VILLENA VS.

SEC OF INTERIOR

FACTS:
Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior
recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The Secretary
then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The
power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative
Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments,
that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the
provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188
of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his
supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending
and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must
yield to the special law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation.

HELD:
Yes.

There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under
investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code which provides that “The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude“.

The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to
the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the
Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the President
of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec.
2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in
the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid
of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to
suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without
the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive
suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial investigation.
DADOLE VS COA
G.R. No. 125350
FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowances to
RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and
municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional monthly allowances of the judges shall
be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the amount they received in excess of P1000
from the last six months.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President.

RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy
remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X
of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments or their officials were
performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be
removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the
President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate
powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has
acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs
DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES
G.R. No. 149724

FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec.
Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal
City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.

RULING:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec.
17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."

In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII
Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR
Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated
the same.
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out
power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may
call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,― and in my capacity as
their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article
12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it
is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury”
resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining
the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor
General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President
may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these
cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely
on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary
power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017
calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out
power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This
is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority
to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article
VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor
a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to
exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article
VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed
upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to
meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
 Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed
upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court
rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from
Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken
over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement
PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the
Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
GUDANI VS. SENGA
GR No. 170165
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing
of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the
military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate
Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a
directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating
the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be
subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them
from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-
chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At
the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom
Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so
inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer.
Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive
officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the
considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on
specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to
control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-
chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still
subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power
as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to
conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President
has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the
military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing
before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the
courts.
SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary
FACTS:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting
upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in
Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts
constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers
went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General
Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.
(2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated
any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary
Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of
rebellion.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

HELD:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section
18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its
Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the
President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise
of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in
a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported
their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of
no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities
have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is
of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive
powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may
be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as
Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.