1
CITIZENSHIP Bessie Kelley according to an
TECSON V. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
FACTS
- On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP).
- In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ
represented himself to be a natural-born
citizen.
- His real name was stated to be “Fernando,
Jr.” or “Ronald Allan” Poe, born in Manila
on August 20, 1939.
- On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier
filed a petition before the COMELEC to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy on the
ground that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
- According to Fornier, FPJ’s parents were
foreigners – his mother Bessie Kelley Poe
was an American and his father Allan F.
Poe was a Spanish national being a son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
- Even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was
illegitimate.
- Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage
to a certain Paulita Gomez before marrying
- Certified copy of the certificate of birth of
“uncertified” copy of a supposed
certification of the marriage in July 5,
1936.
- Even if no such prior marriage existed,
Allan F. Poe married Bessey Kelley only
a year after the birth of FPJ. The
marriage certificate of their marriage
reflected the date of their marriage to be
on September 16, 1940 where Allan was
25, unmarried and Filipino, and Bessie
was 22, unmarried and American.
- FPJ’s earliest established ascendant was
his grandfather Lorenzo Pou.
- No birth certificate for Lorenzo but his
death certificate issued upon his death in
September 11, 1954 at age 84 identified
him as a Filipino residing in San Carlos,
Pangasinan.
- Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their
son Allan was born on May 17, 1915.
The birth certificate of Allan showed that
his father was an Español father and to a
mestiza Español mother.
Procedure
- In the January 19, 2004 hearing before
the COMELEC, Fornier presented the
following pieces of evidence:
- Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ
- Certified photocopy of an affidavit by
Paulita Gomez-Poe attesting that she had
filed a bigamy case against Allan F. Poe
because of his relationship with Kelley
(in Spanish)
English translation of (b)
Allan F. Poe
- Certification from the director of the
Records Management and Archives Office
stating that a Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in
the Philippines before 1907
- Certification from OIC of the Archives
Division of the National Archives stating
that there was no available information
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe
- FPJ presented the following pieces of
evidence among others:
- Certification that there was no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F.
Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan
- Certification by the OIC of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that there
was no available information about the
marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez
- Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe
- Original Certificate of Title if the Registry
Deeds of Pangasinan in the name of
Lorenzo Pou,
- Copies of tax declarations under the name
of Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo
Pou
- Copy of marriage contract of Fernando
Pou and Bessie Kelley
- Certification issued by the City Civil
Registrar of San Carlos, Pangasinan stating
that the records of the birth of the said

office from 1900 to May 1946 were
destroyed during World War II
- January 23, 2004 – COMELEC dismissed
the Fornier petition for lack of merit and
Fornier filed a motion for reconsideration
on January 26, 2004. The motion was
denied by the COMELEC en banc on
February 6, 2004.
- February 10, 2004 – Fornier filed a
petition before the Supreme Court, praying
for TRO, a writ of preliminary injunction
or any other resolution that would stay the
finality and/or execution of the COMELEC
resolutions.
- The two other petitions (Tecson and
Desidero v. COMELEC and Velez v. Poe)
challenge the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and assert that only the
Supreme Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the
case.
ISSUES
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the
three cases filed?
2. Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential
candidate on the ground that he materially
misrepresented in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a natural-born
Filipino?
HELD
1. Ratio Jurisdiction issue
- The COMELEC’s decision on
disqualified cases involving a presidential
candidate could be elevated to and could be
taken cognizance by the Supreme Court.
- The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
would not include cases directly brought
before it questioning the qualifications of
a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
Reasoning
- Does the Court have jurisdiction over
the three cases filed?
- Fornier petition - Yes
- In seeking the disqualification of FPJ
before the COMELEC, Fornier relied on
the following:
- “A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 is false…”
(Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 78)
- “…the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of
enduring free, orderly and honest
elections…” (Sec. 52, same)
- “any interested party” authorized to file
a verified petition to deny or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance
candidate (Art. 69, same)
- Decisions of the COMELEC on
disqualification cases may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court under the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65).
Aside from that, according to Art. 9, Sec.
7 of the Constitution, “any decision,
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order or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt thereof.”
- Judicial power is vested in the Supreme
Court which includes the duty of the courts
to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch of instrumentality
of the government. (Art. 8, Sec. 1,
Constitution).
- Tecson petition and Velez petition - No
- The Tecson and Velez petitions make use
of Art. 7, Sec 4(7) of the Constitution in
assailing the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
when it took cognizance of the Fornier
petition because the “Supreme Court sitting
en banc shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice
President and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.”
- A “contest” refers to a post-election
scenario. Election contests are either
election protests or a quo warranto which
would have the objective of dislodging the
winner from office. The Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal state:
- “Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all
contests…relating to qualifications of the
President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.” (Rule 12)

- “An election contest is initiated by the
filing of an election contest or a petition for
quo-warranto against the President or Vice-
President.” (Rule 13)
- “Only the registered candidate for
President or Vice-President who received
the second or third highest number of votes
may contest the election of the President or
the Vice-President…by filing a verified
petition…within 30 days after the
proclamation of the winner.” (Rule 14)
- The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal over contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the
President and the Vice President and not
candidates for President or Vice-President.
2. Ratio FPJ’s citizenship issue (Voting 6
concur, 7 dissent, 1 abstention and 1
separate opinion)
- The distinctions between legitimacy and
illegitimacy should only remain in the
sphere of civil law and should not unduly
impinge on the domain of political law.
- The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship
to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
Reasoning
- Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential
candidate on the ground that he materially
misrepresented in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a natural-born
Filipino?
- Concept of citizenship
- Aristotle described a citizen as a man
who shared in the administration of
justice and in the holding of an office and
the state would be composed of such
individuals in order to achieve a self-
sufficient existence.
- Citizenship deals with rights and
entitlements on the one hand and with
concomitant obligations on the other.
- Citizenship underwent changes in the
18th to 20th centuries.
- In the 18th century, the concept was
civil citizenship which established the
rights necessary for necessary for
individual freedom (eg. Rights to
property, personal liberty and justice)
- In the 19th century, it expanded to
include political citizenship which
encompassed the right to participate in
the exercise of political power.
- In the 20th century, there was the
development of social citizenship which
laid emphasis on the right of the citizen
to economic well-being and social
security.
- Internationalization of citizenship is an
ongoing development.
- Citizenship in the Philippines from the
Spanish times to the present
- During the Spanish period, no such term
as “Philippine citizens,” only “Spanish
subjects.” In church records, natives
were identified as “indios.”
- Spanish laws on citizenship included:
- Order de la Regencia of 1841
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- Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 (defined
the political status of children born in the
Philippines)
- Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 1870
- The 1876 Spanish Constitution was not
extended to the Philippines because the
colony was to be governed by special laws.
- According to the Civil Code of Spain, the
following were Spanish citizens:
- Persons born in Spanish territory
- Children of a Spanish father or mother
even if they were born outside Spain
- Foreigners who have obtained
naturalization papers
- Those who, without such papers, may
have become domiciled inhabitants of any
town of the Monarchy
- Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated
that the civil and political status of the
native inhabitants would be determined by
the US Congress. Spanish subjects and
natives who choose to remain in the
territory may preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain by making a
declaration of their decision within a year
from the date of the ratification of the
treaty. If no such declaration is made, their
allegiance shall be held renounced and they
would have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they reside.
- Upon ratification of the treaty, the native
inhabitants of the Philippines became
Spanish subjects.
- They did not become American citizens
but were issued passports describing them

to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to
protection of the US.
- Philippine Organic Act of 1902 – first
appearance of the term “citizens of the
Philippine islands.” A citizen of the
Philippine islands under this Act was:
- An inhabitant of the Philippines and a
Spanish subject on April 11, 1899.
- An inhabitant meant:
- A native born inhabitant
- An inhabitant who was a native of Spain
- An inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before April 11, 1899.
- Controversy as to the citizenship of a
child born between April 11, 1899 and July
1, 1902 as there was no citizenship law in
the Philippines. The common law principle
jus soli (principle of territoriality) was said
to govern those born in the Philippines
during this time.
- Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) –
A native born inhabitant of the Philippines
was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if:
- A Spanish subject on April 11, 1899
- Residing in the Philippines on the said
date
- Since that date, not a citizen of another
country
- 1935 Constitution – provided that jus
sanguinis (blood relationship) be the basis
for citizenship, as stated in Sec. 1, Art. 3:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution
- Those born in the Philippine Islands of
foreign parents who, before the adoption
of this Constitution, had been elected to
public office in the Philippine Islands
- Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines
- Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship
- Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law
- 1973 Constitution – Corrected Sec. 1,
Art. 3 (4) of the 1935 Constitution,
which, when taken together with the
existing civil law provisions would
provide that women would automatically
lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire
that of their foreign husbands. This was
deemed discriminatory in that it
incapacitated the Filipino woman from
transmitting her citizenship to her
legitimate children and required
illegitimate children of Filipino mothers
to still elect Filipino citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. The
provisions of Sec. 1, Art. 3 of the 1973
Constitution state that the following are
citizens of the Philippines:
- Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution
- Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines
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- Those who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the 1935
Constitution
- Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law
- Add Sec. 2 of the same article which
provided that a female citizen of the
Philippines who marries an alien retainers
her Philippine citizenship unless by her act
or omission she is deemed to have
renounced her citizenship under the law.
- 1987 Constitution – aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution which outlines in Article 4,
Sec. 1 that the following are Filipino
citizens:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines
at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
- Those whose fathers and mothers are
citizens of the Philippines
- Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority
- Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
- The Constitution requires that the
President of the Philippines should be,
among the many requirements, a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines (Art. 7, Sec.
2).
- Natural born citizen – citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to

perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship
- Citizenship of FPJ in relation to
grandfather Lorenzo Pou’s citizenship and
father Allan F. Poe’s citizenship
- Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen
because his father Lorenzo was also
Filipino.
- Conclusions with some degree of
certainty to be drawn from the documents
presented:
- The parents of FPJ were Allen Poe and
Bessie Kelley.
- FPJ was born to them on August 20,
1939.
- Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married to each other on September 16,
1940.
- The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo
Pou.
- At the time of his death on September 11,
1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
- The public documents submitted are
deemed trustworthy.
- The three documents (birth certificate of
FPJ, marriage certificate of Bessie and
Allan and the death certificate of Lorenzo)
were certified true copies of the originals.
- The Rules of Court (130, Section 3) state
that when the subject of the inquiry is the
content of the document, no evidence shall
be admissible except the original document
itself. One of the exceptions however is
when the original is a public record in the
custody of a public office is recorded in a
public office.
- As public documents, the three
documents are prima facie proof of their
contents as stated in the Rules of Court
(130, Section 44) that the entries in
official records made by a public officer
in the performance of his duty are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
This is grounded on:’ of official duty in
the preparation of the statement made.
The penalty affixed to a breach of that
duty. Routine and disinterested origin of
most such statements. Publicity of the
record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have
occurred
- It is safe to assume that Lorenzo Pou’s
place of residence at the time of death
was the same as his residence before
death in the absence of evidence that
would attest otherwise. In that case,
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the “en masse Filipinization” that the
Philippine Bill effected in 1902. This
citizenship would then extend to his son
Allan F. Poe, FPJ’s father.
- Lorenzo born sometime in 1870 during
the Spanish colonization period.
- Fornier argues that Lorenzo was not in
the Philippines during the crucial period
of 1898 to 1902 but there is no existing
record to attest to that claim.
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- Fornier failed to show that Lorenzo was
out of the country during that same time
period.
- Lorenzo’s residence at the time of death
was in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
- For proof of filiation or paternity, the
mandatory rules of civil law would not
apply in this case. The duly notarized
declaration by Ruby Kelley Mangahas,
FPJ’s maternal aunt and sister of his mother
Bessie, proving the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship
with FPJ (living with Bessie and the
children in one house as one family) would
be accepted.
- Fornier argues that the mandatory rules
under civil rule should apply because FPJ
was an illegitimate son.
- Acknowledgement needed to establish
paternity (eg. Acknowledgement in the
birth certificate by signing name)
- In the FPJ case, there was no signature of
Allan F. Poe in the birth certificate of FPJ.
- 1950 Civil Code – acknowledgement of
illegitimate children of three types which
had to be done during the lifetime of the
presumed parent:
- Voluntary (expressly made in record birth,
will or a statement before the court in
authentic writing)
- Legal (in favor of full blood brothers and
sisters of an illegitimate child who was
recognized as natural)

- Compulsory (demanded generally in
cases when the child had in his favor any
evidence to prove filiation)
- The Family Code has liberalized the rules
as stated in Articles 172, 173 and 175 and
the rules have retroactive effect (Article
255). These provisions are there to govern
the private and personal affairs of the
family. There is little indication that this
should also govern his political rights.
- This should be taken in the context of
civil law, being that branch of law which is
concerned with the organization of the
family and regulation of property. The
relevance of citizenship is exemplified in
Art. 15 of the Civil Code.
- The proof of filiation for purposes of
determining citizenship status should be
deemed independent from those prescribed
for civil code purposes. The ordinary rules
should govern.
- DNA testing to prove paternity could also
be resorted to.
- There is no jurisprudence to prove that an
illegitimate child cannot inherit his father’s
citizenship.
- Fornier argues that even if Allan F. Poe
were Filipino, Allan’s citizenship would
not have been transmitted to FPJ because
FPJ was illegitimate.
- FPJ was alleged to be illegitimate because
of the bigamous marriage between his
parents Allan and Bessie for the reason that
Allan allegedly had a prior existing
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez. The
Court held that the veracity of this
marriage between Paulita and Allan is
doubtful.
- Fornier also contended that even if
Allan and Bessie’s marriage was not
bigamous, FPJ was still illegitimate
because his parents were married after he
was born. Fornier based his arguments
on the cases of Morano v. Vivo,
Chiongbian v. de Leon and Serra v.
Republic.
- In the cases cited above, it is important
to note the lis mota in each case. If the
pronouncement of jus sangunis was in the
lis mota, it would constitute doctrine
courtesy of stare decisis. If not, it is mere
obiter dictum.
- In all of the mentioned cases, there was
no jus sanguinis in the lis mota of the
cases. If there was jus sangunis
mentioned, it was mere obiter dictum.
- The pronouncement that an illegitimate
child cannot inherit the father’s
citizenship has no textual basis in the
Constitution and violates the equal
protection clause.
- For jurisprudence that regarded an
illegitimate child to inherit the mother’s
citizenship, it was there to ensure a
Filipino nationality for the child with the
assumption that the mother would gain
custody.
- The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ
since he was born during that time period
and it states that Filipino citizens include
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those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
Decision
1. The evidence does not establish
conclusively FPJ’s citizenship but the
evidence preponderates in his favor to hold
that he could not be guilty of
misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy. Fornier v. COMELEC
DISMISSED for failure to show grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC for dismissing the original
petition.
2. Tecson v. COMELEC and Velez v, Poe
DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.
MOY YA LIM YAO VS.
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa
to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant
on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation
made in connection with her application for
a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines, she stated that she was a
Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong,
and that she desired to take a pleasure trip
to the Philippines to visit her great grand
uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted
to come into the Philippines on 13 March
1961 for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng
filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others, that said Lau

Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of
her authorized period of stay in this country
or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly
allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung
was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to
13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner
of Immigration to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation,
after the expiration of her authorized stay,
she brought an action for injunction. At the
hearing which took place one and a half
years after her arrival, it was admitted that
Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak
either English or Tagalog, except for a few
words. She could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a
result, the Court of First Instance of Manila
denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen
Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto
(by the fact itself something so obvious on
its face that it doesn’t need explanation)
became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act
473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same
law. Likewise, an alien woman married to
an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of
her husband the moment he takes his oath
as Filipino citizen, provided that she does
not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to
undergo the naturalization proceedings,
Section 15 is a parallel provision to
Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino,
who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as
a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow
that the wife of a living Filipino cannot
be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is
absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them
differently. As the laws of our country,
both substantive and procedural, stand
today, there is no such procedure (a
substitute for naturalization proceeding to
enable the alien wife of a Philippine
7
citizen to have the matter of her own
citizenship settled and established so that
she may not have to be called upon to
prove it everytime she has to perform an
act or enter into a transaction or business or
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos),
but such is no proof that the citizenship is
not vested as of the date of marriage or the
husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the
case may be, for the truth is that the
situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensible in a
judicial or administrative case. Whatever
the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as
res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again as the occasion may
demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to
have become a Filipino citizen from and by
virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao
al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino
citizen of 25 January 1962.
VALLES vs
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ,
FACTS:
* Petitioner filed a disqualification case
against private respondent in 1998
elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
* Rosalind Ybasco Lopez (private
respondent) was born on May 16, 1934 in
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco,

a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,
Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian.
* In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left
Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines.
* Petitioner contends that in her application
for alien certificate of registration and
immigrant certificate of residence, private
respondent expressly declared under oath
that she was a citizen or subject of
Australia; and said declaration forfeited her
Philippine citizenship, therefore it operated
to disqualify her to run for elective office.
He also argued that Comelec’s finding of
renouncing her Australian citizenship and
had her Australian passport cancelled did
not automatically restore the status of
private respondent as a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is an
Australian citizen
RULING:
No. The Philippine law on citizenship
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality
or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of
place of birth.
* Private respondent was born a year
before the 1935 Constitution took into
effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the
principal organic acts by which the
United States governed the country and
these were the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Jones Law.
* Under both organic acts, all inhabitants
of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens.
* Her father was born on 1879 in Daet,
Camarines Sur. Therefore by virtue of the
said laws, Telesforo’s daughter, herein
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines.
* Also, the principle of jus sanguinis,
which confers citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was subsequently
retained under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
* Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino
citizen, having been born to a Filipino
father.
* Secondly, as ruled in Aznar vs Comelec
and Mercado vs Manzano and Comelec,
the mere fact that private respondent was
a holder of an Australian passport and
had an alien certificate of registration are
not acts constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not
militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express.
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Petition is DISMISSED. COMELEC
resolutions AFFIRMED.
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at
issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that “no person
shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960
of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz
enlisted in the US Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to
the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63
[(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
other, “rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding
his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S.
citizen in 1990, in connection with his
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under RA

2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition
of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who
Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering
Service To, or Accepting Commission In,
the Armed Forces of the United States
(1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of
Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won
over petitioner Bengson who was then
running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for
Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was
not qualified to become a member of the
HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen
as required under Article VI, section 6 of
the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the
petition for quo warranto and declaring
Cruz the duly elected Representative in the
said election.
ISSUE:
WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their
citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. C.A.
No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the
allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On
the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored
to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in,
the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces
of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with
9
Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of
allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance
with the aforecited provision, Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original
status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost
his Philippine citizenship.
Co vs HRET
Modes of Acquisition; Citizens of the
Philippines
Petitioner: Antonio Y. Co
Respondent: Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives and Jose Ong
Facts:
* The petition seeks to set aside and reverse
the decision of the House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal in which it declared that
Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes. Here, it questions whether
or not the HRET acted with grave abuse of
discretion.

* May 11, 1987, the congressional election
was held. Among the candidates in second
district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners. Sixto Balinquit and Antonio
Co, and the private respondent Jose Ong,
Jr.
* Ong was proclaimed the winner.
* The petitioners filed election protest
against Ong on the grounds that the latter is
not a natural born citizen of the Philippines
and not a resident of the second district of
Northern Samar.
* The HRET rendered its decision in favor
of Ong.
Issues:
Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction.
WON it committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
WON the private respondent Ong is a
natural born.
WON the private respondent is a resident
of Northern Samar.
Held:
Yes. The Constitution provides that HRET
and SET shall be the sole judges of all
contests relating to the election returns and
qualifications of their respective members.
(Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).
* The authority conferred upon the
Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete. The use of the word sole
emphasizes the exclusivity of the
jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
* In the case at bar, the Court finds no
improvident use of power, no denial of
due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the
power of judicial review by the Supreme
Court.
* There is another reason why we cannot
declare the HRET as having committed
manifest grave abuse of discretion. The
same issue of natural-born citizenship has
already been decided by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and
by the Batasang Pambansa convened by
authority of the Constitution drafted by
that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood
brother of the respondent, was declared
and accepted as a natural born citizen by
both bodies.
* There would be no basis to call the
HRET decision so arbitrary and
whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion.
Yes. The respondent is a child of a
chinese who twas then declared a Filipino
citizen and was living in the country
since 1905, and a natural born-filipina,
who gave birth of him here in the
country.
* The brother of the respondent was
elected as a delegate to the 1971
Convention and his status as a natural
born citizen was challenged.
10
Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived
citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared
Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as
a natural born Filipino. Hence, it can also
be concluded that the private respondent
Jose Ong is as well a natural born Filipino.
* The pertinent portions of the Constitution
found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of
the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines
at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are
those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens.
* The respondent was born in an outlying
rural town of Samar where there are no
alien enclaves and no racial distinctions.

* The respondent has lived the life of a
Filipino since birth. His father applied for
naturalization when the child was still a
small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has
worked for a sensitive government agency.
His profession requires citizenship for
taking the examinations and getting a
license. He has participated in political
exercises as a Filipino and has always
considered himself a Filipino citizen.
* There is nothing in the records to show
that he does not embrace Philippine
customs and values, nothing to indicate any
tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this
country is not his natural homeland. The
mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly
aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should
know him better than any member of this
Court will ever know him. They voted by
overwhelming numbers to have him
represent them in Congress. Because of his
acts since childhood, they have considered
him as a Filipino.
* The respondent HRET has an interesting
view as to how Mr. Ong elected
citizenship. It observed that "when
protestee was only nine years of age, his
father, Jose Ong Chuan became a
naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Act squarely
applies its benefit to him for he was then a
minor residing in this country.
Concededly, it was the law itself that had
already elected Philippine citizenship for
protestee by declaring him as such."
(Emphasis supplied)
* Moreover, the respondent traces his
natural born citizenship through
his mother, not through the citizenship of
his father. The citizenship of the father is
relevant only to determine whether or not
the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino
when he came of age. At that time and up
to the present, both mother and father
were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could
not have elected any other
citizenship unless he first formally
renounced Philippine citizenship in favor
of a foreign nationality. Unlike other
persons faced with a problem of election,
there was no foreign nationality of his
father which he could possibly have
chosen.
3. Yes.
* The petitioners lose sight of the
meaning of "residence" under the
Constitution. The term "residence" has
been understood as synonymous
with domicile not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution.
* The framers of the Constitution adhered
to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having
the same meaning as domicile.
* The term "domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, one
11
intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v.
Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The
absence of a person from said permanent
residence, no matter how long,
notwithstanding, it continues to be the
domicile of that person. In other words,
domicile is characterized by animus
revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA
147 [1966])
* The domicile of origin of the private
respondent, which was the domicile of his
parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar.
Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose
Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it
remained fixed therein even up to the
present.
* The private respondent, in the
proceedings before the HRET sufficiently
established that after the fire that gutted
their house in 1961, another one was
constructed. Likewise, after the second fire
which again destroyed their house in 1975,
a sixteen-door apartment was built by their
family, two doors of which were reserved
as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong,
Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
* The petitioners' allegation that since the
private respondent owns no property in
Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a
resident of said place is misplaced.
* The properties owned by the Ong Family
are in the name of the private respondent's
parents. Upon the demise of his parents,
necessarily, the private respondent,
pursuant to the laws of succession, became

the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir),
notwithstanding the fact that these were
still in the names of his parents.
* The Constitution only requires that the
candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting
and residence requirements. Nowhere is it
required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in
order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera
v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
* It has also been settled that absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other
than in the place where one is elected, does
not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v.
Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
* The private respondent stayed in Manila
for the purpose of finishing his studies and
later to practice his profession, There was
no intention to abandon the residence in
Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the
periodical journeys made to his home
province reveal that he always had
the animus revertendi.
* The Philippines is made up not only of a
single race; it has, rather, undergone an
interracial evolution.
* Our citizens no doubt constitute the
country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a
special privilege which one must forever
cherish.
* However, in order to truly revere this
treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the
basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to
unreasonably deny it to those who qualify
to share its richness.
* Under the overly strict jurisprudence
surrounding our antiquated naturalization
laws only the very affluent backed by
influential patrons, who were willing to
suffer the indignities of a lengthy,
sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt
process of clearances by minor
bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew
how to overcome so many technical traps
of the judicial process were able to
acquire citizenship. It is time for the
naturalization law to be revised to enable
a more positive, affirmative, and
meaningful examination of an applicant's
suitability to be a Filipino. A more
humane, more indubitable and less
technical approach to citizenship
problems is essential.
Decision: The petition is hereby
dismissed. The questioned decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose
Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar.
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma et al, vs
Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr.,
et al. GR 183133, July 26, 2010
12
Petitioners: Felix Cabiling MA, Jr.,
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma and Valeriano
Cabiling Ma
Respondents: Commissioner Alipio F.
Fernandez, Jr., et al.
Father: Felix (Yao Kong) Ma (Taiwanese)
Mother: Sillona Cabiling, (Filipina)
Children: Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix
Cabiling Ma, Jr., Valeriano Cabiling Ma,
Lechi Ann Ma, Arceli Ma, Nicolas Ma, and
Isidro Ma (Isidro)
FACTS:
Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr.,
Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born
under aegis (protection) of the 1935
Philippine Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father. They were all
raised, studied and received their primary
and secondary education and have resided
in this country for almost sixty (60) years;
they spent their whole lives, they do not
speak nor understand the Chinese
language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and
do not know any relative of their father;
they have not even traveled abroad; and
they have already raised their respective
families in the Philippines.
During their age of minority, they secured
from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien
Certificates of Registration (ACRs).
Immediately upon reaching the age of
twenty-one, they claimed Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Section

1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution,
which provides that "(t)hose whose
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,
upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship" are citizens of the
Philippines.
Having taken their oath of allegiance as
Philippine citizens, petitioners, however,
failed to have the necessary documents
registered in the civil registry as required
under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
625 (An Act Providing the Manner in
which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be declared by a Person
whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen).
27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years
after they elected Philippine citizenship
that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so. On the
other hand, there is no showing that
Valeriano complied with the registration
requirement.
ISSUE:
WON the failure to immediately file the
documents of election with the nearest civil
registry, be considered foreign nationals
subject to deportation as undocumented
aliens? (If the omission negates their rights
to Filipino citizenship as children of a
Filipino mother, and erase the years lived
and spent as Filipinos)
Ruling of the Supreme Court
NO. The court is guided by this evolvement
from election of Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority under the
1935 Philippine Constitution to
dispensing with the election requirement
under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to
express classification of these children as
natural-born citizens under the 1987
Constitution towards the conclusion that
the omission of the 1941 statutory
requirement of registration of the
documents of election should not result in
the obliteration of the right to Philippine
citizenship.
FINAL DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29
August 2007, and the Resolution dated 29
May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 89532 affirming the
Judgment dated 2 February 2005, and the
Resolution dated 8 April 2005 of the
Bureau of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No.
AFF-04-574 OC-STF-04-09/23-1416 are
hereby SET ASIDE with respect to
petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix
Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling
Ma. Petitioners are given ninety (90) days
from notice within which to COMPLY
with the requirements of the Bureau of
Immigration embodied in its Judgment of
2 February 2005. The Bureau of
Immigration shall ENSURE that all
requirements, including the payment of
their financial obligations to the state, if
any, have been complied with subject to
the imposition of appropriate
administrative fines; REVIEW the
documents submitted by the petitioners;
13
and ACT thereon in accordance with the
decision of this Court.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION:
Facts:
5 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his
affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and took his oath of allegiance
before then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez,
Municipal Judge, Surigao, Surigao del
Norte.c
14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the same
before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary
Public, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte.
1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance
before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, City
Court of Surigao City, the fact of which the
latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March
2005.
Individual certifications all dated 3 January
2005 issued by the Office of the City
Election Officer, Commission on Elections,
Surigao City, show that all of them are
registered voters of Barangay Washington,
Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997, and
that records on previous registrations are
no longer available because of the
mandatory general registration every ten
(10) years. Moreover, aside from
exercising their right of suffrage,
Balgamelo is one of the
incumbent Barangay

Kagawads in Barangay Washington,
Surigao City.
The Complaint
16 February 2004, the Bureau of
Immigration received the Complaint-
Affidavit of a certain Mat G. Catral (Mr.
Catral), alleging that Felix (Yao Kong) Ma
and his 7 children are undesirable and
overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral, however,
did not participate in the proceedings, and
the Ma family could not but believe that
the complaint against them was politically
motivated because they strongly supported
a candidate in Surigao City in the 2004
National and Local Elections.
9 November 2004, the Legal Department of
the Bureau of Immigration charged them
for violation of Sections 37(a)(7) and
45(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613,
otherwise known as the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
That respondents, being aliens,
misrepresent themselves as Philippine
citizens in order to evade the requirements
of the immigration laws.
Ruling of the Board of Commissioners,
Bureau of Immigration
After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children
were afforded the opportunity to refute the
allegations, the Board of Commissioners
(Board) of the Bureau of Immigration (BI),
composed of the public respondents,
rendered a Judgment dated 2 February
2005 finding that Felix Ma and his children
violated Commonwealth Act No. 613,
Sections 37(a) (7) and 45(e) in relation to
BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-
031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22
August 2001
(1)the Judgment dated 2 February 2005,
ordering the summary deportation of the
petitioners, issuance of a warrant of
deportation against them, inclusion of
their names in the Immigration Blacklist,
and exclusion of the petitioners from the
Philippines; and (2) the Resolution dated
8 April 2005, denying the petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 3 May 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix,
Jr., and Valeriano filed the Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court
of Appeals.
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition after finding that
the petitioners "failed to comply with the
exacting standards of the law providing
for the procedure and conditions for their
continued stay in the Philippines either as
aliens or as its nationals."
On 29 May 2008, it issued a
Resolution denying the petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration dated 20
September 2007.
Ruling of the Supreme Court
It is true that this clause has been
construed to mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority, and that the
Secretary of Justice has ruled that three
14
(3) years is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above,
which period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino.
Petitioners complied with the first and
second requirements upon reaching the age
of majority. It was only the registration of
the documents of election with the civil
registry that was belatedly done.
We rule that under the facts peculiar to the
petitioners, the right to elect Philippine
citizenship has not been lost and they
should be allowed to complete the statutory
requirements for such election.
Notably, the petitioners timely took their
oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This
was a serious undertaking. It was
commitment and fidelity to the state
coupled with a pledge "to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance" to
any other state. This was unqualified
acceptance of their identity as a Filipino
and the complete disavowal of any other
nationality.
Petitioners have passed decades of their
lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their
present status having been formed by their
past, petitioners can no longer have any
national identity except that which they
chose upon reaching the age of reason.
In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was
enacted. It laid down the manner of

electing Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with subsection
(4), Section 1, Article IV, of the
Constitution shall be expressed in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be
filed with the nearest civil registry. The
said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.
The statutory formalities of electing
Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement
of election under oath; (2) an oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3)
registration of the statement of election and
of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625
did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citizenship
should be made. The 1935 Charter only
provides that the election should be made
"upon reaching the age of majority." The
age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice on
cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was
resolved by basing the time period on the
decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In
these decisions, the proper period for
electing Philippine citizenship was, in
turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election
should be made within a reasonable time
after attaining the age of majority. The
phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the elections
should be made within three (3) years
from reaching the age of majority.
Registration, then, is the confirmation of
the existence of a fact. In the instant case,
registration is the confirmation of
election as such election. It is not the
registration of the act of election,
although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will
confer Philippine citizenship on the
petitioners. It is only a means of
confirming the fact that citizenship has
been claimed.
Indeed, we even allow the late
registration of the fact of birth and of
marriage. Thus, has it been admitted
through existing rules that the late
registration of the fact of birth of a child
does not erase the fact of birth. Also, the
fact of marriage cannot be declared void
solely because of the failure to have the
marriage certificate registered with the
designated government agency.
Thus, while the 1935 Constitution
requires that children of Filipino mothers
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
their age of majority, upon the effectivity
15
of the 1973 Constitution, they
automatically become Filipinos and need
not elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
Better than the relaxation of the
requirement, the 1987 Constitution now
classifies them as natural-born citizens
upon election of Philippine citizenship.
Thus, Sec. 2, Article IV thereof provides:
robles virtual law library
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those
who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It
is the basis of the right of the petitioners to
elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners
elected Philippine citizenship in form and
substance. The failure to register the
election in the civil registry should not
defeat the election and resulting negate the
permanent fact that they have a Filipino
mother. The lacking requirements may still
be complied with subject to the imposition
of appropriate administrative penalties, if
any. The documents they submitted
supporting their allegations that they have
already registered with the civil registry,
although belatedly, should be examined for
validation purposes by the appropriate
agency, in this case, the Bureau of

Immigration. Other requirements embodied
in the administrative orders and other
issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and
the Department of Justice shall be
complied with within a reasonable time.
GRACE POE vs. COMELEC
The Case
· Grace Poe was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of
Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo Militar in 1968.
Parental care and custody over her was
passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar and his wife. Emiliano
reported and registered Grace Poe as a
foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City. Fenando Poe, Jr.
and Susan Roces adopted Grace Poe.
· 1991 – Poe went to the US to be a
permanent resident therein
· 2001 – She became a naturalized US
citizen
· First quarter of 2005 – she came
back to the Philippines to permanently
reside herein
· February 14, 2006- she went back to
the US to dispose family belongings
· July 18, 2006 – she re-acquired
Filipino citizenship
· According to Poe in her 2013 COC
for Senator, before the May 13,
2013election, she has been a resident of the
Philippines for 6 years and 6 months
(reckoned from year 2006 when she re-
acquired her Filipino citizenship under
RA 9225).
· Poe filed her COC for Presidency
for the May 9, 2016 elections (hence,
computing from May, 2013, she has been
a resident in the Philippines for 9 years
and 6 monthsonly)
· However, in her COC, Poe
declared that she is a natural born and her
residence in the Philippine up to the day
before election would be 10 years and 11
months counted from May 24, 2005
(when she returned from the US to the
Philippines for good).
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
Poe is qualified to be a candidate for
President in the National and Local
Election on May 9, 2016.
1) Is Poe, a foundling, a natural-born
citizen? Yes, based on:
a) Circumstantial evidence
b) Legislation
c) Generally accepted principles of
international law
Circumstantial evidence
There is more than sufficient evidence
that Poe has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino. xxx.
[T]here is a high probability that her
parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor
General offered official Statistics from
the Philippine Statistics office that from
1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines was
16
15,985. While the Filipinos born in the
country were more than 10 Million. On this
basis, there is a 99% chance that the child
born in the Philippines would be a Filipino
which in turn, would indicate more than
ample probability that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos.
Other circumstantial evidence of the
nationality of Poe’s parents are the fact
that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features.
There are disputable presumptions that
things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature. On this basis, it
is safer to assume that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept
the absurd.
Legislation
Foundlings are as a class, natural born
citizens.
Ø The amendment to the Constitution
proposed by constitutionalist Rafols to
include foundlings as natural born citizens
was not carried out, not because there was
any objection to the notion that persons of
unknown parentage are not citizens, but
only because their number was not enough
to merit specific mention. There was no
intent or language that would permit
discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee

the basic right to equal protection of the
laws.
Ø Likewise, domestic laws on adoption
support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the
adoptee, rather, the adoptee must be
Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
Ø Recent legislation all expressly refer to
“Filipino children” and include foundlings
as among Filipino children who may be
adopted.
Generally accepted principles of
international law
The common thread of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and
the International Convent on Civil and
Political Rights obligates the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and to ensure
that no child is stateless. The principles
stated in the:
1. Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relation to the Conflict of
Nationality laws (that a foundling is
presumed to have the nationality of the
country of birth)
2. Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness (foundling is presumed born
of citizens of the country where he is
found) bind the Philippines although we
are not signatory to these conventions.
Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60
countries in Asia, North and South America
and Europe have passed legislation
recognizing foundlings as its citizens.
166 out of 189 countries accept that
foundlings are recognized as citizens.
Hence, there is a generally accepted
principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born and a
national of the country in which it is
found.
2) After renouncing her American
citizenship and after having taken her
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, has Poe re-acquired her
status as a natural-born Filipino citizen?
Yes, Poe’s repatriation resulted to
reacquisition of natural born citizenship.
A natural born citizen before he lost his
Philippine nationality will be restored to
his former status as natural born Filipino
after repatriation (Benson v. HRET,
Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc).
3) Has Poe satisfied the 10 year
residency requirement? Yes, she will have
been a resident for 10 years and 11
months on the day of the election.
[T]here is overwhelming evidence that
leads to no to other conclusion that Poe
decided to permanently abandon her US
residence and reside in the Philippines as
early as May 24, 2005.
Poe presented voluminous evidence
showing that she and her family
abandoned their US domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good.
These evidence include former US
17
passport showing her arrival on May 24,
2005 and her return to the Philippines
every time she travelled abroad, email
correspondences with freight company to
arrange for the shipment of household
items as well as with the pet Bureau;
school records of her children showing
enrolment in the Philippine to the
Philippine schools starting on June 2005
etc. xxx These evidence, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship is clear that when she returned
in May 2005, it was for good.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in
her 2013 COC was only a mistake in good
faith. As explained by Grace Poe, she
misunderstood the date required in the
2013 COC as the period of residence as of
the day she submitted that COC in 2012.
She said that she reckoned residency from
April-May 2006 which was the period
when the U.S. house was sold and her
husband returned to the Philippines. In that
regard, she was advised by her lawyers in
2015 that residence could be counted from
25 May 2005. Such a mistake could be
given in evidence against her but it was by
no means conclusive considering the
overwhelming evidence submitted by Poe.
Republic vs. dela Rosa
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation
to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the

Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the
Philippines:
to annul the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, Manila, which re-
admitted private respondent as a Filipino
citizen under the Revised Naturalization
Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No.
473); and
to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by
private respondent on February 27,
1992.On September 20, 1991, petitioner
filed a petition for naturalization captioned
to be re-admitted as citizen of th3
Philippines. The respondent Judge set the
petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and
directed the publication of the said order
and petition in the Official Gazette and a
newspaper of general circulation, for three
consecutive weeks,the last publication of
which should be at least six months before
the said date of hearing.On January 14,
1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to
Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule, that it shall
be done on January instead of having it on
March, " where he manifested his intention
to run for public office in the May 1992
elections.
The motion was granted and the hearing
was moved on February.Six days later, on
February 27, respondent Judge rendered
the assailed Decision and held that
Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-
admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines by naturalization,thereby
vesting upon him, all the rights and
privileges of a natural born Filipino
citizen After receiving a copy of the
Decision on March 18, 1992, the
Solicitor General interposed a timely
appeal directly with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted
o his citizenship as Filipino.
Held:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private
respondent is declared NOT a citizen of
the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to
serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of
Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his
office and to SURRENDER the same to
the Vice-Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon once this decision becomes
final and executory. No pronouncement
as to costs. The proceedings of the trial
court was marred by the following
irregularities: (1) the hearing of the
petition was set ahead of the scheduled
date of hearing, without a publication of
the order advancing the date of hearing,
and the petition itself; (2) the petition was
heard within six months from the last
publication of the petition; (3) petitioner
was allowed to take his oath of allegiance
before the finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance
without observing the two-year waiting
period.
18
Frivaldo vs COMELEC
(Citizenship: Reacquisition)
* The petition seeks to determine who
should be declared the rightful governor of
Sorsogon.
Facts:
(Lee vs COMELEC)
* March 20, 1995- Juan Frivaldo filed for
the office of Governor of Sorsogon for
May 1995 elections but his COC was
assailed three days after by Raul Lee,
another candidate, by reason of the former
not yet being a citizen of the Philippines.
* May 1, 1995- The respondent
(COMELEC 2nd division) granted the
prayer and declared the petitioner
disqualified, hence the COC is cancelled.
* May 8, 1995- There was a motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner which
remained unacted upon until after the May
1995 elections, hence his candidacy
continued, he was voted and he garnered
the highest vote in the election.
* May 11, 1995- The COMELEC en banc
affirmed the resolution of the 2nd division
to disqualify the petitioner.
* June 9, 1995- Lee (next to Frivaldo who
has the highest number of votes) prayed a
proclamation for him be declared as the
duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon, and
was granted by the respondent.
* July 6, 1995- the proclamation was
prayed by the petitioner to be annulled and
that there was no more legal impediment to
his proclamation as governor for he took

his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the
Philippines on June 30, 1995 after "his
petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee
on Naturalization in September 1994 had
been granted."
* December 19, 1995- the Comelec First
Division annulled the proclamation of Lee
and proclaimed Frivaldo as rightful
governor.
* Lee filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the Comelec
* Thus, a petition was filed. (Lee vs
COMELEC)
(Frivaldo vs COMELEC- same facts)
* A petition to annul three Resolutions of
the respondent COMELEC:
1. Resolution disqualifying Frivaldo from
running for governor of Sorsogon;
2. Resolution of the Comelec en
banc promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution suspending the proclamation
of Frivaldo
* Frivaldo assails the resolutions based on
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
* He contends that the failure of the
Comelec to act on the petition for
disqualification within fifteen days prior to
the election is a jurisdictional defect which
renders the said Resolutions null and void.
Issues:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid
and legal?
*Is it enough to qualify him to be
proclaimed Governor?
* May it be given retroactive effect?
2. Is Frivaldo's disqualification for lack of
Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to
his eligibility to run for, be elected to or
hold office as governor?
3. Did the respondent Comelec
have jurisdiction over Frivaldo’s petition?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee valid
and legal?
5. Did the respondent Commission on
Elections exceed its jurisdiction in
promulgating the assailed Resolutions,
given the Election Code provision?
Held:
1. Yes.
Lee’s contentions:
* P.D. No. 725 was repealed. Late Pres.
Aquino issued a memorandum directing
the special committee on naturalization to
cease and desist from undertaking any
proceedings.
* The application was approved only in a
day which no proper evaluation made
hence there were irregularities in the
proceeding.
* Citizenship could only be effective as
of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship
qualification prescribed must exist on the
date of his election, if not when the COC
is filed.
Court Findings:
19
* There was no expressed statement that
P.D. 725 was repealed. The memorandum
was just an executive policy. No repeal.
* Frivaldo actually filed on Aug. 17, 1994
and that the special committee was
reactivated only on June 8, 1995, thus the
process did not take much time.
Presumption of regularity of performance
is to be rebutted.
* Reference was mere obiter dictum. Sec.
39 of the LGC does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship.
Hence, the repatriation was valid;
* Purpose of the citizenship qualification is
so that no person owing allegiance to
another nation shall govern our people.
* Impediment no longer existed.
* It should be noted that Section 39 of the
Local Government Code speaks
of qualifications of officials, not of
candidates. Citizenship is necessary at the
time he is proclaimed and at the start of his
term.
Sub-Issue 1: Is Frivaldo’s election valid
given that it is also a requirement that he be
a voter, which in turn necessitates that he
be a Philippine citizen?
* While the concern in citizenship
is allegiance, being a registered voter
requires that the official be registered as a
voter IN THE AREA ORTERRITORY he
seeks to govern.
* Lee has not disputed that Frivaldo is a
registered voter of Sorsogon, and that the

latter’s registration as a voter was sustained
valid by judicial declaration. Frivaldo has
voted in four elections.
* Frivaldo is a registered voter
Sub-Issue 2: Should the repatriation
be given retroactive effect?
* Laws which create new rights are
given retroactive effect.
* P.D. 725 creates a new right and also
provides for a new remedy.
- It granted a new right to women to re-
acquire Filipino citizenship during their
marriage to an alien; new right in favor of
other natural born Filipinos who lost their
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship through
an easier process (repatriation instead
of naturalization).
* Therefore, it was intended to give the
decree retroactive effect
* Not just the decree, but even the
repatriation granted under said law to
Frivaldo is to be deemed to have retroacted
to the date of his application on Augut 17,
1994
* Retroactivity to the date of filing would
prevent prejudice to applicants. If not given
retroactive effect, applicants may become
stateless.
* Since his repatriation has retroactive
effect, his registration as a voter is
validated.
* Retroactivity would not grant Frivaldo
dual citizenship (which could have
disqualified him) since he had long
renounced his American citizenship. He
was stateless when he renounced his US
citizenship until repatriation.
2: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing
Disqualification?
* Lee: Court's two rulings that Frivaldo is
an alien (previous elections) have become
final and executory and is a continuing
bar.
* NO. Decisions declaring the acquisition
or denial of citizenship cannot govern a
person's future status with finality.
* This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire or lose his
citizenship.
Issue 3: Does the Comelec have
Jurisdiction Over Frivaldo’s Petition?
* Lee: proclaimed on June 30, 1995 and
Frivaldo filed the petition beyond the 5-
day reglementary period.
* YES to issue. The Comelec has
the power to annul proclamations.
- This is based on an assumption that the
proclamation is no proclamation at all.
Assumption of office cannot deprive the
COMELEC of the power of declaration
of nullity.
* Power to annul a proclamation must be
done within ten days after proclamation
and petition was filed after six. Comelec
had jurisdiction.
Issue 4: Was Lee’s Proclamation Valid?
* Lee: Had the people been aware
of Frivaldo’s disqualification, they would
20
not have voted for him. The electorate
intentionally wasted their votes.
* It has not been shown that Frivaldo’s
ineligibility was notoriously known.
Decision as to the disqualification
of candidate was not yet final as well.
* NO to issue. If Frivaldo was disqualified,
the vice-governor ascends. In losing the
election, Lee was obviously not the choice
of the people
* The ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Issue 5: Is Section 78 of the Election Code
Mandatory?
* Frivaldo claims that the assailed
Resolutions of the Comelec disqualifying
him should be annulled because of the 15-
day prescription period.
* Issue is now moot and academic since it
was already superseded by subsequent
resolutions declaring Frivaldo governor.
* Section 78 is merely directory as Section
6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
Commission to try and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the elections.
Comelec did not exceed jurisdiction.
Decision: Frivaldo is Governor
(1) Lee’s petition is DISMISSED. The
assailed Resolutions of the respondent
Commission are AFFIRMED.

(2) Frivaldo’s petition is also DISMISSED
for being moot and academic.
TABASA VS CA IN RELATION TO RA
8171
FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A.
Tabasa acquired American citizenship
when his father became a naturalized
citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the
Philippines and was admitted as
"balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested
and detained by the agent of BIR. Th
Consul General of the US embassy of
Manila filed a request with the BID that his
passport has been revoked and that Tabasa
had a standing warrant for several federal
charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino
citizenship by repatriation in accordance
with the RA No. 8171, and that because he
is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be
deported or detained by the BID.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired
Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore, is not an undocumented alien
subject to deportation.
RULING:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail
himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The
only person entitled to repatriation under
RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who
lost her Philippine citizenship by
marriage to an alien, or a natural-born
Filipino, including his minor children
who lost Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic
necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when
he filed for repatriation. The act cannot
be applied in his case because he is no
longer a minor at the time of his
repatriation in 1996. The privilege under
RA 8171 only belongs to children who
are of minor age at the time of filing of
the petition for repatriation.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R.
No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo
Manzano were both candidates for Vice-
Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.
Based on the results of the election,
Manzano garnered the highest number of
votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended due to the pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado
on the ground that he was not a citizen of
the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that
Manzano is both a Filipino and a US
21
citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared
Manzano disqualified as candidate for said
elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of
the respondent was reversed. Respondent
was held to have renounced his US
citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter
in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the
Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31,
1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified
to hold public elective office in the
philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and
R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is different from dual

allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. Dual allegiance on the other
hand, refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
a result of an individual's volition. Article
IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject
to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates
with dual citizenship, it should suffice if,
upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence
of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such
candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which
they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship
by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other
country or government and solemnly
declares that he owes his allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, the condition
imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies
with the provisions of our Naturalization
Law lies within the province and is an
exclusive prerogative of our courts. The
latter should apply the law duly enacted
by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should
interfere with its operation and
application.
The court ruled that the filing of
certificate of candidacy of respondent
sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. By declaring in his certificate of
candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution
of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private
22
respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as
a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s
oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent
his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in
this country, leaves no doubt of his election
of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the
faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that
trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the
denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking
his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied
for the renewal of his Portuguese passport
and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
JACOT VS DAL
Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the
Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying
him from running for the position of Vice-
Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14
May 2007 National and Local Elections, on
the ground that he failed to make a
personal renouncement of US citizenship.
He was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, who became a naturalized
citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He
sought to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.
ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively
renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify
him to run as a vice-mayor?
HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the
oath of allegiance is a general requirement
for all those who wish to run as candidates
in Philippine elections; while the
renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who
have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225
and who seek elective public posts,
considering their special circumstance of
having more than one citizenship.
23
citizenship, by reason of naturalization as
Calilung vs Dumantong citizens of a foreign country. In its face, it
does not recognize dual allegiance.
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2009 [Dual
Citizenship; Dual Allegiance; RA 9225 -
Citizenship Reacquisition Act of 2003]
FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition
be issued to stop respondent from
implementing RA 9225, or Act Making
the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens
Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose
Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended,
and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers
that said Act is unconstitutional as it
violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law."
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9225 is
unconstitutional by recognizing and
allowing dual allegiance.
RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the
Constitution is a declaration of policy and
is not self-executing provision.
What RA 9225 does is to allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost their Philippine