NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW

Excerpts from the 2017 Decisions of the Supreme Court

Compiled by
CARLO L. CRUZ

STATE IMMUNITY

The fundamental law of the land provides that the State cannot be sued without its consent. It is
a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty
that the State, as well as its government, is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. The
rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any
circumstances. The doctrine only conveys that "the state may not be sued without its consent;"
its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. Suits filed against government
agencies may either be against incorporated or unincorporated agencies. In case of incorporated
agencies, its suability depends upon whether its own organic act specifically provides that it can
sue and be sued in Court.

As the State's engineering and construction arm, the DPWH exercises governmental functions
that effectively insulate it from any suit, much less from any monetary liability. The
construction of the Project which was for the purpose of minimizing the perennial problem of
flood in the area of Tunggol, Montawal, Maguindanao, is well within the powers and functions
of the DPWH as mandated by the Administrative Code of 1997.

Hence, the Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the DPWH from being held responsible for alleged
damages it performed in consonance with its mandated duty. Nowhere does it appear in the
petition that the State has given its consent, expressly or impliedly, to be sued before the courts.
The failure to allege the existence of the State's consent to be sued in the complaint is a fatal
defect, and on this basis alone, should cause the dismissal of the complaint. (Buisan v.
Commission on Audit and Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 212376, January 31,
2017)

Besides, case law states that the "absence of opposition from government agencies is of no
controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error
of its officials or agents. Neither is the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the
petition for reconstitution [or correction of title, as in this case] if, on the basis of the law and the
evidence on record, such petition has no merit." Moreover, "in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's."
(Republic v. Galeno, G.R. No. 215009, January 23, 2017)

While estoppel generally does not apply against government, especially when the case involves
the collection of taxes, an exception can be made when the application of the rule will cause
injustice against an innocent party.

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Respondent had already acquired a vested right on the tax classification of its San Mig Light as
a new brand. To allow petitioner to change its position will result in deficiency assessments in
substantial amounts against respondent to the latter's prejudice. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. Nos. 205045 & 205723, January 25, 2017)

The fact that the assailed Notice of Disallowance was issued only after 15 years from the
implementation of Circular No. 25, and only after 10 years from the implementation of
Resolution No. 0246 did not preclude the COA from acting as it did. The general rule is that the
Government is never estopped by the mistake or error of its agents. If that were not so, the
Government would be tied down by the mistakes and blunders of its agents, and the public
would unavoidably suffer. Neither the erroneous application nor the erroneous enforcement of
the statute by public officers can preclude the subsequent corrective application of the statute.
Exceptions to the general rule of non-estoppel may be allowed only in rare and unusual
circumstances in which the interests of justice clearly require the application of estoppel. For
one, estoppel may not be invoked if its application will operate to defeat the effective
implementation of a policy adopted to protect the public.

Here, however, no exceptional circumstance existed that warranted the application of estoppel
against the COA. Accordingly, the Court cannot declare the disallowance invalid on that basis.
(Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216538; Antonio v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216954, April 18, 2017)

PARENS PATRIAE

The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not only upon the State, but also on the
community and even private entities. As to the State, the duty emanates from its role as parens
patriae which holds it under obligation to provide protection and look after the welfare of its
people especially those who cannot tend to themselves. Parens patriae means parent of his or her
country, and refers to the State in its role as "sovereign," or the State in its capacity as a provider
of protection to those unable to care for themselves. In fulfilling this duty, the State may resort
to the exercise of its inherent powers: police power, eminent domain and power of taxation.
(Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No.
199669, April 25, 2017)

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The task of determining probable cause is lodged with the public prosecutor and ultimately, the
Secretary of Justice. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts have no right to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive
Branch of the Government. Thus, we have generally adopted a policy of non-interference with
the executive determination of probable cause. Where, however, there is a clear case of grave
abuse of discretion, courts are allowed to reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings and
conclusions on matters of probable cause. (Forietrans Manufacturing Corporation v. Davidoff Et
Cia. SA, G.R. No. 197482, March 6, 2017)

Anent the question regarding the shift from tax credit to tax deduction, suffice it is to say that it
is within the province of Congress to do so in the exercise of its legislative power. It has the
authority to choose the subject of legislation, outline the effective measures to achieve its

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declared policies and even impose penalties in case of non-compliance. It has the sole discretion
to decide which policies to pursue and devise means to achieve them, and courts often do not
interfere in this exercise for as long as it does not transcend constitutional limitations. "In
performing this duty, the legislature has no guide but its judgment and discretion and the
wisdom of experience." (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and
Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

DELEGATION OF POWER

There is, of course, nothing to prevent Congress from again adopting a policy that prorates the
effectivity of basic personal and additional exemptions. This policy, however, must be explicitly
provided for by law to amend the prevailing law, which provides for full-year treatment. As
already pointed out, R.A. 9504 is totally silent on the matter. This silence cannot be presumed
by the BIR as providing for a half-year application of the new exemption levels. Such
presumption is unjust, as incomes do not remain the same from month to month, especially for
the MWEs.

Therefore, there is no legal basis for the BIR to reintroduce the prorating of the new personal
and additional exemptions. In so doing, respondents overstepped the bounds of their rule-
making power. It is an established rule that administrative regulations are valid only when
these are consistent with the law. Respondents cannot amend, by mere regulation, the laws they
administer. To do so would violate the principle of non-delegability of legislative powers.

The prorated application of the new set of personal and additional exemptions for the year 2008,
which was introduced by respondents, cannot even be justified under the exception to the
canon of non-delegability; that is, when Congress makes a delegation to the executive branch.
The delegation would fail the two accepted tests for a valid delegation of legislative power; the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. The first test requires the law to be complete
in all its terms and conditions, such that the only thing the delegate will have to do is to enforce
it. The sufficient standard test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law that map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and canalize the delegation.

In this case, respondents went beyond enforcement of the law, given the absence of a provision
in R.A. 9504 mandating the prorated application of the new amounts of personal and additional
exemptions for 2008. Further, even assuming that the law intended a prorated application, there
are no parameters set forth in R.A. 9504 that would delimit the legislative power surrendered
by Congress to the delegate. In contrast, Section 23(d) of the 1939 Tax Code authorized not only
the prorating of the exemptions in case of change of status of the taxpayer, but also authorized
the Secretary of Finance to prescribe the corresponding rules and regulations. (Soriano v.
Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 184450, January 24, 2017)

Administrative Bodies

The powers of an administrative body are classified into two fundamental powers: quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial. Quasi-legislative power, otherwise known as the power of
subordinate legislation, has been defined as the authority delegated by the lawmaking body to
the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of
law and implement legislative policy. "[A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate

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legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof." The
exercise by the administrative body of its quasi-legislative power through the promulgation of
regulations of general application does not, as a rule, require notice and hearing. The only
exception being where the Legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be
based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.

Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is known as the power of the administrative agency to
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself. As it involves the exercise of discretion in determining
the rights and liabilities of the parties, the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power requires the
concurrence of two elements: one, jurisdiction which must be acquired by the administrative
body and two, the observance of the requirements of due process, that is, the right to notice and
hearing.

On the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by the FDA in the exercise
of its "regulatory powers" and, therefore, beyond judicial review, the Court holds that it has the
power to review all acts and decisions where there is a commission of grave abuse of discretion.
No less than the Constitution decrees that the Court must exercise its duty to ensure that no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. Such is committed when there is a violation of the
constitutional mandate that "no person is deprived of life, liberty, and property without due
process of law." The Court's power cannot be curtailed by the FDA's invocation of its regulatory
power.

In so arguing, the respondents cited Atty. Carlo L. Cruz in his book, Philippine Administrative
Law.

Lest there be any inaccuracy, the relevant portions of the book cited by the respondents are
hereby quoted as follows:

xxx.

B. The Quasi-Judicial Power

xxx

2. Determinative Powers

To better enable the administrative body to exercise its quasi judicial authority, it is also
vested with what is known as determinative powers and functions.
Professor Freund classifies them generally into the enabling powers and the directing
powers.

The latter includes the dispensing, the examining, and the summary powers.

The enabling powers are those that permit the doing of an act which the law undertakes
to regulate and which would be unlawful with government approval. The most
common example is the issuance of licenses to engage in a particular business or
occupation, like the operation of a liquor store or restaurant. xxx.

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From the above, two things are apparent: one, the "enabling powers" cover "regulatory powers"
as defined by the respondents; and two, they refer to a subcategory of a quasi-judicial power
which, as explained in the Decision, requires the compliance with the twin requirements of
notice and hearing. Nowhere from the above-quoted texts can it be inferred that the exercise of
"regulatory power" places an administrative agency beyond the reach of judicial review. When
there is grave abuse of discretion, such as denying a party of his constitutional right to due
process, the Court can come in and exercise its power of judicial review. It can review the
challenged acts, whether exercised by the FDA in its ministerial, quasi-judicial or regulatory
power. In the past, the Court exercised its power of judicial review over acts and decisions of
agencies exercising their regulatory powers, such as DPWH, TRB, NEA, and the SEC, among
others. In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, the Court properly exercised its power of
judicial review over a Comelec resolution issued in the exercise of its regulatory power.
(Alliance for the Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc. v. Garin, Resolution on Partial MR, G.R. No.
217872/G.R. No. 221866. April 26, 2017)

The FDA wants the Court to consider that, as a body, it has a distinct and separate personality
from the Director-General, who exercises quasi-judicial power. The Court cannot accommodate
the position of the respondents. Section 6(a) of R.A. No. 3720, as amended by Section 7 of R.A.
No. 9711, provides that "(a) The FDA shall be headed by a director-general with the rank of
undersecretary, xxx." How can the head be separated from the body? (Alliance for the Family
Foundation, Philippines, Inc. v. Garin, Resolution on Partial MR, G.R. No. 217872/G.R. No. 221866.
April 26, 2017)

On this score, it should be clarified that the Decision simply enjoined the respondents from
registering, recertifying, procuring, and administering only those contraceptive drugs and
devices which were the subjects of the petitioners' opposition, specifically Implanon and
Implanon NXT. It never meant to enjoin the processing of the entire gamut of family planning
supplies that have been declared as unquestionably non-abortifacient. Moreover, the injunction
issued by the Court was only subject to the condition that the respondents afford the petitioners
a genuine opportunity to their right to due process.

As the Decision explained, the Court cannot lift the TRO prior to the summary hearing to be
conducted by the FDA. To do so would render the summary hearing an exercise in futility.
Specifically, the respondents would want the Court to consider their argument that Implanon
and Implanon NXT have no abortifacient effects. According to them, "the FDA tested these
devices for safety, efficacy, purity, quality, and non-abortiveness prior to the issuance of
certificates of registration and recertification, and after the promulgation of Imbong." The Court,
however, cannot make such determination or pronouncement at this time. To grant its prayer to
lift the TRO would be premature and presumptuous. Any declaration by the Court at this time
would have no basis because the FDA, which has the mandate and expertise on the matter, has
to first resolve the controversy pending before its office. (Alliance for the Family Foundation,
Philippines, Inc. v. Garin, Resolution on Partial MR, G.R. No. 217872/G.R. No. 221866. April 26,
2017)

The need for a certification of non-forum shopping to be attached to respondent's appeal before
the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office is established. xxx. These
requirements notwithstanding, the Intellectual Property Office's own Regulations on Inter
Partes Proceedings (which governs petitions for cancellations of a mark, patent, utility model,

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industrial design, opposition to registration of a mark and compulsory licensing, and which
were in effect when respondent filed its appeal) specify that the Intellectual Property Office
"shall not be bound by the strict technical rules of procedure and evidence." xxx. Given these
premises, it was an error for the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office to have
been so rigid in applying a procedural rule and dismissing respondent's appeal. (Palao v.
Florentino III International, Inc., G.R. No. 186967, January 18, 2017)

Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, in part, provides that the DAR is vested with "primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters" and "exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform" except those falling under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

Section 57, on the other hand, confers "special" and "original and exclusive" jurisdiction to the
SAC over all petitions of landowners for the determination of just compensation. (Mateo v.
Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 186339, February 15, 2017)

...the jurisdiction conferred to the DARAB is limited to agrarian disputes, which is subject to the
precondition that there exist tenancy relations between the parties. This delineation applies in
connection with cancellation of the CLOAs. In Valcurza v. Tamparong, Jr., we stated:

Thus, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of registered
CLO As relating to an agrarian dispute between landowners and tenants. However, in
cases concerning the cancellation of CLO As that involve parties who are not
agricultural tenants or lessees-cases related to the administrative implementation of
agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations – the jurisdiction is with the DAR, and not
the DARAB.

Here, petitioner is correct in alleging that it is the DAR and not the DARAB that has
jurisdiction. First, the issue of whether the CLOA issued to petitioners over
respondent'sland should be cancelled hinges on that of whether the subject landholding
is exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of two zoning ordinances. This question
involves the DAR's determination of whether the subject land is indeed exempt from
CARP coverage - a matter involving the administrative implementation of the CARP
Law. Second, respondent's complaint does not allege that the prayer for the cancellation
of the CLOA was in connection with an agrarian dispute. The complaint is centered on
the fraudulent acts of the MARO, PARO, and the regional director that led to the
issuance of the CLOA. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.) (Union Bank of the
Philippines v. Hon. Regional Agrarian Reform Officer, G.R. No. 200369, March 1, 2017)

An agreement to submit to voluntary arbitration for purposes of vesting jurisdiction over a

construction dispute in the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) need not be
contained in the construction contract, or be signed by the parties. It is enough that the
agreement be in writing. (Federal Builders, Inc. V. Power Factors, Inc., G.R. No. 211504, March 8,
2017)

Worthy to note is that the jurisdiction of the CIAC is over the dispute, not over the contract
between the parties. Section 2.1, Rule 2 of the CIAC Revised Rules particularly specifies that the
CIAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over construction disputes, whether such disputes
arise from or are merely connected with the construction contracts entered into by parties, and
whether such disputes arise before or after the completion of the contracts. Accordingly, the

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execution of the contracts and the effect of the agreement to submit to arbitration are different
matters, and the signing or non-signing of one does not necessarily affect the other. In other
words, the formalities of the contract have nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the CIAC.
(Federal Builders, Inc. V. Power Factors, Inc., G.R. No. 211504, March 8, 2017)

Jurisdiction over annulment of judgment of quasi-judicial bodies

Prior to Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129), we had the chance to rule on the question of
jurisdiction over the annulment of judgment of quasi judicial bodies in BF Northwest
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court. In that case, we held that regional
trial courts can annul the judgment of quasi-judicial bodies which are of the same rank as courts
of first instance. This ruling established two things: first, an action for the annulment of
judgment is a remedy available against a void judgment of a quasi-judicial body. Second,
regional trial courts had jurisdiction whenever the quasi-judicial body involved is of inferior
rank.

With the passage of BP 129, this doctrine appears to have been altered. Section 9(a) of BP 129
expressly vested the CA with jurisdiction over annulment of judgments of regional trial courts.
Notably, it does not mention jurisdiction over annulment of judgment of quasi-judicial bodies.
In fact, quasi-judicial bodies are mentioned only in Section 9(3) which provides for the CA's
appellate jurisdiction over their judgments, orders, resolutions and awards.

In 1997, the new rules of civil procedure took effect. These rules provided, for the first time, a
remedy called annulment of judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Rule 47, however, limits its application to regional trial courts and municipal trial courts.

We had the opportunity to apply these relevant provisions in the 2000 case of Cole v. Court of
Appeals. In this case, we explained that the CA has no jurisdiction over a petition for annulment
of judgment under Rule 47 against a decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, a
quasi-judicial body. Rule 47 allows a resort to the CA only in instances where the judgment
challenged was rendered by regional trial courts. This was also the import of our ruling in Elcee
Farms, Inc. v. Semillano when we held that the CA has no jurisdiction over the annulment of
judgment of the National Labor Relations Commission.

This was reiterated in the 2005 case Galang v. Court of Appeals which dealt with decisions
rendered by the SEC. In that case, we categorically ruled that the CA has no jurisdiction over
annulment of a void judgment rendered by the SEC since Rule 47 of the Rules of Court clearly
states that this jurisdiction only pertains to judgments rendered by regional trial courts.
Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br. 40, Cagayan
de Oro City summarized our foregoing rulings in determining whether the CA has jurisdiction
to annul a void judgment of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
This case was a significant development in the then growing jurisprudence which all merely
said that an action to annul a judgment of a quasi-judicial body cannot be brought before the
CA, and which did not categorically state whether the action may be filed before any other
court.

In Springfield, we explained that regional trial courts have no jurisdiction to annul judgments of
quasi-judicial bodies of equal rank. It then proceeded to state that the CA also has no

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jurisdiction over such an action. Springfield emphasized that Section 9 of BP 129 and Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court both state that the CA has jurisdiction over annulment of judgments of
regional trial courts only. We ruled in this case that the "silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the
jurisdiction of the CA to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of quasi-judicial
bodies like the DARAB indicates its lack of such authority." While this case explained that
neither the regional trial courts nor the CA possess jurisdiction over an action to annul the
judgment of quasi-judicial bodies, it did not categorically state that the remedy itself does not
exist in the first place. Notably, we disposed of this case by remanding the action filed before
us-a special civil action for prohibition to the CA because the matter required a determination of
facts which this Court cannot do. We then held that the CA may rule upon the validity of the
judgment by noting that a void judgment may be collaterally attacked in a proceeding such as
an action for prohibition.

The seeming confusion in the string of cases pertaining to the jurisdiction over petitions for
annulment of judgment of quasi-judicial bodies is clarified when these cases are read in
conjunction with Macalalag v. Ombudsman. While we repeated our consistent ruling that Rule 47
of the Rules of Court only applies to judgments of regional trial courts, Macalalag also explains
that an action for the annulment of judgment is similar in nature to an appeal-both are merely
statutory. No right exists unless expressly granted by law. In Macalalag, we implied that the key
to determining whether this remedy may be had and where such action may be filed is to
ascertain whether there is a law expressly allowing a resort to this action before a particular
tribunal. This then requires an examination of the laws and rules relevant to a specified quasi-
judicial body. While it is correct that both the regional trial courts and the CA cannot take
cognizance of a petition for annulment of judgment of a quasi-judicial body under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court, they may nevertheless do so, if a law categorically provides for such a
remedy and clearly provides them with jurisdiction.

Applying this to the present case, we rule that there is no law at the time pertinent to this case,
which allows the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment before the regional trial courts
and the CA to set aside a void judgment of the SEC on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. We
hasten to emphasize, however, that this pertains only to cases filed prior to Republic Act No.
8799 (RA 8799) which transferred the jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes to regional trial
courts designated as commercial courts. As to the latter, Rule 47 clearly applies.

This leads to the conclusion that the RTC Petition is .not the proper remedy to assail the SEC
Decision. Since it is an action for the annulment of judgment, the RTC Petition cannot prosper
as we have already ruled that this remedy is not available in this particular case.
However, the error in Cruz's RTC Petition does not automatically warrant a dismissal of these
proceedings. We rule that the SEC, in nullifying the sale between Napal and Cruz and in
ordering the cancellation of Cruz's TCTs in favor of NIDSLAND, overstepped its jurisdiction.
The SEC Decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion. (Imperial v. Hon. Armes, G.R. No.
178842, January 30, 2017)

Indeed, our jurisprudence has leaned in favor of recognizing the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial
bodies. However, this jurisdiction must always be viewed within the context of its grant. The
law vests quasi-judicial powers to administrative bodies over matters that require their
particular competence and specialized expertise. This grant of jurisdiction is not and should not
be justification to deprive courts of law of their jurisdiction as determined by law and the

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Constitution. Courts of law are the instruments for the adjudication of legal disputes. In a
system of government where courts of law exist alongside quasi-judicial bodies, the need to
harmonize apparent conflicts in jurisdiction require a determination of whether the matter to be
resolved pertains to a general question of law which belongs to ordinary courts or whether it
refers to a highly specialized question that can be better resolved by a quasi-judicial body in
accordance with its power vested by law.

In overstepping its jurisdiction, the SEC committed grave abuse of discretion. (Imperial v. Hon.
Armes, G.R. No. 178842, January 30, 2017)

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners maintain that it is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCJP), not the regular courts, which has jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain
of the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) regardless of the parties involved.

Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon
an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence. (Unduran v.
Aberasturi, Resolution on the MR, G.R. No. 181284, April 18, 2017)

To recall, the ponencia has held that pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. When such claims and disputes
arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the case shall fall
under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP. Thus, even if the real issue
involves a dispute over a land which appears to be located within the ancestral domain of an
ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which has the power to hear, try and decide the case. In
exceptional cases under Sections 52, 54 and 62 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction
over such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP
group. xxx.

After a circumspect review of the relevant laws and jurisprudence, the Court maintains that the
jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited to claims and disputes
involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both parties belong to the same ICC/IP group, but if such
claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP
group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction. xxx.
After a careful perusal of the provisions of the entire IPRA, the Court discerns nothing therein
that expressly or impliedly confers concurrent jurisdiction to the NCIP and the regular courts
over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs between and among parties belonging
to the same ICC/IP group. What the Court finds instead is that the NCIP's limited jurisdiction is
vested under Section 66 of the IPRA, while its primary jurisdiction is bestowed under Section
52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, and Section 54 thereof. xxx.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP has primary jurisdiction over these
cases even if one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, or where the opposing parties are members of
different ICCs/IPs groups. Indeed, the questions involved in said cases demand the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience, and services of the
NCIP to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. No less than the IPRA states that the

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NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs
and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto, with due regard to
their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions. At this juncture, it is not amiss to state that
the NCIP's decision shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. (Unduran v. Aberasturi, Resolution on the MR, G.R. No.
181284, April 18, 2017)

On a final note, the Court restates that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have
limited jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group; but if such claims and disputes
arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper
regular courts shall have jurisdiction. However, under Sections 52(h) and 53, in relation to
Section 62 of the IPRA, as well as Section 54, the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction over
adverse claims and border disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands,
and cancellation of fraudulently-issued CADTs, regardless of whether the parties are non-
ICCs/IPs, or members of different ICCs/IPs groups, as well as violations of ICCs/IPs rights
under Section 72 of the IPRA where both parties belong to the same ICC/IP group. (Unduran v.
Aberasturi, Resolution on the MR, G.R. No. 181284, April 18, 2017)

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

To question the validity of the ordinance, petitioners should have first filed an appeal before the
Secretary of Justice. However, petitioners justify direct resort to this Court on the ground that
they are entangled in a "catch-22 situation." They believe that filing an appeal before the
Secretary of Justice would merely delay the process and give the City Government of Tagum
ample time to collect real property taxes.
Had petitioners immediately filed an appeal, the Secretary of Justice would have had enough
time to render a decision. Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991 gives the Secretary
of Justice 60 days to act on the appeal. Within 30 days from receipt of an unfavorable decision or
upon inaction by the Secretary of Justice within the time prescribed, aggrieved taxpayers may
opt to lodge the appropriate proceeding before the regular courts.

The "catch-22 situation" petitioners allude to does not exist. Under Section 166 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, local taxes "shall accrue on the first (1 st) day of January of each year."
When the questioned ordinance was published in July 2012, the City Government of Tagum
could not have immediately issued real property tax assessments. Hence, petitioners had ample
time within which to question the validity of the tax ordinance. (Aala v. Uy, G.R. No. 202781,
January 10, 2017)

While the Court recognizes the primacy of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies in our judicial system, it bears emphasizing that the principle admits of exceptions,
among which is when there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that irretrievably
prejudices a complainant. This exception is attendant herein where the LBP and the DAR entered
the property of the Mateos sometime in 1994, but deposited cash and Agrarian Reform Bonds as
payment therefor only on December 13, 1996 and February 11, 1997. The LBP and the DAR were
indisputably aware that the Mateos rejected the price offered as just compensation for the
subject property. Still, at the time the Mateos filed their suit before the SAC, no summary

10
administrative proceeding was yet initiated by the DAR to make further valuation. The SAC
even had to issue no less than three orders dated November 12, 1997, January 7, 1998 and March
18, 1998 for the DAR to conduct the necessary proceedings. DAR's delay and inaction had
unjustly prejudiced the Mateos and precluding them from filing a complaint before the SAC
shall result in an injustice, which the law never intends.

It bears stressing as well that on December 21, 2000 and March 22, 2001, while trial before the
SAC was underway, the DARAB rendered decisions in the summary administrative
proceedings upholding the valuations previously made by the LBP and rejected by the Mateos.
At that point, referring the case back to the DAR would have been completely moot as any
challenge raised against the valuation shall be cognizable by the SAC. Clearly, there were no
more administrative remedies to exhaust.

Prescinding from the above, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the Mateos' complaint
before the SAC. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies finds no application in
the instant case where the DAR took no initiative and inordinately delayed the conduct of
summary administrative proceedings, and where during the pendency of the case before the
SAC, the DARAB rendered decisions affirming the LBP's prior valuations of the subject
property. (Mateo v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 186339, February 15, 2017)

In Applied Food Ingredients Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court, citing San
Roque, ruled that the failure to observe the 120 days prior to filing of a judicial claim for refund
is not a mere non-exhaustion of administrative remedies but is jurisdictional in nature, xxx.
(Marubeni Philippines, Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 198485, June 5,
2017)

Rule-Making Authority

First, an executive regulation cannot go beyond the law. Republic Act No. 3844 (1963) broadly
defined an agricultural land as "land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop
lands." Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, also broadly defines agricultural land as land
devoted to agricultural activity. In contrast, the HLURB Regulations restrict the definition of
agricultural lands to those lands "exclusively or predominantly used for cultivation," not being
a farmlot subdivision.

In limiting the definition of an agricultural land to one "without the intended qualities of a
farmlot subdivision," the HLURB Regulations are overriding, supplanting, and modifying a
statutory definition. This is prohibited. A mere executive issuance cannot alter, expand, or
restrict the provisions of the law it seeks to enforce. (Heirs of Augusto Salas Kr. V. Cabungcal, G.R.
No. 191545, March 29, 2017)

From the above discussion, it can be gleaned that the lawmakers intended to impose the excise
tax on every pack of cigarettes that come in 20 sticks. Individual pouches or packaging
combinations of 5's and 10's for retail purpose are allowed and will be subjected to the same
excise tax rate as long as they are bundled together by not more than 20 sticks. Thus, by issuing
Section 11ofRR17-2012 and Annex "D-1" on Cigarettes Packed by Machine of RMC 90-2012, the
BIR went beyond the provisions of RA10351.

11
It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative rules and regulations enacted
by administrative bodies to implement the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the
force of law and are entitled to great weight and respect. However, these implementations of
the law must not override, supplant, or modify the law but must remain consistent with the law
they intend to implement. It is only Congress which has the power to repeal or amend the law.

In this case, Section 11 of RR 17-2012 and Annex "D-1" on Cigarettes Packed by Machine of
RMC 90-2012 clearly contravened the provisions of RA 10351. It is a well-settled principle that a
revenue regulation cannot amend the law it seeks to implement. In Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Seagate Technology (Philippines), we held that a mere administrative issuance, like
a BIR regulation, cannot amend the law; the former cannot purport to do any more than
implement the latter. The courts will not countenance an administrative regulation that
overrides the statute it seeks to implement.

In the present case, a reading of Section 11 of RR 17-2012 and Annex "D-1" on Cigarettes Packed
by Machine of RMC 90-2012 reveals that they are not simply regulations to implement RA
10351. They are amendatory provisions which require cigarette manufacturers to be liable to
pay for more tax than the law, RA 10351, allows. The BIR, in issuing these revenue regulations,
created an additional tax liability for packaging combinations smaller than 20 cigarette sticks. In
so doing, the BIR amended the law, an act beyond the power of the BIR to do. (Secretary of
Finance v. Philippine Tobacco Institute, G.R. No. 210251, April 17, 2017)

TREATIES

The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the preservation and
restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. It brings together principles in the field
of historical conservation and restoration that have been developed, agreed upon, and laid
down by experts over the years. Each country, however, remains "responsible for applying the
plan within the framework of its own culture and traditions."

The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable as law. The
Philippines is not legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact, these are not directives but ere
guidelines - a set of the best practices and techniques that have been proven over the years to be
the most effective in preserving and restoring historical monuments, sites and buildings.
(Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017)

In this case, it is fairly apparent that the subject taxes in the amount of P52,612,812.00 was
erroneously collected from petitioner, considering that the obligation to pay the same had
already been assumed by the Philippine Government by virtue of its Exchange of Notes with
the Japanese Government. Case law explains that an exchange of notes is considered as an
executive agreement, which is binding on the State even without Senate concurrence. In Abaya
v. Ebdane:

An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with
the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each
of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other.
Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to
record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats
or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to,

12
 either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative
approval. It is stated that "treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols,
declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes" all
refer to "international instruments binding at international law."

xxx

Significantly, an exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which

becomes binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or
Congress. (Mitsubishi Corporation - Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.
No. 175772, June 5, 2017)

Article VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Legislative Power

Anent the question regarding the shift from tax credit to tax deduction, suffice it is to say that it
is within the province of Congress to do so in the exercise of its legislative power. It has the
authority to choose the subject of legislation, outline the effective measures to achieve its
declared policies and even impose penalties in case of non-compliance. It has the sole discretion
to decide which policies to pursue and devise means to achieve them, and courts often do not
interfere in this exercise for as long as it does not transcend constitutional limitations. "In
performing this duty, the legislature has no guide but its judgment and discretion and the
wisdom of experience." (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and
Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

Presidential Certification

Finally, we consider the President's certification of the necessity of e immediate enactment of

Senate Bill No. 2293. That certification became e basis for the Senate to dispense with the three-
day rule for passing a bill. It evinced the intent of the President to afford wage earners
immediate tax relief from the impact of a worldwide increase in the prices of commodities.
Specifically, the certification stated that the purpose was to "address the urgent need to cushion
the adverse impact of the global escalation of commodity prices upon the most vulnerable
within the low income group by providing expanded income tax relief."

In sum, R.A. 9504, like R.A. 7167 in Umali, was a piece of social legislation clearly intended to
afford immediate tax relief to individual taxpayers, particularly low-income compensation
earners. Indeed, if R.A. 9504 was to take effect beginning taxable year 2009 or half of the year
2008 only, then the intent of Congress to address the increase in the cost of living in 2008 would
have been negated. (Soriano v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 184450, January 24, 2017)

Taxation

13
Whether the increased personal and additional exemptions provided by R.A. 9504 should be applied to the
entire taxable year 2008 or prorated, considering that the law took effect only on 6 July 2008

The personal and additional exemptions established by R.A. 9504 should be applied to the
entire taxable year 2008.

Umali is applicable.

Umali v. Estanislao supports this Court's stance that R.A. 9504 should be applied on a full-year
basis for the entire taxable year 2008. In Umali, Congress enacted R.A. 7167 amending the 1977
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). The amounts of basic personal and additional
exemptions given to individual income taxpayers were adjusted to the poverty threshold level.
R.A. 7167 came into law on 30 January 1992. Controversy arose when the Commission of
Internal Revenue (CIR) promulgated RR 1-92 stating that the regulation shall take effect on
compensation income earned beginning 1 January 1992. The issue posed was whether the
increased personal and additional exemptions could be applied to compensation income earned
or received during calendar year 1991, given that R.A. 7167 came into law only on 30 January
1992, when taxable year 1991 had already closed.

This Court ruled in the affirmative, considering that the increased exemptions were already
available on or before 15 April 1992, the date for the filing of individual income tax returns.
Further, the law itself provided that the new set of personal and additional exemptions would
be immediately available upon its effectivity. While R.A. 7167 had not yet become effective
during calendar year 1991, the Court found that it was a piece of social legislation that was in
part intended to alleviate the economic plight of the lower-income taxpayers. For that purpose,
the new law provided for adjustments "to the poverty threshold level" prevailing at the time of
the enactment of the law. (Soriano v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 184450, January 24, 2017)

Tax Exemptions

The issue of whether SLMC is liable for income tax under Section 27(B) of the 1997 NIRC insofar
as its revenues from paying patients are concerned has been settled in G.R. Nos. 195909 and
195960 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc.), where the Court ruled
that:
xxx We hold that Section 27(B) of the NIRC does not remove the income tax exemption of
proprietary non-profit hospitals under Section 30(E) and (G). Section 27(B) on one hand, and
Section 30(E) and (G) on the other hand, can be construed together without the removal of such
tax exemption. The effect of the introduction of Section 27(B) is to subject the taxable income of
two specific institutions, namely, proprietary non-profit educational institutions and proprietary
non-profit hospitals, among the institutions covered by Section 30, to the 10% preferential rate
under Section 27(B) instead of the ordinary 30% corporate rate under the last paragraph of
Section 30 in relation to Section 27(A)(1).

Section 27(B) of the NIRC imposes a 10% preferential tax rate on the income of (1) proprietary
non-profit educational institutions and (2) proprietary non-profit hospitals. The only
qualifications for hospitals are that they must be proprietary and non-profit. 'Proprietary' means
private, following the definition of a 'proprietary educational institution' as 'any private school
maintained and administered by private individuals or groups' with a government permit. 'Non-
profit' means no net income or asset accrues to or benefits any member or specific person, with all

14
the net income or asset devoted to the institution's purposes and all its activities conducted not
for profit.

'Non-profit' does not necessarily mean 'charitable.' In Collector of Internal Revenue v. Club Filipino,
Inc. de Cebu, this Court considered as non-profit a sports club organized for recreation and
entertainment of its stockholders and members. The club was primarily funded by membership
fees and dues. If it had profits, they were used for overhead expenses and improving its golf
course. The club was non-profit because of its purpose and there was no evidence that it was
engaged in a profit-making enterprise.

The sports club in Club Filipino, Inc. de Cebu may be non-profit, but it was not charitable. The
Court defined 'charity' in Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City as 'a gift, to be applied
consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by
bringing their minds and hearts under the influence of education or religion, by assisting them to
establish themselves in life or [by] otherwise lessening the burden of government.' A non-profit
club for the benefit of its members fails this test. An organization may be considered as non-profit
if it does not distribute any part of its income to stockholders or members. However, despite its
being a tax exempt institution, any income such institution earns from activities conducted for
profit is taxable, ad expressly provided in the last paragraph of Section 30.

To be a charitable institution, however, an organization must meet the substantive test of charity
in Lung Center. The issue in Lung Center concerns exemption from real property tax and not
income tax. However, it provides for the test of charity in our jurisdiction. Charity is essentially a
gift to an indefinite number of persons which lessens the burden of government. In other words,
charitable institutions provide for free goods and services to the public which would otherwise
fall on the shoulders of government. Thus, as a matter of efficiency, the government forgoes taxes
which should have been spent to address public needs, because certain private entities already
assume a part of the burden. This is the rationale for the tax exemption of charitable institutions.
The loss of taxes by the government is compensated by its relief from doing public works which
would have been funded by appropriations from the Treasury.

Charitable institutions, however, are not ipso facto entitled to a tax exemption. The requirements
for a tax exemption are specified by the law granting it. The power of Congress to tax implies the
power to exempt from tax. Congress can create tax exemptions, subject to the constitutional
provision that '[n]o law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of Congress.' The requirements for a tax exemption are strictly
construed against tl1e taxpayer because an exemption restricts the collection of taxes necessary
for the existence of the government.

The Court in Lung Center declared that the Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable
institution for the purpose of exemption from real property taxes. This ruling uses the same
premise as Hospital de San Juan and Jesus Sacred Heart College which says that receiving income
from paying patients does not destroy the charitable nature of a hospital.

As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its
exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether
outpatient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long
as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is
intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing
or operating the institution.

For real property taxes, the incidental generation of income is permissible because the test of
exemption is the use of the property. The Constitution provides that '[c]haritable institutions,

15
churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and
all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.' The test of exemption is not
strictly a requirement on the intrinsic nature or character of the institution. The test requires that
the institution use property in a certain way, i.e., for a charitable purpose. Thus, the Court held
that the Lung Center of the Philippines did not lose its charitable character when it used a portion
of its lot for commercial purposes. The effect of failing to meet the use requirement is simply to
remove from the tax exemption that portion of the property not devoted to charity.

The Constitution exempts charitable institutions only from real property taxes. In the NIRC,
Congress decided to extend the exemption to income taxes. However, the way Congress crafted
Section 30(E) of the NIRC is materially different from Section 28(3), Article VI of the Constitution.
Section 30(E) of the NIRC defines the corporation or association that is exempt from income tax.
On the other hand, Section 28(3), Article VI of the Constitution does not define a charitable
institution, but requires that the institution 'actually, directly and exclusively' use the property for
a charitable purpose.

Section 30(E) of the NIRC provides that a charitable institution must be:

(1) A non-stock corporation or association;

(2) Organized exclusively for charitable purposes;

(3) Operated exclusively for charitable purposes; and

(4) No part of its net income or asset shall belong to or inure to the benefit of any member,
organizer, officer or any specific person.

Thus, both the organization and operations of the charitable institution must be devoted
'exclusively' for charitable purposes. The organization of the institution refers to its corporate
form, as shown by its articles of incorporation, by-laws and other constitutive documents. Section
30(E) of the NIRC specifically requires that the corporation or association be non-stock, which is
defined by the Corporation Code as 'one where no part of its income is distributable as dividends
to its members, trustees, or officers' and that any profit 'obtain[ed] as an incident to its operations
shall, whenever necessary or proper, be used for the furtherance of the purpose or purposes for
which the corporation was organized.' However, under Lung Center, any profit by a charitable
institution must not only be plowed back 'whenever necessary or proper,' but must be 'devoted
or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve.'

The operations of the charitable institution generally refer to its regular activities. Section 30(E) of
the NIRC requires that these operations be exclusive to charity. There is also a specific
requirement that 'no part of [the] net income or asset shall belong to or inure to the benefit of any
member, organizer, officer or any specific person.' The use of lands, buildings and improvements
of the institution is but a part of its operations.

There is no dispute that St. Luke's is organized as a non-stock and non profit charitable
institution. However, this does not automatically exempt St Luke's from paying taxes. This only
refers to the organization of St. Luke's. Even if St. Luke's meets the test of charity, a charitable
institution is not ipso facto tax exempt To be exempt from real property taxes, Section 28(3),
Article VI of the Constitution requires that a charitable institution use the property 'actually,
directly and exclusively' for charitable purposes. To be exempt from income taxes, Section 30(E)
of the NIRC requires that a charitable institution must be 'organized and operated exclusively' for

16
charitable purposes. Likewise, to be exempt from income taxes, Section 30(G) of the NIRC
requires that the institution be 'operated exclusively' for social welfare.

However, the last paragraph of Section 30 of the NIRC qualifies the words 'organized and
operated exclusively' by providing that:

Notwithstanding the provisions in the preceding paragraphs, the income of whatever

kind and character of the foregoing organizations from any of their properties, real or
personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit regardless of the disposition
made of such income, shall be subject to tax imposed under this Code.

In short, the last paragraph of Section 30 provides that if a tax exempt charitable
institution conducts 'any' activity for profit, such activity is not tax exempt even as its
not-for-profit activities remain tax exempt. This paragraph qualifies the requirements in
Section 30(E) that the [n]on-stock corporation or association [must be] organized and
operated exclusively for . . . charitable . . . purposes . . . It likewise qualifies the
requirement in Section 30(G) that the civic organization must be 'operated exclusively' for
the promotion of social welfare.

Thus, even if the charitable institution must be 'organized and operated exclusively' for
charitable purposes, it is nevertheless allowed to engage in 'activities conducted for
profit' without losing its tax exempt status for its not for profit activities. The only
consequence is that the 'income of whatever kind and character' of a charitable institution
'from any of its activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such
income, shall be subject to tax.' Prior to the introduction of Section 27(B), the tax rate on
such income from for profit activities was the ordinary corporate rate under Section
27(A). With the introduction of Section 27(B), the tax rate is now 10%.

In 1998, St. Luke's had total revenues of P1,730,367,965 from services to paying patients.
It cannot be disputed that a hospital which receives approximately P1.73 billion from
paying patients is not an institution 'operated exclusively' for charitable purposes.
Clearly, revenues from paying patients are income received from 'activities conducted for
profit.' Indeed, St. Luke's admits that it derived profits from its paying patients. St. Luke's
declared P1,730,367,965 as 'Revenues from Services to Patients' in contrast to its 'Free
Services' expenditure of P218,187,498. In its Comment in G.R. No. 195909, St. Luke's
showed the following 'calculation' to support its claim that 65.20% of its 'income after
expenses was allocated to free or charitable services' in 1998. xxxx.

In Lung Center, this Court declared:

'[e]xclusive' is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from
participation or enjoyment; and 'exclusively' is defined, 'in a manner to exclude; as
enjoying a privilege exclusively.' ... The words 'dominant use' or 'principal use' cannot be
substituted for the words 'used exclusively' without doing violence to the Constitution
and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively.

The Court cannot expand the meaning of the words 'operated exclusively' without violating the
NIRC. Services to paying patients are activities conducted for profit. They cannot be considered
any other way. There is a 'purpose to make profit over and above the cost' of services. The P1.73
billion total revenues :from paying patients is not even incidental to St. Luke's charity
expenditure of P218,187,498 for non-paying patients.

St Luke's claims that its charity expenditure of P218,187,498 is 65.20% of its operating income in

17
1998. However, if a part of the remaining 34.80% of the operating income is reinvested in
property, equipment or facilities used for services to paying and non-paying patients, then it
cannot be said that the income is 'devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is
intended to achieve.' The income is plowed back to the corporation not entirely for charitable
purposes, but for profit as well. In any case, the last paragraph of Section 30 of the NIRC
expressly qualifies that income from activities for profit is taxable 'regardless of the disposition
made of such income.'

Jesus Sacred Heart College declared that there is no official legislative record explaining the phrase
'any activity conducted for profit.' However, it quoted a deposition of Senator Mariano Jesus
Cuenco, who was a member of the Committee of Conference for the Senate, which introduced the
phrase 'or from any activity conducted for profit.'

P. Cuando ha hablado de la Universidad de Santo Tomas que tiene un hospital, no cree Vd. que es
una actividad esencial dicho hospital para el funcionamiento del colegio de medicina de medicina
de dicha universidad?

xxx xxx xxx

R. Si el hospital se limita a recibir enformos pobres, mi contestacion seria afirmativa; pero

considerando que el hospital tiene cuartos de pago, y a los mismos generalmente van
enformos de buena posicion social economica, lo que se paga por estos enformos debe
estar sujeto a 'income tax', y es una de las razones que hemos tenido para insertar las
palabras o frase 'or from any activity conducted for profit.'

The question was whether having a hospital is essential to an educational institution like the
College of Medicine of the University of Santo Tomas. Senator Cuenco answered that if the
hospital has paid rooms generally occupied by people of good economic standing, then it should
be subject to income tax. He said that this was one of the reasons Congress inserted the phrase 'or
any activity conducted for profit.'

The question in Jesus Sacred Heart College involves an educational institution. However, it is
applicable to charitable institutions because Senator Cuenco's response shows an intent to focus
on the activities of charitable institutions. Activities for profit should not escape the reach of
taxation. Being a non-stock and non-profit corporation does not, by this reason alone, completely
exempt an institution from tax. An institution cannot use its corporate form to prevent its
profitable activities from being taxed.

The Court finds that St. Luke's is a corporation that is not 'operated exclusively' for charitable or
social welfare purposes insofar as its revenues from paying patients are C.Qncemed. This ruling
is bacred not only on a strict interpretation of a provision granting tax exemption, but also on the
clear and plain text of Section 30(E) and (G). Section 30(E) and (G) of the NIRC requires that an
institution be 'operated exclusively' for charitable or social welfare purposes to be completely
exempt from income tax. An institution tmder Section 30(E) or (G) does not lose its tax exemption
if it earns income from its for-profit activities. Such income from for-profit activities, tmder the
last paragraph of Section 30, is merely subject to income tax, previously at the ordinary corporate
rate but now at the preferential 1O% rate pursuant to Section 27(B).

A tax exemption is effectively a social subsidy granted by the State because an exempt institution
is spared from sharing in the expenses of government and yet benefits from them. Tax
exemptions for charitable institutions should therefore be limited to institutions beneficial to the

18
 public and those which improve social welfare. A profit-making entity should not be allowed to
exploit this subsidy to the detriment of the government and other taxpayers.

St. Luke's fails to meet the requirements under Section 30(E) and (G) of the NlRC to be
completely tax exempt from all its income. However, it remains a proprietary non-profit hospital
under Section 27(B) of the NIRC as long as it does not distribute any of its profits to its members
and such profits are reinvested pursuant to its corporate purposes. St. Luke's, as a proprietary
non-profit hospital, is entitled to the preferential tax rate of 10% on its net income from its for-
profit activities.

St. Luke's is therefore liable for deficiency income tax in 1998 under Section 27(B) of the NIRC.
However, St. Luke's has good reasons to rely on the letter dated 6 June 1990 by the BIR, which
opined that St. Luke's is 'a corporation for purely charitable and social welfare purposes' and thus
exempt from income tax. In Michael J. Lhuillier, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court
said that 'good faith and honest belief that one is not subject to tax on the basis of previous
interpretation of government agencies tasked to implement the tax law, are sufficient justification
to delete the imposition of surcharges and interest.'

A careful review of the pleadings reveals that there is no countervailing consideration for the
Court to revisit its aforequoted ruling in G.R. Nos. 195909 and 195960 (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc.). Thus, under the doctrine of stare decisis, which states
that "[o]nce a case has been decided in one way, any other case involving exactly the same point
at issue xxx should be decided in the same manner," the Court finds that SLMC is subject to 10%
income tax insofar as its revenues from paying patients are concerned.

To be clear, for an institution to be completely exempt from income tax, Section 30(E) and (G) of
the 1997 NIRC requires said institution to operate exclusively for charitable or social welfare
purpose. But in case an exempt institution under Section 30(E) or (G) of the said Code earns
income from its for-profit activities, it will not lose its tax exemption. However, its income from
for profit activities will be subject to income tax at the preferential 10% rate pursuant to Section
27(B) thereof. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc., G.R. No. 203514,
February 13, 2017)

We take judicial notice that on 25 July 2016, the present CIR Caesar R. Dulay issued RMO No.
44-2016, which provides that:

SUBJECT: Amending Revenue Memorandum Order No. 20- 2013, as amended

(Prescribing the Policies and Guidelines in the Issuance of Tax Exemption Rulings to
Qualified Non-Stock, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations under Section 30 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as Amended)

In line with the Bureau's commitment to put in proper context the nature and tax status
of non-profit, non-stock educational institutions, this Order is being issued to exclude
non-stock, non-profit educational institutions from the coverage of Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 20-2013, as amended.

SECTION 1. Nature of Tax Exemption. --- The tax exemption of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions is directly conferred by paragraph 3, Section 4, Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution, the pertinent portion of which reads:

19
 "All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually,
directly and exclusively (or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties."
This constitutional exemption is reiterated in Section 30 (H) of the 1997 Tax Code,
as amended, which provides as follows:

"Sec. 30. Exempt from Tax on Corporations. - The following organizations shall
not be taxed under this Title in respect to income received by them as such:

xxx xxx xxx

(H) A non-stock and non-profit educational institution; xxx."

It is clear and unmistakable from the aforequoted constitutional provision that non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions are constitutionally exempt from tax on all revenues derived in
pursuance of its purpose as an educational institution and used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes. This constitutional exemption gives the non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions a distinct character. And for the constitutional exemption to be
enjoyed, jurisprudence and tax rulings affirm the doctrinal rule that there are only two
requisites: (1) The school must be non-stock and non-profit; and (2) The income is actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. There are no other conditions and
limitations.

In this light, the constitutional conferral of tax exemption upon non-stock and non-profit
educational institutions should not be implemented or interpreted in such a manner that will
defeat or diminish the intent and language of the Constitution. xxx. (Jacinto-Henares v. St. Paul
College of Makati, G.R. No. 215383, March 8, 2017)
To "assume" means "[t]o take on, become bound as another is bound, or put oneself in place of
another as to an obligation or liability." This means that the obligation or liability remains,
although the same is merely passed on to a different person. In this light, the concept of an
assumption is therefore different from an exemption, the latter being the "[f]reedom from a
duty, liability or other requirement" or "[a] privilege given to a judgment debtor by law,
allowing the debtor to retain [a] certain property without liability." Thus, contrary to the CTA
En Banc's opinion, the constitutional provisions on tax exemptions would not apply. (Mitsubishi
Corporation - Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 175772, June 5, 2017)

Appropriations for Sectarian Purposes

Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public money or property shall
be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium."

The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose." "Appropriate" means "to
prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or to designate or destine a fund or property for
a distinct use, or for the payment of a particular demand."

20
Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself
or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.
This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize
and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.

Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean that what is prohibited is
the use of public money or property for the sole purpose of benefiting or supporting any
church. The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended
for the furtherance of a particular church.

It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the use of
public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely
incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general."
Hence, a public street may be used for a religious procession even as it is available for a civic
parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it may also be
used for a political assemblage.

In relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the manner of appropriation of
public money or property, not as to whether a particular act involves a direct or a mere
incidental benefit to any church. Otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have placed
it before "use, benefit or support" to describe the same. Even the exception to the same provision
bolsters this interpretation. The exception contemplates a situation wherein public funds are
paid to a priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary because they
rendered service in the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium. That a priest belongs to a particular church and the latter may have benefited from
the money he received is of no moment, for the purpose of the payment of public funds is
merely to compensate the priest for services rendered and for which other persons, who will
perform the same services will also be compensated in the same manner.

Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. As such, the
foregoing interpretation finds support in the Establishment Clause, which is as clear as daylight
in stating that what is proscribed is the passage of any law which tends to establish a religion,
not merely to accommodate the free exercise thereof.

The Constitution even grants tax exemption to properties actually, directly and exclusively
devoted to religious purposes. Certainly, this benefits the religious sects for a portion of what
could have been collected for the benefit of the public is surrendered in their favor.

In Manosca v. CA, a parcel of land located in Taguig was determined by the National Historical
Institute to be the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic then
sought to expropriate the said property. The exercise of the power of eminent domain was
questioned on the ground that it would only benefit members of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Court
upheld the legality of the expropriation, viz.:

21
 The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains
to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. [Emphasis supplied]

Again, in Aglipay, the issuing and selling of postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress was assailed on the ground that it violated the constitutional
prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any church.
In ruling that there was no such violation, the Court held:

It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if
any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in
its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the
purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere
incidental results not contemplated. [Emphasis supplied]

Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or employed for the
sole purpose of supporting the Roman Catholics.

Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel for the exclusive use of its
faithful contrary to the claim of Valenciana. Judge Maceren reported that the basement is also
being used as a public waiting area for most of the day and a meeting place for different
employee organizations. The use of the area for holding masses is limited to lunch break period
from twelve (12) o'clock to one (1) o'clock in the afternoon. Further, Judge Sagun, Jr. related that
masses run for just a little over thirty (30) minutes. It is, therefore, clear that no undue religious
bias is being committed when the subject basement is allowed to be temporarily used by the
Catholics to celebrate mass, as the same area can be used by other groups of people and for
other purposes. Thus, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice has remained to be a public
property devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere
incidental consequence of its primary purpose. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-
19-SC, March 7, 2017)

ARTICLE VII
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Multiple Offices

As the records bear out, the petitioners who approved the EMEs (Extraordinary and
Miscellaneous Expenses) failed to observe the following: first, there is already a law, the GAA,
that limits the grant of EMEs; second; COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997
is a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed
by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their
deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving
double compensation; and third, the irregularity of giving additional compensation or
allowances to ex officio members was already settled by jurisprudence, during the time that the
subject allowances were authorized by the BSP.

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Indeed, the petitioners-approving officers' disregard of the aforementioned case laws, COA
issuances, and the Constitution, cannot be deemed as a mere lapse consistent with the
presumption of good faith. (Tetangco v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 215061, June 6, 2017)

Power of Appointment

In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court ruled that the clustering impinged upon the
President's appointing power in the following ways: The President's option for every vacancy
was limited to the five to seven nominees in each cluster. Once the President had appointed a
nominee from one cluster, then he was proscribed from considering the other nominees in the
same cluster for the other vacancies. All the nominees applied for and were found to be
qualified for appointment to any of the vacant Associate Justice positions in the Sandiganbayan,
but the JBC failed to explain why one nominee should be considered for appointment to the
position assigned to one specific cluster only. Correspondingly, the nominees' chance for
appointment was restricted to the consideration of the one cluster in which they were included,
even though they applied and were found to be qualified for all the vacancies. Moreover, by
designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC established the seniority or order of
preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, a power which the law (Section 1,
paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606), rules (Rule II, Section 1(b) of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan), and jurisprudence (Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent
Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals), vest exclusively upon the
President. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, Resolution on the MR, February 21, 2017)
Military Powers

Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves
ordinary police action. The President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it
becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power
to call is fully discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being that he acts within
permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion.
In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is xxx not subject to judicial
review." (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

xxx the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although,
of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this
case. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or
declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and
public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of
these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by Congress;
[and] (3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court.”

The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and phrase "imminent danger
thereof' as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration
of martial law. They perceived the phrase "imminent danger" to be "fraught with possibilities
abuse;" besides, the calling out power of the President "is sufficient for handling imminent
danger.”

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The power to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the
declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has
called upon the military assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency
remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will
render it more difficult to restore order and enforce the law. As such, their exercise requires
more stringent safeguards by the Congress, and review by the Court. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R.
No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power,
which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police
power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government
agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which
remains under the control of the State. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's (Justice
Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that
under a valid declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the
"(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of
news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees xxx".
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform do not give
him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is because
martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does it supplant the
operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of
Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially
charged with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.

Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties, the
Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a state of martial law.
(Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in-Chief, a 'sequence' of

‘graduated power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial
law." It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope
and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the
Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or
restrict the manner by which the President decides which power to choose.

These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as
Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to
determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether
the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls
for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to
choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions
is a judgment call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad

24
enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the
government, and the very integrity of the State. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4,
2017)

Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise
of such power." Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck
down. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Since the Constitution did not define the term "rebellion," it must be understood to have the
same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). (Lagman v. Medialdea,
G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there
is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is
being committed. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the
exercise of his emergency powers. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the declaration of
martial law on May 23, 2017, the President had already issued Proclamation No. 55 on
September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in
Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on
the foregoing presidential actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no obligation or
requirement on his part to use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis, still
the President made the conscious and deliberate effort to first employ the most benign from
among his extraordinary powers. As the initial and preliminary step towards suppressing and
preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided to use his calling out
power first. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve; on the contrary, it only worsened.
Thus, exercising his and exclusive prerogative, the President decided to impose martial law
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the belief that the armed hostilities in
Mindanao already amount to actual rebellion and public safety requires it. (Lagman v. Medialdea,
G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid,
there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In
his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute
Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise against
civilians and their properties. In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats
were issued; road blockades and checkpoints were set up; schools and churches were burned;
civilian hostages were taken and killed; non-Muslims or Christians were targeted; young male
Muslims were forced to join their group; medical services and delivery of basic services were
hampered; reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were hindered; and the
security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised. xxx.

25
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied
with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that
rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, [the President] may xxx suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants
to the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or
only a part thereof under martial law.

This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department,

particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and
live information necessary for and relevant in calibrating the territorial application of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that
the President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed
understanding of what is happening on the ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation
on the period of application, which is 60 days, unless sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but
not on the territorial scope or area of coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any part
thereof," depending on the assessment of the President. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658,
July 4, 2017)

It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of rebellion is armed public uprising against the
government;" and that by nature "rebellion is xxx a crime of masses or multitudes, involving
crowd action, that cannot be confined a priori, within predetermined bounds." We understand
this to mean that the precise extent or range of the rebellion could not be measured by exact
metes and bounds. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

xxx the discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The
Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial law should be confined
only in the particular place where the armed public uprising actually transpired. This is not
only practical but also logical. Martial law is an urgent measure since at stake is the nation's
territorial sovereignty and survival. As such, the President has to respond quickly. After the
rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not wait for another rebellion to be mounted in
Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat. If that is the case, then the President
would have to wait until every remote corner in the country is infested with rebels before he
could declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario envisioned
by the Constitution. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, "involves
the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general
public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters." Public
safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope
could not be physically measured by metes and bounds. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658,
July 4, 2017)

26
Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not necessarily be
limited to the particular vicinity where the armed public uprising actually transpired, is because
of the unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime. "The crime of rebellion consists of many acts.
It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in
furtherance of rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves[,] deemed absorbed in one single crime
of rebellion." Rebellion absorbs "other acts committed in its pursuance.” Direct assault, murder,
robbery and kidnapping, just to name a few, are absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed
in furtherance of rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a basis of a separate charge." Jurisprudence also
teaches that not only common crimes may be absorbed in rebellion but also "offenses under
special laws [such as Presidential Decree No. 1829] which are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political offense". "All whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime
of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.

Thus, by the theory of absorption, the crime of murder committed in Makati City, if committed
in furtherance of the crime of rebellion being hypothetically staged in Padre Faura, Ermita,
Manila, is stripped of common complexion and is absorbed in the crime of rebellion. This all the
more makes it difficult to confine the application of martial law only to the place where the
armed public uprising is actually taking place.

In the illustration above, Padre Faura could only be the nerve center of the rebellion but at the
same time rebellion is also happening in Makati City.

In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct
proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and
public safety have no fixed dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise
measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be
drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these
limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the
territorial scope of martial law.

Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the
place where there is actual rebellion; it extends other areas where the present hostilities are in
danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from
Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from
different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place
where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it
will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658,
July 4, 2017)

It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has been ongoing for decades. While
some groups have sought legal and peaceful means, others have resorted to violent extremism
and terrorism. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader
scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various
means by which terrorism can be committed. However, while the scope of terrorism may be
comprehensive, its purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow
and create a condition of widespread fear among the populace in order to coerce the

27
government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear is
traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading, among
others. In contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e., (a) to
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the
Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or armed forces; or (b) to deprive
the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.

In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the
malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to
the Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other
hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand, the crime is terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President
did not err in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the
crime of rebellion. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987
Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine. (Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent
of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was
not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the
Executive Department. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action. In particular,
the President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress. (Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may
revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but
likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the
absolute correctness of the factual basis(.) xxx Congress could probe deeper and further; it can
delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658,
July 4, 2017)

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in
an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is

28
automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.

Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only
totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the
same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the
power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of
Congress. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety requires it,
and is no longer under threat or in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and urgency
for the President to act quickly to protect the country. The Court, as Congress does, must thus
accord the President the same leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively
by the Constitution to the Executive Department. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4,
2017)
Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other
high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A
plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to
declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion
or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if
the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego.
Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed. (Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Pardoning Power

However, the fact that respondent Roque was still a probationer when he applied for the
position of Utility Worker and accomplished his Personal Data Sheet did not disqualify him
from applying for the position. In Moreno v. Commission on Elections (530 Phil. 279 (2006)), the
Court clarified that the grant of probation suspends the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint versus Judge Divina T. Samson, A.M. No. MTJ-
16-1870, June 6, 2017)

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Judicial Power

The KOR also invokes this Court’s exercise of its extraordinary certiorari power of review under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. However, this Court can only exercise its
extraordinary certiorari power if the City of Manila, in issuing the required permits and licenses,
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Tellingly, neither the
majority nor minority opinion in this case has found that the City of Manila committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the permits and licenses to DMCI-PDI. Thus, there is no

29
justification at all for this Court to exercise its extraordinary certiorari power. (Knights of Rizal v.
DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017)

A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants
authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. xxx.

It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an
appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section
5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section
18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's
exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used
in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18,
Article VII. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the
President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the
Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII. xxx.
To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not only
placed the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing
any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation
or suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon
any citizen a demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said
proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to
examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis, and to render its
decision thereon within a limited period of 30 days from date of filing. (Lagman v. Medialdea,
G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

In other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph
of Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court. (Lagman v. Medialdea,
G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article
VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be found in the last paragraph
of Section 4, Article VII. The power of the Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or
ruling of the Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7,
Article IX(A). (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it
should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII.
Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will
follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution

30
also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive
of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is
likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the
limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its decision. (Lagman v. Medialdea,
G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and
independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or
default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.
(Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the
President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or
conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the
Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior concurrence
of the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that judicial review does not include the
calibration of the President's decision of which of his graduated powers be availed of in a given
situation. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." "[A] statute or
act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance,
the statute] is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.”

The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. A facial challenge
is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because of possible
'"'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person
who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law
may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The
overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence."

It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only to free-speech cases.
They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658, July 4, 2017)

Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted.
Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights that may be facially challenged. What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech. (Lagman
v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

31
The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 open to broad
interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained. xxx.

The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the
context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other
rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas
clauses. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the ground that it
has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
region. Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of
the proclamation. In Part III, we declared that judicial review covers only sufficiency of
information or data available to or known to the President prior to, or at the time of, the
declaration or suspension. And, as will discussed exhaustively in Part VII, the review will be
confined to the proclamation itself and the Report submitted to Congress.

Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the
implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders
issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under
the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human
rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the
Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed trespassing into the sphere that is reserved
exclusively for Congress in exercise of its power to revoke. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658, July 4, 2017)

The Court’s ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration of a state
of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55
dated September 4, 2016, where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in
the Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating
elsewhere in the Philippines. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

xxx the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although,
of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this
case.

Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his calling out the
Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.

As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the President's exercise of his power to
call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion may only
be examined by the Court as to whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. (Lagman v. Medialdea,
G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

32
Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of
the President done pursuant thereto. Under "operative fact doctrine," the unconstitutional
statute is recognized as an "operative fact" before it is declared unconstitutional. xxx. However,
it must also be stressed that this "operative fact doctrine" is not a fool-proof shield that would
repulse any challenge to acts performed during the effectivity of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, purportedly in furtherance of quelling rebellion or
invasion, and promotion of public safety, when evidence shows otherwise. (Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, by
providing only for judicial review based on the determination of the sufficiency of the factual
bases, has in fact done away with the test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang. (Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review by the
introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658,
July 4, 2017)

As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to the
President. As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what to include and
what not to include in the proclamation and the written Report taking into account the urgency
of the situation as well as national security. He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports
and confidential information that may prejudice the operations and the safety of the military.
(Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in
the written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
since these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may
be used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of
factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself. (Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the
Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the
accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require
precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore
impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the
President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within
a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of
course, would not only place the President in peril but would also defeat the very purpose of
the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice Antonio T.
Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put an end to the root cause of the emergency". Possibly, by
the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be
too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is
hard, if not impossible, to curtail. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

33
At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the
determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only
the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that
rebellion exists. It must also be reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency and much
leeway and flexibility should be accorded the President. As such, he is not expected to
completely validate all the information received before declaring martial law or suspending the
privilege of the of habeas corpus. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Interpretation of Laws

Petitioners posit that Section 144 only applies to the provisions of the Corporation Code or its
amendments "not otherwise specifically penalized" by said statute and should not cover
Sections 31 and 34 which both prescribe the "penalties" for their violation; namely, damages,
accounting and restitution of profits. On the other hand, respondent and the appellate court
have taken the position that the term "penalized" under Section 144 should be interpreted as
referring to criminal penalty, such as fine or imprisonment, and that it could not possibly
contemplate "civil" penalties such as damages, accounting or restitution.

As Section 144 speaks, among others, of the imposition of criminal penalties, the Court is
guided by the elementary rules of statutory construction of penal provisions. First, in all
criminal prosecutions, the existence of criminal liability for which the accused is made
answerable must be clear and certain. We have consistently held that "penal statutes are
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. When there is doubt on
the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. Since penal
laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether their application is
consistent with the purpose and reason of the law."

Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The rule applies when the
court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the
accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation
which is more lenient to the accused.

In American jurisprudence, there are two schools of thought regarding the application of the
rule of lenity. Justice David Souter, writing for the majority in United States v. R.L.C., refused to
resort to the rule and held that lenity is reserved "for those situations in which a reasonable
doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to 'the language and structure,
legislative history, and motivating policies' of the statute." Justice Antonin Scalia, although
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, argued that "it is not consistent with the rule
of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous penal statute against a criminal defendant on the
basis of legislative history... The rule of lenity, in my view, prescribes the result when a criminal
statute is ambiguous: The more lenient interpretation must prevail." In other words, for Justice
Scalia, textual ambiguity in a penal statute suffices for the rule of lenity to be applied. Although
foreign case law is merely persuasive authority and this Court is not bound by either legal

34
perspective expounded in United States v. R.L.C., said case provides a useful framework in our
own examination of the scope and application of Section 144.

After a meticulous consideration of the arguments presented by both sides, the Court comes to
the conclusion that there is textual ambiguity in Section 144; moreover, such ambiguity remains
even after an examination of its legislative history and the use of other aids to statutory
construction, necessitating the application of the rule of lenity in the case at bar. (Schulze v.
Tullett Prebon (Philippines), Inc., G.R. No. 189158, January 11, 2017)

In Crandon v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court had the occasion to state that:

In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory
language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.
Moreover, because the governing standard is set forth in a criminal statute, it is
appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the
statute's coverage. To the extent that the language or history of [the statute] is uncertain,
this "time-honored interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning
of the boundaries of criminal conduct and that legislatures, not courts, define criminal
liability. (Citations omitted; emphases supplied.)

Under the circumstances of this case, we are convinced to adopt a similar view. For this reason,
we take into account the avowed legislative policy in the enactment of the Corporation Code as
outlined in the Sponsorship Speech of Minister Mendoza:

Cabinet Bill No. 3 is entitled "The Corporation Code of the Philippines." Its consideration
at this time in the history of our nation provides a fitting occasion to remind that under
our Constitution the economic system known as "free enterprise" is recognized and
protected. We acknowledge as a democratic republic that the individual must be free and
that as a free man - "free to choose his work and to retain the fruits of his labor" he may
best develop his capabilities and will produce and supply the economic needs of the
nation. xxx

The formation and organization of private corporations, and I underscore private

corporations as distinguished from corporations owned or controlled by the government
or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, gives wider dimensions to free enterprise
or free trade. For not only is the right of individuals to organize collectively recognized;
the collective organization is vested with a juridical personality distinct from their own.
Thus "the skill, dexterity, and judgment" of a nation's labor force need not be constricted
in their application to those of an individual or that which he alone may assemble but to
those of a collective organization.

While a code, such as the proposed code now before us, may appear essentially
regulatory in nature, it does not, and is not intended, to curb or stifle the use of the
corporate entity as a business organization. Rather, the proposed code recognizes the
value, and seeks to inspire confidence in the value of the corporate vehicle in the
economic life of society. (Emphases supplied.)

The Corporation Code was intended as a regulatory measure, not primarily as a penal statute.
Sections 31 to 34 in particular were intended to impose exacting standards of fidelity on
corporate officers and directors but without unduly impeding them in the discharge of their
work with concerns of litigation. Considering the object and policy of the Corporation Code to

35
encourage the use of the corporate entity as a vehicle for economic growth, we cannot espouse a
strict construction of Sections 31 and 34 as penal offenses in relation to Section 144 in the
absence of unambiguous statutory language and legislative intent to that effect.

When Congress intends to criminalize certain acts it does so in plain, categorical language,
otherwise such a statute would be susceptible to constitutional attack. As earlier discussed, this
can be readily seen from the text of Section 45G) of Republic Act No. 8189 and Section 74 of the
Corporation Code.

We stress that had the Legislature intended to attach penal sanctions to Sections 31 and 34 of the
Corporation Code it could have expressly stated such intent in the same manner that it did for
Section 74 of the same Code. (Schulze v. Tullett Prebon (Philippines), Inc., G.R. No. 189158, January
11, 2017)

Jurisdiction

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Code of Muslim Personal Laws) vests concurrent
jurisdiction upon Shari'a district courts over personal and real actions wherein the parties involved are Muslims,
except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The question presented is whether the Shari'a District Court
of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for recovery of possession filed by Muslim individuals against a
municipality whose mayor is a Muslim. The respondent judge held that it has. We reverse.

The matters over which Shari'a district courts have Jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, specifically in Article 143. Consistent with the purpose of the law to
provide for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among
Muslims, it has a catchall provision granting Shari'a district courts original jurisdiction over
personal and real actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The Shari'a
district courts' jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent with regular civil courts, i.e.,
municipal trial courts and regional trial courts. There is, however, a limit to the general
jurisdiction of Shari'a district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such
jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the
action must be filed before the regular courts.

The complaint below, which is a real action involving title to and possession of the land situated
at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, was filed by private respondents before the Shari'a District
Court pursuant to the general jurisdiction conferred by Article 143(2)(b). In determining
whether the Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over the case, the threshold question is
whether both parties are Muslims. There is no disagreement that private respondents, as
plaintiffs below, are Muslims. The only dispute is whether the requirement is satisfied because
the mayor of the defendant municipality is also a Muslim. xxx.

It is clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was
impleaded only in a representative capacity, as chief executive of the local government of
Tangkal. When an action is defended by a representative, that representative is not-and neither
does he become-a real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in
interest; the representative remains to be a third party to the action. That Mayor Batingolo is a
Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying with the jurisdictional requirement
under Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To satisfy the requirement, it is the real

36
party defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a Muslim. Such a proposition,
however, is a legal impossibility.

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a "Muslim" as "a person who testifies to the oneness
of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam." Although the definition does
not explicitly distinguish between natural and juridical persons, it nonetheless connotes the
exercise of religion, which is a fundamental personal right. The ability to testify to the "oneness
of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad" and to profess Islam is, by its nature, restricted to
natural persons. In contrast, juridical persons are artificial beings with "no consciences, no
beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires." They are considered persons only by virtue of legal
fiction. The Municipality of Tangkal falls under this category. Under the Local Government
Code, a municipality is a body politic and corporate that exercises powers as a political
subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of
its territory. (Municipality of Tangkal v. Balindong, G.R. No. 193340, January 11, 2017)

Contrary to complainant's allegation, respondent judge is correct in stating that he is prohibited

from issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the case filed by SFC and
complainant. Although the prohibition against the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was not expressly stated under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, such prohibition is very clear
under Section I of PD 605 which reads:

SECTION 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case
involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or
suspension of, or any action whatsoever by proper administrative official or body on
concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with
the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration, and/ or development of the natural
resources of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

The case filed by SFC and complainant to compel the renewal of the license of their fishing
vessel is clearly covered under Section 1 of PD 605, prohibiting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving the disapproval, revocation or
suspension of a license in connection with the exploitation of natural resources. It was therefore
proper for respondent judge to deny their prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. Besides, respondent judge found that complainant failed to show that
there is a clear and inescapable right to be protected which would justify the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction. (Ortega v. Judge Dacara, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2423, January 11,
2017)

Republic Act No. 9282, which amended Republic Act No. 1125, took effect on April 23, 2004,
and significantly expanded the extent and scope of the cases that the Court of Tax Appeals was
tasked to hear and adjudicate. Under Section 7, paragraph (a)(3), the Court of Tax Appeals is
vested with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over, among others, appeals from the "decisions,
orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction."

The case a quo is a local tax case that is within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Tax Appeals. Parenthetically, the case arose from the dispute between Napocor and
respondents over the purported franchise tax delinquency of Napocor. Although the complaint

37
filed with the trial court is a Petition for declaration of nullity of foreclosure sale with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction, a reading of the petition shows that it essentially assails the
correctness of the local franchise tax assessments by the Provincial Government of Bataan.
Indeed, one of the prayers in the petition is for the court a quo to declare Napocor "as exempt
from payment of local franchise taxes." Basic is the rule that allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought determine the nature of an action. In order for the trial court to
resolve the complaint, the issues regarding the correctness of the tax assessment and collection
must also necessarily be dealt with. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, "the issue of the
validity and legality of the foreclosure sale is essentially related to the issue of the
demandability of the local franchise tax."

Therefore, the dismissal of Napocor's appeal by the Court of Appeals was in order. Napocor's
procedural lapse would have been sufficient to reconsider this Court's decision and instead
deny the instant petition. However, the substantial merits of the case and the patent error
committed by the Bataan Regional Trial Court compels this Court to exercise its power of
judicial review for purposes of judicial economy. (National Power Corporation v. Provincial
Government of Bataan, G.R. No. 180654, March 6, 2017)

The Muslim Code recognizes divorce in marriages between Muslims, and mixed marriages
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim law or the Muslim Code in any part of the Philippines. At present, this is the only law
in the Philippines that allows domestic divorce. xxx.

Jurisdiction over actions for divorce is vested upon the Shari'a Circuit Courts, whose decisions
may be appealed to the Shari'a District Courts.

Under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts, an appeal must be made within a
reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of judgment. The judgment shall become final and
executory after the expiration of the period to appeal, or upon decision of the Shari 'a District
Courts on appeal from the Shari 'a Circuit Court. (Pacasum v. Zamoranos, G.R. No. 193719, March
21, 2017)

Generally, the office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of
authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations,
oards, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not
been vested by law. This is, however, not the lone office of an action for prohibition. In Diaz, et
al. v. The Secretary of Finance, et al., prohibition was also recognized as a proper remedy to
prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority.
And, in a number of jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed as a proper action to assail the
constitutionality of a law or prohibit its implementation. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The
Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

Clearly, prohibition has been found an appropriate remedy to challenge the constitutionality of
various laws, rules, and regulations. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social
Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

38
Actual Case or Controversy

Further, anent the claim of respondent De Borja that the Petition had already been rendered
moot and academic due to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 0003 by the SB, the Court finds the
same lacking in merit. It is axiomatic that a dismissal on the basis of a demurrer to evidence is
similar to a judgment; it is a final order ruling on the merits of a case. Hence, when petitioner
Republic brought the instant appeal before this Court, the same was limited to respondent De
Borja's liability alone. In this regard, the propriety of the SB's granting of respondent De Borja's
Demurrer to Evidence, which is the subject matter of this case, is separate and distinct from the
subject matter of the appeal in G.R. No. 199323, i.e., liability of Velasco, et al.

Thus, respondent De Borja's claim in his Motion to Dismiss that "the complaint against [him]
was dismissed not only once but twice" is inaccurate and legally flawed. Perforce, it is of no
moment that the SB dismissed Civil Case No. 0003 as the same was merely with respect to the
respondents other than respondent De Borja who, by then, was already confronted with the
instant appeal brought by petitioner Republic. (Republic v. de Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January 9,
2017)

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of
no practical value or use. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on
the ground of mootness.

With the issuance of RMO No. 44-2016, a supervening event has transpired that rendered this
petition moot and academic, and subject to denial. The CIR, in her petition, assails the RTC
Decision finding RMO No. 20-2013 unconstitutional because it violated the non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions' tax exemption privilege under the Constitution. However,
subsequently, RMO No. 44-2016 clarified that non-stock, non-profit educational institutions are
excluded from the coverage of RMO No. 20-2013. Consequently, the RTC Decision no longer
stands, and there is no longer any practical value in resolving the issues raised in this petition.
(Jacinto-Henares v. St. Paul College of Makati, G.R. No. 215383, March 8, 2017)

Locus Standi

Hence, for failing to show that it is a juridical entity, endowed by law with the capacity to bring
suits in its own name, PISTON is devoid of any legal capacity to institute this action.

With respect to petitioner-in-intervention AAP, Stradcom claims that it does not have the
requisite legal personality to intervene, as it does not allege any injury to the organization.
Rather, the injury, if any, would be to its members who would be required to pay the RFID fee.
Stradcom claims that absent any allegation that it is AAP that will shoulder the costs of the
RFID for the latter's members, AAP cannot institute the present suit.

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. However, despite its lack of
interest, an association has the legal personality to file a suit and represent its members if the

39
outcome of the case will affect their vital interests. Similarly, an organization has the standing to
assert the concern of its constituents.

In view thereof, we rule that AAP has the standing to file the instant suit. (Bayan Muna v.
Mendoza, G.R. No. 190431, January 31, 2017)

Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of the
Republic;" similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all
women, all of [age], and residents of Marawi City". xxx. In any case, the Court can take judicial
cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines
since Philippine citizenship is a requirement for them to be elected as representatives. We will
therefore consider them as suing in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides,
respondent did not question petitioners' legal standing. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658,
July 4, 2017)

In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines had failed to
sufficiently comply with the requisites of locus standi, as it was not able to show any specific
injury which it had suffered or could suffer by virtue of President Joseph Estrada's order
deploying the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metropolis.

This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the Court's
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is concerned. In fact, by
constitutional design, such review may be instituted by any citizen before the Court, without
the need to prove that he or she stands to sustain a direct and personal injury as a consequence
of the questioned Presidential act/s. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), respondents
argue that the petitioners failed to show that they have the requisite standing to file the petition,
being representatives of a rather amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or
injury. Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that
the rules on standing had been relaxed following the decision in Oposa v. Factoran; and that, in
any event, legal standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its
discretion.

The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the requirements on
standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations under
environmental laws. This has been confirmed by this Court's rulings in Arigo v. Swift, and
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-BioTech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast
Asia (Philippines). However, it bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the
inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the
issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally
aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No.
211010, March 7, 2017)

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

40
As expressly provided in the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction "over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus." However, this Court has
emphasized in People v. Cuaresma that the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus does not exclusively pertain to this Court. Rather, it is shared with the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts. Nevertheless, "this concurrence of jurisdiction" does not
give parties unfettered discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts
is determinative of the appropriate venue where petitions for extraordinary writs should be
filed. Parties cannot randomly select the court or forum to which their actions will be directed.
There is another reason why this Court enjoins strict adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts. As explained in Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, "[t]he doctrine that requires
respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the
judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner." Thus:

Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence
presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which
may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in
relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially
organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those
territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of
inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In
many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly
present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such
action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however,
some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the
determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This
nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the
Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the
trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and,
ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there
are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further
reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench
or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the
actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order
that it truly performs that role. (Citation omitted)

Consequently, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the
lower courts. This holds especially true when questions of fact are raised. Unlike this Court,
trial courts and the Court of Appeals are better equipped to resolve questions of fact. They are
in the best position to deal with causes in the first instance.

However, the doctrine on hierarchy of courts is not an inflexible rule. In Spouses Chua v. Ang,
this Court held that "[a] strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason behind
the rule is not present in a case[.]"This Court has recognized that a direct invocation of its
original jurisdiction may be warranted in exceptional cases as when there are compelling
reasons clearly set forth in the petition, or when what is raised is a pure question of law.

41
In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following
grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be
addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the
case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when
time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7)
when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when
the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by
the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10)
when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.

None of the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts are present in this case.
Significantly, although petitioners raise questions of law, other interrelated factual issues have
emerged from the parties' arguments, which this Court deems indispensable for the proper
disposition of this case. (Aala v. Uy, G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017)

Respondents also seek the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners failed to
adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, reasoning that since a petition for the issuance of a
writ of kalikasan must be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of
Appeals, then the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is applicable. Petitioners, on the other hand,
cite the same provision and argue that direct recourse to this Court is available, and that the
provision shows that the remedy to environmental damage should not be limited to the
territorial jurisdiction of the lower courts.

The respondents' argument does not persuade. Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an
extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a
narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming,
among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of
one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and
territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological
threats. At the very least, the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated under the
RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct
resort is allowed where it is dictated by public welfare. Given that the RPEC allows direct resort
to this Court, it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions
brought directly before it. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017)

In the same manner, the supposed violation of the principle of the hierarchy of courts does not
pose any hindrance to the full deliberation of the issues at hand. It is well to remember that "the
judicial hierarchy of courts is 1 not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving
warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to [refer] to the trial courts at
the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of
the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be
brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict
application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.

42
Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important
reasons, such as when dictated by public welfare and 'the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice. Thus, when based on the good judgment of the
court, the urgency and significance of the issues presented calls for its intervention, it should
not hesitate to exercise its duty to resolve.

The instant petition presents an exception to the principle as it basically raises a legal question
on the constitutionality of the mandatory discount and the breadth of its rightful beneficiaries.
(Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No.
199669, April 25, 2017)

Writ of Amparo

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC specifically delimits the coverage of the writ of
amparo to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, viz.:

Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose rights to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearance has been
defined by the Court as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the law.

In an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective claims by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation
that would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged.

After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court affirms the factual findings of the
CA, which is largely based on the respondent's evidence. Verily, the totality of the evidence
presented by the respondent meets the requisite evidentiary threshold. To corroborate his
allegations, the respondent presented the testimony of Haber who, during the hearing
conducted by the CA on October 6, 2009, averred that on June 15, 2009, he was brought to
Mayor Mamba's house where he and the respondent were tortured. Haber testified that hot wax
was dripped onto their bodies while they were handcuffed; that they were kicked and beaten
with a cue stick and an alcohol container. Thereafter, Haber testified that he and the respondent
were brought to the guardhouse where they were suffocated by placing plastic bags on their

43
heads. He also testified that a wire was inserted inside their penises. (Mayor Mamba v. Bueno,
G.R. No. 191416, February 7, 2017)
What is clear is that the respondent was able to prove by substantial evidence that he was
apprehended by the members of the Task Force, illegally detained, and tortured. It was further
established that Maritess would not have seen his son if not for the timely intercession of
P/Supt. Buenaobra of the PNP Cagayan Regional Office. The members of the Task Force
apprehended and detained the respondent to make him admit to his complicity in the heist the
night before sans the benefit of legal and judicial processes.

Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the respondent, after four days of detention, had been
released by the members of the Task Force on June 18, 2009. This fact alone, however, does not
negate the propriety of the grant of a writ of amparo.

In the seminal case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al. the Court emphasized
that the writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation
of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and
action.

Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's favor notwithstanding that he
has already been released from detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate
the punishment of those behind the illegal detention through subsequent investigation and
action.

More importantly, the writ of amparo likewise covers violations of the right to security. At the
core of the guarantee of the right to security, as embodied in Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person, i.e.,
houses, papers and effects, against unwarranted government intrusion. Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution not only limits the State's power over a person's home and possession, but
more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.

The right to security is separate and distinct from the right to life. The right to life guarantees
essentially the right to be alive - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned.
On the other hand, the right to security is a guarantee of the secure quality of life, i.e., the life, to
which each person has a right, is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler.

In Manalo, the Court further opined that the right to security of person yields various
permutations of the exercise of the right, such as freedom from fear or, in the amparo context,
freedom from threat; a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security; and a
guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. As regards the right to security, in
the sense of the guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government, the Court explained:

In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the rights to
life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is
a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under

44
 Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of
order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security
of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims
of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. xxx. (Citation omitted and emphasis
in the original)

In this case, it is incumbent upon the petitioners, who all hold positions in the local government
of Tuao, to conduct, at the very least, an investigation on the alleged illegal arrest, illegal
detention and torture of the respondent. The petitioners, nevertheless, claim that the Office of
the Mayor and the police station of Tuao, unknown to the respondent, are conducting an
investigation on the incident. However, other than their bare assertion, they failed to present
any evidence that would prove the supposed investigation. Mere allegation is not a fact. Absent
any evidence that would corroborate the said claim, it is a mere allegation that does not have
any probative value.

Verily, the petitioners failed to point to any specific measures undertaken by them to effectively
investigate the irregularities alleged by the respondent and to prosecute those who are
responsible therefor. Worse, the illegal detention and torture suffered by the respondent were
perpetrated by the members of the Task Force themselves.

Instead of effectively addressing the irregularities committed against the respondent, the
petitioners seemingly justify the illegal arrest and detention and infliction of bodily harm upon
the respondent by stating that the latter is a habitual delinquent and was the one responsible for
the robbery of the canteen. As stated earlier, even if the respondent committed a crime, the
petitioners, as local government officials, are not at liberty to disregard the respondent's
constitutionally guaranteed rights to life, liberty and security. It is quite unfortunate that the
petitioners, all local government officials, are the very ones who are infringing on the
respondent's fundamental rights to life, liberty and security

Clearly, there is substantial evidence in this case that would warrant the conclusion that the
respondent's right to security, as a guarantee of protection by the government, was violated.
Accordingly, the CA correctly issued the writ of amparo in favor of the respondent. (Mayor
Mamba v. Bueno, G.R. No. 191416, February 7, 2017)

Writ of Kalikasan

This is a petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus to compel the implementation of
the following environmental laws and executive issuances - Republic Act No. (RA) 9729 (Climate Change Act),
and RA 8749 (Clean Air Act); Executive Order No. 774 (BO 774); AO 254, s. 2009 (AO 254); and Administrative
Order No. 171, s. 2007 (AO 171).

For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and

healthful ecology;

45
 2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity; and

3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of

such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces.

It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to
show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.

In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a
balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners
failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that
constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology. (Segovia v.
Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017)

Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for continuing
mandamus as follows:

RULES
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS

SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.-When any agency or instrumentality of the

government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection
with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right
therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition
concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is
fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or
regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping.

First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the
respondents to be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had been liberalized
in environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for
continuing mandamus.

Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. It cannot be

considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public respondents to
determine the manner by which this principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not
those that are discretionary, and the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to
act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the

46
terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an
official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by
mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R.
No. 211010, March 7, 2017)

Rules of Court

In Magsino v. De Ocampo, the Court instructs that:

Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and
litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in
some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was
never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.
The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not
a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most
persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure.

The rules were instituted to be faithfully complied with, and allowing them to be ignored
or lightly dismissed to suit the convenience of a party like the petitioner was
impermissible. Such rules, often derided as merely technical, are to be relaxed only in the
furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving. Their liberal construction in
exceptional situations should then rest on a showing of justifiable reasons and of at least
a reasonable attempt at compliance with them. xxx.

In the case at bar, the CA aptly pointed out that the Spouses Louh filed their Answer with the
RTC only on July 20, 2012 or more than three months after the prescribed period, which expired
on March 4, 2012. When they were thereafter declared in default, they filed no motion to set
aside the RTC's order, a remedy which is allowed under Rule 9, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Spouses Louh failed to show that they exerted due diligence in timely pursuing
their cause so as to entitle them to a liberal construction of the rules, which can only be made in
exceptional cases. (Louh v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 225562, March 8, 2017)

Administrative Supervision

We would like to further stress that all directives coming from the Court Administrator and his
deputies are issued in the exercise of this Court's administrative supervision of trial courts and
their personnel, hence, should be respected. These directives are not mere requests, but should
be complied with promptly and completely. Clearly, Judge Demot-Mariñas' unexplained
disregard of the orders of the OCA for her to comment on the complaint shows her disrespect
for and contempt, not just for the OCA, but also for the Court, which exercises direct
administrative supervision over trial court officers and employees through the OCA. Her
indifference to, and disregard of, the directives issued to her clearly constituted insubordination

47
which this Court will not tolerate. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Demot-Marinas, A.M.
No. RTJ-16-2446, March 7, 2017)

Judicial and Bar Council

The JBC avers that it has no duty to increase the chances of appointment of every candidate it
has adjudged to have met the minimum qualifications for a judicial post. The Court does not
impose upon the JBC such duty, it only requires that the JBC gives all qualified nominees fair
and equal opportunity to be appointed. The clustering by the JBC of nominees for
simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts can actually be a device to
favor or prejudice a particular nominee. A favored nominee can be included in a cluster with no
other strong contender to ensure his/her appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be placed
in a cluster with many strong contenders to minimize his/her chances of appointment.
(Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, Resolution on the MR, February 21, 2017)

The Court emphasizes that the requirements and qualifications, as well as the powers, duties,
and responsibilities are the same for all vacant posts in a collegiate court, such as the
Sandiganbayan; and if an individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is
found to be qualified for all the other vacancies - there are no distinctions among the vacant
posts. It is improbable that the nominees expressed their desire to be appointed to only a
specific vacant position and not the other vacant positions in the same collegiate court, when
neither the Constitution nor the law provides a specific designation or distinctive description
for each vacant position in the collegiate court. The JBC did not cite any cogent reason in its
Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention for assigning a nominee to a particular
cluster/vacancy. The Court highlights that without objective criteria, standards, or guidelines in
determining which nominees are to be included in which cluster, the clustering of nominees for
specific vacant posts seems to be at the very least, totally arbitrary. The lack of such criteria,
standards, or guidelines may open the clustering to manipulation to favor or prejudice a
qualified nominee. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, Resolution on the MR, February 21,
2017)

In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court already adjudged that:

Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical order of the Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices cannot be determined until their actual appointment by the President.

It also bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint members of a collegiate
court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or order of preference
of such newly appointed members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members'
appointment or commission papers. By already designating the numerical order of the vacancies,
the JBC would be establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices even before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating
unto itself a vital part of the President's power of appointment.

It is also not clear to the Court how, as the JBC avowed in its Motion for Reconsideration, the
clustering of nominees for simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts into separate short lists
can rid the appointment process to the Judiciary of political pressure; or conversely, how the
previous practice of submitting a single list of nominees to the President for simultaneous
vacancies in collegiate courts, requiring the same qualifications, made the appointment process

48
more susceptible to political pressure. The 1987 Constitution itself, by creating the JBC and
requiring that the President can only appoint judges and Justices from the nominees submitted
by the JBC, already sets in place the mechanism to protect the appointment process from
political pressure. By arbitrarily clustering the nominees for appointment to the six
simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into separate short lists, the JBC
influenced the appointment process and encroached on the President's power to appoint
members of the Judiciary and determine seniority in the said court, beyond its mandate under
the 1987 Constitution. As the Court pronounced in its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the
power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to
appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing
to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints
someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid, and he, not the JBC, determines the
seniority of appointees to a collegiate court.

Finally, the JBC maintains that it is not bound by the Decision dated November 29, 2016 of the
Court in this case on the ground that it is not a party herein. The JBC prays in its Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, among other reliefs and
remedies, for the Court to reverse its ruling in the Decision dated November 29, 2016 denying
the Motion for Intervention of the JBC in the present case. However, the Court has now
practically allowed the intervention of the JBC in this case, by taking into consideration the
issues raised and arguments adduced in its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention, but which the Court found to be unmeritorious.

To recapitulate, the Petition at bar challenged President Aquino's appointment of respondents

Econg and Musngi as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, which disregarded the clustering by
the JBC of the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies in said collegiate court into six
separate short lists. The Court ultimately decreed in its Decision dated November 29, 2016 that:

President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the
Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for
the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
President Aquino merely maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the
paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This
does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the
President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for every
vacancy. To meet the minimum requirement under said constitutional provision of three
nominees per vacancy, there should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the minimum requirement was even
exceeded herein because the JBC submitted for the President's consideration a total of 37
qualified nominees. All the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met
the requirement of nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, as well as the
other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity.

The declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for the simultaneous
vacancies that occurred by the creation of six new positions of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional was only incidental to its ruling that President Aquino is not
bound by such clustering in making his appointments to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate

49
Justice posts. Other than said declaration, the Court did not require the JBC to do or to refrain
from doing something insofar as the issue of clustering of the nominees to the then six vacant
posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was concerned.

As for the other new rules and practices adopted by the JBC which the Court has taken
cognizance of and docketed as a separate administrative matter (viz., Item No.2: the deletion or
non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8,
Section 1 of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council, referred to in pages 45 to 51 of
the Decision dated November 29, 2016), the JBC is actually being given the opportunity to
submit its comment and be heard on the same. The administrative matter was already raffled to
another ponente, thus, any incident concerning the same should be consolidated in the said
administrative matter.

Regarding the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Caguioa, it must be pointed out that he has
conceded that the President did not commit an unconstitutional act in "disregarding the
clustering done by the JBC" when he chose Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan "outside" of
the "clustered" lists provided by the JBC. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, Resolution on
the MR, February 21, 2017)

Disciplinary Authority

The Court disagrees with the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. The
IBP has no jurisdiction over the disbarment complaint. The administrative complaint must be
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.

Republic Act No. 6770 (R.A. No. 6770), otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989,"
prescribes the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. Section 15, paragraph 1 of R.A. No.
6770 provides:

Section 15. Powers, Function and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation
of such cases.

The 1987 Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman with the administrative
disciplinary authority to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any government
official when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The
Office of the Ombudsman is the government agency responsible for enforcing administrative,
civil, and criminal liability of government officials "in every case where the evidence warrants
in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people." In Samson v. Restrivera,
the Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance committed by any public officer or employee during his or her
tenure. Consequently, acts or missions of public officials relating to the performance of their

50
function as government officials are within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

In Spouses Buffe v. Secretary Gonzales, the Court held that the IBP has no jurisdiction over
government lawyers who are charged with administrative offenses involving their official
duties. In the present case, the allegations in Alicias' complaint against Atty. Macatangay, Atty.
Zerna, Atty. Ronquillo, and Atty. Buenaflor, which include their (1) failure to evaluate CSC
records; (2) failure to evaluate documentary evidence presented to the CSC; and (3) non-service
of CSC Orders and Resolutions, all relate to their misconduct in the discharge of their official
duties as government lawyers working in the CSC. Hence, the IBP has no jurisdiction over
Alicias' complaint. These are acts or omissions connected with their duties as government
lawyers exercising official functions in the CSC and within the administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction of their superior or the Office of the Ombudsman. (Alicias v. Macatangay, A.C. No.
7478, January 11, 2017)

Petitioner assails two acts as violating the confidentiality rule: first, respondents' supposed
public threats of filing a disbarment case against him, and second, respondents' public statement
that they had filed a disbarment complaint.

Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to keep private and
confidential. Respondents' threats were made before November 4, 2014, and there was no
proceeding to keep private.

As for the Press Statement made on November 4, 2014, a close examination reveals that it does
not divulge anything that merits punishment for contempt.

The Press Statement declared only three (3) things: first, respondent AFP filed a disbarment
complaint against petitioner; second, petitioner is a lawyer, and thus, must conduct himself
according to the standards of the legal profession; and third, petitioner's "unlawful conduct" is
prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. As regards the disbarment, the Press
Statement only said:

At about 2 p.m. today, the AFP has filed a verified disbarment complaint before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Harry Roque for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Press Statement's coverage of the disbarment complaint was a brief, unembellished report
that a complaint had been filed. Such an announcement does not, in and of itself, violate the
confidentiality rule, particularly considering that it did not discuss the disbarment complaint
itself.

In any case, the Press Statement does not divulge any acts or character traits on the part of
petitioner that would damage his personal and professional reputation. Although the Press
Statement mentioned that a disbarment complaint had been filed against petitioner, no
particulars were given about the content of the complaint or the actual charges filed.

Furthermore, prior to the filing of the complaint, petitioner even made his own public statement
regarding respondents' possible filing of a disbarment complaint. Even before any case against
him had been filed, media reported that petitioner tweeted publicly that he looked forward to

51
answering the complaint before the AFP. In the articles cited by petitioner as evidence of
respondents' violation of the confidentiality rule, he, too, is quoted, saying "the case is a chance
for him to 'clarify a lawyer's role in pushing victims' rights and sovereignty." It is unlikely that
petitioner's reputation could be further damaged by a factual report that a complaint had
actually been filed. Petitioner has made it even more public by filing the instant case against the
entire Armed Forces of the Philippines, instead of targeting only the individuals who
participated in the disclosure.

Even the events that led to the filing of the disbarment case transpired in front of media. As
alleged by petitioner, the question of custody over Pemberton was the subject of public
discussion. In relation to that issue, petitioner accompanied his clients when they demanded to
see Pemberton, when they were refused, and when they forced themselves into Pemberton's
detention facility, in a serious breach of security of a military zone.

Thus, this Court agrees with respondents, that they should not be faulted for releasing a
subsequent press statement regarding the disbarment complaint they filed against petitioner.
The statements were official statements made in the performance of respondents' official
functions to address a matter of public concern. It was the publication of an institutional action
in response to a serious breach of security. Respondents, in the exercise of their public
functions, should not be punished for responding publicly to such public actions. (Roque v. AFP
Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017)

With regard to the imputation of falsification of public document, the Court shall not inquire
into the merits of the said criminal case pending adjudication before the MTCC and make a
ruling on the matter. Commissioner Esquivel correctly declined to resolve the falsification case
pending resolution before the regular court to which jurisdiction properly pertains. Though
disbarment proceedings are sui generis as they belong to a class of their own and are distinct
from that of civil or criminal actions, it is judicious for an administrative body like IBP-CBD not
to pre-empt the course of action of the regular courts in order to avert contradictory findings.
(Malvar v. Baleros, A.C. No. 11346, March 8, 2017)

The respondent's accountability did not end with her removal from the Judiciary. In the
decision of November 22, 2016, we declared that her misdemeanor as a member of the Bench
could also cause her expulsion from the Legal Profession through disbarment. xxx.

Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of any
lawful order by the Court constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. In the respondent's case, she
was herein found to have committed all of these grounds for disbarment, warranting her
immediate disbarment as a consequence.

We deem it worthwhile to remind that the penalty of disbarment being hereby imposed does
not equate to stripping the respondent of the source of her livelihood. Disbarment is intended to
protect the administration of justice by ensuring that those taking part in it as attorneys should
be competent, honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the clients they serve to rightly
repose their confidence in them.

Once again, we express our disdain for judges and attorneys who undeservedly think too
highly of themselves, their personal and professional qualifications and qualities at the expense

52
of the nobility of the Law Profession. It is well to remind the respondent that membership in the
Law Profession is not like that in any ordinary trade. The Law is a noble calling, and only the
individuals who are competent and fit according to the canons and standards set by this Court,
the law and the Rules of Court may be bestowed the privilege to practice it.

Lastly, every lawyer must pursue only the highest standards in the practice of his calling. The
practice of law is a privilege, and only those adjudged qualified are permitted to do so. The
respondent has fallen short of this standard thus meriting her expulsion from the profession.
(Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Eliza B. Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017)

Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against lawyers
in government service arising from their administrative duties, and refers the complaint first
either to the proper administrative body that has disciplinary authority over the erring public
official or employee or the Ombudsman. For instance, in Spouses Buffe v. Gonzales, this Court
dismissed the disbarment complaint against former Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez,
former Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde, Jr., and former Congressman Eleandro Jesus
F. Madrona, holding that the respondents were public officials being charged for actions
involving their official functions during their tenure, which should be resolved by the Office of
the Ombudsman. In that case, one (1) of the respondents sought to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of forum-shopping because he allegedly received an order from the Office of the
Ombudsman directing him to file a counter-affidavit based on the same administrative
complaint filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Again, in the fairly recent case of Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay, the Court dismissed the complaint
against respondents - government lawyers in the Civil Service Commission. The Court held that
the acts or omissions alleged in the complaint were "connected with their . . . official functions
in the [Civil Service Commission] and within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of their
superior or the Office of the Ombudsman." It would seem that the complainant directly
instituted a disbarment complaint with this Court instead of filing an administrative complaint
before the proper administrative body.

This case is an exception. Unlike the circumstances in Spouses Buffe and Alicias, Jr., the records
here show that the Office of the Ombudsman had previously dismissed Fuji's administrative
complaint due to the pendency of his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint before
the Bureau of Immigration, and considered the case closed.

The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuji's petition to reopen his case and ordered
his release. However, it was silent as to the culpability of respondent on the charges levelled by
Fuji.
Thus, with the termination of the administrative proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman and the apparent inaction of the Bureau of Immigration on complainant's
administrative complaint, this Court considers it proper to take cognizance of this case, and to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to discipline respondent under its "plenary
disciplinary authority" over members of the legal profession. (Fuji v. de la Cruz, A.C. No. 11043,
March 8, 2017)

…the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,]

53
and experience." During the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer
must desist from practicing law. It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not
automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period. The lawyer must submit the
required documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she
resumes the practice of law. (Paras v. Paras, A.C. No. 5333, March 13, 2017)

Failing to comply with the mandate to decide cases within the period prescribed by the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of Court and the administrative circulars and guidelines
constitutes gross inefficiency and incompetence, for which the judge may be held to account.
Retirement from the Bench does not exempt the judge from liability for disobeying or ignoring
the mandate. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Aventurado, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2212, April
18, 2017)

Decisions

Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the lower courts to decide or resolve
cases or matters for decision or final resolution within three (3) months from date of
submission. In complaints for forcible entry and unlawful detainer as in this case, Section 10 of
the Rules on Summary Procedure specifically requires that the complaint be resolved within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the last affidavits and position papers. Without any order of
extension granted by this Court, failure to decide even a single case within the required period
constitutes gross inefficiency. (Gamboa-Roces v. Judge Perez, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1887 [Formerly
OCA IPI No. 15-2814-MTJ], January 9, 2017)

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months
within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover,
Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business
promptly and decide cases within the required period. In addition, this Court laid down the
guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13which provides, inter alia, that "[j]udges shall
observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for
the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases
or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all
lower collegiate courts, while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so."
The Court has reiterated this admonition in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-99which requires
all judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases
and the failure to comply therewith is considered a serious violation of the constitutional right
of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases.

This Court has consistently held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction against the erring magistrate. Respondent judge failed to live up to the exacting
standards of duty and responsibility that her position required. As a trial judge, Judge Demot-
Mariñas is a frontline official of the judiciary and should have at all times acted with efficiency
and with probity. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Demot-Marinas, A.M. No. RTJ-16-
2446, March 7, 2017)

Article IX-B
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

54
Jurisdiction

The Administrative Code of 1987 is the law that provided for the Civil Service Commission's
appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases:

Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for
more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in
rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed
directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or
employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any
department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The
results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation
as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty
days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered
by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially
appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same
shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

(3) An investigation may be entrusted to regional director or similar officials who shall
make the necessary report and recommendation to the chief of bureau or office or
department within the period specified in Paragraph (4) of the following Section.

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is
suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.

Section 49. Appeals. - (1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely
affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition
for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen
days. Notice of the appeal shall be filed with the disciplining office, which shall forward
the records of the case, together with the notice of appeal, to the appellate authority
within fifteen days from filing of the notice of appeal, with its comment, if any. The
notice of appeal shall specifically state the date of the decision appealed from and the
date of receipt thereof. It shall also specifically set forth clearly the grounds relied upon
for excepting from the decision.

(2) A petition for reconsideration shall be based only on any of the following grounds: (a)
new evidence has been discovered which materially affects the decision rendered; (b) the
decision is not supported by the evidence on record; or (c) error of law or irregularities
have been committed which are prejudicial to the interest of the respondent: Provided,
That only one petition for reconsideration shall be entertained.

The Administrative Code of 1987 also gave the Civil Service Commission the power to
"[p]rescribe, amend and enforce regulations and rules for carrying into effect the provisions of

55
the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws." Sections 61 and 45 of the 2012 Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service echo the Administrative Code of 1987, and read:

Section 61. Filing. - Subject to Section 45 of this Rule, decisions of heads of departments,
agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty
exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days
salary, may be appealed to the Commission within a period of fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof. In cases the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to
the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department head and then
finally to the Commission.

All decisions of heads of agencies are immediately executory pending appeal before the
Commission. The decision imposing the penalty of dismissal by disciplining authorities
in departments is not immediately executory unless confirmed by the Secretary
concerned. However, the Commission may take cognizance of the appeal pending
confirmation of its execution by the Secretary.

Section 45. Finality of Decisions. - A decision rendered by the disciplining authority

whereby a penalty of suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or a fine in an amount
not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary is imposed, shall be final, executory and not
appealable unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. However, the
respondent may file an appeal when the issue raised is violation of due process.

If the penalty imposed is suspension exceeding thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty (30) days' salary, the same shall be final and executory after the lapse of
the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal and no such
pleading has been filed. (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10,
2017)

The COA promulgated rules of procedure for its agency, which include rules for disciplinary
and administrative cases involving officers and employees of COA. Sections 1 and 10 of Rule
XIV on Administrative Cases of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Audit state:

Section 1. Applicability of Civil Service Law and Other Rules. - The procedures set
forth in the pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law, The Omnibus Rules
Implementing Executive Order No. 292 and COA Memorandum No. 76-48 dated
April 27, 1976, in administrative cases against officers and employees of the
Commission, are hereby adopted and read into these rules.

Section 10. Appeal. - Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party
adversely affected by the decision in accordance with the rules prescribed under
existing Civil Service rules and regulations.

In the present petition, Galindo and Pinto failed to explain why they filed a petition for certiorari
before this Court instead of an appeal before the Civil Service Commission. Galindo and Pinto
also failed to allege and show that the COA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A petition for certiorari
cannot substitute for a lost appeal. The supposed petition for certiorari imputed errors in the
COA's appreciation of facts and evidence presented, which are proper subjects of an appeal.
(Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10, 2017)

56
There is no question that the case that Galindo and Pinto sought to be reviewed is an
administrative disciplinary case. We previously ruled in Saligumba v. Commission on Audit that
our power to review is limited to legal issues in administrative matters, thus:

The petition has to be dismissed for the following reasons:

1. Our power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to
administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel.

2. Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters

as mentioned above, We cannot do so on factual issues; Our power to review is limited to
legal issues. (Emphasis supplied) (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January
10, 2017)

Assuming arguendo that Galindo and Pinto availed of certiorari under Rule 64 as the proper
remedy, the present petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing. Egargo
Puertollano Gervacio Law Offices, Galindo and Pinto's previous counsel, received a copy of the
COA's Resolution on 8 October 2013. The same lawyers withdrew their appearance in a notice
dated 21 October 2013. As notice to counsel is notice to the client, Galindo and Pinto had only
until 7 November 2013 to file a petition for certiorari. When Galindo and Pinto filed their present
petition for certiorari on 30 January 2014, the petition was already 84 days late. Thus, the ruling
of the COA in the cases of Galindo and Pinto became final and executory as of 8 November
2013.

Even if the present petition properly raised this Court's certiorari jurisdiction and was filed
within the reglementary period, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the
COA. There is no capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The COA constituted a team from the FAIO-LSS, which in turn found prima facie
evidence of petitioners' misconduct. Petitioners were charged and hearings were conducted.
The pieces of evidence presented against petitioners were substantial enough to justify the
finding of their administrative liability. (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788,
January 10, 2017)

Galindo and Pinto question the quantum of evidence that established their administrative
liability. However, they conveniently forgot that mere substantial evidence, or "that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion," 22
is sufficient. The pieces of evidence presented before the COA, such as the cash advances of Ms.
Mendoza accompanied by the testimony of Ms. Mendoza herself, as well as the Indices of
Payments and the car loan contracts, establish Galindo's and Pinto's receipt of the disallowed
amounts. "Recipients of unauthorized sums would, after all, ordinarily evade traces of their
receipt of such amounts. Resort to other documents from which such fact could be deduced was
then appropriate."

In the case of Nacion v. Commission on Audit, an offshoot of the FAIO-LSS investigation

involving the set of COA-MWSS officers that included Galindo and Pinto, this Court dismissed
Atty. Janet D. Nacion's petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The COA assigned Atty. Nacion to
MWSS as State Auditor V from 16 October 2001 to 15 September 2003. The COA initiated motu
proprio administrative proceedings against Atty. Nacion after it found unauthorized receipt of

57
bonuses and benefits from MWSS by COA-MWSS officers in the period immediately following
Atty. Nacion's term. Atty. Nacion alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA, and
invoked violation of her right to due process. She argued that the records during her tenure
with the MWSS should not have been included by the FAIO-LSS in its investigations because
the COA Chairperson did not issue an office order specifically for her case.

We found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA finding Atty. Nacion guilty of Grave
Misconduct and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations. We ruled that there was
no need for a separate office order for the FAIO-LSS team's investigation of Atty. Nacion's case.
The COA accorded Atty. Nacion a reasonable opportunity to present her defenses through her
answer to the formal charge issued by the COA Chairperson and her motion for reconsideration
of the COA's decision. (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10, 2017)

The dispute in this case concerns the classification of certain positions in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).The
Court is asked to determine, in particular, whether these positions are properly included in the Career Executive
Service (CES); and whether the occupants of these positions must obtain third-level eligibility to qualify for
permanent appointment. To resolve these questions, the Court must also delineate the respective jurisdictions
granted by law to the competing authorities involved in this case - the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the
Career Executive Service Board (CESB).

Although the specific powers of the CSC are not enumerated in the final version of 1987
Constitution, it is evident from the deliberations of the framers that the concept of a "central
personnel agency" was considered all-encompassing. The concept was understood to be
sufficiently broad as to include the authority to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel
actions, to classify positions, and to exercise all powers and functions inherent in and incidental
to human resources management xxx. (Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017)

... the mandate of the CSC should therefore be read as the comprehensive authority to perform
all functions necessary to ensure the efficient administration of the entire civil service, including
the CES.

The Administrative Code of 1987 further reinforces this view. Book V, Title I, Subtitle A,
Chapter 3, Section 12 thereof enumerates the specific powers and functions of the CSC while
recognizing its comprehensive authority over all civil service matters. [See Section 12, Items (1)
to (5), (11), (14), and (19)] xxx.

It is evident from the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions that the CSC, as the
central personnel agency of the government, has been granted the broad authority and the
specific powers to pass upon all civil service matters. (Career Executive Service Board v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017)

The specific powers of the CESB must be

narrowly interpreted as exceptions to the
comprehensive authority granted to the
CSC by the Constitution and relevant
statutes.

58
In this case, the specific powers of the CESB over members of the CES must be interpreted in a
manner that takes into account the comprehensive mandate of the CSC under the Constitution
and other statutes.

The present case involves the classification of positions belonging to the CES and the
qualifications for these posts. These are matters clearly within the scope of the powers granted
to the CESB under the Administrative Code and the Integrated Reorganization Plan. However,
this fact alone does not push the matter beyond the reach of the CSC.

As previously discussed, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, is given
the comprehensive mandate to administer the civil service under Article IX-B, Section 3 of the
1987 Constitution; and Section 12, Items (4), (5), and (14) of the Administrative Code. It has also
been expressly granted the power to promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the civil
service; and to render opinions and rulings on all personne1 and other civil service matters.

Here, the question of whether the subject PAO positions belong to the CES is clearly a civil
service matter falling within the comprehensive jurisdiction of the CSC. Further, considering the
repercussions of the issue concerning the appointments of those occupying the posts in
question, the jurisdiction of the CSC over personnel actions is implicated. (Career Executive
Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017)

Section 38(a) of Presidential Decree No. 807 has drawn a definite distinction between
subordinate officers or employees who were presidential appointees, on the one hand, and
subordinate officers or employees who were non-presidential appointees, on the other. Without
a doubt, substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees from nonpresidential
appointees truly existed. or one, presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining
authority of the President pursuant to the well-settled principle that, in the absence of a
contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority in whom the
power to appoint is vested. Having the power to remove or to discipline presidential
appointees, therefore, the President has the corollary authority to investigate them and look into
their conduct in office.
Thus, Baculi, as a presidential appointee, came under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
President in line with the principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint." As such, the DAR Secretary held no disciplinary jurisdiction over him. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 807 has expressly specified the procedure for disciplinary actions
involving presidential appointees. (Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8,
2017)

First of all, DAR General Memorandum Order No. 5, Series of 1990, whose pertinent text
expressly vested in the DAR's Office of Legal Affairs the authority to investigate administrative
complaints against presidential appointees, presupposed the actual existence of the
administrative complaints. In respect of Baculi, however, there was yet no administrative
complaint when the DAR-RIC conducted its investigation. Such administrative complaint came
to exist only when Secretary Garilao brought the formal charge for gross dishonesty, abuse of
authority, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Such
formal charge became the administrative complaint contemplated by law. As a consequence,
the DAR-RIC's investigation was separate and apart from the investigation that the DAR Office
of Legal Affairs could have conducted once a formal charge had been initiated.

59
In the absence of a law or administrative issuance barring the DARRIC from conducting its own
investigation of Baculi even when there was no complaint being first filed against him, the
eventual report rendered after investigation was valid.

And, secondly, it was of no moment to the validity and efficacy of the dismissal that only
Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Gaite had signed and issued the order of
dismissal. In so doing, Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite neither exceeded his authority,
nor usurped the power of the President. Although the powers and functions of the Chief
Executive have been expressly reposed by the Constitution in one person, the President of the
Philippines, it would be unnatural to expect the President to personally exercise and discharge
all such powers and functions. Somehow, the exercise and discharge of most of these powers
and functions have been delegated to others, particularly to the members of the Cabinet,
conformably to the doctrine of qualified political agency. Accordingly, we have expressly
recognized the extensive range of authority vested in the Executive Secretary or the Deputy
Executive Secretary as an official who ordinarily acts for and in behalf of the President. As such,
the decisions or orders emanating from the Office of the Executive Secretary are attributable to
the Executive Secretary even if they have been signed only by any of the Deputy Executive
Secretaries.

Given the foregoing, the dismissal of Baculi through the order of June 25, 2003, being by
authority of the President, was entitled to full faith and credit as an act of the President herself.
(Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017)

Appeals

Since the CESB is an attached agency of the CSC, the former's decisions are expressly subject to
the CSC's review on appeal.

Against the express mandate given to the CSC in the foregoing provision, the contention of the
CESB that its decisions may only be appealed to the Office of the President must fail. xxx.

In our view, the foregoing rule on appeals to the Office of the President only covers disciplinary
cases involving members of the CES. It is evident that this special rule was created for that
particular type of case, because members of the CES arc all presidential appointees. Given that
the power to appoint generally carries with it the power to discipline, it is only reasonable for
the president to be given the ultimate authority to discipline presidential appointees. But this
special rule cannot apply to the matter at hand, because CESB Resolution No. 918 did not
involve a disciplinary case. Since it was clearly outside the scope of the foregoing provision, the
Resolution did not come within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President. It was therefore
correctly appealed to the CSC.

From the above discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it
resolved the PAO's appeal. The arguments of the CESB on this point must perforce be rejected.
(Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017)

It is settled that a resort to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition is proper only
in cases where (a) a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions

60
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the
concurrence of both these requisites xxx. In this case, the second requirement is plainly absent.
As respondents correctly observed, there was an appeal available to the CESB in the form of a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. xxx. Here, the CESB could
have appealed the CSC Decision and Resolution to the CA via a petition for review under Rule
43. Hence, the filing of the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is improper regardless
of the grounds invoked therein. (Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R.
No. 197762, March 7, 2017)

Apparently, Dacoycoy broadened the scope of "party adversely affected" so as to include the
disciplining authority whose ruling is in question within its definition. However, this
development introduced in Dacoycoy would be short-lived. In the same year that Dacoycoy was
decided, the Court En Banc would render judgment in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals (Mathay) in
the following wise:

We are aware of our pronouncements in the recent case of Civil Service Commission v.
Pedro Dacoycoy which overturned our rulings in Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission,
Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission and Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission. In Dacoycoy,
we affirmed the right of the Civil Service Commission to bring an appeal as the
aggrieved party affected by a ruling which may seriously prejudice the civil service
system.

The aforementioned case, however, is different from the case at bar. Dacoycoy was an
administrative case involving nepotism whose deleterious effect on government cannot
be overemphasized. The subject of the present case, on the other hand, is reinstatement.

We fail to see how the present petition, involving as it does the reinstatement or non-
reinstatement of one obviously reluctant to litigate, can impair the effectiveness of
government. Accordingly, the ruling in Dacoycoy does not apply.

It would then appear that in not all administrative cases would the doctrine in Dacoycoy find
application. On the other hand, Mathay, one of the cases relied upon by respondents, would
pave the way for the Court's rulings in National Police Commission v. Mamauag (Mamauag) and
Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (Pleyto) that would
clarify the Dacoycoy doctrine, specifying that the government party appealing must not be the
quasi-judicial body that meted out the administrative sanction, but the prosecuting body in the
administrative case. xxx.

Later, in the 2008 case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego (Samaniego), the Court En Banc
rendered judgment covering the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases that is in
tune with both Dacoycoy and Mathay. The Court ratiocinated in Samaniego that aside from the
Ombudsman being the disciplining authority whose decision is being assailed, its mandate
under the Constitution also bestows it wide disciplinary authority that includes prosecutorial
powers. Hence, it has the legal interest to appeal a decision reversing its ruling, satisfying both
the requirements of Dacoycoy and Mathay. xxx.

Thus, as things currently stand, Samaniego remains to be the prevailing doctrine. The
Ombudsman has legal interest in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases. Petitioner

61
could not then be faulted for filing its Omnibus Motion before the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP
No. 107551. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 189100, June 21, 2017)

Eligibility

... To require the occupants of the subject PAO positions to possess third-level eligibility would
be to amend the law and defeat its spirit and intent. xxx.

The authority to prescribe qualifications for pos1t10ns in the government is lodged in Congress
as part of its plenary legislative power to create, abolish and modify public offices to meet
societal demands. From this authority emanates the right to change the qualifications for
existing statutory offices.

It was in the exercise of this power that the legislature enacted Section 5 of R.A. 9406, which
provides for the qualifications for the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys,
Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys xxx.

...it is clear that occupants of the subject PAO positions are only mandated to comply with
requirements as to age, citizenship, education, and experience. Since third-level eligibility is not
at all mentioned in the law, it would be improper for the CESB to impose this additional
qualification as a prerequisite to permanent appointments. To do so would be to amend the law
and to overrule Congress.

While the CESB has been granted the power to prescribe entrance requirements for the third-
level of the civil service, this power cannot be construed as the authority to modify the
qualifications specifically set by law for certain positions. Hence, even granting that the
occupants of the subject positions indeed exercise managerial and executive functions as
incidents of their primary roles, the CESB has no power to impose additional qualifications for
them. It cannot use the authority granted to it by Congress itself to defeat the express provisions
of statutes enacted by the latter.

It is also beyond the power of the CESB to question or overrule the specific qualifications
imposed by Congress for the subject positions. The legislature must be deemed to have
considered the entirety of the functions attendant to these posts when it enacted R.A. 9406 and
prescribed the relevant qualifications for each position. The choice not to require third level
eligibility in this instance must be respected - not only by the CESB but also by this Court - as a
matter that goes into the wisdom and the policy of a statute. (Career Executive Service Board v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017)

... it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction and authority as the central personnel
agency of the government when it passed upon the appeal filed by the PAO from CESB
Resolution No. 918. Further, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC when
it reversed the said resolution, which refused to declassify the subject PAO positions. As the
CSC noted, the third-level eligibility required by the CESB as an additional qualification for
these posts contravened not only the express terms, but also the clear intent of R.A. 9406. (Career
Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017)

62
However, the fact that respondent Roque was still a probationer when he applied for the
position of Utility Worker and accomplished his Personal Data Sheet did not disqualify him
from applying for the position. In Moreno v. Commission on Elections (530 Phil. 279 (2006)), the
Court clarified that the grant of probation suspends the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint versus Judge Divina T. Samson, A.M. No. MTJ-
16-1870, June 6, 2017)

… it is clear that when respondent Roque was granted probation, not only was the imposition
of the principal penalty of imprisonment suspended, but the accessory penalty of suspension
from the right to follow a profession or calling was also suspended. Hence, respondent Roque
retained the right to seek employment and was, therefore, not disqualified to apply for the
position of utility worker in the court when he was still a probationer. However, respondent
Roque had the obligation to disclose the fact that he had been formally charged and convicted
of an offense in his Personal Data Sheet and cannot justify his non-disclosure of such fact by
invoking the confidentiality of his records under the Probation Law. (Re: Anonymous Letter-
Complaint versus Judge Divina T. Samson, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1870, June 6, 2017)

Investigation

In this case, records show that the Formal Charge against Gutierrez was issued following the
LTO's issuance of a Show Cause Memorandum. Under Section 16 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), a Show Cause Memorandum emanating
from the disciplining authority or its authorized representative is sufficient to institute
preliminary investigation proceedings, xxx.

A reading of the Show Cause Memorandum issued by the LTO shows that Gutierrez was
directed to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her. The latter then duly
complied therewith by submitting her letter-reply pursuant thereto. Evidently, Gutierrez was
accorded her right to procedural due process when she was given an opportunity to be heard
before the LTO found a prima facie case against her, which thus, necessitated the issuance of the
Formal Charge. In fact, even after the issuance of a Formal Charge, the LTO continued to
respect Gutierrez's right to procedural due process as it allowed her to file an Answer to refute
the charges of Gross Insubordination, Refusal to Perform Official Duties, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against her. (Disciplinary Board, Land Transportation
Office v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 224395, July 3, 2017)

Preventive Suspension

The law abhors the indefinite preventive suspension of public officials and employees, whether
they are presidential appointees or not. For presidential appointees, the suspension should last
only within a reasonable time. For non-presidential appointees, the maximum period of
preventive suspension is 90 days. Once the allowable period of preventive suspension had been
served, the public officials and employees must be automatically reinstated. (Baculi v. Office of
the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017)

63
By law, Baculi should have been automatically reinstated at the end of the 90-day period of his
preventive suspension because his case was not finally decided within the said period.

We have to point out that preventive suspension is of two kinds. The first is the preventive
suspension pending investigation, and the second is the preventive suspension pending appeal
where the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is either suspension or dismissal but
after review the respondent official or employee is exonerated. The nature of preventive
suspension pending investigation has been explained in the following manner:

xxx Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure

intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent
by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against
him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period,
the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after
investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should
be reinstated.

Preventive suspension pending investigation is not violative of the Constitution because it is not
a penalty. It is authorized by law whenever the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or whenever there are reasons to believe that
the respondent is guilty of charges that would warrant removal from the service. If the proper
disciplinary authority does not finally decide the administrative case within a period of 90 days
from the start of preventive suspension pending investigation, and the respondent is not a
presidential appointee, the preventive. suspension is lifted and the respondent is "automatically
reinstated in the service." In the case of presidential appointees, the preventive suspension
pending investigation shall be "for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may
warrant."

Nonetheless, there shall be no indefinite suspension pending investigation, whether the

respondent officials are presidential or nonpresidential appointees. The law abhors indefinite
preventive suspension because the indefiniteness violates the constitutional guarantees under
the due process and equal protection clauses, as well as the right of public officers and
employees to security of tenure. The abhorrence of indefinite suspensions impelled the Court in
Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan to delineate rules on preventive suspensions pending investigation,
viz.:

To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under
Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of
all concerned that this Court set forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension
under the aforementioned laws, as follows:

1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to
a maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuance thereof, and this applies to all
public officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged
under said Act.

2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or
employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections
3 and 4 of said Pres. Decree 807; and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90)
days from issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is

64
 due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of
delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided
that if the person suspended is a presidential appointee, the continuance of his
suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may warrant.

It cannot be validly argued that in the case of presidential appointees the preventive suspension
pending investigation can be indefinite. The Court discredited such argument in Garcia v. The
Executive Secretary, and directed the immediate reinstatement of a presidential appointee whose
preventive suspension had lasted for nearly seven months, declaring:

To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing
administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to
countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty
itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the
Constitution and the Civil Service law. This, it is believed, is not conducive to the
maintenance of a robust, effective and efficient civil service, the integrity of which has,
in this jurisdiction, received constitutional guarantee, as it places in the hands of the
Chief Executive a weapon that could be wielded to undermine the security of tenure of
public officers. Of course, this is not so in the case of those officers holding office at the
pleasure of the President. But where the tenure of office is fixed, as in the case of herein
petitioner, which according to the law he could hold "for 6 years and shall not be
removed therefrom except for cause", to sanction the stand of respondents would be to
nullify and render useless such specific condition imposed by the law itself If he could
be preventively suspended indefinitely, until the final determination of the
administrative charges against him (and under the circumstances, it would be the
President himself who would decide the same at a time only he can determine) then the
provisions of the law both as to the fixity of his tenure and the limitation of his removal
to only for cause would be meaningless. In the guise of a preventive suspension, his
term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed without a finding
of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. This
would set at naught the !audible (sic) purpose of Congress to surround the tenure of
office of the Chairman of the National Science Development Board, which is longer than
that of the President himself, with all the safeguards compatible with the purpose of
maintaining the office of such officer, considering its highly scientific and technological
nature, beyond extraneous influences, and of insuring continuity of research and
development activities in an atmosphere of stability and detachment so necessary for
the fulfillment of its mission, uninterrupted by factors other than removal for cause.32
(Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

In Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court has further reminded that preventive suspension
pending investigation for an indefinite period of time, like one that would last until the case
against the incumbent official would have been finally terminated, would "outrun the bounds
of reason and result in sheer oppression," and would be a denial of due process.

Conformably with the foregoing disquisitions, we hold that the CA correctly decreed that
Baculi should be paid his back salaries and other benefits for the entire time that he should have
been automatically reinstated at the rate owing to his position that he last received prior to his
preventive suspension on September 4, 1992. Such time corresponded to the period from
December 4, 1992 until June 25, 2003, but excluding the interval from March 12, 2001 until
December 31, 2001 when he was briefly reinstated. (Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
188681, March 8, 2017)

65
Dropping from the Rolls

There is no question that a public officer or employee who is AWOL may be separated from
service or dropped from the rolls of employees without prior notice. (Civil Service Commission v.
Plopino, G.R. No. 197571, April 3, 2017)

Based on current rules, a public officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls for AWOL
without prior notice, under any of the following circumstances: (1) the public officer or
employee was continuously absent without approved leave for at least 30 working days; or (2)
the public officer or employee had established a scheme to circumvent the rule by incurring
substantial absences, though less than 30 working days, three times in a semester, such that a
pattern was readily apparent.

Dropping from the rolls is not disciplinary in nature. It shall not result in the forfeiture of any
benefit of the public official or employee concerned nor in said public official or employee's
disqualification from reemployment in the government. Thus, the concerned public official or
employee need not be notified or be heard. (Civil Service Commission v. Plopino, G.R. No. 197571,
April 3, 2017)

Article IX-C
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Enforcement and Administration of

Election Laws

Under Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC has the duty to
"[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election xxx."
The Court had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel the CoC of
anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office,
albeit, arising from a criminal conviction. Considering, however, that Section 52 (a), Rule 10 of
the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service similarly imposes the penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal
from service, the Court sees no reason why the ratiocination enunciated in such earlier criminal
case should not apply here, xxx. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18,
2017)

In Romeo G. Jalosjos v. COMELEC (Jalosjos), the Court had illumined that while the denial of due
course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise of the
COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either Sections 12
or 78 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive
on account of final and executory judgments, as in this case, such exercise falls within the
COMELEC's administrative functions. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158,
April 18, 2017)

66
As petitioner's disqualification to run for public office pursuant to the final and executory OMB
rulings dismissing him from service now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the
COMELEC to cancel petitioner's CoC as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its
Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulation relative to the conduct of
an election. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017)

Certificates of Candidacy

A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of the OEC provides
that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that he is eligible for the office he
seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of his knowledge. To be
"eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of being elected to an office.
Conversely, "ineligibility" has been defined as a "disqualification or legal incapacity to be
elected to an office or appointed to a particular position." In this relation, a person intending to
run for public office must not only possess the required qualifications for the position for which
he or she intends to run, but must also possess none of the grounds for disqualification under
the law. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017)

In this case, petitioner had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct by a final judgment, and
punished with dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties, including perpetual
disqualification from holding public office. Verily, perpetual disqualification to hold public
office is a material fact involving eligibility which rendered petitioner's CoC void from the start
since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed the same. (Dimapilis v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017)

A person whose CoC had been cancelled is deemed to have not been a candidate at all because
his CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and
necessarily to valid votes. The cancellation of the CoC essentially renders the votes cast for him
or her as stray votes, and are not considered in determining the winner of an election. This
would necessarily invalidate his proclamation and entitle the qualified candidate receiving the
highest number of votes to the position. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158,
April 18, 2017)

It is likewise imperative for the eligible candidate who garnered the highest number of votes to
assume the office. In Svetlana P. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, the Court explained:

There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was
proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the
ineligibility.

The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot apply in
instances when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over.
The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the
Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de Jure officer, the
rightful winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the position. (Dimapilis v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017)

67
Petitioner filed the petition for disqualification of respondent on the grounds that he allegedly
violated the three-term limit rule provided under the Constitution and the LGC; and that he
was suspended from office as a result of an administrative case. Notably, however, a reading of
the grounds enumerated under the above-quoted provisions for a candidate's disqualification
does not include the two grounds relied upon by petitioner. Thus, the COMELEC Second
Division was correct when it found that the petition was not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions. xxx.

While the alleged violation of the three-term limit rule is not a ground for a petition for
disqualification, however, the COMELEC Second Division found that it is an ineligibility which
is a proper ground for a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a Certificate of Candidacy
under Section 78 of the OEC, hence considered the petition as such. xxx

Since the petition filed was a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy, such petition must be filed within 25 days from the time of filing of the COC, as
provided under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, as the COMELEC found,
the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period, and dismissed the petition for being
filed out time. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed such dismissal.

We agree. (Albania v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 226792, June 7, 2017)

We, likewise, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC En Banc when it
found that the petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC will not also prosper as there was
no violation of the three-term limit rule. Petitioner alleges that since respondent had already
been elected and had served as Governor of Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms, i.e.,
2007, 2010, and 2013, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2016 elections
as it would already be his fourth consecutive term.

We are not convinced.

We held that two conditions must concur for the application of the disqualification of a
candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. xxx.

In this case, while respondent ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, he did
not win as such. It was only after he filed a petition for correction of manifest error that he was
proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor. He assumed the post and served the unexpired term
of his opponent from March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010. Consequently, he did not hold the
office for the full term of three years to which he was supposedly entitled to. Thus, such period
of time that respondent served as Governor did not constitute a complete and full service of his
term. The period when he was out of office involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his
service as Governor. As he had not fully served the 2007-2010 term, and had not been elected
for three consecutive terms as Governor, there was no violation of the three-term limit rule
when he ran again in the 2016 elections. (Albania v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 226792,
June 7, 2017)

Canvassing of Votes

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In Nasser lmmam v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that a complete canvass of votes is necessary in
order to reflect the true desire of the electorate, and that a proclamation of winning candidates
on the basis of incomplete canvass is illegal and of no effect, viz.:

Jurisprudence provides that all votes cast in an election must be considered, otherwise
voters shall be disenfranchised. A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the
electorate unless and until all returns are considered and none is omitted. In this case,
fourteen (14) precincts were omitted in the canvassing. xxx

An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent

proclamation. A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all
returns are considered and none is omitted. This is true when the election returns
missing or not counted will affect the results of the election.

We note that the votes of petitioner totaled one thousand nine hundred and sixty-one
(1,961) while private respondent garnered a total of one thousand nine hundred thirty
(1,930) votes. The difference was only thirty-one (31) votes. There were fourteen (14)
precincts unaccounted for whose total number of registered voters are two thousand
three hundred

and forty-eight (2,348). Surely, these votes will affect the result of the election.
Consequently, the non-inclusion of the 14 precincts in the counting disenfranchised the
voters.

In the case at bar, the COMELEC En Banc correctly pointed out that the uncanvassed election
returns can still drastically affect the outcome of the elections, since "at the time of Sinsuat's
proclamation, he garnered only [1,230] votes, with the exclusion of the [12] election returns and
[4] election returns that have yet to be canvassed. These [4] election returns amount to [3,049]
votes, or equivalent to 42.91% of the total registered voters of South Upi, Maguindanao."
Notably, Mamalinta's defense of duress - which was upheld in her other two (2) acts of double
proclamation and unauthorized transfer of the place for canvassing - is untenable in this
instance as there was no showing that the MBOC was intimidated or coerced into proclaiming
Sinsuat as the winning candidate for the position of Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao. The
allegations of Mamalinta that force and threats were exerted on her to make said premature
proclamation are self-serving and not supported by any other evidence, hence, cannot be relied
upon. Therefore, Mamalinta's afore-described act of premature proclamation may still be
considered as Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of Service, and thus, she should be held administratively liable therefor. (Commission on
Elections v. Mamalinta, G.R. No. 226622, March 14, 2017)

The penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office may be properly imposed on a
candidate for public office who repeatedly fails to submit his Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures (SOCE) pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166. The penalty does not
amount to the cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment proscribed by the Bill of Rights.
(Maturan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017)

Nonetheless, the petitioner submits that he only failed to submit his SOCE once, in 2010. He
pleads good faith because he thought that he was no longer required to submit his SOCE for the
2013 elections because of his having withdrawn from the mayoral race in that year.

69
His plea of good faith is undeserving of consideration.

The petitioner should have paid heed to the 1995 ruling in Pilar v. Commission of Elections, which
the COMELEC properly cited in its assailed resolution. Based on Pilar, every candidate,
including one who meanwhile withdraws his candidacy, is required to file his SOCE by Section
14 of R.A. No. 7166. Accordingly, the petitioner could not invoke good faith on the basis of his
having withdrawn his candidacy a day before the 2013 elections. (Maturan v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017)

Cardino immediately filed a petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC, which sought to nullify the candidacy
of Jalosjos on the ground of ineligibility. Said petition was docketed as EPC No. 2013-06 before the COMELEC
Second Division.

Cardino alleged that Jalosjos was a former natural-born Filipino citizen who subsequently became a naturalized
citizen of the United States of America (USA). Jalosjos later applied for the reacquisition of her Filipino citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California, USA. On
August 2, 2009, Jalosjos took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and an Order of Approval of
citizenship retention and reacquisition was issued in her favor. However, when Jalosjos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Dapitan City on October 1, 2012, she attached therein an Affidavit of Renunciation
of her American citizenship that was subscribed and sworn to on July 16, 2012 before Judge Veronica C. De
Guzman-Laput of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte.

Cardino averred that based on the certification from the Bureau of Immigration, Jalosjos left the Philippines for the
USA on May 30, 2012 and she presented her US passport to the immigration authorities. Jalosjos then arrived back
in the Philippines via Delta Airlines Flight No. 173 on July 17, 2012 at around 10:45 p.m. using her US passport.
Cardino, therefore, argued that it was physically impossible for Jalosjos to have personally appeared in Manukan,
Zamboanga del Norte before Judge De Guzman-Laput on July 16, 2012 to execute, sign and swear to her Affidavit
of Renunciation.

Cardino alleged that Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation was a falsified document that had no legal effect. As such,
when Jalosjos filed her COC for Mayor of Dapitan City, she still possessed both Philippine and American
citizenships and was therefore disqualified from running for any elective local position. Given that Jalosjos' COC
was void ab initio, she was never a candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City. Cardino, thus, prayed for Jalosjos to be
declared ineligible to run for Mayor of Dapitan City, that her proclamation be set aside, and that he be proclaimed as
the duly-elected Mayor of Dapitan City.

Jalosjos answered that the date of "16th day of July, 2012" was mistakenly indicated in the Affidavit of
Renunciation instead of its actual execution date of July 19, 2012. Jalosjos claimed that it was on the latter date that
she appeared before Judge De Guzman-Laput to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship. Jalosjos further contended that Cardino failed to show that Judge De Guzman-Laput denied having
administered the oath that Jalosjos took as she renounced said citizenship. Jalosjos averred that she had no reason to
make it appear that she renounced her American citizenship on July 16, 2012. The actual date of Jalosjos'
renunciation of her American citizenship on July 19, 2012 allegedly complied with the requirements under Republic
Act No. 9225 such that she remained eligible for the position of Mayor of Dapitan City. (Cardino v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 216637, March 7, 2017)

In this case, the crux of the controversy involves the validity of Jalosjos' Affidavit of
Renunciation. Cardino asserts the spuriousness of the affidavit based on the date of its
supposed execution on July 16, 2012; whereas Jalosjos claims otherwise, insisting that while the
affidavit was so dated, the same was merely an error as the affidavit was executed and
subscribed to on July 19, 2012.

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The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Second Division that the date of July 16, 2012
in the Affidavit of Renunciation was indeed a clerical error. The COMELEC Second Division
gave greater weight to the evidence offered by Jalosjos, particularly the testimony of Judge De
Guzman-Laput, who unequivocally stated that Jalosjos personally appeared before her sala "on
July 19, 2012 to subscribe to the Affidavit of Renunciation. The COMELEC Second Division
found that Cardino failed to disprove Judge De Guzman-Laput's testimony.

After carefully reviewing the evidence on hand, the Court finds no proper reason to disturb the
factual findings of the COMELEC. (Cardino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216637, March 7,
2017)

All things considered, the Court affirms the findings of the COMELEC Second Division that
Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation is not a falsified document. As such, Jalosjos complied with
the provisions of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. By virtue thereof, Jalosjos was able to
fully divest herself of her American citizenship, thus making her eligible to run for the
mayorship of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte. (Cardino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
216637, March 7, 2017)

In Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained in detail the requirements

that must be complied with under Republic Act No. 9225 before a person with dual citizenship
can be qualified to run for any elective public office, to wit:

[Republic Act] No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic, thus:

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship
and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain
conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and

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 be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath; xxx

The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC,
we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual
citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or
she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of
filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the
renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an
affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to
administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is
renouncing all foreign citizenship. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.
(Cardino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216637, March 7, 2017)

Article IX-D
COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that "[u]nless otherwise provided by this
Constitution, or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof." (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10, 2017)

In administrative disciplinary cases decided by the COA, the proper remedy in case of an
adverse decision is an appeal to the Civil Service Commission and not a petition for certiorari
before this Court under Rule 64. (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10,
2017)

Rule 64 governs the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Audit and the Commission on Elections. It refers to Rule 65 for the mode of review of the
judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Audit and the Commission on
Elections. A petition filed under Rule 65 requires that the "tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law xxx."
(Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10, 2017)

Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution governs the review of the COA, in that the COA 's
decisions, final orders or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Cou11 on certiorari by the
aggrieved pai1y within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. To differentiate this review from

72
the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the Court incorporated a new rule (Rule 64)
in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court under the title Review of' Judgments and Final Orders or
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit. Except for the period for
bringing the petition for review, Rule 64 is a replication of the provisions of Rule 65 on the
special civil action for certiorari. (Bintudan v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211937, March 21,
2017)

The Constitution vests enough latitude in the COA, as the guardian of public funds, to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government fund. The COA is thus accorded the complete
discretion to exercise its constitutional duty. To accord with such constitutional empowerment,
the Court generally sustains the COA's decisions in recognition of its expertise in the
implementation of the laws it has been entrusted to enforce. Only if the COA acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, may the Court intervene and correct the COA's actions. For this purpose, grave
abuse of discretion means that there is on the part of the COA an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law, such as
when the assailed decision or resolution rendered is not based on law and the evidence but on
caprice, whim and despotism. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 216538; Antonio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216954, April 18, 2017)

Without any evidence being presented by the COA to show that the individual beneficiaries
and the approving officers had acted in bad faith and with gross negligence in the performance
of their duties in relation to the MVLPP, the persons identified by the COA to be liable for the
disallowances should not be ordered to refund the amounts or restitute the benefits disallowed
by the COA.

Nonetheless, the Court needs to clarify that the claim of good faith is being favorably
considered herein only because the Notice of Disallowance issued long after the disallowed
availments were made, and because no evidence showed those who had availed themselves of
the benefits had not fully returned the funds in question. Verily, there would be no way of
appreciating good faith in their favor had the availments been made after the disallowance
issued. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216538; Antonio v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216954, April 18, 2017)

By jurisprudence, the patent disregard of several case laws and COA directives, as in this case,
amounts to gross negligence; hence, petitioners cannot be presumed in good faith. (Tetangco v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 215061, June 6, 2017)

As the records bear out, the petitioners who approved the EMEs (Extraordinary and
Miscellaneous Expenses) failed to observe the following: first, there is already a law, the GAA,
that limits the grant of EMEs; second; COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997
is a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed
by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their
deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving
double compensation; and third, the irregularity of giving additional compensation or
allowances to ex officio members was already settled by jurisprudence, during the time that the
subject allowances were authorized by the BSP.

73
Indeed, the petitioners-approving officers' disregard of the aforementioned case laws, COA
issuances, and the Constitution, cannot be deemed as a mere lapse consistent with the
presumption of good faith. (Tetangco v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 215061, June 6, 2017)

Clearly, therefore, public officials who are directly responsible for, or participated in making the
illegal expenditures, as well as those who actually received the amounts therefrom shall be
solidarily liable for their reimbursement.

However, in cases involving the disallowance of salaries, emoluments, benefits, and allowances
due to government employees, jurisprudence has settled that recipients or payees in good faith
need not refund these disallowed amounts. For as long as there is no showing of ill intent and
the disbursement was made in good faith, public officers and employees who receive
subsequently disallowed benefits or allowances may keep the amounts disbursed to them.

On the part of the approving officers, they shall only be required to refund if they are found to
have acted in bad faith or were grossly negligent amounting to bad faith. In common usage, the
term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of
intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another,
even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or
belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious." (Sambo v. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 223244, June 20, 2017)

Petitioners failed to faithfully discharge their respective duties and to exercise the required
diligence which resulted in the irregular disbursements paid to the employees whose
appointments have not been approved by the CSC. Being a GOCC, QUEDANCOR is bound by
civil service laws. Under the Constitution, the CSC is the central personnel agency of the
government, including GOCCs. It primarily deals with matters affecting the career
development, rights and welfare of government employees. In this light, the ruling of the COA
Commission Proper in not appreciating good faith on the part of the petitioners must perforce
be upheld. (Sambo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 223244, June 20, 2017)

Article X
LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, aggrieved taxpayers who question
the validity or legality of a tax ordinance are required to file an appeal before the Secretary of
Justice before they seek intervention from the regular courts. Section 187 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 provides:

SECTION 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue
Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances
and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided,
That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof:
Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances
or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from
the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the

74
 effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the
tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt
of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting
upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of
competent jurisdiction. (Aala v. Uy, G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017)

In this case, respondent has no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be
compelled. To recount, respondent filed a mandamus petition before the RTC, seeking that
petitioner, as city government, release the funds appropriated for Brgy. 76-A, together with the
funds for the compensation of barangay employees, and all funds that in the future may accrue
to Brgy. 76-A, including legal interests until full payment. As it appears, respondent anchors his
legal interest to claim such relief on his ostensible authority as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A.
xxx. However, records clearly show that respondent's proclamation as Punong Barangay was
overturned by the COMELEC upon the successful election protest of Tizon, who was later
declared the duly-elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. xxx. Thus, considering that
respondent had no right to the office of Punong Barangay at the time he filed his mandamus
petition on July 26, 2005, during which the SQAO had already been recalled, he had no valid
legal interest to the reliefs prayed for. xxx.

In addition, petitioner could not have been compelled by mandamus to release the funds prayed
for by respondent in view of the attending circumstances. It is well-settled that "[ m ]andamus
only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the
performance of a discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may
not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means the power or right
conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under certain circumstances according to
the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment or
conscience of others."

In this case, petitioner, as city government, had to exercise its discretion not to release the funds
to respondent considering the COMELEC's declaration of Tizon as the duly-elected Punong
Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. Surely, it was part of petitioner's fiscal responsibility to ensure that the
barangay funds would not be released to a person without proper authority. (City of Davao v.
Olanolan, G.R. No. 181149, April 17, 2017)

The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience, and welfare.
There is no indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any harm, or hazard to the people
in the surrounding areas except that the building allegedly poses an unsightly view on the
taking of photos or the visual appreciation of the Rizal Monument by locals and tourists. In fact,
the Court must take the approval of the MZBAA, and its subsequent ratification by the City
Council of Manila, as the duly authorized exercise of discretion by the city officials. Great care
must be taken that the Court does not unduly tread upon the local government's performance
of its duties. It is not for this Court to dictate upon the other branches of the government how
their discretion must be exercised so long as these branches do not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R.
No. 213948, April 25, 2017)

In this case, while respondent ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, he did
not win as such. It was only after he filed a petition for correction of manifest error that he was
proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor. He assumed the post and served the unexpired term

75
of his opponent from March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010. Consequently, he did not hold the
office for the full term of three years to which he was supposedly entitled to. Thus, such period
of time that respondent served as Governor did not constitute a complete and full service of his
term. The period when he was out of office involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his
service as Governor. As he had not fully served the 2007-2010 term, and had not been elected
for three consecutive terms as Governor, there was no violation of the three-term limit rule
when he ran again in the 2016 elections. (Albania v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 226792,
June 7, 2017)
Article XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Public Officers

Munoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing government time for his private
practice. As correctly observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws
(Omnibus Rules), requires government officers and employees of all departments and agencies,
except those covered by special laws, to render not less than eight (8) hours of work a day for
five (5) days a week, or a total of forty (40) hours a week. The number of required weekly
working hours may not be reduced, even in cases where the department or agency adopts a
flexible work schedule.

Notably, Muñoz did not deny Monares' allegation that he made at least eighty-six (86) court
appearances in connection with at least thirty (30) cases from April 11, 1996 to August 1, 2001.
He merely alleged that his private practice did not prejudice the functions of his office.

Court appearances are necessarily made within regular government working hours, from 8:00
in the morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon. Additional time is likewise
required to study each case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer volume of cases
handled by Muñoz clearly indicates that government time was necessarily utilized in pursuit of
his private practice, in clear violation of the DILG authorization and Ru le 6.02 of the CPR.
(Monares v. Munoz, A.C. No. 5582, January 24, 2017)

In Philippine National Railways v. Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., lnc., this Court has held
that contracts that do not comply with the foregoing requirements are void:

Thus, the Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts
involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements are satisfied.
First, there must be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in the
contract. Second, there must be attached to the contract a certification by the proper
accounting official and auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds
are available. Failure to comply with any of these two requirements renders the contract
void.

In several cases, the Court had the occasion to apply these provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. In
these cases, the Court clearly ruled that the two requirements-the existence of
appropriation and the attachment of the certification-are "conditions sine qua non for the
execution of government contracts."

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In COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla, we stated:

It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of
appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or
conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. The obvious intent is to
impose such conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed contract.

The law expressly declares void a contract that fails to comply with the two
requirements, namely, an appropriation law funding the contract and a certification of
appropriation and fund availability. The clear purpose of these requirements is to insure
that government contracts are never signed unless supported by the corresponding
appropriation law and fund availability.

The three contracts between PNR and Kanlaon do not comply with the requirement of a
certification of appropriation and fund availability. Even if a certification of
appropriation is not applicable to PNR if the funds used are internally generated, still a
certificate of fund availability is required. Thus, the three contracts between PNR and
Kanlaon are void for violation of Sections 46, 4 7, and 48, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, as well as Sections 85, 86, and 87 of the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.

However, Kanlaon is not left without recourse. The law itself affords it the remedy.
Section 48 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides that "the officer or officers
entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for
any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between
private parties." Kanlaon could go after the officers who signed the contract and hold
them personally liable. (Citations omitted)

The Complaint, however, completely ignored the foregoing requisites for the validity of
contracts involving expenditure of public funds. Thus, the Regional Trial Court could not order
the enforcement of the alleged contract on the basis of the Complaint, and the Complaint was
properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

Finally, petitioners' invocation of the principle of quantum meruit could not save the Complaint
from dismissal. A careful reading reveals that the Complaint does not mention the principle of
quantum meruit, or any facts showing that the public has derived any benefit from the "Joyride"
project. Even assuming that basis exists to reimburse petitioners under the principle of quantum
meruit, no factual basis for its application was laid down in the Complaint. Its belated
invocation does not retroactively make the Complaint sufficient.

However, as in Philippine National Railways, petitioners are not without recourse.

Under the Administrative Code, officers who enter into contracts contrary to Sections 46 and 47
of Book V, Title I, Subtitle B, Chapter 8 of the Administrative Code are liable to the government
or to the other contracting party for damages:

SECTION 48. Void Contract and Liability of Officer. - Any contract entered into contrary to
the requirements of the two (2) immediately preceding sections shall be void, and the
officer or officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or other
contracting party for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had
been wholly between private parties.

77
Thus, assuming petitioners are able to prove a contract was entered into, they may go after the
officers who entered into said contract and hold them personally liable. (Guillermo v. Philippine
Information Agency, G.R. No. 223751, March 15, 2017)

The Court is not unaware of the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (Arias) that heads of offices may
rely on their subordinates. For the Arias doctrine to apply, however, there must be no reason for
the head of offices to go beyond the recommendations of their subordinates, which is not the
case here.

Given the amounts involved and the timing of the alleged deliveries, the circumstances
reasonably impose on Espina a higher degree of care and vigilance in the discharge of his
duties. Thus, he should have been prompted to make further inquiry as to the truth of his
subordinates' reports. Had he made the proper inquiries, he would have discovered the non-
delivery of the procured items and the non-performance of the procured services, and
prevented the unlawful disbursement. However, he did not do this at all. Instead, he blindly
relied on the report and recommendation of his subordinates and affixed his signature on the
IRFs. Plainly, Espina acted negligently, unmindful of the high position he occupied and the
responsibilities it carried, and without regard to his accountability for the hundreds of millions
in taxpayers' money involved.

Verily, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a "[p ]ublic office is a
public trust [and] [p]ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice and lead modest lives." This high constitutional standard of conduct is not intended to be
mere rhetoric and taken lightly as those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply with
this standard or run the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. Erring public officials may also be held
personally liable for disbursements made in violation of law or regulation, as stated in Section
52, Chapter 9, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Thus, public
officers, as recipients of public trust, are under obligation to perform the duties of their offices
honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their ability. Unfortunately, Espina failed miserably in
this respect. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Espina, G.R. No. 213500, March 15, 2017)

Failing to comply with the mandate to decide cases within the period prescribed by the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of Court and the administrative circulars and guidelines
constitutes gross inefficiency and incompetence, for which the judge may be held to account.
Retirement from the Bench does not exempt the judge from liability for disobeying or ignoring
the mandate. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Aventurado, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2212, April
18, 2017)

… it is worthy to emphasize that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged

with an offense punishable by dismissal from service does not render moot the administrative
case against him. (Judaya v. Balbona, A.M. No. P-06-2279, June 6, 2017)

Here, the Executive Judge of the RTC and the OCA correctly pointed out that respondent's
failure to report for work, which eventually caused him to be declared in AWOL, and his
resignation during the pendency of the investigation against him did not render this

78
administrative case moot and academic, especially so that he is being charged with an offense
punishable by dismissal from service. (Judaya v. Balbona, A.M. No. P-06-2279, June 6, 2017)

Condonation Doctrine

In Carpio Morales, the Court abandoned the "condonation doctrine," explaining that "[e]lection is
not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different
term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior
term."

Although Carpio Morales clarified that such abandonment should be prospectively applied
(thus, treating the condonation doctrine as "good law" when the COMELEC's petition was
commenced on October 29, 2013, and when petitioner filed his Verified Answer cum
Memorandum invoking the same), the parameters for the operation of such doctrine simply do
not obtain in petitioner's favor. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18,
2017)

In this case, the OMB rulings dismissing petitioner for Grave Misconduct had already attained
finality on May 28, 2010, which date was even prior to his first election as Punong Barangay of
Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the October 2010 Barangay Elections. As above-stated, "[t]he penalty
of dismissal [from service] shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government
service, unless otherwise provided in the decision." Although the principal penalty of dismissal
appears to have not been effectively implemented (since petitioner was even able to run and
win for two [2] consecutive elections), the corresponding accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office had already rendered him ineligible to run for any
elective local position. Bearing the same sense as its criminal law counterpart, the term
perpetual in this administrative penalty should likewise connote a lifetime restriction and is not
dependent on the term of any principal penalty. It is undisputable that this accessory penalty
sprung from the same final OMB rulings, and therefore had already attached and consequently,
remained effective at the time petitioner filed his CoC on October 11, 2013 and his later re-
election in 2013. Therefore, petitioner could not have been validly re-elected so as to avail of the
condonation doctrine, unlike in other cases where the condonation doctrine was successfully
invoked by virtue of re-elections which overtook and thus, rendered moot and academic
pending administrative cases. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18,
2017)

Retirement

Retirement benefits are given to government employees to reward them for giving the best
years of their lives to the service of their country. This is especially true with those in
government service occupying positions of leadership or positions requiring management skills
because the years they devote to government service could be spent more profitably elsewhere,
such as in lucrative appointments in the private sector. Hence, in exchange for their selfless
dedication to government service, they should enjoy security of tenure and be ensured of a
reasonable amount of support after they leave the government.

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Pauig insists that retirement laws must be liberally construed in favor of the retirees because the
intention is to provide for their sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when they no longer
have the stamina to continue earning their livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to
public service, Pauig asserts that he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best
concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length
of his services. That generosity, he argues, is the least he should expect now that his work is
done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the
approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to savor the fruits of his toil.

However, the doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in this case, where the law
invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or construction. To uphold
Pauig's position will contravene the very words of the law, and will defeat the ends which it
seeks to attain. (Government Service Insurance System v. Pauig, G.R. No. 210328, January 30, 2017)

Pauig cited the case of GSIS v. CSC, where the Court ruled that the basis for the provision of
retirement benefits is service to the government. Indeed, while a government insurance system
rationalizes the management of funds necessary to keep this system of retirement support afloat
and is partly dependent on contributions made by the thousands of members of the system, the
fact that these contributions are minimal when compared to the amount of retirement benefits
actually received shows that such contributions, while necessary, are not absolutely
determinative in drawing up criteria for those who would qualify as recipients of the retirement
benefit system.

Unfortunately, Pauig's reliance on the aforecited case is misplaced. True, in GSIS v. CSC, the
Court allowed the claimants to avail of their retirement benefits although no deductions were
made from their salaries during the disputed periods when they were paid on a per diem basis.
However, unlike in the case at bar, deductions were actually made from claimant's fixed salary
before and after the short controversial period. She assumed in all good faith that she continued
to be covered by the GSIS insurance benefits considering that, in fact and in practice, the
deductions are virtually mandatorily made from all government employees on an essentially
involuntary basis. More importantly, neither of the claimants in this case of GSIS v. CSC was a
casual or temporary employee like Pauig, both of them being elective officials. Here, the
primordial reason why there were no deductions during those fourteen (14) years was because
Pauig was not yet a GSIS member at that time. There was thus no legal obligation to pay the
premium as no basis for the remittance of the same existed. And since only periods of service
where premium payments were actually made and duly remitted to the GSIS shall be included
in the computation of retirement benefits, said disputed period of fourteen (14) years must
corollarily be removed from Pauig's creditable service.

The Court must deny Pauig's appeal to liberal construction since the applicable law is clear and
unambiguous. The primary modality of addressing the present case is to look into the
provisions of the retirement law itself. Guided by the rules of statutory construction in this
consideration, the Court finds that the language of the retirement law is clear and unequivocal;
no room for construction or interpretation exists, only the application of the letter of the law.
Therefore, Pauig's casual and temporary service in the government from February 12, 1964 to
July 18, 1977 must necessarily be excluded from the creditable period of service for retirement
purposes. (Government Service Insurance System v. Pauig, G.R. No. 210328, January 30, 2017)

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Ombudsman

The issue presented in these consolidated petitions is not novel. In fact, it has long been settled
in a number of cases, to wit: Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, Villasenor, et al. v.
Ombudsman, et al., and The Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencerina, stating that the OMB's
decision, even if the penalty imposed is dismissal from the service, is immediately executory
despite the pendency of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal and cannot be stayed by
mere filing of them. (Cobarde-Gamallo v. Escandor, G.R. No. 184464, June 21, 2017)

It can be gleaned from the afore-quoted provision that the OMB's decisions in administrative
cases may either be unappealable or appealable. The unappealable decisions are final and
executory, to wit: (1) respondent is absolved of the charge; (2) the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not more than one month; and (4) a fine equivalent to
one month's salary. The appealable decisions, on the other hand, are those falling outside the
aforesaid enumeration, and may be appealed to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
within 15 days from receipt of the written notice of the decision or order denying the motion for
reconsideration. Section 7 (of Rule III, of the OMB Rules of Procedure, as amended by AO No.
17) is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory,
and that such shall be executed as a matter of course. (Cobarde-Gamallo v. Escandor, G.R. No.
184464, June 21, 2017)

Here, Escandor was ordered dismissed from the service. Undoubtedly, such decision against
him is appealable via Rule 43 to the CA. Nonetheless, the same is immediately executory even
pending appeal or in his case even pending his motion for reconsideration before the OMB as
that is the clear mandate of Section 7, Rule III of the OMB Rules of Procedure, as amended, as
well as the OMB's MC No. 01, Series of 2006. As such, Escandor's filing of a motion for
reconsideration does not stay the immediate implementation of the OMB's order of dismissal
since "a decision of the [OMB] in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course"
under the afore-quoted Section 7. (Cobarde-Gamallo v. Escandor, G.R. No. 184464, June 21, 2017)

Further, in applying Section 7, there is no vested right that is violated as the respondent in the
administrative case is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal and, in the
event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal. To note, there is no such thing as a vested
interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Except for constitutional offices that
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office. Hence, no vested right of Escandor would be violated as he would be
considered under preventive suspension and entitled to the salary and emoluments that he did
not receive, by reason of his dismissal from the service, in the event that his Motion for
Reconsideration will be granted or that he wins in his eventual appeal. (Cobarde-Gamallo v.
Escandor, G.R. No. 184464, June 21, 2017)

The OMB is authorized to promulgate its own rules of procedure by none other than the
Constitution, which is fleshed out in Sections 18 and 27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770,
otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989" empowering the OMB to "promulgate its
rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties"

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and to accordingly amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may require. With that,
the CA cannot just stay the execution of decisions rendered by the OMB when its rules
categorically and specifically warrant their enforcement, else the OMB’s rule-making authority
be unduly encroached and the constitutional and statutory provisions providing the same be
disregarded. (Cobarde-Gamallo v. Escandor, G.R. No. 184464, June 21, 2017)

Thus, as things currently stand, Samaniego remains to be the prevailing doctrine. The
Ombudsman has legal interest in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases. Petitioner
could not then be faulted for filing its Omnibus Motion before the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP
No. 107551. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 189100, June 21, 2017)

Thus, in the three cases that seemingly strayed from Samaniego, it can be said that under the
circumstances obtaining therein, the appellate court had a valid reason for disallowing the
Ombudsman to participate in those cases because the latter only moved for intervention after
the CA already rendered judgment. By that time, intervention is no longer warranted. (Office of
the Ombudsman v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 189100, June 21, 2017)

SALNs

It must be emphasized that the filing of SALNs is obligatory on the part of all officials and
employees of the government. A SALN is a pro forma document which must be completed and
submitted under oath by the declarant attesting to his/her total assets and liabilities, including
businesses and financial interests that make up his/her net worth. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, mandates all officials and employees in the government service to accomplish and
submit, under oath, declarations of their assets, liabilities, net worth and business interests
including those of their spouse and unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age. xxx.

Thus, upon assumption of office and every year thereafter, it is mandatory for all public officials
and employees, whether regular or co-terminous, to file their SALNs.

In completing the SALN, particularly the portion requiring the declaration of real properties, it
is compulsory for the declarant to disclose the kind, location, year, and mode of acquisition, the
assessed value, current fair market value and the acquisition cost of the property including the
improvements thereon. Before 2011, public officers and employees accomplished their SALNs
by accomplishing the pro forma form drawn up by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). During
the time, a general statement of one's assets and liabilities would suffice, as the declarant had no
obligation to enumerate in detail his assets and liabilities.

In order to make the SALN a more effective tool for transparency and accountability, the CSC
created a technical working group for the revision and amendments on the use of SALN. On
July 8, 2011, the CSC issued Resolution No. 1100902 prescribing the guidelines in accomplishing
the revised SALN. The implementation of the revised SALN was, however, deferred due to
several requests from the private sectors, the House Committee on Civil Service and
Professional Regulation, and the Senate Committee on Civil Service and Government
Reorganization, citing that government workers had not fully comprehended the requirements
in the filling out of the new SALN form and for lack of sufficient knowledge on how to
accomplish it.

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Thereafter, CSC Resolution No. 1300174, dated January 24, 2013, was circulated prescribing the
new SALN Form and Guidelines in the Filling Out of the SALN Form. This was, however,
revised again thru CSC Resolution No. 1500088, dated January 23, 2015. CSC Resolution No.
1500088 is the current SALN that must be accomplished by all government officials and
employees. Unlike the old form, the new SALN form is more restrictive as it requires a more
detailed and sworn statement of the declarant's assets, liabilities and net worth, disclosure of
business interests, financial connections, relatives in the government service, and amount and
sources of income for the preceding calendar year. With respect to real property, the declarant is
mandated to disclose the description and the exact location of the property involved. (In re:
Alleged Immorality and Unexplained Wealth of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado, A.M.
OCA IPI No. 10-21-SB-J. April 4, 2017)

Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or
employee, and would normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that
mere non-declaration of the required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to such
an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements.
In addition, a public officer or employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such
non-declaration results in the accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to
his/her income, and income from other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain
these sources of income and acquisitions.

Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a wrong, or to
deceive the authorities, and conceal the other properties in petitioner's and her husband's
names. Petitioner's failure to disclose in her 1997 SALN her business interest in KEI is not a
sufficient badge of dishonesty in the absence of bad faith, or any malicious intent to conceal the
truth or to make false statements. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some
motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. xxx.

It should be emphasized that the laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition of unexplained
wealth. Thus, in several cases where the source of the undisclosed wealth was properly
accounted for, the Court deemed the same an "explained wealth" which the law does not
penalize. Consequently, absent any intent to commit a wrong, and having accounted for the
source of the "undisclosed wealth," as in this case, petitioner cannot be adjudged guilty of the
charge of Dishonesty; but at the most, of mere negligence for having failed to accomplish her
SALN properly and accurately. (Daplas v. Department of Finance, G.R. No. 221153, April 17, 2017)

Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land
back to the mass of the public domain. It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded
and disposed of to private individuals or corporations. There are also instances when we
granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a "person obtains a title under the
Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the
Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because
it is of the public domain."

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In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation
in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa's favor. The argument
for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully included in the certificate of title
because it is of the public domain.

Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the State to
prove that the property was classified as timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to
Espinosa. To reiterate, there is no burden on Caliston to prove that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land. At this stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from
whom Caliston derived her title, had already established that the property is alienable and
disposable land considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it. In this reversion
proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the
property in Espinosa's title because it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule
that the burden of proof rests on the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. (Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 186603, April 5, 2017)

The Gamboa Decision already held, in no uncertain terms, that what the Constitution requires is
"[f]ull [and legal] beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled
with 60 percent of the voting rights xxx must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals xxx." And,
precisely that is what SEC-MC No. 8 provides, viz.: "xxx For purposes of determining
compliance [with the constitutional or statutory ownership], the required percentage of Filipino
ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled
to vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock,
whether or not entitled to vote xxx." xxx. (Roy v. Herbosa, Resolution on the MR, G.R. No.
207246, April 18, 2017)

… the definition of "beneficial owner or beneficial ownership" in the SRC-IRR, which is in

consonance with the concept of "full beneficial ownership" in the FIA-IRR, is, as stressed in the
Decision, relevant in resolving only the question of who is the beneficial owner or has beneficial
ownership of each "specific stock" of the public utility company whose stocks are under review.
If the Filipino has the voting power of the "specific stock," i.e., he can vote the stock or direct
another to vote for him, or the Filipino has the investment power over the "specific stock", i.e.,
he can dispose of the stock or direct another to dispose of it for him, or both, i.e., he can vote and
dispose of that "specific stock" or direct another to vote or dispose it for him, then such Filipino
is the "beneficial owner" of that "specific stock." Being considered Filipino, that "specific stock" is
then to be counted as part of the 60% Filipino ownership requirement under the Constitution.
The right to the dividends, jus fruendi - a right emanating from ownership of that "specific stock"
necessarily accrues to its Filipino beneficial owner." (Roy v. Herbosa, Resolution on the MR, G.R.
No. 207246, April 18, 2017)

Article XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law generally covers all public
and private agricultural lands. (Heirs of Augusto Salas Kr. V. Cabungcal, G.R. No. 191545, March
29, 2017)

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The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law covers all public and private agricultural lands, as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced. However, a maximum of five (5) hectares of the landowner's compact or contiguous
landholdings may not be distributed to qualified beneficiaries, as it is within the landowner's
rights to retain this area.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program covers the following lands: (1) all alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture; (2) all lands of the
public domain exceeding the total area of five hectares and below to be retained by the
landowner; (3) all government-owned lands that are devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and
(4) all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture, regardless of the agricultural
products raised or can be raised on these lands. (Heirs of Augusto Salas Kr. V. Cabungcal, G.R. No.
191545, March 29, 2017)

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law covers all agricultural lands, save for those not used
or suitable for agricultural activities.

The law defines agricultural land as "land devoted to agricultural activity ... and not classified
as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." For agricultural land to be
considered devoted to an agricultural activity, there must be "cultivation of the soil, planting of
crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of
such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical." (Heirs
of Augusto Salas Kr. V. Cabungcal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017)

Aside from being devoted to an agricultural activity, the land must, likewise, not have been
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land. (Heirs of Augusto Salas
Kr. V. Cabungcal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017)

As a general rule, agricultural lands that were reclassified as commercial, residential, or

industrial by the local government, as approved by the HLURB, before June 15, 1988 are
excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

A farmlot is not included in any of these categories. (Heirs of Augusto Salas Kr. V. Cabungcal, G.R.
No. 191545, March 29, 2017)

The reclassification of Salas' landholding into a farmlot subdivision, although effected before
Republic Act No. 6657, has not changed the nature of these agricultural lands, the legal
relationships existing over such lands, or the agricultural usability of the lands. Thus, these lots
were properly subjected to compulsory coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. (Heirs of Augusto Salas Kr. V. Cabungcal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017)

However, We emphasize that the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not
meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor
does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right. We should always be
mindful that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of

85
established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. (C. F. Sharp Crew Management
v. Castillo, G.R. No. 208215, April 19, 2017)

Article XIV
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, etc.

Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject of arts and culture,
provides that "[t]he State shall conserve, promote and the nation's historical and cultural
heritage and resources xx ." Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress passed laws
dealing with the preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage. (Knights of Rizal v.
DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017)

CARLO L. CRUZ

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