years.
UNACCEPTABLE AND ACCEPTABLE H A Z A R D S
Having obtained estimates of the above, the
question arises, under what conditions is the
hazard unacceptable? There is much contro-
versy as to how one should approach this
problem at the present time. One approach is
that if the analysis shows a hazard which is
not greater than that of a similar kind which
has been endured in the past, then this is evi-
dence that the hazard is not unendurable.
However, one must be very careful in postu-
lating the factors which will allow us to say
whether the known, endured type of incident
is, indeed, one of a similar kind. The charac-
teristics of a major incident involving fire or
explosion with LPG are t h a t it will kill by fire
in a short time m a n y of the people exposed
to the risk; but, in some cases, those facing
the risk welcome the activity, in other cases
t h e y are neutral, and in others antipathetic.
Data which would assist in developing quan-
titative criteria may be obtained by studying
our present risk of exposure to catastrophic
fire and explosion hazards. The evidence from
232

TABLE 4
Summaries of fault tree analyses involving major LPG risks

Type of risk Projected disaster Estimated probability

of disaster

Horton sphere 600 (1) Catastrophic (1) 1.7 × 10 8/annum

ton capacity. fireball at sphere.
Protected by water (2) Open Ilammable (2) 2.2 X 10 6/annum
spray system and an cloud explosion on
available fire fighting plant following
crew. Situated 150 m drifting of cloud
from main chemical of unignited vapours
plant [20].

Liquefied gas marine Major fire or 2.3 x 10-3/annum

terminal handling explosion in the
pressurised LPG [21]. terminal area involving
either catastrophic fire
ball or large open flam-
mable cloud explosion
or fire

such a study that I have carried out indicates
that, at present, a c o m m u n i t y of some 10 000
people, for example, might expect a fire disas-
ter that would kill more than one hundred
people, caused by a risk to whose benefit they
are neutral, about once in 10 million years. A
difficulty with probabilities as low as this is
that it is below the range of probabilities that
may be confidently predicted by fault trees at
the present time. However, it suggests t h a t a
criterion for acceptability of the order of once
in 10 000 years, implied by the Canvey Island
report [15], is too high.
METHODS OF IMPROVING F I R E SAFETY WITH
LPG
General hazards
The poor record of LPG with regard to fire
occurrence compared with piped gas prompts
one to look for possible ways of improving its
safety. Unfortunately, it is not obvious to find
these. The high fire rate would appear to be
inherent in the places and manner where LPG
is used, and arise because o f the sheer conve-
nience of using bottled gas. Good Codes of
Practice, such as the Home Office Codes [ 13,
14], have been available since 1971, and
LPGITA have provided much guidance on this
matter [15]. Recently Kemp and Drysdale
have produced a design guide for architects
[ 16]. The effect of these might well begin to
show in future years. The situation should
also improve when regulations under the
Health and Safety at Work, Etc. Act are pro-
duced with accompanying Codes of Practice
for different industrial situations. A possible
general improvement that might be effected
is to recommend that flammable gas detectors
be employed in the vicinity of LPG appliances.
The provision of a mass market for such de-
tectors could well result in a cheap, reliable
instrument in a way similar to that in which
the mass market for smoke detection has de-
veloped in the United States. They could
actually be fitted on appliances and set to
give a warning or shut off a supply or even
open extra ventilation if a high concentration
of flammable gas is detected.
A major step forward, particularly if the
use of LPG is to be increased, is to move the
use into the direction where there would be
less handling of cylinders, particularly towards
piped gas. Another possibility is to use LPG
for road vehicles. Here, the hazard would need
to be comparable with that of petrol if such a
use was n o t to give rise to special anxiety on
fire safety. There are reasons for believing that
in some respects the fire hazard would be
greater than petrol, e.g., the influence of a fire
near the tank as a result of a leak. Even though
the LPG tank m a y be vented, this is unlikely
to prevent a substantial fire inside a vehicle
when the vent operated. Also, overfilling is
more likely to lead to accidents. However,

the tank would be more robust than a petrol
tank and less likely to be damaged in a colli-
sion. A detailed hazard survey would be valu-
able before this use were to become extensive
in the UK, perhaps with some full scale tests,
as well, on the effect of fire. LPG is being used
widely for cars in Europe, particularly in Hol-
land where 450 000 tons per annum are being
used for road transport. An enquiry to the
Dutch Research Institute for Road Vehicles
has indicated t h a t experience in Holland has
not given reason for special concern.
Major hazards
What can we do about the major hazards
associated with storage a~d transport of LPG
in quantities of a few tons upwards? The
relatively clean record in the UK so far should
not blind us to the risk t h a t exists, not only
to the population at large but also, and per-
haps particularly, to emergency services called
to deal with an incident. As far as road tankers
are concerned, the recent regulations requir-
ing them to carry a warning panel which in-
cludes instructions on emergency action [ 17],
goes some way to reducing the hazard to which
t h e y are exposed. The code 2WE for butane
and propane indicates t h a t there is danger of
a violent explosion, t h e y should wear full pro-
tective clothing and use water fog as a con-
trolling medium; t h e y should also consider
evacuation of the public. However, it contains
no indication of how far away danger would
be manifest if there is a "violent explosion".
Thus, American experience of incidents
involving a road or rail tanker and accompanied
by fire, is that there may be only about 10
minutes available before a BLEVE takes place.
The latter is an acronym for "boiling liquid
expanding vapour explosion" but really cor-
responds to the fireball situation outlined in
Table 1. The information in the Table suggests
that if firemen are called to a fire incident on
such a tanker, t h e y would be unwise to ap-
proach within 300 metres, especially as the
so called full protective clothing is n o t a pro-
tection against radiant heat. They almost cer-
tainly would approach in order to set up some
cooling onto the tank, particularly if m a n y
people were at risk, but in doing so they would
themselves be taking a risk. Even if there is no
leak following an incident in which an LPG
tanker is involved in violent collision, there
may be sufficient damage, possibly unseen,
233
to the tanker which could result in its strength
being reduced below that of the pressure re-
lease, and its sudden bursting. Thus, there is
evidence that the unexpected BLEVE at
Waverley, Tennessee, last year was due to the
scoring of a rail tanker which had been de-
railed. It is m y opinion t h a t a major step to-
wards reducing the possibility of incidents of
this kind would be to transport LPG, and,
indeed, other dangerous materials like it, in
the refrigerated state in insulated containers.
The safety would be improved by reducing
the temperature to well below the normal
boiling point. This practice should eliminate
BLEVES and pressure bursts of the above
kind. Also, in spite of the mistake of over-
filling which appears to have been made in
the recent Spanish disaster, it almost certainly
would not have occurred if the liquid had been
transported in an insulated container. Such a
change would bring about some changes in
the fuel as used in practice and would cause
extra expense. However, a fundamental reas-
sessment of the way LPG is handled is timely
if there is likely to be a sharp increase in its
use. For example, if LPG is to be used as an
automotive fuel, it could be transported in
the refrigerated state, stored at the retailing
garage in this state, and warmed sufficiently
on it being delivered to the fuel tanks of ve-
hicles, if this is indeed necessary. Another in-
teresting possibility is to fill the tank with a
metal mesh. This has been used in the past to
suppress vapour-air explosions in a tank, a
risk which is mostly irrelevant for LPG. How-
ever, the presence of the metal mesh may re-
duce the rate of ejection of the fluid follow-
ing a burst, but this needs to be investigated.
With regard to very large tonnage stored in
refrigerated tanks on land, here, at least, a step
towards safety has been taken by reducing the
liquid temperature to its boiling point. One
still has the possibility of failure of the tank
but the state of the liquid allows a very impor-
tant safety step to be taken, i.e., that of re-
d u n d a n t secondary containment. This means
putting a second container round the first,
which will hold all the liquid if the first con-
tainer fails. The structure of the redundant
containment should be such as not to fail by
mechanisms which cause failure of the first
(mainly rollover and metallurgical failure). An
outer shell of concrete is therefore appropriate
for the task.
234
GAS TANKERS ON SHIPS
This still leaves the t h o r n y question of
liquefied gas tanks on ships. In addition t o the
mechanisms o f failure indicated above, these
have certain mo r e likely failure mechanisms.
These ships move a bout in inshore waters
where t h e y may be subject to collision and
stranding, and t h e y are of t e n in direct c o n t a c t
with a terminal where there is a significant
probability there could be a leak or overfilling,
or some o t h e r maloper a t i on t h a t might cause
spillage. There m a y also be ignition sources on
or near ships. In addition, the m anagem e nt of
ships tends to be heterogeneous and n o t unde r
the same degree o f discipline and cont r ol as
land based management. Finally, there ex-
ists, in close p r o x i m i t y , m uc h water with
which these liquefied gases are thermally in-
compatible and which could enhance a spil-
lage hazard b y causing rapid vaporisation.
A simple solution would be to keep these
tankers away f r o m highly p o p u l a t e d areas.
Table 1 suggests th a t a distance o f about 6 km
or 4 miles would be reasonable. Although this
is within the m a x i m u m distance o f spread to
the L FL, it is unlikely t ha t a large area t hat
would maintain a flash fire would build up
outside this distance for a leakage up to 1 0 0 0
t o n s . What is perhaps m o r e i m p o r t a n t is t ha t
this distance will allow a flexibility o f emer-
gency o p er atio n if there is a dangerous inci-
dent which results in a tank being punct ur e d,
particularly u n d e r water. Thus, if the vapours
o f such a leak are n o t threatening people, the
safest way o f dealing with t hem is to allow
t h e m to disperse on their own. Owing to the
possibility o f a sudden intensification of the
incident, resulting f r om the possible ent r y o f
water into a tank, I would r e c o m m e n d imme-
diate evacuation o f those on board and ex-
posed to th e vapours, and would advise t ha t
emergency services should n o t approach un-
less t h e y are p r o t e c t e d against being sur-
r o u n d e d by fire and exposed to explosion
forces. However, if t he vapour leak becomes
so large as to develop into a t hr eat to people
on shore, particularly in a built-up area, then
I t h i n k it would be necessary to ignite the
leak. This will result in a flash back to the ship
and a fierce fire there. T he evacuation o f per-
sonnel is a necessary precaution to allow this
o p t i o n to be exercised. However, the dimen-
sions o f the fire near the ship, although great,
would be m uch less than the m a x i m u m flash
area indicated in Table 1. Thus, for 2 000 tons
of LPG leaking in 13 minutes, the fire size
would be a b o u t 130 m diameter and 360 m
high; for 20 000 tons escaping in 26 minutes,
300 m in diameter and 600 m high. Even the
occurrence o f a fireball during such a fire as a
result o f a 2 000 t on tank suddenly disrupting
is unlikely to endanger people at a distance o f
6 km. However, the liability of such a tank to
disrupt at any time if water can gain access to
the tank will compromise the ability of emer-
gency services to call for an evacuation to a
safe distance in an emergency situation for
distances less than a b o u t 4 km.
As things are at t he m o m e n t , these tankers
move well within this 6 km distance. Can the
risk in this situation be reduced to endurable
levels ? Management at terminals and tankers
could be tightened, e.g., only one management
could be responsible for both. Also, tankers
could be used which are designed so as not to
punct ure or spill c o n t e n t s into the sea, under
any conditions of stranding, collision or pro-
cess maloperation. Judging from the Canvey
Island r e p o r t and our own hazard analysis for
an LPG terminal given in Table 4, there ap-
pears to be a long haul before this approach
becomes convincingly viable, bearing in mind
the criterion for acceptability implied above
rather than the one adopt ed in the Canvey
Island report. It should be n o t e d here that the
1975 International (IMCO) Standard [18]
allows bot h butane and propane tanks to be
situated only 0.76 m from the hull, and actu-
ally visualises the puncturing of tanks and their
becoming filled with water as a possible condi-
tion for the design of the stability of the ship.
Contributions to safety might be made by
chilling a liquefied gas cargo to a t e m p e r a t u r e
well below its boiling point and surrounding
the tanker at the terminal by a b o o m which
will reduce the e x t e n t of spread of spilled
liquefied gas. If there is a substantial spillage
this would cause ice to form under the spil-
lage and considerably reduce the rate o f vapo-
risation which is the dangerous factor in this
situation. Thus, Reid and Smith report [19]
a rate of vaporisation for LPG on a limited
area o f ice a b o u t one-third that on a limited
area of water, and, in both cases, the rate
drops o f f inversely as the square r o o t of the
time. Moreover, if there is a punct ure in a
tank which results in water invasion, the lower

temperature of the LPG would encourage the
rapid formation of ice w i t h o u t vapour forma-
tion soon after the water ingress, and there-
fore considerably reduce the possibility of
explosive formation of flammable vapour in
the tank. However, much research is required
to establish o p t i m u m conditions for this re-
duction. Even w i t h o u t extra chilling, a boom
set up some 20 metres away from the ship's
side, attached to each end of the ship and
strengthened and perhaps compartmented
with supporting spokes to the ship's side,
would provide valuable independent second-
ary containment for m a n y spillage situations.
The vapour would n o t be held back but its
rate of production would be reduced and
would probably become controllable by emer-
gency measures, e.g., the automatic action of
medium or high expansion foam generators.
Indeed, it would be desirable for such ships to
carry such a b o o m while moving near popu-
lated areas. Although this m a y result in struc-
tural and navigational difficulties it could be
made to act as a first line of defence against
a lateral collision. The boom may be kept on
deck for passage through the high seas and
lowered for inshore waters. An inner hull, as
is c o m m o n for LNG ships, would also be
beneficial.
Beyond this, if there is any residual, unac-
ceptable risk to exposed residential areas,
there is little one can recommend other than
to give the houses the necessary degree of fire
and explosion protection and to compensate
injured parties for exposure to excessive risk
and anxiety due to risk. It must be remem-
bered t h a t anxiety is caused n o t only by pos-
sible accidents affecting the injured parties
directly, but by catastrophic accidents t h a t
may happen anywhere in the world -- par-
ticularly if it cannot be clearly demonstrated
t h a t conditions are significantly different. The
type of protection that would be relevant
would be:
(a) A warning system which would give warn-
ing of imminent danger due to a major spillage
having occurred, or some other reason.
(b) Emergency procedure including notice
of what people should do in the event of a
warning. This would include instructions on
how to seek refuge or to evacuate.
(c) Provision of a controlled flammable gas
detector-ignition source system to ignite
flammable gases if t h e y approach the shore.
235
(d) Provision of fire retardant shutters or
curtains for windows of premises under threat
of fire.
(e) Provision of treatment for splintering of
all glass under threat of explosion pressures
and not protected under (d).
(f) Provision of sprinkler installations for
all premises under threat of fire.
(g) Provision of safe refuges against explo-
sion or fire effects.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) Liquefied fuel gas is a valuable fuel re-
source which is likely to increase greatly in
availability in future years. However, special
efforts are needed to make its use sufficiently
safe with regard to fire and explosion.
(2) The fire and explosion hazard of LPG in
its everyday use is intrinsically more difficult
to counter than t h a t of town gas or natural
gas. The reasons are:
(a) that LPG vapours are heavier than air;
(b) the gas is provided as an article of com-
merce rather than in a piped system;
(c) because of its special convenience it is
used in situations where it is not easily subject
to control.
(3) Available statistics on fire indicate that
LPG is more than ten times more likely than
natural gas to cause fires and explosions per
unit energy use of fuel.
(4) Future major expansion of LPG should
take place in the direction of providing piped
fuel or into situations which do not require
exchange and trading of gas cylinders, A de-
tailed hazard survey is justified prior to any
extension in its use. More extensive regula-
tions and codes are also required.
(5) LPG as used at present has attached to it a
very serious propensity for major fire and ex-
plosion hazard. This is due to the ability of
the liquefied gas to vaporise very rapidly when
containment has been lost and thus produce
massive vapour clouds in a short time. This
applies particularly to the pressurised liquid at
ambient temperatures for which secondary
containment is generally impracticable, but
also, under some conditions, to the refrigerated
liquid at ambient pressure for which second-
ary corrtainment is generally practicable.
(6) The hazards result from the possibility of
a large fireball which would occur if ignition
followed soon after release or fire or explo-
236
sion, in an open flammable cloud, if ignition
was delayed. Perhaps the greatest hazard to
people would occur if a flammable cloud
drifted over a populated area and became
ignited.
(7) In the UK there is no experience of a
major disaster of the type outlined in (6).
However, hazard surveys available indicate
that the likelihood of such a disaster is quite
credible.
(8) Reduction of major hazards in road and
rail transport could follow if LPG were trans-
ported in the refrigerated state -- particularly
if the temperature was well below the boiling
point at ambient temperature. There would,
however, be economic disadvantages of doing
this.
(9) Both pressurised and refrigerated tankers
(ships) should, if possible, be kept well away
from populated areas, both to prevent a dis-
aster and to give flexibility in an emergency
situation. If, in the national interest, it is not
possible to do this in certain instances, then it
is necessary to reduce the risk o f a major dis-
aster due to fire or explosion to a level below
that which appears to be the case at the pre-
sent time. This can be done by:
(a) Improving management and design of
tankers and terminals so that spillages will
occ, ur at a far lower expected frequency.
(b) Devising methods of reducing the rate
of vapour formation from the spillage, partic-
ularly by containment.
(c) Providing special fire and explosion pro-
tection to those exposed to the risk.
There may also be a case fgr providing com-
pensation to some of those exposed to the
risk.
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