Syquia v.

Court of Appeals

JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and

ANTHONY C. SYQUIA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and
THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC., respondents.

Facts:

On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed Syquia,
plaintiffs-appellants herein, filed a complaint for damages against defendant-
appellee, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.

The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of Sale (Contract No.
6885) dated August 27, 1969 and Interment Order No. 7106 dated July 21, 1978
executed between plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia and defendant-appellee, the
former, father of deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed
defendant-appellee to inter the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery in the morning of July 25, 1978 conformably and in accordance with
defendant-appellee interment procedures; that on September 4, 1978, preparatory
to transferring the said remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was
removed from its niche underground with the assistance of certain employees of
defendant-appellee; that as the concrete vault was being raised to the surface,
plaintiffs- appellants discovered that the concrete vault had a hole approximately
three (3) inches in diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing out the
width of the vault on one end and that for a certain length of time (one hour, more
or less), water drained out of the hole; that because of the aforesaid discovery,
plaintiffs- appellants became agitated and upset with concern that the water which
had collected inside the vault might have risen as it in fact did rise, to the level of the
coffin and flooded the same as well as the remains of the deceased with ill effects
thereto; that pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila on September 14, 1978, plaintiffs-appellants with the assistance of
licensed morticians and certain personnel of defendant-appellee caused the opening
of the concrete vault on September 15, 1978; that upon opening the vault, the
following became apparent to the plaintiffs-appellants: (a) the interior walls of the
concrete vault showed evidence of total flooding; (b) the coffin was entirely
damaged by water, filth and silt causing the wooden parts to warp and separate and
to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above the head and torso of the
deceased; (c) the entire lining of the coffin, the clothing of the deceased, and the
exposed parts of the deceased’s remains were damaged and soiled by the action of
the water and silt and were also coated with filth.

Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defen- dant-appellee of its
obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the remains of
the deceased and the coffin against the elements which resulted in the desecration
of deceased’s grave and in the alternative, because of defendant- appellee’s gross
negligence conformably to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code in failing to seal the
concrete vault, the complaint prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00 for actual damages,
P500,000.00 for moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount determined by
the court, 20% of defendant-appellee’s total liability as attorney’s fees, and expenses
of litigation and costs of suit.

In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between the
parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof; that there
could be no quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or
negligence, and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the
Syquias and defendant Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The trial court also
noted that the father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing that
said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that
water would eventually seep through the vault.

From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged that the trial court erred in
holding that the contract allowed the flooding of the vault; that there was no
desecration; that the boring of the hole was justifiable; and in not awarding
damages.

Court of Appeals in the Decision4 dated December 7, 1990 however, affirmed the
judgment of dismissal.

At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring a hole by private
respondent on the vault of the deceased kin of the bereaved petitioners. The latter
allege that such act was either a breach of private respondent’s contractual
obligation to provide a sealed vault, or, in the alternative, a negligent act which
constituted a quasi-delict. Nonetheless, petitioners claim that whatever kind of
negligence private respondent has committed, the latter is liable for desecrating the
grave of petitioners’ dead.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. breached its
contract with petitioners – NO
2) Whether or not the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. was guilty of tort –
NO

Ruling:

1) Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract with
them as the latter held out in the brochure it distributed that the “x x x lot may hold
single or double interment underground in sealed concrete vault.” Petitioners claim
that the vault provided by private respondent was not sealed, that is, not
waterproof. Consequently, water seeped through the cement enclosure and
damaged everything inside it.

We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of
Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof. Private respondent’s witness, Mr.
Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the term “sealed” meant “closed.” On the other
hand, the word “seal” is defined as “x x x any of various closures or fastenings x x x
that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering
or unauthorized opening.” The meaning that has been given by private respondent
to the word conforms with the cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite
clear that “sealed” cannot be equated with “waterproof”. Well settled is the rule that
when the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of
the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.
Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be
interpreted beyond their obvious intendment.

2) With respect to herein petitioners’ averment that private respondent has

committed culpa aquiliana, the Court of Appeals found no negligent act on the part
of private respondent to justify an award of damages against it. Although a pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of
a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent’s Court finding that
there was no negligence.

“Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict x x x.”.

In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled “Deed of Sale and Certificate of
Perpetual Care”6 on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the
parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been
actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would
be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as
provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
“Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages.”

Additional:

We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation
to the Syquias. While this may be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa
aquiliana for boring the hole on the vault? It cannot be denied that the hole made
possible the entry of more water and soil than was natural had there been no hole.

The law defines negligence as the “omission of that diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place.” In the absence of stipulation or legal provision
providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the
obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.

The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act—boring of the

hole—negate the allegation of negligence.

Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in

preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in
the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with earth.

Saludaga v. FEU

JOSEPH SALUDAGA, petitioner, vs. FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C.

DE JESUS in his capacity as President of FEU, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern
University (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the
security guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Petitioner was
rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the
wound he sustained.6 Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he
explained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released considering
that no formal complaint was filed against him.

Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the

ground that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and
secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, in turn,
filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and Management
Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security
services within its premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy’s President,
to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any; and
to pay attorney’s fees and cost of the suit. On the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial
filed a Fourth-Party Complaint against AFP General Insurance.

RTC: In favor of petitioner

CA: In favor of respondent
Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach of student-
school contract for a safe learning environment.

Respondent’s contention: In order to avoid liability, however, respondents aver that

the shooting incident was a fortuitous event because they could not have reasonably
foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by Rosete as he was not their employee;
and that they complied with their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment
for their students by having exercised due diligence in selecting the security services
of Galaxy.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent FEU is guilty of its contractual obligation

Ruling:

It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law student in

respondent FEU. As such, there was created a contractual obligation between the
two parties. On petitioner’s part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and
regulations of the school. On the other hand, respondent FEU, as a learning
institution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students with the
necessary skills to pursue higher education or a profession. At the same time, it is
obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the
campus.

It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract
and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.
In the instant case, we find that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no
less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises,
there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation
to provide a safe and secure environment to its students.

Respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due
diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their students. They failed to
prove that they en sured that the guards assigned in the campus met the
requirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Indeed, certain
documents about Galaxy were presented during trial; however, no evidence as to
the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for the university was offered.

Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm
that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifications
required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not proven that they examined
the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documents
enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security agency about
these matters or failure to check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards
is negligence on the part of respondents. A learning institution should not be
allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the
security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent
obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.

Consequently, respondents’ defense of force majeure must fail. In order for force
majeure to be considered, respondents must show that no negligence or misconduct
was committed that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked
to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss. One’s negligence may have concurred with an act of
God in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the
immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would
not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a
person’s participation—whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act—
the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of
God.

Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the
performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach of
contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment, respondent
FEU is liable to petitioner for damages. It is essential in the award of damages that
the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the
factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant’s acts.

In the instant case, it was established that petitioner spent P35,298.25 for his
hospitalization and other medical expenses. The other expenses being claimed by
petitioner, such as transportation expenses and those incurred in hiring a personal
assistant while recuperating were however not duly supported by receipts.21 In the
absence thereof, no actual damages may be awarded. Nonetheless, temperate
damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered where it has been
shown that the claimant suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof
cannot be proved with certainty. Hence, the amount of P20,000.00 as temperate
damages is awarded to petitioner.

On damages:

As regards the award of moral damages, there is no hard and fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case
must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.22 The testimony of petitioner
about his physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, and moral shock
resulting from the shooting incident23 justify the award of moral damages.
However, moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the
defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or
amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It is
aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then
guard against the award of exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced,
restrained and measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion,
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court.24 We deem it just and
reasonable under the circumstances to award petitioner moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00.

Likewise, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P50,000.00 as part
of damages is reasonable in view of Article 2208 of the Civil Code. However, the
award of exemplary damages is deleted considering the absence of proof that
respondents acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.

On Article 2180, vicarious liability:

We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents cannot be held
liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code because respondents are not
the employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued
by respondents’ Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily
no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into
by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element of
control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete.

On FEU’s Third Party Claim against Galaxy:

Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate their respective claims and defenses in
the course of the trial of petitioner’s complaint. Evidence duly supports the findings
of the trial court that Galaxy is negligent not only in the selection of its employees
but also in their supervision. Indeed, no administrative sanction was imposed
against Rosete despite the shooting incident; moreover, he was even allowed to go
on leave of absence which led eventually to his disappearance.34 Galaxy also failed
to monitor petitioner’s condition or extend the necessary assistance, other than the
P5,000.00 initially given to petitioner. Galaxy and Imperial failed to make good their
pledge to reimburse petitioner’s medical expenses.

For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an
unqualified security guard, which resulted to the latter’s breach of obligation to
petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU for such damages
equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner.

Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with Galaxy for
being grossly negligent in directing the affairs of the security agency. It was Imperial
who assured petitioner that his medical expenses will be shouldered by Galaxy but
said representations were not fulfilled because they presumed that petitioner and
his family were no longer interested in filing a formal complaint against them.
Spouses Batal v. Spouses San Pedro

SPOUSES ERLINDA BATAL AND FRANK BATAL, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES LUZ SAN
PEDRO AND KENICHIRO TOMINAGA, respondents.

Facts:

This case originated from an action for damages filed with the RTC by Spouses Luz
San Pedro and Kenichiro Tominaga (respondents) against Spouses Erlinda Batal and
Frank Batal (petitioners) for failure to exercise due care and diligence by the latter
in the preparation of a survey which formed the basis for the construction of a
perimeter fence that was later discovered to have encroached on a right of way.

The spouses Luz San Pedro (Luz) and Kenichiro Tominaga (Kenichiro) are the
owners of a parcel of land, on which their house was erected, described as Lot 1509-
C-3 with an area of 700 square meters situated in Barangay Malis, Guiguinto,
Bulacan. Said property was acquired by them from one Guillermo Narciso as
evidenced by a “Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa” dated March 18, 1992.

The spouses Luz and Kenichiro then contracted the services of Frank Batal (Frank)
who represented himself as a surveyor to conduct a survey of their lot for the sum of
P6,500.00. As Luz and Kenichiro wanted to enclose their property, they again
procured the services of Frank for an additional fee of P1,500.00 in order to
determine the exact boundaries of the same by which they will base the
construction of their perimeter fence.

Consequently, Frank placed concrete monuments marked P.S. on all corners of the
lot which were used as guides by Luz and Kenichiro in erecting a concrete fence
measuring about eight (8) feet in height and cost them P250,000.00 to build.

Sometime in 1996, a complaint was lodged against Luz and Kenichiro before the
barangay on the ground that the northern portion of their fence allegedly
encroached upon a designated right-of-way known as Lot 1509-D. Upon verification
with another surveyor, Luz and Kenichiro found that their wall indeed overlapped
the adjoining lot. They also discovered that it was not Frank but his wife Erlinda
Batal (Erlinda), who is a licensed geodetic engineer.

During their confrontations before the barangay, Frank admitted that he made a
mistake and offered to share in the expenses for the demolition and reconstruction
of the questioned portion of Luz and Kenichiro’s fence. He however failed to deliver
on his word, thus the filing of the instant suit.

In their defense, the defendants-spouses Frank and Erlinda Batal submitted that
Frank never represented himself to be a licensed geodetic engineer. It was Erlinda
who supervised her husband’s work [and t]hat the house and lot of plaintiffs, Luz
and Kenichiro, were already fenced even before they were contracted to do a
resurvey of the same and the laying out of the concrete monuments. The spouses
Frank and Erlinda also refuted the spouses Luz’s and Kenichiro’s allegation of
negligence and averred that the subject complaint was instituted to harass them.”

RTC:

The RTC found that indeed the perimeter fence constructed by the respondents
encroached on the right-of-way in question; that the preponderance of evidence
supports the finding that the encroachment was caused by the negligence of the
petitioners; that, in particular, respondents constructed the fence based on the
concrete cyclone monuments that were installed by petitioner Frank Batal and after
he gave his assurance that they can proceed accordingly; that the negligence in the
installation of the monuments was due to the fact that petitioner Erlinda Batal, the
one truly qualified, did not provide the needed supervision over the work; and,
lastly, that the testimonies of the petitioners on the whole were not credible.

CA: Affirmed RTC.

CA in addition held that the petitioners cannot claim that the error of the
construction of the fence was due to the unilateral act of respondents in building the
same without their consent, since the former gave their word that the arrangement
of the monuments of title accurately reflected the boundaries of the lot; and that, as
a result, the northern portion of the fence had to be demolished and rebuilt in order
to correct the error.

Ruling:

Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses: either as culpa

aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a
vinculum juris and gives rise to an obliga tion between two persons not formally
bound by any other obligation, or as culpa contractual, which is the fault or
negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed, and
which increases the liability from such already existing obligation.13 Culpa
aquiliana is governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code and the immediately
following Articles; while culpa contractual is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of
the same Code.

Articles 1170 and 1173 provide:

ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages.
ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2202, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.

In the present case, it is clear that the petitioners, in carrying out their contractual
obligations, failed to exercise the requisite diligence in the placement of the
markings for the concrete perimeter fence that was later constructed. The
placement of the markings had been done solely by petitioner Frank Batal who is
not a geodetic engineer. It was later discovered that it was not he but his wife,
petitioner Erlinda Batal, who is the licensed geodetic engineer and who is, therefore,
the one qualified to do the work. Petitioner Frank Batal’s installation of the concrete
cyclone monuments had been done without the adequate supervision of his wife,
Erlinda. As a result, the placement of the monuments did not accurately reflect the
dimensions of the lot. The respondents, upon assurance given by petitioner Frank
Batal that they could proceed with the construction of the perimeter fence by
relying on the purported accuracy of the placement of the monuments, erected their
fence which turned out to encroach on an adjacent easement. Because of the
encroachment, the respondents had to demolish and reconstruct the fence and, thus,
suffered damages.

“A party, having performed affirmative acts upon which another person based his
subsequent actions, cannot thereafter refute his acts or renege on the effects of the
same, to the prejudice of the latter.” (Pureza v. Court of Appeals)

Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners are liable for damages suffered
by the respondents in accordance with Articles 1170 and 2201 of the Civil Code.

Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who
acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of
fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation.

On the matter of damages:

Going now to the claims for damages, Engr. Arnold Martin testified on his
computation and estimate (Exhibits “G” and “G-1”) that the total cost for the
demolition and reconstruction of the perimeter fence in question would be in the
total amount of P428,163.90, and this was not at all disputed by the defendants,
whose counsel waived cross-examination. This estimate is practically double the
amount of the cost of constructing said fence as testified to by plaintiff Luz San
Pedro as she was told that it is much costlier to demolish and reconstruct a fence
than to simply erect one because of the added expense involved in tearing it down
and hauling its debris. On the other hand, said plaintiff stated that the iron
decorative grills of the fence, which is reusable, cost her P50,000.00, and it is only
proper to deduct said amount from the total cost of reconstructing the fence in
question. At the same time, some figures in the said estimate appear to be quite
excessive, such as the estimated cost for demolition which was quoted at
P25,000.00 in addition to the amount of excavation priced at P30,000.00 and the
cost of hauling of scrap materials at P10,000.00. The court believes that the sum of
P300,000.00 for the demolition and reconstruction of the fence in question would
be reasonable considering that the original cost for its construction was only about
P200,000.00, and considering further that its iron grills are re-usable.

The plaintiffs are likewise entitled to recover attorney’s fees considering that they
were compelled by the defendants to resort to court action in order to protect their
rights and interest, as defendants, particularly defendant Frank Batal, failed and
refused repeatedly to even attend the confrontation of conciliation meetings
arranged between him and the plaintiffs by the barangay authorities concerned, and
to honor his promise to help in shouldering the cost of reconstructing the fence in
question.

On the other hand, there is no legal or factual bases for the claim of the plaintiffs for
moral or exemplary damages as there was no showing at all that defendants acted
with malice or in bad faith.

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that in the absence of a wrongful
act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded.

Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers

DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., DUSIT

THANI PUBLIC CO., LTD. and FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE CORPORATION,
respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner’s version:

On 11 June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited
her friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the hotel’s swimming
pool facility. They started bathing at around 5:00 p.m. At around 7:00 p.m., the
hotel’s swimming pool attendant informed them that the swimming pool area was
about to be closed. The two subse quently proceeded to the shower room adjacent
to the swimming pool to take a shower and dress up. However, when they came out
of the bathroom, the entire swimming pool area was already pitch black and there
was no longer any person around but the two of them. They carefully walked
towards the main door leading to the hotel but, to their surprise, the door was
locked.

Petitioner and Delia waited for 10 more minutes near the door hoping someone
would come to their rescue but they waited in vain. Delia became anxious about
their situation so petitioner began to walk around to look for a house phone. Delia
followed petitioner. After some time, petitioner saw a phone behind the lifeguard’s
counter. While slowly walking towards the phone, a hard and heavy object, which
later turned out to be the folding wooden counter top, fell on petitioner’s head that
knocked her down almost unconscious.

Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the hotel telephone
operator of the incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at the main entrance
door of the swimming pool area but it took them at least 20 to 30 minutes to get
inside. When the door was finally opened, three hotel chambermaids assisted
petitioner by placing an ice pack and applying some ointment on her head. After
petitioner had slightly recovered, she requested to be assisted to the hotel’s coffee
shop to have some rest. Petitioner demanded the services of the hotel physician.

Dr. Violeta Dalumpines (Dr. Dalumpines) arrived. She approached petitioner and
introduced herself as the hotel physician. However, instead of immediately
providing the needed medical assistance, Dr. Dalumpines presented a “Waiver” and
demanded that it be signed by petitioner, otherwise, the hotel management will not
render her any assistance. Petitioner refused to do so.

After eating her dinner and having rested for a while, petitioner left the hotel’s
coffee shop and went home. Thereupon, petitioner started to feel extraordinary
dizziness accompanied by an uncomfortable feeling in her stomach, which lasted
until the following day. Petitioner was constrained to stay at home, thus, missing all
her important appointments with her patients. She also began experiencing “on”
and “off” severe headaches that caused her three (3) sleepless nights.

Petitioner consulted A LOT OF DOCTORS… diagnosis: post-traumatic or post

concussion syndrome.

Respondent’s version:

According to respondents PHI and DTPCI, a sufficient notice had been posted on the
glass door of the hotel leading to the swimming pool area to apprise the people,
especially the hotel guests, that the swimming pool area is open only from 7:00 a.m.
to 7:00 p.m. Though the hotel’s swimming pool area is open only between the
aforestated time, the lights thereon are kept on until 10:00 p.m. for, (1) security
reasons; (2) housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of the swimming pool
surroundings; and (3) people doing their exercise routine at the Slimmer’s World
Gym adjacent to the swimming pool area, which was then open until 10:00 p.m., to
have a good view of the hotel’s swimming pool. Even granting that the lights in the
hotel’s swimming pool area were turned off, it would not render the area completely
dark as the Slimmer’s World Gym near it was well-illuminated.

Further, on 11 June 1995, at round 7:00 p.m., the hotel’s swimming pool attendant
advised petitioner and Delia to take their showers as it was already closing time.
Afterwards, at around 7:40 p.m., Pearlie Benedicto-Lipana (Ms. Pearlie), the hotel
staff nurse, who was at the hotel clinic located at the mezzanine floor, received a call
from the hotel telephone operator informing her that there was a guest requiring
medical assistance at the hotel’s swimming pool area located one floor above the
clinic.

Immediately, Ms. Pearlie got hold of her medical kit and hurriedly went to the
hotel’s swimming pool area. There she saw Delia and petitioner, who told her that
she was hit on the head by a folding wooden counter top. Although petitioner looked
normal as there was no indication of any blood or bruise on her head, Ms. Pearlie
still asked her if she needed any medical attention to which petitioner replied that
she is a doctor, she was fine and she did not need any medical attention. Petitioner,
instead, requested for a hirudoid cream to which Ms. Pearlie acceded.

At about 8:00 p.m., after attending to petitioner, Ms. Pearlie went back to the hotel
clinic to inform Dr. Dalumpines of the incident at the hotel’s swimming pool area.
But before she could do that, Dr. Dalumpines had already chanced upon Delia and
petitioner at the hotel’s coffee shop and the latter reported to Dr. Dalumpines that
her head was hit by a folding wooden counter top while she was inside the hotel’s
swimming pool area. When asked by Dr. Dalumpines how she was, petitioner
responded she is a doctor, she was fine and she was already attended to by the hotel
nurse, who went at the hotel’s swimming pool area right after the accident. Dr.
Dalumpines then called Ms. Pearlie to verify the same, which the latter confirmed.
Afterwards, Dr. Dalumpines went back to petitioner and checked the latter’s
condition. Petitioner insisted that she was fine and that the hirudoid cream was
enough. Having been assured that everything was fine, Dr. Dalumpines requested
petitioner to execute a handwritten certification regarding the incident that
occurred that night. Dr. Dalumpines then suggested to petitioner to have an X-ray
test. Petitioner replied that it was not necessary. Petitioner also refused further
medical attention.

On 13 June 1995, petitioner called up Dr. Dalumpines. The call, however, had
nothing to do with the 11 June 1995 incident. Instead, petitioner merely engaged in
small talk with Dr. Dalumpines while having her daily massage. The two talked
about petitioner’s personal matters, i.e., past medical history, differences with
siblings and family over inheritance and difficulty in practice. Petitioner even
disclosed to Dr. Dalumpines that she once fell from a horse; that she had a stroke;
had hysterectomy and is incapable of having children for her uterus had already
been removed; that she had blood disorder, particularly lack of platelets, that can
cause bleeding; and she had an “on” and “off” headaches. Petitioner oftentimes
called Dr. Dalumpines at the hotel clinic to discuss topics similar to those discussed
during their 13 June 1995 conversation.

Also, during one of their telephone conversations, petitioner requested for a

certification regarding the 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotel’s swimming pool
area. Dr. Dalumpines accordingly issued Certification dated 7 September 1995.

Petitioner personally picked up the afore-quoted Certification at the hotel clinic

without any objection as to its contents.

From 11 June 1995 until 7 September 1995, the hotel clinic never received any
complaint from petitioner regarding the latter’s condition. The hotel itself neither
received any written complaint from petitioner.

Ruling:

On negligence:

We do not think so. Several factors militate against [petitioner’s] contention.

One. [Petitioner] recognized the fact that the pool area’s closing time is [7:00 p.m.].
She, herself, admitted during her testimony that she was well aware of the sign
when she and [Delia] entered the pool area. Hence, upon knowing, at the outset, of
the pool’s closing time, she took the risk of overstaying when she decided to take
shower and leave the area beyond the closing hour. In fact, it was only upon the
advise of the pool attendants that she thereafter took her shower.

Two. She admitted, through her certification that she lifted the wooden bar
countertop, which then fell onto her head. The admission in her certificate proves
the circumstances surrounding the occurrence that transpired on the night of [11
June 1995]. This is contrary to her assertion in the complaint and testimony that,
while she was passing through the counter door, she was suddenly knocked out by a
hard and heavy object. In view of the fact that she admitted having lifted the counter
top, it was her own doing, therefore, that made the counter top fell on to her head.

Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to [petitioner’s] assertion that the pool area
was totally dark in that she herself admitted that she saw a telephone at the counter
after searching for one. It must be noted that [petitioner] and [Delia] had walked
around the pool area with ease since they were able to proceed to the glass entrance
door from shower room, and back to the counter area where the telephone was
located without encountering any untoward incident. Otherwise, she could have
easily stumbled over, or slid, or bumped into something while searching for the
telephone. This negates her assertion that the pool area was completely dark,
thereby, totally impairing her vision.


The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that the

proximate and immediate cause of the injury of [petitioner] was due to her
own negligence.

Moreover, [petitioner] failed to sufficiently substantiate that the medical symptoms

she is currently experiencing are the direct result of the head injury she sustained
on [11 June 1995] as was aptly discussed in the lower court’s findings.


With the foregoing, the following were clearly established, to wit: (1) petitioner
stayed in the hotel’s swimming pool facility beyond its closing hours; (2) she lifted
the folding wooden counter top that eventually hit her head; and (3) respondents
PHI and DTPCI extended medical assistance to her. As such, no negligence can be
attributed either to respondents PHI and DTPCI or to their staff and/or
management. Since the question of negligence is one of fact, this Court is bound by
the said factual findings made by the lower courts. It has been repeatedly held that
the trial court’s factual findings, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
conclusive and binding upon this Court, if they are not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence. Petitioner has
not presented sufficient ground to warrant a deviation from this rule.

On res ipsa loquitur:

With regard to petitioner’s contention that the principles of res ipsa loquitur and
respondeat superior are applicable in this case, this Court holds otherwise.

Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.” It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the
cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on
inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the
supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence
when direct evidence is lacking.87 Simply stated, this doctrine finds no application if
there is direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. If there is sufficient
proof showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury
occurred, then the creative reason for the said doctrine disappears.

Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the
defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged
with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
In the case at bench, even granting that respondents PHI and DTPCI’s staff
negligently turned off the lights and locked the door, the folding wooden counter top
would still not fall on petitioner’s head had she not lifted the same. Although the
folding wooden counter top is within the exclusive management or control of
respondents PHI and DTPCI, the falling of the same and hitting the head of
petitioner was not due to the negligence of the former. As found by both lower
courts, the folding wooden counter top did not fall on petitioner’s head without any
human intervention. Records showed that petitioner lifted the said folding
wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit her head.

On respondeat superior:

The doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the absence of any

showing that the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI were negligent. Since in
this case, the trial court and the appellate court found no negligence on the part of
the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI, thus, the latter cannot also be held
liable for negligence and be made to pay the millions of pesos damages prayed for
by petitioner.

Note: Quasi-Delict vs. Breach of Contract

In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the following differences
between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and breach of contract (culpa contractual). In
quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and independent, while in breach of
contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the contractual
obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation. In quasi-delict, the defense
of “good father of a family” is a complete and proper defense insofar as parents,
guardians and employers are concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a
complete and proper defense in the selection and supervision of employees. In
quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the
injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the former’s
complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of contract, negligence is presumed
so long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract and the burden
is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of the
terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is followed.

Radio Communication of the Philippines, Inc. v. Verchez

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs.

ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE, ZENAIDA
VER-CHEZ-CATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO CATIBOG, respondents.

Facts:
On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon
Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On even date, her daughter Grace Verchez-
Infante (Grace) immediately hied to the Sorsogon Branch of the Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she engaged to send
a telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) who was residing at 18
Legal St., GSIS Village, Quezon City reading: “Send check money Mommy hospital.”
For RCPI’s services, Grace paid P10.50 for which she was issued a receipt.

As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida no response
was received from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru JRS Delivery
Service, reprimanding her for not sending any financial aid.

Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida, along with her husband
Fortunato Catibog, left on January 26, 1991 for Sorsogon. On her arrival at Sorsogon,
she disclaimed having received any telegram.

In the meantime, Zenaida and her husband, together with her mother Editha left for
Quezon City on January 28, 1991 and brought Editha to the Veterans Memorial
Hospital in Quezon City where she was confined from January 30, 1991 to March 21,
1991.

The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on February 15, 1991.
On inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, a messenger of RCPI replied
that he had nothing to do with the delivery thereof as it was another messenger who
previously was assigned to deliver the same but the address could not be located,
hence, the telegram was resent on February 2, 1991, and the second messenger
finally found the address on February 15, 1991.

Editha’s husband Alfonso Verchez (Verchez), by letter of March 5, 1991, demanded

an explanation from the manager of the Service Quality Control Department of the
RCPI, Ms. Lorna D. Fabian (Respondent’s reply: delivery was not immediately
effected due to the occurrence of circumstances which were beyond the control and
foresight of RCPI. Among others, during the transmission process, the radio link
connecting the points of communication involved encountered radio noise and
interferences such that subject telegram did not initially register in the receiving
teleprinter machine.)

Verchez’s lawyer thereupon wrote RCPI’s manager Fabian, by letter of July 23, 1991,
requesting for a conference on a specified date and time, but no representative of
RCPI showed up at said date and time.

On April 17, 1992, Editha died.

On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and
their respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that,
inter alia, the delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of the
late Editha to their damage and prejudice, for which they prayed for the award of
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Petitioner’s contention: any delay in the sending of the telegram was due to force
majeure, “specifically, but not limited to, radio noise and interferences which
adversely affected the14 transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic
message”; the clause in the Telegram Transmission Form signed by Grace absolved
it from liability for any damage arising from the transmission other than the refund
of telegram tolls; it observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees; and at all events, any cause of action had been barred by laches.

RTC:

The trial court, observing that “although the delayed delivery of the questioned
telegram was not apparently the proximate cause of the death of Editha,” ruled out
the presence of force majeure. Respecting the clause in the telegram relied upon by
RCPI, the trial court held that it partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion.
Finding that the nature of RCPI’s business obligated it to dispatch the telegram to
the addressee at the earliest possible time but that it did not in view of the
negligence of its employees to repair its radio transmitter and the concomitant
delay in delivering the telegram on time, the trial court, upon the following
provisions of the Civil Code, to wit:

“Article 2176—Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being at

fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence if
there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi- delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Article 1173 defines the fault of (sic) negligence of the obligor as the “omission of the
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time, or the place.”

In the instant case, the obligation of the defendant to deliver the telegram to the
addressee is of an urgent nature. Its essence is the early delivery of the telegram to
the concerned person. Yet, due to the negligence of its employees, the defendant
failed to discharge of its obligation on time making it liable for damages under
Article 2176.

The negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer.”

CA: Affirmed RTC

Issues:
(1) “Is the award of moral damages proper even if the trial court found that there
was no direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts?

(2) “Are the stipulations in the ‘Telegram Transmission Form,’ in the nature
“contracts of adhesion”?

Ruling:

RCPI insists that respondents failed to prove any causal connection between its
delay in transmitting the telegram and Editha’s death.22
RCPI’s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or
breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard to her co- plaintiffs-
herein-co-respondents.

Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides:

Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages.

In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest
possible time. It took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it.
RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and interferences
which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic
message. Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not locate the address of
Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the
telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper,
“x x x it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may
have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who
has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss.
One’s negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and
injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of
the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability.
When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person’s participation—
whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act—the whole
occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of
God.
xxxx
Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that no person shall be responsible for a
fortuitous event that could not be foreseen or, though foreseen, was inevitable. In
other words, there must be an exclusion of human intervention from the cause
of injury or loss.”
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering
the telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of
the non-transmission and the non-delivery so that she could have taken steps to
remedy the situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.
In an earlier case also involving RCPI, this Court held:
“Considering the public utility of RCPI’s business and its contractual obligation to
transmit messages, it should exercise due diligence to ascertain that messages are
delivered to the persons at the given address and should provide a system whereby
in cases of undelivered messages the sender is given notice of non- delivery. Messages
sent by cable or wireless means are usually more important and urgent than those
which can wait for the mail.

xxxx
People depend on telecommunications companies in times of deep emotional
stress or pressing financial needs. Knowing that messages about the illnesses or
deaths of loved ones, births or marriages in a family, important business
transactions, and notices of conferences or meetings as in this case, are coursed
through the petitioner and similar corporations, it is incumbent upon them to
exercise a greater amount of care and concern than that shown in this case. Every
reasonable effort to inform senders of the non-delivery of messages should be
undertaken.”

RCPI argues, however, against the presence of urgency in the delivery of the
telegram, as well as the basis for the award of moral damages, thus: The request to
send check as written in the telegraphic text negates the existence of urgency that
private respondents’ allegations that ‘time was of the essence’ imports. Alfonso
Verchez did not accompany his late wife when the latter went to Manila by bus. He
stayed behind in Sorsogon for almost 1 week before he proceeded to Manila. It is the
common reaction of a husband to be at his ailing wife’s side as much as possible. The
fact that private respondent Alfonso Verchez stayed behind in Sorsogon for almost 1
week convincingly demonstrates that he himself knew that his wife was not in critical
condition.

RCPI’s arguments fail. For it is its breach of contract upon which its liability is, it
bears repeating, anchored. Since RCPI breached its contract, the presumption is that
it was at fault or negligent. It, however, failed to rebut this presumption.
For breach of contract then, RCPI is liable to Grace for damages.

And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace’s corespondents following Article 2176 of
the Civil Code which provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
RCPI’s liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it could prove that it
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Article 2180
of the Civil Code so provides:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.

RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.

On damages:

Respecting the assailed award of moral damages, a determination of the presence of

the following requisites to justify the award is in order:
x x x firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological
suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually
established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is
predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

Respecting the first requisite, evidence of suffering by the plaintiffs-herein

respondents was correctly appreciated by the CA in this wise:
The failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram containing the message of appellees on
time, disturbed their filial tranquillity. Family members blamed each other for
failing to respond swiftly to an emergency that involved the life of the late Mrs.
Verchez, who suffered from diabetes.
As reflected in the foregoing discussions, the second and third requisites are
present.

On the fourth requisite, Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides:

Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The
same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
After RCPI’s first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it did not inform Grace of the
non-delivery thereof and waited for 12 days before trying to deliver it again,
knowing—as it should know—that time is of the essence in the delivery of
telegrams. When its second long-delayed attempt to deliver the telegram again
failed, it, again, waited for another 12 days before making a third attempt. Such
nonchalance in performing its urgent obligation indicates gross negligence
amounting to bad faith. The fourth requisite is thus also present.

In applying the above-quoted Article 2220, this Court has awarded moral damages
in cases of breach of contract where the defendant was guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation.
On quasi-delict:

As for RCPI’s tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:

Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention,
and other relief:
xxxx
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another.

RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed

the peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the
appellate court, it disrupted the “filial tranquillity” among them as they blamed each
other “for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency.” The tortious acts and/or
omissions complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned
under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict
when courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is in order,

as is the award of attorney’s fees, respondents having been compelled to litigate to
protect their rights.

Clutching at straws, RCPI insists that the limited liability clause in the “Telegram
Transmission Form” is not a contract of adhesion. Thus it argues:
Neither can the Telegram Transmission Form be considered a contract of adhesion
as held by the respondent court. The said stipulations were all written in bold letters
right in front of the Telegram Transmission Form. As a matter of fact they were
beside the space where the telegram senders write their telegraphic messages. It
would have been different if the stipulations were written at the back for surely
there is no way the sender will easily notice them. The fact that the stipulations were
located in a particular space where they can easily be seen, is sufficient notice to any
sender (like Grace Verchez-Infante) where she could manifest her disapproval,
leave the RCPI station and avail of the services of the other telegram operators.

RCPI misunderstands the nature of a contract of adhesion. Neither the readability of

the stipulations nor their physical location in the contract determines whether it is
one of adhesion.

A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties imposes a ready-
made form of contract, which the other party may accept or reject, but which the
latter cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in the contract, while the
other party merely affixes his signature or his “adhesion” thereto, giving no room for
negotiation and depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal
footing.
While a contract of adhesion is not necessarily void and unenforceable, since it is
construed strictly against the party who drafted it or gave rise to any ambiguity
therein, it is stricken down as void and unenforceable or subversive of public policy
when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining
party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived
of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.

This Court holds that the Court of Appeals’ finding that the parties’ contract is one of
adhesion which is void is, given the facts and circumstances of the case, thus well-
taken.

Note:
Quasi-delict vs. Breach of Contract

“In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the
failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law,
recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free
from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a
contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the
injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered.
The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promissee that may include his
“expectation interest,” which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been
performed, or his “reliance interest,” which is his interest in being reimbursed for
loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract not been made; or his “restitution interest,”
which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on
the other party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or
for society, unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every infraction is
to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been injured
by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence x x x or of the
attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his
ensuing liability.”

Air France vs. Carrascoso

Facts:

Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims

that left Manila for Lourdes. Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to Carrascoso a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila
to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso travelled in "first class", but at
Bangkok, the Manager of the airline forced Carrascoso to vacate the "first class" seat
that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there
was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When
asked to vacate his "first class" seat, Carrascoso, as was to be expected, refused, and
told the airlines’ Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a
commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino
passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso
was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to
Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man. "

It is conceded in all quarters that Carrascoso paid to and received from Air France a
first class ticket. But Air France asserts that said ticket did not represent the true
and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that Carrascoso knew that he did
not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had
tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the
availability of first class seats.

The Court of First Instance of Manila sentenced Air France to pay respondent Rafael
Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest
at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus
P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to
P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Air France is liable for the acts of its employees
2. Whether or not damages arising from quasi-delict are recoverable from Air
France

Ruling:

1. YES. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need
not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's
manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code
says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.

In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that
upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.

2. YES. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from
any other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier
sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites
people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance
of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be

treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any
rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives
the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Thus, "Where a steamship company had accepted a passenger's check, it was a

breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of
third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand
payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and
she was not ejected." And this, because, although the relation of passenger and
carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks
the contract may be also a tort".

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper.