24. G.R. Nos.

212656-57, November 23, 2016

MAYOR AMADO CORPUZ, JR , v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

SANDIGANBAYAN,

Facts:

Petitioner Corpuz, in his official capacity as the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo,

Nueva Ecija, was indicted for two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Document. That
the petitioner falsify the Certificate of Marriage, of Manny Asuncion and Dina Lumanlan
and of Alex Pascual and Esperanza Arizbal, by certifying therein that it was he who
solemnized their marriage when in truth and in fact, he was not the one who solemnized
the same but rather Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., Local Civil Registrar (of) Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija, to the damage and prejudice of the said couple and of public interest.

As petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges, trial ensued with the prosecution
presenting five (5) witnesses, and the defense presenting three (3) witnesses, inclusive
of documentary evidence admitted therein, in order to resolve the jointly proposed issue
of "who among the parties the complainant on the one hand, [and] the married couples
and the sponsors who attest to the fact that it was the accused who solemnized the said
marriage is telling the truth?" At the trial, the prosecution presented complainant Arsenio
Flores, who testified that being one of the wedding sponsors of Alex Pascual and
Esperanza Arizabal, he attended and witnessed the actual ceremony of their wedding
which was solemnized by Thelmo Corpuz, Sr. His testimony was corroborated by
Honorato M. Tolentino, the brother-in-law of Alex Pascual, who testified that he
rendered his services for free as a photographer during said wedding, and witnessed
the actual ceremony, with the observation that it was Thelmo Corpuz, Sr. who
solemnized the same. Lastly, the prosecution presented as rebuttal witness, Thelmo O.
Corpuz, Sr., who testified that complainant Arsenio Flores filed a case for usurpation of
official functions against him before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in connection with
the marriages of the couples, which he allegedly solemnized; that he changed his plea
of NOT GUILTY to that of GUILTY, in order to have a peace of mind and to reveal the
truth that it was actually him who solemnized said marriages.

In his defense, petitioner himself testified. He insisted that he actually solemnized

at his office the marriage of spouses Pascual and that of spouses Asuncion; that
complainant Arsenio Flores was not present at the mayor's office when the wedding of
spouses Pascual took place; that in the subject weddings, all signatures appearing on
the marriage certificates were actually signed in his presence; that as a mayor for
eighteen ( 18) years, he knew that the power to solemnize marriage cannot be
delegated. In his memorandum, the [petitioner] maintains his innocence as he questions
the trustworthiness and reliability of the prosecution's witnesses. According to him, the
presumption of authenticity of public documents, the marriage certificates in these
cases, should prevail over the inconsistent testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution that it was not him who officiated these ceremonies. According to him also,
the couples themselves through Alex and Manny, who are definitely in the best position
to attest that it was the [petitioner] himself who solemnized their marriage, did so in
open court and expressed such fact in their Joint Affidavits.

Issue

Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification
of public documents

Ruling

NO. At the outset, the Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness ofthe defense's evidence for it has the onus probandi in establishing
the guilt of the accused - ei incumbit probatio qui elicit, non que negat - he who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove. In other words, the burden of such proof rests with the
prosecution, which must rely on the strength of its case rather than on the weakness of
the case for the defense. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of
those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence. Worthy to mention that in every criminal conviction, the prosecution is
required to prove two thins beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the commission of
the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements of the offense; and second, the
fact that the accused was the perpetrator of the crime.

In ruling that petitioner was not the one who solemnized the subject marriages,
the Sandiganbayan relied heavily on the testimonial evidence of the prosecution's
witnesses, particularly on the common fact that they all witnessed an alleged ceremony
conducted on said dates wherein Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar, was
the one who acted as the solemnizing officer, and not petitioner. It further considered
the photos and photocopies of the invitations presented and offered as additional proofs
to establish the aforesaid incidents which show spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion
standing in front of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. Moreover, the testimony of Thelmo O.
Corpuz, Sr., being a rebuttal evidence to the claims of Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M.
Asuncion that it was petitioner who solemnized their respective marriages, was vastly
recognized as acceptable and damaging to petitioner's defense since the principle
of res inter alios acta (the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or mission of another) does not apply in this case. A perusal of the offered and
admitted evidence, testimonial and documentary, reveals some misappreciation of facts
of which if considered· may result in a different conclusion. In other words, there were
findings grounded entirely on speculation and/or premised on want of evidence that are
needed to be resolved in the case before us.

None of the testimonial and documentary evidence offered by the prosecution

was able to dispute the presumption of regularity of an official function and authenticity
and due execution of the public instruments issued by petitioner as the Municipal
Mayor, which may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Looking into the evidence presented, the only patent conclusion that can be derived
from the prosecution's evidence, as admitted by the witnesses for the defense, is that
both couples appeared before. Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., for the sole purpose of recetvmg
marriage counseling and/or marriage rehearsals, nothing more.

If only to stress the merit of this petition, we repeat the axioms that the Bill of
Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the prosecution is required
to adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the
accused to be freed, it becomes the Court's constitutional duty to acquit him.

Furthermore, it has been consistently ruled that "[c]ourts must judge the guilt or
innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures, presumptions,
or suspicions."29 It is iniquitous to base petitioner's guilt on the presumptions of the
prosecution's witnesses for the Court has, time and again, declared that if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of
which being consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or others
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the constitutional presumption of
innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support a
conviction.

25. G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016

GLORIA S. DY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANDY

COMMODITIES CO., INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, WILLIAM
MANDY, Respondent
Facts

Petitioner was the former General Manager of MCCL. In the course of her
employment, petitioner assisted MCCI in its business involving several properties. One
such business pertained to the construction of warehouses over a property (Numancia
Property) that MCCI leased from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Sometime in May
1996, in pursuit of MCCI's business, petitioner proposed to William Mandy (Mandy),
President of MCCI, the purchase of a property owned by Pantranco. As the transaction
involved a large amount of money, Mandy agreed to obtain a loan from the International
China Bank of Commerce (ICBC). Petitioner represented that she could facilitate the
approval of the loan. As security, MCCI also executed a chattel mortgage over the
warehouses in the Numancia Property. Mandy entrusted petitioner with the obligation to
manage the payment of the loan.

In February 1999, MCCI received a notice of foreclosure over the mortgaged

property due to its default in paying the loan obligation. In order to prevent the
foreclosure, Mandy instructed petitioner to facilitate the payment of the loan. MCCI,
through Mandy, issued 13 Allied Bank checks and 12 Asia Trust Bank checks in varying
amounts. Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner. Mandy claims that he delivered the
checks with the instruction that petitioner use the checks to pay the loan. Petitioner, on
the other hand, testified that she encashed the checks and returned the money to
Mandy. ICBC eventually foreclosed the mortgaged property as MCCI continued to
default in its obligation to pay. Mandy claims that it was only at this point in time that he
discovered that not a check was paid to ICBC.n

Thus, on October 7, 2002, MCCI, represented by Mandy, filed a Compiamt-

Affidavit for Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. After a full-blown
trial, the RTC Manila rendered a decision acquitting petitioner. The RTC Manila found
that while petitioner admitted that she received the checks, the prosecution failed to
establish that she was under any obligation to deliver them to ICBC in payment of
MCCFs loan. The trial court made this finding on the strength of Mandy's admission that
he gave the checks to petitioner with the agreement that she would encash them.
Petitioner would then pay ICBC using her own checks. The trial court further made a
finding that Mandy and petitioner entered into a contract of loan. Thus, it held that the
prosecution failed to establish an important element of the crime of estafa—
misappropriation or conversion. However, while the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner, it
ordered her to pay the amount of the checks. Petitioner filed an appeal15 of the civil
aspect of the RTC Decision with the CA. In the Assailed Decision, the CA found the
appeal without merit. It held that the acquittal of petitioner does not necessarily absolve
her of civil liability.

Issue
Whether or not the right to due process of the petitioner was violated

Ruling

Yes. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution dictates that a civil liability arising from
a contract must be litigated in a separate civil action. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights
states that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. This
provision protects a person's right to both substantive and procedural due process.
Substantive due process looks into the validity of a law and protects against
arbitrariness. Procedural due process, on the other hand, guarantees procedural
fairness. It requires an ascertainment of "what process is due, when it is due, and the
degree of what is due."This aspect of due process is at the heart of this case.

In general terms, procedural due process means the right to notice and hearing
which the Rules of Court provides the set of procedures. It requires that any person
invoking the power of the judiciary to protect or enforce a right or prevent or redress a
wrong must file an initiatory pleading which embodies a cause of action, which is
defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.The contents
of an initiatory pleading alleging a cause of action will vary depending on the source of
the obligation involved. In the case of an obligation arising from a contract, as in this
case, the cause of action in an initiatory pleading will involve the duties of the parties to
the contract, and what particular obligation was breached. On the other hand, when the
obligation arises from an act or omission constituting a crime, the cause of action must
necessarily be different. In such a case, the initiatory pleading will assert as a cause of
action the act or omission of respondent, and the specific criminal statute he or she
violated. Where the initiatory pleading fails to state a cause of action, the respondent
may file a motion to dismiss even before trial.

In a situation where a court (in a fused action for the enforcement of criminal and
civil liability) may validly order an accused-respondent to pay an obligation arising from
a contract, a person's right to be notified of the complaint, and the right to have the
complaint dismissed if there is no cause of action, are completely defeated. In this
event, the accused-respondent is completely unaware of the nature of the liability
claimed against him or her at the onset of the case. The accused-respondent will not
have read any complaint stating the cause of action of an obligation arising from a
contract. All throughout the trial, the accused-respondent is made to believe that should
there be any civil liability awarded against him or her, this liability is rooted from the act
or omission constituting the crime. The accused-respondent is also deprived of the
remedy of having the complaint dismissed through a motion to dismiss before trial. In a
fused action, the accused-respondent could not have availed of this remedy because he
or she was not even given an opportunity to ascertain what cause of action to look for in
the initiatory pleading. In such a case, the accused-respondent is blindsided. He or she
could not even have prepared the appropriate defenses and evidence to protect his or
her interest. This is not the concept of fair play embodied in the Due Process Clause. It
is a clear violation of a person's right to due process. The right to be heard under the
Due Process Clause requires not just any kind of an opportunity to be heard. It
mandates that a party to a case must have the chance to be heard in a real and
meaningful sense. It does not require a perfunctory hearing, but a court proceeding
where the party may adequately avail of the procedural remedies granted to him or her.
A court decision resulting from this falls short of the mandate of the Due Process
Clause.

Indeed, the language of the Constitution is clear. No person shall be deprived of

property without due process of law. Due Process, in its procedural sense, requires, in
essence, the right to notice and hearing. These rights are further fleshed out in the
Rules of Court. The Rules of Court enforces procedural due process because, to repeat
the words of this Court in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, it provides for "what process is
due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due." A court ordering an accused in a
fused action to pay his or her contractual liability deprives him or her of his or her
property without the right to notice and hearing as expressed in the procedures and
remedies under the Rules of Court. Thus, any court ruling directing an accused in a
fused action to pay civil liability arising from a contract is one that completely disregards
the Due Process Clause. This ruling must be reversed and the Constitution upheld.

26. G.R. No. 210858 June 29, 2016

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Petitioner, vs. BCA INTERNATIONAL

CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts

In an Amended Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement dated 5 April 2002

(Agreement), petitioner Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) awarded the Machine
Readable Passport and Visa Project (MRPN Project) to respondent BCA International
Corporation (BCA), a domestic corporation. During the implementation of
the MRPN Project, DFA sought to terminate the Agreement. However, BCA opposed
the termination and filed a Request for Arbitration, according to the provision in the
Agreement:

On 29 June 2009, an ad hoc arbitral tribunal was constituted. In an Order dated

15 April 2013, the arbitral tribunal approved BCA's request to apply in court for the
issuance of subpoena, subject to the conditions that the application will not affect its
proceedings and the hearing set in October 2013 will proceed whether the witnesses
attend or not. On 16 May 2013, BCA filed before the RTC a Petition for Assistance in
Taking Evidence. In its petition, BCA sought the issuance of subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum to the following witnesses and documents in
their custody.

DFA filed its comment, alleging that the presentation of the witnesses and
documents was prohibited by law and protected by the deliberative process privilege.

Issue

Whether of not the witnesses presented during the hearings before the ad hoc arbitral
tribunal are prohibited from disclosing information on the basis of the deliberative
process privilege

Ruling

According to the RTC, based on Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, "acts,

transactions or decisions are privileged only before a definite proposition is reached by
the agency," and since, in this case, DFA not only made "a definite proposition" but
already entered into a contract then the evidence sought to be produced is no longer
privileged. Furthermore, information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or
proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately
accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going,
there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However,
once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite
proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right to
information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information
leading to such definite proposition.

The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as

privileged information under the separation of powers. The right does not also apply to
information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security,
and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential. The
right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law.

Contrary to the RTC's ruling, there is nothing in our Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority ruling which states that once a "definite proposition" is reached by an agency,
the privileged character of a document no longer exists. On the other hand, we hold that
before a "definite proposition" is reached by an agency, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" yet which can be accessed by the public under the right to
information. Only when there is an official recommendation can a "definite proposition"
arise and, accordingly, the public's right to information attaches. However, this right to
information has certain limitations and does not cover privileged information to
protect the independence of decision-making by the government. Clearly, Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority expressly mandates that "privileged information" should be
outside the scope of the constitutional right to information, just like military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. In
these exceptional cases, even the occurrence of a "definite proposition" will not give rise
to the public's right to information.

The deliberative process privilege applies if its purpose is served, that is, "to
protect the frank exchange of ideas and opinions critical to the government's decision[-
]making process where disclosure would discourage such discussion in the future. The
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that the deliberative process
privilege's "ultimate purpose x x x is to prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions
by allowing government officials freedom to debate alternative approaches in private,"
and this ultimate purpose would not be served equally well by making the privilege
temporary or held to have expired. Thus, "[t]he deliberative process privilege exempts
materials that are 'predecisional' and 'deliberative,' but requires disclosure of policy
statements and final opinions 'that have the force of law or explain actions that an
agency has already taken."
In the present case, considering that the RTC erred in applying our ruling
in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,and both BCA's and DFA's assertions of
subpoena of evidence and the deliberative process privilege are broad and lack
specificity, we will not be able to determine whether the evidence sought to be produced
is covered by the deliberative process privilege. The parties are directed to specify their
claims before the RTC and, thereafter, the RTC shall determine which evidence is
covered by the deliberative process privilege,

27. G.R. No. 222702

RAPPLER, INC., Petitioner, vs. ANDRES D. BAUTISTA, Respondent.

Facts:

Rappler, Inc. Signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to sponsor the 2016

Presidential and Vice-Presidential debates. Alleging that is it being discriminated
particularly as regards the MOA provisions on live audio broadcast via online streaming,
Rappler argues that the MOA grants radio stations the right to simultaneously broadcast
live the audio of the debates, even if the radio stations are not obliged to perform any
obligation under the MOA. However, the right to broadcast by online live streaming the
audio of the debates is denied to the petitioner and other online media entities which
also have the capacity to live stream the audio of the debates
 Rappler filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against COMELEC Chairman
Andres Bautista to nullify MOA provisions on the ground of violating the fundamental
rights protected under the Constitution.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioner has the right to live stream the debates

Ruling

Yes, Rappler has the right to live stream the debates because the exercise to do so is
contractual right under the MOA. Under the MOA, as long as it complies with the
copyright conditions for the debates, it can live stream the debates.

The MOA recognized the right of other mass media entities, not parties to the
MOA, to reproduce the debates subject to the same copyright conditions. The freedom
of the pres to report and disseminate the live audio can no longer be infringed or subject
to prior restraint. Such freedom of the press to report and disseminate the live audio of
the debates is now protected and guaranteed under Section4, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that, “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom ...of
the press>”

The petition was partially granted. The COMELEC Chairman was directed to
allow the debates to be shown or live streamed unaltered on the petitioner’s website
subject to the copyright condition hat the source is clearly indicated.

28. GR. NOS. 206310-11 (OMB-0-01-0211 and OMB-0-01 0291; Sandiganbayan

Special Division-Criminal Case No. 26558), December 07, 2016

JAIME DICHAVES, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL

DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

Facts

This resolves a Petition for Certiorari1 assailing the Office of the Ombudsman's
finding of probable cause to charge petitioner Jaime Dichaves with plunder. The
consolidated complaints trace their roots to the contents of the sealed second envelope,
Estrada's impeachment trial, and his plunder trial before the Sandiganbayan in People
v. Estrada (Criminal Case No. 26558).

Dichaves was subsequently identified as one of the John Does in People v.

Estrada. While the preliminary investigation proceedings in these complaints were being
conducted, Dichaves was nowhere to be found in the Philippines. On September 13,
2001, the Ombudsman jointly resolved OMB-0-01-0211 and OMB-0-01-0291, finding
probable cause to also indict Dichaves for plunder under Section 2 of Republic Act No.
7080.Consequently, a warrant of arrest was issued against Dichaves, but he could not
be located as he had already slipped out of the country. No subpoena was served on
him.

After Estrada's conviction and pardon, Dichaves resurfaced on November 19,

2010. He filed a Motion to Quash and/or Motion for Reinvestigation, seeking for a
preliminary investigation of his case as none was conducted, which was granted by the
Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman commenced the preliminary investigation,and
Dichaves was ordered to submit his counter-affidavit on the consolidated cases.On
March 14, 2012, the Office of the Ombudsman Special Panel issued a Joint Resolution,
finding probable cause to charge Dichaves with plunder.

Thus, Dichaves was indicted for conspiring with the former President in amassing
ill-gotten wealth through profits and commissions from the purchase of Belle
Corporation shares by the Government Service Insurance System and the Social
Security System.

Issue

Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding
probable cause against petitioner since the pieces of evidence allegedly was not
presented during the preliminary investigation

Ruling

No. Petitioner argues that he was not able to cross-examine the witnesses; thus,
the evidence presented during the impeachment and the plunder trials of Estrada -
consisting of testimonies of Clarissa Ocampo, Atty. Manuel Curato and Willy Ng Ocier -
are allegedly hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible.

A person's rights in a preliminary investigation are subject to the limitations of

procedural law. These rights are statutory, not constitutional. The purpose of a
preliminary investigation is merely to present such evidence "as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that [the respondent in a
criminal complaint] is probably guilty thereof."

Thus, petitioner has no right to cross-examine the witnesses during a preliminary

investigation. At this early stage, the Ombudsman has yet to file an information that
would trigger into operation the rights of the accused (found under Section 14(2) of
Article III150 of the Constitution). "It is the filing of a complaint or information in court that
initiates a criminal action[,]" and carries with it all the accompanying rights of an
accused.

Only when a person stands trial may he or she demand "the right to confront and
cross-examine his [or her] accusers[.]"This right cannot apply to petitioner, who has yet
to be arraigned and face trial as he left the country at the time he was initially charged
with plunder. Furthermore, petitioner's failure to cross-examine the witnesses during the
trial in People v. Estrada was, thus, his own fault. When he slipped out of the
Philippines following Estrada's impeachment in 2000, petitioner was able to avert the
implementation of the initial warrant of arrest against him. His decisions have
consequences.

29. G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SPS. MARGARITO ASOQUE

AND TARCINIA ASOQUE, Respondents.

Facts:

Spouses Asoque are the registered owners of a parcel of coconut land located in
Barangay Bugtong, Calbayog City. Sometime in November 1995, the National Power
Corporation entered the Spouses Asoque's land to install transmission lines for its 350
KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Line Project.

The National Power Corporation utilized 4,352 square meters for the project.

Spouses Asoque allege that beforehand, they were made to understand that the
National Power Corporation would pay them the value of the portion of the land used
and all improvements that would be destroyed for the National Power Corporation's
project.They incurred actual damages as a result of the National Power Corporation's
cutting off some coconut trees and other fruit- and non-fruit-bearing plants during the
construction. They were also prohibited from introducing on the 4,352-square-meter
area any improvement that could rise by a few meters from the ground.

Upon Spouses Asoque's demand for just compensation, the National Power
Corporation only paid for the improvements destroyed and refused to pay for the actual
value of the 4,352-square-meter area utilized for the project. The National Power
Corporation claimed that it was only liable to pay for right of way at 10% of the market
value under Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395,... as amended.

On September 20, 1999, Spouses Asoque filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Calbayog City a Complaint... for payment of just compensation and damages against
the National Power Corporation.

In its Answer... dated February 7, 2000, the National Power Corporation denied
Spouses Asoque's claims that it had illegally utilized their property. It alleged that it
entered the property with Spouses Asoque's consent, as shown by the acknowledgment
receipt... for P9,897.00 as payment for damaged improvements and waiver of claims to
improvements damaged.

By virtue of the acknowledgement receipt and the waiver, the National Power
Corporation claimed that there was no more need for it to institute an expropriation
proceeding.

On June 25, 2002, the Regional Trial Court rendered the Decision... in favor of
Spouses Asoque and ordered the National Power Corporation to pay them. Aggrieved,
the National Power Corporation filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals denied... the National Power Corporation's appeal in its
Decision dated November 21, 2005. It affirmed with modification the Regional Trial
Court Decision by deleting the amount of P158,369.00 as compensation for the
damaged improvements for lack of legal and factual basis. The Court of Appeals found
no impropriety on the part of the Regional Trial Court in allowing Spouses Asoque to
present their evidence ex parte and in appointing the Branch Clerk of Court as
Commissioner to receive Spouses Asoque's evidence ex parte.

It also found no irregularity in the trial court's adoption of the Commissioner's

report/recommendation, which was found to be comprehensive and supported by
evidence.

Rejecting the National Power Corporation's stance that only an easement of right
of way was acquired at 10% of the market value under Section 3-A of Republic Act No.
6395, the Court of Appeals ruled that the determination of just compensation is a judicial
function and cannot be diminished by Republic Act No. 6395, as amended.

Finally, the Court of Appeals found that Spouses Asoque have already been
properly compensated for the damaged improvements per disbursement vouchers in
the total amount of P17,133.50, and Spouses Asoque failed to present competent proof
that they were entitled to an additional award of actual damages.

Issues:

Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full
compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines
Ruling:

Petitioner NPC is liable to pay respondents just compensation and not merely an
easement fee on the basis that its acquisition of a right-of-way easement over the
portion of respondents' land was a taking under the power of eminent domain.

While expropriation normally involves a taking of title to and possession of the

property, an easement of right of way on a private property can be considered a taking
under eminent domain under certain conditions. In Republic v. PLDT:

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or

appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden
upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way.

There is taking in the context of the state's power of eminent domain when the
following elements are present:(1) The expropriator enters a private property;(2) The
entrance into the private property is indefinite or permanent;(3) There is color of legal
authority in the entry into the property;(4) The property is devoted to public use or
purpose; and(5) The use of property for public use removed from the owner all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.

A right-of-way easement or burden becomes a "taking" under eminent domain

when there is material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the
ordinary uses of the property for an indefinite period.

The intrusion into the property must be so immediate and direct as to subtract
from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his or her exploitation of it.

In Republic v. Andaya,... he enforcement by the Republic of its legal easement

on Andaya's property for concrete levees and floodwalls would render the remaining
property unusable and uninhabitable. This Court held that there was a taking of the
remaining area of Andaya's property:

We are, however, unable to sustain the Republic's argument that it is not liable to
pay consequential damages if in enforcing the legal easement on Andaya's property,
the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable. "Taking," in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the government actually
deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but
also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his
property. Using this standard, there was undoubtedly a taking of the remaining area of
Andaya's property. True, no burden was imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title
and possession of the property. But, as correctly observed by the Board and affirmed by
the courts a quo, the nature and the effect of the Jloodwalls would deprive Andaya of
the normal use of the remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to the
property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River.
 National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Sangkay... held that the National Power
Corporation's surreptitious construction of a tunnel underneath the respondents' land
adversely affected the respondent's rights and interests. This is because the National
Power Corporation's subterranean intervention prevented the respondents from
introducing any developments on the surface and from disposing of the land or any
portion of it. Hence, there was a taking of the land as to entitle the owners to just
compensation:We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on
the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually
dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be
compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the
expropriator's action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or
occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and
necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or
destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use
of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the
owner, or in any respect changes hands.

The right-of-way easement resulting in a limitation on property rights over the

land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term
"expropriation."

Hence, due to the nature of the easement, which will deprive the normal use of
the land for an indefinite period and expose the property owners' lives and limbs to
danger, just compensation must be based on the full market value of the affected
property.

Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, states that only 10% of the
market value of the property is due the owner of the property subject to a right-of-way
easement. However, this rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that the
determination of just compensation for property taken in expropriation is a judicial
prerogative. Such discretion cannot be curtailed by legislation.

The value and character of the land at the time it was taken by government are
the criteria for determining just compensation. "All the facts as to the condition of the
property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, must thus
be considered."

Furthermore, the Branch Clerk of Court as Commissioner stated that one high-
ranking personnel of the City Assessor's Office of Calbayog observed that the market
value of respondents' land in the Tax Declaration is a very low appraisal. As such, when
he made the recommendation, he considered other factors such as the accessibility of
the property, availability of basic services in the area, land valuation trend in the City of
Calbayog (which was somewhere between P600.00 and P3,000.00 per square
meter),... and interviews with some landowners of the adjacent lots stating that they
would not sell their lands lower than P500.00 per square meter.
 The Regional Trial Court found the amount recommended by the Commissioner
as just compensation for the property to be reasonable, thus:[T]he Court finds the
amount recommended by the commissioner as just compensation of the property
expropriated by defendant to be reasonable and fairly based on the evidence adduced
by plaintiff. Exhibits "F" and series, "G" and series, and "H" and series show the
comparative value of the lands in Western Samar. The Court takes note that in the three
cases of expropriation involving lands in Catbalogan, Samar, the National Power
Corporation was adjudged to pay the value of the properties from Php2,000.00 to
Php2,200.00 per square meter, and these were cases decided in 1997. Likewise, this
Court takes cognizance of the fact that the commissioner may avail or consider certain
factors in determining the fair market value of the property apart from the preferred
documentary evidences. Thus, the factors taken into account by the commissioner in
arriving at the recommended fair market value of the property at Php800.00 per square
meter, aside from the evidence available, were valid criteria or gauge in the
determination of the just compensation of the subject property.

The determination of just compensation being a judicial function, we find no

compelling reason to disturb the valuation set by the Regional Trial Court and approved
by the Court of Appeals. It has not been sufficiently shown to be grossly exorbitant or
otherwise unjustified.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

30. A.C. No. 10117

IN RE: RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 14, 2013 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN

CA-G.R. CV No. 94656, vs.
ATTY. GIDEON D.V. MORTEL, Respondent

Facts

On July 20, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a Notice for Atty. Mortel to file an
appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, Angelita De Jesus, within the reglementary
period of 45 days from notice.

Atty. Mortel recently moved out of his office at Herrera Tower, Makati City due to
the high cost of maintenance. Looking for a new office, he requested to use the address
of his friend’s law firm as his address on record for Bank of the Philippine Islands. Atty.
Marcelino Ferdinand V. Jose (Atty. Jose), Managing Partner of MFV Jose Law Office,
granted this request sometime in August 2010. All communication, court orders,
resolutions, notices, or other court processes addressed to MFV Jose Law Office were
received by the law firm’s staff. The staff would pass these to the desk of Atty. Jose for
monitoring and checking. Atty. Jose would then forward these to the handling lawyer in
the office. The law firm’s messenger, Randy G. Lucero (Lucero), was tasked with
informing Atty. Mortel whenever there was a resolution or order pertinent to Bank of
Philippine Islands.
 On August 16, 2010, instead of heeding the Court of Appeals Notice to file the
appellant’s brief, Atty. Mortel moved to withdraw Angelita De Jesus’ appeal in light of an
amicable settlement on the disputed property. After the Motion to Withdraw Appeal was
filed, he stopped communicating with MFV Law Office and instructed De Leon to do the
same. In the Resolution, the Court of Appeals directed Atty. Mortel to secure and submit
Angelita De Jesus’ written conformity to the Motion to Withdraw Appeal within five (5)
days from notice. Atty. Mortel did not comply. Despite having ignored 11 Court of
Appeals Resolutions, Atty. Mortel did not show cause for him not to be suspended. The
Court of Appeals found that his "failure or obstinate refusal without justification or valid
reason to comply with the [Court of Appeals’] directives constitutes disobedience or
defiance of the lawful orders of [the Court of Appeals], amounting to gross misconduct
and insubordination or disrespect."

On February 25, 2014, Atty. Jose read this Court’s January 20, 2014 Resolution
meant for Atty. Mortel, and saw that Atty. Mortel had been suspended by the Court of
Appeals. He "immediately tried looking for Atty. Mortel’s mobile number" to inform him
of this development. On the following day, he was able to reach Atty. Mortel through a
mutual friend.

Four (4) years passed since the Court of Appeals first sent a Resolutio to Atty.
Mortel, through MFV Jose Law Office, in 2010. Atty. Jose asked Lucero, his messenger,
why these Resolutions were not forwarded to Atty. Mortel. Lucero stated that he "had no
other way of finding [De Leon]" and knew nothing of De Leon’s whereabouts. He hoped
that either Atty. Mortel or De Leon would pick up the mails sent by the Court of Appeals
for Atty. Mortel. Not knowing how to contact Atty. Mortel’s messenger, Lucero simply
kept the copies in the office racks or on his table.

Issue

Whether or not Atty. Mortel’s constitutional right was violated

Ruling

Yes, Atty. Jose’s reading of this Court’s January 20, 2014 Resolutionis also
highly questionable. While the Resolution was sent to his law firm, it was addressed to
respondent, a lawyer not under his employ.

Article III, Section 3(1) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that: The privacy of
communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

Atty. Jose took hold of this Court’s correspondence meant for respondent and
read it. On February 25, 2014, he "look[ed] into the said case [and] noticed that the
Resolution . . . was already in the pink form issued by the Supreme Court. [He] saw the
word ‘suspended’ and, upon perusal, saw that [respondent] was now subjected to an
administrative case[.]"
 Atty. Jose may claim that he did so out of concern. However, if he were truly
concerned, his proper recourse would have been to inform respondent about receiving
mail from this Court, not to read it. Moreover, he would have informed respondent, as
early as 2010, that his law firm received several Court of Appeals correspondences, and
that these letters kept arriving for respondent until 2013.

31. G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, vs. COMELEC AND

ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO

Facts

Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a

newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the
parental care and custody over petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and his
wife, she has been reported and registered as a foundling and issued a Foundling
Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was given the name, Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar.

When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronal Allan
Kelley (aka Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a
petition foe her adoption. The trial court granted their petition and ordered that her name
be changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.

Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in 1986; in

1988, she applied and was issued Philippine Passport by the DFA; in 1993 and 1998,
she renewed her passport.
 She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after enrolling
and pursuing a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines. She
graduated in 1991 from Boston College where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree
in Political Studies.

She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the

Philippines and the U.S., in San Juan City and decided to flew back to the U.S. after
their wedding. She gave birth to her eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two
daughters in the Philippines.

She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the
Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for president in the May 2004 elections
and gave birth to her youngest daughter. They then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but
after few months, she rushed back to the Philippines to attend to her ailing father. After
her father’s death, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines in 2005 and immediately secured a TIN, then her
children followed suit; acquired property where she and her children resided.

In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003;
she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children which was granted. She registered
as a voter; secured Philippine passport; appointed and took her oath as Chairperson of
the MTRCB after executing an affidavit of Renunciation of American citizenship before
the Vice Consul of the USA and was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
USA in 2011.

In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the
question “Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner
obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May
2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen
and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached
to her COC an “Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino
citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were
Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she was
in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.
Issue:

Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino

citizen.

Held:

Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-

born Filipino.

It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no

restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already
impliedly so recognized. There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or
language permitting discrimination against foundlings as the three Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. Foundlings are citizens under
international law as this is supported by some treaties, adhering to the customary rule to
presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

The Court also held that there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos,
as being shown in her physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the
fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99%
probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that
Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are
admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

32. Alliance for the Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc. (ALFI) et.al. vs. Hon.
Garin (G.R. Nos. 217872 and 221866, 26 April 2017)

Facts

Petitioners opposed the unilateral act of the Food and Drugs Administration
(FDA) on re-certifying the contraceptive drugs named Implanon and Implanon NXT; the
basis of their opposition hinges on the fact that these drugs are abortifacients. Thus,
according to them, they should have been given notice of the certification proceedings,
and a chance to present evidence that indeed such drugs are abortifacients.

Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioners are not entitled to notice
and hearing because the said proceedings are done in the exercise of its regulatory
power, not quasi-judicial power; also, they alleged that the Honorable Supreme Court is
incompetent to rule on the instant controversy due to the same reason.

Issues:
 Whether or not petitioners were deprived of substantial and procedural due process of
law;

Ruling

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that petitioners were deprived of their Right to Due
Process. Perusal of the law and rules of procedure of the instant agency reveals the
need of an issuance of notice to all concerned MAHs and a posting of the contraceptive
products for public comments.These, respondents failed to do.

This was thoroughly explained by the Court, to wit:

“Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. In order that a
particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must
be compliance with both the substantive and procedural requirements thereof.
Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the
rights of a person to his property. Procedural due process, on the other hand, means
compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in
conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those
who are called upon to administer it. xxx

xxx To conclude that product registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution

of the questioned contraceptive drugs and devices by the FDA in the exercise of its
regulatory power need not comply with the requirements of due process would render
the issuance of notices to concerned MAHs and the posting of a list of contraceptives
for public comment a meaningless exercise. Concerned MAHs and the public in general
will be deprived of any significant participation if what they will submit will not be
considered.

Section 7.04, Rule 7 of the IRR of the RH Law (RH-IRR), relied upon by the
respondents in support of their claims, expressly allows the consideration of
conflicting evidence, such as that supplied by the petitioners in support of their
opposition to the approval of certain contraceptive drugs and devices. In fact, the said
provision mandated that the FDA utilize the “best evidence available” to ensure that no
abortifacient is approved as family planning drug or device. It bears mentioning that the
same provision even allows an independent evidence review group (ERG) to ensure
that evidence for or against the certification of a contraceptive drug or device is duly
considered.”